CAUSES OF POVERTY:

Findings from Recent Research

By Amy Rynell

The Heartland Alliance

Mid-America Institute on Poverty

October 2008
Acknowledgements

Funder

This report was supported by a grant from the Chicago Community Trust.

Editorial Support

Jim Lewis, Chicago Community Trust

Amy Terpstra, The Heartland Alliance Mid-America Institute on Poverty

Research Team

The Heartland Alliance Mid-America Institute on Poverty provides dynamic research and
analysis on today’s most pressing social issues and solutions to inform and equip those
working toward a just global society. For more information call 773.336.6075, email
[email protected], or visit www.heartlandalliance.org/maip/.

This report as well as other publications on poverty are available for download from
www.heartlandalliance.org/maip/.

1
Table of Contents

1. Background on Methods 3

2. Poverty Overview: Scale and Dynamics in the United States 4

3. What is the Relationship of Macroeconomic Performance to Poverty? 6

4. What Aspects of Employment Trigger Entry into Poverty? 8

5. How Does Human Capital Development Impact Employment and Poverty

10
Chances?

6. What Household Composition Factors Increase the Likelihood that a

12
Family will Enter Poverty?

7. How Are Disability and Poor Health Linked to Poverty? 14

8. How Does the Rise in Men with Criminal Records Decrease Economic
16
Chances for Themselves and Their Families?

9. Does Being an Immigrant Impact the Likelihood of Being Poor? 18

10. Does Having Experienced Violence Increase the Risk of Economic

21
Insecurity for Women?

11. What are the Economic Consequences of Living in Disproportionately

24
Poor Neighborhoods?

12. Summary of Findings 27

13. References 29

2
1. Background on Methods
Over the past 25 years significant structural changes have occurred in the United States that have
influenced poverty, making current-day poverty different in some ways from poverty just a few
decades ago. These structural changes include transformations in our economic structure such as
the shift from manufacturing employment to service-sector employment; the de-
institutionalization of people with mental illnesses into community settings; welfare reform,
which resulted in a an emphasis on work over welfare; changes in immigration patterns; and
skyrocketing rates of incarceration. Given these considerable changes, the vast majority of the
literature referenced in this summary is from the mid-1990s through 2007 to capture what has
been learned about poverty within this new context. Studies prior to this time period are
referenced when they are the most recent available and/or are landmark studies that are still
applicable to the issue being addressed.

The majority of the literature referenced here on each specific poverty-related issue is primary
research that used rigorous econometric or statistical methods and robust nationally
representative data sets. Included are studies and findings that surface throughout high quality
literature reviews on the specified issues. Most have been published in journals or at poverty
institutes affiliated with universities. The assessment of the methods of analysis used in the
referenced research was rooted in peer reviews, frequency of citations, and perceived quality; for
the purposes of this summary the methods were not re-analyzed or tested. Though there is a large
body of international research on issues related to poverty, the research addressed here is almost
exclusively focused on findings within the context of the United States.

What follows is an analysis of these characteristic causes of poverty as well as research on issues
that impact income, earnings, and poverty, some of which can be considered proximate
determinants of poverty. These issues include characteristics and life experiences that put people
at risk of not working or not working enough to prevent entry into poverty, such as race and
gender of head of household, strength of the economy, quality of wages, human capital
(education) of working age adults, health or disability status of household members, having a
criminal record, being an immigrant, having experienced domestic violence, and neighborhood
conditions. Certain events are more influential for various subgroups within the at-risk-of-
poverty population than they are for others.

This summary does not include an analysis of the public benefits determinants of poverty, and as
such, discussions of benefit levels and impacts for unearned income sources such as disability
income and welfare are not included.∗

∗
Throughout this paper we typically apply terminology as used by the researcher being cited. This is most prevalent
in the use racial and ethnic terms, such as black versus African American, or Hispanic versus Latino.

3
2. Poverty Overview: Scale and Dynamics in the United
States
The scale and conditions of poverty make it one of the most pressing social issues facing the
nation. Over 36 million people in the United States are living in poverty and 54 million are
at severe risk of falling into poverty.1 The annual rate of entry into poverty for the total
population of the United States has been estimated at roughly three percent per year.2

Poverty will touch

the majority of Graphic from Rank and Hirschl, 1999, p211

Americans at some
point during
adulthood. It is
estimated that, on
average, 60 percent
of 20 year olds in
America will
experience poverty
at some point during
their adult years and
about half of adults
will experience
poverty by the time
they are age 65. As
shown in the
Cumulative Lifetime
Risk of Poverty, by
Race graphic, 27.1 percent of adults will experience poverty by the age of 30, 41.8 percent by the
age of 50, and 51.4 percent by age 65.3 In addition, one third of the overall population of the
United States will experience extreme poverty in their lifetimes, with incomes below half of the
poverty line.4

Poverty is not a fixed state. Rather, the state of poverty is fluid with families moving into and out
of poverty at different points in time. Almost half of the spells of poverty are quite short: nearly
45 percent end within 1 year, 70 percent are over within 3 years, and 12 percent last 10 years or
more.5 In general, research suggests that the longer a person has been poor, the less likely it is
that he or she will escape poverty.6 Further complicating matters, though many spells of
poverty are short, there is substantial risk of returning to poverty after having exited. Poverty
reentry rates are relatively high: half of all individuals ending a poverty spell in a given year
will again have incomes below the poverty line within 4 years.7

There are considerable disparities in the rates of poverty entry across racial groups. While overall
the majority of people who are poor are white, individuals who are black are much more likely to
experience poverty than those who are white. Race is foremost among the distinguishing
characteristics with respect to a child’s probability of experiencing poverty.8 Virtually every

4
black American will experience poverty at some point during his or her adulthood: 9 out of
every 10 black and 1 out of every 2 white American adults (age 20 and up) who live out a
normal lifespan (defined as to age 75) will at some point experience poverty.9 Similar
disparities exist in the likelihood of reentering poverty after having escaped it: more than half of
all people who are black and around one third of people who are white that fall into poverty in
some year will have family incomes below the poverty line in 5 or more of the next 10 years,
with the average time in poverty over the next 10 years at over 4 years. Among people who are
black, the probability of returning to poverty after 1 year out is more than a third.10

In looking at poverty across all ages, the poverty rate for children remains higher than for any
other age group and for elderly who become poor, poverty is more persistent. Nearly half of the
children in the United States will become economically vulnerable at least once during their
childhood; and about one third will actually fall below the poverty line.11 Long-term child
poverty is unequally distributed: almost 9 out of 10 long-term poor children are African
American.12 In addition, it can be long lasting: poor children are many times more likely than
non-poor children to be poor in their mid-twenties (24.1% versus 3.8%).13 While Social Security
has had a tremendous impact on reducing poverty rates for seniors, along with the fact that
people who are older are less likely to enter poverty14, poverty still persists for almost 3.4 million
people age 65 and older.15 Households headed by an older adult (age 55 and over) are less likely
to exit poverty than other age groups.16

Finally, it is common in American thinking to believe that all people have the likelihood of
experiencing upward mobility, regardless of their economic standing at birth. Recent research,
finds that while there is considerable mobility, there is also considerable persistence of income
status.17 Intergenerational elasticity in earnings is estimated to be around 0.6 – this is the
correlation in earnings between parents and their children in adulthood. This means that for a
hypothetical family of four whose current income is at the poverty line, it would take the
descendants of the family 5 to 6 generations (125 to 150 years) before their income will be
within 5 percent of the national average.18 Estimates of intergenerational mobility are
significantly lower for families with little or no wealth.19 African Americans and single mothers
and their children are less likely to be upwardly mobile than other groups.20

So what has been proven to cause these entries and reentries into poverty? The first three
sections of this brief focus on economic, employment, and human capital factors. Those are
followed by a section on household composition factors, including teen parenthood, marital
status, and female-headed households. The remaining sections discuss events and characteristics
that may increase someone’s vulnerability to low earnings and poverty, such as having a criminal
record, experiencing domestic violence, or living in a high poverty neighborhood.

5
3. What is the Relationship of Macroeconomic
Performance to Poverty?
Macroeconomic performance is commonly considered to be a key determinant of poverty.21
There are clear business cycle effects with poverty rates declining with economic expansions and
rising during recessions. A strong economy typically results in reduction in poverty because
more jobs are created, unemployment drops, and wages increase. Recessions, on the other hand,
have a disproportionate impact on lower-income families because they cause rising
unemployment, a reduction in work hours, and the stagnation of family incomes – all of which
have the greatest impact for those with the least income to begin with.

Unemployment rates,
wages, and inequality
are used to measure
the impact of
economic performance
on poverty, and all
have rather
consistently predicted
poverty over the past
two decades.22 To use
one example, as
shown in the Poverty
Rates, Unemployment
Rates and Median
Wages, 1967-2003
graphic, year-to-year
changes in the
poverty rate are
roughly correlated
(rising or falling) with Graphic from Hoynes, et. al., 2005, p.46

unemployment.23

Further refined analyses of the effects of increases in the unemployment rate find the following:
• Overall, a one-percentage-point increase in the total unemployment rate in the 1990s, holding
all other factors constant, resulted in an estimated four- to nine-tenths-percentage-points
increase in the poverty rate.24
• Each one-point increase in the unemployment rate of males aged 25 to 64 increases poverty by
about 0.7 percentage points in the same year.25 26
• Every one-percentage-point increase in the local area unemployment rate decreases the
probability that less-educated black males are employed by 2.7 percentage points.27
• Each one-percentage-point increase in unemployment is predicted to lower the growth of
income among young families by 1.6 percent, with a diminishing impact of unemployment by
age.28

6
Low unemployment rates reduce poverty by increasing the likelihood that low-skilled,
lower-wage workers will become employed or will work additional hours. Low
unemployment has always disproportionately benefited less-skilled workers. When employment
grows (resulting in a tight labor market), people who are previously unemployed, part-time
workers, people who are underemployed, and those out of the labor market (all groups at
increased risk of poverty) are most able to benefit. Employers rely on less traditional sources of
labor, and are more likely to hire and train workers who might not have been considered for
more skilled positions in a different economy when they have fewer openings.29 30
Disadvantaged workers, including minorities, younger workers, high school dropouts, single
mothers, and immigrants, had particularly strong wage gains in the latter part of the 1990s when
the national economy was very strong and the unemployment rates were low.31

Both the availability and the quality of employment significantly affect poverty. Recent
structural changes in the economy of the United States, as evidenced by the decline of
manufacturing sector jobs and the increasing role of the service sector employment, have a
pronounced impact on low-skilled workers. There has been significant erosion of wages and
compensation for workers resulting from the employment shift to low-paying industries since the
1980s.32 As seen in the Poverty Rates, Unemployment Rates and Median Wages, 1967-2003
figure, wages today are well below their levels in the 1970s. Service sector job growth represents
the most prominent shift in employment occurring in metropolitan areas across the United States
today.33 These jobs typically offer low-wages, part-time positions, and limited career potential or
upward mobility. This changing economy has disproportionately hurt less-skilled workers who
traditionally benefited from manufacturing jobs. In the face of severe deindustrialization, service
jobs do very little to protect a community from becoming poor.34

Ongoing employment shifts to the service sector reinforce continued African-American

economic vulnerability, especially among less-educated workers. An African American
individual living in a metropolitan area with a one-percentage point increase in the
proportion of employment in the service sector was 27.4 percent less likely to exit poverty.
African Americans’ were also less likely to exit poverty when living in metropolitan areas with a
declining proportion of workers employed in manufacturing (both affect people who are black
much more than whites, as people who are black are over-represented in these sectors).35

Unionized workers typically earn higher wages than comparable non-union workers and
historically unions have helped less educated workers obtain higher wages than they could get
otherwise.36 In addition, unions raise the wages of minorities more than those of whites.37 The
estimate of the degree to which union wages exceed non-union wages range from 14.7 percent to
28.1 percent.38 However, unionization has declined dramatically: 43.1 percent of blue-collar
workers were unionized in 1978 versus just 19.2 percent in 2005. The falling rate of
unionization has lowered wages, not only because some workers no longer receive union
wages, but also because there is less pressure on non-union employers to raise wages 39

Forces largely seen as outside of the control of individuals have dramatic impacts on income,
earnings, and poverty. Recessions, high unemployment, the decline in the manufacturing sector
and growth in the service sector, and declining unionization depress earnings and increase
poverty, particularly for disadvantaged workers.

7
4. What Aspects of Employment Trigger Entry into
Poverty?
Employment has a tremendous effect on earnings and consequently poverty. Important factors
include job loss, declines in earnings, reductions in wages or hours worked, and growth in low-
wage sectors.

Studies that test different events that trigger poverty find that the likelihood of entering or exiting
poverty is highest for persons living in households with employment changes, when controlling
for demographic and economic factors.40 Individuals in households that experience a loss of
employment are the most likely to enter poverty. Nearly 20 percent of those entering poverty
had a head of household lose a job.41 Looking more broadly at all adult workers in the
household, more than 40 percent of people who enter poverty live in a household that
experienced a job loss by the head, spouse, or other household member. Twenty-five percent of
female-headed households enter poverty as a result of job loss.42

Some research looked at declines in earnings more broadly instead of solely job loss and found
these declines trigger poverty. Almost half (49.3%) of poverty spells begin when the
household experiences a decline in earnings: 37.9 percent coincide with a fall in the household
head's earnings and 11.4 percent of entries coincided with a fall in the spouse’s or other family
member’s earnings.43 The amount of labor force attachment (weeks worked) is also a key
indicator of whether or not someone will be poor. Among workers who do not have full-time,
full-year employment, below poverty income is a substantial problem.44 In looking specifically at
children’s entries into poverty, changes in the labor supply of secondary earners (other than head
of household) as well as the head of household, coincides with children becoming poor.45

Employment alone does not prevent entry into poverty if the wages are too low. As
mentioned earlier, structural changes in the economy have contributed to a rise in low-wage
employment. It is well established that workers at the lower end of the wage distribution have
not fared well in recent decades, with the exception of the boom of the latter half of the
nineties,46 and are on the receiving end of the worst the formal labor market has to offer. When
available jobs are concentrated in low-skill occupations with shrinking wages, limited benefits,
poor working conditions, and fluctuating schedules, labor force participation may not be
sufficient to keep some workers and their families out of poverty.

Over 29 million workers, or one-fourth (24.5%) of the workforce in the United States earns
poverty level wages (the hourly wage that a full-time, year-round workers must earn to sustain a
family of four at the poverty threshold).47 The average hourly wage for this group is $7.36 versus
$18.07 for the total workforce. The workers are disproportionately female, minority, non-college
educated, and new younger entrants into the workforce. They are more likely to work in retail
trade and service industries and are less likely to work in durable manufacturing, transportation,
finance and information services, and government.48

8
Across the United States,
median annual earnings
of full-time, year-round
workers fell in 2006, for
the third year in a row,
down about 1 percent for
both men and women. In
particular, African
Americans have
experienced large drops in
median annual earnings
since 2000, posting a loss
of about $2,800 (or 8%) in
inflation-adjusted
dollars.49

Women are much more

likely to earn low wages
than men. In 2005, 29.4
percent of women earned
poverty-level wages or less, significantly more than the share of men (19.9%). On average,
women’s median wage is only 82 percent of that of men’s wages ($12.82 versus $15.64).50

Some groups of workers, particularly minorities, are disadvantaged in the labor market due to
discrimination by employers. In lieu of a criminal background check, some employers use race to
infer past criminal activity and hence are much less likely to hire black men. It is estimated that
such discrimination against black men reduces the demand for their labor by at least 10
percent to 13 percent, with large implied effects on their wage and employment rates.51
Studies find that people with and without criminal records who are black both receive many
fewer job offers than their white counterparts in each category; in fact people with criminal
records who are white generally receive as many job offers as people who are black without a
record.52

A number of workers, particularly in low-income neighborhoods, are attached to work via an

underground economy or informal labor market and hence income is likely understated in many
of the datasets. This type of ‘off the books’ employment typically results in workers
experiencing unstable incomes and difficult working conditions.53 It is likely that much of the
employment in this sector is not greatly reducing the risk of poverty.

Employment and related changes, such as job loss by an adult in the household, joblessness,
decline in earnings due to job changes, reduction in wages or hours worked, discrimination in
hiring, and employment opportunities concentrated in low-wage sectors, greatly increase the
likelihood that a household will become poor. Women are much more likely to earn poverty
level wages, and black male workers have been especially affected by earnings decreases and
discrimination in hiring.

9
5. How Does Human Capital Development Impact
Employment and Poverty Chances?
Human capital corresponds to the quality of jobs and earnings workers can expect to get. Level
of educational attainment is probably the most important aspect of human capital development
but job training, skills, work experience, and social networks also play important roles. A variety
of studies show that a statistically significant effect of schooling exists with rates of return
ranging as high as 16 percent per year.54

Persons without a high school diploma are significantly more likely to be poor in the United
States: 22.9 percent or 6.4 million people without a high school diploma are poor versus
only 3.6 percent or 2 million people with a college degree or higher.55

Education is a strong predictor of poverty status.56 Higher educational attainment of the

household head is associated with a lower probability of entering poverty. Persons who live in
households headed by individuals with more than a high school degree are the least likely to
enter poverty, followed by persons in households where the head has a high school degree only.
Those in households headed by persons with no high school degree are the most likely to
enter poverty of any educational grouping.57 Conversely, persons with greater education
levels and those who increase educational attainment have higher poverty exit rates.58 59

Multiple studies have shown that high school dropouts are more frequently unemployed than
graduates.60 As seen in the chart Unemployment
rates by education, individuals without a high
school degree on average experience
unemployment rates that are 3 to 5 times greater
than the rates experienced by individuals with a
college degree or more.61 The more education an
individual has, the more likely it is that he or she
will become employed.62

Despite the value of a high school degree in

preventing poverty, high school non-completion
rates are very high. Approximately one-third of
high school students do not graduate after 4 years of
high school.63 Almost 28 million adults age 25 and
up in the United States in 2006 did not have a high
school diploma or equivalent.64 Research indicates
Graphic from Valetta & Hodges, 2005, p3
there are a number of factors, including

10
socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, single-parent families, siblings’ educational attainment, and
family mobility that are correlated with the likelihood of dropping out. Socioeconomic status,
most commonly measured by parental income and education, has the strongest relationship to
dropping out.65

Multiple studies have shown that even when employed, high school dropouts earn less money.66
Wages have declined considerably for those without a diploma. The economic status of
young dropouts has plummeted since the late 1970s. Employment and earnings prospects have
declined, with earnings declining in absolute terms and also relative to the incomes of those with
more education.
• The earning power of 25- to 34-year-old dropouts who work full time for a full year (in
constant 2002 dollars) has been in steady decline, during a developmental phase vital to
getting established in the workforce and as an independent adult, and to forming
families.67
• In 1971, 25- to 34-year-old male dropouts earned $35,087 annually on average, (in 2002
dollars), falling to $22,903 in 2002, a decline of 35%. In the same period, the earnings of
female dropouts fell from $19,888 to $17,114. For female dropouts the average earnings
would keep a three-person family out of poverty but not a four-person family. The
average 25- to 34-year-old dropout in this age group working full-time for a full-year is
hovering around poverty-level earnings in terms of supporting a family.68
• Earnings also fell for high school graduates though not as severely as earnings for those
without a high school diploma.69

In addition to education, work experience and skills play a role in labor market success or failure.
Poverty is endemic among individuals with no work experience – roughly 1 in 5 people with no
work experience in the previous year were poor.70 A number of market changes have made it
harder for less-skilled to earn their way out of poverty including changes in productive
technologies, globalization of labor markets, and movement of jobs from central cities to
suburbs.71

Education correlates with earnings, and employment status and school failure is a good predictor
of future economic status. Employment and earnings prospects have declined for those without a
high school diploma, with earnings declining in absolute terms and also relative to the incomes
of those with more education. There was a time when a high school diploma was sufficient to
prevent poverty entry but that day is no longer. It actually took relatively more education and
work hours to lift children out of poverty in 1999 than in 1969.72 The economic disadvantage of
lower education levels is hard to overcome without increasing one’s education.

11
6. What Household Composition Factors Increase the
Likelihood that a Family will Enter Poverty?

A number of household composition factors including having children, teen parenthood, marital
status, and female-headed households are highly correlated with income and poverty. These
disproportionately impact women and children.

In terms of household structure, households headed by women are far more likely to be poor than
other types of households. There are 4.1 million female-headed families in poverty and 2.9
million married-couple families in poverty; in total over 14.4 million households are headed by
women.73 Half of all women will potentially experience single motherhood at some point in
their lifetimes; 80 percent of black women and 45 percent of white women will become family
heads at some time during their childbearing years.74 In 2000, the distribution of female-headed
household types with children was as follows: 12 percent were headed by a woman with a
cohabitating male partner, 14.3 percent were headed by a grandmother, and 73.8 percent by a
single mother. A larger share of the households headed by a grandmother is black.75

Poverty rates in female-headed households are typically 3 to 4 times as high as those for the
overall population.76 Individuals in households that become headed by a female are extremely
likely to enter into poverty:
• When a two-adult household becomes a female-headed household, 20.1 percent entered
poverty.77
• The transition to a female-headed family accounts for 59 percent of the poverty
beginnings for female heads with children: 38 percent of these poverty spell
beginnings result from a marital breakup and 21 percent result from what is most likely
unmarried motherhood.78
• Persons in households that have been female-headed for 2 or more years are more likely
enter poverty than persons in two-adult and single male-headed households.79
• More than 6 out of 10 children who have experienced persistent or long-term
poverty have spent time in single parent families.80

Many female-headed households begin with a divorce. Nationally, over 13 million women are
divorced, and 18.4 percent of them are living in poverty.81 Divorce erodes the economic well-
being of custodial parents and their children. There is considerable evidence that upon divorce
women and children experience substantial financial declines, with income dropping;
divorced men’s relative income, on the other hand, remains stable or even increases.82 Median
household income for custodial parent households declines 40 percent, on average, during
the 5 years following divorce. Moreover, the decline in economic well-being held for poorly
educated and highly educated couples alike.83 Of those experiencing a new marital break-up, 23
percent become poor with the month that the break-up occurs (31% for female-headed families,
19% for families with elderly members).84 A father leaving the family increases the likelihood
that families with children will be poor: in one study the percent of families below poverty
increased by ten percentage points (about a 46% increase in the total number of families).85

12
Female-headed households’ status is closely tied to poverty because single parent families
typically have just one potential earner and are less likely than married parents to have a full-
time worker. When there is only one adult earner in the household, fewer hours are worked and
fewer hours are available to be worked due to care giving responsibilities. Though employment
rates are high for single women with children (almost 80% work)86, mothers who never
marry are 70 percent less likely to be working full time compared to women who have only
marital births.87 If there is not another earner in the household, grandmother-headed households
with children have extremely high odds of experiencing poverty, significantly higher (40%) than
those headed by a single mother.88

Having children impacts income generation and income needed to make ends meet. At its
simplest, having children increases household size, increases the amount of income needed to
make ends meet, and likely reduces the number of hours the parent can work, thereby increasing
the risk of poverty. It is estimated that 8.6% of poverty entries happen when a child is born into a
household, and 1 of every 5 spells of poverty for children begin this way.89 In families with a
new baby, 12.9 percent become poor in the month the event occurred; this percent increases
to 24.6 percent for female-headed households.90 It is estimated that 6.5 percent of poverty entries
happen when a child under age 6 enters the household. The likelihood of entering poverty is
higher for persons in households with more children.91

In 2006, 38.5 percent of children born in the United States were born to unmarried mothers (over
1.6 million births).92 Over half of all children born in the United States today will, if current
trends continue, spend some time living apart from one of their biological parents (while
growing up.93 High divorce rates, falling marriage rates, and rising non-marital birthrates over
the past three decades have more than doubled the share of children living with single mothers.94

Half of all non-marital childbearing starts during the teen years.95 In 2006, the birthrate of teenage
females aged 15-19 was 41.9 births per 1,000, 96 (though it is important to note that the teen birth
rate has generally been declining since the early 1990s). 97 Women who have had teenage and
post-teenage non-marital births fare particularly badly economically – one study
documented that 55 percent were officially poor.98 Teen parenthood is associated with both
lower high school graduation rates and a roughly 20 percent reduction in the girls’ adult income.99
Women with post-adolescent non-marital births who did not have teenage births were
substantially better off than those who did – their median income was nearly double and their
poverty rate (20%) was less than half than that of those with adolescent births.100 In addition to
increasing poverty risk, having a non-marital birth substantially lowers women’s future
incomes.101

The financial strength of women and children is compromised by certain household structure
characteristics. About half of all women will experience single motherhood at some point in their
lifetimes and half of all children will live in a single parent-headed household. Attributes of
female-headed households that are associated with poverty include: having children in the
household under age 6, being of younger age, not being married, being black or Hispanic, and
not participating in the labor force.102 Female-headed households are disproportionately poor due
to lower wages paid to women, fewer hours worked in households with one adult earner, and
fewer hours available to work due to care giving responsibilities.

13
7. How Are Disability and Poor Health Linked to Poverty?

Households that have an adult with a health problem or disability which prevents them from
working or which limits the kind or amount of work they can do are at heightened risk for
economic insecurity. These health conditions can result from a myriad of things including a birth
defect, accident, illness, and environmental causes.

In the United States, 12.9 percent of adults ages 21 to 64 have a disability (almost 21.5 million
people),103 11.6 percent report fair/poor health, and 8.1 percent report poor mental health.104
These conditions are much more prevalent in the low-income population as in the total
adult population: 25.1 percent of low-income adults report fair/poor health and 15.2
percent report poor mental health.105 The fraction of the population reporting work limitations
due to health or disability rises dramatically with age. In addition, many Americans have
disabilities that do not qualify them for the major government programs that provide cash
grants106 - that is they are not considered disabled enough by government definitions to prevent
working, yet they are not succeeding in the labor market.

When a head of household becomes disabled, 6.4 percent of households enter poverty.107
The disability status of the household head has powerful effects on the prevalence of children’s
poverty. In families where the household head was disabled during a 15-year period children
who are black could expect to be poor in almost 11 of the 15 years and white children could
expect to be poor 3.3 of 15 years.108

People without disabilities are more than twice as likely to be employed as those with a
disability.109 Over one third (37.2%) of people with disabilities are working compared to 75.1
percent of people without.110 Even among people with disabilities who are employed, the hours
worked and dollars earned are substantially less than for those without disabilities.111 People with
a health-related work limitation have significantly lower household income, on average, than
respondents who are not employed but report no such limitation. They also receive a much lower
fraction of their income from earnings. Poor health leads many older workers (aged 50 to 62) to
withdraw from the labor force. Among people in poor health, more than half who exit the labor
force apply for disability benefits.112 Individuals with an early onset of disability (before age 22)
have higher rates of employment than those with a later onset of disability.113

Many children with disabilities do not graduate from high school or go on to further
education, and many are not adequately prepared for the workforce.114 People ages 22 to35
with an early onset of disability (before age 22), have a lower probability of completing high
school (33.3% versus 12.7%) and a lower probability of being employed (38.1% versus 80.7%)
than those without disabilities. Younger workers with disabilities are significantly more likely to
work part-time (40.9%) than workers without disabilities (14.6%). Young people with
disabilities receive significantly lower earnings than people without disabilities ($1,000 per
month versus $1,800 per month).115

Lower employment rates of people with disabilities that began when they were young and
the consequent low incomes are caused by lower levels of high school completion and a
direct negative impact of disability on work.116 Barriers to employment for persons with
14
disabilities include the need for specific work accommodations, difficulties in accessing
transportation and personal supports or assisting technologies, and the need for health
insurance.117 Many workers with disabilities work fewer hours are therefore likely to have lower
total earnings; this may be a result of their disability or it may reflect the types of jobs people
with disabilities are more likely to be hired to perform.118

Child disability rates have grown substantially in recent decades. Some children with disabilities
require additional or specialized care relative to other children, and their mothers may be less
available to work, or to work full time due to care-giving responsibilities. A number of studies
provide evidence that the presence of one or more children with a disability has a negative
influence on the paid employment of mothers.119 120 In a study of welfare recipients, mothers
with a child who is severely disabled, or more than one child with moderately disabilities, were
20 to 30 percent less likely to have worked in the previous month than mothers with healthier
children. Having a child with a severe disability but not receiving disability income increased the
likelihood by as much as 30 percent that the family would experience material hardship.121 Not
working or reducing hours worked to take care of the needs of a child with disabilities can have
severe economic consequences for many single-parent families.

A head of household becoming disabled has powerful and consistent effects on the prevalence of
children’s poverty. This is in part due the fact that the presence of a disability can significantly
reduce labor force attachment. Even among people employed with disabilities, the hours worked
and dollars earned are substantially less than for those without disabilities. Poor health leads
many older workers to leave the labor market before retirement age. Finally, having a child with
a disability puts families at risk of economic insecurity, particularly single-parent-headed
households.

15
8. How Does the Rise in Men with Criminal Records
Decrease Economic Chances for Themselves and Their
Families?
Incarceration interrupts participation in the labor force and the generation of earnings, has long-
term consequences on employment and earnings chances and may have ripple effects that
disproportionately negatively impact the economic security of certain groups.

Incarceration is at its highest point on record and is distributed unequally across the
population. All told, 1 in 37 adults in the United States have ever served time in prison (over 5.6
million as of 2001). An estimated 16.6 percent of adult black males were current or former State
or Federal prisoners – a rate that was twice that of Hispanic males (7.7%) and 6 times that of
white males (2.6%) in 2001. Female incarceration rates are significantly lower but follow similar
racial and ethnic disparities. Nearly 1 in 15 (6.6%) of all persons born in the United States in
2001 will go to State or Federal prison during their lifetime, up from 1.9 percent in 1974. If
current incarceration rates remain unchanged, about 1 in 3 black males, 1 in 6 Hispanic males
and 1 in 17 white males are expected to go to prison during their lifetimes. Nearly 9 times as
many men as women have ever been in prison. A male has a 1 in 9 chance of ever going to
prison while a female has a 1 in 56 chance.122

Those who are incarcerated average less than 12 years of completed schooling. High school
dropouts are 3 to 4 times as likely to be in prison as those with 12 years of schooling. The
risks of incarceration are highly stratified by education. By the end of the 1990s a black male
high school dropout born in the late 1960s had a 60 percent chance of serving time in prison
(about 3 times higher than 20 years earlier), and one without college education had a 30 percent
chance.123

Considerable empirical evidence points to negative effects of incarceration on the subsequent

employment and earnings of those who spent time in prison. Wage levels, wage growth, and
weeks worked are all significantly lower among those with criminal records than those
without them. Studies show only 30 to 40 percent of people with criminal records generally
showing any employment per quarter, with quarterly earnings of those working often averaging
around $2,000.124 Incarceration reduces the wages of people who were formerly
incarcerated by 10 to 20 percent and reduces wage growth by almost one third.125

The increasing proportion of black men that are either currently or formerly incarcerated is likely
to suppress their relative socioeconomic status.126 Previous incarceration is particularly
associated with large declines in employment and labor force participation among young
black men. For percentage point rise in the overall incarceration rate of black men, employment
and labor force participation among younger black men (not incarcerated) declined by 1.0 to 1.5
percent.127

Youth detained in correctional facilities have higher unemployment rates and receive lower
wages a decade or more after incarceration. On average, youth incarceration reduces future
employment by about 5 percent, or about 3 weeks per year. The effect is particularly large for

16
black youth who were previously incarcerated; their employment is reduced by about 9%, or
around five weeks in the year. Adult employment lost through youth incarceration exceeds the
large negative effects of dropping out of high school or living in a high unemployment area. The
negative impacts of youth incarceration do not appear to decay over time with the negative
impact being extremely long lasting. Even after 15 years those incarcerated as juveniles worked
between 5 and 10 percent less than those who were not incarcerated as youth.128

Once they are released, people with criminal records have a long-term reduced prospect of
stable employment and adequate earnings over their life course.129
• A felony record can disqualify employment in certain occupations including jobs with
contact with children, certain health services occupations, and employment with firms
providing security services.
• Once released, success in the labor market might be reduced for a variety of supply-based
reasons, such as the fact that their human capital or skills depreciate over time, their
information about the job market weakens, and their networks atrophy.130
• In all surveys of employers that asked about their willingness to hire people with criminal
records, employer responses reveal a strong aversion to hiring applicants with criminal
records, stronger than their aversion to hiring other groups of stigmatized workers.131
Over 60 percent of employers who have recently hired low-skilled workers indicate
that they would ‘probably not’ or ‘definitely not’ be willing to hire an applicant
with a criminal record.132
• Employers may be unwilling to hire applicants with criminal records for many reasons-
such as the risk of legal liability if they harm a customer or coworker, the risk of financial
liability if they engage in theft, fears of personal violence, and the negative signals that a
period of incarceration sends about an applicant’s general skills or trustworthiness.133
• Those released from prison, facing reduced employment prospects, may not succeed in
the labor market, likely raising recidivism rates (i.e., returns to prison). The employment
of people who are formerly incarcerated is quite negatively correlated with their tendency
to re-offend and recidivate.134

A number of studies of families of prisoners highlight the resulting financial instability and
severe financial strain. Imprisonment of a parent can alter the prospects of a family in a number
of significant ways, especially if the family becomes headed by a single parent.135 In addition,
serving a prison sentence can result in the lengthy absence of African American males from their
spouses, partners, and children is likely to hamper family formation and hasten the dissolution of
existing, if not stable, family units.136

Having a criminal record is becoming an increasingly common characteristic, particularly so in

the life course of black males. The experience of imprisonment is linked with risk of
unemployment and low earnings due to stigma, interruptions one’s work/career history, and
declines in job skills. The reduced employment and earnings of fathers likely reduce the family
incomes of their children and may have intergenerational consequences. “One might argue that
in light of the potentially permanent consequences of an incarceration spell, the high
incarceration rate among black males is perhaps one of the chief barriers to their socioeconomic
progress.”137

17
9. Does Being an Immigrant Impact the Likelihood of
Being Poor?

There has been much speculation about the impact of immigration on the economy, labor market
chances and poverty. Much of the discussion has focused on opinion and not on empirical
evidence. Research does shed some light on the implications of growing immigration on
economic security, and in general finds that negative effects have been overstated.

The foreign-born population comprises about 12.6 percent of the population of the United States
at more than 37 million people.138 Best estimates determine that there are between 7 and 11
million undocumented immigrants in the United States representing one quarter of the overall
foreign-born population.139 One in five children in the United States and one in four low-income
children lives in an immigrant family.140 Most children of immigrants in the United States are
born in the United States and 75 percent are citizens.141 Approximately 700,000 to 900,000
documented immigrants and at least 300,000 to 500,000 undocumented immigrants arrive each
year. If these trends persist and immigration policies of the 1990s continue, the foreign-born
population is projected to double by 2050, when it will account for 15 percent of the total
population of the United States. This would be the same level of immigration that existed in
1900.142 It is important to note that not all immigrants who enter the United States stay there
permanently – it is widely believed that as many as one-third eventually return to their countries
of origin.143

The recent rise in immigration has had a very minor affect on the poverty rate.144 One study
found that increases in the foreign-born population since 1980 have increased the poverty
rate by about 0.3 percent more than it otherwise would have been.145 Another study shows
that if immigration had been held constant, poverty rates would have been only slightly lower
and median income slightly higher between 1993 and 2000. Specifically, if the shares of
immigrants and non-immigrants were frozen at 1993 levels (9%), the overall poverty rate would
have been 12.6 percent; instead the immigrant population grew to 12 percent, and the national
poverty rate was essentially unchanged at 12.7 percent (only one–tenth of a percentage point
higher). The decline in immigrant poverty has almost fully offset the effect of the growth in the
immigrant population.146

Immigration was neither the sole nor most important factor determining poverty rates in
the past decade. Immigration’s role in recent poverty trends appears to have been overstated at
the expense of other economic factors, including increasing inequality and unemployment that
hurt the economic prospects of all low-wage workers, not just immigrants.147 Roughly half of
the increase in immigrant child poverty from 1969-1999 can be attributed to changing
conditions in the United States economy that make it more difficult to lift a family out of
poverty (both immigrant and native) than 30 years ago.148

18
 Graphic from Chapman, 2003, p 12

While some immigrants have higher poverty rates than native-born individuals, their
likelihood of being poor has fallen. Immigrant poverty rates have fallen nearly 3 times as
fast as did those of non-immigrants in recent years, as shown in the chart Poverty rates for all
persons, U.S. natives, immigrants, and recent immigrants 1994-2000.149 Immigrants also
experienced greater increases in real median family incomes than did native-born individuals (an
increase of 26.3 percent from 1994 to 2000, while native-born grew half that fast).150 The longer
immigrants live in the United States, the more similar to the native-born population in social and
economic status they become. Median family income has risen over time for immigrants and is
now as high as that of natives for immigrants who entered the country before 1980.151

Immigrants are increasingly a large share of the labor force of the United States (1 of every 7
workers or 14%); however, immigrants are over-represented among low-wage workers (1 of
every 5 workers or 20%). Immigrants’ hourly wages are lower on average than those of native-
born workers, and nearly half earn less than twice the minimum wage. Two million immigrant
workers earned less than the minimum wage. The average low-wage immigrant worker
earned $14,400 in 2001.152 Though virtually all undocumented men are in the labor force (96%),
they earn considerably less than working American citizens.153 This is in large part because
immigrants without legal status have restricted access to jobs, are ineligible for most social
programs, and cannot become citizens. About two-thirds of undocumented workers earn less
than twice the minimum wage, compared with only one-third of all workers.154

19
It is widely thought that the recent surge in low-skilled immigration has produced a growing pool
of workers with very low reservation wages (the wage at which workers will agree to offer their
services) and no bargaining power,155 and many attribute this to depressing wages for other low-
skilled workers. The academic literature on this is contentious, though there is rough consensus
that large surges of immigration have generated, at most, small negative wage effects for less
advantaged members of the labor force.156 Most research shows that a 10 percent increase in
the fraction of immigrants in the population reduces the wages of the least-skilled native-
born workers by, at most, 1 percent.157 Upon reviewing the literature on this, economists,
Rachel Friedberg and Jennifer Hunt concluded that “given the widespread nature of the popular
view that immigration has large adverse effects on the economic outcomes of the native-born
population of the United States, there is surprisingly little evidence to support this. Evidence of
immigrants reducing employment or labor-force participation rates or increasing the
unemployment rate is even harder to find.”158

Different groups come to the United States with differing levels of education, job skills, and
other human capital assets that impact earnings. Beyond their human capital the legal status of
immigrants also strongly affects their social and economic characteristics and chances.159 Despite
these challenges, immigrants, particularly men, have very high rates of employment.
Unfortunately these jobs are often concentrated in low-paying sectors, resulting in higher poverty
rates. However, immigration was not the most important factor in affecting poverty rates in the
past decade; instead more fundamentally economic factors, such as increasing inequality and
unemployment hurt the economic prospects of all low-wage workers, not just immigrants.

20
10. Does Having Experienced Violence Increase the Risk
of Economic Insecurity for Women?
Unfortunately, women encounter different types of violence in their lives including rape,
physical assault, and domestic violence that may have financial consequences in addition to the
more obvious health and safety consequences. Research on these issues is somewhat limited, due
to limited data sets and a focus on outcomes other than financial. The majority of the research
reported here is from surveys that took place in specified geographies, with some of the surveys
further focused on low-income women.

The National Violence Against Women Survey found that in the previous 12 months, 302,091
women experienced rape, and 1,913,243 experienced physical assault, for a total of over 2
million women experiencing violence within the preceding year. Throughout their lifetime 1 in 6
women in the United States experienced an attempted or completed rape, and 1 in 2 (52%)
experienced a physical assault. Many assaults against women are committed by an intimate
partner: 25 percent of surveyed women said they were raped and/or physically assaulted by a
current or former spouse, a co-habitating partner, or a date at some point in their life.160
Prevalence of intimate partner violence is much higher among welfare recipients: estimates range
from 63 to 75 percent reporting serious physical abuse by an intimate partner in their lifetimes.161

The results of a random household survey with 824 women from a low-income neighborhood
showed that women who reported having experienced violence were more likely to have
lower personal incomes than women who had not:
• Those who reported being controlled, harassed, or threatened (or experiencing other
symbolic aggression) in the past 12 months reported incomes $215 lower than those who
had not.
• Those who reported being pushed, shoved, or grabbed (or other physical aggression)
reported incomes $211 lower than those who had not.
• Those who had experienced beatings or rape (or other severe aggression) reported
incomes $997 lower than those who had not been severely aggressed against.162

Women who are physically or sexually assaulted go on to experience increased risk for poverty,
divorce, and unemployment. Research shows that women who were living above the poverty
level initially were at increased risk for decline into poverty following sexual or physical assault.
New victimization was particularly harmful for women who had been previously assaulted
and who were not living in poverty initially- this doubled the likelihood that these women
would become poor over time. In addition, women with a history of having experienced
violence who experienced a new assault were more than twice as likely to be unemployed than
women who did not experience a new assault.163

Domestic violence can trigger poverty in different ways including decreasing employment
stability of the woman, causing formation of female-headed households, and causing formation
of new households that have no personal assets or income due to the violence. Research shows
that women who have experienced domestic violence are at risk of subsequent disruption in
employment and reduced income following victimization.164 Because many women who have

21
experienced domestic violence are economically dependent on the men who abuse them, few
have the resources necessary to start over for themselves and their children. For example, many
abused women do not have ready access to cash, checking accounts, or charge accounts.165
One study showed that 27 percent of abused women had no access to cash, 34 percent had no
access to a checking account, 51 percent had no access to charge accounts, and 22 percent had no
access to a car.166

Some women remain trapped in abusive relationships because they lack resources to leave and
know that poverty and material hardship may result.167 Most women try to leave the abuser: 50
to 90 percent of women attempt to escape their abusive environments.168 Their efforts to leave
the abuser are severely hindered by the economic deprivation that frequently accompanies
domestic violence and by the volatile response by the abuser.169 Women who flee abuse usually
take their children with them and thus have additional financial responsibilities that contribute to
poverty.170 In addition, they frequently must leave quickly and secretly without time to pack and
hence need to essentially repurchase all of the essentials needed for themselves and their
children.

The interaction between employment and having experienced violence is complicated, and it is
not exactly clear how the violence women experience affects them as workers.171 One study
indicates that cumulative domestic violence has a long-term impact on women’s capacity to be
economically self-sufficient.172 Another study found that the combination of physical and
sexual abuse as an adult was associated with employment instability, such as having more
jobs, fewer months of work, lower hourly wages, and fewer hours of work per week.173
Higher levels of recent violence have also been associated with fewer months worked. The effect
of violence on employment is significant even in the presence of other work-related factors such
as human capital.174 Finally, abuse can interfere with a woman’s job stability by increasing the
risk of serious physical- and mental-health problems.175 Research shows that psychological
distress is significantly associated with unemployment for women with a history of domestic
violence.176

A number of qualitative and quantitative studies reveal that abusers did not support and often
prevented employment. Abused women are 10 times more likely to have a current or former
partner who would not like them going to school or work, compared to women who did not have
an abusive partner,177 potentially leaving them without the work experience, education and up-to-
date skills needed to succeed in the workforce. Approximately 16 to 60 percent of women
surveyed in five studies had partners had discouraged them from working, and 33 to 46 percent
said that their partner prevented them from working.178 179 Abusers interfere with employment in
many ways: keeping women up all night before a job interview, turning off the alarm clock,
destroying clothing, inflicting visible facial injuries, deliberately disabling the family car,
threatening to kidnap the children from child care centers, failing to show up as promised for
child care or transportation, and in-person harassment on the job.180 A survey of abused women
who were working at the time the abuse occurred found that 56 percent of their partners had
harassed them at work by phone or in person and 21 percent of their partners frequently harassed
them at work. In two other studies, approximately 35 to 40 percent of the women surveyed said
their abuser had shown up at their place of work and caused a disruption.181

22
This interference with employment by the abuser puts the woman being abused at risk of losing
her job. Three of the studies that interviewed women who had experienced domestic violence
who were working when the abuse occurred found that 44 to 60 percent had been
reprimanded at work for behaviors related to the abuse, such as being late to work, and 24
to 52 percent said they lost their jobs because of the abuse.182 Almost 70 percent of the
respondents to one survey said that their job performance was negatively affected by the abuse,
and about 50 percent said that they felt they had lost opportunities for salary and career
advancement because of problems related to abuse.183

Violence appears to put women at risk of economic insecurity in a number of ways. Certain
types of violence and the number of events increases the likelihood a women will become poor.
Violence interacts with employment, in some cases increasing unemployment or decreasing
hours worked. As many women who have experienced domestic violence are economically
dependent on the men who abuse them, few have the resources necessary to start over for
themselves and their children. Abusers interfere with employment in a myriad of ways that
increase job instability and job loss and compromise movement toward economic self-reliance.

23
11. What are the Economic Consequences of Living in
Disproportionately Poor Neighborhoods?
There is a growing body of theory indicating that neighborhoods play an important role in
perpetuating poverty across generations. However, studies have not isolated exactly what about
neighborhoods make a difference.184 185 Neighborhood factors are complex and interactive,
making them hard to isolate in research. Therefore, much of this section should be understood as
contextually relevant to understanding poverty, but not a delineation of proven causal factors of
poverty.

One in 10 people who are poor live in communities with high concentrations of poverty,
where over 40 percent of the residents are poor.186 These are typically racially segregated
neighborhoods that are economically declining and neglected, lacking economic and institutional
and resources.187 Key community institutions, including businesses, school, churches, and
community organizations have declined or disappeared leaving residents cutoff from key
institutional resources.188 Studies have found that outcomes are worse for people who are black
that reside in segregated urban areas. Young black adults between the ages of 20 and 30 were
less likely to have graduated from high school or college, more likely to be idle (less likely to
have a job or be in school), more likely to earn less income, and more likely to be a single
mother if they lived in a highly of a less segregated area.189

To understand the neighborhood role, it is important to look at how people come to live in
neighborhoods. Residential choices are largely influenced by housing/rental prices and by
discrimination. Residing in an area of concentrated poverty is often the result of the
affordability of the housing in those neighborhoods and persistent discrimination in the
housing market. For example, black renters face a 10.7 percent change of being totally excluded
from housing made available to white renters with similar characteristics, and a 23.3 percent
chance of learning about fewer apartments.190 One estimate finds that this discrimination could
discourage as much as 20 percent of the moves that would otherwise be made by black
households.191

There has been a devastating impact of manufacturing losses on the economic prospects for
low-skilled minority workers in general and for inner-city residents in particular.192 193 It is
thought that the loss of well-paying manufacturing jobs that employed many less-educated black
workers from high poverty minority neighborhoods reduces the chances of the remaining
residents and their children of escaping poverty. Industrial restructuring and the shift of
manufacturing employment from the cities to the suburbs mean that the number of jobs available
and compatible with the skills of residents living in concentrated poverty neighborhoods has
dropped. One result is that many high poverty minority neighborhoods across the United States
have lost the workforce that is necessary to sustain viable labor market activity. These factors
increase male unemployment, reduce the pool of men eligible for marriage, and so reduce
marriage rates in the inner city and increase the number of children raised in single parent
families.194 195

24
When low-skilled jobs move to suburban areas, housing markets do not always adjust to make
lower-income housing available. In many instances zoning and building restrictions may prohibit
multi-unit housing, which is generally more affordable. As a result segregated housing patterns
keep low-income households in the central city with reduced access to low-skill jobs in
suburban areas. This spatial mismatch, however, is difficult to test with research. Studies have
found that access to jobs heavily influences employment for both minority and white youth; that
average access to jobs is much higher for whites than for blacks or Hispanics; and that
differences in job access explain 25 to 30 percent of the unemployment gap between white and
Hispanic youth, and one-third to one-half of the employment gap between black and white
youth.196 197 A comparison of public housing residents from the city who moved to the suburbs
with those who moved within the city, found that those in the suburbs were 25 percent more
likely to have a job than those in the city. It also found that the older non-college bound youth
who had moved to the suburbs were more likely to work full-time, were 4 times as likely to earn
over $6.50 per hour, and were more likely to have a job with benefits than those who stayed in
the city.198

At the same time jobs left, the migration of the middle-class residents out of the inner city
weakened important socializing institutions, reduced the exposure of poverty-area residents to
mainstream values and norms, reduced job-finding networks, and reduced the number of work
role models.199 It is well established that social networks can help a person find out about a job,
get hired into a position, learn how to do the job, and retain the job.200 Support from social
networks is especially important when employers are likely to discriminate on the basis of race,
ethnicity, work experience, home address, age, or gender.201 Approximately 50 percent of all
workers at a point in time knew someone at their firm when they first took the job. Poor
communities may be less able to generate labor market information necessary for matching
community members to jobs, in part because they are isolated from mainstream
opportunities for work.202

Segregation and discrimination in housing serve to separate low-income minority children

into schools where poverty rates are relatively high and student performance is relatively
low.203 The ensuing educational disparities translate into earnings disparities, and hence into
higher poverty for blacks and Hispanics.204 A lack of role models in the neighborhood seems to
contribute to low educational attainment. If the children within a community consider the
experiences of adults in assessing the economic payoff of education, children in poor
communities observe biased outcomes in the sense that the observed payoff among adults in the
community is lower than what the child should expect, creating the possibility that poor children
are systematically misinformed about the benefits of education and therefore make lower
educational choices.205

Middle class out-migration also means that poverty area residents have few examples of
mainstream success, and this limits their expectations about what is possible for them.206
This further increases the neighborhood’s social isolation, defined as ‘the lack of contact or of
sustained interaction with individuals and institutions that represent mainstream society’.207
Sociologists argue that social isolation virtually condemned residents of the of high poverty
minority neighborhoods to a lifetime of jobless poverty through negative role models, the failure

25
to connect school success to labor market mobility, and the formlessness of days unstructured by
the discipline of work life.208

Residential segregation, housing and labor market discrimination, joblessness, and the migration
of middle class residents are common in neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty and
may constrain economic opportunities and choices across generations. Studies show that growing
up in a high poverty neighborhood may have a negative impact on economic outcomes and may
explain some of the disproportionately high rates of poverty in minority groups. There is no
consensus, however, about the magnitude of the neighborhood effects on economic and other
outcomes.209 Concentrated poverty does appear to have a negative impact on educational
performance, and hence contributes to lower earnings potential and ultimately to poverty.210

26
12. Summary of Findings
Poverty is widespread and will touch the majority of Americans at some point during their
lifetimes. What emerges out of a review of the literature is a picture of a heterogeneous poor
population with different triggers for entry into poverty. Certain groups are disproportionately
impacted and certain events are more influential for various subgroups within the at-risk-of-
poverty population than they are for others.

What groups are more likely to be poor?

• Women face greater risk of poverty than men and comprise a greater number of all
people in poverty.
• Minorities face greater risk of poverty than whites yet comprise a somewhat smaller
number of all people in poverty.
• Children face greater risk of poverty than any other age group yet comprise a somewhat
smaller number of all people in poverty.
• Immigrants face greater risk of poverty than native-born individuals, but comprise a
much smaller number of all people in poverty.
• People with disabilities face greater risk of poverty then those without, yet comprise a
much smaller number of all people in poverty.
• Female-headed households are at a far greater risk of poverty than married-couple
families, and represent a greater number of all families in poverty.

What events are more likely to push people into poverty?

• Loss of a job: nearly 20 percent of people enter poverty when the head of household loses
a job.
• Decline in earnings: half of poverty spells begin with the household experiences a decline
in earnings.
• No high school degree: households headed by someone without a high school degree
have a high likelihood of entering poverty.
• Female-headed household: When a two-adult household becomes a female-headed
household 20.1 percent entered poverty.
• Having children: 8.6 percent of poverty entries happen when a child is born into a
household.
• Disability: when a head of household becomes disabled, 6.5 percent of households enter
poverty.

What contributes to these events happening?

Forces largely seen as outside of the control of individuals have dramatic impacts on income,
earnings, and poverty. Recessions, high unemployment, the decline in the manufacturing sector
and growth in the service sector, and declining unionization depress earnings and increase
poverty, particularly for disadvantaged workers. A healthy economy alone, while integral to
preventing poverty, does not prevent all entries into poverty. Many people at risk of poverty have

27
circumstances that prevent them from entering the labor market or that limits their wages or the
hours they work:
• Growth in low-wage work: one-fourth of the workforce in the United States earns
poverty level wages, particularly impacting women and minorities.
• Discrimination: estimates suggest that discrimination against black men reduces the
demand for their labor by at least 10 to13 percent.
• Wage declines for dropouts: high school dropouts earn less money than those with more
education and their wages have declined considerably.
• Teen births: half of all non-marital childbearing starts during the teen years which is
associated with lower high school graduation and a 20 percent reduction in the girl’s
adult income.
• Not working full time: this is particularly prevalent for single parents and people with
disabilities or parents caring for children with disabilities.
• Increased incarceration experience: previous incarceration reduces wages by 10 to 20
percent and increases likelihood of unemployment, particularly for black men.
• Violence: having experienced violence increases employment instability for some women
and leaving an abuser can render a woman without any income.
• High poverty neighborhoods: segregation, discrimination, the decline in jobs, and the loss
of positive role models constrain current opportunities and future aspirations for poor
minority residents.

This deeper look at causes of poverty provides a solid jumping off point for policy and system
change. By understanding the specific triggers that increase the likelihood that someone will
experience poverty, we can better target our interventions and investments. There is a spectrum
of solutions that should considered, including prevention, human capital development, immigrant
integration, economic development, income supports and asset development, that can directly
impact the lives of millions of Americans.

28
13. References
1
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 2007 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, Microdata, calculation
conducted by the Mid-America Institute on Poverty of Heartland Alliance.
2
Eller, T.J. (1996, June). Who stays poor? Who doesn’t? U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current
Population Reports. P70-55. Household Economic Studies. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
3
Rank, M. R., & Hirschl, T. A. (1999). The likelihood of poverty across the American adult life span. Social Work, 44, 201-216.
4
Rank, M. R., & Hirschl, T. A. (1999). The likelihood of poverty across the American adult life span. Social Work, 44, 201-216.
5
Bane, M. J., Ellwood, D. (1986). Slipping into and out of poverty: The dynamics of spells. Journal of Human Resources, 21(1),
1-23.
6
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