SECOND DIVISION received the said pieces of jewelry to the damage and

prejudice of the said Francisca M. Santiago.

G.R. No. 126480      August 10, 2001
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY, petitioner,
vs. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
At the trial, private complainant Dr. Francisca Santiago testified
QUISUMBING, J.: that on February 8, 1980, she and Aurora Jose went to Mady's
Pawnshop owned by petitioner to pawn some pieces of jewelry.
This petition assails the decision of the Court of appeals dated She initially asked for P250,000.00 but petitioner offered only
July 24, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court P220,000.00, P200,000.00 first and then the P20,000.00 a week
of Manila, Branch 40, dated May 5, 1993, finding the accused later. A list of the jewelries was typewritten by a helper of the
(now petitioner) Maria Tin @ "Maria Ty" @ "Maria Dy" guilty of petitioner. This list was signed by petitioner as evidence of her
estafa and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of six years receipt of the said jewelries. Dr. Santiago also averred that from
and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 20 years 1980 to 1982, she made 19 payments of various amounts
of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the private totaling P95,600.00. She said that the loan was under a "white-
complainant, Dr. Francisca M. Santiago, the amount of paper" system where there is no maturity/expiration date and
P280,000.00 plus 12 percent interest per annum from the filing where the jewelry can be redeemed anytime provided the
of the information and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees. interests were paid.4

Petitioner was charged in an Information which reads: On February 1, 1984, Dr. Santiago said, she went to the
pawnshop, with a certain Mrs. Dava and a Mrs. Zuñiga to
That, on or about February 8, 1980, in the City of Manila, redeem her jewelry. She brought with her the amount of
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, P450,000.00 to settle her loan. However, petitioner told her that
unlawfully and feloniously defraud one FRANCISCA M. the jewelries were already sold.5 This prompted Dr. Santiago to
SANTIAGO in the following manner, to wit: the accused consult Atty. German Abaya Sipin, who wrote to Maria Tin
received in trust from said Francisca M. Santiago several asking her to allow Dr. Santiago to redeem the pieces of
pieces of jewelry with an estimated value of more than jewelry. On March 2, 1984, petitioner replied through her
P220,000.00 as collateral to the loan in the amount of counsel, Atty. Marcelo T. Dy, confirming that Dr. Santiago has
P220,000.00 which the latter obtained from the accused, an unsettled obligation of P220,000.00 and demanding
under the express obligation of returning the said pieces payment. The letter also stated that no jewelries were received
of jewelry to said Francisca M. Santiago immediately as collateral for the loan. In a handwritten letter dated March 7,
upon demand for redemption, but the said accused once 1984, Dr. Santiago pleaded for the redemption of her
in possession of the said pieces of jewelry far from jewelries. Maria Tin, also in a handwritten letter dated March 16,
complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and 1984, replied that she merely acted as guarantor of the loan and
refused, and still fails and refuses to do so despite since she was made to pay the loan she now was demanding
repeated demands made upon her to that effect and with payment therefor.9 In said letter, Tin narrated the circumstances
intent to defraud the said accused denied having
behind the loan, and alleged that it was another person who Petitioner appealed with the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
gave the loan and received the jewelry as collateral. trial court's decision. Her Motion for Reconsideration was
denied.
Petitioner testified that the real parties to the loan were Dr.
Santiago and her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan. She merely Hence, this petition. Petitioner avers that the appellate court
introduced them to one another and it was Mia Chan who erred in:
signed the acknowledgment receipt and who actually received
the pieces of jewelry.10 I. ... NOT FINDING [Link] PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE IS FULL OF LOOPHOLES AND SELF-
Mia Chan, for her part, corroborated the testimony of petitioner, CONTRADICTIONS, APART FROM BEING
her mother-in-law. She stated that she was the one who INHERENTLY INCREDIBLE, AND HENCE GROSSLY
extended the loan to Dr. Santiago and that she merely asked INSUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION.
petitioner to appraise the pieces of jewelry for her. She also
requested petitioner to collect payments from Dr. Santiago. II. ... RELYING ON WHAT IT PERCEIVED TO BE
According to Mia Chan, the loan was for a three-month term WEAKNESSES OF THE DEFENSE RATHER ON THE
with 14 percent interest per annum. She stated she signed the STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION'S CASE.
receipt upon request of Dr. Santiago. 11
Ill. ... NOT UPHOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
On May 5, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision finding CONTENTION (A) THAT SANTIAGO LIED WHEN SHE
petitioner guilty. The dispositive portion of the said decision SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY WHEN SHE ARRIVED AT
reads: MADY'S PAWNSHOP THAT SHE CAME TO KNOW
FROM WHOM SHE WAS GOING TO OBTAIN A LOAN
From the foregoing, the court finds MARIA TIN; alias AND THAT IT WAS SANTIAGO WHO TYPED AND
MARIA TY or MARIA DY, the accused, GUlLTY beyond PREPARED EXH. "A" AND (B) THAT DRA. SANTIAGO
reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA. Accused is HERSELF PREPARED EXH. "A" AND WROTE THE
hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) NAME "MARIA TIN" AS THE LENDER.
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Essentially, in our view, petitioner raises issues of fact by
assailing the credibility of witnesses. As a general rule, this
Accused is hereby ordered to pay Dr. Francisca M. Court in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court will
Santiago the amount of P280,000.00 plus 12% interest review only errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to
per annum from the filing of the Information and weigh the evidence on factual issues all over [Link],
P40,000.00 as Attorney's Fees. there are certain exceptions to this rule, one of which is when
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts, In this case,
Dr. Francisca M. Santiago is required to pay the docket the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
fees of the civil aspect of this case. allegedly based on misapprehensions of vital facts, making their
review necessary.
SO ORDERED.12
A conviction in this case for estafa depends on three facts: (1) obviously hearsay. While hearsay evidence may be admitted
that accused was the one who extended the loan; (2) that because of lack of objection by the adverse party's counsel, it is
accused was the one who received the pieces of jewelry as nonetheless without probative value.
collateral for the loan she extended; and (3) that the loan was
for an indefinite term. These factual circumstances must relate Second, the signature appearing in the receipt, Exhibit "A",
directly to the elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of apparently differs from the specimen signatures provided by
confidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal petitioner Maria Tin in open court. But it has striking and obvious
Code.15 similarities to Mia Chan's specimen signatures. The differences
and similarities are so obvious to the eye. They could not be
Both trial and appellate courts held that it was petitioner who casually disregarded. Expert handwriting analysis is probably
extended the loan and who actually received the jewelries from useful here, but it is not indispensable. As said in People vs
Dr. Santiago. Their conclusion stemmed from the following Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226:
circumstances:
When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and
(1) In a letter she wrote to Fiscal Jumino, one Aurora denied upon the other to be the writing of a particular
Jose who had allegedly introduced Dr. Santiago to Maria person, any other writing of that person may be admitted
Tin and who was present when the transaction took in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the
place, corroborated Dr. Santiago's testimony; writing in dispute. It is also recognized that a comparison
of writing is a rational method of investigation; similarities
(2) The signature of appellant [petitioner] appears on the and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in
document  acknowledging receipt of the pieces of jewelry; the search for truth. Thus, it has been held that, where a
comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court,
(3) Receipts evidencing payments made by Dr. Santiago with or without the aid of expert witnesses. The court
and which appeared to be signed by the petitioner were may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, order a party
not denied by the latter; to write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison.
For, the handwriting of a person is characteristic of the
(4) Petitioner did not deny that she sent a note (Exh. "M- person himself. Once admitted, the genuineness of other
2") to Dr. Santiago reminding her to update her offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer
payments, or else she would auction the pieces of becomes a question for the trier of fact who may, but
jewelry. need not, be assisted in this task by experts. 23

A careful review of the records, however, reveals that, first, it In the present case, the prosecution bears the burden of proving
was erroneous for the Court of Appeals to consider in evidence that the signature in Exhibit "A" was the petitioner's, not Mia
the letter which a certain Aurora Jose sent to Fiscal Jumino. Chan's. This the prosecution did not do.
Aurora Jose was never presented to testify on the veracity of
said letter, much less its contents. A private certification is Third, petitioner did not deny that she received payments and
hearsay where the person who issued the same was never made demands for payment from private complainant. They do
presented as a [Link] same is true of letters. They are not show, however, that she was the one who extended the loan
hearsay evidence. Here, Aurora Jose's alleged letter is and accepted the jewelries. Note that even Mia Chan received
certain payments from Dr. Santiago, as shown by Exhibits "8", for the prosecution to present evidence which can help further
"8-A", "10" and "10-A". A certain "Viring" also received payment its case, or explain why such evidence is not presented. When
from Dr. Santiago. These instances only prove that a person the sole testimony of the complainant is met by an equally
who received payments from another is not necessarily the credible evidence of the defense, then the prosecution must
person who extended the loan. present credible corroborative witnesses to buttress its case. Its
failure to present corroborative witnesses, without any
Fourth, Exhibit "M-2"25 which the Court of Appeals considered explanation why they were not produced, weakens the
proof that petitioner was in possession of the jewelry, deserves testimony of the witness who named those corroborating
serious scrutiny. Said exhibit was not properly identified or witnesses in her testimony.30 In this case, the prosecution's
introduced as evidence at the trial. It was marked as an exhibit failure to present the corroborative witnesses, without any
upon mere manifestation of counsel.26 It was not touched upon explanation for their non-appearance, makes private
during the testimony of the private complainant nor listed in the complainant's testimony weak.
list of exhibits for the prosecution,27 hence deemed inadmissible
in evidence.28 Further, since it was private complainant who asserted that the
loan was for an indefinite term under the so-called "white-paper
Fifth, Mia Chan's admission, that she was the one who system" of the pawnshop, she had the burden of proving that
extended the loan and received the jewelries, deserves weighty fact as true. In this she failed, and her failure undermines the
consideration and could not be ignored. That admission is one case for the prosecution.
against self-interest, amounting to an incriminatory statement,
which the witness could not have volunteered if not the truth. Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the
equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the evidence on an issue
Petitioner claims that the loan was for a three-month period of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the
only. But private complainant averred that it was extended evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
under a so-called "white-paper" system, or a loan with an loses.31 The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory
indefinite term. Petitioner presented her daughter-in-law, Mia facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
Chan, to establish that the loan was only for a three-month explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
period. Private complainant did not present evidence to the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the
substantiate her claim, other than her self-serving testimony. evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not
Private complainant relied' on the acknowledgment receipt suffice to produce a conviction.32 Briefly stated, the needed
allegedly, signed by petitioner in the presence of two witnesses; quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is
However, the prosecution did not present Aurora Jose, who found lacking. And in this case, the petitioner must be declared
allegedly witnessed the transaction. Nor did it present Mrs. innocent and set free.
Dava and Mrs. Zuñiga who allegedly accompanied Dr. Santiago
when the latter tried to redeem her jewelries. While non- WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
presentation of certain witnesses is not a valid defense nor does CA-G.R. CR No. 14818, affirming that of the Regional Trial
it work against the prosecution's cause,29 this holds true only if Court in Crim. Case No. 88-64598, is
the evidence of the prosecution is sufficiently strong to hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Tin
overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. If the is ACQUITTED of the charge against her under Article 315 (1)
prosecution evidence is not strong, then it becomes mandatory
(b) of the Revised Penal Code, for lack of evidence sufficient to
sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines he lacked funds with which to purchase the necessary
SUPREME COURT equipment to make such business operational. Thus, petitioner,
Manila representing Ultra Sources International Corporation,
approached Corazon Teng, (private complainant) Vice
SECOND DIVISION President of Mancor Industries (hereinafter referred to as
Mancor) for his needed car repair service equipment of which
  Mancor was a distributor, (Rollo, pp. 40-41)

G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992 Having been approached by petitioner on his predicament, who
fully bared that he had no sufficient funds to buy the equipment
ORIEL MAGNO, petitioner, needed, the former (Corazon Teng) referred Magno to LS
vs. Finance and Management Corporation (LB Finance for brevity)
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez, that Mancor was
PHILIPPINES, respondents. willing and able to supply the pieces of equipment needed if LS
Finance could accommodate petitioner and provide him credit
facilities. (Ibid., P. 41)

PARAS, J.: The arrangement went through on condition that petitioner has

to put up a warranty deposit equivalent to thirty per
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised centum (30%) of the total value of the pieces of equipment to be
Rules of Court, from the decision* of the respondent Court of purchased, amounting to P29,790.00. Since petitioner could not
Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial come up with such amount, he requested Joey Gomez on a
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104 finding the accused personal level to look for a third party who could lend him the
petitioner, guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, in equivalent amount of the warranty deposit, however, unknown
Criminal Cases Q-35693 to 35696 before they were elevated on to petitioner, it was Corazon Teng who advanced the deposit in
appeal to the respondent appellate Court under CA-G.R. CR question, on condition that the same would be paid as a short
No. 04889. term loan at 3% interest (Ibid., P. 41)

The antecedent facts and circumstances of the four (4) counts The specific provision in the Leasing Agreement, reads:
of the offense charged, have been clearly illustrated, in the
Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General as official 1.1. WARRANTY DEPOSIT — Before or upon
counsel for the public respondent, thus: delivery of each item of Equipment, the Lessee
shall deposit with the Lessor such sum or sums
Petitioner was in the process of putting up a car repair shop specified in Schedule A to serve as security for the
sometime in April 1983, but a did not have complete equipment faithful performance of its obligations.
that could make his venture workable. He also had another
problem, and that while he was going into this entrepreneurship, This deposit shall be refunded to the Lessee upon
the satisfactory completion of the entire period of
 Lease, subject to the conditions of clause 1.12 of . . . finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
this Article. (Ibid., p. 17) reasonable doubt of the offense of violations of
B.P. Blg. 22 and sentencing the accused to
As part of the arrangement, petitioner and LS Finance entered imprisonment for one year in each Criminal Case
into a leasing agreement whereby LS Finance would lease the Nos. Q-35693, Q-35695 and Q-35696 and to pay
garage equipments and petitioner would pay the corresponding to complainant the respective amounts reflected in
rent with the option to buy the same. After the documentation subject checks. (Ibid., pp. 25, 27)
was completed, the equipment were delivered to petitioner who
in turn issued a postdated check and gave it to Joey Gomez Reviewing the above and the affirmation of the above-stated
who, unknown to the petitioner, delivered the same to Corazon decision of the court a quo, this Court is intrigued about the
Teng. When the check matured, Petitioner requested through outcome of the checks subject of the cases which were
Joey Gomez not to deposit the check as he (Magno) was no intended by the parties, the petitioner on the one hand and the
longer banking with Pacific Bank. private complainant on the other, to cover the "warranty deposit"
equivalent to the 30% requirement of the financing company.
To replace the first check issued, petitioner issued another set Corazon Teng is one of the officers of Mancor, the supplier of
of six (6) postdated checks. Two (2) checks dated July 29, 1983 the equipment subject of the Leasing Agreement subject of the
were deposited and cleared while the four (4) others, which high financing scheme undertaken by the petitioner as lessee of
were the subject of the four counts of the aforestated charges the repair service equipment, which was arranged at the
subject of the petition, were held momentarily by Corazon Teng, instance of Mrs. Teng from the very beginning of the
on the request of Magno as they were not covered with transaction.
sufficient funds. These checks were a) Piso Bank Check Nos.
006858, dated August 15, 1983, 006859 dated August 28, 1983 By the nature of the "warranty deposit" amounting to
and 006860 dated September 15, 1983, all in the amount of P29,790.00 corresponding to 30% of the "purchase/lease" value
P5,038.43 and No. 006861 dated September 28, 1983, in the of the equipments subject of the transaction, it is obvious that
amount of P10,076.87. (Ibid., pp. 42 & 43). the "cash out" made by Mrs. Teng was not used by petitioner
who was just paying rentals for the equipment. It would have
Subsequently, petitioner could not pay LS Finance the monthly been different if petitioner opted to purchase the pieces of
rentals, thus it pulled out the garage equipments. It was then on equipment on or about the termination of the lease-purchase
this occasion that petitioner became aware that Corazon Teng agreement in which case he had to pay the additional amount of
was the one who advanced the warranty deposit. Petitioner with the warranty deposit which should have formed part of the
his wife went to see Corazon Teng and promised to pay the purchase price. As the transaction did not ripen into a purchase,
latter but the payment never came and when the four (4) checks but remained a lease with rentals being paid for the loaned
were deposited they were returned for the reason "account equipment, which were pulled out by the Lessor (Mancor) when
closed." (Ibid., p. 43) the petitioner failed to continue paying possibly due to economic
constraints or business failure, then it is lawful and just that the
After joint trial before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, warranty deposit should not be charged against the petitioner.
Branch 104, the accused-petitioner was convicted for violations
of BP Blg. 22 on the four (4) cases, as follows: To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit"
which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it
having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an amount of P29,790.00 subject of the cases, were mere
unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive accommodation-arrangements with somebody thru Joey
the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the Gomez, petitioner did not even attempt to secure the refund of
safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, said amount from LS Finance, notwithstanding the agreement
supervised and operated by the corporation officials and provision to the contrary. To argue that after the termination of
employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the the lease agreement, the warranty deposit should be refundable
checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. in full to Mrs. Teng by petitioner when he did not cash out the
Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her "warranty deposit" for his official or personal use, is to stretch
instruction. This fact alone evoke suspicion that the transaction the nicety of the alleged law (B.P. No, 22) violated.
is irregular and immoral per se, hence, she specifically
requested Gomez not to divulge the source of the "warranty For all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard
deposit". the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public
checking account user. It did not intend to shelter or favor nor
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not want the encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through
petitioner to know that it was she who "accommodated" manipulations and circumvention of the noble purpose and
petitioner's request for Joey Gomez, to source out the needed objective of the law. Least should it be used also as a means of
funds for the "warranty deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of jeopardizing honest-to-goodness transactions with some color
transaction that is shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and of "get-rich" scheme to the prejudice of well-meaning
doubtful legality. It is in simple language, a scheme whereby businessmen who are the pillars of society.
Mrs. Teng as the supplier of the equipment in the name of her
corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its goods Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal
as in this case, and at the same time, privately financing those law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the
who desperately need petty accommodations as this one. protective (sic) of society against actual and potential
This modus operandi has in so many instances victimized wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be
unsuspecting businessmen, who likewise need protection from considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be
the law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty deposit" punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can
not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing equipment under be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount
the guise of a lease-purchase agreement when it is a scheme to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be
designed to skim off business clients. clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will
not be failing prey to such a vicious transaction (Aquino, The
This maneuvering has serious implications especially with Revised Penal Code, 1987 Edition, Vol. I, P. 11)
respect to the threat of the penal sanction of the law in issue, as
in this case. And, with a willing court system to apply the full Corollary to the above view, is the application of the theory that
harshness of the special law in question, using the "mala "criminal law is founded upon that moral disapprobation . . . of
prohibitia" doctrine, the noble objective of the law is tainted with actions which are immoral, i.e., which are detrimental (or
materialism and opportunism in the highest, degree. dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society. This disappropriation
This angle is bolstered by the fact that since the petitioner or is inevitable to the extent that morality is generally founded and
lessee referred to above in the lease agreement knew that the built upon a certain concurrence in the moral opinions of all. . . .
That which we call punishment is only an external means of already observed, in order that there may be a
emphasizing moral disapprobation the method of punishment is conviction under the from paragraph of Section 2
in reality the amount of punishment," (Ibid., P. 11, citing People of B.P. Blg 22 — with respect to the element of
v. Roldan Zaballero, CA 54 O.G. 6904, Note also Justice said offense that the check should have been
Pablo's view in People v. Piosca and Peremne, 86 Phil. 31). made and issued on account or for value — it is
sufficient, all the other elements of the offense
Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the being present, that the check must have been
punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of drawn and issued in payment of an obligation.
retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the
"actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is Moreover, even granting, arguendo, that the
no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to extinguishment, after the issuance of the checks,
collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of of the obligation in consideration of which the
an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and checks were issued, would have resulted in
therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of placing the case at bar beyond the purview of the
the checks in question. Following the aforecited theory, in prohibition in Section 1 of BP Blg. 22, there is no
petitioner's stead the "potential wrongdoer", whose operation satisfactory proof that there was such an
could be a menace to society, should not be glorified by extinguishment in the present case. Appellee aptly
convicting the petitioner. points out that appellant had not adduced any
direct evidence to prove that the amount
While in case of doubt, the case should have been resolved in advanced by the complainant to cover the
favor of the accused, however, by the open admission of the warranty deposit must already have been returned
appellate court below, oven when the ultimate beneficiary of the to her. (Rollo, p. 30)
"warranty deposit" is of doubtful certainty, the accused was
convicted, as shown below: It is indubitable that the respondent Court of Appeals even
disregarded the cardinal rule that the accused is presumed
Nor do We see any merit in appellant's claim that innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On the
the obligation of the accused to complainant had contrary, the same court even expected the petitioner-appellant
been extinguished by the termination of the to adduce evidence to show that he was not guilty of the crime
leasing agreement — by the terms of which the charged. But how can be produce documents showing that the
warranty deposit advanced by complainant was warranty deposit has already been taken back by Mrs. Teng
refundable to the accused as lessee — and that when she is an officer of Mancor which has interest in the
as the lessor L.S. Finance neither made any transaction, besides being personally interested in the profit of
liquidation of said amount nor returned the same her side-line. Thus, even if she may have gotten back the value
to the accused, it may he assumed that the of the accommodation, she would still pursue collecting from the
amount was already returned to the complainant. petitioner since she had in her possession the checks that
For these allegations, even if true, do not change "bounced".
the fact, admitted by appellant and established by
the evidence, that the four checks were originally
issued on account or for value. And as We have
That the court a quo merely relied on the law, without looking relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or
into the real nature of the warranty deposit is evident from the furnish suitable goods, there is, unless excluded or
following pronouncement: modified, an implied warranty that the goods shall
be fit for such purpose, (Ibid., p. 573)
And the trail court concluded that there is no
question that the accused violated BP Blg. 22, b) Deposit: — Money lodged with a person as an
which is a special statutory law, violations of which earnest or security for the performance of some
are mala prohibita. The court relied on the rule that contract, to be forfeited if the depositor fails in his
in cases of mala prohibita, the only inquiry is undertaking. It may be deemed to be part payment
whether or not the law had been violated, proof of and to that extent may constitute the purchaser
criminal intent not being necessary for the the actual owner of the estate.
conviction of the accused, the acts being
prohibited for reasons of public policy and the To commit to custody, or to lay down; to place; to
defenses of good faith and absence of criminal put. To lodge for safe- keeping or as a pledge to
intent being unavailing in prosecutions for said intrust to the care of another.
offenses." (Ibid., p. 26)
The act of placing money in the custody of a bank
The crux of the matter rests upon the reason for the drawing of or banker, for safety or convenience, to be
the postdated checks by the petitioner, i.e., whether they were withdrawn at the will of the depositor or under
drawn or issued "to apply on account or for value", as required rules and regulations agreed on. Also, the money
under Section 1 of B.P. Blg, 22. When viewed against the so deposited, or the credit which the depositor
following definitions of the catch-terms "warranty" and "deposit", receives for it. Deposit, according to its commonly
for which the postdated checks were issued or drawn, all the accepted and generally understood among
more, the alleged crime could not have been committed by bankers and by the public, includes not only
petitioner: deposits payable on demand and for which
certificates, whether interest-bearing or not, may
a) Warranty — A promise that a proposition of fact be issued, payable on demand, or on certain
is true. A promise that certain facts are truly as notice or at a fixed future time. (Ibid., pp. 394-395)
they are represented to be and that they will
remain so: . . . (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Furthermore, the element of "knowing at the time of issue that
Edition, (1979) p. 1423) he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment,
A cross-reference to the following term shows: which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
Fitness for Particular Purpose: — for the same reason . . . is inversely applied in this case. From
the very beginning, petitioner never hid the fact that he did not
Where the seller at the time of contracting has have the funds with which to put up the warranty deposit and as
reason to know any particular purpose for which a matter of fact, he openly intimated this to the vital conduit of
the goods are required and that the buyer is the transaction, Joey Gomez, to whom petitioner was introduced
by Mrs. Teng. It would have been different if this predicament
was not communicated to all the parties he dealt with regarding
the lease agreement the financing of which was covered by L.S.
Finance Management.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the

accused-petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED.