Tano vs Socrates

G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997

Facts:
On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of all live
fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing,
buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and
coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court declare the said ordinances and
resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their
livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2
and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Are the challenged ordinances unconstitutional?

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the challenged ordinances did not suffer
from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the
petitioners qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow
any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-
called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In
accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution, their “exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

In addition, one of the devolved powers of the LCG on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters
including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such
fishery laws within the municipal waters. In light of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC
and the powers granted therein to LGUs which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the
questioned ordinances cannot be doubted.
Yu Cong Eng et al vs. Trinidad
GR No. L-20479 | Feb. 6, 1925
J. MALCOLM

Facts:
The petitioner, Yu Cong Eng, was charged by information in the court of first instance of Manila, with a violation of Act
2972, which provides that (Section 1) it shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in
commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with existing law,
to keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish or any local dialect. He was arrested, his books were
seized, and the trial was about to proceed, when he and the other petitioner, Co Liam, on their own behalf, and on behalf of
all the other Chinese merchants in the Philippines, filed the petition against the fiscal, or prosecuting attorney of Manila, and
the collector of internal revenue engaged in the prosecution, and against the judge presiding.

Issue:
Whether or Not Act 2972 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
Yes. The Philippine government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep proper records of their
business transactions in English or Spanish or Filipino dialect by which an adequate measure of what is due from them in
meeting the cost of government can be had. But we are clearly of opinion that it is not within the police power of the
Philippine Legislature, because it would be oppressive and arbitrary, to prohibit all Chinese merchants from maintaining a
set of books in the Chinese language, and in the Chinese characters, and thus prevent them from keeping advised of the
status of their business and directing its conduct.
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council
G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
J. BERSAMIN

Facts:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and
Bar Council to resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to the
incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1),
clearly intended the ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and they contended that the
principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.

Issue:
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated in
Sec. 15, Article VII?

Ruling:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on presidential appointments during the period stated
in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the records of the
Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15, Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a
provision on nepotism.

Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling
that the prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential appointments immediately before the
next presidential elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in the
Supreme Court.
Estrada v, Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001
J. BELLOSILLO

Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionality infirm. That there was a
clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation.

Issue:
Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague.

Ruling:
No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them. There is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessary result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be
gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and
ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning
to those words.

Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other part.

There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. 7080

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and
underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and
a maximum of P50,000. Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the
Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE, however, denied the request for lack of merit. Respondent then filed a petition
for prohibition and annulment with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the
trial court.

After trial on the merits, the trial court nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in
the law.6 The court intimated that the Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might
exceed the maximum penalty under the law. In view of the foregoing, this Court renders judgment declaring DOE Circular
No. 2000-06-010 null and void and prohibits the respondent from implementing the same.

The trial court denied for lack of merit petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether Circular No. 2000-06-10 is invalid for exceeding the provisions of B.P. 33

Ruling:
No. The Circular is valid as the DOE merely filled up the details and the manner through which B.P. 33, as amended may be
carried out. A criminal statute is not rendered uncertain and void because general terms are used therein. The lawmakers
have no positive constitutional or statutory duty to define each and every word in an enactment, as long as the legislative
will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, as distinctly expressed in B.P. 33 (amended) Thus, the
respondent’s reliance on the “void for vagueness” doctrine is misplaced. Moreover, the violation on a per cylinder basis falls
within the phrase “any act” as mandated in Sec. 4 of B.P. 33. To provide for the same penalty regardless of the number of
cylinders would be indiscriminate, oppressive and impractical.
G.R. No. 98310 October 24, 1996
MATUGUINA INTEGRATED WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs. The HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DAVAO ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, The HON. MINISTER, (NOW
SECRETARY) of NATURAL RESOURCES AND PHILLIP CO, respondents.
J. TORRES JR.

Facts:
On June 28, 1973, the Acting Director of the Bureau of Forest Development issued Provisional Timber LicensemNo. 30,
covering an area of 5,400 hectares to Ms. Milagros Matuguina who was then doing business under the name of MLE, a sole
proprietorship venture. A portion, covering 1,900 hectares, of the said area was located within the territorial boundary of
Gov. Generoso in Mati, Davao Oriental, and adjoined the timber concession of Davao Enterprises Corporation, the private
respondent in this case. On July 10, 1974, petitioner Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. was incorporated, having an
authorized capital stock of Ten Million Pesos. Milagros Matuguina became the majority stockholder of MIWPI on
September 24, 1974, when the latter's Board of Directors approved by Resolution the transfer of 1,000,000 shares from
Henry Wee to Milagros Matuguina, thus giving her seventy percent (70%) stock ownership of MIWPI. In an undated letter
to the Director of Forest Development (BFD) on November 26, 1974, Milagros Matuguina requested the Director for a
change of name and transfer of management of PTL No. 30 from a single proprietorship under her name, to that of MIWPI.
This request was favorably endorsed on December 2, 1974 3 by the BFD's Acting Director, Jose Viado to respondent
Secretary of Natural Resources, who approved the same. After investigation of DAVENCOR's complaint, the Investigating
Committee which looked into DAVENCOR's complaint submitted its report to the Director, finding that MLE had
encroached on the concession area of DAVENCOR. In line with this, the Director of Forest Development issued an Order 6
on July 15, 1981, finding and declaring MLE to have encroached upon, and conducted illegal logging operations within the
licensed or concession area of DAVENCOR.

MLE appealed the Order to the Ministry of Natural Resources, which appealed and affirmed the earlier decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the transfer of the obligations mean all the obligations acquired previously by the transferee.

Ruling:
No. Even if it is mandated in the provision that "the transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor" this does
not mean that all obligations are assumed, indiscriminately.

Invariably, it is not the letter, but the spirit of the law and intent of the legislature that is important. When the interpretation
of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurdity, it should be construed according to
the spirit and reason, disregarding if necessary the letter of the law.

In construing statutes, the terms used therein are generally to be given their ordinary meaning, that is, such meaning which
is ascribed to them when they are commonly used, to the end that absurdity in the law must be avoided. The term
"obligations" as used in the final clause of the second paragraph of Section 61 of P.D. 705 is construed to mean those
obligations incurred by the transferor in the ordinary course of business. It cannot be construed to mean those obligations or
liabilities incurred by the transferor as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal obligations of the
transferor, and could not have been included in the term "obligations" absent any modifying provision to that effect.
G.R. No. 166199 April 24, 2009
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,
vs. CHRISTOPHER KORUGA, Respondent.
J. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Facts:
Sometime in August 2001, then BI Commissioner Andrea Domingo received an anonymous letter requesting the deportation
of respondent as an undesirable alien for having been found guilty of Violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in
the State of Washington, United States of America for attempted possession of cocaine sometime in 1983.

On September 17, 2001, respondent was arrested and charged before the Board of Special Inquiry for violation of Section
37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The case was docketed as BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-126. On
September 17, 2001, at about 10:00 A.M., respondent was arrested by Intelligence operatives at his residence, located at
1001 MARBELLA CONDOMINIUM II, Roxas Boulevard, Malate, Manila, pursuant to Mission Order No. ADD-01-162;
That respondent was convicted and/or sentenced for Uniform Controlled Substance Act in connection with his being Drug
Trafficker and/or Courier of prohibited drugs in the State of Washington, United States of America, thus, making him an
undesirable alien and/or a public burden in violation of Sec. 37(4) [sic] of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended.
After filing for bail and was granted provisionally released. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was
denied by the BOC. On April 1, 2003, then DOJ Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong rendered a Resolution dismissing the
appeal. On April 15, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 which he subsequently withdrew18 on April 23,
2003. Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. he CA rendered a Decision20 setting aside the Resolution
dated April 1, 2003 of the DOJ Secretary and the Judgment dated February 11, 2002 of the BOC and dismissing the
deportation case filed against respondent. The CA held that there was no valid and legal ground for the deportation of
respondent since there was no violation of Section 37(a)(4) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, because
respondent was not convicted or sentenced for a violation of the law on prohibited drugs since the U.S. Court dismissed the
case for violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the State of Washington, USA filed against respondent; that
petitioners further failed to present or attach to their pleadings any document which would support their allegations that
respondent entered into a plea bargain with the U.S. Prosecutor for deferred sentence nor did they attach to the record the
alleged order or judgment of the U.S. Court which would show the conviction of respondent for violation of the prohibited
drugs law in the USA among others.

Issue:
Whether or not the use of the definite article "the" immediately preceding the phrase "law on prohibited drugs" emphasizes
not just any prohibited drugs law but the law applicable in this jurisdiction, at that time, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Ruling:
No. The general rule in construing words and phrases used in a statute is that in the absence of legislative intent to the
contrary, they should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. However, a literal interpretation of a
statute is to be rejected if it will operate unjustly, lead to absurd results, or contract the evident meaning of the statute taken
as a whole.34 After all, statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention
and so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Indeed, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to
absurd or unreasonable consequences.

Were the Court to follow the letter of Section 37(a)(4) and make it applicable only to convictions under the Philippine
prohibited drugs law, the Court will in effect be paving the way to an absurd situation whereby aliens convicted of foreign
prohibited drugs laws may be allowed to enter the country to the detriment of the public health and safety of its citizens. It
suggests a double standard of treatment where only aliens convicted of Philippine prohibited drugs law would be deported,
while aliens convicted of foreign prohibited drugs laws would be allowed entry in the country. The Court must emphatically
reject such interpretation of the law. Certainly, such a situation was not envisioned by the framers of the law, for to do so
would be contrary to reason and therefore, absurd. Over time, courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that
what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law.
G.R. No. 115507 May 19, 1998
ALEJANDRO TAN, ISMAEL RAMILO and FRED MORENO, petitioners,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
J. PANGANIBAN

Facts:
On October 26, 1989, about 6:30 p.m., in the town proper of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island, Romblon, Forest Guards Joseph
Panadero and Eduardo Rabino intercepted a dump truck loaded with narra and white lauan lumber. The truck was driven by
Petitioner Fred Moreno, an employee of A & E Construction. Again, about 8:00 p.m. on October 30, 1989, this time in
Barangay Cambajao, Forest Guards Panadero and Rabino apprehended another dump truck with Plate No. DEK-646 loaded
with tanguile lumber. Said truck was driven by Crispin Cabudol, also an employee of A & E Construction. Both motor
vehicles, as well as the construction firm, were owned by Petitioner Alejandro Tan. In both instances, no documents
showing legal possession of the lumber were, upon demand, presented to the forest guards; thus, the pieces of lumber were
confiscated.

That on or about the 26th day of October, 1989, at around 6:30 o clock in the evening, in the Poblacion, municipality of
Cajidiocan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in their possession and under their custody and control 13 pieces narra lumber about 171 board feet and 41
pieces tanguile lumber about 834 board feet valued at P8,724.00, Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforestated amount.

In another Information, Tan and Ramilo, together with Crispin Cabudol, were also charged for the same violation in
connection with the October 30, 1989 incident. On April 26, 1990, all the accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned on
the basis of the aforementioned Informations; each pleaded not guilty. The cases were thence jointly tried, pursuant to
Section 14, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. RTC convicted them for violation of Forestry Reform Code. CA affirmed.

Issue:
Whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD 705

Ruling:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products
as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of
Processing plant, which reads:

(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine used for the processing of logs and
other forest raw materials into lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished
wood products.

This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber
in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Websters Third New International Dictionary, lumber is
defined, inter alia, as timber or logs after being prepared for the market. Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.

It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their
plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is
concerned, Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither do we.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus.
G.R. No. L-5872 November 29, 1954
ENRIQUE BERNARDO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs. CRISOSTOMO S. BERNARDO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
J. JBL REYES

Facts:
Enrique Bernardo the petitioner sold his lot to the respondent Crisostomo S. Bernardo. That lot also found that the house of
the petitioner since July 13, 1944; that because of family relationship the petitioners "were able to remain in the premises
due to the tolerance of, and out of charity from, the appellee (respondent Crisostomo Bernardo) and his deceased parents
who were the rightful lessees of the lot in question."

Due to his long stay in that parcel of land; the petitioner argue that he is a bona fide occupants thereof because of his long
stay in said parcel of land.

Issue:
Whether or not the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual" and "bona fide" are
synonymous based on the existing laws.

Ruling:
No. The law provides that the terms "actual bona fide settlers and occupants", plainly indicating that "actual" and "bona
fide" are not synonymous, while the Commonwealth acts deleted the term "actual" and solely used the words "bona fide
occupant", thereby emphasizing the requirement that the prospective beneficiaries of the acts should be endowed with
legitimate tenure.
G.R. No. L-56028 : July 30, 1981
NILO A. MALANYAON, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. HON. ESTEBAN M. LISING, as Judge of the CFI of Camarines
Sur, Br. VI, and CESARIO GOLETA, as Municipal Treasurer of Bula, Camarines Sur, Respondents-Appellees.
J. ABAD SANTOS

Facts:
Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). He was suspended from
office but he died during his incumbency, and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death.
Petitioner sought the payment of the Mayor's salary during his period of suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019
which provides - should a public officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or gravity benefits
under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits to which he failed to
receive during his suspension. Malanyaon was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur. He filed an
action to declare illegal the disbursement made by Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion
of the salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such municipality during the period of his suspension from August 16,
1977 up to November 28, 1979. However, Judge Lising dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against
Mayor Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.

Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused constitutes acquittal.

Ruling:
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted". It means that after due hearing and
consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal.
G.R. No. L-1567 October 13, 1949
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. OSCAR SALICO, Defendant-Appellee.
J. FERIA

Facts:
This an appeal by the provincial fiscal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros which, upon the
petition of the defendant before the latter has presented his evidence, dismissed the criminal action against the defendant
charged with homicide on the ground that the fiscal was not able to prove that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, or that the town or municipality of Victorias in which it was committed is within the
Province of Negros Occidental.

It is obvious that the lower court erred in not taking judicial notice as it ought to of the political subdivisions or
municipalities of the Province of Occidental Negros, that is, that the municipality or town of Victorias was within that
province, and therefore the offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros.

Issue:
Whether or not the appeal by the prosecution from the order of the Court of First Instance in the present case would place
the defendant in double jeopardy.

Ruling:
No. First, because by the dismissal of the case by the court below upon motion of the defendant, the latter has not been in
jeopardy; Second, because the appeal by the prosecution in the present case would not place the defendant in double
jeopardy. And Third, because assuming arguendo that the defendant had been already in jeopardy in the court below and
would be placed in the double jeopardy by the appeal, the defendant has waived his constitutional right not to be put in
danger of being convicted twice for the same offense. But when the case id dismissed with the express consent of the
defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional rights or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
G.R. No. 154491 November 14, 2008
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHILS., INC. (CCBPI), Naga Plant, petitioner,
vs. QUINTIN J. GOMEZ, a.k.a. "KIT" GOMEZ and DANILO E. GALICIA, a.k.a. "DANNY GALICIA",
respondents.
J. Brion

Facts:
On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke empty bottles in Pepsi's yard in
Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as unfair competition under the IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that
the bottles must be confiscated to preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment by the respondents. Coca-Cola
submitted the sworn statements of three witnesses: Naga plant representative Arnel John Ponce said he was informed that
one of their plant security guards had gained access into the Pepsi compound and had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant
security officer Ylano A. Regaspi said he investigated reports that Pepsi was hoarding large quantities of Coke bottles by
requesting their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was informed by the security guard that Pepsi hoarded several
Coke bottles; security guard Edwin Lirio stated that he entered Pepsi's yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw empty Coke
bottles inside Pepsi shells or cases. MTC issued search warrants. The respondents also filed motions for the return of their
shells and to quash the search warrant. MTC denied as well as the motion for reconsideration. Before RTC the warrants
were voided for lack of probable cause and the non-commission of the crime of unfair competition, even as it implied that
other laws may have been violated by the respondents. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Is the hoarding of a competitor's product containers punishable as unfair competition under the Intellectual Property Code
that would entitle the aggrieved party to a search warrant against the hoarder?

Ruling:
No. What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 168.3 when it provides specifics of what unfair
competition is "without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair competition." Part of these particulars is
provided under Section 168.3(c)... which provides the general "catch-all" phrase that the petitioner cites. Under this phrase,
a person shall be guilty of unfair competition "who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated
to discredit the goods, business or services of... another."

The critical question, however, is not the intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what is... critical for purposes of Section
168.3 (c) is to determine if the hoarding, as charged, "is of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services" of
the petitioner. Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the "hoarding" - as defined and charged by the petitioner -
does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168 in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark,
trade name or service mark that the... respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the
petitioner.

In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law - R.A. No. 623
If it serves any purpose at all in our discussions, it is to show that the underlying factual situation of the present case is in
fact covered by another law, not by the IP Code that the petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack of probable cause to
support the disputed search warrant at once becomes apparent.
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs. JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,
Respondents.
J. MENDOZA

Facts:
In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2)
of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C.
Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner
has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of
Congress.” It is their theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are permanent and mandatory
components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under
the Constitution. Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses exercise their respective
powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution speaks of “a representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress.

Issue:
Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting
members unconstitutional?

Ruling:
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the
sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba
legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII, Section
8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the
House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit in
the JBC. It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not
be divided into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that
matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially
in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which
the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario,
it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so
worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of
Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers,
through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate.
In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds
true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these
powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC
representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress”
must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
G.R. No. 169143 February 2, 2007
[Formerly G.R. No. 138328] PEOPLE OF THE PHLIPPINES, Appellee
vs. SIMPLICIO DELANTAR, Appellant.
J. Tinga

Facts:
On 27 August 1996, an information for violation of Section 5, Article III of Republic Act No. 76101 was filed against
appellant Simplicio Delantar y Redondo. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-91752 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City, the information was amended on 3 September 1996.3 The accusatory portion of the Amended Information reads:

That sometime and during the period from 1994 to August 1996, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, SIMPLICIO DELANTAR Y REDONDO, through coercion
and influence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously promote, facilitate and induce AAA, a female child
below 12 years of age, to indulge in sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct for money, profit and other consideration.
Appellant assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty and informed the court that he did not want a pre-trial.
After trial RTC convicted Delantar.

Issue:
Whether or not accused falls under the father as defined in the Code

Ruling:
No. We thus hold that the birth certificate of AAA is prima facie evidence only of the fact of her birth and not of her relation
to appellant. After all, it is undisputed that appellant is not AAA’s biological father.

At best, appellant is AAA’s de facto guardian. Now, would this circumstance justify the imposition of the higher penalty on
him? We think not. We apply, by analogy, the ruling of this Court in People v. Garcia,85 where we held that the restrictive
concept of guardian, legal or judicial, is required by Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 7659. Said provision, by way of amending Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, ordains that where the victim of the crime of rape is under eighteen years of age and the offender
is, inter alia, a guardian of the victim, the death penalty shall be imposed.

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the solemnity of judicial appointment
which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his office and normally deters him from violating its objectives.
Such considerations do not obtain in appellant’s case or, for that matter, any person similarly circumstanced as a mere
custodian of a ward or another’s property. The fiduciary powers granted to a real guardian warrant the exacting sanctions
should he betray the trust.

Further, according to the maxim noscitur a sociis, the correct construction of a word or phrase susceptible of various
meanings may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is
associated. Section 31(c) of R.A. No. 7610 contains a listing of the circumstances of relationship between the perpetrator
and the victim which will justify the imposition of the maximum penalty, namely when the perpetrator is an "ascendant,
parent, guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity." It should be noted
that the words with which "guardian" is associated in the provision all denote a legal relationship. From this description we
may safely deduce that the guardian envisioned by law is a person who has a legal relationship with a ward. This
relationship may be established either by being the ward’s biological parent (natural guardian) or by adoption (legal
guardian). Appellant is neither AAA’s biological parent nor is he AAA’s adoptive father. Clearly, appellant is not the
"guardian" contemplated by law.
G.R. No. L-39419 April 12, 1982
MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
J. DE CASTRO

Facts:
Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on
November 21, 1970. A Policy was issued by Perla thru its author representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna, for a period of twelve
(12) months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of
policy, information was filed against the wife of Rodrigo because allegedly she unlawfully acted as an agent in the
solicitation of the insurance without having been first secured a certificate of authority to act as an agent from the office of
the Insurance Commission. The People of the Philippines presented evidence that aforementioned policy was issued with
active participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in her defense sought to show that being the wife
of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on
top of her husband’s desk to renew. RTC and CA find the accused guilty and fined petitioner 500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency for the violation of the Insurance Act. Solicitor General was made to comment on the
case and the same said that the petitioner is not guilty because she does not fall under the definition of agent as provided
under par. 2 of the sec. 189 of the Insurance Act.

Issue:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without
reference to the second paragraph of the same section?

Ruling:
No. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph
of Section 189 is intended to define the word “agent” mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the
intent of Section 189. Hence —
Any person who for compensation … shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section, … Patently, the definition
of an insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs
of the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to qualify the term
“agent” mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section.

Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and
phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole.

Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second paragraph is also applicable to the agent
mentioned in the first paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of the first
paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive
any compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689,
making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of
authority to act as an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation either
directly or indirectly, charges no offense. It must be noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the
negotiation of an insurance contracts by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for compensation. This allegation is
essential, and having been omitted, a conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our jurisprudence
that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
G.R. No. 112940 November 21, 199
DAI-CHI ELECTRONICS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, Metro Manila
and ADONIS C. LIMJUCO, respondents.
J. QUIASON

Facts:
On July 29, 1993, the petitioner Daichi electronics filed a complaint for damages with RTC branch 156 for an employee’s
(Limjuco) violation of their contract in 1990 which stipulated that the termination of service of an employee restricted him
from working in a company which has a similar set of products or ventures for a span of 2 years following the termination
of service. The petitioner claimed that respondent became an employee of such a company called Angel Sound with the
same position as head of material management control before the 2 years was up.

The petitioner sought to claim 100k in damages and prevent the former employee from working in the rival business within
the 1 year timespan. The respondent court under Villarama claimed that it had no jurisdiction because the complaint was for
damages from labor-employee relations and should be adjudicated under the Labor Arbiter under Art 217 s 4 of the LC. The
petitioner asked for reversal because the case was recognizable under the regular courts and that the cause of action didn’t
arise from employee-employer relationships even if the claim was in the employee’s contract.

Issue:
Is the petitioner’s claim for damages one arising from employee-employer relations?

Ruling:
No. Article 217 Section 4 of the Labor Code stipulated that Labor Arbiters have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases for workers with claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee
relations.
The court held that the cuase of action was under Civil Law, not the labor code. Why?
The petitioner sought to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for respondent’s breach of his contractual
obligation to its damage and prejudice. He also didn’t ask for relief under the Labor Code. The applicable case law was
Singapore airlines v Pano where the employer’s claim for damages was based on wanton failure and refusal without just
cause to report to duty coupled with the averment that the employee maliciously and with bad faith violated the contract.
The employee didn’t report for duty as a course of convention training which is a quasi-delict.
There must be a causal connection for claims provided in the Article 217 Section 4 of the Labor Code. Only when there is
such a connection with other claims can damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations. Further the
use of noscitur a sociis wherein the entire universe of family claims asserted by workers has been observed into the
exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters. Nos a soc was also used to limit par 3 (par 4 in the present labor code) of art 217
wherein it was read in relation to par 1 (unfair labor practices), par 2 (terms and conditions of employment), par 4
(household services) and par 5 (restrictions on activities of employees and employers) There was a unifying element which
referred to cases out of employer-employee relations. Money claims that didn’t arise out of such relations was to be taken in
by regular courts. The claims should have a causal connection with employer-employee relations.
G.R. No. 169637 June 8, 2007
BENGUET STATE UNIVERSITY represented by its President ROGELIO D. COLTING, petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
J. NACHURA

Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act No. 8292 entitled An Act Providing for the Uniform Composition and Powers of the
Governing Boards, the Manner of Appointment and Term of Office of the President of Chartered State Universities and
Colleges, and for Other Purposes, commonly known as the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997. Pursuant to
Section 4 (d) of the said law, the Board of Regents of BSU passed and approved Board Resolution No. 794 on October 31,
1997, granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to BSUs employees. The sums were taken from the income derived
from the operations of BSU and were given to the employees at different periods in 1998. A Notice of Disallowance was
issued stating that RA 8292 does not provide for the grant of said allowance to employees and officials of the University.
BSU requested the lifting of the disallowance with COA Regional Office but was denied. It held that the grant of said
allowances lacked statutory basis, transgressed the constitutional proscription on additional, double, or indirect
compensation and ran counter to the provisions of the Salary Standardization Law.

Issue:
Whether or not granting rice subsidy and health care allowance to BSU employees is repugnant to Section 8 of Article 9 of
the 1987 Constitution

Ruling:
COA ruling is upheld.

Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular kind accompanied by words of a
generic character, the generic word will usually be limited to things os a similar nature with those particularly enumerated,
unless there be something in the context of a statute which would repel such inference.

COA correctly rules that the "other programs/projects" under RA 8292 and its implementing rules should be of the same
nature as instruction, research, and extension. In BSU's case, the disbursements were for rice subsidy and health care
allowances which are in no way intended for academic programs similar to instruction, research, or extension. Section 4
cannot therefore, be relied upon by BSU as the legal basis for the grant of the allowances.

Further, a reading of the entire provision supports COA's interpretation that the authority given to the Governing Board of
state universities and colleges is not plenary and absolute and is subject to limitations contrary to its claim.
G.R. No. 182380 August 28, 2009
ROBERT P. GUZMAN, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MAYOR RANDOLPH S. TING AND SALVACION GARCIA, Respondents.
J. BERSAMIN

Facts:
On March 31, 2004, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tuguegarao City passed Resolution No. 048-2004 to authorize City
Mayor Ting to acquire two parcels of land for use as a public cemetery of the City. Pursuant to the resolution, City Mayor
Ting purchased the two parcels of land, identified as Lot Nos. 5860 and 5861 and located at Atulayan Sur, Tuguegarao City,
with an aggregate area of 24,816 square meters (covered by Transfer Certificates of Title [TCT] No. T-36942 and TCT No.
T-36943 of the Register of Deeds in Tuguegarao City), from Anselmo Almazan, Angelo Almazan and Anselmo Almazan III.
As payment, City Treasurer Garcia issued and released Treasury Warrant No. 0001534514 dated April 20, 2004 in the sum
of P8,486,027.00. On May 5, 2004, the City Government of Tuguegarao caused the registration of the sale and the issuance
of new certificates in its name (i.e., TCT No. T-144428 and TCT No. T-144429). Based on the transaction, the petitioner
filed a complaint in the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Cagayan Province against City Mayor Ting and City
Treasurer Garcia, charging them with a violation of Section 261, paragraphs (v) and (w), of the Omnibus Election Code, for
having undertaken to construct a public cemetery and for having released, disbursed and expended public funds within 45
days prior to the May 9, 2004 election, in disregard of the prohibitions under said provisions due to the election ban period
having commenced on March 26, 2004 and ended on May 9, 2004. City Mayor Ting denied the accusations in his counter-
affidavit but City Treasurer Garcia opted not to answer. After investigation, the Acting Provincial Election Supervisor of
Cagayan recommended the dismissal of the complaint. COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint.

Issue:
Whether or not acquisition of Lots 5860 And 5881 during the Period of the Election Ban, not considered as "Public Works"
in Violation of Sec. 261 (v), Omnibus Election Code

Ruling:
Yes. It is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be
held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. But this rule
must be discarded where the legislative intention is plain to the contrary.

Accordingly, absent an indication of any contrary legislative intention, the term public works as used in Section 261 (v) of
the Omnibus Election Code is properly construed to refer to any building or structure on land or to structures (such as roads
or dams) built by the Government for public use and paid for by public funds. Public works are clearly works, whether of
construction or adaptation undertaken and carried out by the national, state, or municipal authorities, designed to subserve
some purpose of public necessity, use or convenience, such as public buildings, roads, aqueducts, parks, etc.; or, in other
words, all fixed works constructed for public use.12

It becomes inevitable to conclude, therefore, that the petitioner's insistence − that the acquisition of Lots 5860 and 5881 for
use as a public cemetery be considered a disbursement of the public funds for public works in violation of Section 261(v) of
the Omnibus Election Code − was unfounded and unwarranted.
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, respondents.
J. CRUZ

Facts:
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during the Christmas
season.

Civil organizations angrily denounced the project. Petitioners opposed the casino’s opening and enacted Ordinance No.
3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and canceling existing business permit to the establishment for the
operation of the casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of the casino and providing a penalty for its
violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that they both violated Presidential Decree No. 1869.
Petitioners contend that, pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the
operation of casino for the general welfare.

Issue:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid

Ruling:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes
indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General
Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows: Sec. 16.

General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which
are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units
shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety,
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.

Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other
prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact
permitted by law.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must
conform to the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Casino gambling is
authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest
that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place,
and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are
contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
G.R. No. 119122 August 8, 2000
PHILIPPINE BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
respondents.
J. PURISIMA

Facts:
On June 21, 1989, the petitioner received an assessment letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for the payment
of deficiency amusement tax. petitioner contested the assessment by filing a protest with respondent Commissioner who
denied the same on November 6, 1989. On January 8, 1990, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax
Appeals questioning the denial by respondent Commissioner of its tax protest. On December 24, 1993, respondent CTA
dismissed petitioner's petition. Petitioner presented a motion for reconsideration4 of the said decision but the same was
denied by respondent CTA in a resolution ALF dated April 8, 1994. Thereafter and within the reglementary period for
interposing appeals, petitioner appealed the CTA decision to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered its
questioned Decision, affirming the decision of the CTA and dismissing petitioner's appeal. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of said decision but to no avail. The same was denied by the Court of Appeals

Issue:
Whether or not the term gross receipts' embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement
place.

Ruling:
Yes. For the purpose of the amusement tax, the term gross receipts' embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee or
operator of the amusement place. Said gross receipts also include income from television, radio and motion picture rights, if
any. A person, or entity or association conducting any activity subject to the tax herein imposed shall be similarly liable for
said tax with respect to such portion of the receipts derived by him or it.

From the foregoing it is clear that the "proprietor, lessee or operator of professional basketball games" is required to pay an
amusement tax equivalent to fifteen per centum (15%) of their gross receipts to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, which
payment is a national tax. The said payment of amusement tax is in lieu of all other percentage taxes of whatever nature and
description.

While Section 13 of the Local Tax Code mentions "other places of amusement", professional basketball games are definitely
not within its scope. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of persons or
things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but
are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.9 Thus, in
determining the meaning of the phrase "other places of amusement", one must refer to the prior enumeration of theaters,
cinematographs, concert halls and circuses with artistic expression as their common characteristic. Professional basketball
games do not fall under the same category as theaters, cinematographs, concert halls and circuses as the latter basically
belong to artistic forms of entertainment while the former caters to sports and gaming.
G.R. No. 155703 September 8, 2008
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs. DOMINADOR SANTUA, respondent.
J. NACHURA

Facts:
On February, 16, 1999, respondent Dominador Santua filed with the RTC of Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, a petition for
judicial reconstitution of Transfer Certificate of Title. Respondent alleged that he is the registered owner of certain parcels
of land with an area of 3,306 square meters, situated in Poblacion, Victoria, Oriental Mindoro, and covered by TCT No. T-
22868; the original copy of TCT No. T-22868 was among those destroyed by the fire that completely razed the Capitol
Building then housing the Office of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro on August 12, 1977. The names and
addresses of the adjoining property owners were enumerated in the petition. Attached to the petition were a tax declaration,
survey plan, and technical description of each lot.
The RTC issued an Order setting the initial hearing of the case. It also directed the publication of the order in the Official
Gazette, its posting at the main entrance of the Capitol Building and in the Municipal Building of Victoria, Calapan City,
and sending of copies thereof to all adjoining owners mentioned in the petition, the Register of Deeds, Provincial
Prosecutor, Director of Lands, Solicitor General and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority. RTC granted the
petition. The OSG filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given due course by the RTC. On September 23, 2002, the CA
affirmed the RTC Decision. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not tax declarations, technical descriptions and lot plans are sufficient bases for reconstitution of lost or
destroyed certificate of titles.

Ruling:
The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed
instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. It partakes of a land registration proceeding. Thus, it must be
granted only upon clear proof that the title sought to be restored was indeed issued to the petitioner. In this regard, Section 3
of Republic Act No. 26 enumerates the documents regarded as valid and sufficient bases for reconstitution of a transfer
certificate of title: SEC. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated
as may be available, in the following order: (a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title; (b) The co-owner’s,
mortgagee’s or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title; (c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by
the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof; (d) The deed of transfer or other document on file in the registry of
deeds, containing the description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been
registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued; (e) A document, on file in the
registry of deeds, by which the property the description of which is given in said documents, is mortgaged, leased or
encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and (f) Any other
document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed
certificate of title. The instant petition for reconstitution is anchored on Section 3(f) of RA No. 26, with respondent
proffering three significant documents - a tax declaration, survey plan and technical descriptions of each lot.

The Court has already settled in a number of cases that, following the principle of ejusdem generis in statutory construction,
"any document" mentioned in Section 3 should be interpreted to refer to documents similar to those previously enumerated
therein. As aptly observed by the petitioner, the documents enumerated in Section 3(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are documents
that had been issued or are on file with the Register of Deeds, thus, highly credible. Moreover, they are documents from
which the particulars of the certificate of title or the circumstances which brought about its issuance could readily be
ascertained. After all, the purpose of reconstitution proceedings under RA No. 26 is the restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. Consequently, a petitioner’s
documentary evidence should be able to establish that the lost or destroyed certificate of title has, in fact, been issued to the
petitioner or his predecessor-in-interest and such title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed.

The tax declaration obviously does not serve as a valid basis for reconstitution. At most, the tax declaration can only be
prima facie evidence of possession or a claim of ownership, which however is not the issue in a reconstitution proceeding.
As for the survey plan and technical descriptions, the Court has previously dismissed the same as not the documents
referred to in Section 3(f) but merely additional documents that should accompany the petition for reconstitution as required
under Section 12 of RA 26 and Land Registration Commission Circular No. 35. Moreover, a survey plan or technical
description prepared at the instance of a party cannot be considered in his favor, the same being self-serving.
G.R. NO. 162411 June 30, 2008
NASIPIT INTEGRATED ARRASTRE AND STEVEDORING SERVICES, INC. (NIASSI), represented by RAMON
M. CALO, Petitioner, v. NASIPIT EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (NELU)-ALU-TUCP, represented by DONELL P.
DAGANI, Respondent.
J. VELASCO JR.

Facts:
NIASSI is a domestic corporation with office at Talisay, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte. Respondent Nasipit Employees Labor
Union was and may still be the collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of NIASSI and is a local chapter
of the Associated Labor Union.

The dispute started when, in October 1999, the Regional Tripartite Wages and Productivity Board (Wage Board) of Caraga
Region in Northeastern Mindanao issued Wage Order No. (WO) RXIII-02 which granted an additional PhP 12 per day cost
of living allowance to the minimum wage earners in that region. Owing allegedly to NIASSI's failure to implement the
wage order, the Union filed a complaint before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Caraga Regional Office
for the inspection of NIASSI's records and the enforcement of WO RXIII-02. A DOLE inspection team was accordingly
dispatched to NIASSI. In its reports dated May 30, 2000 and November 28, 2000, the inspection team stated that WO
RXIII-02 was not applicable to NIASSI's employees since they were already receiving a wage rate higher than the
prescribed minimum wage. Upon motion by the Union, the DOLE Regional Director indorsed the case to the National
Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch for further hearing. On May 18, 2001, Executive Labor Arbiter
Rogelio P. Legaspi, in turn, referred the case to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for voluntary
arbitration. The case was, accordingly, referred to the NCMB which docketed the same as VA Case No. 0925-XIII-08-003-
01A. Voluntary Arbitrator Jesus G. Chavez rendered a decision granting the Union's prayer for the implementation of WO
RXIII-02 on the rationale that WO RXIII-02 did not specifically prohibit the grant of wage increase to employees earning
above the minimum wage. Following the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NIASSI filed with the CA a Petition for
Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court to nullify the February 22, 2002 Decision of Chavez.

Issue:
Whether WO RXIII-02 may be made to apply and cover Nasipit's employees who, at the time of the issuance and effectivity
of the wage order, were already receiving a wage rate higher than the prevailing minimum wage.

Ruling:
It is abundantly clear from the above quoted provisions of WO RXIII-02 and its IRR that only minimum wage earners are
entitled to the prescribed wage increase. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The express mention of one person, thing, act,
or consequence excludes all others. The beneficent, operative provision of WO RXIII-02 is specific enough to cover only
minimum wage earners. Necessarily excluded are those receiving rates above the prescribed minimum wage. The only
situation when employees receiving a wage rate higher than that prescribed by the WO RXIII-02 may still benefit from the
order is, as indicated in Sec. 1 (c) of the IRRs, through the correction of wage distortions. Clearly then, only employees
receiving salaries below the prescribed minimum wage are entitled to the wage increase set forth under WO RXIII-02,
without prejudice, of course, to the grant of increase to correct wage distortions consequent to the implementation of such
wage order. Considering that NIASSI's employees are undisputedly already receiving a wage rate higher than that
prescribed by the wage order, NIASSI is not legally obliged to grant them wage increase.
G.R. No. 157095 : January 15, 2010
MA. LUISA G. DAZON, PETITIONER, VS. KENNETH Y. YAP AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
J. Del Castillo

Facts:
Kenneth Y. Yap was the president of Primetown Property Group, Inc., the developer of Kiener Hills Mactan Condominium,
a low-rise condominium project. In November 1996, petitioner Ma. Luisa G. Dazon entered into a contract with Primetown
for the purchase of Unit No. C-108 of the said condominium project. Petitioner made a down payment and several
installment payments Primetown, However, failed to finish the condominium project. Petitioner filed a criminal complaint
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Lapu-Lapu City against respondent.
Meanwhile, respondent, in connection with the resolution finding probable cause filed a Petition for Review with the
Department of Justice.  On June 14,2002, the DOJ rendered a Resolution ordering the trial prosecutor to cause the
withdrawal... of the Information. Hence, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information with the RTC. The RTC
granted the withdrawal of the motion. Thereafter, a motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not a regional trial court has jurisdiction over a criminal action arising from violation of PD 957

Ruling:
Jurisdiction over criminal actions arising from violations of PD 957 is vested in the regular courts.

It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing in the law means the exclusion of others not
expressly mentioned. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by
its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule
proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to
confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. Noticeably, cases that are criminal in nature are not mentioned in the
enumeration quoted above. The primordial function of the HLURB, after all, is the regulation of the real estate trade and
business and not the conviction and punishment of criminals. Administrative agencies being tribunals of limited jurisdiction
can only wield such powers as are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. PD 957 makes the following
specific grant of powers to the NHA (now HLURB) for the imposition of administrative fines, and it also mentions penalties
for criminal cases... the power in relation to criminal liability mentioned in the immediately succeeding provision, to
impose, upon conviction, fines above ten thousand pesos and/or imprisonment, was not conferred on it.
G.R. No. 171427: March 30, 2011
STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
(LLDA) and JOAQUIN G. MENDOZA, in his capacity as General Manager of LLDA, Respondents.
NACHURA, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its products are manufactured in the home of its
principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria and Juan Luis Faustmann, located in Barangay Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City.
For creating loud unceasing noise and emitting toxic fues coming from the plant, one of petitioners neighbors filed a
complaint with the Barangay. During conciliation proceedings, petitioners management undertook to relocate its operations
within a month. The parties signed an Agreement to that effect. However, petitioner failed to abide by the undertaking and
continued to manufacture its products in its Brgy. Alicia P. Maceda, another neighbor filed a complaint before the barangay
and a formal complaint with the DENR. After, investigation a Notice of Violation and a Cease and Desist Order were served
on petitioner after it was found that it was operating without an LLDA Clearance and Permit, as required by Republic Act
No. 4850. Petitioner then filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. Contending that, as a
cottage industry, its jewelry business is exempt from the requirement to secure a permit from the LLDA. The RTC denied
the petition. Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appeals to the CA. The CA however dismissed the
appeal. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the Decision, but the CA denied the same. Hence, petitioner filed this
petition for review before the High Court.

Issue:
Whether petitioner is exempted from complying with the requirement to obtain a clearance from the LLDA to operate its
business.

Ruling:
No. CA Decision Affirmed. Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible, including,
inter alia, for certain purposes, patents and causes of action which belong to any person, including a corporation and the
estate of a decedent. In view of the emphasis in law after law on the capitalization or asset requirements, it is crystal clear
that the same is a defining element in determining if an enterprise is a cottage industry.

Assets consist of property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible, including, inter alia, for certain purposes,
patents and causes of action which belong to any person, including a corporation and the estate of a decedent. It is the entire
property of a person, association, corporation, or estate that is applicable or subject to the payment of his, her, or its debts.
Petitioner cannot insist on using merely its paid-up capital as basis to determine its assets. The law speaks of total assets.
Petitioners own evidence, i.e., balance sheets prepared by CPAs it commissioned itself, shows that it has assets other than its
paid-up capital. According to the Consolidated Balance Sheet presented by petitioner, it had assets amounting to
P4,628,900.80 by the end of 1998, and P1,746,328.17 by the end of 1997. Obviously, these amounts are over the maximum
prescribed by law for cottage industries.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner cannot be considered a cottage industry. Therefore, it is not exempted from
complying with the clearance requirement of the LLDA.
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
J. Corona

Facts:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building erected thereon located in Manila. His mother and
brother contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter
ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in
court.Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in the subsequent ejectment case. Complainant filed
the instant administrative complaint, claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public
officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings
between the litigants as punong barangay.

Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:
Yes. Respondent suspended for six (6) months. Respondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating his
oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A civil service officer or
employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the
private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned in accordance with Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the
meaning of the word delicadeza.
G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994
MARTIN CENTENO, petitioner, vs.
HON. VICTORIA VILLALON-PORNILLOS, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 10, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
J. Regalado

Facts:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for violating P.D. 1564 known as
the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for the renovation of their chapel without a permit from the
DSWD. In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund drive for the
renovation of their chapel in Bulacan. The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident
of Tikay, a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the
Soliciation Permit Law. In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.
In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose” is not expressly included in the
provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes.
Issue: 
Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the broadest sense so as to include a religious
purpose.

Ruling:
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and “religious” separately and independently of each
other. In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” which means that it was not the intention of the
framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes. The world “religious purpose” is not interchangeable with
the expression “charitable purpose”.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not contemplate solicitation for
religious purposes. The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of
police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the
coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor. The
decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno is acquitted of the offense charged.
G.R. No. 146943 October 4, 2002
SARIO MALINIAS, petitioner, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTOR
DOMINGUEZ, respondents.
J. CARPIO

Facts:
On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor and congress representative
positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto
Tangilag and others for their violation of the following laws: 1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and 2. Sections 232 and 261
(i) of B.P. Blg. 881. Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz
was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then the Chief
of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters
were deprived from participating in the canvassing of election returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the
course of their way to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province. Among the
private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they
ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent
rules pursuant to COMELEC Res. No.2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and order around the vicinity of the
canvassing site. Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some groups who were
reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such a response was not unwarranted as
this has already happened in the past, wherein, in fact, the petitioners were among them.

Issue:
Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint?

Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the respondents for insufficiency of
evidence to establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but it was also denied for failure of adducing additional
evidence thereon. Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review on certiorari on this case. SC
AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord
with its jurisdiction and duties under the law. In this case, COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as there
is nothing capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue
the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
G.R. No. 147749 June 22, 2006
SAN PABLO MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
CJ Corona

Facts:
San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and
exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. It was assessed and ordered to pay by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue miller’s tax and manufacturer’s sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year 1987 particularly on
SPMC’s sales of crude oil to United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn
and edible oil as manufactured products. SPMC opposed the assessments. The Commissioner denied its protest. SPMC
appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of Tax Appeals by way of a petition for review. docketed as CTA Case No.
5423. It insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the merits of the petition, SPMC was not liable for the 3%
miller’s tax. It maintains that the crude oil which it sold to UNICHEM was actually exported by UNICHEM as an
ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subject to miller’s tax pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code. Since
UNICHEM, the buyer of SPMC’s milled products, subsequently exported said products, SPMC should be exempted from
the miller’s tax.

Issue:
Whether or not SPMC’s sale of crude coconut oil to UNICHEM was subject to the 3% miller’s task.

Ruling:
NO. Petition was denied. The language of the exempting clause of Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code was clear. The tax
exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and dessicated coconuts,
whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or
operator of the factory or by the miller himself.

Where the law enumerates the subject or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects
all those not expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is
excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute
cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. Its application in this case is
consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. To allow SPMC’s claim for tax
exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.
G.R. No. 168062 : June 29, 2010
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND INTERNATIONAL
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. RESPONDENTS.
J. DEL CASTILLO

Facts:
Petitioner Victorias Milling Co. filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages against respondent IPI before the
MCTC of E.B. Magalona-Manapla, docketed as Civil Case No. 392-M. On March 10, 2004, the sheriff served the summons
upon Danilo Maglasang, IPI's Human Relations Department Manager. On March 19, 2004, IPI filed its Answer with express
reservation that said Answer should not be construed as a waiver of the lack of jurisdiction of the MCTC over the person of
IPI, for non-service of summons on the proper person. It then filed an Omnibus Motion for Hearing of Affirmative Defenses
raised in the Answer and moved for the suspension of proceedings. On August 30, 2004, the MCTC issued an
Order[2] denying the suspension of the proceedings of the case sought by IPI. The motion for reconsideration was denied.
Thus IPI filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, Cebu City to question the jurisdiction of the MCTC over its person. On
February 22, 2005, the CA directed VMC to file its comment, to which IPI filed its reply. VMC thereafter filed its rejoinder.
In the meantime, in the MCTC, during the scheduled preliminary conference, IPI moved for the deferment of the
preliminary conference while VMC moved for the termination of the same. The said preliminary conference was terminated
and the parties were directed to submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence together with their position
papers. The parties subsequently submitted the required position papers with the MCTC.[4]
On May 6, 2005, the CA issued the assailed Resolution which states that the petitioner is not entitled thereto, let a WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION be issued enjoining the public respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court of E. B. Magalona-
Manapla, Municipality of Magalona from proceeding with Civil Case No. 392-M and disturbing the possession of the
petitioner over the leased premises during the pendency of this petition until further orders from this Court.
VMC no longer filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA's Resolution, on the ground that the questioned CA Resolution
is patently null and void and due to the urgency of VMC's predicament. It instead immediately filed the present petition
for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by IPI assailing the MCTC's interlocutory order in an ejectment case is
clearly and specifically prohibited under Section 13 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as well as the Rule on Summary
Procedure.

Ruling:
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, provides: Sec. 13. Prohibited pleadings and
motions.-The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed: 7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court. Although it is alleged that there may be a technical error in
connection with the service of summons, there is no showing of any substantive injustice that would be caused to IPI so as
to call for the disregard of the clear and categorical prohibition of filing petitions for certiorari. It must be pointed out that
the Rule on Summary Procedure, by way of exception, permits only a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but it does not mention the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person. It is a settled
rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. From this it can be gleaned that allegations on the matter of lack of jurisdiction over the person by reason
of improper service of summons, by itself, without a convincing showing of any resulting substantive injustice, cannot be
used to hinder or stop the proceedings before the MCTC in the ejectment suit. With more reason, such ground should not be
used to justify the violation of an express prohibition in the rules prohibiting the petition for certiorari.
G.R. No. 168062 : June 29, 2010
VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND INTERNATIONAL
PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. RESPONDENTS.
J. DEL CASTILLO

Facts:
Petitioner further seeks to prohibit the implementation of Bureau of Internal Revenue Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 for
being contrary to law. With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on May 24, 2005, certain sections of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997 were amended.
Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and constitutionality of
R.A. No. 933710% Value Added Tax on sale of goods and properties, 10% VAT on importation of goods, 10% VAT on sale
of services and use or lease of properties the Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9337.
On the same date, respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005, specifically identifying PAGCOR as one of the
franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by
R.A. No. 9337. Furthermore, according to the OSG, public respondent BIR exceeded its statutory authority when it enacted
RR No. 16-2005, because the latter's provisions are contrary to the mandates of P.D. No. 1869 in relation to R.A. No. 9337.

Issues:
Whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337.

Ruling:
No. Anent the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision subjecting PAGCOR to 10% VAT is invalid for
being contrary to R.A. No. 9337.  Nowhere in R.A. No. 9337 is it provided that petitioner can be subjected to VAT.  R.A.
No. 9337 is clear only as to... the removal of petitioner's exemption from the payment of corporate income tax, which was
already addressed above by this Court.

As pointed out by the OSG, R.A. No. 9337 itself exempts petitioner from VAT pursuant to Section 7 (k) thereof... the
following transactions shall be exempt from the value-added tax: Transactions which are exempt under international
agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory or under special laws.

Petitioner is exempt from the payment of VAT, because PAGCOR's charter, P.D. No. 1869, is a special law that grants
petitioner exemption from taxes. Moreover, the exemption of PAGCOR from VAT is supported by Section 6 of R.A. No.
9337

The following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-registered persons shall be subject to zero percent (0%) rate;
Services rendered to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws subjects the supply of such services to zero
percent (0%) rate... although R.A. No. 9337 introduced amendments to Section 108 of R.A. No. 8424 by imposing VAT on
other services not previously covered, it did not amend the portion of Section 108 (B) (3) that subjects to zero percent rate
services performed by VAT-registered persons to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws or international
agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the supply of such services to 0% rate.
G.R. No. 153866             February 11, 2005
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, 
vs. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES), respondent.
J. Panganiban

Facts:
A VAT-registered enterprise, STP has principal office address at the new Cebu Township One, Special Economic Zone,
Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu. STP is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority and certified to engage in the
manufacture of recording components primarily used in computers for export. VAT returns were filed for the period 1 April
1998 to 30 June 1999. With supporting documents, a claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the amount of 28 million pesos
(inclusive of the 12-million VAT input taxes subject of this Petition for Review) was filed on 4 October 1999. CIR did not
act promptly upon STP's claim so the latter elevated the case to the CTA for review in order to toll the running of the two-
year prescriptive period. On appeal, CIR asserted that by virtue of the PEZA registration alone of STP, the latter is not
subject to the VAT. According to CIR, STP's sales transactions intended for export are not exempt.

Issue:
Whether or not a BIR Regulation in effect amended the law additionally requiring an approved prior application for
effective zero rating.

Ruling:
No. The BIR regulations additionally requiring an approved prior application for effective zero rating cannot prevail over
the clear VAT nature of respondent’s transactions. The scope of such regulations is not "within the statutory authority x x x
granted by the legislature.

First, a mere administrative issuance, like a BIR regulation, cannot amend the law; the former cannot purport to do any
more than interpret the latter. The courts will not countenance one that overrides the statute it seeks to apply and implement.
Other than the general registration of a taxpayer the VAT status of which is aptly determined, no provision under our VAT
law requires an additional application to be made for such taxpayer’s transactions to be considered effectively zero-rated.
An effectively zero-rated transaction does not and cannot become exempt simply because an application therefor was not
made or, if made, was denied. To allow the additional requirement is to give unfettered discretion to those officials or agents
who, without fluid consideration, are bent on denying a valid application. Moreover, the State can never be estopped by the
omissions, mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.
GR No. 124893 April 18, 1997
LYNETTE G. GARVIDA, petitioner, vs. FLORENCIO G. SALES, JR., THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ELECTION OFFICER DIONISIO F. RIOS and PROVINCIAL SUPERVISOR NOLI PIPO, respondents.
J. PUNO

Facts:
Petitioner Garvida applied for registration as member and voter of the Katipunan ng Kabataan of a certain barangay.
However the Board of election tellers denied her application on the ground that she is already 21 years and 10 months old.
She already exceeded the age limit for membership as laid down in Sec 3(b) of COMELEC resolution no. 2824. The
municipal circuit trial court found her to be qualified and ordered her registration as member and voter in the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The Board of Election Tellers appealed to the RTC, but the presiding judge inhibited himself from acting on the
appeal due to his close association with petitioner. However, private respondent Sales a rival candidate, filed with the
COMELEC en banc a “Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy” against Garvida for falsely
representing her age qualification in her certificate of candidacy. He claimed that Garvida is disqualified to become a voter
and a candidate for the SK for the reason that she will be more than twenty-one (21) years of age on May 6, 1996; that she
was born on June 11, 1974 as can be gleaned from her birth certificate.
Issue:
Whether or not Garvida can assume office as the elected SK official

Ruling:
No. In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16, 1996, the day she registered as voter for the May
6, 1996 SK elections, petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day of the elections, she was 21
years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days old
and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old. Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan
ng Kabataan but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set by Section 428 of the Local
Government Code and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution No. 2824.Thus, she is ineligible to run as candidate for
the May 6, 1996 Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
G.R. No. 141386. November 29, 2001
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT OF THE PROVINCE OF CEBU, Represented by Provincial Auditor ROY L.
URSAL,, Petitioner, v. PROVINCE OF CEBU, Represented by Governor PABLO P. GARCIA, respondent.
J. YNARES-SANTIAGO

Facts:
In the audit of accounts conducted by the Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu, it appeared that the salaries and
personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed by the province for the extension classes were charged against the
provincial SEF.  Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province.  Consequently, the COA
issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship
grants are not chargeable to the provincial SEF.

Issue:
Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in
connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship
grants, may be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned.

Ruling:
Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the compensation of teachers handling extension classes. Under
the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of extension classes
logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services.  Every statute is
understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to
make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.  Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the
corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes.

Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged principally with the DECS. The SEF may be expended
only for the salaries and personnel-related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection with the
establishment and maintenance of extension classes. With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the
pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of
the SEF may be appropriated.  
G.R. No. 14129             July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
J. REGALA

Facts:
Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election Code in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan. The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace the
defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the said
motion. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in
People vs. Macaraeg applying the rule of “expressio unius, est exclusion alterius”. The lower court dismissed the
information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. The issue was raised to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not a justice of the peace was included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

Ruling:
Yes. The order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for trial on the merits.
The application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather
from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the
present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of
terms. On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee’s contention that justices of the peace are not covered by the
injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down
by the legislature.

Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of “expressio unius, est
exclusion alterius” in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54, the rule has no
application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial
court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged
change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
G.R. No. 166735               November 23, 2007
SPS. NEREO & NIEVA DELFINO, Petitioners,
vs. ST. JAMES HOSPITAL, INC., and THE HONORABLE RONALDO ZAMORA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. Respondents.
J. CHICO-NAZARIO

Facts:
Respondent now claims that the legislative history of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance shows that commercial and institutional
uses were expressly allowed in Sec. 2, par. 1 of said Ordinance as it retained uses that are commercial and institutional as
well as recreational in character and those for the maintenance of ecological balance. Thus, respondent postulates that even
if parks, playgrounds and recreation centers which were expressly provided for in the 1981 Zoning Ordinance under letters
(h) and (k) were excluded in the enumeration in the 1991 Zoning Ordinance, the same cannot, by any stretch of logic, be
interpreted to mean that they are no longer allowed. On the contrary, respondent explains that what appears is the fact that
parks, playgrounds, and recreation centers are deemed to have been covered by Sec. 2, par. 1 of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance
which speaks of "x x x other spaces designed for recreational pursuit and maintenance of ecological balance x x x." Hence,
respondent concludes that the same reading applies in the non-inclusion of the words hospitals, clinics, school, churches and
other places of worship, and drugstores which cannot be interpreted to mean that the aforesaid uses are to be deemed non-
conforming under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as these uses are allegedly covered by the clause allowing for institutional
and commercial uses.
Arising from this interpretation, respondent maintains that the Court erred in applying Sec. 1 of Article X of the 1991
Zoning Ordinance which pertains only to existing non-conforming uses and buildings, since, according to respondent, the
St. James Hospital and its expansion are consistent with the uses allowed under the zoning ordinance.

Issue:
Whether or not parks, playgrounds and recreation centres are included in the zoning ordinance

Ruling:
Whatever meaning the legislative body had intended in employing the word "institutional" must be discerned in light of the
restrictive enumeration in the said article. Under the legal maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, the express
mention of one thing in a law, means the exclusion of others not expressly mentioned. Thus, in interpreting the whole of
Section 2, Article VI, it must be understood that in expressly enumerating the allowable uses within a residential zone, those
not included in the enumeration are deemed excluded. Hence, since hospitals, among other things, are not among those
enumerated as allowable uses within the residential zone, the only inference to be deduced from said exclusion is that said
hospitals have been deliberately eliminated from those structures permitted to be constructed within a residential area in
Santa Rosa, Laguna.

Furthermore, according to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing omitted must be considered to have
been omitted intentionally. Therefore, with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more than ten capacity" in the new
Zoning Ordinance, and the corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone classification, the only logical
conclusion is that the legislative body had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a residential zone.
Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under
the 1991 Zoning Ordinance.

Having concluded that the St. James Hospital is now considered a non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning
Ordinance, we now come to the issue of the legality of the proposed expansion of said hospital into a four-storey, forty-bed
medical institution. We shall decide this said issue in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 Zoning Ordinance relating
to non-conforming buildings, the applicable law at the time of the proposal.
G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987
PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., and
DOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.
J. GANCAYCO

Facts:
Private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian
Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent
succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. The
latter in turn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc., so the
attached properties were released. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Sycwin. Varian Industrial Corporation
appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the
properties of Varian in respondent Court. The respondent Court granted the petition of Sycwin. Varian, thru its insurer and
petitioner herein, raised the issue to the Supreme Court. A temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from
enforcing the order complaint of was issued.

Issue:
Whether or not an order of execution pending appeal of any judgment maybe enforced on the counterbond of the petitioner.

Ruling:
YES. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit and the restraining order dissolved with costs against petitioner. It is well
recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus. The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute
should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase should
not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the
law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not
authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it
ought to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.
G.R. No. 48817. January 22, 1943
JUANA YAP DAES ET AL., Petitioners, v. WE KO (alias KUA), Respondent.
J. BOCOBO

Facts:
The petitioners, who are respectively the widow and children of Pedro Basa, brought an action under Act No. 1874 for
damages in the amount of P2,000 for the death of said Basa while working for the Respondent. It appears that the
respondent was having some repairs done on his house. He engaged Basa to take from the river to his residence four logs
which were needed, at a compensation of P1.20 per log. The deceased engaged three persons to help -him. They succeeded
in loading three of the logs on carts furnished by the respondent, but as they were trying to load the fourth log, it slipped
down, and hit Basa, killing him.

The Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissed the action. The Court of Appeals held that Basa was not an "employee"
of respondent within the purview of Act No. 1874, and dismissed the case. Basa had been engaged to do one particular thing
and was not subject to respondent’s direction, the Court of Appeals said. That Court also held it was immaterial that at other
times Basa had performed odd jobs for respondent and that latter had loaned the deceased two carts on which to load the
logs. We believe the Court of Appeals erred. Act No. 1874 does not require that the work should be more or less permanent.
It is enough that the laborer is engaged to do any job for another person. The temporary or occasional character of the work
is immaterial, for two reasons: 1. Act No. 1874 uses the term "employee" without any distinction between occasional or
permanent employees. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. It is significant that while the Workmen’s
Compensation Act (No. 3428) specifically excludes purely casual employment, Act No. 1874 on the other hand does not. It
is thus plain that Act No. 1874 which applies only to mishaps in small industries and other activities in which the gross
annual income is less than P20,000, is intended to safeguard all laborers, regardless of the duration or character of their
employment. Finespun distinctions would fritter away the salutary substance of this law. 2. Act No. 1874 being remedial
legislation, envisaged to protect laborers, its scope must not be so limited as to defeat this paramount objective, unless its
terms clearly warrant such restrictive interpretation.

Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 1874 require that the work should be more or less permanent.

Ruling:
No. Act No. 1874 does not require that the work should be more or less permanent. It is enough that the laborer is engaged
to do any job for another person. The temporary or occasional character of the work is immaterial, for two reasons: In the
first place, Act No. 1874 uses the term "employee" without any distinction between occasional or permanent employees.
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. It is significant that while the Workmen’s Compensation Act (No.
3428) specifically excludes purely casual employment, Act No. 1874 on the other hand does not. It is thus plain that Act No.
1874 which applies only to mishaps in small industries and other activities in which the gross annual income is less than
P20,000, is intended to safeguard all laborers, regardless of the duration or character of their employment. Finespun
distinctions would fritter away the salutary substance of this law. And, in the second place, Act No. 1874 being remedial
legislation, envisaged to protect laborers, its scope must not be so limited as to defeat this paramount objective, unless its
terms clearly warrant such restrictive interpretation.

Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, but the case shall be remanded to that court which
should make findings as above indicated, and render decision accordingly, without special pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
J. QUIASON

Facts:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed
upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures. In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065. Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-
040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28, 1994. Petition for certiorari was subsequently filed to the
Supreme Court.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he
was a “non-candidate,” having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that “it is
clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost” under Section
14 of R.A. 7166 entitled “An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms,
Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes”.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 excludes candidates who already withdrew their candidacy for election.
Ruling:
No. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish, ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. In the case at bench, as the law makes no
distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term “every
candidate” must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his
candidacy. Also, under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, it is provided that “[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal
or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.” Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did not
extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
G.R. No. 93828, December 11, 1992
People of the Philippines
vs. Santiago Evaristo and Noli Carillo
J. PADILLA

Facts:
Peace officers composed of Sgt. Eladio Romeroso and CIC Edgardo Vallarta of Philippine Constabulary together with Sgt.
Daniel Maligaya and 2 other members of the Integrated National Police were on routine patrol duty in Barangay III,
Mendez, Cavite. At 5:00 in the afternoon, the officers heard a successive burst of gunfire and they came upon Barequiel
Rosillo who was firing a gun into the air.

Seeing the patrol, Rosillo ran to the nearby house of Evaristo prompting the lawmen to pursue him. Upon approaching the
immediate perimeter of the house, the patrol chanced upon Evaristo and Carillo. They inquired as to the whereabouts of
Rosillo. The police patrol members were told that he had already escaped through a window of the house. Vallarta noticed a
bulge around the waist of Carillo and upon being frisked he admitted the same to be a  revolver.

As the patrol was still in pursuit of Rosillo, Sgt. Romeroso sought Evaristo’s permission to scour through the house which
was granted. Romaroso found a number of firearms and paraphernalia supposedly used in the repair and manufacture of
firearms. Evaristo and Carillo were ound guilty of illegal possession of firearms.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without warrant in accidental discovery of evidence is admissible.

Ruling:
According to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which provides: Section 2: The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purposes
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Also Section 3 (1); (2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

It is to be noted that what the above constitutional provisions prohibit are unreasonable searches and seizures. For a search
to be reasonable under the law, there must, as a rule, be a search warrant validly issued by an appropriate judicial officer.
Yet, the rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid search warrant is not an absolute and inflexible rule, for
jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions to the search warrant requirement. Among these exceptions is the seizure of
evidence in plain view.

The records in this case show that Sgt. Romerosa was granted permission by the appellant Evaristo to enter his house. The
officer’s purpose was to apprehend Rosillo whom he saw had sought refuge therein. Therefore, it is clear that the search for
firearms was not Romerosa’s purpose in entering the house, thereby rendering his discovery of the subject as inadvertent
and even accidental.

With respect to the firearms seized from the appellant Carillo, the Court sustains the validly of the firearm’s seizure and
admissibility in evidence, based on the rule on authorized warrantless arrests.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
J. KAPUNAN

Facts:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and
furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.”. Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private
communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said
motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order
as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.

Issue:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one
of the parties to the conversation.
Ruling:
No. Petition denied. Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute. The unambiguity of the
express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the
private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Petitioner’s contention that the
phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary
meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.
G.R. No. 193960               January 7, 2013
KARLO ANGELO DABALOS y SAN DIEGO, Petitioner, 
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,BRANCH 59, ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA), REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDING JUDGE MA. ANGELICA T. PARAS-QUIAMBAO; THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR,
ANGELES CITY (PAMPANGA); AND ABC, Respondents.
J. PERLAS-BERNABE

Facts:
Dabalos had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously used personal violence against the complainant whom he had a dating
relationship with. The said violence constituted the pulling of hair, punching the complainant's back, shoulder, and left eye
which have demeaning and degrading effects on the complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation
of Section 5 (a) of the Republic Act 9262. In Dabalos' defense, he averred that the relationship had already ceased at the
time of the alleged incident.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 9262 be construed when the dating relationship was not the proximate cause of the violence?

Ruling:
Yes. The law provides that any act can be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm when it is
committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom he has or had
sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child, and when it results in or is likely to result in physical
harm or suffering.

Applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, neither should the courts, the punishable
acts refer to all acts of violence against women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship. It did not
distinguish that the act of violence should be a consequence of such relationship.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD MOVIE AND
TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD vs. ABS-CBN
BROADCASTING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005.
Facts:
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired
"Prostituition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and
hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to
enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes,
pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women's
University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the
facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background
of the episode. The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community.
Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents
and Teachers Association led letter-complaints 3 3 with petitioner MTRCB. Both
complainants alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in
the harassment of some of its female students. In their answer, respondents explained
that the "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news documentary and sociopolitical
editorial," the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly, petitioner has no power, authority
and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the “The Inside Story is a television program, within the jurisdiction
of the MTRCB over which it has power of review”.
Held:
YES. The only exceptions from the MTRCB's power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 of P.D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2)
newsreels. Apparently, the newsreels are straight presentations of events. They are
depictions of actual realities. Correspondingly, the MTRCB Rules and Regulations,
implementing P.D. No. 1986 defines newsreels as "straight news reporting, as
distinguished from new analyses, commentaries and opinions. Talk shows on a given
issue are not considered newsreels. Clearly, the “The Inside Story” cannot be considered
a newsreel. It is more of a public affairs program which is described as a variety of news
treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries,
analysis and/or exchange of opinions. Certainly, such kind of programs are within the
petitioner’s review power.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 119673. July 26, 1996.
Facts:
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a television
program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2 every Saturday and on
Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents and propagates petitioner's religious
beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and November 1992, petitioner
submitted to the respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR
tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121 and 128. The Board classified the
series as "X" or not for public viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an
attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law."
Issue:
Whether the respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo”.
Held:
YES. We thus reject petitioner's postulate that its religious program is per se
beyond review by the respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious
program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches
even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule that the exercise of
religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e.,
serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public
welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal
mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues
to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. Across the sea and in our shore, the
bloodiest and bitterest wars fought by men were caused by irreconcilable religious
differences. Our country is still not safe from the recurrence of this stultifying strife
considering our warring religious beliefs and the fanaticism with which some of us cling
and claw to these beliefs. Even now, we have yet to settle the near century old strife in
Mindanao, the roots of which have been nourished by the mistrust and misunderstanding
between our Christian and Muslim brothers and sisters. The bewildering rise of weird
religious cults espousing violence as an article of faith also proves the wisdom of our rule
rejecting a strict let alone policy on the exercise of religion. For sure, we shall continue to
subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny
but we shall not leave its rationale exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion
divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still.
GINA M. TIANGCO vs. UNIWIDE SALES WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC. G.R. No. G.R.
No. 168697. December 14, 2009.
Facts:
Petitioners Gina M. Tiangco and Salvacion Jenny Manego were employees of
respondent Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc., a domestic corporation. Respondent
Jimmy N. Go was the president of the corporation. Petitioner Tiangco was employed by
respondent USWCI on June 10, 1997 as concession manager. In 1998, she was
designated as group merchandising manager for the fashion and personal care
department with a monthly salary of P45,000. On the other hand, petitioner Manego was
initially employed as buyer on January 16, 1984 but was promoted as senior category
head with a monthly salary of P25,000. On July 5, 2001 and July 13, 2001, petitioners
Tiangco and Manego respectively led separate complaints for illegal dismissal, payment
of separation pay as well as award of moral and exemplary damages in the National Labor
Relations Commission.
Issue:
Whether the consolidated illegal dismissal cases can be reopened at this point of
the SEC proceedings for respondent USWCI's rehabilitation.
Held:
YES. The term "claim," as contemplated in Section 6 (c), refers to debts or
demands of a pecuniary nature. It is the assertion of rights for the payment of money.
Here, petitioners have pecuniary claims — the payment of separation pay and moral and
exemplary damages. Section 1, Rule 2 of the Interim Rules defines "claims" as follows:
"Claim" shall include all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against a
debtor or its property, whether for money or otherwise. Thus, labor claims are included
among the actions suspended upon the placing under rehabilitation of employercorporations.
Article 217 of the Labor Code 26 26 should be construed not in isolation but
in harmony with PD 902-A, according to the basic rule in statutory construction that
implied repeals are not favored. Indeed, it is axiomatic that each and every statute must
be construed in a way that would avoid conflict with existing laws. True, the NLRC has
the power to hear and decide labor disputes, but such authority is deemed suspended
when PD 902-A is put into effect by the SEC. This Court notes that PD 902-A itself does
not provide for the duration of the automatic stay. Neither does the Order of the SEC.
Furthermore, the suspensive effect has no time limit and remains in force as long as
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Order. Herewith, considering that
respondent USWCI's SARP had already been approved before then, the 2000 Interim
Rules still govern this case. In sum, when the labor arbiter proceeded with the
consolidated cases despite the SEC suspension order, he exceeded his jurisdiction to
hear and decide illegal dismissal cases and the CA correctly reversed his June 16, 2004
order.
RUBBERWORLD (PHILS.), INC vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 126773. April 14, 1999.
Facts:
By virtue of a SEC Order, all actions for claims against Rubberworld Phil., Inc.,
pending before any court, tribunal, office, body or board were suspended. Consequently,
all pending incidents for preliminary injunctions, attachments, foreclosures and the like
were rendered moot and academic. Meanwhile, private respondents who are employees
of Rubberworld led against the latter their respective complaints for illegal dismissal,
unfair labor practice, damages and payment of separation pay, retirement benefits, 13th
month pay and service incentive pay. Rubberworld moved to suspend the proceedings in
the labor cases on the strength of the SEC Order, but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the preference of credit granted the worker or employees under
Article 110 of the Labor Code is applicable.
Held:
NO. It must be noted that, upon petition of Rubberworld with the SEC, the latter
ordered the creation of a management committee and the suspension of all actions for
claims against Rubberworld. Thus, the applicable law here is P.D. 902-A, as amended.
No exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned in the law. Thus, allowing labor cases
to proceed clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and severely encumbers the
management committee's time and resources, whose primary and urgent duty is to work
towards rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again. Besides, even if the
NLRC awards the claims of private respondents, as it did, its ruling could not be enforced
as long as the petitioner is under the management committee. True the NLRC has the
power to hear and decide labor disputes but such authority is deemed suspended when
P.D. 902-A was put also effect by the SEC. Further, the preferential right of workers and
employees under Article 110 of the Labor Code may be invoked only upon the institution
of insolvency or judicial liquidation proceedings. The present case involves the
rehabilitation, not the liquidation of the corporation.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
TEODORO TEODORO TAMANI
G.R. Nos. L-22160 & L-22161. January 21, 1974.
Facts:
There is no dispute that sometime after twilight on the night of June 11, 1953 in
the place called Centro at the commercial street of Angadanan, Isabela, a man names
Jose Siyang, the town assistant sanitary inspector, was mortally wounded by gunfire.
Death resulted from internal hemorrhage caused by the following four (4) through and
through gunshot wounds. By means of the same gunfire, an attempt was made to kill
Mayor Eduardo Domingo. He sustained a through and through wound in the palm of his
right hand which caused his confinement in the Isabela Provincial Hospital from June 11
to 22, 1953. He confessed to have made the crime, however, during the trial, he
repudiated his confession. He assailed its voluntariness. He set up the defense of alibi.
Through his principal witness, Francisco Siyang, the father of the deceased Jose Siyang,
he endeavored to prove that the latter was shot by Policemen Gaspar Ibarra and Melchor
Tumaneng. Thus, a simple case, where the extrajudicial confession is corroborated by
evidence of the corpus delicti, became controversial, complicated and perplexing.
Issue:
Whether or not the guilt of the accuse was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
YES. Appellant Tamani's defense of alibi, which can be fabricated with facility,
cannot be given serious consideration. Assuming that he was in Barrio Aniog in the
afternoon and night of June 11th, it was physically possible for him to be at the scene of
the shooting at the time that it was perpetrated and return to the house of Vice-Mayor
Tamani in Barrio Aniog. That place was only two kilometers from the store of Pedro Pua.
The victims were shot in front of the store. The settled rule is that an alibi, to be tenable,
must be such as to preclude the possibility of the presence of the accused at the scene
of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Lesions graves is not
well-taken. As already pointed out, the killing of Siyang cannot be characterized as
homicide. It was qualified by treachery. There was intent to kill in the shooting of the
mayor. So, the wound inflicted on him cannot be regarded as a mere physical injury. It
was an overt act manifesting the willful design of the accused to liquidate the mayor. The
infliction of the four fatal gunshot wounds on Siyang and of the wound in the palm of the
mayor's right hand was not the result of a single act. The injuries were the consequences
of two volleys of gunshots. Hence, the assaults on Siyang and the mayor cannot be
categorized as a complex crime. To convict the accused of the complex crime of murder
with attempted murder would result in the imposition of the death penalty. That eventuality
would be worse for him.
CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO
G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005.
Facts:
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built
and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly
accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC led a
Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein
petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim , Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members
of the City Council of Manila. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. On the other hand, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that
the City Council had the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to
protect the social and moral welfare of the community" as provided for in Section 458 (a)
4 (vii) of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid exercise of power by the City Councils
Held:
NO. The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon and is subject to the limitation that its
exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment
of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of
constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private
rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The object of the Ordinance
was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council's police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. The Ordinance
seeks to legislate morality but fails to address the core issues of morality. Try as the
Ordinance may to shape morality, it should not foster the illusion that it can make a moral
man out of it because immorality is not a thing, a building or establishment; it is in the
hearts of men. The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside
the establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants,
premiums and blessings of democracy.
SABINA EXCONDE vs. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO
G.R. No. L-10134. June 29, 1957.
Facts:
It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts Organization and
a student of the Balintawak Elementary School situated in a barrio in the City of San Pablo
and on March 31, 1949. He attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon
instruction of the city school's supervisor. From the school, Dante, with other students,
boarded a jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and drove it
while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when the jeep turned turtle
and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro Caperiña, died as a consequence.
It further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of
the accident, nor did he know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to
know it when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon
instruction of his teacher.
Issue:
Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally
with his son Dante, for damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by
the negligent act of minor Dante Capuno.
Held:
It is true that under the law above quoted, "teachers or directors of arts and trades
are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under
their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not
to any academic educational institution. Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extracurricular activity, he attended the
parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it
was in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and
while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that neither the
head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held liable for the negligent
act of Dante because he was not then a student of an institution of arts and trades as
provided for by law. The civil liability which the law imposes upon the father, and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor
children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting
them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion
to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them
in moderation. The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
JOSE S. AMADORA vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47745. April 15, 1988.
Facts:
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San
JoseRecoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to death by Pablito
Daffon, a classmate. The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to nish his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was then under the
custody of the private respondents. The private respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora
had gone to the school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he
was no longer in their custody because the semester had already ended. Daffon was
convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. 2 2 Additionally, the herein petitioners,
as the victim's parents, led a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the dean
of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through
their respective parents.
Issue:
Whether or not the there is sufficient evidence to make the respondents liable.
Held:
No. After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or vocational in
nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in
charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule.
However, the court held that, at the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in
the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the
fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in the school
auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what
is important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. The rector, the high school
principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher-in-charge. Each of them was exercising only a general authority over the student
body and not the direct control and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of
particular classes or sections and thus immediately involved in its discipline. Furthermore,
assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent
in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and
regulations of the school or condoned their nonobservance. Lastly, the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage caused
by the student or apprentice.
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES vs. UNITED
PLANNERS CONSULTANTS, INC
G.R. No. 212081. February 23, 2015.
Facts:
On July 26, 1993, petitioner, through the Land Management Bureau, entered into
an Agreement for Consultancy Services with respondent United Planners Consultants,
Inc. in connection with the LMB's Land Resource Management Master Plan Project.
Under the Consultancy Agreement, petitioner committed to pay a total contract price of
P4,337,141.00, based on a predetermined percentage corresponding to the particular
stage of work accomplished. In December 1994, respondent completed the work
required, which petitioner formally accepted on December 27, 1994. However, petitioner
was able to pay only 47% of the total contract price in the amount of P2,038,456.30. On
October 25, 1994, the Commission on Audit (COA) released the Technical Services
Office Report finding the contract price of the Agreement to be 84.14% excessive. This
notwithstanding, petitioner, in a letter dated December 10, 1998, acknowledged its liability
to respondent in the amount of P2,239,479.60 and assured payment at the soonest
possible time.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in applying the provisions of the Special ADR Rules,
resulting in the dismissal of petitioner's special civil action for certiorari.
Held:
NO. Republic Act No. (RA) 9285, 54 otherwise known as the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004," institutionalized the use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution
System in the Philippines. The Act, however, was without prejudice to the adoption by the
Supreme Court of any ADR system as a means of achieving speedy and efficient means
of resolving cases pending before all courts in the Philippines. Accordingly, A.M. No. 07-
11-08-SC was created setting forth the Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution that shall govern the procedure to be followed by the courts whenever judicial
intervention is sought in ADR proceedings in the specific cases where it is allowed. In the
case at bar, the Consultancy Agreement contained an arbitration clause. Hence,
respondent, after it led its complaint, moved for its referral to arbitration which was not
objected to by petitioner. By its referral to arbitration, the case fell within the coverage of
the Special ADR Rules. However, with respect to the arbitration proceedings itself, the
parties had agreed to adopt the CIAC Rules before the Arbitral Tribunal in accordance
with Rule 2.3 of the Special ADR Rules. From the foregoing, the settlement of
respondent's money claim is still subject to the primary jurisdiction of the COA despite
finality of the confirmed arbitral award by the RTC pursuant to the Special ADR Rules.
Hence, the respondent has to first seek the approval of the COA of their monetary claim.
LYDIA O. CHUA vs. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 88979. February 7, 1992.
Facts:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act
No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement
and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary
separation due to reorganization. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to
avail of the benefits of the program, led an application on 30 January 1989 with
respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same;
instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay
for every years of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil
Service Commission yielded negative results.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted by law.
Held:
YES. Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered
years of continuous service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement
Law, as long as they led their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long
as they comply with CSC regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection,
Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1990 implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, requires,
as a condition to qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years
of government service which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service,
whether appointive, elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous,
including military and police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service
Commission. A similar regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No.
6683 of co-terminous personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping
with the coverage of "all social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental
well-being of public servants." After all, co-terminous personnel are also obligated to the
government for GSIS contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the general
disadvantage of transience. In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by
the respondents NIA and CSC of petitioner's application for early retirement benefits
under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had
led an application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled
to the benefits of said law. While the application was led after expiration of her term, we
can give allowance for the fact that she originally led the application on her own without
the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice, her application must be
granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years — the minimum
requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4) successive
governmental projects.
SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC vs. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
G.R. No. 116194. February 2, 2000.
Facts:
On October 26, 1993, the SRBI-Association of Professional, Supervisory, Oce, and
Technical Employees Union, a union in petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank (SRB), led a
petition for certification election of the supervisory employees of SRBI. On October 28,
1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition, but SRBI led a motion to dismiss
the union's petition. It sought to prevent the holding of a certification election on the
grounds that the members of APSOTEU-TUCP were in fact managerial or confidential
employees and ALU-TUCP was representing the union. The union led its opposition to
the motion to dismiss arguing that its members were not managerial but merely
supervisory employees. On December 9, 1993, the Med-Arbiter denied petitioner's
motion to dismiss. SRBI appealed the Med-Arbiter's decision to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, but the appeal was denied. On December 22, 1993, petitioner
proceeded to file a petition with the DOLE Regional Office seeking the cancellation of the
respondent union's registration. It averred that APSOTEU-TUCP members were actually
managerial employees who were prohibited by law from joining or organizing unions. On
April 22, 1994, the respondent DOLE Undersecretary denied SRBI's appeal for lack of
merit. SRBI moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Undersecretary Laguesma acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Held:
NO. The Supreme Court found the petition bereft of merit. The Court ruled that
the Undersecretary of Labor committed no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion
when he found the order of the Med-Arbiter scheduling a certification election in order.
The list of employees eligible to vote in said certification was also found in order, for none
of the members of the respondent union came into the rank-and-file employees of the
bank. Likewise, the claim that the members of respondent union are managerial are not
true as the Cashiers, Accountants and Acting Chiefs of the Loans Department of the
petitioner did not possess the managerial powers or duties. Neither of the respondent
employees' fell under the category of confidential employees prohibited from joining the
union as not one of them had any duties specifically connected to labor relations.
Accordingly, the instant petition was dismissed.
REPUBLIC NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES
G.R. No. 93468. December 29, 1994.
Facts:
On 17 March 1989, NATU led a petition for certification election to determine the
exclusive bargaining representative of respondent Bank's employees occupying
supervisory positions. On 24 April 1989, the Bank moved to dismiss the petition on the
ground that the supposed supervisory employees were actually managerial and/or
confidential employees thus ineligible to join, assist or form a union, and that the petition
lacked the 20% signatory requirement under the Labor Code. Respondent Bank appealed
the order to the Secretary of Labor on the main ground that several of the employees
sought to be included in the certification election, particularly the Department Managers,
Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers were managerial and/or confidential
employees and thus ineligible to join, assist or form a union. It presented annexes
detailing the job description and duties of the positions in question and affidavits of certain
employees. It also invoked provisions of the General Banking Act and the Central Bank
Act to show the duties and responsibilities of the bank and its branches.
Issue:
Whether the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch Managers/OICs,
Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/or confidential
employees hence ineligible to join or assist the union of petitioner.
Held:
YES. The grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent is at once
apparent. Art. 212, par. (m), of the Labor Code is explicit. A managerial employee is (a)
one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies, or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees; (b) one who is vested with both powers or prerogatives. A supervisory
employee is different from a managerial employee in the sense that the supervisory
employee, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommends such managerial
actions, if the exercise of such managerial authority is not routinary in nature but requires
the use of independent judgment. In fine, only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and
Controllers of respondent Bank, being confidential employees, are disqualified from
joining or assisting petitioner Union, or joining, assisting or forming any other labor
organization. But this ruling should be understood to apply only to the present case based
on the evidence of the parties, as well as to those similarly situated. It should not be
understood in any way to apply to banks in general.
BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION
vs. HON. HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 74425. October 7, 1986.
Facts:
Petitioner corporation has been engaged in the business of newspaper and
magazine publishing for over half a century. Its current publications include the national
daily "Bulletin Today" (now Manila Daily Bulletin), the tabloid "Tempo", and a weekly
magazine called "Panorama". The total number of the personnel complement of the said
firm, constituting the rank-and-file regular members, is said to be over three hundred
persons. The supervisory employees number forty-eight. About three hundred employees
belonging to the rank-and-file had previously formed the Bulletin Employees Union. This
labor organization (BEU) presently administers their current Collective Bargaining
Agreement which began on July 15, 1984 and remain effective up to July 15, 1987. Ever
since, there has been only one bargaining unit in the petitioner company and this is the
BEU — the union of the rank-and-file employees. Supervisory employees were never
included in said bargaining unit nor had they ever sought inclusion in the said BEU labor
union, much less registered any protest or challenged to their non-inclusion therein.
Issue:
Whether or not supervisors in petitioner company may, for purposes of collective
bargaining, form a union separate and distinct from the existing union organized by the
rank-and-file employees of the same company.
Held:
NO. We are constrained to hold that the supervisory employees of petitioner firm
may not, under the law, form a supervisor’s union, separate and distinct from the existing
bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-and-le employees of the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation. It is evident that most of the private respondents are considered managerial
employees. Also, it is distinctly stated in Section 11, Rule II, of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, that supervisory unions are presently no longer recognized
nor allowed to exist and operate as such. Also, Article 246 of the Labor Code explicitly
excludes managerial employees from the right of self-organization, the right to form, join
and assist labor organizations. Their responsibilities inherently require the exercise of
discretion and independent judgment as supervisors. They possess the power and
authority to lay down or exercise management policies. Managerial employees are those
vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies and/or
to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to
effectively recommend such managerial actions. All employees not falling within this
definition are considered rank-and le employees.
GOLDEN FARMS, INC. GOLDEN FARMS, INC. vs. DIRECTOR PURA FERRERCALLEJA,
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
G.R. No. 78755. July 19, 1989.
Facts:
Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the production of bananas for export. Private
respondent Union represents the employees/workers of petitioner corporation, who were
the same signatories to an earlier Petition for Certification Election led in 1984 before the
Ministry of Labor. The said Petition for Direct Certification Election or Recognition led by
herein private respondent in behalf of certain office employees and foremen before
Regional Office No. XI, Davao City of the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Petitioner
herein opposed said petition on the ground among others that a perusal of the names
allegedly supporting the said petition showed that said persons by the nature of their jobs
are performing managerial functions and/or occupying confidential positions such that
they cannot validly constitute a separate or distinct group from the existing collective
bargaining unit also represented by private respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not may supervisors, cashiers, foremen, and employees holding
confidential/managerial function compel management to enter into a collective bargaining
agreement with them.
Held:
NO. If these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union,
the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of
interests or that the Union can be company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in Union membership. A managerial employee is defined under Art. 212 (k) of
the new Labor Code as "one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions. All
employees not falling within this definition are considered rank-and-file employees for
purposes of this Book." This rationale holds true also for confidential employees such as
accounting personnel, radio and telegraph operators, who having access to confidential
information, may become the source of undue advantage. Said employees may act as a
spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement. This is especially true in
the present case where the petitioning Union is already the bargaining agent of the rankand-
le employees in the establishment. As to the company foremen, while in the
performance of supervisory functions, they may be the extension or alter ego of the
management. Adversely, the foremen, by their actuation, may inuence the workers under
their supervision to engage in slow down commercial activities or similar activities
detrimental to the policy, interest or business objectives of the company or corporation,
hence they also cannot join.
FORTUNATO MERCADO vs. NATIONAL LABOR NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
G.R. No. 79869. September 5, 1991.
Facts:
This petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
wages, non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave benefits,
emergency cost of living allowances and 13th month pay, led by above-named petitioners
against private respondents Aurora L. Cruz, Francisco Borja, Leticia C. Borja and Sto.
Niño Realty Incorporated, with Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, National Labor
Relations Commission in San Fernando, Pampanga. Petitioners alleged in their complaint
that they were agricultural workers utilized by private respondents in all the agricultural
phases of work on the 7 1/2 hectares of rice land and 10 hectares of sugar land owned
by the latter; that Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Leon Santillan worked in the farm of private
respondents since 1949, Fortunato Mercado, Jr. and Antonio Mercado since 1972 and
the rest of the petitioners since 1960 up to April 1979, when they were all allegedly
dismissed from their employment.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and therefore
entitled to the benefits which they pray for.
Held:
NO. Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment
discloses that the concept of regular and casual employees was designed to put an end
to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been abused by many employers to
prevent so-called casuals from enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent
casuals from joining unions. The same instructions show that the proviso in the second
paragraph of Art. 280 was not designed to stifle small-scale businesses nor to oppress
agricultural land owners to further the interests of laborers, whether agricultural or
industrial. What it seeks to eliminate are abuses of employers against their employees
and not, as petitioners would have us believe, to prevent small-scale businesses from
engaging in legitimate methods to realize profit. Hence, the proviso is applicable only to
the employees who are deemed "casuals" but not to the "project" employees nor the
regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. 280. Clearly, therefore, petitioners
being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal employees, their
employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the season. The termination
of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.
ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T. RIVERA ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and
HECTOR T. RIVERA vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125359. September 4, 2001.
Facts:
In 1991 to 1992, petitioners, together with former First Lady Imelda Marcos, were
charged with 25 information at the RTC for dollar salting (violation of Central Bank Circular
No. 960). The complaints alleged that petitioners maintained foreign exchange abroad
without prior authorization from and failed to report earnings or receipts to the CB.
Petitioners posted bail, entered pleas and led various motions and pleadings. On
November 3, 1990, petitioners entered into a compromise agreement with the
government Tanodbayan (PhilAsia), and PCGG. Meanwhile, CB Circular No. 1318
revised the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions and Circular No.
1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for foreign exchange-funded
expenditures obtained from the banking system. Both circulars contained a saving clause
exempting from its coverage pending criminal actions involving violations of Circular No.
960 and Circular No. 1318, respectively. Motions to quash were then led on grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, irregular conduct of preliminary investigation,
extinction of criminal liability and the grant of absolute immunity as a result of the
compromise agreement. It was alleged that the dollar-salting charges were violations of
the Anti-Graft Law (R.A. 3019) falling under the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and that the act of receiving interest earnings on Treasury Notes is an element of the
offense of prohibited transactions. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals dismissed the same
for lack of merit, hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent law extinguished the criminal liability of the accuse.
Held:
Jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the
time the action is instituted. The cases led against petitioners were punishable by
imprisonment of not more than six years. Under P .D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has
no jurisdiction over cases where the imposable penalty is less than six (6) years The rule
that absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving a court of its authority to
punish a person charged with violation of the old law prior to its repeal is subject to
exceptions, one of which is the inclusion of a saving clause in the repealing law, which is
present in the case at bar. Thus, the pending cases of petitioners are not affected by the
repeal. The period of recovery of ill-gotten wealth, pursuant to the explicit command of
the Provisional Constitution, commenced to run only after the EDSA Revolution of
February, 1986. The criminal actions against petitioners were led in 1991-92, a period
well within the eight (8)-year prescriptive period. The compromise agreement entered into
by petitioner with the government refers only to cases specifically mentioned therein.
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001
Facts:
The Court armed the constitutionality of RA 7080, otherwise known as the Plunder
Law, as amended by RA 7659. The Plunder Law contained ascertainable standards and
well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Indeed, it can be understood that what the assailed statute punishes is the act
of a public officer in amassing ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000 through a series
or combination of acts enumerated in the Plunder Law. Petitioner bewailed the failure of
the law to provide statutory definitions of the terms used.
Issue:
Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional.
Held:
NO. Petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is misplaced. A
statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application.
In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects — it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in
imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively
phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types
of activities. The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
when measured by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however,
that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld — not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as
the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to
provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. In dismissing the petition, this
Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer
from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident
bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes
by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and
the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment
charges three (3) distinct offenses.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs. CITY OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 149110. April 9, 2003.
Facts:
Petitioner is a government owned and controlled corporation created under
Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended. For many years, petitioner sold electric power
to the residents of Cabanatuan City. Pursuant to a 1992 ordinance, the respondent
assessed the petitioner a franchise tax. In refusing to pay the tax assessment, petitioner
argued that the respondent had no authority to impose tax on government entities like
itself and that it was a tax exempt entity by express provisions of law. Hence, respondent
led a collection suit demanding payment of the assessed tax due alleging that petitioner's
exemption from local taxes has been repealed. The trial court dismissed the case and
ruled that the tax exemption privileges granted to petitioner still subsists. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition for review led before the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the tax exemption of the said corporation is valid.
Held:
NO. In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the
scope of state activity, and taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the
equitable distribution of wealth, economic progress and the protection of local industries
as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation assumes even greater
significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power to tax is
no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct
authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution. This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development
can be achieved only by strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of
governance. The Supreme Court denied this petition and armed the decision of the Court
of Appeals. According to the Court, one of the most significant provisions of the Local
Government Code (LGC) is the removal of the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and
agencies of the national government from the coverage of local taxation. Although as a
general rule, Local Government Units (LGU) cannot impose taxes, fees or charges of any
kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits
an exception, i.e ., when specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGU to impose
taxes, fees or charges on the aforementioned entities. In the case at bar, Section 151 in
relation to Section 137 of the LGC clearly authorized the respondent city government to
impose on the petitioner the franchise tax in question.
IMELDA R. MARCOS IMELDA R. MARCOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 126594. September 5, 1997.
Facts:
Nearly six years after the 1986 EDSA Revolution which toppled the Marcos regime,
petitioner was charged with violations of Sections 4 and 10 of CB Circular 960 before the
RTC of Manila for allegedly opening and maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad
without prior authorization from the CB or otherwise allowed by CB regulations, and for
allegedly failing to submit a report of the foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or
to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB within the period mandated
by Section 10 of CB Circular No. 960. During the pendency of these cases, CB Circular
No. 1318 (Revised Manual of Rules and Regulations Governing Non-Trade Foreign
Exchange Transactions) dated January 3, 1992 and CB Circular No. 1353 (Further
Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulations) dated August 24, 1992 were issued by the
CB. CB Circular No. 1318 repealed insofar as inconsistent therewith all existing provisions
of CB Circular No. 960, among other circulars, while CB Circular No. 1353 repealed all
the provisions of Chapter X of CB Circular No. 1318 only insofar as they are inconsistent
therewith. Both circulars, however, contain a saving clause excepting from the circular
pending criminal actions involving violations of CB Circular No. 960 and CB Circular No.
1318. Petitioner led a motion to quash and then a motion for reconsideration which were
denied by the trial court. She then led a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
respondent Court of Appeals claiming that violations of CB Circular No. 960, specifically
Sections 4 and 10 thereof, ceased to be punishable upon the issuance in 1992 of CB
Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353, on the theory that the latter circulars completely repealed
the former, and that the reservations made in each of the repealing clauses of the latter
circulars are invalid. Respondent appellate court rejected her thesis on this score.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of the provisions of the circular under Republic
Act 265, as amended (The Central Bank Act).
Held:
YES. The Supreme Court agrees with respondent appellate court that such
amendments and saving clauses are valid and were authorized enactments under a
delegated power of the Monetary Board under Section 14 of the Central Bank Act.
Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are
penal in nature where the law itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation
punishable and provides for its penalty. This is still the rule on the matter and in the instant
case, the Central Bank Act defined the offense and its penalty while the questioned
circular merely spelled out the details of the offense.
FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION FORT BONIFACIO
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 158885. October 2, 2009.
Facts:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed Fort Bonifacio Development
Corporation's presumptive input tax credit arising from the land inventory on the basis of
Revenue Regulation 7-95 (RR 7-95) and Revenue Memorandum Circular 3-96 (RMC 3-
96).
Issue:
Whether or not Section 100 of the old national internal revenue code, as amended
by republic act no. 7716, could not have supplied the distinction between the treatment
of real properties or real estate dealers on the one hand, and the treatment of transactions
involving other commercial goods on the other hand.
Held:
The term “goods or properties” by the unambiguous terms of Section 100 includes
real properties held primarily for sale to customers or held for lease in the ordinary course
of business. Having been defined in Section 100 of the NIRC, the term "goods" as used
in Section 105 of the same code could not have a different meaning. As mandated by
Article 7 of the Civil Code, an administrative rule or regulation cannot contravene the law
on which it is based. RR 7-95 is inconsistent with Section 105 insofar as the definition of
the term "goods" is concerned. This is a legislative act beyond the authority of the CIR
and the Secretary of Finance. The rules and regulations that administrative agencies
promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and
additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
statutory authority granted by the legislature to the objects and purposes of the law, and
should not be in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.
To recapitulate, RR 7-95, insofar as it restricts the definition of "goods" as basis of
transitional input tax credit under Section 105 is a nullity. It is clear, therefore, that under
RR 6-97, the allowable transitional input tax credit is not limited to improvements on real
properties. The particular provision of RR 7-95 has effectively been repealed by RR 6-97
which is now in consonance with Section 100 of the NIRC, insofar as the definition of real
properties as goods is concerned. The failure to add a specific repealing clause would
not necessarily indicate that there was no intent to repeal RR 7-95. The fact that the
aforequoted paragraph was deleted created an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy between the provisions of RR 6-97 and RR 7-95.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, INC. vs. CITY OF DAVAO
G.R. No. 143867. August 22, 2001.
Facts:
In January 1999, petitioner PLDT applied for a Mayor's Permit to operate its Davao
Metro Exchange. The application was withheld by the respondent City of Davao pending
payment of its local franchise tax in the amount of P3,681,985.72 for the first to the fourth
quarter of 1999. Petitioner protested the assessment and requested a refund paid by it
for the year 1997 and the first to the third quarter of 1998. Petitioner contended that it was
exempt from the payment of the franchise tax based on an opinion of the Bureau of Local
Government Finance that PLDT shall be exempted from the payment of franchise and
business taxes imposable by Local Government Units upon the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 7925 on March 16, 1995, but it shall be liable to pay the franchise and business taxes
on its gross receipts realized from January 1, 1992 to March 15, 1995 since at that time,
it was not enjoying yet the "most favored clause" proviso of RA 7925. The City Treasurer
of Davao denied the protest and claim for tax refund of petitioner. Petitioner then led a
petition in the Regional Trial Court of Davao seeking a reversal of respondent City
Treasurer's denial of petitioner's protest and the refund of the franchise tax paid by it for
the year 1998 in the amount of P2,580,829.23. The trial court denied petitioner's appeal
and armed the City Treasurer's decision. It ruled that the LGC withdrew all tax exemptions
previously enjoyed by all persons and authorized local government units to impose a tax
on business enjoying a franchise notwithstanding the grant of tax exemption to them. It
also denied petitioner's claim for exemption under RA 7925 for reasons, among others,
that it is clear from the wording of Section 193 of the LGC that Congress did not intend to
exempt any franchise holder from the payment of local franchise and business taxes.
Issue:
Whether or not PLDT is exempt from payment of taxes under the laws
Held:
NO. The Court ruled that it does not appear that, in approving Section 23 of R.A.
No. 7925, Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax
exemptions and the rule that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations
in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, the Court held that Section
23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's franchise so
as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition of local franchise taxes. Consequently,
the Court held that petitioner is liable to pay local franchise taxes in the amount of
P3,681,985.72 for the period covering the first to the fourth quarter of 1999 and that it is
not entitled to a refund of taxes paid by it for the period covering the first to the third
quarter of 1998.
AT&T COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 185969. November 19, 2014.
Facts:
Petitioner led its Quarterly VAT Returns with the Bureau of Internal Revenue for
the taxable year period covering 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2003. On 5 February
2004, petitioner filed its first Amended Quarterly VAT Return for the Fourth Quarter of
taxable year 2003; while on 26 April 2004, petitioner filed its Amended Quarterly VAT
Returns for the First to Fourth Quarters of the taxable year 2003. Petitioner led on 13 April
2005 with the BIR an application for refund and/or tax credit of its unutilized VAT input
taxes for the aforesaid taxable period amounting to P3,003,265.14. However, there being
no action on said administrative claim, petitioner led a Petition for Review before the CTA
in Division on 20 April 2005 (or exactly seven days from the time it led its administrative
claim) in order to suspend the running of the prescriptive period provided under Section
229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund or issuance of a TCC in its favor
amounting to P3,003,265.14 allegedly representing unutilized input VAT attributable to
petitioner's zero-rated sales for the period of 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2003, in
accordance with the provisions of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, other pertinent laws,
and applicable jurisprudential proclamations
Held:
YES. Clearly, the CTA had no jurisdiction to rule on petitioner's refund
claim covering the First Quarter of taxable year 2003 since its administrative claim was
led beyond the 2 year prescriptive period as mandated by law, or exactly fourteen (14)
days after the last day to file the same. On the other hand, as to petitioner's claims
covering the remaining quarters of taxable year 2003, the Court finds that petitioner has
indeed properly led its judicial claim before the CTA, even without waiting for the
expiration of the one hundred twenty (120) day period, since at the time petitioner filed its
petition, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 issued on 10 December 2003 was already in effect.
Without doubt, it is evident from the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements that as a
general rule, a taxpayer-claimant needs to wait for the expiration of the one hundred
twenty (120)-day period before it may be considered as "inaction" on the part of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Thereafter, the taxpayer-claimant is given only a
limited period of thirty (30) days from said expiration to file its corresponding judicial claim
with the CTA. However, with the exception of claims made during the effectivity of BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 (from 10 December 2003 to 5 October 2010), petitioner has indeed
properly and timely filed its judicial claim covering the Second, Third, and Fourth Quarters
of taxable year 2003, within the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence.
JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES JUDGE TOMAS C. LEYNES, p e titio n e r , v s v s .
THE COMMISSION ON . THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA)
G.R. No. 143596. December 11, 2003.
Facts:
Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 40 was formerly assigned
to the Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro as the sole presiding judge of the Municipal
Trial Court thereof. On March 15, 1993, the sanggunian Bayan of Naujan, through
Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget
Officer regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the
municipality to petitioner judge. On May 7, 1993, the Sanggunian Bayan unanimously
approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judge's monthly allowance from P944
to P1,600 starting May 1993. In 1994, the Municipal Government of Naujan again
provided for petitioner judge's P1,600 monthly allowance in its annual budget which was
again approved by the Sanggunian Panlalawigan and the Office of Provincial Budget and
Management of Oriental Mindoro. On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion M.
Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the Sanggunian Bayan of Naujan
directing them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance or RATA to petitioner
judge and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter.
She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in
addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not resolution no. 101, series of 1993 of naujan is valid.
Held:
YES. From the foregoing history of the power of LGUs to grant allowances
to judges, the following principles should be noted: (1) the power of LGUs to grant
allowances to judges has long been recognized (since 1984 by virtue of LOI No. 1418)
and, at present, it is expressly and unequivocally provided in Sections 447, 458 and 468
of the Local Government Code of 1991; (2) the issuance of DBM Circular No. 91-7 dated
June 25, 1991 and LBC No. 55 dated March 15, 1994 indicates that the national
government recognizes the power of LGUs to grant such allowances to judges; (3) in
Circular No. 91-7, the national government merely provides the guidelines for the
continued receipt of allowances by judges from LGUs while in LBC No. 55, the national
government merely tries to limit the amount of allowances LGUs may grant to judges; and
(4) in the recent case of Dadole, et al. vs. COA, the Court upheld the constitutionally
enshrined autonomy of LGUs to grant allowances to judges in any amount deemed
appropriate, depending on availability of funds, in accordance with the Local Government
Code of 1991. We rule in favor of petitioner judge.
ALPHA INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY AGENCY, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 111722. May 27, 1997.
Facts:
Petitioner Alpha Investigation and Agency, Inc. (AISA) is a private corporation
engaged in the business of providing security services to its clients, one of whom is the
Don Mariano Marcos State University. Private respondents were hired as security guards
by AISA on February 16, 1990. Five months later, 43 security guards filed before the
Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment a complaint against AISA
for non-compliance with the current minimum wage order. Private respondents have been
receiving a monthly salary of P900.00 although the security service agreement between
AISA and DMMSU provided a monthly pay of P1,200.00 for each security guard. AISA
made representations with DMMSU for an increase in the contract rates of the security
guards to enable them to pay the mandated minimum wage rates without compromising
its administrative and operational expenses. DMMSU, however, replied that, being a
government corporation, it cannot grant said request due to budgetary constraints.
Issue:
Whether or not the principal of a security service agreement be held jointly and
severally liable with the contractor for non-payment of the minimum wage.
Held:
YES. AISA's solidary liability for the amounts due the security guards finds
support in Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code. The joint and several liability of
the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor Code to ensure compliance
with its provisions, including the statutory minimum wage. The contractor is made liable
by virtue of his status as direct employer, while the principal becomes the indirect
employer of the former's employees for the purpose of paying their wages in the event of
failure of the contractor to pay them. This gives the workers ample protection consonant
with the labor and social justice provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is to be borne in
mind that wages orders, being statutory and mandatory, cannot be waived. AISA cannot
escape liability since the law provides for the joint and solidary liability of the principal and
the contractor to protect the laborers.
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 109835. November 22, 1993.
Facts:
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
applying these rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond
is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they
are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay
a license fee of P30,000.00 but also to post a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety
bond of P50,000.00. In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of
P200,000.00 with the Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II,
Book II of the same Rule, "to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited
workers as a result of recruitment violations or money claims."
Issue:
Whether or not the order of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a decision of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to post the
required appeal bond, valid.
Held:
YES. The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in
addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an
amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision
of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal bond is intended to further insure the payment of the
monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed
to guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these
claims are not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment
have been violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the
recruiter of the conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules, E.O. 247 (reorganizing the POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as
the settlement of other liabilities the recruiter may incur. As for the escrow agreement, it
was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it were, to be used only as a
last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of every claim of recruited
workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may not even be
enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be exhausted
after satisfying other subsequent claims. Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in
favor of the employee to exceed the amount of P350,000.00, which is the sum of the
bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
ALFREDO SAJONAS and CONCHITA vs. THE . THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 102377. July 5, 1996.
Facts:
On September 22, 1983, the spouses Ernesto Uychocde and Lucita Jarin agreed
to sell a parcel of residential land located in Antipolo, Rizal to the spouses Alfredo Sajonas
and Conchita R. Sajonas on installment basis as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated
September 22, 1983. On August 27, 1984, the Sajonas couple caused the annotation of
an adverse claim based on the said Contract to Sell on the title of the subject property.
Upon full payment of the purchase price, the Uychocdes executed a Deed of Sale
involving the property in question in favor of the Sajonas couple on September 4, 1984.
The deed of absolute sale was registered almost a year after, or on August 28, 1985.
Meanwhile, it appears that Domingo Pilares filed for collection of sum of money against
Ernesto Uychocde. On June 25, 1980, a Compromise Agreement was entered into by the
parties in the said case under which Ernesto Uychocde acknowledged his monetary
obligation to Domingo Pilares amounting to P27,800 and agreed to pay the same in two
years from June 25, 1980. When Uychocde failed to comply with his undertaking in the
compromise agreement, a writ of execution was issued on August 12, 1982 by the CFI of
Quezon City where the civil case was pending. Pursuant to the order of execution dated
August 3, 1982, a notice of levy on execution was issued on February 12, 1985. On
February 12, 1985, defendant sheriff Roberto Garcia of Quezon City presented said
notice of levy on execution.
Issue:
Whether or not Pilares has a better right than the Sajonas couple to the property.
Held:
YES. Under the Torrens system, registration is the operative act which gives
validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land. A person dealing with registered
land is not required to go behind the register to determine the condition of the property.
He is only charged with notice of the burdens on the property which are noted on the face
of the register or certificate of title. While it is the act of registration which is the operative
act which conveys or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned, it is likewise
true, that the subsequent sale of property covered by a Certificate of Title cannot prevail
over an adverse claim, duly sworn to and annotated on the certificate of title previous to
the sale. In sum the disputed inscription of adverse claim on the Transfer Certificate of
Title No. N-79073 was still in effect on February 12, 1985 when Quezon City Sheriff
Roberto Garcia annotated the notice of levy on execution thereto. Consequently, he is
charged with knowledge that the property sought to be levied upon on execution was
encumbered by an interest the same as or better than that of the registered owner thereof.
Such notice of levy cannot prevail over the existing adverse claim inscribed on the
certificate of title in favor of the petitioners.
AKBAYAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001.
Facts:
Invoking this right, herein petitioners — representing the youth sector — seek to
direct the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before
the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners,
around four million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline
set by the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. On January 29, 2001,
Commissioners Tancangco and Lantion submitted Memorandum No. 2001-027 on the
Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only.
Commissioner Borra called a consultation meeting among regional heads and
representatives and a number of senior staff headed by Executive Director
Mamasapunod Aguam. It was the consensus of the group, with the exception of Director
Jose Tolentino, Jr. of the ASD, to disapprove the request for additional registration of
voters on the ground that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration
shall be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a
regular election and that the Commission has no more time left to accomplish all preelection
activities.
Issue:
Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to conduct a special registration of new voters during the
period between the COMELEC's imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14,
2001 general elections.
Held:
NO. We hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189 applies in the present case, for the
purpose of upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution and denying the instant
petitions, considering that the aforesaid law explicitly provides that no registration shall
be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular
election. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because
it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. Considering the
circumstances where the writ of m a n d a m u s lies and the peculiarities of the present
case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to establish, to the satisfaction of this
Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to effectively
compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration of voters.
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY vs. GREEN ASIA CONSTRUCTION &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 188866. October 19, 2011.
Facts:
Petitioner PEZA and respondent Green Asia Construction & Development
Corporation were parties to a contract for a road network/storm drainage project. The
project was awarded to Green Asia on 14 September 1992 with a contract price of
P130,595,337.40. Tagumpay R. Jardiniano, administrator of the then EPZA and Renato
P. Legaspi, the president of Green Asia, signed the contract on 23 September 1992. The
stipulations in the contract include the contract price, the mode of payment, advance
payment, and the progress payment. These stipulations found in Articles III to VI of the
contract comprised all the liabilities pertaining to EPZA. EPZA was later on effectively
succeeded by PEZA. On 26 March 1996, Green Asia sent a letter to the PEZA Director
General through Atty. Eugenio V. Vigo, Project Director for Construction of the PEZA
Development Project. The letter, invoking Presidential Decree No. 1594, notified PEZA
of Green Asia's claim for price escalation in the amount of P9,860,169.58. This claim was
denied by PEZA through a letter signed by the Acting Corporate Secretary Atty. Nestor
Hun Nadal. The denial of the claim was anchored on Section 8, PD 1594, requiring proof
of the increase or decrease in construction cost due to the direct acts of the government.
Issue:
Whether Presidential Decree 1594 requires the contractor to prove that the price
increase of construction materials was due to the direct acts of the government before a
price escalation is granted in this payment dispute in a construction contract.
Held:
NO. Price escalation, as explained in paragraph 6 of Cl 2.1 of the IRR, is meant
to compensate for changes in the prices of relevant construction necessities during the
effectivity of the contract, resulting in more than 5% increase or decrease in the unit price
of those items. It is thus the prices of the items that have actually increased that become
the basis of the computation. The contract between PEZA and Green Asia did not
incorporate provisions prohibiting price escalation or any clause that may be interpreted
as a waiver of the price escalation. Consequently, payment of price escalation is deemed
to have included the provision for the payment of price escalation. It was therefore wrong
for PEZA to disregard PD 454 by automatically denying the claim of Green Asia for price
escalation or to require the latter to prove that the increase in the construction cost was
due to the direct acts of the government. PD 454 actually bridges the gap between PD
1594 and its IRR. PD 1594 no longer explains the provision on price adjustment, because
it is already found in PD 454 and in older laws.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 182249. March 5, 2013.
Facts:
On August 30, 2001, De Guzman was appointed on a permanent status as
Financial Management Specialist IV of TIDCORP, a government-owned and controlled
corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080. His appointment was
included in TIDCORP's Report on Personnel Actions for August 2001, which was
submitted to the CSC — Department of Budget and Management Field Office. In a letter
dated September 28, 2001, Director Leticia M. Bugtong disallowed De Guzman's
appointment because the position of Financial Management Specialist IV was not
included in the DBM's Index of Occupational Service. TIDCORP's Executive Vice
President Jane U. Tambanillo appealed the invalidation of De Guzman's appointment to
Director IV Agnes Padilla of the CSC-National Capital Region. According to Tambanillo,
Republic Act No. 8494, which amended TIDCORP's charter, empowers its Board of
Directors to create its own organizational structure and staffing pattern, and to approve
its own compensation and position classification system and qualification standards.
Issue:
Whether the Constitution empowers the CSC to prescribe and enforce civil service
rules and regulations contrary to laws passed by Congress
Held:
NO. TIDCORP is only required to furnish the CSC with its compensation and
position classification system and qualification standards so that the CSC can be properly
guided in processing TIDCORP's appointments, promotion and personnel action. The
1987 Constitution created the CSC as the central personnel agency of the government
mandated to establish a career service and promote morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It is a constitutionally
created administrative agency that possesses executive, quasi-judicial and quasilegislative
or rule-making powers. While not explicitly stated, the CSC's rule-making
power is subsumed under its designation as the government's "central personnel agency"
in Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. The original draft of Section 3
empowered the CSC to "promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, classify
positions, prescribe conditions of employment except as to compensation and other
monetary benefits which shall be provided by law." The CSC's rule-making power as a
constitutional grant is an aspect of its independence as a constitutional commission. It
places the grant of this power outside the reach of Congress, which cannot withdraw the
power at any time. As an administrative agency, the CSC's quasi-legislative power is
subject to the same limitations applicable to other administrative bodies.
BISHOP BRODERICK S. PABILLO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 216098. April 21, 2015.
Facts:
In 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436, which authorized the
COMELEC "to use an automated election system for the process of voting, counting of
votes and canvassing/consolidation of results for the May 11, 1998]national and local
elections," as well as for subsequent national and local electoral exercises. To achieve
this purpose, the COMELEC was "to procure by purchase, lease or otherwise any
supplies, equipment, materials, and services needed for the holding of the elections by
an expedited process of public bidding of vendors, suppliers or lessors." RA 8436 further
provided that the AES "shall be under the exclusive supervision and control of the
COMELEC." The petitioners stated that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in adopting Resolution No. 9922 as it violates the GPRA, which requires
competitive bidding for government procurement contracts as a general rule.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing Resolution
No. 9922 and in subsequently entering into the Extended Warranty Contract Program 1
with Smartmatic-TM.
Held:
YES. The Court has not even gone to this extreme and prohibited the re-use of
the PCOS machines. Yet, the COMELEC's own spokesperson has conceded that when
push comes to shove, automated elections are still possible. There are no qualms about
the task of having the PCOS machines repaired and refurbished. However, there are
serious and unignorable legal flaws about how the COMELEC intends to pursue this
undertaking. Bluntly, the COMELEC has failed to justify its reasons for directly contracting
with Smartmatic-TIM: it had not shown that any of the conditions under Section 50, Article
XVI of the GPRA exists; its claims of impracticality were not supported by independently
verified and competent data; and lastly, its perceived "warranty extension" is, in reality,
just a circumvention of the procurement law. For all these counts, the conclusion thus
reached is that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. As a result, its Resolution No. 9922 and the Extended
Warranty Contract (Program 1) should be stricken down, and necessarily, all amounts
paid to Smartmatic-TIM pursuant to the said contract, if any, being public funds sourced
from taxpayers' money, should be returned to the government in accordance with the
procedures contained in existing rules and regulations. Note that the disposition of these
cases does not prohibit the COMELEC from resorting to direct contracting anew or other
alternative method of procurement with any service contractor, subject to compliance with
the conditions provided in the GPRA and all the pertinent rules and procedures.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 176162. October 9, 2012.
Facts:
Respondents Dante G. Guevarra and Augustus F . Cezar were the Officer-in-
Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively, of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines in 2005. On September 27, 2005, petitioner
Honesto L. Cueva, then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against
Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, falsification of official
documents, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, being notoriously
undesirable, and for violating Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6713. Cueva charged
Guevarra with falsification of a public document, specifically the Application for Bond of
Accountable Officials and Employees of the Republic of the Philippines, in which the latter
denied the existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases. As the head of the
school, Guevarra was required to be bonded in order to be able to engage in financial
transactions on behalf of PUP.
Issue:
Whether the CSC has jurisdiction over administrative cases filed directly with it
against officials of a chartered state university.
Held:
YES. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the
power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal. Section 2 (1),
Article IX (B) of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1341, PUP
became a chartered state university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled
corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are
subject to the provisions of E.O. No. 292. The understanding by the CA of Section 47,
Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of E.O. No. 292 which states that "a complaint may
be filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or
employee" is that the CSC can only take cognizance of a case filed directly before it if the
complaint was made by a private citizen. The Court is not unaware of the use of the words
"private citizen" in the subject provision and the plain meaning rule of statutory
construction which requires that when the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken
to mean exactly what it says. The Court, however, finds that a simplistic interpretation is
not in keeping with the intention of the statute and prevailing jurisprudence. It is a wellestablished
rule that laws should be given a reasonable interpretation so as not to defeat
the very purpose for which they were passed. As such, "a literal interpretation is to be
rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results."
GOV. EXEQUIEL B. JAVIER vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 215847. January 12, 2016.
Facts:
On December 3, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa enacted the Omnibus Election
Code. Coercion, as an election offense, is punishable by imprisonment of not less than
one year but not more than six years. Notably, Section 68 of the Election Code provides
that the Commission may administratively disqualify a candidate who violates Section 261
(d) or (e). On February 20, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7890 amending the
definition of Grave Coercion under the Revised Penal Code. It increased the penalty for
coercion committed in violation of a person's right to suffrage to prision mayor. Further,
Section 3 of R.A. 7890 expressly repealed Section 26, paragraphs (d) (1) and (2) of the
Election Code. On September 3, 2012, Valderrama Municipal Vice-Mayor Christopher B.
Maguad filed an administrative complaint for Gross Misconduct/Dereliction of Duty and
Abuse of Authority against Mayor Mary Joyce U. Roquero.
Issue:
Whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion when it issued Resolution
No. 9581 fixing the 2013 election period from January 13, 2013 until June 12, 2013, for
the purpose of determining administrative and criminal liability for election offenses.
Held:
NO. No less than the Constitution authorizes the Commission to fix the dates of
the election period. Article IX-C, Section 9 provides: Unless otherwise fixed by the
Commission in special cases, the election period shall commence ninety days before the
day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter. Evidently, the 120-day period is merely
the default election period. The Commission is not precluded from fixing the length and
the starting date of the election period to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections. This is not merely a statutory but a constitutionally granted power of
the Commission. Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the Commission's act of fixing
the election period does not amount to an encroachment on legislative prerogative. The
Commission did not prescribe or defined the elements of election offenses. Congress
already defined them through the Omnibus Election Code, the Fair Elections Act, and
other pertinent election laws. There is also no merit in the petitioner's argument that the
extended election period only applies to pre-election activities other than the
determination of administrative or criminal liability for violating election laws. Neither the
law nor the Constitution authorizes the use of two distinct election periods for the same
election. The law does not distinguish between election offenses and other pre-election
activities in terms of the applicable election period. Where the law does not distinguish,
neither should this Court.
LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 186739-960. April 17, 2013.
Facts:
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his
term, he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society
groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and
monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General
Nakar. Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to
transport salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three
(43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one hundred seventy-eight (178)
were signed by his co-accused Guillermo T. Sabiduria, then municipal administrator of
General Nakar. On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221
Information for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official
Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria
Issue:
Whether the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest
product is solely with the DENR, and no one else.
Held:
NO. The LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample authority to promulgate
rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products,
provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully
complied with. While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality
charged with the mandate of promulgating rules and regulations for the protection of the
environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only government
instrumentality clothed with such authority. While the law has designated DENR as the
primary agency tasked to protect the environment, it was not the intention of the law to
arrogate unto the DENR the exclusive prerogative of exercising this function. Whether in
ordinary or in legal parlance, the word "primary" can never be taken to be synonymous
with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions of PD 705 nor EO 192
suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the
exclusion of all other government instrumentalities. On the contrary, the claim of DENR's
supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy
enshrined in the 1987 Constitution in relation to the general welfare clause under Sec. 16
of the LGC of 1991. Municipal governments are clothed with authority to enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon them by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants, and ensure the protection of property in the municipality.
BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. BORACAY FOUNDATION, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE
OF THE PROVINCE OF AKLAN
G.R. No. 196870. June 26, 2012.
Facts:
In 2005, Boracay 2010 Summit was held and participated in by representatives
from national government agencies, local government units, and the private sector. The
Summit aimed "to reestablish a common vision of all stakeholders to ensure the
conservation, restoration, and preservation of Boracay Island" and "to develop an action
plan that would allow all sectors to work in concert among and with each other for the
long term benefit and sustainability of the island and the community." The Summit yielded
a Terminal Report stating that the participants had shared their dream of having worldclass
land, water and air infrastructure, as well as given their observations that
government support was lacking, infrastructure was poor, and, more importantly, the
influx of tourists to Boracay was increasing. The Report showed that there was a need to
expand the port facilities at Caticlan due to congestion in the holding area of the existing
port, caused by inadequate facilities, thus tourists suffered long queues while waiting for
the boat ride going to the island.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent province, proponent of the reclamation project,
failed to comply with relevant rules and regulations in the acquisition of an ECC.
Held:
YES. The DENR is the government agency vested with delegated powers to
review and evaluate all EIA reports, and to grant or deny ECCs to project proponents. It
is the DENR that has the duty to implement the EIS system. It appears, however, that
respondent DENR-EMB RVI's evaluation of this reclamation project was problematic,
based on the valid questions raised by petitioner. An EIA is a 'process that involves
predicting and evaluating the likely impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on
the environment during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also
includes designing appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures
addressing these consequences to protect the environment and the community's welfare.
Thus, the EIA process must have been able to predict the likely impact of the reclamation
project to the environment and to prevent any harm that may otherwise be caused. The
project now before us involves reclamation of land that is more than five times the size of
the original reclaimed land. Furthermore, the area prior to construction merely contained
a jetty port, whereas the proposed expansion involves so much more. The Court chooses
to remand these matters to respondent DENR-EMB RVI for it to make a proper study,
and if it should find necessary, to require respondent Province to address these
environmental issues raised by petitioner and submit the correct EIA report as required
by the project's specifications.
FIDEL M. BAÑARES vs. ELIZABETH BALISING
G.R. No. 132624. March 13, 2000.
Facts:
Petitioners herein were charged with sixteen criminal cases of estafa filed by
private respondents herein. After they were arraigned and pleaded not guilty, they led a
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the cases were prematurely filed. The parties thereto
failed to undergo conciliation proceedings at the barangay lever that was required by law
considering that the parties lived in the same barangay. The Municipal Trial Court first
denied the motion on the ground that they failed to seasonably invoke said ground, which
amounted to waiver of the right to use it as a basis for dismissing the cases. After a motion
for reconsideration was filed, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed all sixteen cases against
petitioners without prejudice. More than two months later, private respondents filed a
motion to revive the above-mentioned criminal cases against petitioners stating that the
requirement of referral to the barangay for conciliation had already been complied with.
Petitioners filed an opposition to the cases claiming that the dismissal had long become
final and executory. The motion to revive was granted by the Municipal Trial Court and
the motion for reconsideration was denied. The Regional Trial Court of Antipolo denied
the petitioners' petition for certiorari, as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain
finality if not appealed within the reglementary period, as in the present case.
Held:
YES. A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving
nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the
court. As distinguished therefrom, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose
of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The Supreme
Court ruled that the Regional Trial Court erred when it denied the petition for certiorari,
injunction and prohibition and when it ruled that the order of the Municipal Trial Court
dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality
and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive. Sec. 18 of the
1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure merely states that when a case covered by
the rule is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issue to the Lupon, the same
may be revived only after the dispute is submitted to barangay conciliation as required
under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case
may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal
or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed. The petition was granted.
PURIFICACION DE URBANO vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 137904. October 19, 2001.
Facts:
In 1971, petitioners mortgaged their 200-square meter property in Quezon City to
respondent GSIS to secure a housing loan of P47,000.00. As petitioners failed to pay
their loan when it fell due, the GSIS foreclosed the mortgage on October 28, 1983. GSIS
emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction of the property. Petitioners pleaded
several times to respondent GSIS to give them a chance to redeem the property. The
GSIS acceded to their plea but still they failed to redeem the subject property. After the
redemption period expired, the GSIS consolidated its title over the property, in favor of
the GSIS. On August 11, 1987, the GSIS approved under Resolution No. 342 the "sale
of the subject property to respondent Crispina dela Cruz for a consideration of
P267,000.00 CASH." Having learned about the sale of the subject property to dela Cruz,
petitioner Arrienda wrote a letter to the GSIS on September 27, 1987 protesting the said
sale and requesting its reconsideration and recall. Arrienda again wrote another letter to
the GSIS requesting for a formal investigation of the circumstances leading to the sale.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has a right to repurchase the property.
Held:
NO. The Court ruled that petitioners are not entitled to repurchase the subject
property as a matter of right and the sale of the property to respondent dela Cruz cannot
be annulled on the basis of their alleged right to repurchase. The GSIS Board exercised
its discretion in accordance with law in denying petitioners' requests which was based not
on whim or caprice, but on a factual assessment of the financial capacity of the petitioners
to make good their repeated offers to purchase the subject property. The action taken by
the GSIS was well within the powers of the Board under the then GSIS charter or PD.
1146. The Court also upheld the GSIS in disposing the subject property through public
bidding. Being a financial institution extending loans to its members, the foreclosure of
the subject property as collateral to a loan was done in the regular course of business. Its
sale to private respondent dela Cruz falls within the exception provided by COA Circular
No. 86-264 allowing the disposal by government financial institutions of foreclosed assets
or collaterals acquired in the regular course of business. The Court also ruled that the
GSIS did not act in bad faith in their dealing with petitioners. The Court also considered
the fact that the GSIS sold the subject property to respondent dela Cruz only after giving
petitioners an almost one year opportunity to repurchase the property and only after
ascertaining that the purchase price proposed by private respondent dela Cruz in
payment of the subject property would benefit the GSIS.
GOV. ANTONIO CALINGIN, GOV. ANTONIO CALINGIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 154616. July 12, 2004.
Facts:
The Office of the President issued a Resolution dated March 22, 2001 suspending
Gov. Calingin for 90 days. On April 30, 2001, Undersecretary Eduardo R. Soliman of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government, by authority of Secretary Jose D. Lina,
Jr., issued a Memorandum implementing the said Resolution of the Office of the
President. On May 3, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed before the Office of the President a Motion
for Reconsideration. The DILG Memorandum bore the authority of the COMELEC which
granted an exemption to the election ban in the movement of any public officer in its
Resolution No. 3992 promulgated on April 24, 2001. This was in pursuance to COMELEC
Resolution No. 340. On May 7, 2001, Gov. Calingin filed a petition for prohibition before
the Court of Appeals to prevent the DILG from executing the assailed suspension order.
However, on May 11, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the said petition and by
resolution issued on July 1, 2002, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the President already final and
executory.
Held:
YES. The decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No
motion for reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to
the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of the decision.
Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution. A perusal of the
records, however, reveals that the Resolution was approved and signed on March 22,
2001 by Executive Secretary Renato de Villa by the authority of the President. Hence, the
approval was before the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3992 on April 24,
2001. The record also shows that the request to implement the said suspension order
was filed on March 22, 2001 by the Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of
the President pursuant to the requirements stated in the Resolution. Moreover,
COMELEC Resolution No. 3529, which may be applied by analogy and in relation to Sec.
2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3401 merely requires the request to be in writing indicating
the office and place from which the officer is removed, and the reason for said movement,
and submitted together with the formal complaint executed under oath and containing the
specific charges and the answer to said complaint. The request for the exemption was
accompanied with the Affidavit of Complaint, Affidavit of Controversion, Reply and Draft
Resolution. The pertinent documents required by the COMELEC to substantiate the
request were submitted. There being a proper basis for its grant of exemption, COMELEC
Resolution No. 3992 is valid.
GOVERNOR MANUEL M. LAPID vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142261. June 29, 2000.
Facts:
Petitioner Lapid, Governor of the Province of Pampanga, and five other provincial
officers were charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service for demanding and collecting fees for quarrying operations
beyond the P40.00 prescribed under the present provincial ordinance. The Ombudsman
rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for misconduct and meted on petitioner the
penalty of suspension for one year without pay. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but
the same was denied. The decision was brought to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for review with petitioner praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction. After the lapse of the period without the Court of Appeals resolving the
issuance of said writ, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus seeking the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the
reversal of the assailed decision. Petitioner further alleged the apparent prejudgment of
the merits of the case by the Appellate Court in denying his prayer for preliminary
injunction and that the DILG acted prematurely in implementing the decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding herein
petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one
(1) year suspension without pay is immediately executory pending appeal.
Held:
NO. Section 27 of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 7, Rule III
of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman enumerate the final and
unappealable punishments imposed by the Ombudsman. Suspension for one year
without pay is not among those listed as final and unappealable. Thus, the same cannot
be implemented pending appeal. The legal maxim "inclusion unius est exclusio alterius"
applies. The provisions of the Local Government Code and the Administrative Code of
1987 mandating execution pending appeal do not apply to petitioner who was charged
with violations of the Ombudsman Act of 1989, and said laws were not even suppletory
to the Ombudsman Law in the absence of any provision in the latter providing for such
suppletory application. Where there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that
which was specially designed for the said case must prevail over the other.
MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO vs. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 169202. March 5, 2010.
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine
passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner being married to Francisco R.
Rallonza, the following entries appear in her passport: "Rallonza" as her surname, "Maria
Virginia" as her given name, and "Remo" as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the
validity of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal
of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A.,
with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal and ruled that Section
5 (d) of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 "offers no leeway
for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or declaration of
nullity of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport
purposes." The Office of the President further held that in case of conflict between a
general and special law, the latter will control the former regardless of the respective
dates of passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA 8239.
Issue:
Whether petitioner, who originally used her husband's surname in her expired
passport, can revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite
the subsistence of her marriage.
Held:
NO. In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either
adopt her husband's surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she chooses to
adopt her husband's surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires the
submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers
to continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her
from continuously using her maiden name. However, once a married woman opted to
adopt her husband's surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden
name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5 (d) of RA 8239. These instances are:
(1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since
petitioner's marriage to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in
the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of
her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. Even assuming
RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law
specifically dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the provisions of Title XIII of
the Civil Code which is the general law on the use of surnames.
COMPANY, INC. LICHAUCO & COMPANY, INC. vs. SILVERIO APOSTOL
G.R. No. 19628. December 4, 1922.
Facts:
The petitioner asserts that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052 of the Philippine Legislature, it has
"an absolute and unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine
cattle for the manufacture of serum from Pnom-Pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippine
Islands" and that the respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner the
restriction requiring the immunization of the cattle before shipment. The respondents, on
the other hand, rely upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and upon
Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, promulgated on July 29, 1922,
by the Director of Agriculture, in relation with Department Order No. 6, promulgated on
July 28, 1922, by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as supplying
authority for the action taken.
Issue:
Whether or not there is sufficient ground for granting the writs of mandamus and
injunction filed by petitioner.
Held:
No. We find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the
bringing of animals into the Islands at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers
on the Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a
dangerous communicable disease prevails in some foreign country, and the provision is
intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. Section 1770 is the backbone
of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the special emergency
therein contemplated; and if that section should be obliterated, the administrative
authorities here would be powerless to protect the agricultural industry of the Islands from
the spread of animal infection originating abroad. It is well settled that repeals by
implication are not to be favored. And where two statutes cover, in whole or in part, the
same matter, and are not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court — no purpose to
repeal being clearly expressed or indicated — is, if possible, to give effect to both. In other
words, it must not be supposed that the Legislature intended by a later statute to repeal
a prior one on the same subject, unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so
clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject,
and therefore to displace the prior statute.
Republic vs Herbieto

Facts:
Respondents are Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC a single application for registration of two
parcels of land. They claimed to be owners by virtue of its purchase from their parents
Republic filed an opposition arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession required
by law; (2) Respondents’ muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain
MTC granted the application for registration of the parcels of land of Jeremias and David.
CA affirmed the decision of MTC holding that the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report
dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership.
Republic appealed to the SC contending that 1) MTC had no jurisdiction since there was a procedural defect in filing of a
single application for two parcels of land; 2) Respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier.

ISSUE: W/N there is a procedural defect which resulted to MTC’s lack of jurisdiction

HELD:
YES, but not with the ground stated by the petitioner, but because respondents, failed to comply with the publication
requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the
case.[26] They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof
PUBLICATION: MTC did not acquire jurisdiction because publication on the Freeman and the Banat News was only done
3 months after the hearing which renders inutile the intention of the mandatory publication. In the instant Petition, the initial
hearing was held on 03 September 1999.  While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02
August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat News only on 19
December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing. Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the
date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective.  Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The
Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for him to
appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents’ application for registration, and to present
his claim and evidence in support of such claim
With regard to period of possession, Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject
Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title. The said lots are public lands classified as
alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963 and the respondents were seeking for a confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title through judicial legalization. Under Sec.48 of the Public Land Act, which is the ruling law in this case,
Respondents were not able to prove their continuous ownership of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier, because said lands
were only classified as alienable and disposable only on June 25, 1963
Goldenway Merchandising Corporation vs. Equitable PCI Bank G.R. No. 195540, March 13, 2013

Facts:
On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation executed a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI
Bank over three parcels of land. The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) loan granted to petitioner.
Petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, so respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13, 2000.
Accordingly, a Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent on January 26, 2001. On February 16, 2001, the Certificate of
Sale was registered.
In a letter dated March 8, 2001, petitioner’s counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check.
However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been
registered and consolidated in favor of respondent March 9, 2001.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages contending that the 1-year period of redemption under
Act 3135 should apply, and not the shorter redemption period under RA 8791 as applying RA 8791 would result in the
impairment of obligations of contracts and would violate the equal protection clause under the constitution.
The RTC dismissed the action of the petitioner ruling that redemption was made belatedly and that there was no redemption
made at all. The CA affirmed the RTC, thus this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not the redemption period should be the 1-year period provided under Act 3135, and not the shorter period under
RA 8791 as the parties expressly agreed that foreclosure would be in accordance with Act 3135.

Held:
No. The shorter period under RA 8791 should apply.
The one-year period of redemption is counted from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale. In this case, the
parties provided in their real estate mortgage contract that upon petitioner’s default and the latter’s entire loan obligation
becoming due, respondent may immediately foreclose the mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or
extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended.
Amending Act no. 3135 is Sec 47 of RA 8791, which stated an exception made in the case of juridical persons which are
allowed to exercise the right of redemption only “until, but not after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale”
and in no case more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever comes first.
The legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose properties were foreclosed
and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and within the
prescribed time limit, to make it effective.
Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State
and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to
change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or
as experience may demonstrate the necessity.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. FERNANDO P. DE LEON, Respondent.

FACTS: Respondent Fernando P. de Leon retired as Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1992,
after 44 years of service to the government. He applied for retirement under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 910, invoking R.A.
No. 3783, as amended by R.A. No. 4140, which provides that chief state prosecutors hold the same rank as judges.
Thereafter, and for more than nine years, respondent continuously received his retirement benefits, until 2001, when he
failed to receive his monthly pension.

Respondent learned that GSIS cancelled the payment of his pension because the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) informed GSIS that respondent was not qualified to retire under R.A. No. 910; that the law was meant to apply only
to justices and judges; and that having the same rank and qualification as a judge did not entitle respondent to the retirement
benefits provided thereunder.

Respondent then filed a petition for mandamus before the CA, praying that petitioner be compelled to continue paying his
monthly pension and to pay his unpaid monthly benefits from 2001. The CA granted the petition. Petitioner GSIS is now
before this Court, assailing the Decision of the CA and the Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration. GSIS argues
that the writ of mandamus issued by the CA is not proper because it compels petitioner to perform an act that is contrary to
law.

ISSUE:

Did the CA err in granting the petition for mandamus?

HELD: 
This case involves a former government official who, after honorably serving office for 44 years, was comfortably enjoying
his retirement in the relative security of a regular monthly pension, but found himself abruptly denied the benefit and left
without means of sustenance. This is a situation that obviously cries out for the proper application of retirement laws, which
are in the class of social legislation. Indeed, retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons
intended to be benefited, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve their humanitarian purpose.

In this case, respondent was able to establish that he has a clear legal right to the reinstatement of his retirement benefits. In
stopping the payment of respondents monthly pension, GSIS relied on the memorandum of the DBM, which, in turn, was
based on the Chief Presidential Legal Counsels opinion that respondent, not being a judge, was not entitled to retire under
R.A. No. 910. And because respondent had been mistakenly allowed to receive retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910,
GSIS erroneously concluded that respondent was not entitled to any retirement benefits at all, not even under any other
extant retirement law. This is flawed logic.

Respondents disqualification from receiving retirement benefits under R.A. No. 910 does not mean that he is disqualified
from receiving any retirement benefit under any other existing retirement law.
Prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8291, retiring government employees who were not entitled to the benefits under R.A.
No. 910 had the option to retire under either of two laws: Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 660, or
P.D. No. 1146.

Respondent had complied with these requirements at the time of his retirement. GSIS does not dispute this. Accordingly,
respondent is entitled to receive the benefits provided under Section 12 of the same law. To grant respondent these benefits
does not equate to double retirement, as GSIS mistakenly claims. Since respondent has been declared ineligible to retire
under R.A. No. 910, GSIS should simply apply the proper retirement law to respondents claim, in substitution of R.A. No.
910.
It must also be underscored that GSIS itself allowed respondent to retire under R.A. No. 910, following jurisprudence laid
down by this Court.

One could hardly fault respondent, though a seasoned lawyer, for relying on petitioners interpretation of the pertinent
retirement laws, considering that the latter is tasked to administer the governments retirement system. He had the right to
assume that GSIS personnel knew what they were doing. Since the change in circumstances was through no fault of
respondent, he cannot be prejudiced by the same.
Castillo v Tolentino

Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or
exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on
various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24
of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution

Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of
the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill
which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House
bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed,
what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of
the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and
problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill
from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the
Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had
certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also
that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings
on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.
MARIA BUENA OBRA, petitioner, 
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (Jollar Industrial Sales and Services Inc.), respondents.

FACTS: 
Juanito Buena Obra, husband of petitioner, worked as a driver for twenty-four (24) years and five (5) months. His first and
second employers were logging companies. Thereafter, he was employed at Jollar Industrial Sales and Services Inc. as a
dump truck driver from January 1980 to June 1988. He was assigned to about 4 project within that time frame.

On 27 June 1988, Juanito suffered a heart attack while driving a dump truck inside the work compound, and died shortly
thereafter. In the Report of Death submitted by his employer to the Social Security System (SSS), Juanito expired at the
Worker’s Quarters at 10:30 a.m., of Myocardial Infarction.

Petitioner Maria M. Buenaobra immediately filed her claim for death benefits under the SSS law. She started receiving her
pension in November 1988. Petitioner was, however, unaware of the other compensation benefits due her under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended, or the Law on Employees’ Compensation. In September 1998, or more than ten (10) years
after the death of her husband, that she learned of the benefits under P.D. No. 626 through the television program of then
broadcaster Ted Failon who informed that one may claim for Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) benefits if the
spouse died while working for the company. Petitioner prepared the documents to support her claim for ECC benefits. On
23 April 1999, she filed with the SSS her claim for funeral benefits under PD 626.

SSS denied the claim of petitioner for funeral benefits ruling that the cause of death of Juanito was not work-connected,
absent a causal relationship between the illness and the job. Re-evaluation was also denied. Records were then elevated to
the ECC.

The appellate court then held that the petitioner’s cause of action has prescribed. Petitioner’s husband died on 27 June 1988.
She filed her claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626 or the Law on Employees’ Compensation only on 23 April 1999,
or more than ten (10) years from his death. The CA applied Art. 1142(2) of the Civil Code (brought within ten (10) years
from the time the right of action accrues: (2) Upon an obligation created by law

ISSUE:
WON the claim has prescribed
WON the illness of the deceased is work-related

HELD:
We agree with the petitioner that her claim for death benefits under the SSS law should be considered as the Employees’
Compensation claim itself. This is but logical and reasonable because the claim for death benefits which petitioner filed
with the SSS is of the same nature as her claim before the ECC. Furthermore, the SSS is the same agency with which
Employees’ Compensation claims are filed. As correctly contended by the petitioner, when she filed her claim for death
benefits with the SSS under the SSS law, she had already notified the SSS of her employees’ compensation claim, because
the SSS is the very same agency where claims for payment of sickness/disability/death benefits under P.D. No. 626 are filed.

It is true that under the proviso, the employees’ compensation claim shall be filed with the GSIS/SSS within a reasonable
time as provided by law. It should be noted that neither statute nor jurisprudence has defined the limits of “reasonable time.”
Thus, what is reasonable time depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.

In the case at bar, we also find petitioner’s claim to have been filed within a reasonable time considering the situation and
condition of the petitioner. We have ruled that when the petitioner filed her claim for death benefits under the SSS law, her
claim for the same benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Law should be considered as filed. The evidence shows
that the System failed to process her compensation claim. Under the circumstances, the petitioner cannot be made to suffer
for the lapse committed by the System. It is the avowed policy of the State to construe social legislations liberally in favor
of the beneficiaries. This court has time and again upheld the policy of liberality of the law in favor of labor.

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND AIDA

Facts:
The assailed Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals reversed a ruling by petitioner, a government agency organized
under P.D. 422, as amended, holding that private respondent, a policeman’s widow, is not entitled to compensation. The
facts are not disputed and are quoted by the assailed Decision 4 from the reversed judgment of petitioner as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The decreased was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station, assigned at the Pasig Provincial Jail as 2nd Shift Jailer
with tour of duty from 7:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. He had been serving the Mandaluyong Police Station for more than twenty
years, since he first entered the service on April 1, 1964, until his death on November 19, 1988.

Records disclosed that on November 19, 1988, at around 11:50 in the evening, the decreased was infront (sic) of the Office
of the Criminal Investigation of the Mandaluyong Police Station and was talking with another policeman, PFC. Ruben Cruz,
when another policeman, Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who had just arrived, immediately got off the car holding his service firearm
and approached the deceased and without saying any word, he fired three successive shots at the surprised police sergeant
which sent him slumped to the ground. The deceased, however, although critically wounded, drew his side firearm and fired
back, twice hitting fatally Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who was still advancing towards him and uttering ‘ano, ano.’ Both fell, fatally
wounded, and were rushed to the Mandaluyong Medical Center, but Sgt. Alvaran was pronounced dead upon arrival. Pat.
Cesar Arcilla, died in the same hospital, the day after.

Records further disclosed that previous to that shooting incident, it was learned that the same, stemmed from a family feud,
wherein Sgt. Alvaran’s sons, stabbed the patrolman’s nephew, a day before (November 18, 1988). Such quarrel was
aggravated when the latter fired shots on (sic) on the air and uttered defamatory words before the relatives of the former.
The presence of Sgt. Alvaran at the Mandaluyong Police Station, that night of November 19, 1988, (when he was supposed
to be in the Pasig Provincial Jail, as 2nd Shift Jailer), was to accompany his son who was to be interviewed at the same and
to shed light with regards (sic) that stabbing incident which he got involved (in) a day before.

Issue:
The respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the private respondent is entitled to the compensation benefit under
P.D. 626, as amended, on account of the death of her husband, P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran.

Ruling:
in Vicente v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 14 we held that in case of doubt, "the sympathy of the law on social
security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor."
For this reason, this Court lends a very sympathetic ear to the cries of the poor widows and orphans of police officers. If we
must demand — as we ought to — strict accountability from our policemen in safeguarding peace and order day and night,
we must also to the same extent be ready to compensate their loved ones who, by their untimely death, are left without any
means of supporting themselves.
Torres vs. Ventura 187 SCRA 96 , July 02, 1990

FACTS:
Petitioner was the leasehold tenant of a 4,000 square-meter parcel of land included in the Florencio Firme Estate and located
at Caloocan, Cabatuan, Isabela. In 1972, when Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law, petitioner was the tiller of the
aforementioned piece of land and was automatically deemed owner of the property. Under Presidential Decree No. 27, any
form of transfer of those lands within the coverage of the law is prohibited except as otherwise provided therein.

In 1978, urgently in need of money, petitioner was forced to enter into what is called a "selda" agreement, with private
respondent, wherein he transferred his rights of possession and enjoyment over the landholding in question to the latter
inconsideration of a loan in the amount of P5,000.00 to be paid not earlier than 1980. As part of the agreement, petitioner
signed an "Affidavit of Waiver" whereby he waived all his rights over the property in favor of private respondent. According
to petitioner, it was also agreed upon by them that upon the payment of the loaned amount, private respondent will deliver
possession and enjoyment of the property back to petitioner.Two years later or in 1980, petitioner offered to pay the
loanedamount but private respondent asked for an extension of one more year to continue cultivating the land and enjoying its
fruits. Because of this, the money being offered by petitioner to pay for the loan was utilized for other purposes. In 1981,
though petitioner really wanted to get the property back, he could not do so because he lacked the necessary funds. It was
only in 1985 when petitioner was able to save enough money to make another offer but this time private respondent
categorically denied said offer and refused to vacate the land.Hence, petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay captain of
Magsaysay, Cabatuan, Isabela stating therein that he mortgaged his land to private respondent and that he already wanted to
redeem it. The waiver was declared null and void. Upon appeal, the decision is reversed. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: Who is the rightful owner of the land?

RULING:
The petitioner has the better right to the property.It is not disputed by private respondent that petitioner was in fact the tiller of
the subject land when Presidential Decree No. 27 was promulgated in 1972. As a consequence of the law, petitioner was
granted the right to possess and enjoy the property for himself. The Court of Appeals, believed that petitioner completely
waived his rights over the land as evidenced by the Affidavit of Waiver he executed. According to the Court of Appeals, the
said Affidavit of Waiver is valid because at the time of its execution, petitioner was not yet the owner of the land there having
been no title issued to him yet. As such, continued the Court of Appeals, the Affidavit of Waiver did not violate Presidential
Decree No. 27. The Court of Appeals further added that petitioner abandoned his landholding and received benefits under
the agreement, hence, should not be rewarded at the expense of private respondent.

After a careful scrutiny of the two conflicting decisions and an exhaustive study of the laws and jurisprudence applicable to
this case, We affirm the judgment of the trial court. First, of all, We have given much weight to the finding of the trial court
that what was entered upon by the parties herein was a contract of mortgage. It need not be stressed that in the matter of
credibility of witnesses, We rely heavily on the findings of the trial court because it had the opportunity to meet them face to
face. As the trial court observed, petitioner's version is more convincing because of the apparent evasive attitude of private
respondent as compared to the candid testimony of the petitioner. 3chanrobles virtual law library
FRANCISCO ESTOLAS, PETITIONER, VS. ADOLFO MABALOT, RESPONDENT.

Fatcs:
"On November 11, 1973, a Certificate of Land Transfer (hereinafter referred to as CLT) was issued in favor of respondent
over a 5,000 square meter lot (hereinafter referred to as subject land) located in Barangay Samon, Sta. Maria, Pangasinan.  
Sometime in May, 1978, needing money for medical treatment, respondent passed on the subject land to the petitioner for
the amount of P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice.  According to respondent, there was only a verbal mortgage; while
according to petitioner, a sale had taken place.  Acting on the transfer, the DAR officials in Sta. Maria, Pangasinan
authorized the survey and issuance of an Emancipation Patent, leading to the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3736 on December 4, 1987, in favor of the petitioner.

"Sometime in May, 1988, respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner before the Barangay Lupon in Pangasinan for
the purpose of redeeming the subject land.  When no amicable settlement was reached, the case was referred to the
Department of Agrarian Reform's (hereinafter referred to as DAR) regional office at Pilar, Sta. Maria, Pangasinan.

"On July 8, 1988, Atty. Linda F. Peralta of the DAR's District Office submitted her investigation report finding that
respondent merely gave the subject land to petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan he had incurred from the latter;
and recommending that the CLT remain in the name of respondent and that the money loan be returned to petitioner.

"Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 20, 1988, petitioner insisted that the subject land had been sold to him by
respondent and requested the DAR to cancel the CLT in respondent's name.  Another investigation was conducted on the
matter which led to the Order dated March 9, 1989, issued by DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa.  In the said Order,
the DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of petitioner as constituting abandonment
thereof, and denied respondent's prayer for redemption of the subject land.  Respondent's request for reinvestigation was
denied in a Resolution, dated April 11, 1989.

"Thus, on May 3, 1989, respondent appealed the case to the DAR Central Office which, on August 28, 1990, issued an
Order reversing the assailed Order of DAR Regional Director Antonio M. Nuesa and ordering the petitioner to return the
subject land to respondent.  Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on June 8, 1992.  He filed an Appeal with
the Office of the President which was dismissed in a Decision dated August 29, 1994.  Petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Decision was also denied in an Order dated November 28, 1994.  Likewise, petitioner's second
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated July 5, 1995."[4]

Issue:

"A. Whether or not in law there is a valid abandonment made by Respondent Mabalot.

Ruling:
The subject property was awarded to respondent by virtue of PD 27.  On November 11, 1973,[9] a CLT was issued in his
favor.  PD 27 specifically provides that when private agricultural land -- whether classified as landed estate or not is
primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy, the tenant farmers thereof shall be deemed
owners of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated, and three (3) hectares if irrigated.

Petitioner avers that respondent neither protested when the former had the subject land surveyed and planted with 40 mango
trees, nor attempted to return the money he had borrowed from petitioner in 1976.  Because the lot has been abandoned by
respondent, the beneficiary, and because PD 27 does not prohibit the transfer of properties acquired under it, petitioner
theorizes that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) may award the land to another qualified farmer-grantee. [10]
VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE UNION

FACTS:
1. Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo",
had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company) since 1958. 

2. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had
with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows: 
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees workers covered by
this Agreement. 

3. The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but was renewed the following day, March 4, 1964. 

4. Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the
employer was not precluded "from making an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however,
Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to — paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic
Act No. 875, as follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of
their members in any such labor organization". 

5. Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its members with any labor organization, Appellee
presented his resignation to appellant Union in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated his resignation on
September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letter to the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from
the service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. 

6. The management of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could achieve a
satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This
prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. 58894 in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "union
security clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and
contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9 (d) and (e). 

ISSUE/S:
WON RA 3350 introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as
follows: ... "but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members
in any such labor organization" is unconstitutional

WON RA 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations when it "prohibits all the members of a given
religious sect from joining any labor union if such sect prohibits affiliations of their members thereto" 5 ; and, consequently,
deprives said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution

RULING:

1. NO. R.A. No. 3350 is constitutional on all counts. It must be pointed out that the free exercise of religious profession or
belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore, yield to the former.

2. No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced
to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any
closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs
on the sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. 
Calalang vs Williams

Facts:
The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to the Director of the Public
Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along the following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2)  along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the
approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCommonwealth Act No. 548 
which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of
and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on
August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced
the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO.
548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom
of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people?

Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of
public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the
public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the
State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which
should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent
curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and
the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may  at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of
powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
Vda. de Santos v. Garcia

Facts:
This case comes to us for review from the Court of Agrarian Relations. The only issue raised is whether a tenant, who reaps
crops without the previous knowledge and consent of the landholder, may be ejected from the land.

Respondent was found by the Court of Agrarian Relations to have reaped a portion of the 1958-1959 crop without first
notifying petitioner landholder, contrary to his earlier assurance to petitioner’s son, Gregorio Santos, that all the palay
harvest had been taken to the threshing site and that nothing else remained on the land. Discovery of the remaining palay
here complained of to have been unlawfully reaped, estimated to be two cavans, came only when petitioner’s son happened
to go to respondent’s landholding for the purpose of surveying the same.

Upon the above facts, respondent Judge Domingo M. Cabangon, before whom the case was tried, ordered the ejectment of
the Respondent. On a motion for reconsideration filed, the order of ejectment was reversed, the said tribunal
declaring:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Humanly, however, it would be revolting against the conscience of man if by reason of such a violation involving an
insignificant amount which does not even disturb one meal, or even the ‘segundo almuerzo,’ so to speak, of petitioner, the
tenant’s ejectment would be meted out, thus causing him misery and hunger . . . Under these particular circumstances, the
Court will be willing to be lenient, considering that the amount involved in the violation of the law is so small but inflicting
bigger penalty such as his ejectment from his landholding which is the source of his livelihood."cralaw virtua1aw library

From that resolution, petitioner appealed to this Court. Here, the Court of Agrarian Relations found that respondent had
reaped the remaining portion of the crop for 1958-1959 without previous notice to the landholder. While under Section 36 of
Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263, respondent has the right to determine when to reap his crop,
yet this right is subject to the proviso that the reaping must be done "in accordance with proven farm practices and after due
notice to the landholder." Section 39 provides that —

"It shall be unlawful for either the tenant or the landholder, without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at
any time previous to the date set for its threshing. Any violation by either party shall be treated and penalized in accordance
with this Act and/or under the general provisions of law applicable to the act committed."cralaw virtua1aw library

Issue:
Whether ot not liberal construction shall be used in this case.

Ruling:
We concede that a literal interpretation of the above provision of law can warrant and even justify the ejectment of the
herein respondent tenant. However, in the consideration of social welfare legislations, like the one at bar, this Court is
guided by more than just an inquiry into the literal meaning of the law. This Court will not ignore the truth that the broad
consideration bearing upon the proper interpretation of tenancy and labor legislations are the ultimate resolution of doubts in
favor of the tenant or worker (Section 56). Similar principle is embodied in Article 1702 of our Civil Code. Furthermore, it
should be noted that under this last mentioned rule of law, in case of doubt, the law should be construed in favor of safety
and decent living of the laborer. There would be no better example or illustration of the applicability of this principle than
the one involved in this case.

In this connection, We would like to make certain observations regarding this case. The Court of Agrarian Relations found
that the amount involved in this litigation (2 cavans of palay) involves either P4.20 or P7.70 only (share of the landowner),
depending upon the tenancy contract of the parties concerned. It is evident, therefore, as the Court of Agrarian Relation
observed, that the amount was relatively insignificant. Moreover, respondent tenant has already been called to account for
his conduct here complained of when the herein petitioner filed a complaint for theft against him with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Sta. Ana, Pampanga. Significantly, the said criminal action was dismissed.
De Ramas v. Court of Agrarian Relations

Facts: 
Petitioners and private respondents were the official candidates of the NPC Lakas-NUCD for elective municipal positions of
Guipos, Zamboanga del Sur. After the canvass of election returns, petitioners were proclaimed as the duly elected municipal
officials therein. 

Private respondents seasonably filed an election protest with the RTC of Pagadian City which ruled in their favor.
Respondents thereafter filed a Motion for Immediate Execution of Decision pending Appeal, however, petitioner filed an
Opposition to this Motion. 

The trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution pending appeal. COMELEC concurs with the trial court’s
decision, hence, this petition. 

Issue: 
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it concurs with the decision of the trial court. 

Held: 
The Supreme Court held the it has explicitly recognized and given approval to execution of judgments pending appeal in
election cases filed under existing election laws. All that was required for a valid exercise of the discretion to allow
execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a special
order.” 

The rationale why such executionis allowed in election cases is “to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judge’s
decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers.” 

To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would bring back the ghost of the “grab-the-
proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often resorted to by devious politicians in the past in their efforts to
perpetuate their hold to an elective office.” The following constitutes “good reasons,” and a combination of two or more of
them will suffice to grant the execution pending appeal: (1) public interest involved or the will of the electorate; (2) the
shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; (3) the length of time that the election contest has
been pending. In this case, all elements was present, considering that this has been pending for a year, the trial court did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo

Facts:

Respondent-vendor Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27, 1963 and
March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-square meter and 7,638-
square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.

In Case L-25326, respondent-vendor sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other parcels of land for
P4,000.00. Petitioners-spouses Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that the parcel worked by
them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective areas, productivities, accessibilities, and
assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00
by respondents-vendees in their favor.
In Case L-25327, respondent-vendor sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and petitioners-spouses Hilario
Aguila and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the same price
of P750.00 by respondents-vendees in their favor.
The petitioner-tenants have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day notice of intention to
sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given by respondent-vendor to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently,
the deeds of sale executed by respondent-vendor were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of
Batangas in the records of their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by respondent-vendor of the affidavit
required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.

Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working form the purchases
thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their landholder of the latter's intention to
sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the
registration of the deed of sale.
OR
Is the right of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants?

Held:
The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who
inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and
preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted
by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of their
voluntary sale by the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes
the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the
letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p. 526.) A statute 'should be construed
according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of
Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course
to 'its intent.
Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject landholdings are granted. In
case L-25326 however  the case is remanded to the agrarian court to determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners
therein to Procorpio Hidalgo for redemption of the landholding in accordance with the observations made.
POSADAS V. CA

FACTS:
On October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, both members of the
Integrated National Police (INP) of the Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City.

While they were within the premises of the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they
noticed him to be acting suspiciously.

They approached the petitioner and identified themselves as members of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt
to get away was thwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitioner where they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wesson revolver with
Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds of live ammunition for a .38 caliber gun  a smoke (tear gas) grenade, and two (2) live
ammunition for a .22 caliber gun.

They brought the petitioner to the police station for further investigation. Petitioner failed to show license or authority to
possess the weapons. Thus, he was charged and eventually convicted for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions
by the RTC of Davao. CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the seizure conducted. However, even the OSG justified the warrantless search that it is
in accordance of Section 12, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything used as proof of a commission of an offense without a search warrant. It is further alleged that the
arrest without a warrant of the petitioner was lawful under the circumstances.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest is valid

HELD:
YES. An arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person arrested has
committed it.

At the time the peace officers, in this case, identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they
did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were.
The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant.

However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa.

Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police checkpoints and the search thereat in the
case at bar, there is no question that, indeed, the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was
effected on the basis of a probable cause. The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to
flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and
duty of the police officers to inspect the same.
Peña v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

FACTS:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who
vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit
and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of
the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds: 1) Jose Ong, Jr. is
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and 2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

ISSUE:
whether or not, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion. (EWAN KO KUNG TAMA TOH)

HELD:
On Jurisdiction
The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral
Tribunal (SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. (See Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word  sole emphasizes the
exclusivity of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the
bounds of the Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that
the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. ( See Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will
necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.
On Citizenship
His grandfather was naturalized as a Filipino, Ong married a Filipina…. Blah blah…. He is only renting a house
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case ofDe los
Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his
residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or
relative. (Emphasis supplied)

To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a
property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence
requirements. Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified
to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])
David v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: 
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his
death. He was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the
[p]latform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the
chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc.

The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The
employer argued that in Floresca, the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of
the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of
compensation under the remedy chosen will preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception
is where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the
Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.

Petitioner, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. As
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8,
Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.

ISSUE:
Whether the private respondent is already barred from claiming damages under the Civil Code pursuant to Article 3 of the
Civil Code.

HELD: 
No. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced from the language of
the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in
Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance
thereof cannot be held against her.

In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on November
15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25,
1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.

There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was
filed.
De Jesus v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts: 
Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land in Barrio Wawa, Binangonan, Rizal (area: 19,061 sq m)
Petitioners allege that in October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, Lorenzo Cadiente, a private contractor and the
Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying 1,165 sq m of their parcel
of land. Aside from the road, an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long was also constructed, occupying
an area of 2,906 sq m of their property constructed in a zigzag manner, the creak meandered through their property.
Petitioners files two cases which were later consolidated. Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases several
grounds, including that both cases were in reality suits against the state which could not be maintained without the State's
consent. The lower court dismissed the petition; petitioners elevated the case to the SC on certiorari, which referred the
cases back to the IAC

IAC ruled: the two actions cannot be maintained because they are suits against the State without consent
Case was again elevated to the SC on certiorari

Issue:
Whether or not the consolidated actions, as suits against the State, can be maintained

Held:
 Yes.
Ratio:
 The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen; it
cannot serve as defense by the State against an action for payment by the owner
The respondent government officials executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for public use; no
expropriation proceedings had been undertaken prior to the construction of the projects
Damages may be awarded the petitioners in the form of legal interest on the price of the land to be reckoned from the time
of the unlawful taking
Petition granted. Civil Cases remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits after the Republic of the Philippines shall
have been impleaded as defendant in both cases.
Catorce v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
n 1954, petitioner was instituted tenant over a parcel of irrigated rice land situated at Sta. Cruz, Buhi, Camarines Sur, with
an area of .7065 hectare, by the owner thereof, Simeona Merilles. Their agreement was subject to the condition that
petitioner would shoulder all the expenses of production under a sharing system of 1/4 — 3/4 in favor of petitioner. The
landholding in question was planted to rice two times a year, the "cataunan" cropping season covering the period from June
to November, and the "doble", covering the period from December to May, with the highest production at 25 cavans per
cropping season.

In 1960, the property was mortgaged by the landowner to Andrea Bagayawa, mother of respondent, who from that time on,
received the landowner’s share of the harvest from petitioner.

In October, 1977, Andrea took possession of the land without petitioner’s knowledge and consent, and caused the
cultivation thereof without giving any share of the harvest to petitioner. The latter tried to retrieve possession but Andrea
told him that she would work the land for the "cataunan" season only to recover the expenses she had incurred in the
cultivation of the land. Petitioner acceded to buy peace.

After the "cataunan" cropping season, petitioner tried again to get possession but Andrea and her son, respondent Pedro
Bagayawa, refused and, instead, continued tilling the land. Petitioner reported the incident to the Office of the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform at Nabua, which sent mediation notices to Andrea 1 , but the latter never appeared. Petitioner, assisted by
the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, then filed a Complaint with the Agrarian Court
(CAR Case No. 6040) on January 9, 1980 which was, however, dismissed without prejudice for not having passed first the
Lupon Pambarangay as mandatorily required by Presidential Decree No. 1508. Andrea died on January 30. 1980, and
respondent, her son, took over possession of the land.

Issue:
Whether or not liberal contruction should be used.

Ruling:
The Agricultural Land Reform Code has been designed to promote economic and social stability (Gonzales v. GSIS, 107
SCRA 492 (1981). Being a social legislation, it must be interpreted liberally to give full force and effect to its clear intent
(Ibid., Pasadas v. CA, 82 SCRA 250 (1978), which is "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers" and to make
them "more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society."
(Section 2[2] and [6], R.A. No. 3844, as amended)
Santiago v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner Ildefonso Santiago donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry on the terms that the Bureau should
construct a building and install lighting facilities on the said lot. 
When time passed and there were still no improvements on the lot, Santiago filed a case pleading for the revocation of such
contract of donation but the trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit against the government and should not
prosper without the consent of the government.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent government has waived its immunity from suit.

Held:
Yes.
Ratio:

The government's waiver of immunity was implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government
is a beneficiary of the terms of the donation but it did not comply with such terms. Thus, the donor Santiago has the right to
be heard in the court. Also, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical and contrary to equity which the
government so advances. The Court of First Instance is hereby directed to proceed with the case.
Cabatan v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly awarded a verbal contract of lease in Rizal Park
by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract accommodation was unclear
because there was no document or instrument involved.

With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC, petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park
and terminated the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate the area.

The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its
contents but later on claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice.

On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the RTC against the petitioner but
it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the state which could not be sued without its
consent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ruled that a government official being sued in
his official capacity is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his authority.

Issues:
Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against
the state which cannot be sued without its consent.

Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private respondents from Rizal Park.

Held:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.
No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.

Ratio:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials for acts done in the performance
of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against
the public official concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act. 
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal capacity. It is evident from the complaint that
Lansang was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
There was no evidence of abuse of authority.
Feliciano v. Court of Agrarian Relations

Facts:
Conception Feliciano filed a petition before the Court of Agrarian Relations asking for authority to dispossess her tenant
Amado Afable of his holding situated in barrio Libtong, Meycauayan, Bulacan, on the ground that (1) she desires to
cultivate it personally under Section 50 (a) Republic Act No. 1199, and (2) said tenant failed to pay in full the agreed annual
rental for the agricultural years 1951 to 1955.

The tenant, thru counsel, after admitting his tenancy relationship with petitioner, disclaimed knowledge of the truth of the
allegations contained in the petition.

After both parties had presented their evidence, the court, on September 8, 1958, rendered judgment denying the petition.
Petitioner was required to maintain her tenancy relationship with respondent and to respect his peaceful possession of his
landholding in accordance with law. Petitioner interposed the present petition for review.

Issue:
Whether the finding that petitioner ‘did not show that the "agreed" rental is legal and proper’, is supported by the evidence.

Ruling:
The same community of life and of interest exist between the members of the family. We can even sat that the spiritual tie is
greater when it comes to the relation of a mother and a son. If a wife is given the privilege of working a farmland thru her
husband, no valid reason is seen why a mother cannot be given the same privilege.

Moreover, the law allows a tenant to cultivate a piece of agricultural land held under a contract of tenancy either personally
or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household (Republic Act No.1199, Section 4,
paragraph 3, as amended by Republic Act No 2263). Note that he is not even required to have said cultivation undertaken by
immediate members of his family, but only by his immediate members of his family, but only by his immediate farm
household, who may or may not belong to the family. Surely, no reason exists why the same right should be denied to the
landowner himself. If the purpose of the law is to establish the tenancy relation between landlord and tenant upon the
principle of social justice, and to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenant and landholder (Section 2, Republic
Act No. 1199), the protective arm of the law must be extended equally to the tenant as well as to the landlord.

Having reached the above conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.
De Tanedo v. Dela Cruz

FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children.  During their coverture,
they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in various businesses.  The plaintiff filed an action against her
husband for the separation of their properties.  She further alleged that her husband aside from abandoning her, also
mismanaged their conjugal properties.  On the other hand, Severino contended that he had always visited the conjugal home
and had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of
their business.  Since 1955, he had not slept in the conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory
although he paid short visits in the conjugal home, which was affirmed by Estrella.  The latter suspected that her husband
had a mistress named Nenita Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might
squander and dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE: 
WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been an abused of his authority as
administrator of the conjugal partnership.

HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the family.  To be legally declared
as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and with intention of not coming back and perpetual
separation.  There must be real abandonment and not mere separation.  In fact, the husband never failed to give monthly
financial support as admitted by the wife.  This negates the intention of coming home to the conjugal abode.  The plaintiff
even testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more than one visit.  Likewise, as testified by the manager of one
of their businesses, the wife has been drawing a monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the
defendant or the witness himself.

SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal
partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration.  In order for abuse to exist,
there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts or
omissions prejudicial to the latter.  
De Chavez v. Zobel

Facts:
Private respondent Zobel, as the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Calatagan, Batangas, known as Hacienda
Bigaa, with an aggregate area of more than five hundred hectares, sought to eject petitioners, his tenants tilling lands in a
portion thereof, relying on the provision of Republic Act No. 1199, which would justify such a move where the land is
suited for mechanization. 5 Petitioners, as tenants, vigorously objected to such petition not only on the ground that the small
areas they are occupying were not suited for mechanization, but likewise on the allegation that the true intention of
respondent as landholder was to utilize the same for pasture and for the raising of sorghum. The Court of Agrarian Relations
dismissed the petition for ejectment, doubting such an intent to mechanize and at the same time holding that mechanization
during the rainy season of the year was not practicable. The matter was elevated to respondent Court of Appeals, which
reversed the Court of Agrarian Relations and granted such petition for ejectment. Hence this petition for review.

Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in its decision.

Ruling:
On this vital policy question, one of the utmost concern, the need for what for some is a radical solution in its pristine sense,
one that goes at the root, was apparent. Presidential Decree No. 27 was thus conceived. It was issued in October of 1972.
The very next month, the 1971 Constitutional Convention voiced its overwhelming approval. There is no doubt then, as set
forth expressly therein, that the goal is emancipation. 13 What is more, the decree is now part and parcel of the law of the
land according to the revised Constitution itself. 14 Ejectment therefore of petitioners is simply out of the question. That
would be to set at naught an express mandate of the Constitution. Once it has spoken, our duty is clear; obedience is
unavoidable. This is not only so because of the cardinal postulate of constitutionalism, the supremacy of the fundamental
law. It is also because any other approach would run the risk of setting at naught this basic aspiration to do away with all
remnants of a feudalistic order at war with the promise and the hope associated with an open society. To deprive petitioners
of the small landholdings in the face of a presidential decree considered ratified by the new Constitution and precisely in
accordance with its avowed objective could indeed be contributory to perpetuating the misery that tenancy had spawned in
the past as well as the grave social problems thereby created. There can be no justification for any other decision then
whether predicated on a juridical norm or on the traditional role assigned to the judiciary of implementing and not thwarting
fundamental policy goals.
Liberal Party v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:
OnJuly 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 settingAugust 17, 2009as the last day for the filing of
petitions for registration of political parties.On January 21, 2010, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752,
providing, among others, for the rules for the filing of petitions for accreditation for the determination of the dominant
majority party, the dominant minority party, ten major national parties, and two major local parties for the May 10, 2010
elections.Resolution No. 8752 also set thedeadline for filing of petitions for accreditation onFebruary 12, 2010and required
that accreditation applicants be registered political parties, organizations or coalitions.

OnFebruary 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party.On the
same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a
coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of theMay
10, 2010elections. It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 that it was
an accreditation case.

In support of its petition, the petitioner attached the Sworn Affidavits of two prominent members of the NPC, namely: Atty.
Sixto S. Brillantes (the current NPC Legal Counsel) and Daniel Laogan (a member of the NPCs National Central
Committee) to show that the NP-NPC was entered into without consultations; much less, the approval of the NPCs National
Convention which was not even convened.

ISSUES:
Is the NP-NPC an operative fact that the COMELEC simply has to note and recognize without need of registration?

Ruling:
The respondents next argue that the petitions cited grounds are mere errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.This objection can be read as afacial objectionto the petition or
asasubstantiveone that goes into the merits of the petition.We will discuss under the present topic the facial objection, as it is
a threshold issue that determines whether we shall proceed to consider the case or simply dismiss the petition outright.

A facial objection is meritorious if,expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous
applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.After due
consideration, we conclude that the petition passes the facial objection test.
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections

Facts:
On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for
the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in
the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his
place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship
to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ
on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie
Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of
FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004,
Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10
February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order,
a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC
resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both
challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue:
Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines.

Held:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election,
and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born
citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August
1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization,
jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis – had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person
to being a “natural-born” citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long.
With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus
sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations
made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his
parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The
parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5)
At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the
custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78,
in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or
not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.
Violago v. Commission on Elections

Facts:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in
Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and
falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed
men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the
Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend
the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On
certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made
before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the
irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners
should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the
2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency,
Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue
of Javier’s death.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.

HELD: 
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held
that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated
they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They
must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no
point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments
of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall
have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in
which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no
writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments
are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. B.F. Goodrich Phils. Inc.

Facts:
The facts are undisputed.4 Private Respondent BF Goodrich Phils., Inc. (now Sime Darby International Tire Co. Inc.), was
an American-owned and controlled corporation previous to July 3, 1974. As a condition for approving the manufacture by
private respondent of tires and other rubber products, the Central Bank of the Philippines required that it should develop a
rubber plantation. In compliance with this requirement, private respondent purchased from the Philippine government in
1961, under the Public Land Act and the Parity Amendment to the 1935 Constitution, certain parcels of land located in
Tumajubong, Basilan, and there developed a rubber plantation.

More than a decade later, on August 2, 1973, the justice secretary rendered an opinion stating that, upon the expiration of
the Parity Amendment on July 3, 1974, the ownership rights of Americans over public agricultural lands, including the right
to dispose or sell their real estate, would be lost. On the basis of this Opinion, private respondent sold to Siltown Realty
Philippines, Inc. on January 21, 1974, its Basilan landholding for P500,000 payable in installments. In accord with the terms
of the sale, Siltown Realty Philippines, Inc. leased the said parcels of land to private respondent for a period of 25 years,
with an extension of another 25 years at the latters option.

Based on the BIRs Letter of Authority No. 10115 dated April 14, 1975, the books and accounts of private respondent were
examined for the purpose of determining its tax liability for taxable year 1974. The examination resulted in the April 23,
1975 assessment of private respondent for deficiency income tax in the amount of P6,005.35, which it duly paid.

Subsequently the BIR also issued Letters of Authority Nos. 074420 RR and 074421 RR and Memorandum Authority
Reference No. 749157 for the purpose of examining Siltowns business, income and tax liabilities. On the basis of this
examination, the BIR commissioner issued against private respondent on October 10, 1980, an assessment for deficiency in
donors tax in the amount of P1,020,850, in relation to the previously mentioned sale of its Basilan landholdings to Siltown.
Apparently, the BIR deemed the consideration for the sale insufficient, and the difference between the fair market value and
the actual purchase price a taxable donation.

In a letter dated November 24, 1980, private respondent contested this assessment. On April 9, 1981, it received another
assessment dated March 16, 1981, which increased to P1,092,949 the amount demanded for the alleged deficiency donors
tax, surcharge, interest and compromise penalty.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners right to assess herein deficiency donors tax has indeed prescribed as ruled by public respondent
Court of Appeals

Ruling:
The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the CTA on the issue of prescription, because its ruling
was based on factual findings that should have been left undisturbed on appeal, in the absence of any showing that it had
been tainted with gross error or grave abuse of discretion.8 The Court is not persuaded.

True, the factual findings of the CTA are generally not disturbed on appeal when supported by substantial evidence and in
the absence of gross error or grave abuse of discretion. However, the CTAs application of the law to the facts of this
controversy is an altogether different matter, for it involves a legal question. There is a question of law when the issue is the
application of the law to a given set of facts. On the other hand, a question of fact involves the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts.9 In the present case, the Court of Appeals ruled not on the truth or falsity of the facts found by the CTA, but on the
latters application of the law on prescription.
Amora Jr. v. Commission on Elections

FACTS:
In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and
won.While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot inBarangayVeteransVillage, Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same.In September 2008 he began occupying the house.

After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga
Sibugay, for the transfer of his voters registration record to Precinct 0051F ofBarangayVeteransVillage.Dan Erasmo, Sr.,
respondent in G.R. 192474, opposed the application.After due proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos application and
denied Erasmos opposition.

Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voter. After hearing, the MCTC rendered
judgment excluding Jalosjos from the list of registered voters in question.The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon
his domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its Mayor.Jalosjos appealed his case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pagadian City which affirmed the MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009.

Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition for certiorari with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction which was granted. On November 26, 2009 the CA granted his application and
enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the result that his name was reinstated in the Barangay
Veterans Village voters list pending the resolution of the petition.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections.This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny
due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that
COC when he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.But the Second Division of the COMELEC issued
a joint resolution, dismissing Erasmos petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.

While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took
place, resulting in Jalosjos winning the elections for Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.He was
proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.

Meantime, the CA rendered judgment in the voters exclusion case before it,holding that the lower courts erred in excluding
Jalosjos from the voters list of Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil since he was qualified under the Constitution and Republic
Act 8189 to vote in that place.Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA decision before this Court in G.R. 193566.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the question of Jalosjos residency
qualification for running for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that
he has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

HELD:
POLITICAL LAW: power and jurisdiction of the COMELEC

While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power todecide all questions affecting elections, such power is not
without limitation.It does not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives and the Senate.The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.

The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET
begins.The Proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over
disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
Hebron v. Reyes

FACTS : The Philippine Tourism Authority filed four (4) Complaints with the Court of First Instance of Cebu City for the
expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu City, under PTA's
express authority "to acquire by purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation proceedings any private land within and
without the tourist zones" for the purposes indicated in Section 5, paragraph B(2), of its Revised Charter (PD 564), more
specifically, for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined geographic areas with
potential tourism value

The defendants in Civil Cases Nos. R-20701 and R-21608 filed their respective Opposition with Motion to Dismiss and/or
Reconsideration. The defendants in Civil Case No. R-19562 filed a manifestation adopting the answer of defendants in Civil
Case No. R-19864.
In their motions to dismiss, the petitioners alleged, in addition to the issue of public use, that there is no specific
constitutional provision authorizing the taking of private property for tourism purposes; that assuming that PTA has such
power, the intended use cannot be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the amount
of compensation by Legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since the land is under the land reform program, it
is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases.

The Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with The Philippine National Bank, Cebu City Branch, an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1533. the lower court issued separate
orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and directing the issuance of writs of possession.

On May 25, 1982, petitioners filed this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Judge

ISSUE :
WON The Expropriation for Tourism Purposes of Lands Covered by the Land Reform Program Violates the Constitution

HELD :
There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Section 2, Article IV states that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6,
Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of just compensation to
transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article
XIV states that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the expropriation of private lands
to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.

While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on
social justice and agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of eminent domain in
the implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far-reaching insofar as taking of private property is concerned

There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditions' purposes as the construction of roads, bridges, ports,
waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses,
parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of
public use is not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases
of "use by the public" has been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use.
One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer,
through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that
at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Miguel Corporation

FACTS:
When SMC's October 19, 1999 letter requested the registration and authority to manufacture "San Mig Light," to be taxed at
₱12.15 per liter, the BIR granted the request, thus confirming SMC can register, manufacture, and sell "San Mig Light" as a
new brand.

The CIR argues that "San Mig Light," launched in November 1999, is not a new brand but merely a low-calorie variant of
"San Miguel Pale Pilsen." Thus, the application of the higher excise tax rate for variant products is appropriate (₱19.91 per
liter instead of ₱9.15 per liter) and SMC should not be entitled to a refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate. The CTA
sided with SMC; hence, this petition by the CIR with the SC.

ISSUES:
[1] Can the BIR validly reclassify brands?
[2] Is "San Mig Light" is a new brand and not a variant of "San Miguel Pale Pilsen"?
[3] Is it not that estoppel does not apply to the government in case of collection of taxes?
[4] Is SMC entitled to a refund of excess payment of excise taxes on "San Mig Light"?

HELD:
[1] No, any reclassification of fermented liquor products should be by act of Congress. (Section 143 of the Tax Code)

The CIR's letters and Notices of Discrepancy, which effectively changed San Mig Light's brand's classification from "new
brand to variant of existing brand," necessarily changes San Mig Light's tax bracket. Based on the legislative intent behind
the classification freeze provision, petitioner has no power to do this. A reclassification of a fermented liquor brand
introduced between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2003, such as "San Mig Light," must be by act of Congress. There
was none in this case.

[2] A new brand still because the BIR has no power to reclassify.

Also, a 'variant of a brand' shall refer to a brand on which a modifier is prefixed and/or suffixed to the root name of the
brand. The word "Light" cannot he considered as a mere suffix to the word "San Miguel," hut it is part and parcel of an
entirely new brand name, "San Mig Light."

Though the "escudo" logo appears on both "Pale Pilsen" bottle and "San Mig Light" bottle and can, the same cannot be
considered as an indication that "San Mig Light" is merely a variant of the brand "Pale Pilsen", since the said "escudo"
insignia is the corporate logo of petitioner. It merely identifies the products, as having been manufactured by petitioner, but
does not form part of its brand. In fact, it appears not only in petitioner's beer products, but even in its non-beer products.

[3] While estoppel generally does not apply against government, especially when the case involves the collection of taxes,
an exception can be made when the application of the rule will cause injustice against an innocent party.136 Respondent had
already acquired a vested right on the tax classification of its San Mig Light as a new brand. To allow petitioner to change
its position will result in deficiency assessments in substantial amounts against respondent to the latter's prejudice.

The authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to overrule, correct, or reverse the mistakes or errors of its agents is
conceded. However, this authority must be exercised reasonably.

[4] Yes, SMC is entitled to tax refund or tax credit certification. The Tax Code includes remedies for erroneous collection
and overpayment of taxes. Under Sections 229 and 204(C) of the Tax Code, a taxpayer may seek recovery of erroneously
paid taxes within two (2) years from date of payment.
Philacor Credit Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:
Philacor is a domestic corporation organized under Philippine laws and is engaged in the business of retail financing.
Through retail financing, a prospective buyer of a home appliance with neither cash nor any credit card may purchase
appliances on installment basis from an appliance dealer. After Philacor conducts a credit investigation and approves the
buyers application, the buyer executes a unilateral promissory note in favor of the appliance dealer. The same promissory
note is subsequently assigned by the appliance dealer to Philacor.4?r?l1

Pursuant to Letter of Authority No. 17107 dated July 6, 1974, Revenue Officer Celestino Mejia examined Philacors books
of accounts and other accounting records for the fiscal year August 1, 1992 to July 31, 1993. Philacor received tentative
computations of deficiency taxes for this year. Philacors Finance Manager, Leticia Pangan, contested the tentative
computations of deficiency taxes (totaling P20,037,013.83) through a letter dated April 17, 1995.

Issue:
The Cta En Banc Decision Extended The Words "Assignment" And "Transferring" In Section 173 To The Promissory
Notes; Such That, The "Assignment" Or "Transferring" Of Promissory Notes Is Subject To Dst. However Sections 176, 178,
And 198 Of Title Vii Of The Tax Code Expressly Imposes [Sic] Dst On The Transfer/Assignment Of Certain Documents
Which Reveals The Legislative Intent That Only The Assignment/Transfer Of Certain Documents In Sections 176, 178, And
198 Are Subject To Dst

Ruling:
Philacor, as an assignee or transferee of the promissory notes, is not liable for the assignment or transfer of promissory notes
as this transaction is not taxed under the law.

The CIR argues that the DST is levied on the exercise of privileges through the execution of specific instruments, or the
privilege to enter into a transaction. Therefore, the DST should be imposed on every exercise of the privilege to enter into a
transaction.34 There is nothing in Section 180 of the 1986 Tax Code that supports this argument; the argument is even
contradicted by the way the provisions on DST were drafted.

As Philacor correctly points out, there are provisions in the 1997 NIRC that specifically impose the DST on the transfer
and/or assignment of documents evidencing particular transactions. Section 176 imposes a DST on the transfer of due bills,
certificates of obligation, or shares or certificates of stock in a corporation, apart from Section 175 which imposes the DST
on the issuance of shares of stock in a corporation. Section 178 imposes the DST on certificates of profits, or any certificate
or memorandum showing interest in a property or accumulations of any corporation, and on all transfers of such certificate
or memoranda. Section 198 imposes the DST on the assignment or transfer of any mortgage, lease or policy of insurance,
apart from Sections 183, 184, 185, 194 and 195 which impose it on the issuances of mortgages, leases and policies of
insurance. Indeed, the law has set a pattern of expressly providing for the imposition of DST on the transfer and/or
assignment of documents evidencing certain transactions. Thus, we can safely conclude that where the law did not specify
that such transfer and/or assignment is to be taxed, there would be no basis to recognize an imposition.
Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:
The CTA EBs narration of the pertinent facts is as follows:cralawlibrary
[CIR] is the duly appointed Commissioner of Internal Revenue, empowered, among others, to act upon and approve claims
for refund or tax credit, with office at the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon
City.

[San Roque] is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines with
principal office at Barangay San Roque, San Manuel, Pangasinan. It was incorporated in October 1997 to design, construct,
erect, assemble, own, commission and operate power-generating plants and related facilities pursuant to and under contract
with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or any subdivision, instrumentality or agency thereof, or any
governmentowned or controlled corporation, or other entity engaged in the development, supply, or distribution of energy.

As a seller of services, [San Roque] is duly registered with the BIR with TIN/VAT No. 005-017-501. It is likewise registered
with the Board of Investments ("BOI") on a preferred pioneer status, to engage in the design, construction, erection,
assembly, as well as to own, commission, and operate electric power-generating plants and related activities, for which it
was issued Certificate of Registration No. 97-356 on February 11, 1998.

On October 11, 1997, [San Roque] entered into a Power Purchase Agreement ("PPA") with the National Power Corporation
("NPC") to develop hydro-potential of the Lower Agno River and generate additional power and energy for the Luzon
Power Grid, by building the San Roque Multi-Purpose Project located in San Manuel, Pangasinan. The PPA provides,
among others, that [San Roque] shall be responsible for the design, construction, installation, completion, testing and
commissioning of the Power Station and shall operate and maintain the same, subject to NPC instructions. During the
cooperation period of twenty-five (25) years commencing from the completion date of the Power Station, NPC will take and
pay for all electricity available from the Power Station.

On the construction and development of the San Roque Multi- Purpose Project which comprises of the dam, spillway and
power plant, [San Roque] allegedly incurred, excess input VAT in the amount of ?559,709,337.54 for taxable year 2001
which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for the same year. [San Roque] duly filed with the BIR separate claims
for refund, in the total amount of ?559,709,337.54, representing unutilized input taxes as declared in its VAT returns for
taxable year 2001.
However, on March 28, 2003, [San Roque] filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the year 2001 since it increased its
unutilized input VAT to the amount of ?560,200,283.14. Consequently, [San Roque] filed with the BIR on even date,
separate amended claims for refund in the aggregate amount of ?560,200,283.14.

Issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in construing that the advances made by Philex in the management of the Sto. Nino Mine
pursuant to the Power of Attorney partook of the nature of an investment rather than a loan.

Ruling:
The lower courts correctly held that the "Power of Attorney" is the instrument that is material in determining the true nature
of the business relationship between petitioner and Baguio Gold. Before resort may be had to the two compromise
agreements, the parties’ contractual intent must first be discovered from the expressed language of the primary contract
under which the parties’ business relations were founded. It should be noted that the compromise agreements were mere
collateral documents executed by the parties pursuant to the termination of their business relationship created under the
"Power of Attorney". On the other hand, it is the latter which established the juridical relation of the parties and defined the
parameters of their dealings with one another.

The execution of the two compromise agreements can hardly be considered as a subsequent or contemporaneous act that is
reflective of the parties’ true intent. The compromise agreements were executed eleven years after the "Power of Attorney"
and merely laid out a plan or procedure by which petitioner could recover the advances and payments it made under the
"Power of Attorney". The parties entered into the compromise agreements as a consequence of the dissolution of their
business relationship. It did not define that relationship or indicate its real character.
Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FACTS:
Davao Gulf Lumber Corporation, a licensed forest concessionaire possessing a Timber License Agreement granted by the
Ministry of Natural Resources  (Now DENR), purchased from various oil companies refined and manufactured oils as well
as motor and diesel fuels for its exploitation and operation.  

Selling companies paid and passed the specific taxes imposed under Sec. 153 and 156 of the 1997 NIRC to petitioner as
purchaser who in turn filed before CIR a Claim for Refund for P120, 825 representing 25% of the specific taxes actually
paid based on Insular Lumber Co. v. CTA and Sec. 5 of RA 1435 and complied with its procedure.

Then, petitioner filed before CA a Petition for Review: Favored petitioner to a partial refund P2,923 (excluding those that
have prescribed) and based on the rates deemed paid under RA 1435 (NOT higher rates actually paid under the NIRC)

Insisting that the basis be the higher rate, petitioner elevated the case to the CTA who affirmed the CA's decision

ISSUE:
W/N the basis should be the higher rates prescribed by Sec. 153 and 156 of the 1997 NIRC

HELD: 
NO.  A tax cannot be imposed unless it is supported by the clear and express language of a statute; On the other hand, once
the tax is unquestionably imposed, a claim of exemption from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language
in the law too plain to be mistaken.  Section 5, RA 1435 as a tax exemption, must be construed strictissimi juris against the
grantee.

Supported by CIR v. CA and Atlas Co., CIR v. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corp.   and Insular Lumber Co. - all cases where
purchases was made BEFORE 1997 NIRC is in effect.
According to an eminent authority on taxation, there is no tax exemption solely on the ground of equity
Province of Tarlac v. Alcantara

Facts:
The present petition for review on certiorari questions the August 12, 1983 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
Branch LXIII dismissing the complaint filed by the Province of Tarlac against Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. for collection of real
property tax, and the order of September 28, 1983 denying the motion for the reconsideration of said decision.

Hence, petitioner prayed that private respondent be ordered to pay the sum of P532,435.55 representing the accrued real
estate taxes, as well as damages and the costs of the suit.

On March 2, 1983, the private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which was opposed by the petitioner. In
its order of March 30, 1983, 2 the lower court denied the motion. A motion for the reconsideration of the said order was
subsequently filed by the private respondent but it was likewise denied by the lower court. 3

Thereafter, the petitioner set the auction sale of the private respondent’s properties to satisfy the real estate taxes due. This
prompted the private respondent to file a motion praying that petitioner be directed to desist from proceeding with the public
auction sale. 4 On April 15, 1983, the lower court issued an order granting said motion to prevent mootness of the case
considering that the properties to be sold were the, subjects of the complaint. 5

Consequently, the private respondent filed its answer 6 admitting that demands for the payment of, real property taxes had
been made by the petitioner but it refused to pay the same for the reason that under Sec. 40, paragraph (g) of Presidential
Decree No. 464 in relation to P.D. No. 551, as amended, it was exempt from paying said tax. It also raised as affirmative
defenses that the complaint stated no cause of action and that the claims had been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished or barred by the statute of limitations.chanrobles law library : red

On August 12, 1983, the lower court rendered the decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled that P.D. No. 551 expressly
exempts private respondent from paying the real property taxes demanded, it being a grantee of a franchise to generate,
distribute and sell electric current for light. The court held that in lieu of said taxes, private respondent had been required to
pay two percent (2%) franchise tax in line with the intent of the law to give assistance to operators such as the private
respondent to enable the consumers to enjoy cheaper rates. Citing the case of Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan, 7 the
court ruled that local-governments are without power to tax the electric companies already subject to franchise tax unless
their franchise allows the imposition of additional tax.

Issue:
Petitioner contends that respondent- judge erred in: (a) holding that private respondent is exempt from the payment of realty
tax under P.D. No. 551, as amended; (b) ruling, under the authority of Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. Butuan City, that it is without
power to impose said realty tax on private respondent, and (c) dismissing the complaint and denying its motion for the
reconsideration of its decision.

Ruling:
It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority" primarily because "taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need." Thus, to be exempted from payment of taxes, it is the taxpayer’s duty to justify
the exemption "by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted." Private respondent has utterly
failed to discharge this duty.
Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia Rizal

Facts:
Petitioner, Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC for short) is a business enterprise engaged in the manufacture of
lubricated oil basestock which is a petroleum product, with its refinery plant situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal, conducting its
business activities within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal and is in continuous operation up to
the present (Rollo p. 60). PPC owns and maintains an oil refinery including forty-nine storage tanks for its petroleum
products in Malaya, Pililla, Rizal (Rollo, p. 12).
Under Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific
tax.
On June 28, 1973, Presidential Decree No. 231, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code was issued by former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos governing the exercise by provinces, cities, municipalities and barrios of their taxing and other
revenue-raising powers. Sections 19 and 19 (a) thereof, provide among others, that the municipality may impose taxes on
business, except on those for which fixed taxes are provided on manufacturers, importers or producers of any article of
commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers, rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors,
distilled spirits and/or wines in accordance with the schedule listed therein.
The Secretary of Finance issued Provincial Circular No. 26-73 dated December 27, 1973, directed to all provincial, city and
municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in old or new tax ordinances in the business of
manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in petroleum products subject to the specific tax under the National
Internal Revenue Code (Rollo, p. 76).
Likewise, Provincial Circular No. 26 A-73 dated January 9, 1973 was issued by the Secretary of Finance instructing all City
Treasurers to refrain from collecting any local tax imposed in tax ordinances enacted before or after the effectivity of the
Local Tax Code on July 1, 1973, on the businesses of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in, petroleum
products subject to the specific tax under the National Internal Revenue Code (Rollo, p. 79).
Respondent Municipality of Pililla, Rizal, through Municipal Council Resolution No. 25, S-1974 enacted Municipal Tax
Ordinance No. 1, S-1974 otherwise known as "The Pililla Tax Code of 1974" on June 14, 1974, which took effect on July 1,
1974 (Rollo, pp. 181-182). Sections 9 and 10 of the said ordinance imposed a tax on business, except for those for which
fixed taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code on manufacturers, importers, or producers of any article of commerce of
whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers, rectifiers, repackers, and compounders of liquors, distilled spirits
and/or wines in accordance with the schedule found in the Local Tax Code, as well as mayor's permit, sanitary inspection
fee and storage permit fee for flammable, combustible or explosive substances (Rollo, pp. 183-187), while Section 139 of
the disputed ordinance imposed surcharges and interests on unpaid taxes, fees or charges (Ibid., p. 193).

Issue:
The Rtc Erred In Failing To Hold That Respondents Computation Of Tax Liability Has Absolutely No Basis;

Ruling:
As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees, the trial court did not
err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative
prerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor who is an executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an expression
of a policy thru the enactment of a tax." The waiver partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is an ancient rule that
exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority
(Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, 18 SCRA 488 [1966]). Tax exemptions are looked upon
with disfavor (Western Minolco Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 124 SCRA 121 [1983]). Thus, in the absence
of a clear and express exemption from the payment of said fees, the waiver cannot be recognized. As already stated, it is the
law-making body, and not an executive like the mayor, who can make an exemption. Under Section 36 of the Code, a permit
fee like the mayor's permit, shall be required before any individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or
occupation under the provisions of the Code.

However, since the Local Tax Code does not provide the prescriptive period for collection of local taxes, Article 1143 of the
Civil Code applies. Said law provides that an action upon an obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10) years from
the time the right of action accrues. The Municipality of Pililla can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on business of
petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986, and NOT the tax that had accrued prior to 1976.
Planters Association of Southern Negros Inc. v. Ponferrada

Facts:
Prior to the passage of Republic Act No. 6982, entitled An Act Strengthening the Sugar Amelioration Program in the Sugar
Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its Implementation, and for other Purposes, there were two principal laws providing
additional financial benefits to sugar farm workers, namely: Republic Act No. 809 and Presidential Decree No.
621.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Republic Act No. 809 5 (implementable in milling districts with an annual gross production of 150,000 piculs or more),
institutionalized production sharing scheme, in the absence of any private agreement between the planters and farm
workers, depending on the mill’s total production for each immediately preceding crop year; and specifically providing that
any increase in the planters’ share shall be divided in the following manner: 40% of the increase shall accrue to the planter
and 60% to the farm workers. 6

On the other hand, Presidential Decree No. 621, 7 as amended, charged a lien of P2.00 per picul on all sugar produced, to be
pooled into a fund for subsequent distribution as bonuses to sugar workers. 8

On May 24, 1991, Republic Act No. 6982 took effect. It imposed a lien of P5.00 per picul on the gross production of sugar
beginning sugar crop year 1991-1992, with an automatic additional lien of P1.00 for every two (2) years for the succeeding
ten (10) years from the effectivity of the Act subject to the discretion of the Secretary of Labor and Employment and upon
recommendation of the Sugar Tripartite Council.

Issue:
That the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot supersede or substitute the benefits under RA 809 in milling districts
where the latter law was already in implementation at the time of the effectivity of RA 6982

Ruling:
It is a well-settled rule of legal hermeneutics that each provision of law should be construed in connection with every other
part so as to produce a harmonious whole and every meaning to be given to each word or phrase is ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute. 19 Ut magis valeat quam pereat. 20 Consequently, laws are given a reasonable
construction such that apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them, reference
being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment of the statute. 21

Applying the abovestated doctrine, Section 12 therefore, which apparently mandates a total substitution by R. A. No. 6982
of all the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 existing at the time of the effectivity of R.A. No. 6982, can not be
construed apart from Section 14 which prohibits such substitution if the effect thereof would be to reduce any benefit,
interest, right or participation enjoyed by the worker at the time R.A. No. 6982 took effect. The Court finds as untenable the
interpretation of the petitioner based an unqualified substitution of the benefits under R.A. No. 809 and P.D. No. 621 by the
monetary rewards conferred by R.A. No. 6982 in the amount of P5,583,145.61 as against the P36,173,232.53 previously
enjoyed by the sugar farm workers under the former laws.chanrobles law library
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Bureau of Internal Revenue

Facts:
[PAGCOR] claims that it is a duly organized government-owned and controlled corporation existing under and by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended, with business address at the 6 th Floor, Hyatt Hotel and Casino, Pedro Gil corner
M.H. Del Pilar Streets, Malate, Manila. It was created to regulate, establish and operate clubs and casinos for amusement
and recreation, including sports gaming pools, and such other forms of amusement and recreation.

Respondent [CIR], on the other hand, is the Head of the [BIR] with authority, among others, to resolve protests on
assessments issued by her office or her authorized representatives. She holds office at the BIR National Office Building,
Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City.

[PAGCOR] provides a car plan program to its qualified officers under which sixty percent (60%) of the car plan availment
is shouldered by PAGCOR and the remaining forty percent (40%) for the account of the officer, payable in five (5) years.

On October 10, 2007, [PAGCOR] received a Post Reporting Notice dated September 28, 2007 from BIR Regional Director
Alfredo Misajon [RD Misajon] of Revenue Region 6, Revenue District No. 33, for an informal conference to discuss the
result of its investigation on [PAGCOR's] internal revenue taxes in 2004. The Post Reporting Notice shows that [PAGCOR]
has deficiencies on Value Added Tax (VAT), Withholding Tax on VAT (WTV), Expanded Withholding Tax (EWT), and
Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT).

Subsequently, the BIR abandoned the claim for deficiency assessments on VAT, WTV and EWT in the Letter to [PAGCOR]
dated November 23, 2007 in view of the principles laid down in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Acesite Hotel
Corporation [G.R. No. 147295] exempting [PAGCOR] and its contractors from VAT. However, the assessment on
deficiency FBT subsists and remains due to date.

On January 17, 2008, [PAGCOR] received a Final Assessment Notice [FAN] dated January 14, 2008, with demand for
payment of deficiency FBT for taxable year 2004 in the amount of P48,589,507.65.

On January 24, 2008, [PAGCOR] filed a protest to the FAN addressed to [RD Misajon] of Revenue Region No. 6 of the
BIR.

On August 14, 2008, [PAGCOR] elevated its protest to respondent CIR in a Letter dated August 13, 2008, there being no
action taken thereon as of that date.

In a Letter dated September 23, 2008 received on September 25, 2008, [PAGCOR] was informed that the Legal Division of
Revenue Region No. 6 sustained Revenue Officer Ma. Elena Llantada on the imposition of FBT against it based on the
provisions of Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 3-98 and that its protest was forwarded to the Assessment Division for further
action.

On November 19, 2008, [PAGCOR] received a letter from the OIC-Regional Director, Revenue Region No. 6 (Manila),
stating that its letter protest was referred to Revenue District Office No. 33 for appropriate action.

On March 11, 2009, [PAGCOR] filed the instant Petition for Review alleging respondents' inaction in its protest on the
disputed deficiency FBT.[6]

ISSUE:
Is Republic Act 9337 constitutional insofar as it excluded PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs exempt from the
payment of corporate income tax?

HELD:
YES. The original exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax was not made pursuant to a valid classification based
on substantial distinctions so that the law may operate only on some and not on all. Instead, the same was merely granted
due to the acquiescence of the House Committee on Ways and Means to the request of PAGCOR.
The argument that the withdrawal of the exemption also violates the non-impairment clause will not hold since any
franchise is subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress.
However, the Court made it clear that PAGCOR remains exempt from payment of indirect taxes and as such its purchases
remain not subject to VAT, reiterating the rule laid down in the Acesite case.
Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FACTS:
Atlas is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged in the production of copper concentrates
for export.

Atlas applied with the BIR for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund under Section 106(b) of the Tax Code.

Atlas then filed a petition for review with the CTA on February 22, 1995 to prevent the running of the prescriptive period
under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code.

On October 13, 1997, the CTA rendered a Decision denying Atlas’ claim for tax credit or refund.

Respondent CIR filed his Answer asserting that Atlas has the burden of proving erroneous or illegal payment of the tax
being claimed for refund, as claims for refund are strictly construed against the taxpayer

In denying Atlas’ claim for tax credit or refund, the CTA held that Atlas failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant the
grant of tax credit or refund for the alleged input taxes paid by Atlas. Relying on Revenue Regulation No. (RR) 3-88 which
was issued to implement the then VAT law and list the documents to be submitted in actions for refunds or tax credits of
input taxes in export sales, it found that the documents submitted by Atlas did not comply with said regulation. It pointed
out that Atlas failed to submit photocopies of export documents, invoices, or receipts evidencing the sale of goods and
others.

Atlas timely filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the above decision contending that it relied on Sec. 106 of the Tax Code
which merely required proof that the foreign exchange proceeds has been accounted for in accordance with the regulations
of the Central Bank of the Philippines. Consequently, Atlas asserted that the documents it presented, coupled with the
testimony of its Accounting and Finance Manager sufficiently proved its case. It argued that RR 3-88 was issued for claims
for refund of input VAT to be processed by the BIR, that is, for administrative claims, and not for judicial claims as in the
present case. Anyhow, Atlas prayed for a re-trial, even as it admitted that it has committed a mistake or excusable
negligence when the CTA ruled that RR 3-88 should be the one applied for Atlas to submit the basis required under the
regulation.

On Atlas’ appeal, the CA denied and dismissed Atlas’ petition on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to support Atlas’
action for tax credit or refund.

ISSUE:
Whether Atlas has sufficiently proven entitlement to a tax credit or refund.

HELD:
No.
The Rules of Court, which is suppletory in quasi-judicial proceedings, particularly Sec. 349 of Rule 132, Revised Rules on
Evidence, is clear that no evidence which has not been formally offered shall be considered. Thus, where the pertinent
invoices or receipts purportedly evidencing the VAT paid by Atlas were not submitted, the courts a quo evidently could not
determine the veracity of the input VAT Atlas has paid. Moreover, when Atlas likewise failed to submit pertinent export
documents to prove actual export sales with due certification from accredited banks on the export proceeds in foreign
currency with the corresponding conversion rate into Philippine currency, the courts a quo likewise could not determine the
veracity of the export sales as indicated in Atlas’ amended VAT return.

It must be noted that the most competent evidence must be adduced and presented to prove the allegations in a complaint,
petition, or protest before a judicial court. And where the best evidence cannot be submitted, secondary evidence may be
presented. In the instant case, the pertinent documents which are the best pieces of evidence were not presented.
KEPCO Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking reversal of the February 20, 2008
Decision[2] of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc (CTA)  in C.T.A. EB No. 299, which ruled that "in order for petitioner to be
entitled to its claim for refund/issuance of tax credit certificate representing unutilized input VAT attributable to its zero-
rated sales for taxable year 2002, it must comply with the substantiation requirements under the appropriate Revenue
Regulations."

Petitioner KEPCO Philippines Corporation (Kepco) is a VAT-registered independent power producer engaged in the
business of generating electricity.  It exclusively sells electricity to National Power Corporation (NPC), an entity exempt
from taxes under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6395 (RA No. 6395).

Issue:
The court of tax appeals en banc gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it held that
non-compliance with the invoicing requirement shall result in the automatic denial of the claim.

Ruling:
The issue of whether the word "zero-rated" should be imprinted on invoices and/or official receipts as part of the invoicing
requirement has been settled in the case of Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue[30] and restated in the later case of J.R.A. Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner.[31]  In the first
case, Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation (Panasonic), a VAT-registered entity, was engaged in the production
and exportation of plain paper copiers and their parts and accessories.  From April 1998 to March 31, 1999, Panasonic
generated export sales amounting to US$12,819,475.15 and US$11,859,489.78 totaling US$24,678,964.93.  Thus, it paid
input VAT of P9,368,482.40 that it attributed to its zero-rated sales. It filed applications for refund or tax credit on what it
had paid.  The CTA denied its application.  Panasonic's export sales were subject to 0% VAT under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1)
of the 1997 NIRC but it did not qualify for zero-rating because the word "zero-rated" was not printed on Panasonic's export
invoices. This omission, according to the CTA, violated the invoicing requirements of Section 4.108-1 of RR No. 7-95.
Panasonic argued, however, that "in requiring the printing on its sales invoices of the word `zero-rated,' the Secretary of
Finance unduly expanded, amended, and modified by a mere regulation (Section 4.108-1 of RR No.  7-95) the letter and
spirit of Sections 113 and 237 of the 1997 NIRC, prior to their amendment by R.A. 9337." [32]  Panasonic stressed that
Sections 113 and 237 did not necessitate the imprinting of the word "zero-rated" for its zero-rated sales receipts or invoices.
The BIR integrated this requirement only after the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 on November 1, 2005, a law that was still
inexistent at the time of the transactions.
Aquino III v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010

FACTS:
The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled “An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.”

Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it
has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district
shall be composed of 176,383 population count.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard with a minimum population of
250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized
as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for non-
compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A.
9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no
locus standi to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether or not a population of
250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.

RULING::
The Court ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was
explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a
representative, with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first
be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to two additional districts from
the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance, other than population, the results of the apportionment were
valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.
Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections
G.R. Nos. 136781, 136786, 136795
October 6, 2000
FACTS:
COMELEC proclaimed 14 party-list representatives from 13 parties which obtained at least 2% of the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system as members of the House of Representatives. Upon
petition for respondents, who were party-list organizations, it proclaimed 38 additional party-list
representatives although they obtained less than 2% of the total number of votes cast for the party-list
system on the ground that under the Constitution, it is mandatory that at least 20% of the members of
the House of Representatives come from the party-list representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty
percent allocation for party-list solons be filled up completely and all the time?

RULING:
It is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution vested Congress with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the
party-list system of representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress deemed it
necessary to require parties participating in the system to obtain at least 2% of the total votes cast for
the party list system to be entitled to a party-list seat. Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties
having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in
Congress.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 203766
April 2, 2013

FACTS:
52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. In a Resolution
dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the
13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector; 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from
this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-
list elections. Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc
scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations
that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have
continually complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani), which COMELEC later disqualified several
groups. 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing
the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official
ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status
Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the criteria for participating as party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT should be applied by the Comelec in the coming May 2013 party-list elections

RULING:
No. Political parties need not align themselves with sectoral groups or organizations, and the nominees
thereof need not come from that sector itself, provided that he can show that he has a proven track
record for advocating the cause of the organization he seeks to represent. The recognition that national
and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need
not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties
who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.
On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor,
peasant, fisher folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of
Representatives. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must
"wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the
middle class or those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical
Coordination Board.
Hidalgo v. Hidalgo
G.R. No. L-25326
May 29, 1970

FACTS:
Policarpio Hidalgo was until the time of the execution of the deeds of sale on September 27, 1963 and
March 2, 1964 in favor of his seven above-named private co-respondents, the owner of the 22,876-
square meter and 7,638-square meter agricultural parcels of land situated in Lumil, San Jose, Batangas.

In Case L-25326, Policarpio sold the 22,876-square meter parcel of land, together with two other
parcels of land for P4,000.00. Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales, as tenants thereof, alleging that
the parcel worked by them as tenants is fairly worth P1,500.00, "taking into account the respective
areas, productivities, accessibilities, and assessed values of three lots, seek by way of redemption the
execution of a deed of sale for the same amount of P1,500.00 by Policarpio in their favor.

In Case L-25327, Policarpio sold the 7,638-square meter parcel of land for P750.00, and Hilario Aguila
and Adela Hidalgo as tenants thereof, seek by way of redemption the execution of a deed of sale for the
same price of P750.00 by Policarpio in their favor.

The Igmidio and others have for several years been working on the lands as share tenants. No 90-day
notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11
of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844, enacted on August 8, 1963) was given
by Policarpio to petitioners-tenants. Subsequently, the deeds of sale executed by Policarpio-vendor
were registered by respondents register of deeds and provincial assessor of Batangas in the records of
their respective offices notwithstanding the non-execution by Policarpio-vendor of the affidavit
required by section 13 of the Land Reform Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working
form the purchases thereof, where no notice was previously given to them by the vendor, who was their
landholder of the latter's intention to sell the property and where the vendor did not execute the
affidavit required by Section 13 of RA 3844 before the registration of the deed of sale. Or, is the right
of redemption granted by Section 12 of RA 3844 applicable to share tenants?

RULING:
The code intended to afford the farmers' who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its
enactment but who inexorably would be agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed
abolition of tenancy, the same priority and preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the
enactment of the Code or soon thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into
agricultural lessees, to acquire the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by
the owner or of their acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority. It then becomes
the court's duty to enforce the intent and will of the Code, for "... (I)n fact, the spirit or intention of a
statute prevails over the letter thereof.' (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 23, 1957, citing 82 C.J.S., p.
526.) A statute 'should be construed according to its spirit or intention, disregarding as far as necessary,
the letter of the law.' (Lopez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 100 Phil. 855.) By this, we do not
correct the act of the Legislature, but rather ... carry out and give due course to 'its intent.

Therefore, the decision of Agrarian Court is reversed and the petitions to redeem the subject
landholdings are granted. In case L-25326 however the case is remanded to the agrarian court to
determine the reasonable price to be paid by petitioners therein to Policarpio Hidalgo for redemption of
the landholding in accordance with the observations made.
Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan
G.R. No. 83987
December 24, 1997
FACTS:
On January 1988, the petitioner applied with the office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit
to engage in the business in the said area. The mayor granted the petitioner the privilege of a “real
estate dealer/privately-owned public market operator” under the trade name of Balanga Central Market.
In February 1988, the Sangguniang Bayan passed a resolution annulling the mayor’s permit issued to
petitioner and advising the mayor to revoke the permit “to operate a public market” in which the mayor
did by passing an executive order. Because of which, the petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of
writ of preliminary injunction which the court denied. Petitioner argues that it had not violated any law
or ordinance; hence, there was no reason for the respondents to revoke the Mayor’s permit issued to it.
Respondents claims that petitioner had violated an existing municipal ordinance when it failed to
disclose the true status of the area involved in the permit and when it did not secure separate permits
for its two businesses, i.e., one as "real estate dealer" and another as "privately-owned public market
operator." Respondents referred to Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code which, inter alia,
enjoins an applicant for a Mayor's permit from making a false statement in his application and provides
for the penalties for violation of any existing ordinance regulating business establishments.

ISSUE:
Whetehr or not petitioner’s applying for two business permit is a ground for revocation

RULING:
The permit should not have been issued without the required information given in the application form
itself. Revoking the permit, however, because of a false statement in the application form cannot be
justified under the aforementioned provision. There must be proof of willful misrepresentation and
deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed, and as it happened,
petitioner did not make any false statement in the pertinent entry. Neither was petitioner's applying for
two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does
not expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only
that separate fees be paid for each business. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed
in strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality

Granting, however, that separate permits are actually required, the application form does not contain
any entry as regards the number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.Respondents
insinuated bad faith on the part of petitioner in failing to supply the pertinent information in the
application form and for taking advantage of the fact that Mayor Banzon was then newly installed as
Mayor of Balanga. The absence of the material information in the application form was nonetheless
supplied in the face of the permit signed and issued by Mayor Banzon himself.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines
G.R. No. 160528
October 9, 2006
FACTS:
On November 5, 1997, [respondent's] AVP-Revenue Operations and Tax Services Officer, Atty.
Edgardo P. Curbita, filed with the Office of the then Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a written
request for refund of the amount of P2,241,527.22 which represents the total amount of 20% final
withholding tax withheld from the [respondent] by various withholding agent banks, and which amount
includes the 20% final withholding tax withheld by the UCPB and RCBC for the period starting March
1995 through February 1997. On December 4, 1997, the [respondent's] AVP-Revenue Operations and
Tax Services Officer again filed with [petitioner] CIR another written request for refund of the amount
of P1,048,047.23, representing the total amount of 20% final withholding tax withheld by various
depository banks of the [respondent] which amount includes the 20% withholding tax withheld by
PNB, EBC, and JPSMB for the period starting March 1995 through November 1997. The CTA ruled
that Respondent PAL was not entitled to the refund. Section 13 of Presidential Decree No. 1590, PAL's
franchise, allegedly gave respondent the option to pay either its corporate income tax under the
provisions of the NIRC or a franchise tax of two percent of its gross revenues. Payment of either tax
would be in lieu of all "other taxes." The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the CTA. The CA
held that PAL was bound to pay only the corporate income tax or the franchise tax. Section 13 of
Presidential Decree No. 1590 exempts respondent from paying all other taxes, duties, royalties and
other fees of any kind. Respondent chose to pay its basic corporate income tax, which, after
considering the factors allowed by law, resulted in a zero tax liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law ruling that the 'in lieu of all other taxes'
provision in Section 13 of PD No. 1590 applies even if there were in fact no taxes paid under any of
subsections (A) and (B) of the said decree

RULING:
The fallacy of the CIR's argument is evident from the fact that the payment of a measly sum of one
peso would suffice to exempt PAL from other taxes, whereas a zero liability arising from its losses
would not. There is no substantial distinction between a zero tax and a one-peso tax liability.

The Court is bound to effectuate the lawmakers' intent, which is the controlling factor in interpreting a
statute.29 Significantly, this Court has held that the soul of the law is intent:

"The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the
purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and
the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of
the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained,
although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow
the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature
and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which
gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out
and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best
with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the
legislature."30

While the Court recognizes the general rule that the grant of tax exemptions is strictly construed
against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing power,31 Section 13 of the franchise of respondent
leaves no room for interpretation. Its franchise exempts it from paying any tax other than the option it
chooses: either the "basic corporate income tax" or the two percent gross revenue tax. Determining
whether this tax exemption is wise or advantageous is outside the realm of judicial power. This matter
is addressed to the sound discretion of the lawmaking department of government.
 Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Association
G.R. No. 138298
November 29, 2000
FACTS:
On May 6, 1999, petitioner Raoul B. del Mar initially filed in G.R. No. 138298 a Petition for
Prohibition to prevent respondent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque
pelota games, by itself or in agreement with Belle Corporation, on the ground that the controverted act
is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.
However, on June 17, 1999, respondent PAGCOR entered into an Agreement with private respondents
Belle Jai Alai Corporation (BELLE) and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator Corporation
(FILGAME) wherein it was agreed that BELLE will make available to PAGCOR the required
infrastructure facilities including the main fronton, as well as provide the needed funding for jai-alai
operations with no financial outlay from PAGCOR, while PAGCOR handles the actual management
and operation of jai-alai. Thus, on August 10, 1999, petitioner Del Mar filed a Supplemental Petition
for Certiorari questioning the validity of said Agreement on the ground that PAGCOR is without
jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or power to enter into such Agreement for the opening,
establishment, operation, control and management of jai-alai games. A little earlier, or on July 1, 1999,
petitioners Federico S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a Petition for Injunction, docketed as
G.R. No. 138982, which seeks to enjoin respondent PAGCOR from operating or otherwise managing
the jai-alai or Basque pelota games by itself or in joint venture with Belle Corporation, for being
patently illegal, having no basis in the law or the Constitution, and in usurpation of the authority that
properly pertains to the legislative branch of the government. In this case, a Petition in Intervention was
filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is
not included in the scope of PAGCOR’s franchise which covers only games of chance. Petitioners
Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval II, Michael T. Defensor, and intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, are
suing as taxpayers and in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives representing the
First District of Cebu City, the Lone Congressional District of Malabon-Navotas, the Third
Congressional District of Quezon City, and the Third Congressional District of Bukidnon, respectively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country

RULING:
A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in
either of two or more senses. In the cases at bar, it is difficult to see how a literal reading of the
statutory text would unerringly reveal the legislative intent. To be sure, the term "jai-alai" was never
used and is nowhere to be found in the law. The conclusion that it is included in the franchise granted
to PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of and a blind reliance on the ordinary and
plain meaning of the statutory terms used such as "gaming pools" and "lotteries." Sutherland tells us
that a statute is "ambiguous", and so open to explanation by extrinsic aids, not only when its abstract
meaning or the connotation of its terms is uncertain, but also when it is uncertain in its application to,
or effect upon, the fact-situation of the case at bar.
Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Standard Eastern, Inc.
G.R. No. L-28329
August 7, 1975

FACTS:
Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining plant in Limay Bataan.
Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the five years following the
granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all equipment,
machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the
special import tax (which it paid under protest). Petitioner contends that the special import tax under
Republic Act No. 1394 is separate and distinct from the customs duty prescribed by the Tariff and
Customs Code, and that the exemption enjoyed by respondent ESSO from the payment of customs
duties under the Petroleum net of 1949 does not include exemption from the payment of the special
import tax provided in R.A. No. 1394.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the exemptions enjoyed by respondent ESSO under R.A. No. 387 have been abrogated
by R.A. No. 1394

RULING:
The history of the enactment of the statute and purpose of the legislature in employing a clause or
provision in the law had been applied in determining the true intent of the lawmaking body, We are
convinced that R.A. No. 387, The Petroleum Act of 1949, was intended to encourage the exploitation,
exploration and development of the petroleum resources of the country by giving it the necessary
incentive in the form of tax exemptions. This is the raison d etre for the generous grant of tax
exemptions to those who would invest their financial resources towards the achievement of this
national economic goal.

On the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions enjoyed by respondent ESSO under R.A.
No. 387 have been abrogated by R.A. No. 1394, We hold that repeal by implication is not favored
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same
matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing
as a result of the language used, or unless the latter act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier.
People v. Muñoz
G.R. No. 38969-70
February 9, 1989
FACTS:
On June 30, 1972 in Balite Sur, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, Feliciano Muñoz, Marvin Millora, Tomas
Tayaba, Jose Mislang, and the other seven unidentified men, went out in a jeep at the behest of one of
them who had complained of having been victimized by cattle rustlers. Having found their supposed
quarry, they proceeded to execute each one of them in cold blood without further ado and without
mercy. Mauro Bulatao was shot in the mouth and died instantly as his son and daughter looked on in
horror. Alejandro Bulatao was forced to lie down on the ground and then shot twice, also in the head,
before his terrified wife and son. Aquilino Bulatao, who was only sixteen years old, was kicked in the
head until he bled before he too had his brains blown out. The four identified accused were convicted
for the crime of murder qualified by treachery. The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article
III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. It further provides that neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, abolish the death penalty.
RULING:

A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty
shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while
rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language
under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the
records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. Thus, Article III, Section 19(l) does not
change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only
insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The
range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged.
People v. Degamo
G.R. No. 121211
April 30, 2003
FACTS:
A complaint was filed before the trial court charging Roneto “Roy’’ Degamo with a crime of rape to
which, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty. Before the start of the trial proper the court allowed the
complaint to be amended to include the allegation that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has
become insane. Upon arraignment, Roy pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued.

The prosecution’s version of evidence alleged that Roy raped Ellen Vertudazo on October 1, 1994, at
around 1:00 in the morning inside her house by forcing his way inside the house and poked a knife at
the complainant’s neck. She tried to move away from Roy but he grabbed her and told her that he
would kill her if she will not accede to his demands. Roy then told her to put off the light, strip off her
clothes and not make any noise. Thereafter, Roy had a sexual intercourse with her. Due to her traumatic
experience, complainant suffered from Psychosis, which is a form of mental disorder, technical term
for insanity, induced by an overwhelming trauma secondary to rape.

The version of Roy is based on his lone testimony. He admits that he and complainant were neighbors
but claims that they were lovers, and they had sexual intercourse without him having to use force.
Therefore, the trial court rendered a decision finding Roy guilty of rape. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of insanity of the victim by reason or on occasion of the
rape committed against complainant should likewise be considered in the imposition of the proper
penalty

RULING:
There is no jurisprudence yet, however, which construed the provision has become insane. Though
there is no doubt that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim becomes permanently insane,
there is no ruling yet whether temporary insanity by reason of rape (when the victim responded to
psychiatric treatment as in the present case) still falls within the purview of the same provision.

For the guidance of the Bench and the Bar, we deem it proper to resolve what should be the correct
construction of the provision has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape committed.

It is a hornbook doctrine in statutory construction that it is the duty of the court in construing a law to
determine legislative intention from its language.33 The history of events that transpired during the
process of enacting a law, from its introduction in the legislature to its final validation has generally
been the first extrinsic aid to which courts turn to construe an ambiguous act.34cräläwvirtualibräry

Republic Act No. 263235 is the first law that introduced the qualifying circumstance of insanity by
reason or on occasion of rape, amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. An examination of the
deliberation of the lawmakers in enacting R.A. No. 2632, convinces us that the degree of insanity,
whether permanent or temporary, is not relevant in considering the same as a qualifying circumstance
for as long as the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape.
Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Manufacturing Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission
G.R. No. L-23606
July 29, 1968
FACTS:
Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Manufacturing Company, Inc. was duly incorporated under Philippine
laws on January 15, 1912. By its corporate articles it was to exist for fifty (50) years from
incorporation. Its term of existence expired on January 15, 1962. On that date, it ceased transacting
business, entered into a state of liquidation. Thereafter, a new corporation, Alhambra Industries, Inc.,
was formed to carry on the business of Alhambra. On June 20, 1963, within Alhambra's three-year
statutory period for liquidation, RA 3531 was enacted into law. It amended Section 18 of the
Corporation Law empowering domestic private corporations to extend their corporate life beyond the
period fixed by the articles of incorporation for a term not to exceed fifty years in any one instance.
Previous to RA 3531, the maximum non-extendible term of such corporations was fifty years. On July
15, 1963, at a special meeting, Alhambra's board of directors resolved to amend paragraph "Fourth" of
its articles of incorporation to extend its corporate life for an additional fifty years, or a total of 100
years from its incorporation. Alhambra's articles of incorporation as so amended certified correct by its
president and secretary and a majority of its board of directors, were then filed with SEC. SEC,
however, returned said amended articles of incorporation to Alhambra's counsel with the ruling that RA
3531 "which took effect only on June 20, 1963, cannot be availed of by the said corporation, for the
reason that its term of existence had already expired when the said law took effect in short, said law has
no retroactive effect."

ISSUE:
Whether or not a corporation can extend its life by amendment of its articles of incorporation effected
during the three-year statutory period for liquidation when its original term of existence had already
expired.

RULING:
The situation here presented is not one where the law under consideration is ambiguous, where courts
have to put in harness extrinsic aids such as a look at another statute to disentangle doubts. It is an
elementary rule in legal hermeneutics that where the terms of the law are clear, no statutory
construction may be permitted. Upon the basic conceptual scheme under which corporations operate,
and with Section 77 of the Corporation Law particularly in mind, we find no vagueness in Section 18,
as amended by Republic Act 3531. As we view it, by directing attention to Republic Act 1932,
Alhambra would seek to create obscurity in the law; and, with that, ask of us a ruling that such
obscurity be explained. This, we dare say, cannot be done.

The pari materia rule of statutory construction, in fact, commands that statutes must be harmonized
with each other.14 So harmonizing, the conclusion is clear that Section 18 of the Corporation Law, as
amended by Republic Act 3531 in reference to extensions of corporate existence, is to be read in the
same light as Republic Act 1932. Which means that domestic corporations in general, as with domestic
insurance companies, can extend corporate existence only on or before the expiration of the term fixed
in their charters.
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103882
November 25, 1998
FACTS:

On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities
to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of
any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and
adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in
consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of
foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate
Corporation for the said project. Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that
the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside
the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.

Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA
1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than that in the definition provided by the
dictionary. RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed
by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance passed by Pasay City is valid

RULING:

The Court ruled that, it is erroneous and unsustainable is the opinion of respondent court that under RA
1899, the term "foreshore lands" includes submerged areas. As can be gleaned from its disquisition and
rationalization aforequoted, the respondent court unduly stretched and broadened the meaning of
"foreshore lands", beyond the intentment of the law, and against the recognized legal connotation of
"foreshore lands". Well entrenched, to the point of being elementary, is the rule that when the law
speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only
for application. So also, resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, is
unwarranted, the language of the law being plain and unambiguous.

The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only
signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance
No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of
RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.
 Vera v. Avelino
G.R. No. L-543
August 31, 1946
FACTS:
Commission on Elections submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress of the Philippines
a report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by reason of certain
specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac,
the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.

During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was approved
referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero – who had been
included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes, proclaimed by the
Commissions on Elections – shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the chamber, pending the
termination of the of the protest lodged against their election.

Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues responsible for the resolution,
praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their seats and to
exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had jurisdiction
over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the validity of the
pendatum resolution.

ISSUE:
Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in the
said provinces are valid.

RULING:
.
The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of powers, holding that the
case was not a “contest”, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to determine who shall be
admitted to its membership.

The theory has been proposed — modesty aside — that the dissenting members of this Court who were
delegates to the Constitutional Convention and were "co-authors of the Constitution" "are in a better
position to interpret" that same Constitution in this particular litigation. There is no doubt that their
properly recorded utterances during the debates and proceedings of the Convention deserve weight,
like those of any other delegate therein. Note, however, that the proceedings of the Convention "are
less conclusive of the power construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the
proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while
in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives.

The proceedings of the Convention "are less conclusive of the power construction of the instrument
than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the
intent of the legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the
people through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.Their writings (of the
delegates) commenting or explaining that instrument, published shortly thereafter,the book of Delegate
Aruego, supra, and of others — have persuasive force.
 Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp.
G.R. No. 158540
July 8, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in
the business of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation. Private respondent
Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association of domestic cement
manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray
Portland cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic production, capacity
utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly,
Philcemcor sought the imposition a definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to
the Safeguard Measures Act. The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal
investigation to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray
Portland cement Tariff Commission’s report: The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of
serious injury not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general
safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement. After reviewing the report,
then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II (DTI Secretary) disagreed with the conclusion of the Tariff
Commission that there was no serious injury to the local cement industry caused by the surge of
imports. In view of this disagreement, the DTI requested an opinion from the Department of Justice
(DOJ) on the DTI Secretarys scope of options in acting on the Commissions recommendations.

Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating that Section 13 of the
SMA precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commissions negative finding, or finding
that a definitive safeguard measure should not be imposed. DTI then denied application for safeguard
measures against the importation of gray Portland cement. Philcemcor received a copy of the DTI
Decision on 12 April 2002. Ten days later, it filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions
Report. On the other hand, Southern Cross filed its Comment arguing that the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition, for it is on the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) that the SMA
conferred jurisdiction to review rulings of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a
safeguard measure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures in the absence of a positive
final determination by the Tariff Commission.
RULING:

The plain meaning of Section 5 emphasizes that only if the Tariff Commission renders a positive
determination could the DTI Secretary impose a safeguard measure. Resort to the congressional
records to ascertain legislative intent is not warranted if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity.
The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statuteMinority or solitary views,
anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional crude witticisms, may improperly acquire the mantle of
legislative intent by the sole virtue of their publication in the authoritative congressional record. Hence,
resort to legislative deliberations is allowable when the statute is crafted in such a manner as to leave
room for doubt on the real intent of the legislature.

Section 5 plainly evinces legislative intent to restrict the DTI Secretary's power to impose a general
safeguard measure by preconditioning such imposition on a positive determination by the Tariff
Commission. Such legislative intent should be given full force and effect, as the executive power to
impose definitive safeguard measures is but a delegated power¾the power of taxation, by nature and by
command of the fundamental law, being a preserve of the legislature
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.
G.R. No. 183505
February 26, 2010
FACTS:
Several CTA cases, the BIR sent SM Prime and First Asia a Preliminary Assessment Notice for VAT
deficiency on cinema ticket sales for taxable year 2000 (SM), 1999 (First Asia), 2000 (First Asia), 2002
(First Asia), and 2003 (First Asia). SM and First Asia filed for protest but the BIR just denied them and
sent them Letter of Demand subsequently. All the PANs were subjected to Petition for Review file by
SM and First Asia to CTA. The CTA First Division ruled that there should only be one business tax
applicable to theater and movie houses, the 30% amusement tax. Hence, CIR is wrong in collecting
VAT from the ticket sales. The CIR appealed the case to the CTA En banc. The latter affirmed the
ruling of the CTA First Division.

ISSUE:
W1hether the gross receipts derived by operators or proprietors of cinema/theater houses from
admission tickets are subject to VAT

RULING:

When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would lead to
absurdity or injustice, legislative history is all important. In such cases, courts may take judicial notice
of the origin and history of the law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well as prior laws on the
same subject matter3 to ascertain the true intent or spirit of the law.

A cursory reading of the foregoing provision clearly shows that the enumeration of the "sale or
exchange of services" subject to VAT is not exhaustive. The words, "including," "similar services," and
"shall likewise include," indicate that the enumeration is by way of example only.Among those
included in the enumeration is the "lease of motion picture films, films, tapes and discs." This,
however, is not the same as the showing or exhibition of motion pictures or films. Since the activity of
showing motion pictures, films or movies by cinema/ theater operators or proprietors is not included in
the enumeration, it is incumbent upon the court to the determine whether such activity falls under the
phrase "similar services." The intent of the legislature must therefore be ascertained.The legislature
never intended operators or proprietors of cinema/theater houses to be covered by VAT
Laurel v. Abrogar
G.R. No. 155076
February 27, 2006
FACTS:
Laurel was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and
completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency
and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined.

PLDT alleges that the “international phone calls” which are “electric currents or sets of electric
impulses transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern representing the human voice to a
receiver,” are Personal properties which may be the subject of theft. Art. 416(3) deems “forces of
nature” (which includes electricity” which are brought under the control by science, are personal
property.

Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the phone or a communication carried out using
the telephone. It is not synonymous to electric currents or impulses. Hence, it may not be considered as
personal property susceptible of appropriation. Laurel claims that the analogy between generated
electricity and telephone calls is misplaced. PLDT does not produce or generate telephone calls. It only
Provides the facilities or services for the transmission and switching of the calls. He also insists that
“business” is not personal property. It is not the “business” that is protected but the “right to carry a
business.” This right is what is considered as property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be
considered as “property,” the same may not be the subject of theft.

ISSUE:
Whether or not international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Cards through the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in short, PLDT’s business of
providing said telecommunication services, are proper subjects of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code
RULING:

The Court find and so hold that the international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card
holders, the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services
are not personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The construction by the
respondents of Article 308 of the said Code to include, within its coverage, the aforesaid international
telephone calls, telecommunication services and business is contrary to the letter and intent of the law.

The rule is that, penal laws are to be construed strictly. Such rule is founded on the tenderness of the
law for the rights of individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in
Congress, not in the judicial department. It is Congress, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and
ordain its punishment.44 Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies
constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow
interpretation" is appropriate. The Court must take heed to language, legislative history and purpose, in
order to strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids. However, when the
congressional purpose is unclear, the court must apply the rule of lenity, that is, ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.

Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the language
used; and may not be held to include offenses other than those which are clearly described,
notwithstanding that the Court may think that Congress should have made them more comprehensive.
Words and phrases in a statute are to be construed according to their common meaning and accepted
usage.
Navarro v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 180050
April 12, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to nullify
Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands is
106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial Government of Surigao del
Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with average annual income for
calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square kilometers as
certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a province may be created if it has
an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices as certified by the
Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO,
or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province. Thereafter, the bill
creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into law and a plebiscite was held subsequently
yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative. With the approval of the people from both the
mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created
 into a separate and distinct province. Respondents argued that exemption from the land area
requirement is germane to the purpose of the Local Government Code to develop self-reliant political
and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as
they are germane to the objects and purposes of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 valid

RULING:
The matters raised during the said Bicameral Conference Committee meeting clearly show the manifest
intention of Congress to promote development in the previously underdeveloped and uninhabited land
areas by allowing them to directly share in the allocation of funds under the national budget. It should
be remembered that, under Sections 284 and 285

of the LGC, the IRA is given back to local governments, and the sharing is based on land area,
population, and local revenue.

Elementary is the principle that, if the literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction, such as the legislative
history of the law, or may consider the implementing rules and regulations and pertinent executive
issuances in the nature of executive and/or legislative construction. Pursuant to this principle, Article
9(2) of the LGC-IRR should be deemed incorporated in the basic law, the LGC.

It is well to remember that the LGC-IRR was formulated by the Oversight Committee consisting of
members of both the Executive and Legislative departments, pursuant to Section 53332 of the LGC. As
Section 533 provides, the Oversight Committee shall formulate and issue the appropriate rules and
regulations necessary for the efficient and effective implementation of any and all provisions of this
Code, thereby ensuring compliance with the principles of local autonomy as defined under the
Constitution.
 Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 160675
June 16, 2006
FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1
dated October 30, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69313, which had declared
that the Office of the Ombudsman has no power to impose the penalty of suspension. According to the
appellate court, its power is limited only to the recommendation of the penalty of removal, suspension,
demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee found to be at fault.By declaring
that the Office of the Ombudsman can only recommend, but cannot directly impose, the penalty in
administrative cases, the appellate court allegedly, in effect, nullified and invalidated the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6770 relating to its administrative disciplinary powers. Stated in another manner, the
appellate court has allegedly deemed that the Office of the Ombudsman cannot make a determination
of guilt for an administrative offense; it cannot assess a penalty; and it cannot cause its decisions to be
implemented. Petitioner stresses that the grant of administrative disciplinary authority to the Office of
the Ombudsman is not prohibited by, or inconsistent with, the Constitution. It invokes the legislative
history of Republic Act No. 6770 to buttress its claim that it was the intention of the lawmakers to
provide for an independent constitutional body that would serve as "the protector of the people" with
"real powers."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman only has the power to recommend, but not to impose, the
penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee

RULING:
The Court rejected the argument that the power of the Office of the Ombudsman is only advisory or
recommendatory in nature. It cautioned against the literal interpretation of Section 13(3), Article XI of
the Constitution which directs the Office of the Ombudsman to "recommend" to the officer concerned
the removal, suspension demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of any public official or employee at
fault. Notwithstanding the term "recommend," according to the Court, the said provision, construed
together with the pertinent provisions in Republic Act No. 6770, is not only advisory in nature but is
actually mandatory within the bounds of law.

The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears out the conclusion that the Office of the
Ombudsman was intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority, including the power to
impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer
or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be "an
activist watchman," not merely a passive on
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin
G.R. No. 130230
April 15, 2005
FACTS:
Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver's license
confiscated for parking illegally along Binondo. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the
respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his
driver's license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court. Receiving no immediate
reply, Garin filed a complaint before the RTC contending that in the absence of any implementing rules
and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive
erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the
deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further
contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority. In filing this petition, the MMDA reiterates and reinforces its argument in the
court below and contends that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither a contract nor a property
right, but is a privilege subject to reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest of the
public safety and welfare. The petitioner further argues that revocation or suspension of this privilege
does not constitute a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given the right to appeal the
revocation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the MMDA has the authority to confiscate and suspend or revoke driver’s licenses in
the enforcement of traffic laws and regulations

RULING:
The legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not
a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its
predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the
street was invalid. We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police
power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature
to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good
and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body
of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this
power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such
legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. Our Congress delegated
police power to the LGUs in the Local Government Code of 1991. A local government is a "political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs.”
Local government units are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies.

Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that
given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the
implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f)
of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the
power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank
G.R. No. L-8888
November 29, 1957.
FACTS:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried
cocoa beans for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totalling P74,671.04. Claiming
exemption from said tax under section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted
payment; and in its amended complaint it included the Treasurer of the Philippines. The suit was filed
in the Manila Court of First Instance, wherein defendants submitted in due time a motion to dismiss on
the grounds: first, the complaint stated no cause of action because cocoa beans were not "chocolate";
and second, it was a suit against the Government without the latter's consent
ISSUE:
Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the
foreign exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended

RULING:
The quotations refer to "cocoa" as chocolate nut" "chocolate bean" or "chocolate tree." And the legal
exemption refers to "chocolate" not the bean, nor the nut nor the tree.In view of the foregoing, and
having in mind the principle of strict construction of statutes exempting from taxation, we are of the
opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in the above section 2 does not include "cocoa
beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the latter is ready for
human consumption; the former is not.

Parts of the Congressional record quoted in the briefs would seem to show that in approving House Bill
No. 2576, the Congress agreed to exempt "cocoa beans" instead of chocolate with a view to favoring
local manufacturers of chocolate products.6 A change of legislative policy, as appellees contend7 —
not a declaration or clarification of previous Congressional purpose. In fact, as indicating, the
Government's new policy of exempting for the first time importations of "cocoa beans," there is the
President's proclamation No. 62 of September 2, 1954 issued in accordance with Republic Act No.
1197 specifying that said exemption (of cocoa beans) shall operate from and after September 3, 1954
— not before. As a general rule, it may be added, statutes operate prospectively.
Francisco v. Bosier
G.R. No. 137677
May 31, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Adalia B. Francisco and three of her sisters, Ester, Elizabeth and Adeluisa, were co-owners
of four parcels of registered lands. On August 5, 1992, petitioner received summons filed by
respondent demanding her share in the rentals being collected by petitioner from the tenants of the
building. Petitioner then informed respondent that she was exercising her right of redemption as a co-
owner of the subject property. 

On August 8, 1986, without the knowledge of the other co-owners, Adela Blas sold her 1/5 share for
P10,000.00 to respondent Zenaida Boiser who is another sister of petitioner.

On September 14, 1995, petitioner filed a suit before the Regional Trial Court in Caloocan City. She
alleged that the 30-day period for redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code had not begun to run
against her since the vendor, Adela Blas, never informed her and the other owners about the sale to
respondent. She learned about the sale only on August 5, 1992, after she received the summons
together with the complaint. Respondent, on the other hand, contended that petitioner knew about the
sale as early as May 30, 1992, because, on that date, she wrote petitioner a letter2 informing the latter
about the sale, with a demand that the rentals corresponding to her 1/5 share of the subject property be
remitted to her.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the letter of May 30, 1992 sent by respondent to petitioner notifying her of the sale on
August 8, 1986 of Adela Blas' 1/5 share of the property to respondent, containing a copy of the deed
evidencing such sale, can be considered sufficient as compliance with the notice requirement of Art.
1623 for the purpose of legal redemption

RULING:

Art. 1623 of the Civil Code is clear in requiring that the written notification should come from the
vendor or prospective vendor, not from any other person. There is, therefore, no room for construction.
Indeed, the principal difference between Art. 1524 of the former Civil Code and Art. 1623 of the
present one is that the former did not specify who must give the notice, whereas the present one
expressly says the notice must be given by the vendor. Effect must be given to this change in statutory
language.

In the present case, as previously discussed, receipt by petitioner of summons in Civil Case No. 15510
on August 5, 1992 amounted to actual knowledge of the sale from which the 30-day period of
redemption commenced to run. Petitioner had until September 4, 1992 within which to exercise her
right of legal redemption, but on August 12, 1992 she deposited the P10,000.00 redemption price. As
petitioner's exercise of said right was timely, the same should be given effect.
Buenaseda v. Flavier
G.R. No. 106719
September 21, 1993
FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or
Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order
of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al.
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the
Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to
comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a)
“The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to
suspend;” and (b) “Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official
or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions
have not been met in the instant case”

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees
working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the
administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees

RULING:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power “to recommend the suspension” of a public
official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to “suspension,” as a punitive measure. All the words
associated with the word “suspension” in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases,
e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word “suspension” should
be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering
the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.

Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public
officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute.
The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in
the investigation of the administrative charges.
People v. Yadao
G.R. No. L-6835
March 30, 1954
FACTS:
An information for violation of Section 1 of Republic Act No 145 was filed against repondent Yadao,
alleging that defendants conspiring together, willfully did "offer to assist one Floverto Jazmin in the
prosecution and expeditious approval of his legitimate claim of $2,207 for benefits under the laws of
the United States administered in the Philippines by the United States Veterans Administration, and as
consideration for which, said accused directly solicited and/or charged said Floverto Jazmin as fee or
compensation the sum of P800 which is in excess of the lawful charge of P20 in any one claim."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the information filed against defendant-appellees in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
sufficiently describes a violation of section 1 of Republic Act No. 145

RULING:
The Court explained that one who offers to assist, but does not assist, is not included within the penal
prohibition, which by its nature must be restrictively interpreted, or strictly construed against the
government. Although there was an attempt to commit the offense described by Republic Act No. 145.
But the said statute does not expressly punish attempts to commit the offense, and the provisions of the
Penal Code about attempts (tentativas) do not apply.

The prosecution relies upon Sanchez vs. U.S., to wit: wherein this was said:

A showing that an excessive fee was solicited, contracted for, charged or received for assistance in
preparation and execution of necessary papers in any application to Veterans' Administration will
support a conviction of violation of fee limitation for assistance in such application regardless of
whether such assistance was in fact rendered.

But such adjudication is not conclusive, because the statute therein construed differs materially from
ours. It punishes "any person who shall directly or indirectly contract for, charge or receive, or who
shall attempt to solicit, contract for excessive compensation." The section does not contain the phrase
"assisting a claimant" after the words "any person" and before the words "who shall etc". That phrase
conditions each and every violation of section 1 of Republic Act No. 145. The appealed decision
quashing the indictment is, therefore, affirmed, without costs.
Nilo v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-34586, L-36625
April 2, 1984
FACTS:
These petitions are jointly heard to question the effectivity of of RA 6839, which amended Sec 36 (1)
of RA 3844 allowing a landowner to eject an agricultural lessee or tenant on the ground that the owner
shall personally cultivate the land himself. 

GR No L-34586: Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of riceland at Barrio San
Roque, San Rafael, Bulacan with an area of two (2) hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-76791 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been the agricultural
share-tenant of Gatchalian since agricultural year 1964-65. On March 7, 1968, Gatchalian flied an
ejectment suit against petitioner on the ground of personal cultivation under Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act
No. 3844. Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the ejectment suit was but an act of reprisal
and retaliation because he elected the leasehold system, The RTC and CA ruled in favor of private
respondents. Upon MOR to the CA, the petitioner "personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of an
agricultural lessee has been eliminated under Republic Act No. 6389. The CA denied the motion
resolving that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive application.

GR No. L-36625: This is an appeal raised by petitioner Fortunato Castro to the Court of Appeals from
the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissing his complaint for the ejectment of his tenant,
respondent Juan Castro, on the ground of personal cultivation. The landowner wants to personally
cultivate the land owned by him located in Pulilan, Bulacan with an area of 6,941 square meters.
Petitioner Fortunato Castro questioned the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6389
which amended Section 36(l) of Republic Act No. 3844. After the enactment of Republic Act No. 6389
on September 10, 1971, the respondent moved for the dismissal of petitioner's complaint on the ground
that the new law eliminated personal cultivation by the landowmer as a ground for the ejectment of an
agricultural tenant. The Court of Agrarian Relation dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment in R.A. 6389 should be given retroactive effect to cover cases that were
filed during the effectivity of the repealed provision

RULING:

Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not always
safe guides and, hence, may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the
lawmaking body. It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by
the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members
thereof. Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke,
might differ from each other.

The petitioner-tenant in G.R. No. L-34586 contends that since Republic Act No. 6389 is a social
legislation and passed under the police power of the State, it should be liberally interpreted in favor of
the tenants. The law in question is social legislation. But social justice is not for tenants alone. The
disputed land in L-36625 is only 6,941 square meters. The area of the land in L-34586 is slightly
bigger, about two (2) hectares. A person with only one or two hectares of land to his name is equally
deserving of social justice.

A majority of the landowners affected by the repeal of "personal cultivation" as a ground for the
ejectment of a tenant own small landholdings. The records of Senate Bill No. 478 which eventually
became Republic Act No. 6389 reveal that the repeal has affected an estimated 75% of landowners in
the country who own tenanted lands of less than 3 hectares, 40% of those who own 5 hectares or less
and 96% of landowners who own an area of less than 10 hectares each.
AFP General Insurance Corporation v. Molina
G.R. No. 151133
June 30, 2008
FACTS:
The private respondents are the complainants in a case for illegal dismissal filed against Radon
Security & Allied Services Agency and/or Raquel Aquias and Ever Emporium, Inc. Labor Arbiter ruled
that the private respondents were illegally dismissed and ordered Radon Security to pay them
separation pay, backwages, and other monetary claims. Radon Security appealed the Labor Arbiter's
decision to public respondent NLRC and posted a supersedeas bond, issued by herein petitioner
AFPGIC as surety. NLRC affirmed with modification the decision of the Labor Arbiter. By virtue of
the writ of execution, the NLRC Sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment against the supersedeas bond.
AFPGIC entered the fray by filing before the Labor Arbiter an Omnibus Motion to Quash Notice/Writ
of Garnishment and to Discharge AFPGIC's Appeal Bond on the ground that said bond "has been
cancelled and thus non-existent in view of the failure of Radon Security to pay the yearly premiums."
However, both Labor Arbiter and NLRC denied the motion. In dismissing the appeal of AFPGIC, the
NLRC pointed out that AFPGIC's theory that the bond cannot anymore be proceeded against for failure
of Radon Security to pay the premium is untenable, considering that the bond is effective until the
finality of the decision. The NLRC stressed that a contrary ruling would allow respondents to simply
stop paying the premium to frustrate satisfaction of the money judgment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the bond was already cancelled for non-payment of premium

RULING:

The bond remains enforceable and under the jurisdiction of the NLRC until it is discharged.

Rule VI, Section 6 of the Revised NLRC Rules of Procedure is a contemporaneous construction of
Article 223 by the NLRC. As an interpretation of a law by the implementing administrative agency, it is
accorded great respect by this Court.30 Note that Rule VI, Section 6 categorically states that the cash or
surety bond posted in appeals involving monetary awards in labor disputes "shall be in effect until final
disposition of the case." This could only be construed to mean that the surety bond shall remain valid
and in force until finality and execution of judgment, with the resultant discharge of the surety
company only thereafter, if we are to give teeth to the labor protection clause of the Constitution. To
construe the provision any other way would open the floodgates to unscrupulous and heartless
employers who would simply forego paying premiums on their surety bond in order to evade payment
of the monetary judgment. The Court cannot be a party to any such iniquity.

The petitioner contends that under Section 64 of the Insurance Code, which is deemed written into
every insurance contract or contract of surety, an insurer may cancel a policy upon non-payment of the
premium. Said cancellation is binding upon the beneficiary as the right of a beneficiary is subordinate
to that of the insured. Hence, according to petitioner, the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error
in not holding that under Section 77 of the Insurance Code, the surety bond between it and Radon
Security was not valid and binding for non-payment of premiums, even as against a third person who
was intended to benefit therefrom. According to the SC, the petitioner's reliance on Sections 64 and 77
of the Insurance Code is misplaced. The said provisions refer to insurance contracts in general. The
instant case pertains to a surety bond; thus, the applicable provision of the Insurance Code is Section
177, which specifically governs suretyship. It provides that a surety bond, once accepted by the obligee
becomes valid and enforceable, irrespective of whether or not the premium has been paid by the
obligor. The private respondents, the obligees here, accepted the bond posted by Radon Security and
issued by the petitioner. Hence, the bond is both valid and enforceable.
 In re Frank Stanley Allen
G.R. No. 1455
October 29 1903
FACTS:
The petitioner, Frank Stanley Allen, who is an alien, claims that he is unlawfully detained and
restrained of his liberty in Manila, P.I., by W. Morgan Shuster, as Collector of Customs for the
Philippine Archipelago, who threatens to deport the petitioner from the Islands for the reason that said
Collector claims that the petitioner is a prohibited alien contract laborer whose importation is forbidden
by the act of Congress approved March 3, 1903, entitled "An act to regulate the immigration of aliens
into the United States."

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Archipelago lawful authority to execute, or
cause to be executed, so much of said act of Congress as provides for the detention and deportation of
prohibited aliens

RULING:
In promulgating this act of Congress in these Islands, Governor Taft stated that it had been decided by
the legal adviser of the Secretary of War that while this law, in its restrictions upon the admission of
aliens into the United States, applies to the Philippines, the provisions therein made for the enforcement
of the law by the Secretary of the Treasury Department of the United States and the Commissioner-
General of Immigration do not apply here, and that the new immigration law should be enforced in the
same manner in these Islands as the previous law on the same subject was enforced — that is, through
the Collector of Customs and his subordinate officers. The Secretary of the Treasury must also have
given a similar construction of this law, otherwise he would, without doubt, have appointed
immigration inspectors and established immigration stations in the Islands long ago — in fact, as far
back as April 29, 1902, when the Chinese exclusion act was made applicable to the Philippines, he
being then charged with its enforcement.

It follows that these two Departments of the Government, the two Departments concerned in the
enforcement of the immigration and exclusion laws, have held that the duty of the administering these
laws in the Philippines was to be continued in the customs department of the Islands, and by its
immigration inspectors.Much weight is always given by courts to the contemporaneous exposition of
statutes, and the construction of the departments affected by an act may be restored to in determining
the meaning, scope, and intent of the statute.

The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the
government, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the
construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities
need be cited to support it.It follows, then, that to give this act a literal construction, such as the court is
asked to give it, is to hold that Congress meant to leave the ports of these Islands open and free of
access to all the objectionable and prohibited classes mentioned in the act for a period of at least a
month, and for such further period as the Secretary of the Treasury might see fit to remain inactive
Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 113079
April 20, 2001
FACTS:
On June 30,1983, Shell filed with the quondam Bureau of Energy Utilization (BEU) an application for
authority to relocate its Shell Service Station at Tambo, Parañaque, Metro Manila, to Imelda Marcos
Avenue of the same municipality. Petroleum Distributors and Service Corporation, who owned a Caltex
station nearby, opposed such application on the grounds that: There are adequate service stations in the
area; ruinous competition will result from such actions; and there is a decline in sales in the area. The
BEU case was remanded to the ERB that rendered the decision allowing Shell to establish the service
station. PDSC elevated its cause to the CA that reversed the judgment.
ISSUE: 
Whether CA gravely erred in making findings of facts contrary to those of the ERB whose findings
were based on substantial evidence
Whether the CA gravely erred in passing judgment and making pronouncements on purely economic
and policy issues on petroleum business, which are within the realm of the ERB which has a
recognized expertise in oil economics
Whether assuming CA has the power to consider new evidence presented for the first time before the
said court, it should have referred such matter to the ERB under the doctrine of prior resort or primary
jurisdiction

RULING:
The interpretation of an administrative government agency like the ERB, which is tasked to implement
a statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. A long line of
cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.When an administrative agency renders an
opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law and the administrative
interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Thus, an
action by an administrative agency may be set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of
law, abuse of power, lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with the letter
and spirit of the law. However, there is no cogent reason to depart from the general rule because the
findings of the ERB conform to, rather than conflict with, the governing statutes and controlling case
law on the matter.
Prior to Republic Act No. 8479, the downstream oil industry was regulated by the ERB and from 1993
onwards, the Energy Industry Regulation Board. These regulatory bodies were empowered, among
others, to entertain and act on applications for the establishment of gasoline stations in the Philippines.
The ERB, which used to be the Board of Energy (BOE), is tasked with the following powers and
functions by Executive Order No. 172, which took effect immediately after its issuance on May 8,
1987. A distinct worldwide trend towards economic deregulation has been evident in the past decade.
Both developed and developing countries have seriously considered and extensively adopted various
measures for this purpose. The country has been no exception. Indeed, the buzzwords of the third
millenium are "deregulation", "globalization" and "liberalization." It need not be overemphasized that
this trend is reflected in our policy considerations, statutes and jurisprudence. Tested against the
foregoing legal yardsticks, it becomes readily apparent that the reasons relied upon by the appellate
court in rejecting petitioner's application to set up a gasoline service station becomes tenuous. This is
especially clear in the face of such recent developments in the oil industry, in relation to controlling
case law on the matter recently promulgated to address the legal issues spawned by these events. In
other words, recent developments in the oil industry as well as legislative enactments and
jurisprudential pronouncements have overtaken and rendered stale the view espoused by the appellate
court in denying Shell's application to put up the gasoline station.
On the contrary, the record discloses that the ERB Decision approving Shell's application in ERB Case
No. 89-57 was based on hard economic data on developmental projects, residential subdivision listings,
population count, public conveyances, commercial establishments, traffic count, fuel demand, growth
of private cars, public utility vehicles and commercial vehicles, etc., rather than empirical evidence to
support its conclusions.
Philippine Scout Veterans Security & Investigation Agency, Inc. (PSVSAI) v. National Labor
Relations Commission
G.R. No. 99850
September 20, 1996
FACTS:
Private respondent worked for the petitioner as a security guard since September 1963 until his
retirement at the age of 60 on March 20, 1989, with a monthly salary of P1,480.00. He formally
requested petitioner for payment of his retirement pay, but petitioner refused, stating that it would give
him financial assistance instead, without specifying the amount, which offer was refused by the private
respondent. On May 11, 1989, private respondent filed a complaint for non-payment of retirement
benefits against petitioner. Petitioner in its position paper alleged that private respondent was not
entitled to retirement pay since there was no company policy which provided for nor any collective
bargaining agreement granting it. On September 19, 1989, the arbiter rendered his decision in favor of
private respondent. NLRC affirmed the arbiter’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent is legally entitled to retirement benefits

RULING:
The fact that respondent Commission had a prior ruling in a similar case granting retirement benefits is
of no moment. Although it may be true that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by executive
officers tasked to enforce and implement said statute should be given great weight by the courts,
nevertheless, is such construction is erroneous or is clearly shown to be in conflict with the governing
statute or the Constitution or other laws, the same must be declared null and void. "It is the role of the
Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the
context of the interactions of the three branches of the government."

It has been held that "(i)t is axiomatic that retirement laws are liberally construed and administered in
favor of the persons intended to be benefited. All doubts as to the intent of the law should be resolved
in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purposes. The intention is to provide for the retiree's
sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. Unfortunately, such interpretation cannot be made in this case in the light of the clear lack
of consensual and statutory basis of the grant of retirement benefits to private respondent.
Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank
G.R. No. 154470-71
September 24, 1996
FACTS:
RCBC owned two sets of Central Bank Bills (CB Bills): (1) 7 CB Bills worth 70Million; and (2) 2 CB
Bills worth 20Million. The first set was sold to BOC which the latter in turn sold to PDB. PDB, in
turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth P 70 million, with maturity date of June 29, 1994. The
second set of CB Bills was sold by RCBC to PDB and subsequently acquired by BOC. All in all, the
BOC acquired the first and Second sets of CB bills. On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers
involving the CB bills, PDB requested the BSP to record its claim in the BSP’s books, explaining that
its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent
set off or transfer." BSP denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations
Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization of the Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and
Redemption of the Public Debt) which requires the presentation of the bond before a registered bond
may be transferred on the books of the BSP.In light of these BSP responses and the impending maturity
of the CB bills, the PDB filed with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and
Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
The BOC filed its Answer, praying for the dismissal of the petition. It argued that the PDB has no cause
of action against it since the PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. On the other hand, the BSP
countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section
applies only to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which the PDB is neither.

ISSUE:
Whether or not BSP or PDB has a better right over the subject CB bills

RULING:
A general reading of the two circulars shows that the second instance of implied repeal is present in this
case. CB Circular No. 28, entitled "Regulations Governing Open Market Operations, Stabilization of
Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and Redemption of Public Debt," is a regulation governing the
servicing and redemption of public debt, including the issue, inscription, registration, transfer, payment
and replacement of bonds and securities representing the public debt. On the other hand, CB Circular
No. 769-80, entitled "Rules and Regulations Governing Central Bank Certificate of Indebtedness," is
the governing regulation on matters (i) involving certificate of indebtedness issued by the Central Bank
itself and (ii) which are similarly covered by CB Circular No. 28.

The CB Monetary Board issued CB Circular No. 28 to regulate the servicing and redemption of public
debt, pursuant to Section 124 (now Section 119 of Republic Act R.A. No. 7653) of the old Central
Bank law which provides that "the servicing and redemption of the public debt shall also be effected
through the Bangko Sentral." However, even as R.A. No. 7653 continued to recognize this role by the
BSP, the law required a phase-out of all fiscal agency functions by the BSP, including Section 119 of
R.A. No. 7653. In other words, even if CB Circular No. 28 applies broadly to both government-issued
bonds and securities and Central Bank-issued evidence of indebtedness, given the present state of law,
CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 now operate on the same subject – Central Bank-
issued evidence of indebtedness. Under Section 1, Article XI of CB Circular No. 769-80, the continued
relevance and application of CB Circular No. 28 would depend on the need to supplement any
deficiency or silence in CB Circular No. 769-80 on a particular matter.

In the present case, both CB Circular No. 28 and CB Circular No. 769-80 provide the BSP with a
course of action in case of an allegedly fraudulently assigned certificate of indebtedness. Under CB
Circular No. 28, in case of fraudulent assignments, the BSP would have to "call upon the owner and the
person presenting the bond to substantiate their respective claims" and, from there, determine who has
a better right over the registered bond. On the other hand, under CB Circular No. 769-80, the BSP shall
merely "issue and circularize a ‘stop order’ against the transfer, exchange, redemption of the
[registered] certificate" without any adjudicative function (which is the precise root of the present
controversy). As the two circulars stand, the patent irreconcilability of these two provisions does not
require elaboration. Section 5, Article V of CB Circular No. 769-80 inescapably repealed Section 10 (d)
4 of CB Circular No. 28.
 Nestle Philippines Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 86738,
November 13, 1991
FACTS:
Sometime in February 1983, the authorized capital stock of petitioner Nestle Philippines Inc. ("Nestle")
was increased from P300 million divided into 3 million shares with a par value of P100.00 per share, to
P600 million divided into 6 million shares with a par value of P100.00 per share. Nestle underwent the
necessary procedures involving Board and stockholders approvals and effected the necessary filings to
secure the approval of the increase of authorized capital stock by respondent Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), which approval was in fact granted. Nestle has only two (2) principal
stockholders: San Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A

On 16 December 1983, the Board of Directors and stockholders of Nestle approved resolutions
authorizing the issuance of 344,500 shares out of the previously authorized but unissued capital stock
of Nestle, exclusively to San Miguel Corporation and to Nestle S.A. San Miguel Corporation
subscribed to and completely paid up 168,800 shares, while Nestle S.A. subscribed to and paid up the
balance of 175,700 shares of stock. On 28 March 1985, petitioner Nestle filed a letter signed by its
Corporate Secretary, M.L. Antonio, with the SEC seeking exemption of its proposed issuance of
additional shares to its existing principal shareholders, from the registration requirement of Section 4 of
the Revised Securities Act and from payment of the fee referred to in Section 6(c) of the same Act.

The Commission then advised petitioner to file the appropriate request for exemption and to pay the fee
required under Section 6 (c) of the statute, which provides: (c) A fee equivalent to one-tenth of one per
centum of the maximum aggregate price or issued value of the securities shall be collected by the
Commission for granting a general or particular exemption from the registration requirements of this
Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or not that there is a need to file a petition for exemption under Section 6(b) of the Revised
Securities Act with respect to the issuance of the said 344,600 additional shares to their existing
stockholders out of their unissued capital stock

RULING:
The reading by the SEC of the scope of application of Section 6(a) (4) permits greater opportunity for
the SEC to implement the statutory objective of protecting the investing public by requiring proposed
issuers of capital stock to inform such public of the true financial conditions and prospects of the
corporation.When capital stock is issued in the course of and in compliance with the requirements of
increasing its authorized capital stock under Section 38 of the Corporation Code, the SEC as a matter
of course examines the financial condition of the corporation, and hence there is no real need for
exercise of SEC authority under the Revised Securities Act.

In contrast, under the ruling issued by the SEC, an issuance of previously authorized but still unissued
capital stock may, in a particular instance, be held to be an exempt transaction by the SEC under
Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the requirements of registration under the Revised Securities
Act are "not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of the investors" by reason, inter alia,
of the small amount of stock that is proposed to be issued or because the potential buyers are very
limited in number and are in a position to protect themselves

The principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the
government, whose duty is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the
construction of the statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisdiction that no authorities
need be cited to support it.
 Adasa v. Abalos
G.R. No. 168617
February 19, 2007
FACTS:
Cecille Abalos filed two complaints against Bernadette Adasa for Estafa. The Office of the City
Prosecutor found probable cause and filed two criminal cases against petitioner. The Trial Court
ordered reinvestigation, but the prosecutor maintained that there is probable cause. After Adasa’s
arraignment where she entered an unconditional plea of not guilty, Adasa filed a Petition for Review in
the DOJ. The Secretary of Justice reversed the prosecutor’s resolution and ordered the withdrawal of
the case, which the trial court granted upon motion of the prosecutor. The Court of Appeals reversed
the dismissal of the Trial Court claiming that Circular No. 70 expressly prohibits the Secretary of
Justice from taking cognizance of a Petition for Review filed AFTER the accused has already been
arraigned. The Supreme Court upheld the CA’s judgment and denied Adasa’s claim that Section 7 and
12 should be construed as granting the Secretary of Justice discretion on whether to take cognizance of
an appeal or not. The mandate of Section 7 and 12 are clear, and there is no conflict between the two
provisions. As such, both must be followed according to their letter. Therefore, the DOJ should not
have taken cognizance of Adasa’s appeal which she filed AFTER she had already unconditionally
pleaded not guilty. She is deemed to have waived the right to preliminary investigation and the right to
question any irregularity that surrounds it, which is applicable in cases of reinvestigation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the DOJ can take cognizance of an appeal or petition for review (of the resolution of the
Office of the Prosecutor) filed AFTER arraignment of an accused.

RULING:
Contemporaneous interpretation or construction by the officers charged with the enforcement of the
rules and regulations it promulgated is entitled to great weight by the court in the latter’s construction
of such rules and regulations. That does not, however, make such a construction necessarily controlling
or binding. For equally settled is the rule that courts may disregard contemporaneous construction in
instances where the law or rule construed possesses no ambiguity, where the construction is clearly
erroneous, where strong reason to the contrary exists, and where the court has previously given the
statute a different interpretation.

If through misapprehension of law or a rule an executive or administrative officer called upon to

Petitioner’s posture on a supposed exception to the mandatory import of the word "shall" is misplaced.
It is petitioner’s view that the language of Section 12 is permissive and therefore the mandate in
Section 7 has been transformed into a matter within the discretion of the DOJ.
Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 123784
June 18, 1996
FACTS:
On 1 April 1990, acting on an information that a huge stockpile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were
seen inside the lumberyard of the petitioner in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, DENR organized a team of
foresters and policemen and sent it to conduct surveillance at the said lumberyard. In the course
thereof, the team members saw coming out from the lumberyard the petitioner's truck, loaded with
lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. Since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at the DENR compound at Visayas Avenue, Quezon City. The team was not able to
gain entry into the premises because of the refusal of the owner.

On 3 April 1990, the team was able to secure a search warrant from Executive Judge Adriano R. Osorio
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. By virtue thereof, the team seized on
that date from the petitioner's lumberyard four truckloads of narra shorts, trimmings, and slabs; a
negligible number of narra lumber; and approximately 200,000 board feet of lumber and shorts of
various species including almaciga and supa.

On 4 April 1990, the team returned to the premises of the petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela and
placed under administrative seizure the remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a
total volume of 311,000 board feet because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the
corresponding certificate of lumber origin, auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from
the source of the invoices covering the lumber to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.

The petitioner's question the seizure contending that the possession of lumber, as opposed to timber, is
not penalized in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, and even granting arguendo that lumber falls
within the purview of the said section, the same may not be used in evidence against him for they were
taken by virtue of an illegal seizure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contention of the petitioner is correct that lumber is different from timber

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or
lumber.While the former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the
latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant."

Lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.

The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of
Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as "timber or logs after
being prepared for the market."

Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to
the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and common
usage meaning. And insofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned,
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, makes no distinction between raw or processed timber.
Neither should we.
Domingo v. Commission on Audit
G.R. No. 112371
October 7, 1998
FACTS:
Aida Domingo (Domingo) was appointed as President of Regional Director,Region 5 of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and she assumed office as such. Several
government vehicles were endorsed to the personnelof the entire Region 5 DSWD.Regional Auditor
Manuel Canares (Canares) sent a notice to Domingo thatofficials who were provided
vehicles were still collecting transportation allowances.Canares requested her to instruct all
personnel to cease collecting transportation allowances.Domingo asked for reconsideration
stating that she should get transportation allowance on days that she did not use the government
vehicles. Canares denied the petition on the grounds that he followed the Commission on Audit's (CoA)
prior decision where which held that government officials which have been allotted vehicles cannot
collect transportation allowances whether or not he/she uses the vehicles.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Domingo can collect transportation allowances despite having been allotted vehicles
for their office.

RULING:

When the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction or
interpretation, only implementation is needed. According to the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of
1991:"The transportation allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials assigned a
government vehicle or use of government motor transportation." (underline provided)This provision is
categorical in providing that those who use government vehicles and government motor transportation
cannot avail transportation allowances. The use of the words "assigned" and not "used" means that it is
not necessary for the vehicles to be used by said persons. It is of no moment that the vehicles assigned
were for the whole Region 5 DSWD, and not specifically for Domingo
 Schmid & Oberly, Inc. v. RJL Martinez Fishing Corporatio
G.R. No. 75198
October 18, 1988
FACTS:
RJL Martinez Fishing Corporation is engaged in deep-sea fishing. In the course of its business, it
needed electrical generators for the operation of its business. Schmid and Oberly sells electrical
generators with the brand of “Nagata”, a Japanese product. D. Nagata Co. Ltd. of Japan was Schmid’s
supplier. Schmid advertised the 12 Nagata generators for sale and RJL purchased 12 brand new
generators. Through an irrevocable line of credit, Nagata shipped to the Schmid the generators and RJL
paid the amount of the purchase price. (First sale = 3 generators; Second sale = 12 generators).

Later, the generators were found to be factory defective. RJL informed the Schmid that it shall return
the 12 generators. 3 were returned. Schmid replaced the 3 generators subject of the first sale with
generators of a different brand. As to the second sale, 3 were shipped to Japan and the remaining 9
were not replaced.

RJL sued the defendant on the warranty, asking for rescission of the contract and that Schmid be
ordered to accept the generators and be ordered to pay back the purchase money as well as be liable for
damages. Schmid opposes such liability averring that it was merely the indentor in the sale between
Nagata Co., the exporter and RJL Martinez, the importer. As mere indentor, it avers that is not liable for
the seller’s implied warranty against hidden defects, Schmid not having personally assumed any such
warranty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the second transaction between the parties was a sale or an indent transaction

RULING:
The SC held it to be an indent transaction. An indentor is a middlemen in the same class as commercial
brokers and commission merchants. A broker is generally defined as one who is engaged, for others, on
a commission, negotiating contracts relative to property with the custody of which he has no concern;
the negotiator between other parties, never acting in his own name but in the name of those who
employed him; he is strictly a middleman and for some purpose the agent of both parties. There are 3
parties to an indent transaction, (1) buyer, (2) indentor, and (3) supplier who is usually a non-resident
manufacturer residing in the country where the goods are to be bought. The chief feature of a
commercial broker and a commercial merchant is that in effecting a sale, they are merely
intermediaries or middle-men, and act in a certain sense as the agent of both parties to the transaction.

RJL MARTINEZ admitted that the generators were purchased “through indent order.” RJL admitted in
its demand letter previously sent to SCHMID that 12 of 15 generators “were purchased through your
company, by indent order and three (3) by direct purchase.” The evidence also show that RJL
MARTINEZ paid directly NAGATA CO, for the generators, and that the latter company itself invoiced
the sale and shipped the generators directly to the former. The only participation of Schmid was to act
as an intermediary or middleman between Nagata and RJL, by procuring an order from RJL and
forwarding the same to Nagata for which the company received a commission from Nagata.
 Gallego v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. L-57841
July 30, 1982
FACTS:
An information was filed in the Sandiganbayan by Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor Mariflor Punzalan-
Castillo against Ramon Deseo, Bernardo Gallego, Herminio Erorita and Felix Agoncillo, for violation
of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Petitioners Bernardo Gallego and Felix Agoncillo filed a motion to quash the information
against them on the following grounds: the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; or, in the
alternative; and the information charges more than one offense.

Petitioners claim that the information charges the accused with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: "(a)
the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through manifest partiality; (b) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits
through evident bad faith; and (c) the giving of 'unwarranted' benefits through gross inexcusable
negligence" while in the discharge of their official and/or administrative functions; that the right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them is violated because they
are left to guess... which of the three, if not all, offenses they are being prosecuted. The motion to quash
was opposed by the prosecution alleging that the term "unwarranted"' in Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019 is clear, unambiguous and unequivocal and is presumed to have been used in its primary and
general acceptation; that the objection by petitioners on... the clarity of the term "unwarranted" does not
suffice for the courts to declare said section unconstitutional; that said Section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019 is valid unless otherwise held by final judgment of a competent court. With respect to petitioners'
allegation that the information charges more than one offense, the prosecution avers that what is
charged in the information "is the giving of unwarranted benefits to the owners of Test Booklets Nos.
839 and 144, while manifest partiality, evident... bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence are only the
means of commission." Respondent Sandiganbayan sustained the prosecution and denied the motion to
quash.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is null and void because it is
unconstitutionally vague

RULING:
We hold that Section 3(e) of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "gross
inexcusable negligence merely describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Section
3(e) of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same information does not
mean that the indictment charges three distinct offenses.

The information definitely states the names of the parties, the tune, place, manner of commission and
designation of the offense. The argument that failure in the information to state the reasons why the
benefits bestowed are unwarranted renders it defective is without merit informations need only state the
ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.
Flores v. People of the Philippines
G.R. Nos. 93411-12
July 20, 1992
FACTS:
Private complainant Pedro Oval went to the residence of petitioner on 15 February 1986 to inquire if
she could send people abroad to work, to which inquiry petitioner replied in the affirmative but on
condition that money first be given to her. On the same occasion, Oval met one Pacifico de Jesus who
was likewise in petitioner’s house for the same purpose.

On 20 March 1986, Oval gave P2,000.00 for his passport to the petitioner who received the amount. On
26 March 1986, petitioner demanded P13,000.00 from Oval to enable him to leave for his job as can
maker in Japan. Again, Oval gave the amount demanded. No receipts were issued to him by the
petitioner for both amounts. Petitioner was able to secure a passport and a visa for Oval. However,
Oval was not able to leave for the job in Japan because what was issued to him was a tourist visa and
not a work visa. For this reason, Oval demanded that petitioner return his money. Petitioner then gave
Oval P1,000.00 and promised to return the balance on 15 August 1986.

Pacifico de Jesus underwent a similar experience regarding petitioner’s commitment that she would be
able to send him abroad to work and, consequently, he gave petitioner money in consideration of the
overseas employment promised him. Because of their frustration in not being able to work overseas as
promised by petitioner and because of her failure to return their money, Oval and de Jesus reported the
matter to the police authorities. Two (2) policemen brought petitioner to the police detachment at the
Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) on Roxas Boulevard for investigation. There, petitioner
acknowledged her obligation to Oval and de Jesus and signed a promissory note in the amount of
P23,000.00 representing the amounts they gave her, payable to both Oval and de Jesus on or before 15
August 1986. When petitioner failed to return his money as promised, Oval filed against the petitioner
the complaints for Illegal Recruitment and Estafa defined under par. 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code. In due course, informations for Illegal Recruitment (Criminal Case No. 86-48113) and
Estafa (Criminal Case No. 86-48114) were filed against the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch XLI. On 22 August 1988, the trial court rendered a consolidated decision convicting
petitioner Encarnacion Flores of the crimes charged. On appeal to the respondent court, the decision of
the a quo was affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the term “recruiter” cannot be applied to her

RULING:
The term "recruit" or "recruitment" must be understood in the light of what the law contemplates and
not how a dictionary defines it. As aptly explicated by respondent court — "The crime of illegal
recruitment is defined in Art. 38 (a) of PD No. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines as amended, which is quoted as follows: "Article 38. Illegal Recruitment — a) The
following recruitment activities are deemed illegal and punishable as provided herein; 1. Those
undertaken in any form or manner by non-licensees or non-holders of authority; . . . Article 13.
Definition — b) Recruitment and placement — refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. Provided, that any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged
in recruitment and placement.

We agree with the respondent court that there is evidence that accused-petitioner had represented to
Oval that she could send the latter abroad for employment as a can maker in Japan. And because of this
representation, Oval and his companion, Pacifico de Jesus, gave her money in consideration of the
same representation. Petitioner’s defense that she did not recruit Oval for employment abroad is beside
the point. The undisputable fact is that she gave Oval the distinct impression that she had the power or
ability to send people abroad for work so that he was convinced to give her the money she demanded to
enable him to be employed as a can maker in Japan.
Valderama v. National Labor Relations Commission
G.R. No. 98239
April 25, 1996
FACTS:
In 1983, Saavedra filed a complaint against COMMODEX Inc, Valderrama (owner), and other
executives of the corporation. The Labor Arbiter ruled in her favor and held that she was illegally
dismissed, hence she is entitled to backpay wages.

A writ of execution was granted bu it was returned and unsatisfied since the corporation had ceased
operation, and the respondents too k the position that the writ could not be enforced against them on the
ground that the dispositive portion mentioned only COMMODEX. Saavedra then filed a motion for
clarification, in which she prayed that the executives be held liable. The petitioner filed an opposition,
saying that the decision cannot be amended since it’s already final and executory. Saavedra replied that
it was not an amendment she sought, but merely a clarification.

NLRC granted Saavedra’s motion. This is an appeal by Valderrama.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision can be amended or clarified

RULING:
The rule that once a judgment becomes final, it can no longer be disturbed, altered, or modified, is not
an inflexible one. It admits of exceptions, as where facts and circumstances transpire after a judgment
has become final and executory which render its execution impossible of unjust. In such a case, the
modification may be sought and alter the judgment to harmonize it with justice and the facts.

In the case at bar, modification of the judgment is appropriate considering that the company is no
longer in operation and there is no showing that it has filed bankruptcy proceedings in which private
respondent might file a claim and pursue her remedy under Article 110 of the Labor Code. Holding
petitioner personally liable for the judgment in this case is eminently just and proper considering that,
although the dispositive portion of the decision mentions only the “respondent company,” the text
repeatedly mentions “respondents” in assessing liability for the illegal dismissal of private respondent.
For indeed petitioner and others were respondents below and there can be no doubt of their personal
liability. The mere happenstance that only the company is mentioned should not, therefore, be allowed
to obscure the fact that in the text of the decision petitioner and her corespondents below were found
guilty of having illegally dismissed private respondent and of claiming that private respondent’s
employment was terminated because of retrenchment, when the truth was that she was dismissed for
pregnancy. Hence they should be held personally liable for private respondent’s reinstatement with
backwages.
People v. Samonte, G.R. No. 126048, September 29, 2000.

FACTS:
There was a shooting incident resulting to the death of Perez. Accused was detailed in the Mayor’s Office. His
revolver and a .38 palter was taken from him. Branch 9 acquitted him of the crime of homicide but Branch 3 found him
guilty of illegal possession of firearms aggravated by homicide under PD 1866.

ISSUE:
Whether or not qualified illegal possession of firearms and homicide are distinct and separate offenses punishable
under separate laws.

Whether or not R.A. 8294 should be given retroactive application.

RULING:
In support of the first assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that inspite of the fact that it was made
known to the trial court that Branch 9 of the same court (Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City) acquitted him in Criminal
Case No. 6336 for homicide, said court still entertained Criminal Case No. 6337 for illegal possession of firearms
aggravated by homicide under P.D. 1866. This contention is not tenable. There was no interference by the trial court
(Branch 3) with Branch 9 of the same Regional Trial Court which acquitted the accused-appellant of the crime of homicide.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, citing People vs. Quijada, qualified illegal possession of firearms and homicide are
distinct and separate offenses punishable under separate laws. Considering that accused-appellant allegedly used an
unlicensed firearm in killing Siegfred Perez, he was charged with aggravated illegal possession of firearms. His acquittal of
the homicide did not preclude his prosecution for aggravated illegal possession of firearms for they were two distinct and
separate crimes.

While the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in the present case had been committed on June 13, 1993, we
should give retroactive application to RA 8294 which considers the use of an unlicensed firearm in the killing of the victim
as a mere aggravating circumstance, as it is advantageous to accused-appellant.
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO) vs. Caballeda,
G.R. No.156644, July 28, 2008.

FACTS:
Petitioner Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
sugar milling business and petitioner Renato Cabati is URSUMCO’s manager.

Respondent Agripino Caballeda (Agripino) worked as welder for URSUMCO from March 1989 until June 23,
1997 with a salary of P124.00 per day, while respondent Alejandro Cadalin (Alejandro) worked for URSUMCO as crane
operator from 1976 up to June 15, 1997 with a salary of P209.30 per day.

On April 24, 1991, John Gokongwei, Jr., President of URSUMCO, issued a Memorandum establishing the
company policy on “Compulsory Retirement” (Memorandum) of its employees. Subsequently, on December 9, 1992,
Republic Act (RA) No. 76416 was enacted into law, and it took effect on January 7, 1993,7 amending Article 287 of the
Labor Code.

On April 29, 1993, URSUMCO and the National Federation of Labor (NFL), a legitimate labor organization and
the recognized sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the monthly and daily paid employees of URSUMCO, of
which Alejandro was a member, entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Article XV of the said CBA
particularly provided that the retirement benefits of the members of the collective bargaining unit shall be in accordance
with law.

Agripino and Alejandro (respondents), having reached the age of 60, were allegedly forced to retire by
URSUMCO. Both filed respective Complaints for illegal dismissal, damages and attorney’s fees. They alleged that his
compulsory retirement was in violation of the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 7641 and, was in effect, a form of illegal
dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether R.A.7641 can be given retroactive effect.

RULING:
The issue of the retroactive effect of R.A. 7641 on prior existing employment contracts has long been settled. In
Enriquez Security Services, Inc. v. Cabotaje, 496 SCRA 169, 173-174 (2006), we held: RA 7641 is undoubtedly a social
legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor protection measure and as a curative statute that—absent a retirement plan
devised by, an agreement with, or a voluntary grant from, an employer—can respond, in part at least, to the financial well-
being of workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor. There should be little doubt about the fact that
the law can apply to labor contracts still existing at the time the statute has taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned
not only from the date of the law’s enactment but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have started.

This doctrine has been repeatedly upheld and clarified in several cases. Pursuant thereto, this Court imposed two
(2) essential requisites in order that R.A. 7641 may be given retroactive effect: (1) the claimant for retirement benefits was
still in the employ of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with the
requirements for eligibility for such retirement benefits under the statute.
Rufina Patis Factory v. Alusitain, G.R. No. 146202, July 14, 2004.

FACTS:
In March 1948, Alusitain was hired as a laborer at the Rufina Patis Factory owned and operated by petitioner
Lucas. On February 19, 1991, respondent, then 63 years of age, tendered his letter of resignation, and also executed a duly
notarized affidavit of separation from employment and submitted the same to the Pensions Department of the SSS.
Meanwhile, R. A. 7641 took effect in January 1993.

In 1995, Alusitain, claiming that he retired from the company on January 31, 1995, having reached the age of 65
and due to poor health, demanded the payment of his retirement benefits in the amount of P86,710.00, which petitioner
refused to pay. Respondent filed a complaint before the NLRC against petitioners for non-payment of retirement benefits.

Petitioners maintained that respondent resigned from the company in 1991. On the other hand, respondent
maintained that he continued working for petitioners until January 1995, the date of actual retirement, due to illness and old
age, and that he merely accomplished the documents incompliance with the requirements of the SSS in order to avail of his
retirement benefits. The Labor Arbiter upheld respondent’s position. The Court of Appeals upheld the NLRC decision.
Petitioners assert that the appellate court erred in applying retroactively R.A. 7641 as said law does not expressly provide
for such retroactive application and to do so would defeat the clear intent of Congress. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to his claim for retirement benefits.

RULING:
No. R.A. 7641 is a social legislation and may be given retroactive effect where: (1) the claimant for retirement
benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with
the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits.

It is thus clear that in order for respondent to claim retirement benefits from petitioner, he has to prove that he was
its employee at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. In the case at bar, it was incumbent on respondent to prove that he retired on
January 31, 1995 and not on February 20, 1991 as indicated on his letter of resignation. Respondent failed to prove that he
was an employee of petitioner at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. Thus, his claim for retirement benefits must be disallowed.
J.V. Angeles v. NLRC, G.R. No. 126888, April 14, 1999.
FACTS:
Petitioner assailed the decision of NLRC concerning a case between petitioner and private respondent Pedro
Santos. Petitioner was the employer of Pedro for 23 years and after Pedro compulsorily retired, he filed a complaint for
retirement benefits and service incentive leave pay under RA 7641. Petitioner contended that it should not be made to pay
the demands of private respondent because the statute involved in this case cannot be given retroactive effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7641 can be applied retroactively in this case.

RULING:
No. Pedro was no longer an employee of petitioner at the time the said law took effect. The Court provided in CJC
Trading Inc. v. NLRC the circumstances which must occur before the law could be given retroactive effect, to wit:

(1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the employer at the time the statute took effect; and

(2) the claimant has complied with the requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits."

In the case under scrutiny, private respondent Santos retired and ceased to be an employee of petitioner on
February 1992, eleven (11) months before the effectivity of R.A. 7641, and he brought his complaint on October 23, 1993,
nine (9) months after the law’s effectivity. It is thus decisively clear that the provisions of R.A. 7641 could not be given
retroactive effect in his favor.
PH Scout Veterans Security v. NLRC, G.R. No. 115019, April 14, 1997.

FACTS:
Mariano Federico, private respondent, had been working with petitioners Philippine Scout Veterans Security and
Investigation Agency and/or Severo Santiago as a security guard for twenty-three (23) years. On 16 September 1991
Federico, then already sixty (60) years old, tendered his so-called “letter of resignation” citing as his reasons physical
disability to perform his duties and desire to spend the rest of his life in the province. It seems that the letter did not strictly
refer to “resignation” but “withdrawal from occupation” because thereafter he sought alternative reliefs from petitioners,
namely, termination pay corresponding to his years of service, or retirement benefits.

Petitioners rejected the claim for termination pay contending that respondent Federico voluntarily resigned. The
claim for retirement benefits met the same fate there being no collective or individual agreement providing therefor.

On 4 December 1991 respondent Federico brought his grievance to the Labor Arbiter. However, the latter sustained
the stand of petitioners. Hence on 25 August 1992 he ruled against Federico. Nevertheless, the termination of the
proceedings did not leave respondent empty-handed. The Labor Arbiter directed petitioners to pay respondent P10,000.00,
the amount they previously offered him, as financial assistance.

On 28 December 1993 public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) set aside on appeal the
subject Decision, relying on Art. 287 of the Labor Code as amended by R.A. 7641 which, in the absence of a retirement plan
or agreement providing for retirement benefits, grants retirement pay equivalent to fifteen (15) days for every year of
service.2 The amendment, which took effect on 7 January 1993, was thus retroactively applied in favor of respondent
Federico. On 21 March 1994, NLRC denied reconsideration of the Decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 7641 can be applied retroactively.

RULING:
Under the amendment, respondent Federico appears to be entitled to retirement pay. But can he avail himself of
this provision considering that it took effect subsequent to his filing of the complaint? This brings to mind the principle
reiterated in Allied that police power legislation intended to promote public welfare applies to existing contracts and can
therefore be given retroactive effect. Actually, the case at bench no longer presents a novel issue. We have ruled in Oro
Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRC that R.A. 7641 can indeed be applied retroactively.
Subido, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 122641, January 20, 1997.

FACTS:
On June 25, 1992, Bayani Subido Jr., then a Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
and Rene Parina, a BID special agent, while in the performance of their official functions, issued and implemented a warrant
of arrest against James J. Maksimuk, knowing fully well that the BID decision requiring Maksimuk’s deportation was not
yet final and executory. This resulted to the detention of Maksimuk for a period of 43 days, causing him undue injury.

Subido and Parina were charged with Arbitrary Detention defined and punished by Article 124 of the Revised
Penal Code. For their part, the petitioners filed a Motion to Quash, contending that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over the case since when it was filed, Subido was no longer part of the service and Parina was not occupying a position
corresponding to salary grade “27”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 7975 is a penal law.

RULING:
The petitioners’ invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity of penal laws is misplaced. Simply put, R.A.
No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal laws or statutes are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violation; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. No.
7975, in further amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural
matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e., one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. Moreover, the petitioners even suggest that it is likewise a curative or remedial statute: one which cures
defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing obligations.
Julliano-Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011.

FACTS:
Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice – initially under the Islamic laws and
tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at
Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano’s civil status was indicated as
“divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole world as Sen. Tamano’s wife, and upon his
death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.
Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen. Tamano’s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a
complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for
being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this
marriage remained subsisting when he married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

RULING:
Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen. Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by
PD 1083. Sen. Tamano’s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and
Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the
Civil Code of 1950, under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the marriage
provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not
availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce
under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article
13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the
male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and
Muslim rites.”
Cheng v. Sps. Sy, G.R. No. 174238, July 7, 2009.

FACTS:
Petitioner Anita Cheng filed two (2) estafa cases before the RTC, Branch 7, Manila against respondent spouses
William and Tessie Sy for issuing to her Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) in payment of their loan both of which were
dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against a closed account. Meanwhile, based on the same facts,
petitioner, on January 20, 1999, filed against respondents two (2) cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 25, Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No.
57-97 on the Rules and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the
present case where the nature of the order dismissing the cases for bouncing checks against the respondents was based on
the failure of the prosecution to identify both the accused.

RULING:
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with Section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply because she filed
her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time
of their promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights does not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this
is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Republic v. National Centennial Commission, G.R. No. 141530, March 8, 2003.

FACTS:
In line with the centennial celebration of Philippine Independence on June 12, 1998, the government embarked on
several commemorative Centennial Freedom Trail (CFT) projects. One of these projects was the construction of the Tejeros
Convention Center and the founding site of the Philippine Army on the 3,497 sq. m. property of respondent Fe Manuel
located in Tejeros, Rosario, Cavite. The said property was declared by the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a historical
landmark in its Resolution No. 2 dated April 19, 1995.

To carry out the Tejeros Convention Project, the government, through the National Centennial Commission (NCC),
filed on December 4, 1997 a complaint for expropriation against respondents Fe Manuel and Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank). The land was mortgaged by Fe Manuel to Metrobank and was extrajudicially foreclosed by the
latter on November 20, 1997. Respondent Fe Manuel interposed no objection to the expropriation as long as just
compensation was paid.

ISSUE:
Whether or not procedural laws can be applied retroactively.

RULING:
The amendment under A.M. 00-2-03-SC quoted above is procedural or remedial in character. It does not create
new or remove vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing. It is
settled that procedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
retroactive operation of statutes. They may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is
no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Tan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002.

FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale over the property in
question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the
same contracting parties entered into another agreement where under Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or
repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of
instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real
intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the decision of the appellate
court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgement the decision and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has
on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day period
of redemption of the petitioner has expired.

On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day
redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996. The
redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should be given retroactive effect.

RULING:
We hold that Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect in
this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot
and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this
Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the subject lot.

Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if applied
retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive
application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot
when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the redemption.

Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of reckoning
of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and the change applied
retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already vested.
Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, Inc., G.R. No.138137, March 8, 2001.

FACTS:
Respondent Asia Brewery, Inc., is engaged in the manufacture, distribution and sale of beer; while Petitioner Perla
Zulueta is a dealer and an operator of an outlet selling the former’s beer products. A Dealership Agreement governed their
contractual relations.

Respondent filed a complaint before the Iloilo Regional Trial Court against its former dealer, Zulueta, for breach of
contract. Petitioner filed a later complaint with the Makati Regional Trial Court against respondent for collection of a sum
of money.

The cases were ordered consolidated by the Makati Court but respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the
Court of Appeals against this consolidation. The appellate court found for Asia Brewery, but Zulueta criticized it on the
ground that the date of filing of the petition for certiorari was made beyond the 60-day reglamentary period provided for in
the new Rules of Procedure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 60-day reglamentary period will be applied retroactively.

RULING:
Procedural laws may operate retroactively as to pending proceedings even without express provision to that effect.
Accordingly, rules of procedure can apply to cases pending at the time of their enactment. In fact, statutes regulating the
procedure of the courts will be applied on actions undetermined at the time of their effectivity. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

Clearly, the designation of a specific period of sixty days for the filing of an original action for certiorari under
Rule 65 is purely remedial or procedural in nature. It does not alter or modify any substantive right of respondent,
particularly with respect to the filing of petitions for certiorari.

Although the period for filing the same may have been effectively shortened, respondent had not been unduly
prejudiced thereby, considering that he was not at all deprived of that right. It is a well-established doctrine that rules of
procedure may be modified at any time to become effective at once, so long as the change does not affect vested rights.
Moreover, it is equally axiomatic that there are no vested rights to rules of procedure.
AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION, AND REPEAL

Palanca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106685, December 2, 1994.

FACTS:
Petitioner Palanca, as vendor, and Jose Sanicas, as vendee, entered into a Contract to Sell on Installment of a parcel
of land.

Under the terms of the contract, Jose agreed to pay Palanca the amount of P9,851.00 as down payment and the
balance of P88,659.00 in 120 monthly installments with 14% interest per annum on the outstanding balance.

Jose further agreed to pay the annual real property taxes, and that should he fail to pay the said taxes, he would
have to pay a yearly surcharge or penalty of 50% of the taxes due plus 12% compounded interest per annum.

Respondent Edgardo later assumed the account of his brother Jose and he designated the latter as his authorized
representative in dealing with petitioner.

Paragraph 11 of the contract contained escalator clause:

That it is further agreed and understood by the VENDEE that in the event of monetary fluctuation, the unpaid balance
account of the herein VENDEE on the aforecited subdivision lot shall be increased proportionately on the basis of the
present value of P6.72 to $1.00 US dollar.

Respondent tendered supposed balance payment (44k), but petitioner rejected it, which prompted the former make
a judicial consignment of the amount.

Petitioner justified his refusal by asserting the escalator clause in paragraph 11 of the contract (155k).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract has been visited by an "extraordinary inflation" as to trigger the operation of Article
1250.

RULING:
No, the Court holds that while the contract may contain an "escalator clause” still the autonomy of the parties to
provide such escalator clauses may be limited by law.

Article 1250 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is not the basis herein, but R.A. No. 529, as amended, as a ground
for violation of said clause.

In the case at bench, the clear understanding of the parties is that there should be an upward adjustment of the
purchase price the moment there is a deterioration of the Philippine peso with the U.S. dollar. This is the "monetary
fluctuation" contemplated by them as would justify the adjustment, and not "extraordinary inflation" described in Art.1250.

Thus, the petition is DENIED.

FACTS:
Section 261 (d) and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code prohibits coercion of subordinates by public officers. Section
68 empowers the Commission on Elections on administratively disqualify any candidate who violates these provisions.
Later, RA 7890 expressly repealed Section 261 (d) and increased the penalty for grave coercion in the RPC if the said felony
was committed in violation of a person’s right to suffrage.

Aldon and Raymundo Roquero filed a petition for disqualification with the COMELEC against Javier on the
ground of Section 261 (d). After the elections wherein Javier won for Governor, the COMELEC 2nd Division issued a
resolution disqualifying Javier and annulling his proclamation, on the basis of Section 261 (d). It held that although Section
261 (d) has been repealed, the repeal did not remove coercion as a ground for disqualification under Section 68. Also, there
was no implied repeal under the general repealing clause.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7890 removed coercion as a ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the Election Code.

RULING:
A law that has been expressly repealed ceases to exist and becomes inoperative from the moment the repealing law
becomes effective. The discussion on implied repeals by the Yusoph resolution, (and the concurring opinion of Chairman
Brillantes, Jr.), including the concomitant discussions on the absence of irreconcilable provisions between the two laws,
were thus misplaced. The harmonization of laws can only be had when the repeal is implied, not when it is express, as in
this case.

With the express repeal of Section 261(d), the basis for disqualifying Javier no longer existed. As we held in
Jalosjos, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 683 SCRA 1 (2012), the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is
limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of
COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged
election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice.
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board,
G.R. No. 192986, January 15, 2013.

FACTS:
Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and its President, Eduardo Olaguer claim that they are raising issues of
transcendental importance to the public and so they filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 ROC seeking to declare that
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary Board (CB-MB) by
virtue of R.A. No. 7653, has no authority to continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905, issued by the CB-MB in
1982, which "suspended" the Usury Law of 1916 (Act No. 2655).

R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines, empowered the CB-MB to, among others,
set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit operations, within limits
prescribed by the Usury Law.

In its Resolution No. 2224, the CB-MB issued CB Circular No. 905, Series of 1982. Section 1 of the Circular,
under its General Provisions, removed the ceilings on interest rates on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits.

On June 14, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7653 establishing the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) to replace the CB.

ISSUE:
Whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No. 905, which removed all interest
ceilings and thus suspended Act No. 2655 as regards usurious interest rates.

RULING:
No. The CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it issued CB Circular No. 905.

The power of the CB to effectively suspend the Usury Law pursuant to P.D. No. 1684 has long been recognized
and upheld in many cases. As the Court explained in the landmark case of Medel v. CA, citing several cases, CB Circular
No. 905 "did not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the latter’s effectivity;" that "a CB
Circular cannot repeal a law, [for] only a law can repeal another law;" that "by virtue of CB Circular No. 905, the Usury
Law has been rendered ineffective;" and "Usury has been legally non-existent in our jurisdiction. Interest can now be
charged as lender and borrower may agree upon."

By lifting the interest ceiling, CB Circular No. 905 merely upheld the parties’ freedom of contract to agree freely
on the rate of interest. It cited Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, under which the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
Manlangit v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158014, August 28, 2007.

FACTS:
On October 16, 1998, petitioner, as Officer-in-Charge for Information, Education and Communication of the
Pinatubo Commission, received ₱176,300 to fund the 6th Founding Anniversary Info-Media Activities of the Commission.
A few months thereafter, he resigned without accounting for the fund.

On April 12, 2000, Artaserxes L. Sampang, then Executive Director of the Commission, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman an affidavit-complaint against petitioner for violation of Articles 2174 and 218 of the Revised Penal Code.
According to Sampang, Commission on Audit (COA) Circular No. 90-3315 dated May 3, 1990, as amended by COA
Circular No. 97-0026 dated February 10, 1997, required petitioner to render a true and correct account of all public funds
entrusted to him.

In his counter-affidavit dated July 11, 2000, petitioner averred that he had no intention to appropriate the funds for
himself. He failed to submit on time the liquidation report because of the following reasons: a) a new management took
over, and reorganized the Commission causing some organizational confusion; b) he resigned and had to look for another
employment; and c) he had some personal and family problems. He said that he submitted his liquidation report on July 12,
2000 and settled the account.

The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon filed an information against petitioner for violation of Article 218
of the Revised Penal Code. It presented as evidence the affidavit-complaint of Sampang, the counter-affidavit of petitioner,
and the reply of Yap.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prior demand by the commission on audit or provincial auditor for the public officer to render
an account, not an element of the crime penalized under Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code?

RULING:
Article 218 consists of the following elements:

1. that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated therefrom;
2. that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
3. that he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a provincial auditor; and
4. that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be rendered.

Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an accountable officer is held liable for
a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none is provided, the court may not introduce exceptions or
conditions, neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it
must be taken to mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed. There is no
room for interpretation, but only application.

Petitioner’s reliance on Saberon is misplaced. As correctly pointed out by the OSP, Saberon involved a violation of
Act No. 1740 whereas the present case involves a violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 218 merely
provides that the public officer be required by law and regulation to render account. Statutory construction tells us that in
the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are
deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise.
Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo, G.R. No. 146195, November 18, 2004.

FACTS:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA. There was a
complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
failure to refer the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation is allowed under Section 19 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure. The case was referred to the Lupon Chairman for conciliation. Petitioner’s motion to discuss even if
allowed is bereft of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the parties must undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat, as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court.

RULING:
While it is true that the Sertifikasyon dated September 14, 1997 is entitled ‘Ukol Sa Hindi Pagbibigay Ng
Pahintulot Sa Pagpapakabit Ng Tubig’, this title must not prevail over the actual issues discussed in the proceedings.
Minutes would show that other issues were also discussed such as the violation of the terms of the lease.

Hence, to require another confrontation at the barangay level as a sine qua non for the filing of the instant case
would not serve any useful purpose anymore since no new issues would be raised therein and the parties have proven so
many times in the past that they cannot get to settle their differences amicably.”

Here, while the Pangkat was not constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times at the Office of the Barangay
Chairman for conciliation wherein not only the issue of water installation was discussed but also petitioners’ violation of the
lease contract. It is thus manifest that there was substantial compliance with the law which does not require strict adherence
thereto.
Microsoft Philippines, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
G.R. No. 180173, April 6, 2011.

FACTS:
Microsoft renders marketing services to two affiliated nonresident foreign corporations with their services being
paid for in foreign currency. Microsoft filed a claim for refund for unutilized input VAT but the CTA denied the same on the
basis that the official receipts issued did not bear the imprinted word “zero-rated” on its face and are thus not valid evidence
of Microsoft’s sales.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Microsoft is entitled to a refund.

RULING:
No. The regulations in effect when the sales were made by Microsoft clearly indicate in the portion outlining the
“Invoicing Requirements” that the word “zero-rated” must be imprinted in the invoice. Without such, the invoice is not
considered as VAT invoices and thus could not give rise to any input tax. The Court added that the reason for enforcing this
rule even if only based on regulation is that it prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when
no VAT is actually paid.
Government Service Insurance System v. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 162372, October 19, 2011.

FACTS:
On May 30, 1997, Republic Act No. 8291, otherwise known as "The Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997" (GSIS Act) was enacted and approved, amending Presidential Decree No. 1146, as amended, expanding and
increasing the coverage and benefits of the GSIS, and instituting reforms therein.

On October 17, 2000, pursuant to the powers granted to it under Section 41(n) of the said law, the GSIS Board of
Trustees, upon the recommendation of the Management-Employee Relations Committee (MERCOM), approved Board
Resolution No. 326 wherein they adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan (ELIP).

COA’s General Counsel Santos M. Alquizalas (Alquizalas) issued a Memorandum to COA Commissioner Raul C.
Flores regarding the GSIS RFP. Alquizalas opined that the GSIS RFP is a supplementary retirement plan, which is
prohibited under Republic Act No. 4968, or the "Teves Retirement Law." He also said that since there is no provision in the
new Republic Act No. 8291 expressly repealing the Teves Retirement Law, the two laws must be harmonized absent an
irreconcilable inconsistency. Alquizalas pronounced that Board Resolution Nos. 360 and 6 are null and void for being
violative of Section 28(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186 as amended by Republic Act No. 4968, which bars the creation of
a supplemental retirement scheme; and Section 41(n) of Republic Act No. 8291, which speaks of an early retirement plan or
financial assistance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA the provisions of the Teves Retirement Law that are inconsistent with RA 8291 are deemed
repealed or modified.

RULING:
This is because, unless the intention to revoke is clear and manifest, the abrogation or repeal of a law cannot be
assumed. The repealing clause contained in Republic Act No. 8291 is not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the statutes that are intended to be repealed. It is actually a clause, which predicated the intended repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior laws.

Since Republic Act No. 8291 made no express repeal or abrogation of the provisions of Commonwealth Act No.
186 as amended by the Teves Retirement Law, the reliance of the petitioners on its general repealing clause is erroneous.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause in Republic Act No. 8291 indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.

We are likewise not convinced by petitioners’ claim of repeal by implication. It is a well-settled rule that to bring
about an implied repeal, the two laws must be absolutely incompatible and clearly repugnant that the later law cannot exist
without nullifying the prior law.
Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service,
G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014.

FACTS:
RA 9646 or the Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines was passed, which purpose is to professionalize the real
estate service sector under regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners.

The supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC). The
law required that companies providing real estate services must transact with the employ of duly licensed real estate
brokers.

Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due process clause and infringes the
ownership rights of real estate developers enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, they claim that it violates
the equal protection clause as owners of private properties are allowed to sell their properties without the need of a licensed
real estate broker.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 9646 is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers.

RULING:
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to effect a
repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they
cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied
repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in
character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly
enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. Moreover, the failure to add a specific repealing
clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exist in the terms of the new and old laws.

There is nothing in R.A. No. 9646 that repeals any provision of P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648. P.D.
No. 957, otherwise known as “The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree,” vested the NHA with
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with its provisions. It empowered the NHA
to register, approve and monitor real estate development projects and issue licenses to sell to real estate owners and
developers. It further granted the NHA the authority to register and issue/revoke licenses of brokers, dealers and salesmen
engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units.
Martinez v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 169196, July 6, 2011.

FACTS:
Petitioner Martinez is the General Manager of Claveria Agri-Based Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (CABMPCI)
while respondent Villanueva is the Assistant Regional Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), Regional
Office No. 02, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan. Respondent solicited several loans from CABMPCI. The Ombudsman later
found that Respondent abused her position when she solicited a loan from CABMPCI despite the fact that she is disqualified
by its by-laws. The relevant provision under which respondent was charged is Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713.

On appeal, Respondent argued that the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon erred in treating the loan she
obtained from CABMPCI as a prohibited loan under Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 because she was an official of the CDA.
Respondent argued that although Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713 prohibits all public officials and employees from soliciting
or accepting loans in connection with any operation being regulated by her office, the subsequent enactment of R.A. No.
6938 or the Cooperative Code of the Philippines allows qualified officials and employees to become members of
cooperatives and naturally, to avail of the attendant privileges and benefits of membership. She contended that it would be
absurd if CDA officials and employees who are eligible to apply for membership in a cooperative would be prohibited from
availing loans. On appeal, the CA that respondent should not have been held liable for grave misconduct because of the
supposed failure of Martinez to show undue influence

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Cooperative Code impliedly repealed Section 7 (d) of RA 6713.

RULING:
No. True, the Cooperative Code allows CDA officials and employees to become members of cooperatives and
enjoy the privileges and benefits attendant to membership. However, it should not be taken as creating in favor of CDA
officials and employees an exemption from the coverage of Section 7(d), R.A. No. 6713 considering that the benefits and
privileges attendant to membership in a cooperative are not confined solely to availing of loans and not all cooperatives are
established for the sole purpose of providing credit facilities to their members. Thus, the limitation on the benefits which
respondent may enjoy in connection with her alleged membership in CABMPCI does not lead to absurd results and does not
render naught membership in the cooperative or render R.A. No. 6938 ineffectual, contrary to respondent’s assertions.

We find that such limitation is but a necessary consequence of the privilege of holding a public office and is akin to
the other limitations that, although interfering with a public servant’s private rights, are nonetheless deemed valid in light of
the public trust nature of public employment.
Mecano v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992.

FACTS:
Petitioner requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section
699 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 (RAC). Commission on Audit (COA) Chairman, in his 7th Indorsement,
denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987
(Exec. Order No. 292), solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the latter.

Petitioner also anchored his claim on Department of Justice Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 by Secretary Drilon stating
that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised Administrative
Code. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operated to
revoke or supplant in its entirety the RAC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917.

RULING:
NO. Petition granted. Respondent ordered to give due course on petitioner’s claim for benefits.

Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the
part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a
repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the
old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be
construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same
from the time of the first enactment.

It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read in pari materia.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Airlines Lines, Inc.,
G.R. Nos. 212536-37, August 27, 2014.

FACTS:
Philippine Airlines, Inc. had zero taxable income for 2000 but would have been liable for Minimum Corporate
Income Tax based on its gross income. However, Philippine Airlines, Inc. did not pay the Minimum Corporate Income Tax
using as basis its franchise which exempts it from “all other taxes” upon payment of whichever is lower of either (a) the
basic corporate income tax based on the net taxable income or (b) a franchise tax of 2%.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 1590 has been revoked by the NIRC of 1997.

RULING:
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a later law, general in terms and not expressly repealing or
amending a prior special law, will not ordinarily affect the special provisions of such earlier statute. So, it must be here.
Indeed, as things stand, PD 1590 has not been revoked by the NIRC of 1997, as amended. Or to be more precise, the tax
privilege of PAL provided in Sec. 13 of PD 1590 has not been revoked by Sec. 131 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended by
Sec. 6 of RA 9334.

We said as much in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc, 592 SCRA 237 (2009): That
the Legislature chose not to amend or repeal [PD] 1590 even after PAL was privatized reveals the intent of the Legislature
to let PAL continue to enjoy, as a private corporation, the very same rights and privileges under the terms and conditions
stated in said charter.
Berces v. Guingona, G.R. No. 112099. February 21, 1995.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent incumbent Mayor
and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. Respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President
questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with Sec. 67(b) of the Local
Government Code (LGC).

The Office of the President thru the Executive Secretary directed “stay of execution”. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as
having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Petitioner argued that Sec. 68 of LGC (1991) impliedly repealed Section
6 of Administrative Order No. 18 (1987).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 68 of R.A. No. 7160 repealed Sec. 6 of Administrative Order No. 18.

RULING:
No. Petition was dismissed. “Stay of execution” applied.

The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an “appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final
or executory.” As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the
execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the
authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order
No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention.

An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a
prior law unless an irreconcilable, inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
Erectors Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 104215, May 8, 1996.

FACTS:
In September 1979, Erectors recruited Florencio Burgos to work as Service Contract Driver in Saudi Arabia for 12
months with a salary of $165 and an allowance of $165 per month. Burgos will also be entitled a bonus of $1000 if after the
12-month period, he renews/extends his contract without availing his vacation or home leave. His contract was approved by
the Ministry of Labor and Employment.

However, the contract was not implemented. In December 1979, Erectors notified Burgos that the position of
Service Driver was no longer available. On December 14, 1979, they executed another contract changing his position from
driver to laborer with a salary of $105 and an allowance of $105 per month. This contract was not submitted to the MLE.

On December 1979, Burgos left the country and worked at Erectors Buraidah Sports Complex project in Saudi
Arabia as a laborer. He received a monthly salary and allowance of $210. Burgos renewed his contract after one year and his
salary and allowance were increased to $231.

Burgos returned to Philippines on August 1981. He then invoked his first employment contract. He demanded the
difference between his salary and allowance in the said contract and the amount paid to him.

On March 1982, Burgos filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for underpayment of wages and non-payment of
overtime pay and bonus.

While his case was still in conciliation stage, EO 797 creating POEA was established Sec. 4(a) of EO 797 vested
the POEA with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases including money claims, involving employer-employee
relationship arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment."

Despite EO 797, Labor Arbiter proceeded to try the case and rendered judgement in favor of Burgos. In view of EO
797, Erectors questioned the jurisdiction of the LA in NLRC. NLRC dismissed the petitioner's appeal and upheld the LA's
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 797 applies retroactively to affect pending cases, including the complaint filed by Burgos.

RULING:
No. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. On March 31, 1982, at the time private respondent filed his complaint against the petitioner,
the prevailing laws were Presidential Decree No. 1691 and Presidential Decree No. 1391 which vested the Regional Offices
of the Ministry of Labor and the Labor Arbiters with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving employer-
employee relations including money claims arising out of any law or contracts involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment." At the time of the filing of the complaint, the Labor Arbiter had clear jurisdiction over the same.
City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes, G.R. No. 127708, March 25, 1999.

FACTS:
After the Escudero franchise under Act No. 3648 was transferred to MERALCO, PD. 551 was enacted and
provides that the franchise tax shall be 2% of the gross receipts in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever nature
imposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale of
electric current.

Pursuant to the enactment of the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City enacted
Ordinance No. 56, otherwise known as the Revenue Code of the City of San Pablo imposing a tax on business enjoying a
franchise, at a rate of 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account
realized during the preceding calendar year within the city.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was violation of non-impairment clause when the City of San Pablo imposed a local franchise
tax pursuant to the LGC upon MERALCO considering that under PD 551 the tax paid is in lieu of all taxes and assessments
of whatever nature imposed by any national or local authority on savings or income.

RULING:
No. The phrase in lieu of all taxes have to give way to the peremptory language of the Local Government Code
specifically providing for the withdrawal of such exemptions, privileges, and that upon the effectivity of the Local
Government Code all exemptions except only as provided therein can no longer be invoked by MERALCO to disclaim
liability for the local tax.

There is further basis for the conclusion that the non-impairment of contract clause cannot be invoked to uphold
Meralco’s exemption from the local tax. Legislative franchise under Act No. 3648 provided that the franchise is granted
upon the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, or repeal by the Congress of the United States.

Also, under the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, no franchise or right shall be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so
requires. With or without the reservation clause, franchises are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the
police power; they are also subject to alteration by the power to tax, which like police power cannot be contracted away.
Juan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 132378, January 18, 2000.

FACTS:
Information were filed against Petitioner Juan, De Jesus, Carreon and Galguerra of Barangay Talipapa Nova,
Quezon City for violation of Section 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code before the Regional Trial Court. Juan and De
Jesus used the VHF radio transceiver owned by the barangay for election campaign while the other two used a tricycle
owned by the barangay also for their political campaigns.

Petitioners questioned the standing of movants and assailed the information that it did not conform to the notice
requirements under the Rules of Court. The RTC issued an order directing the immediate suspension from office of all the
accused for a period of 60 days from service of the order.

CA upheld the ruling of the RTC. And said that Section 13 of RA 3019 is mandatory in character upon the filing of
a valid information in court. It can be issued in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation is pending in court
and that it is justifiable for as long as its continuance is for a reasonable length of time,

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can be preventively suspended under RA 3019 since the offense for which they were
charged was under the Omnibus Election Code.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that before the amendment, only public officers charged with violation of RA 3019 or
those covered by the RPC provision on bribery may be preventively suspended. Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, when it amended
RA 3019, expanded the preventive suspension provision. Under the amendment, public officers may likewise be suspended
if they are charged with offenses under Title 7, Book II of the RPC, or with any other form of fraud involving government
funds or property.

The Court categorized the charges against the accused as constituent of fraud involving governments funds or
property. While the accused had been charged under the Omnibus Election Code, the Code must be read with
complementing law. The Court posited that charges are not uni-dimensional, hence, are covered by Section 13 of RA 3019.
It upheld the validity of the preventive suspension.
Giron v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188179, January 22, 2013.

FACTS:
This case is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 12
(Substitution of Candidates) and Sec. 14 (Repealing Clause) of R.A. 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. The
Petition also seeks to prohibit the COMELEC from further implementing the aforesaid sections of the Fair Election Act, on
the ground that these provisions would enable elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow them to disburse
public funds from the time they file their certificates of candidacy until after the elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, or the “one subject-one title” rule.

RULING:
No. It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation, as Congress is deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. Because of this strong presumption, the
one who asserts the invalidity of a law has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution; otherwise the petition must fail.

After a thorough review of the arguments raised, the Court found that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention
were unable to present a compelling reason that would surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in
favor of the Fair Election Act. They have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse the ruling in Fariñas, in which
the SC have already ruled that the title and the objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include subjects other
than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda.
APPLYING LEGAL METHOD

In re Estate of Johnson, G.R. No. L-12767, November 16, 1918.

FACTS:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in
the city of Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated amount of P231,800. The will was written in the
testator’s own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the provisions of law generally applicable to wills
executed by inhabitants of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under section 618.

On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the
probate of this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his death, a citizen of the State of Illinois, United
States of America; 2) that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and hence could properly be
probated here pursuant to section 636 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is inapplicable to his
father’s will.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the part of the petitioner.

RULING:
Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court through the three-week publication of the notice in
Manila Daily Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view of the statute concerned which reads as “A will made
within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with the
law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law of his own
state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if
executed according to the laws of these Islands” the “state”, being not capitalized, does not mean that United States is
excluded from the phrase (because during this time, Philippines was still a territory of the US).
Kare v. Platon, G.R. No. L-35902, October 28, 1931.

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a motion of protest contesting the election of the respondent Francisco Perfecto, upon the
grounds that the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay entered an order requiring the petitioner to give a
personal bond for P3,000 and a cash bond of P2,000 to be deposited with the provincial treasurer of Albay in order that
proper proceedings might be taken on his motion of protest. These sums were later changed so that the cash bond was for
P1,500 and the personal bond for P3,500.

The petitioner invoked section 482 of the Election Law in support of his contention. The respondent judge bases his action
upon the same section and also upon section 479 as lately amended by Act No. 3699. Section 482 provides:

Bond or cash deposit required of contestants. — Before the court shall entertain any such contest or counter-contest or
admit an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest, or appeal shall give bond in an amount fixed by the court with
two sureties satisfactory to it, conditioned that he will pay all expenses and costs incident to such motion or appeal, or shall
deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may require the petitioner either a bond or a cash deposit.

RULING:
Yes. Said section is preceded by the heading, "Bond or cash deposit required of contestants," which apparently
indicates that the court taking cognizance of the election contest may require the contestant either to give a bond or to make
a cash deposit. But the petitioner contends that the right to choose between giving a personal bond and depositing a sum of
money in lieu thereof is granted only to the contestant or appellant. If there be any conflict between the heading of the
section under question and the body, it must be settled according to the canons of statutory construction.

Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 181, says: "Headings prefixed to the titled, chapters, and sections of a statute
or code may be consulted in aid of the interpretation, in case of doubt or ambiguity; but inferences drawn from such
headings are entitled to very little weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses." The rule
accepted by most of the authorities is that if the chapter or section heading has been inserted merely for convenience of
reference, and not as an integral part of the statute, it should not be allowed to control the interpretation.

Applying this rule to the case at bar, it will be seen that the present section provides that before the court entertain
any contest or counter-contest or admits an appeal, the party filing the contest, counter-contest or appeal shall give bond
with two sureties to the satisfaction of the court, or deposit cash in court in lieu of such bond. The court holds that the court
may only require a personal bond, and that the contestant may make a cash deposit in lieu thereof.

The court ruled that although it does not adhere strictly to legal technical phraseology, there is in it no excess of
jurisdiction or abuse of judicial discretion to be rectified by means of the writ applied for. Hence the petition was dismissed.
Centeno v. Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994.

FACTS:
In the last quarter of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng
Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan.

Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made
without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was filed against petitioner Martin
Centeno, together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation
Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602.

On December 29, 1992, the said trial court rendered judgment finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner Centeno
guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine of P200.00

ISSUE:
Whether or not charitable purposes can be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.

RULING:
No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out "charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas
Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes," only goes to show that the framers of
the law in question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no
reason why it would not have so stated expressly.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power.
However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of
Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and therefore
acquitted.
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014.

FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from various sectors of society came
knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of
the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen
(14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RH law is unconstitutional?

RULING:
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as not unconstitutional except with respect to the following provisions which
are declared unconstitutional:

[1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and
non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is
conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;

[2] Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

[3] Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive
health procedures without the consent of the spouse;

[4] Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

[5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same
facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

[6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the
full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

[7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive
health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

[8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a)
of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. Central Bank of the Phil.,
G.R. No. L-8888, November 29,1957.

FACTS:
During the period from January 8, 1953 to October 9, 1953, the plaintiff appellant imported sun dried cocoa beans
for which it paid the foreign exchange tax of 17 per cent totaling P74,671.04. Claiming exemption from said tax under
Section 2 of same Act, it sued the Central Bank that had exacted payment; and in its amended complaint it included the
Treasurer of the Philippines. CFI Manila dismissed the case on the ground that the term "chocolate" does not include sun-
dried cocoa beans.

ISSUE:
Whether or not cocoa beans may be considered as "chocolate" for the purposes of exemption from the foreign
exchange tax imposed by Republic Act No. 601 as amended.

RULING:
No, exemption from Section 2 of chocolate does not include cocoa beans. Having in mind the principle of strict
construction of statutes exempting from taxation, we are of the opinion and so hold, that the exemption for "chocolate" in
the above Section 2 does not include "cocoa beans". The one is raw material, the other manufactured consumer product; the
latter is ready for human consumption; the former is not.

On the other hand, the congress approved Republic Act 1197 amending Section 2 by substituting "cocoa beans" for
"chocolate.". However, since statutes operate prospectively, the amendments cannot be applied in the case at bar. The
appellant's cocoa beans had been imported during January - October 1953, i.e. before the exemption decree which is after
September 3, 1954 pursuant to Proclamation No. 62.
Southern Cross Cement Corp. v. Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp.,
G.R. No. 158540, July 8, 2004.

FACTS:

Petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of cement manufacturing, production, importation and exportation. Private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers
Corporation (Philcemcor) is an association of domestic cement manufacturers. DTI accepted an application from
Philcemcor, alleging that the importation of gray Portland cement in increased quantities has caused declines in domestic
production, capacity utilization, market share, sales and employment; as well as caused depressed local prices. Accordingly,
Philcemcor sought the imposition a definitive safeguard measures on the import of cement pursuant to the Safeguard
Measures Act.

The Tariff Commission received a request from the DTI for a formal investigation to determine whether or not to
impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement.

After reviewing the report, then DTI Secretary Manuel Roxas II (DTI Secretary) disagreed with the conclusion of
the Tariff Commission that there was no serious injury to the local cement industry caused by the surge of imports. In view
of this disagreement, the DTI requested an opinion from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the DTI Secretary’s scope of
options in acting on the Commission’s recommendations.

Subsequently, then DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez rendered an opinion stating that Section 13 of the SMA
precluded a review by the DTI Secretary of the Tariff Commissions negative finding, or finding that a definitive safeguard
measure should not be imposed. DTI then denied application for safeguard measures against the importation of gray
Portland cement.

Philcemcor received a copy of the DTI Decision on 12 April 2002. Ten days later, it filed with the Court of Appeals
a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff
Commissions Report. On the other hand, Southern Cross filed its Comment arguing that the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition, for it is on the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) that the SMA conferred jurisdiction to
review rulings of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of DTI Secretary, to impose safeguard measures is valid.

RULING:
No, due to the nature of this case, the Court found that the DTI should follow the regulations prescribed by SMA.
The Court held that he assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is declared null and void and set aside. The Decision of the
DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003 is also declared null and void and set aside.

Yet on 25 June 2003, the DTI Secretary issued a new Decision, ruling this time that that in light of the appellate
court’s Decision there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard
measures. He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had
suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges. Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the
importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three
years on imported gray Portland Cement.
Nilo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-34586 & L-36625, April 2, 1984.

FACTS:
Respondent Almario Gatchalian is the owner of a parcel of rice land at Barrio San Roque, San Rafael, Bulacan
with an area of two (2) hectares covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-76791 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
Petitioner Hospicio Nilo has been the agricultural share-tenant of Gatchalian since agricultural year 1964-65.

On February 22, 1967, petitioner filed a petition in C.A.R. Case No. 1676 with the Court of Agrarian Relations
electing the leasehold system. On March 7, 1968, Gatchalian flied an ejectment suit against petitioner on the ground of
personal cultivation under Sec. 36 (1) of Republic Act No. 3844. Nilo alleged by way of affirmative defense that the
ejectment suit was but an act of reprisal and retaliation because he elected the leasehold system.

The Court of Agrarian Relations found that there was a bona fide intention to cultivate the land personally. The
petitioner appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations. The
Court found no justification to unduly interfere with the desire of Gatchalian to personally cultivate his own land.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that "personal cultivation as a ground for ejectment of
an agricultural lessee has been eliminated under Republic Act No. 6389". The latter law which took effect on September 10,
1971. The respondent Court of Appeals denied the motion resolving that Republic Act No. 6389 has no retroactive
application.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amendment in R.A. 6389 should be given retroactive effect to cover cases that were filed during
the effectivity of the repealed provision.

RULING:
Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided. (Article 3 of the old Civil Code ,now
Article 4 of the New Civil Code)That it was the intention of the legislature in amending paragraph (1), sec. 36 of R.A. 3844
to deprive the landowner of the right to eject his tenant on the ground that the former would personally cultivate the land
and also to abate cases brought by the landowner to eject the tenant on the same grounds which were still pending at the
time of the passage of the amendatory act, is clear and evident from the deliberations and debate of Congress when Republic
Act 6389 was being deliberated, as published in the Senate Journal ....the massive overhaul of the system of land ownership
by the transfer to the tenants of the ownership of the land they till and the grant to them of the instruments and mechanisms
to increase their land's productivity will decisively improve the people's livelihood and promote political and social stability.

Section 12 of Article XIV specifically mandates that "the State shall formulate and implement an agrarian reform
program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this
Constitution." At any rate, there is no need to pass upon the constitutional issue for the purpose of resolving the narrow
question of retroactivity of the questioned provision. The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Casco Phil. Chem. Co., Inc. v. Gimenez, G.R. No. L- 17931, February 28, 1963.

FACTS:
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and
veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which
are the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and
P6345.72 in May 1960.

Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the
Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is
exempt from said fee.

The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that
the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the provision of section 2 of RA 2609.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

RULING:
No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is
distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contend that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction
“and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of “urea
formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of
Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
Resins, Inc. v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-17888, October 29, 1968.

FACTS:
Petitioner Resins Inc, as in Casco v. Gimenez, seeks a refund from respondent Central Bank on the claim that it
was exempt from the margin fee under RA 2609 for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, as separate units, used for
the production of synthetic glue, of which it was a manufacturer.

Since the specific language of the Act speak of “urea formaldehyde” and petitioner admittedly did import urea and
formaldehyde separately, it can be exempted if the law was construed to read “urea and formaldehyde.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Resin’s contention is with merit.

RULING:
No. “Urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct from “urea” and “formaldehyde”
as separate articles. Resins contend that the approved Congress bill contained the conjunction “and” and that Congress
intended to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately, citing statements made on the floor of the Senate. Said individual
statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate, much less of the House of Representatives. It is also well settled
that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill, the remedy is by
amendment or curative language not by judicial decree.

Additionally, refund partakes of a nature of an exemption, it cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit
and categorical language. The Court has held that exemption from taxation is not favored and never presumed, so that if
granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer (strictissimi juris). Petition denied.
THE MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Yambot v. Tuquero, G.R. No. 169895, March 23, 2011.

FACTS:
An article from the Philippine Daily inquirer headlined a report written by Contreras, herein referred to as the
petitioner regarding the mauling incident that happened between RTC Judge Cruz and Mendoza, an administrative officer
assigned at Makati RTC. Such article was referred to by Judge Cruz as false and malicious so the latter filed a libel case
against the writer, particularly the line that states that the said judge still has a pending sexual harassment case filed at the
SC. It appeared that the sexual harassment being referred to by the Petitioner was based from a Court Petition for
cancellation of contempt order by one Paredes- Garcia. She appended an affidavit executed by Talag-Pascual to purportedly
show the proclivity of Judge Cruz for seducing women who became objects of his fancy, stating that she also suffered the
same infirmities. The SC later on granted the petition for cancellation of contempt order but the administrative case against
the Judge was not passed upon.

Subsequently, the RTC of Makati approved a resolution finding probable cause against the PDI employees hence
an information was filed them. The petitioners appealed to the DOJ and the CA who dismissed the same hence the said
Petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice may be allowed,
notwithstanding the filing of an information with the trial court.

RULING:
Similar to the present case, in Advincula, respondents Amando and Isagani Ocampo filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals questioning the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice which had earlier led to the
filing of Informations against them in court.

The Court of Appeals granted the Petition and set aside the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice. In reversing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, we applied the rule that certiorari, being an extraordinary writ, cannot be resorted to when
other remedies are available. The Court observed that respondents had other remedies available to them, such as the filing of
a Motion to Quash the Information under Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, or allowing the trial to proceed where they could
either file a demurrer to evidence or present their evidence to disprove the charges against them.

At the outset, it should be made clear that the Court is not abandoning the foregoing ruling in Advincula. However,
Advincula cannot be read to completely disallow the institution of certiorari proceedings against the Secretary of Justice’s
determination of probable cause when the criminal information has already been filed in court. Under exceptional
circumstances, a petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an appeal of the
prosecutor’s ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an information with the trial court.
LEGAL METHOD AND THE RULE OF LAW

Maliksi v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 203302, March 12, 2013.

FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite.
Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus,
Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held
a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus
commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the
COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then
installed as Mayor.

The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use
of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the
amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order
for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.

ISSUE:
Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to due process of law considering that decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of the
ballots were done inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the
petitioner and for the first time on appeal.

RULING:
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power of
the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after
giving to all the parties the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon adversarial
issues and matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial
prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the
First Divisions deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its
failure to provide the parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of
due process.

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original
official ballots themselves. That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered "original
documents" simply means that both of them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as
evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.

But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to
the parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the
rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or
best evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown
that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006).

FACTS:
It is alleged that between the years of 1996 and 2001, Hamdan was engaged in actions in preparation of the
September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States. Militia forces in Afghanistan that were fighting the Taliban captured
Hamdan and turned him over to the U.S. Military in 2002. He was transferred to Guantanamo Bay. A United States
occupied Military base. After a year of being detained without any charges being brought against him, President Bush
declared that he had committed acts triable by a military commission. He was charged with one count of conspiracy to
commit offenses triable by the commission. This commission is created by military necessity, not by statute or constitutional
power. This commission has a presiding officer and at least three other members. The accused is afforded military counsel,
and a copy of the charges against him. This hearing may be conducted outside the presence of the accused for the accused
does not have a right to see all evidence or hear all witness statement against him for purposes of national security. After
being tried and convicted of conspiracy, Hamdan apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus stating he deserved all the constitutional
rights afforded to him at trial, the writ was granted.

ISSUE:
Whether Hamdan committed a crime triable by military commissions and whether that commission is
constitutional.

RULING:
No. The President at a time of war has the power to try and punish crimes against the laws of nations. This is the
constitutional provision used to show that military commission tribunals are legal. However, this court feels that only
certain circumstances allow for offense to be triable in a military commission. Those offenses are; (1) in place of civilian
courts when marital law has been declared, (2) temporary military government in occupied territory or in lands where there
is no government to try cases, and (3) when the crime is an incident to the conduct of war which violate the laws of war.

The court states that only the 3rd type applies, however the charge of conspiracy is not an incident to the conduct
of war. Incidents of war are accusations of actual conduct, not the attempt or planning of such conduct. Inchoate criminal
charges belong in a federal court or court martial proceeding. Secondly this commission violates not only constitutional
rights afforded an individual, but also rules established by the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the Geneva
Conventions.

A military commission tribunal must have rules and regulations that do not fall short of at least a military court
marshal proceeding. The lack of presence and ability to see the evidence and witness before you is not constitutional.
Therefore, Hamdan should not be tried in front of this commission. This court reversed the commission’s charges of
conspiracy.