100 Phil.

468

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Plaintiffs herein are court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court
of First Instance of Manila. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 2293 of
said court, entitled Francisco Sycip vs. National Coconut Corporation,
Assistant Corporate Counsel Federico Alikpala, counsel for defendant,
requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken by them duririg the hearing. Plaintiffs complied
with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript
containing 714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their bills for the
payment of their fees. The National Coconut Corporation paid the amount
of P564 to Leopoldo T. Baeani and P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page.
Upon inspecting the books of this corporation, the Auditor General
disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of the
amounts paid.   On January 19, 1953, the Auditor General required the
plaintiffs to reimburse said amounts on the strength of a circular of the
Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed that the National
Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the
payment of the fees in question. On February 6, 1954, the Auditor General
issued an order directing the Cashier of the Department of Justice to deduct
from the salary of Leopold© T. Bacani the amount of P25 every payday and
from the salary of Mateo A. Matoto the amount of P10 every payday
beginning March 30, 1954. To prevent deduction of these fees from1 their
salaries and secure a judicial ruling that the National Coconut Corporation
is not a government entity within the purview of section 16, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, this action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
Defendants set up as a defense that the National Coconut Corporation is a
government entity within the purview of section 2 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the
stenographers' fees under Rule 130 of. the Rules of Court. After trial, the
court found for the plaintiffs declaring (1) "that defendant National
Coconut Corporation is not a government entity within the purview of
section 16, Rule 130 of the. Rules of Court; (2) that the payments already
made by said defendant to plaintiffs herein and received by the latter from
the former in the total amount of P714, for copies of the stenographic
transcripts in question, are valid, just and legal; and (3) that plaintiffs are
under no obligation whatsoever to make a refund of these payments already
received by them." This is an appeal from said decision.
Under section 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the
Philippines is exempt from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and
among these fees are those which stenographers may charge for the
transcript of notes taken by them that may be requested by any interested
person (section 8). The fees in question are for the transcript of notes taken
during the hearing of a ease in which the National Coconut Corporation is
interested, and the transcript was requested by its assistant corporate
counsel for the use of said corporation.
On the other hand, section 2 of the Revised Administrative Code defines the
scope of the term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" as
follows:
" 'The Government of the Philippine Islands' is a term which refers to the
corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government
are exercised throughout the Philippine Islands, including, save as the
contrary appears from the context, the various arras through which political
authority is made effective in said Islands, whether pertaining to the central
Government or to the provincial or. municipal branches or other form of
local government."
The question now to be determined is whether the National Coconut
Corporation may be considered as included in the term "Government of the
Republic of the Philippines" for the purposes of the exemption of the legal
fees provided for in Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As may be noted, the term "Government of the Republic of the Philippines"
refers to a government entity through which the functions of government
are exercised, including the various arms through which political authority
is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the central
government or to the provincial or municipal branches or other form of
local government. This requires a little digression on the nature and
functions of our government as instituted in our Constitution.
To begin with, we state that the term "Government" may be defined as "that
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rules of action which are necessary to enable
men to live in a social state, or which are imposed upon the people forming
that society by those who possess the power or authority of prescribing
them" (U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332).   This institution, when referring to the
national government, has reference to what our Constitution has
established composed of three great departments, the legislative, executive,
and the judicial, through which the powers and functions of government
are exercised. These functions are twofold: constitute and ministrant. The
former are those which constitute the very bonds of society and are
compulsory in nature; the latter are those that are undertaken only by way
of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional.
President Wilson enumerates the constituent functions as follows: 
"'(1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and
property from  violence and robbery. 
'(2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between
parents and children. 
'(3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of
property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. 
'(4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. 
'(5) The definition and punishment of crime.
'(6) The administration of justice in civil cases.
'(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of
citizens.
'(8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state
from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its
international interests.'" (Malcolm, The Government of the Philippine
Islands, p. 19.)
The most important of the ministrant functions are: public works, public
education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of
trade and industry. The principles determining whether or not a
government shall exercise certain o£ these optional functions are: (1) that a
government should do for the public welfare those things which private
capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do
these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for
the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals.
(Malcom, The Government of the Philippine Islands, pp. 19-20.)
From the above we may infer that, strictly speaking, there are functions
which our government is required to exercise to promote its objectives as
expressed in our Constitution and which are exercised by it as an attribute
of sovereignty, and those which it may exercise to promote merely the
welfare, progress and prosperity of the people. To this latter class belongs
the organization of those corporations owned or controlled by the
government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people
such as the National Coconut Corporation. These are what we call
government-owned or controlled corporations which may take on the form
of a private enterprise or one organized with powers and formal
characteristics of a private corporations under the Corporation Law.
The question that now arises is: Does the fact that these corporation
perform certain functions of government make them a part of the
Government of the Philippines? The answer is simple: they do not acquire
that status for the simple reason that they do not come under the
classification of municipal or public corporation.    Take for instance the 
National  Coconut  Corporation.   While it was  organized  with the 
purpose  of  "adjusting  the coconut industry to a position independent of
trade preferences in the United States" and of providing "Facilities for  the
better curing of copra products  and  the proper  utilization  of  coconut by
products",   a  function which our government has chosen to exercise to
promote the coconut industry, however, it was given a corporate power
separate and distinct from our government, for it was made subject to the
provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and
the powers that it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4,
Commonwealth Act No. 518).   It may sue and be sued in the same manner
as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different
from our government. As this Court has aptly said,   "The .mere fact that the
Government happens to be a majority stockholder does not make it a public
corporation" (National Goal Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 46 PML,
586-587). "By becoming a stockholder in the National £oal Company, the
Government divested itself of its sovereign character so far as respects the
transactions of the corporation. * * * Unlike the Government, the
corporation may be sued without its consent, an4 is subject to taxation. Yet
the National Coal Company remains an agency or instrumentality of
government." (Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer, 50 Phil.,
288.)
To recapitulate, we may mention that the term "Government of the
Republic of the Philippines" used in section 2 of the Revised Administrative
Code refers only to that government entity through which the functions of
the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are
included those arms through which political authority is made effective
whether they be provincial, municipal or other form of local government.
These are what we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given a corporate personality separate and
distinct from the government and which are governed by the Corporation
Law. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light
of that law and of their corporate charters. They do not therefore come
within the exemption clause prescribed in section 16, Rule 130 of our Rules
of Court.
"Public corporations are those formed or organized for the government of a
portion of the State." (Section 3, Republic Act No. 1459, Corporation Law)
"'The generally accepted definition of a municipal corporation would only
include organized cities and towns, and like organizations, with political
and legislative powers for the local, civil government and police regulations
of the inhabitants of the particular district included in the boundaries of the
corporation.' Heller vs. Stremmel, 52 Mo. 309, 312."
"In its more general sense the phrase ''municipal corporation' may include
both towns and counties, and other public corporations created by
government for political purposes. In its more common and limited 
signification, it  embraces  only incorporated villages, towns and cities.  
Dunn vs. Court of County Revenues, 85 Ala. l44, 146, 4 So. 661."   
(McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed. Vol. I, p. 385.)  
"We may, therefore , define a municipal corporation in its historical and
strict sense to be the incorporation, by the authority of the government, of
the inhabitants of a particular place or district, and authorizing them tin
their corporate capacity to exercise subordinate specified powers of
legislation and regulation with respect to their local and internal concerns.
This power of local government is the distinctive purpose and the
distinguishing feature of a municipal corporation proper." (Dillon,
Municipal Corporations, 5th ed.( Vol. I, p. 59.)
It is true that under section 3, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as
fees P0.30 for each page of transcript of not less than £00 words before the
appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing of the appeal, but in
this case the National Coconut Corporation has agreed and in fact has paid
1P1.00 per page for the services rendered by the plaintiffs and has not
raised any objection to the amount paid until its propriety was disputed by
the Auditor General. The payment of the fees in question became therefore
contractual and as such is valid even if it goes beyond the limit prescribed
in section 8, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
As regards the question of procedure raised by appellants, suffice it to say
that the same is insubstantial, considering that this case refers not to. a
money claim disapproved by the Auditor General but to an action of
prohibition the purpose of which is to restrain the officials concerned from
deducting from plaintiffs' salaries the amount paid to them as
stenographers' fees. This case does not come under section 1, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court relative to appeals from a decision of the Auditor General.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement
as to costs.
Paras, C J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78059 August 31, 1987
ALFREDO M. DE LEON, ANGEL S. SALAMAT, MARIO C. STA. ANA, JOSE C. TOLENTINO, ROGELIO J.
DE LA ROSA and JOSE M. RESURRECCION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN B. ESGUERRA, in his capacity as OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal, HON.
ROMEO C. DE LEON, in his capacity as OIC Mayor of the Municipality of Taytay, Rizal, FLORENTINO G.
MAGNO, REMIGIO M. TIGAS, RICARDO Z. LACANIENTA, TEODORO V. MEDINA, ROSENDO S. PAZ, and
TERESITA L. TOLENTINO, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them
from their respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Municipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal.
As required by the Court, respondents submitted their Comment on the Petition, and petitioner's their Reply to
respondents' Comment.
In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain
and the other petitioners Angel S. Salamat, Mario C. Sta. Ana, Jose C. Tolentino, Rogelio J. de la Rosa and
Jose M. Resurreccion, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the
OIC Governor was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
Also on February 8, 1987, respondent OIC Governor signed a Memorandum, antedated December 1, 1986
designating respondents Remigio M. Tigas, Ricardo Z. Lacanienta Teodoro V. Medina, Roberto S. Paz and
Teresita L. Tolentino as members of the Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
That the Memoranda had been antedated is evidenced by the Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, the
pertinent portions of which read:
xxx xxx xxx
That I am the OIC Governor of Rizal having been appointed as such on March 20, 1986;
 That as being OIC Governor of the Province of Rizal and in the performance of my duties
thereof, I among others, have signed as I did sign the unnumbered memorandum ordering the
replacement of all the barangay officials of all the barangay(s) in the Municipality of Taytay,
Rizal;
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by me personally on
February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the following day,
February 9. 1987.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NONE.
Pasig, Metro Manila, March 23, 1987.
Before us now, petitioners pray that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and
that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen,
respectively. Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg.
222), their terms of office "shall be six (6) years which shall commence on June 7, 1982 and shall continue until
their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified," or up to June 7, 1988. It is also their position that
with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace
them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents rely on Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution, promulgated on
March 25, 1986, which provided:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of one year from February 25,1986.
By reason of the foregoing provision, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive
officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of the aforequoted provision and not
because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing
the term of office of Barangay officials to six (6) years must be deemed to have been repealed for being
inconsistent with the aforequoted provision of the Provisional Constitution.
Examining the said provision, there should be no question that petitioners, as elective officials under the 1973
Constitution, may continue in office but should vacate their positions upon the occurrence of any of the events
mentioned. 1
Since the promulgation of the Provisional Constitution, there has been no proclamation or executive order
terminating the term of elective Barangay officials. Thus, the issue for resolution is whether or not the
designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year period which ended on
February 25, 1987.
Considering the candid Affidavit of respondent OIC Governor, we hold that February 8, 1977, should be
considered as the effective date of replacement and not December 1,1986 to which it was ante dated, in
keeping with the dictates of justice.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline, the aforequoted provision in the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC
Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III, thereof to designate respondents to the elective
positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the autonomy of the barangays
to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities.  Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the
2

autonomy of local governments and of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part,   and limits the
3

President's power to "general supervision" over local governments.   Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the
4

same 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

 Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years ...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of six (6)
years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982   should still govern.
5

Contrary to the stand of respondents, we find nothing inconsistent between the term of six (6) years for elective
Barangay officials and the 1987 Constitution, and the same should, therefore, be considered as still operative,
pursuant to Section 3, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution, reading:
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987 designating
respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of Barangay Dolores, Taytay,
Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining
respondents perpetually from proceeding with the ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this
Petition. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 
 
Separate Opinions

 
TEEHANKEE, CJ.,  concurring:
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the
date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C.
Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of
Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification
shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view
was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its proponent in
the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the very day of the
plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's
judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Conunission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is
the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely
the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the
Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation of the
committee as indicated in Section 12, unless there are other commissioners who would like to
present amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last
line, after "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going to
propose an additional sentence, the committee would suggest that we take up first his
amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now ready to comment on
that proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lieu thereof
insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN
RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word "constitutions," add the
words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we cannot
accept the second proposed amendment after the word "constitutions" because the
committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions, necessarily it includes "AND
THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam President,
may I request that I be allowed to read the second amendment so the Commission would be
able to appreciate the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE
WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the committee feels
that the second proposed amendment in the form of a new sentence would not be exactly
necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a time frame on
the President to make the proclamation. As we would recall, Madam President, in the
approved Article on the Executive, there is a provision which says that the President shall
make certain that all laws shall be faithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence,
and it says that there will be a proclamation by the President that the Constitution has been
ratified, the President will naturally comply with the law in accordance with the provisions in
the Article on the Executive which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on the
President a time frame within which she will make that declaration. It would be assumed that
the President would immediately do that after the results shall have been canvassed by the
COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the
Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will be an
immediate proclamation of the results by the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendment
which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution dependent upon the proclamation of the
President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification,
not on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I think, is what
happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. In that particular case, the
reason the amendments of 1976 were effective upon the proclamation of the President was
that the draft presented to the people said that the amendment will be effective upon the
proclamation made by the President. I have a suspicion that was put in there precisely to give
the President some kind of leeway on whether to announce the ratification or not.
Therefore, we should not make this dependent on the action of the President since this will be
a manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the supervision of the
COMELEC and it should be the COMELEC who should make the announcement that, in fact,
the votes show that the Constitution was ratified and there should be no need to wait for any
proclamation on the part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when
the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes were
supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We
present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vote, then the votes
are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete the suggested amendment which
says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what
would be, in clear terms, the date when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified or not
ratified, as the case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President were to say that
the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on January 19, 1987, then the date for the effectivity
of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the results
by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam
President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification" is the act of saying "yes"
is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know from
the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot
subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the date of the ratification is reckoned
from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date of reckoning because it is a
plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of casting by each of the voters.
Actually and technically speaking, it would be all right if it would be upon the announcement of
the results of the canvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all
over the country. But it is necessary that there be a body which will make the formal
announcement of the results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President or the COMELEC
itself upon the completion of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the
President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner Davide. I
support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the casting of the
"yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Constitution The announcement merely
confirms the ratification  even if the results are released two or three days after. I think it is a
fundamental principle in political law, even in civil law, because an announcement is a mere
confirmation The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification. If there should be any need for presidential proclamation, that proclamation will
merely confirm the act of ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support for
Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass thereafter is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by
the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the
plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date for the
effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a
month, what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the approval of the
Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore, in favor of the Davide
amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity for the
Commission on Elections to declare the results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because  it is the Commission on Elections which makes the
official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision on
Elections has declared the results of the canvass, will there be a necessity for the President to
make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitted by the Commission on
Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the proclamation
whether the Constitution has been ratified or not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be immaterial
because under the law, the administration of all election laws is under an independent
Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the Commission
on Elections says, it would have no effect. I would only add that when we say that the date of
effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes, what we mean is that the Constitution takes
effect on every single minute and every single second of that day, because the Civil Code
says a day has 24 hours.So that even if the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is
really effective from the previous midnight.
So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the children of Filipino mothers or
anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, which is January 17, 1973,
are natural-born citizens, no matter what time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is the publication of the
results of the canvass by the COMELEC retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. I think it is
precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date (of ratification that
would have a definite date, because  there would be no definite date if we depend upon the
canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC or
the President, would announce that a majority of the votes cast on a given date was in favor
of the Constitution. And that is the date when the Constitution takes effect, apart from the fact
that the provision on the drafting or amendment of the Constitution provides that a constitution
becomes effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast, although I would not say
from the very beginning of the date of election because as of that time it is impossible to
determine whether there is a majority. At the end of the day of election or plebiscite, the
determination is made as of that time-the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on
such and such a date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be considered ratified
and, therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.
 MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of Commissioner
Davide and I support the view of Commissioner Bernas and the others because the ratification
of the Constitution is on the date the people, by a majority vote, have cast their votes in favor
of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a contract, say, between an agent and a third
person and that contract is confirmed or ratified by the principal, the validity does not begin on
the date of ratification but it retroacts from the date the contract was executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the people
have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the Constitution.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting on his
amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion that it will
be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my amendment on the
assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the President or the COMELEC will
make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as stated by
the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the original
committee report as Section 12.
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised
their hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved.  2

The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the date of
its ratification in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on
March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the same date
February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the contrary in
the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to
replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted replacement
of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no
longer produce any legal force and effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period
expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was
shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the
framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed
they provided for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the
six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the
convening of the first Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven Court of
Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2,
1987 . . . could be open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII of
the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar Council created under the
Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is
incorrect. The official records of the Court show that the appointments of the seven Court of Appeals Justices
were transmitted to this Court on February 1, 1987 and they were all appointed on or before January 31,
1987.  (Similarly, the records of the Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last
3

batch of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in completion of the reorganization of the
prosecution service were made on January 31, 1987 and transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.)
It is also a matter of record that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended
by the President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar Council, indicating that the Chief Executive
has likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly declared
by the Court.
CRUZ, J.,  concurring.
In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect than the
tones of thunder. She has written another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that it in
effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted that the
local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired security of tenure under the new
Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right commence on February 25, 1987, after the
deadline set by the Freedom Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new
Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with her ponencia completely.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution with
respect to the tenure of government functionaries, as follows:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-off
period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my mind the
1987 constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ratified pursuant to
Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987, plebiscite day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:
Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its ratification shall have been
ascertained, and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically said
that Constitution was ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that time, had not, and
could not have been, vet determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts that would
have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but would otherwise have been void under the 1987
Charter. I recall, in particular, the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals,
and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of
the l987 Constitution, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy, Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as well as the
amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera,   we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17, 1973,
2

the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the Constitution
Proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice,
Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary,   became final. And this was so notwithstanding Section 16, Article XVII, of the 1973
3

Constitution, thus:
SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and, except as herein provided, shall
supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all amendments thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, proclaiming the ratification
of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation states, inter
alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this certificate
as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the referendum- plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are therefore
effective and in full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that
they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the Ratification by the
Filipino People of the Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of
judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite held, together with the election for local officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said
amendment is hereby declared to take effect immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment shall take
effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of April 7,
1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them
Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the said amendments duly
approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of the date of this Proclamation," It
shall be noted, in this connection, that under Resolutions Nos. I and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa, Third
Regular Session, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, which parented these amendments, the same:
. . .shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ratification or
Rejection, the Amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Sitting
as a Constituent Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three, Two, and One, and to Appropriate Funds
Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass and proclaim the result
of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to it, duly authenticated and certified by the
Board of Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of January 27, 1984, of
the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111,
112 and 113." It states that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9, Batas Blg. 643),
which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Philippines shall
proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held for
the purpose, but not later than three months from the approval of the amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of
the votes cast in an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted to the people for their
ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not at the time
of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite called pursuant
to Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18, 1946, was
adopted on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a retroactive application.
Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February 11, 1987, at
Malacanang Palace:
... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ratified by the
Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect. 
4

the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga   in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter was
5

ratified on February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in
passing-we did not resolve the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution came to life
on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged dismissals done
on February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in force.
 
 
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, CJ.,  concurring:
The main issue resolved in the judgment at bar is whether the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, the date that the plebiscite for its ratification was held or whether it took effect on February 11, 1987, the
date its ratification was proclaimed per Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, Corazon C.
Aquino.
The Court's decision, with the lone dissent of Mr. Justice Sarmiento, holds that by virtue of the provision of
Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2,
1987, the date of its ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.
The thrust of the dissent is that the Constitution should be deemed to "take effect on the date its ratification
shall have been ascertained and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it." This view
was actually proposed at the Constitutional Commission deliberations, but was withdrawn by its proponent in
the face of the "overwhelming" contrary view that the Constitution "will be effective on the very day of the
plebiscite."
The record of the proceedings and debates of the Constitutional Commission fully supports the Court's
judgment. It shows that the clear, unequivocal and express intent of the Constitutional Conunission in
unanimously approving (by thirty-five votes in favor and none against) the aforequoted Section 27 of Transitory
Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution was that "the act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is
the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the President is merely
the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the
Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the plebiscite."
The record of the deliberations and the voting is reproduced hereinbelow: 1
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, may we now put to a vote the original formulation of the
committee as indicated in Section 12, unless there are other commissioners who would like to
present amendments.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. May I propose the following amendments.
On line 2, delete the words "its ratification" and in lieu thereof insert the following-. "THE
PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED." And on the last
line, after "constitutions," add the following: "AND THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. MAAMBONG. Just a moment, Madam President. If Commissioner Davide is going to
propose an additional sentence, the committee would suggest that we take up first his
amendment to the first sentence as originally formulated. We are now ready to comment on
that proposed amendment.
The proposed amendment would be to delete the words "its ratification and in lieu thereof
insert the words "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN
RATIFIED." And the second amendment would be: After the word "constitutions," add the
words" AND THEIR AMENDMENTS,"
The committee accepts the first proposed amendment. However, we regret that we cannot
accept the second proposed amendment after the word "constitutions" because the
committee feels that when we talk of all previous Constitutions, necessarily it includes "AND
THEIR AMENDMENTS."
MR. DAVIDE. With that explanation, l will not insist on the second. But, Madam President,
may I request that I be allowed to read the second amendment so the Commission would be
able to appreciate the change in the first.
MR. MAAMBONG. Yes, Madam President, we can now do that.
MR. DAVIDE. The second sentence will read: "THE PROCLAMATION SHALL BE MADE
WITHIN FIVE DAYS FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE CANVASS BY THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS OF THE RESULTS OF SUCH PLEBISCITE."
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, after conferring with our chairman, the committee feels
that the second proposed amendment in the form of a new sentence would not be exactly
necessary and the committee feels that it would be too much for us to impose a time frame on
the President to make the proclamation. As we would recall, Madam President, in the
approved Article on the Executive, there is a provision which says that the President shall
make certain that all laws shall be faithfully complied. When we approve this first sentence,
and it says that there will be a proclamation by the President that the Constitution has been
ratified, the President will naturally comply with the law in accordance with the provisions in
the Article on the Executive which we have cited. It would be too much to impose on the
President a time frame within which she will make that declaration. It would be assumed that
the President would immediately do that after the results shall have been canvassed by the
COMELEC.
Therefore, the committee regrets that it cannot accept the second sentence which the
Gentleman is proposing, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I am prepared to withdraw the same on the assumption that there will be an
immediate proclamation of the results by the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that understanding, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. I will not insist on the second sentence.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. I would ask the committee to reconsider its acceptance of the amendment
which makes the effectivity of the new Constitution dependent upon the proclamation of the
President. The effectivity of the Constitution should commence on the date of the ratification,
not on the date of the proclamation of the President. What is confusing, I think, is what
happened in 1976 when the amendments of 1976 were ratified. In that particular case, the
reason the amendments of 1976 were effective upon the proclamation of the President was
that the draft presented to the people said that the amendment will be effective upon the
proclamation made by the President. I have a suspicion that was put in there precisely to give
the President some kind of leeway on whether to announce the ratification or not.
Therefore, we should not make this dependent on the action of the President since this will be
a manifestation of the act of the people to be done under the supervision of the
COMELEC and it should be the COMELEC who should make the announcement that, in fact,
the votes show that the Constitution was ratified and there should be no need to wait for any
proclamation on the part of the President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Would the Gentleman answer a few clarificatory questions?
FR. BERNAS. Willingly, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. The Gentleman will agree that a date has to be fixed as to exactly when
the Constitution is supposed to be ratified.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the ratification of the Constitution is on the date the votes were
supposed to have been cast.
MR. MAAMBONG. Let us go to the mechanics of the whole thing, Madam President. We
present the Constitution to a plebiscite, the people exercise their right to vote, then the votes
are canvassed by the Commission on Elections. If we delete the suggested amendment which
says: "THE PROCLAMATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAS BEEN RATIFIED," what
would be, in clear terms, the date when the Constitution is supposed to be ratified or not
ratified, as the case may be?
FR. BERNAS. The date would be the casting of the ballots. if the President were to say that
the plebiscite would be held, for instance, on January 19, 1987, then the date for the effectivity
of the new Constitution would be January 19, 1987.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, it would not depend on the actual issuance of the results
by the Commission on Elections which will be doing the canvass? That is immaterial Madam
President
FR. BERNAS. It would not, Madam President, because "ratification" is the act of saying "yes"
is done when one casts his ballot.
MR. MAAMBONG. So it is the date of the plebiscite itself, Madam President?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. With that statement of Commissioner Bernas, we would like to know from
the proponent, Commissioner Davide, if he is insisting on his amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I am insisting on the amendment because I cannot
subscribe to the view of Commissioner Bernas, that the date of the ratification is reckoned
from the date of the casting of the ballots. That cannot be the date of reckoning because it is a
plebiscite all over the country. We do not split the moment of casting by each of the voters.
Actually and technically speaking, it would be all right if it would be upon the announcement of
the results of the canvass conducted by the COMELEC or the results of the plebiscite held all
over the country. But it is necessary that there be a body which will make the formal
announcement of the results of the plebiscite. So it is either the President or the COMELEC
itself upon the completion of the canvass of the results of the plebiscite, and I opted for the
President.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Nolledo is recognized.
MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Madam President. I beg to disagree with Commissioner Davide. I
support the stand of Commissioner Bernas because it is really the date of the casting of the
"yes" votes that is the date of the ratification of the Constitution The announcement merely
confirms the ratification  even if the results are released two or three days after. I think it is a
fundamental principle in political law, even in civil law, because an announcement is a mere
confirmation The act of ratification is the act of voting by the people. So that is the date of the
ratification. If there should be any need for presidential proclamation, that proclamation will
merely confirm the act of ratification.
Thank you, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Does Commissioner Regalado want to contribute?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, I was precisely going to state the same support for
Commissioner Bernas, because the canvass thereafter is merely the mathematical
confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the proclamation of the
President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which was actually done by
the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their votes on the date of the
plebiscite.
MR. LERUM. Madam President, may I be recognized.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Lerum is recognized.
MR. LERUM. I am in favor of the Davide amendment because we have to fix a date for the
effectivity of the Constitution. Suppose the announcement is delayed by, say, 10 days or a
month, what happens to the obligations and rights that accrue upon the approval of the
Constitution? So I think we must have a definite date. I am, therefore, in favor of the Davide
amendment.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized.
MR. MAAMBONG. With the theory of the Commissioner, would there be a necessity for the
Commission on Elections to declare the results of the canvass?
FR. BERNAS. There would be because  it is the Commission on Elections which makes the
official announcement of the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. My next question which is the final one is: After the Commision on
Elections has declared the results of the canvass, will there be a necessity for the President to
make a proclamation of the results of the canvass as submitted by the Commission on
Elections?
FR. BERNAS. I would say there would be no necessity, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. In other words, the President may or may not make the proclamation
whether the Constitution has been ratified or not.
FR. BERNAS. I would say that the proclamation made by the President would be immaterial
because under the law, the administration of all election laws is under an independent
Commission on Elections. It is the Commission on Elections which announces the results.
MR. MAAMBONG. But nevertheless, the President may make the proclamation.
FR. BERNAS. Yes, the President may. And if what he says contradicts what the Commission
on Elections says, it would have no effect. I would only add that when we say that the date of
effectivity is on the day of the casting of the votes, what we mean is that the Constitution takes
effect on every single minute and every single second of that day, because the Civil Code
says a day has 24 hours.
So that even if the votes are cast in the morning, the Constitution is really effective from the
previous midnight. So that when we adopted the new rule on citizenship, the children of
Filipino mothers or anybody born on the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, which is
January 17, 1973, are natural-born citizens, no matter what time of day or night.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, safely say that whatever date is the publication of the
results of the canvass by the COMELEC retroacts to the date of the plebiscite?
FR. BERNAS. Yes, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. I thank the Commissioner.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Mention was made about the need for having a definite date. I think it is
precisely the proposal of Commissioner Bernas which speaks of the date (of ratification that
would have a definite date, because  there would be no definite date if we depend upon the
canvassing by the COMELEC.
Thank you,
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Concepcion is recognized.
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Madam President.
Whoever makes the announcement as to the result of the plebiscite, be it the COMELEC or
the President, would announce that a majority of the votes cast on a given date was in favor
of the Constitution. And that is the date when the Constitution takes effect, apart from the fact
that the provision on the drafting or amendment of the Constitution provides that a constitution
becomes effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast, although I would not say
from the very beginning of the date of election because as of that time it is impossible to
determine whether there is a majority. At the end of the day of election or plebiscite, the
determination is made as of that time-the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on
such and such a date. So that is the time when the new Constitution will be considered ratified
and, therefore, effective.
THE PRESIDENT. May we now hear Vice-President Padilla.
MR. PADILLA. Madam President, I am against the proposed amendment of Commissioner
Davide and I support the view of Commissioner Bernas and the others because the ratification
of the Constitution is on the date the people, by a majority vote, have cast their votes in favor
of the Constitution. Even in civil law, if there is a contract, say, between an agent and a third
 person and that contract is confirmed or ratified by the principal, the validity does not begin on
the date of ratification but it retroacts from the date the contract was executed.
Therefore, the date of the Constitution as ratified should retroact to the date that the people
have cast their affirmative votes in favor of the Constitution.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Maambong is recognized
MR. MAAMBONG. We will now ask once more Commissioner Davide if he is insisting on his
amendment
MR. DAVIDE. In view of the explanation and overwhelming tyranny of the opinion that it will
be effective on the very day of the plebiscite, I am withdrawing my amendment on the
assumption that any of the following bodies the Office of the President or the COMELEC will
make the formal announcement of the results.
MR. RAMA. Madam President, we are now ready to vote on the original provision as stated by
the committee.
MR. MAAMBONG. The committee will read again the formulation indicated in the original
committee report as Section 12.
This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
We ask for a vote, Madam President.
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised
their hands.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No Member raised his hand.)
The results show 35 votes in favor and none against; Section 12 is approved.  2

The Court next holds as a consequence of its declaration at bar that the Constitution took effect on the date of
its ratification in the plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, that: (1) the Provisional Constitution promulgated on
March 25, 1986 must be deemed to have been superseded by the 1987 Constitution on the same date
February 2, 1987 and (2) by and after said date, February 2, 1987, absent any saying clause to the contrary in
the Transitory Article of the Constitution, respondent OIC Governor could no longer exercise the power to
replace petitioners in their positions as Barangay Captain and Councilmen. Hence, the attempted replacement
of petitioners by respondent OIC Governor's designation on February 8, 1987 of their successors could no
longer produce any legal force and effect. While the Provisional Constitution provided for a one-year period
expiring on March 25, 1987 within which the power of replacement could be exercised, this period was
shortened by the ratification and effectivity on February 2, 1987 of the Constitution. Had the intention of the
framers of the Constitution been otherwise, they would have so provided for in the Transitory Article, as indeed
they provided for multifarious transitory provisions in twenty six sections of Article XVIII, e.g. extension of the
six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of
synchronization of elections, the continued exercise of legislative powers by the incumbent President until the
convening of the first Congress, etc.
A final note of clarification, as to the statement in the dissent that "the appointments of some seven Court of
Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals and 55 city fiscals reported extended (by) the President on February 2,
1987 . . . could be open to serious questions," in view of the provisions of Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII of
the Constitution which require prior endorsement thereof by the Judicial and Bar Council created under the
Constitution. It should be stated for the record that the reported date of the appointments, February 2, 1987, is
incorrect. The official records of the Court show that the appointments of the seven Court of Appeals Justices
were transmitted to this Court on February 1, 1987 and they were all appointed on or before January 31,
1987.  (Similarly, the records of the Department of Justice likewise show that the appointment papers of the last
3

batch of provincial and city fiscals signed by the President in completion of the reorganization of the
prosecution service were made on January 31, 1987 and transmitted to the Department on February 1, 1987.)
It is also a matter of record that since February 2, 1987, no appointments to the Judiciary have been extended
by the President, pending the constitution of the Judicial and Bar Council, indicating that the Chief Executive
has likewise considered February 2, 1987 as the effective date of the Constitution, as now expressly declared
by the Court.
CRUZ, J.,  concurring.
In her quiet and restrained manner, Justice Herrera is able to prove her point with more telling effect than the
tones of thunder. She has written another persuasive opinion, and I am delighted to concur. I note that it in
effect affirms my dissents in the De la Serna, Zamora, Duquing and Bayas cases, where I submitted that the
local OICs may no longer be summarily replaced, having acquired security of tenure under the new
Constitution. Our difference is that whereas I would make that right commence on February 25, 1987, after the
deadline set by the Freedom Constitution, Justice Herrera would opt for February 2, 1987, when the new
Constitution was ratified. I yield to that better view and agree with her ponencia completely.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting.
With due respect to the majority I register this dissent.
While I agree that the one-year deadline prescribed by Section 2, Article III of the Provisional Constitution with
respect to the tenure of government functionaries, as follows:
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the
designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made
within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
was cut short by the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, I entertain serious doubts whether or not that cut-off
period began on February 2, 1987, the date of the plebiscite held to approve the new Charter. To my mind the
1987 constitution took effect on February 11, 1987, the date the same was proclaimed ratified pursuant to
Proclamation No. 58 of the President of the Philippines, and not February 2, 1987, plebiscite day.
I rely, first and foremost, on the language of the 1987 Charter itself, thus:
Sec. 27. This Constitution shag take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous
Constitutions.
It is my reading of this provision that the Constitution takes effect on the date its ratification shall have been
ascertained, and not at the time the people cast their votes to approve or reject it. For it cannot be logically said
that Constitution was ratified during such a plebiscite, when the will of the people as of that time, had not, and
could not have been, vet determined.
Other than that, pragmatic considerations compel me to take the view.
I have no doubt that between February 2, and February 11, 1987 the government performed acts that would
have been valid under the Provisional Constitution but would otherwise have been void under the 1987
Charter. I recall, in particular, the appointments of some seven Court of Appeals Justices, 71 provincial fiscals,
and 55 city fiscals the President reportedly extended on February 2, 1987. 1 Under Sections 8 (1) and 9, Article VIII, of
the l987 Constitution, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. (I)A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex oficio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
xxx xxx xxx
2Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by
the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy, Such appointments need no confirmation.
xxx xxx xxx
such appointments could be open to serious questions.
Since 1973, moreover, we have invariably reckoned the effectivity of the Constitution as well as the
amendments thereto from the date it is proclaimed ratified.
In Magtoto v. Manguera,   we held that the 1973 Constitution became in force and effect on January 17, 1973,
2

the date Proclamation No. 1102, "Announcing the Ratification by the Filipino People of the Constitution
Proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," was issued, although Mr. Justice, now Chief Justice,
Teehankee would push its effectivity date further to April 17, 1973, the date our decision in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary,   became final. And this was so notwithstanding Section 16, Article XVII, of the 1973
3

Constitution, thus:
 SEC. 16. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose and, except as herein provided, shall
supersede the Constitution of nineteen-hundred and thirty- five and all amendments thereto.
On October 27, 1976, then President Marcos promulgated Proclamation no. 1595, proclaiming the ratification
of the 1976 amendments submitted in the plebiscite of October 16- 17, 1976. The Proclamation states, inter
alia, that.
By virtue-of the powers vested in me by law, I hereby proclaim all the amendments embodied in this certificate
as duly ratified by the Filipino people in the referendum — plebiscite held Oct. 16-17, 1976 and are therefore
effective and in full force and effect as of this date.
It shall be noted that under Amendment No. 9 of the said 1976 amendments.
These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that
they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite.
On April 1, 1980, the then Chief Executive issued Proclamation no. 1959, "Proclaiming the Ratification by the
Filipino People of the Amendments of Section 7, Article X of the Constitution" (lengthening the terms of office of
judges and justices). The Proclamation provides:
[t]he above-quoted amendment has been duly ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite held, together with the election for local officials, on January 30, 1980, and that said
amendment is hereby declared to take effect immediately.
It shall be noted that under Resolution No. 21, dated December 18, 1979, the proposed amendment shall take
effect on the date the incumbent President/Prime Minister shall proclaim its ratification.
On April 7, 1981, Proclamation No. 2077 was issued "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of April 7,
1981 of the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 122 and Declaring Them
Therefore Effective and in Full Force and Effect." The Proclamation, in declaring the said amendments duly
approved, further declared them "[e]ffective and in full force and in effect as of the date of this Proclamation," It
shall be noted, in this connection, that under Resolutions Nos. I and 2 of the Batasang Pambansa, Third
Regular Session, Sitting as a Constituent Assembly, which parented these amendments, the same:
... shall become valid as part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite to be held pursuant to Section 2, Article XVI of the Constitution.
On the other hand, Batas Pambansa Blg. 122, "An Act to Submit to the Filipino People, for Ratification or
Rejection, the Amendment to the Constitution of the Philippines, Proposed by the Batasang Pambansa, Sitting
as a Constituent Assembly, in its Resolutions Numbered Three, Two, and One, and to Appropriate Funds
Therefore," provides, as follows:
SEC. 7. The Commission on Elections, sitting en banc, shad canvass and proclaim the result
of the plebiscite using the certificates submitted to it, duly authenticated and certified by the
Board of Canvassers of each province or city.
We have, finally, Proclamation No. 2332, "Proclaiming the Ratification in the Plebiscite of January 27, 1984, of
the Amendments to the Constitution Embodied in Batasang Pambansa Resolutions Nos. 104, 105, 110, 111,
112 and 113." It states that the amendments:
....are therefore effective and in full force and effect as of the date of this Proclamation.
It carries out Resolution no. 104 itself (as well as Resolutions Nos. 110 and 112 and Section 9, Batas Blg. 643),
which states, that:
The proposed amendments shall take effect on the date the President of the Philippines shall
proclaim that they have been ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite held for
the purpose, but not later than three months from the approval of the amendments.
albeit Resolutions Nos. 105, 111, and 113 provide, that:
These amendments shall be valid as a part of the Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast in
an election/plebiscite at which it is submitted to the people for their ratification pursuant to Section 2 of Article
XVI of the Constitution, as amended.
That a Constitution or amendments thereto take effect upon proclamation of their ratification and not at the time
of the plebiscite is a view that is not peculiar to the Marcos era.
The Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) in Joint Session on the March 11, 1947 plebiscite called pursuant
to Republic Act No. 73 and the Resolution of Both Houses (of Congress) adopted on September 18, 1946, was
adopted on April 9,1947. The April 9, 1947 Resolution makes no mention of a retroactive
application. Accordingly, when the incumbent President (Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino) proclaimed on February 11,
1987, at Malacanang Palace:
 ... that the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines adopted by the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, including the Ordinance appended thereto, has been duly ratified by the
Filipino people and is therefore effective and in full force and effect. 
4

the 1987 Constitution, in point of fact, came into force and effect, I hold that it took effect at no other time.
I submit that our ruling in Ponsica v. Ignalaga   in which we declared, in passing, that the new Charter was
5

ratified on February 2, 1987, does not in any way weaken this dissent. As I stated, the remark was said in
passing-we did not resolve the case on account of a categorical holding that the 1987 Constitution came to life
on February 2, 1987. In any event, if we did, I now call for its re-examination.
I am therefore of the opinion, consistent with the views expressed above, that the challenged dismissals done
on February 8, 1987 were valid, the 1987 Constitution not being then as yet in force.
Footnotes
1 Topacio, Jr. vs. Pimentel G.R. No. 73770, April 10, 1986.
2 Section 2, BP Blg. 222.
3 Article 11, Section 25 and Article X, Sections 1, 2, 14, among others.
4 Article X, Section 4.
5 Section 3, BP Blg. 222.
Teehankee, C.J., concurring:
1 Volume Five, Record of the Constitutional Commission Proceedings and Debates, pages
620-623; emphasis supplied.
2 The entire draft Constitution was approved on October 12, 1986 forty forty-five votes in favor
and two against.
3 The seven Court of Appeals Justices referred to are Justices Alfredo L. Benipayo, Minerva
G. Reyes, Magdangal B. Elma, Cecilio PE, Jesus Elbinias, Nicolas Lapena Jr. and Justo P.
Torres, Jr., and their appointments bear various dates from January 9, 1987 to January 31,
1987.
Sarmiento, J., dissenting:
1 Manila Bulletin, Feb. 3, 1987, p. 1, cols. 6-7 Philippine Daily Inquirer, Feb. 3,1987, p. 1, cot
1; Malaya, Feb. 3, 1987, p. 1, col. 1.
2 Nos. 3720102 March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4 (1975).
3 Nos. L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30 (1973).
4 Proclamation No. 58 (1987).
5 G.R. No. 72301.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. L-32052 July 25, 1975
PHILIPPINE VIRGINIA TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, REUEL ABRAHAM, MILAGROS ABUEG, AVELINO ACOSTA,
CAROLINA ACOSTA, MARTIN AGSALUD, JOSEFINA AGUINALDO, GLORIA ALBANO, ANTONIO
ALUNING, COSME ALVAREZ, ISABEL ALZATE, AURORA APUSEN, TOMAS ARCANGEL, LOURDES
ARJONELLO, MANUEL AROMIN, DIONISIO ASISTIN, JOSE AURE, NICASIO AZNAR, EUGENIO AZURIN,
CLARITA BACUGAN, PIO BALAGOT, HEREDIO BALMACEDA, ESTHER BANAAG, JOVENCIO
BARBERO, MONICO BARBADILLO, HERNANDO BARROZO, FILIPINA BARROZO, REMEDIO
BARTOLOME, ANGELINA BASCOS, JOSE BATALLA, ALMARIO BAUTISTA, EUGENIO BAUTISTA, JR.,
HERMALO BAUTISTA, JUANITO BAUTISTA, SEVERINO BARBANO, CAPPIA BARGONIA, ESMERALDA
BERNARDEZ, RUBEN BERNARDEZ, ALFREDO BONGER, TOMAS BOQUIREN, ANGELINA BRAVO,
VIRGINIA BRINGA, ALBERTO BUNEO, SIMEON CABANAYAN, LUCRECIA CACATIAN, LEONIDES
CADAY, ANGELINA CADOTTE, IGNACIO CALAYCAY, PACIFICO CALUB, RUFINO CALUZA, CALVIN
CAMBA, ALFREDO CAMPOSENO, BAGUILITA CANTO, ALFREDO CARRERA, PEDRO CASES,
CRESCENTE CASIS, ERNESTO CASTANEDA, HERMINIO CASTILLO, JOSE CASTRO, LEONOR
CASTRO, MADEO CASTRO, MARIA PINZON CASTRO, PABLO CATURA, RESTITUTO CESPADES,
FLORA CHACON, EDMUNDO CORPUZ, ESTHER CRUZ, CELIA CUARESMA, AQUILINO DACAYO,
DIONISIA DASALLA, SOCORRO DELFIN, ABELARDO DIAZ, ARTHUR DIAZ, CYNTHIA DIZON, MARCIA
DIZON, ISABELO DOMINGO, HONORATA DOZA, CAROLINA DUAD, JUSTINIANO EPISTOLA, ROMEO
ENCARNACION, PRIMITIVO ESCANO, ELSA ESPEJO, JUAN ESPEJO, RIZALINA ESQUILLO, YSMAEL
FARINAS, LORNA FAVIS, DAN FERNANDEZ, JAIME FERNANDEZ, ALFREDO FERRER, MODESTO
FERRER, JR., EUGENIO FLANDEZ, GUILLERMO FLORENDO, ALFREDO FLORES, DOMINGA FLORES,
ROMEO FLORES, LIGAYA FONTANILLA, MELCHOR GASMEN, LEILA GASMENA, CONSUELO
GAROLAGA, ALFONSO GOROSPE, CESAR GOROSPE, RICARDO GOROSPE, JR., CARLITO GUZMAN,
ERNESTO DE GUZMAN, THELMA DE GUZMAN, FELIX HERNANDEZ, SOLIVEN HERNANDO,
FRANCISCO HIDALGO, LEONILO INES, SIXTO JAQUIES, TRINIDAD JAVIER, FERMIN LAGUA,
GUALBERTO LAMBINO, ROMAN LANTING, OSCAR LAZO, ROSARIO LAZO, JOSEFINA DE LARA,
AMBROSIO LAZOL, NALIE LIBATIQUE, LAMBERTO LLAMAS, ANTONIO LLANES, ROMULA LOPEZ,
ADRIANO LORENZANA, ANTONIO MACARAEG, ILDEFONSO MAGAT, CECILIO MAGHANOY, ALFONSO
MAGSANOC, AVELINA MALLARE, AUGUSTO MANALO, DOMINADOR MANASAN, BENITO
MANECLANG, JR., TIRSO MANGUMAY, EVELIA MANZANO, HONORANTE MARIANO, DOMINGO
MEDINA, MARTIN MENDOZA, PERFECTO MILANA, EMILIO MILLAN, GREGORIO MONEGAS,
CONSOLACION NAVALTA, NOLI OCAMPO, VICENTE CLEGARIO, ELPIDIO PALMONES, ARACELI
PANGALANGAN, ISIDORO PANLASIGUI, JR., ARTEMIO PARIS, JR., FEDERICO PAYUMO, JR., NELIA
PAYUMO, BITUEN PAZ, FRANCISCO PENGSON, OSCAR PERALTA, PROCORRO PERALTA, RAMON
PERALTA, MINDA PICHAY, MAURO PIMENTEL, PRUDENCIO PIMENTEL, LEOPOLDO PUNO,
REYNALDO RABE, ROLANDO REA, CONSTANTINO REA, CECILIA RICO, CECILIO RILLORAZA,
AURORA ROMAN, MERCEDES RUBIO, URSULA RUPISAN, OLIVIA SABADO, BERNARDO
SACRAMENTO, LUZ SALVADOR, JOSE SAMSON, JR., ROMULA DE LOS SANTOS, ANTONIO SAYSON,
JR., FLORANTE SERIL, MARIO SISON, RUDY SISON, PROCEDIO TABIN, LUCENA TABISULA,
HANNIBAL TAJANO, ENRIQUE TIANGCO, JR., JUSTINIANO TOBIAS, NYMIA TOLENTINO, CONSTANTE
TOLENTINO, TEODORO TOREBIO, FEDERICO TRINIDAD, JOVENCINTO TRINIDAD, LAZARO VALDEZ,
LUDRALINA VALDEZ, MAXIMINA VALDEZ, FRANCISCO VELASCO, JR., ROSITA VELASCO, SEVERO
VANTANILLA, VENANCIO VENTIGAN, FELICITAS VENUS, NIEVES DE VERA, ELISEO VERSOZA,
SILVESTRE VILA, GLORIA VILLAMOR, ALEJANDRO VELLANUEVA, DAVID VILLANUEVA, CAROLINA
VILLASENOR ORLANDO VILLASTIQUE, MAJELLA VILORIN, ROSARIO VILORIA, MAY VIRATA,
FEDERICO VIRAY, MELBA YAMBAO, MARIO ZAMORA, AUTENOR ABUEG, SOTERO ACEDO,
HONRADO ALBERTO, FELIPE ALIDO, VICENTE ANCHUELO, LIBERTAD APEROCHO, MARIANO
BALBAGO, MARIO BALMACEDA, DAISY BICENIO, SYLVIA BUSTAMANTE, RAYMUNDO GEMERINO,
LAZARO CAPURAS, ROGELIO CARUNGCONG, ZACARIAS CAYETANO, JR., LILY CHUA, ANDRES
CRUZ, ARTURO CRUZ, BIENVENIDO ESTEBAN, PABLO JARETA, MANUEL JOSE, NESTORIA
KINTANAR, CLEOPATRIA LAZEM. MELCHOR LAZO, JESUS LUNA, GASPAR MARINAS, CESAR
MAULSON, MANUEL MEDINA, JESUS PLURAD, LAKAMBINI RAZON, GLORIA IBANEZ, JOSE SANTOS,
ELEAZAR SQUI, JOSE TAMAYO, FELIPE TENORIO, SILVINO UMALI, VICENTE ZARA, SATURNINO
GARCIA, WILLIAM GARCIA, NORMA GARINGARAO, ROSARIO ANTONIO, RUBEN BAUTISTA, QUIRINO
PUESTO, NELIA M. GOMERI, OSCAR R. LANUZA, AURORA M. LINDAYA, GREGORIO MOGSINO,
JACRM B. PAPA, GREGORIO R. RIEGO, TERESITA N. ROZUL, MAGTANGOL SAMALA, PORFIRIO
AGOCOLIS, LEONARDO MONTE, HERMELINO PATI, ALFREDO PAYOYO, PURIFICACION ROJAS,
ODANO TEANO, RICARDO SANTIAGO, and MARCELO MANGAHAS, respondents.
Gov't. Corp. Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera, Trial Attorneys Manuel M. Lazaro and Vicente Constantine, Jr., for
petitioner.
Renato B. Kare and Simeon C. Sato for private respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:
The principal issue that calls for resolution in this appeal by certiorari  from an order of respondent Court of
Industrial Relations is one of constitutional significance. It is concerned with the expanded role of government
necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare. More specifically, it deals with
the question of whether petitioner, the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, discharges governmental
and not proprietary functions. The landmark opinion of the then Justice, row Chief Justice, Makalintal
in Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions in Government
Corporations and offices, points the way to the right answer.  It interpreted the then fundamental law as hostile
1

to the view of a limited or negative state. It is antithetical to the laissez faire concept. For as noted in an earlier
decision, the welfare state concept "is not alien to the philosophy of [the 1935] Constitution."  It is much more
2

so under the present Charter, which is impressed with an even more explicit recognition of social and economic
rights.  There is manifest, to recall Laski, "a definite increase in the profundity of the social conscience,"
3

resulting in "a state which seeks to realize more fully the common good of its members."  It does not
4

necessarily follow, however, just because petitioner is engaged in governmental rather than proprietary
functions, that the labor controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the now defunct respondent Court. Nor is
the objection raised that petitioner does not come within the coverage of the Eight-Hour Labor Law
persuasive.  We cannot then grant the reversal sought. We affirm.
5

The facts are undisputed. On December 20, 1966, claimants, now private respondents, filed with respondent
Court a petition wherein they alleged their employment relationship, the overtime services in excess of the
regular eight hours a day rendered by them, and the failure to pay them overtime compensation in accordance
with Commonwealth Act No. 444. Their prayer was for the differential between the amount actually paid to
them and the amount allegedly due them.  There was an answer filed by petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco
6

Administration denying the allegations and raising the special defenses of lack of a cause of action and lack of
jurisdiction.  The issues were thereafter joined, and the case set for trial, with both parties presenting their
7

evidence.  After the parties submitted the case for decision, the then Presiding Judge Arsenio T. Martinez of
8

respondent Court issued an order sustaining the claims of private respondents for overtime services from
December 23, 1963 up to the date the decision was rendered on March 21, 1970, and directing petitioner to
pay the same, minus what it had already paid. 9 There was a motion for reconsideration, but respondent Court en banc denied
the same. 10 Hence this petition for certiorari.
Petitioner Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, as had been noted, would predicate its plea for the
reversal of the order complained of on the basic proposition that it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent
Court as it is exercising governmental functions and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act
No. 444.   While, to repeat, its submission as to the governmental character of its operation is to be given
11

credence, it is not a necessary consequence that respondent Court is devoid of jurisdiction. Nor could the
challenged order be set aside on the additional argument that the Eight-Hour Labor Law is not applicable to it.
So it was, at the outset, made clear.
1. A reference to the enactments creating petitioner corporation suffices to demonstrate the merit of petitioner's
plea that it performs governmental and not proprietary functions. As originally established by Republic Act No.
2265,   its purposes and objectives were set forth thus: "(a) To promote the effective merchandising of Virginia
12

tobacco in the domestic and foreign markets so that those engaged in the industry will be placed on a basis of
economic security; (b) To establish and maintain balanced production and consumption of Virginia tobacco and
its manufactured products, and such marketing conditions as will insure and stabilize the price of a level
sufficient to cover the cost of production plus reasonable profit both in the local as well as in the foreign market;
(c) To create, establish, maintain, and operate processing, warehousing and marketing facilities in suitable
centers and supervise the selling and buying of Virginia tobacco so that the farmers will enjoy reasonable
prices that secure a fair return of their investments; (d) To prescribe rules and regulations governing the
grading, classifying, and inspecting of Virginia tobacco; and (e) To improve the living and economic conditions
of the people engaged in the tobacco industry."   The amendatory statute, Republic Act No. 4155,   renders
13 14

even more evident its nature as a governmental agency. Its first section on the declaration of policy reads: "It is
declared to be the national policy, with respect to the local Virginia tobacco industry, to encourage the
production of local Virginia tobacco of the qualities needed and in quantities marketable in both domestic and
foreign markets, to establish this industry on an efficient and economic basis, and, to create a climate
conducive to local cigarette manufacture of the qualities desired by the consuming public, blending imported
and native Virginia leaf tobacco to improve the quality of locally manufactured cigarettes."   The objectives are
15

set forth thus: "To attain this national policy the following objectives are hereby adopted: 1. Financing; 2.
Marketing; 3. The disposal of stocks of the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) and the Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration (PVTA) at the best obtainable prices and conditions in order that a reinvigorated
Virginia tobacco industry may be established on a sound basis; and 4. Improving the quality of locally
manufactured cigarettes through blending of imported and native Virginia leaf tobacco; such importation with
corresponding exportation at a ratio of one kilo of imported to four kilos of exported Virginia tobacco, purchased
by the importer-exporter from the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration."  16

It is thus readily apparent from a cursory perusal of such statutory provisions why petitioner can rightfully
invoke the doctrine announced in the leading Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration
decision   and why the objection of private respondents with its overtones of the distinction between constituent
17

and ministrant functions of governments as set forth in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation   if futile. The
18

irrelevance of such a distinction considering the needs of the times was clearly pointed out by the present Chief
Justice, who took note, speaking of the reconstituted Agricultural Credit Administration, that functions of that
sort "may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from
"ministrant"),such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating
property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political
duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and not merely
to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people — these latter functions being ministrant, the
exercise of which is optional on the part of the government."   Nonetheless, as he explained so persuasively:
19

"The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the
functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private
enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it
was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals",
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must
undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost
everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of
course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its
declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice."   Thus was laid to rest the doctrine
20

in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation,   based on the Wilsonian classification of the tasks incumbent on
21

government into constituent and ministrant in accordance with the laissez faire principle. That concept, then
dominant in economics, was carried into the governmental sphere, as noted in a textbook on political
science,   the first edition of which was published in 1898, its author being the then Professor, later American
22

President, Woodrow Wilson. He took pains to emphasize that what was categorized by him as constituent
functions had its basis in a recognition of what was demanded by the "strictest [concept of] laissez faire, [as
they] are indeed the very bonds of society."   The other functions he would minimize as ministrant or optional.
23

It is a matter of law that in the Philippines, the laissez faire principle hardly commanded the authoritative
position which at one time it held in the United States. As early as 1919, Justice Malcolm in Rubi v. Provincial
Board   could affirm: "The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
24

economic and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown a widespread belief in the
amplest possible demonstration of government activity."   The 1935 Constitution, as was indicated earlier,
25

continued that approach. As noted in Edu v. Ericta:  "What is more, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional
26

Convention saw to it that the concept of laissez-faire was rejected. It entrusted to our government the
responsibility of coping with social and economic problems with the commensurate power of control over
economic affairs. Thereby it could live up to its commitment to promote the general welfare through state
action."   Nor did the opinion in Edu stop there: "To repeat, our Constitution which took effect in 1935 erased
27

whatever doubts there might be on that score. Its philosophy is a repudiation of laissez-faire. One of the leading
members of the Constitutional Convention, Manuel A. Roxas, later the first President of the Republic, made it
clear when he disposed of the objection of Delegate Jose Reyes of Sorsogon, who noted the "vast extensions
in the sphere of governmental functions" and the "almost unlimited power to interfere in the affairs of industry
and agriculture as well as to compete with existing business" as "reflections of the fascination exerted by [the
then] current tendencies' in other jurisdictions. He spoke thus: "My answer is that this constitution has a definite
and well defined philosophy, not only political but social and economic.... If in this Constitution the gentlemen
will find declarations of economic policy they are there because they are necessary to safeguard the interest
and welfare of the Filipino people because we believe that the days have come when in self-defense, a nation
may provide in its constitution those safeguards, the patrimony, the freedom to grow, the freedom to develop
national aspirations and national interests, not to be hampered by the artificial boundaries which a
constitutional provision automatically imposes."  28

It would be then to reject what was so emphatically stressed in the Agricultural Credit Administration decision
about which the observation was earlier made that it reflected the philosophy of the 1935 Constitution and is
even more in consonance with the expanded role of government accorded recognition in the present Charter if
the plea of petitioner that it discharges governmental function were not heeded. That path this Court is not
prepared to take. That would be to go backward, to retreat rather than to advance. Nothing can thus be clearer
than that there is no constitutional obstacle to a government pursuing lines of endeavor, formerly reserved for
private enterprise. This is one way, in the language of Laski, by which through such activities, "the harsh
contract which [does] obtain between the levels of the rich and the poor" may be minimized.   It is a response
29

to a trend noted by Justice Laurel in Calalang v. Williams   for the humanization of laws and the promotion of
30

the interest of all component elements of society so that man's innate aspirations, in what was so felicitously
termed by the First Lady as "a compassionate society" be attained.  31

2. The success that attended the efforts of petitioner to be adjudged as performing governmental rather than
proprietary functions cannot militate against respondent Court assuming jurisdiction over this labor dispute. So
it was mentioned earlier. As far back as Tabora v. Montelibano,   this Court, speaking through Justice Padilla,
32

declared: The NARIC was established by the Government to protect the people against excessive or
unreasonable rise in the price of cereals by unscrupulous dealers. With that main objective there is no reason
why its function should not be deemed governmental. The Government owes its very existence to that aim and
purpose — to protect the people."   In a subsequent case, Naric Worker's Union v. Hon. Alvendia,   decided
33 34

four years later, this Court, relying on Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Tan,   which specified the
35

cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations, included among which is one that
involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, ruled that it is precisely respondent Court and
not ordinary courts that should pass upon that particular labor controversy. For Justice J. B. L. Reyes, the
ponente, the fact that there were judicial as well as administrative and executive pronouncements to the effect
that the Naric was performing governmental functions did not suffice to confer competence on the then
respondent Judge to issue a preliminary injunction and to entertain a complaint for damages, which as pointed
out by the labor union, was connected with an unfair labor practice. This is emphasized by the dispositive
portion of the decision: "Wherefore, the restraining orders complained of, dated May 19, 1958 and May 27,
1958, are set aside, and the complaint is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the National Rice and Corn
Corporation's seeking whatever remedy it is entitled to in the Court of Industrial Relations."   Then, too, in a
36

case involving petitioner itself, Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration,   where the point in dispute was
37

whether it was respondent Court or a court of first instance that is possessed of competence in a declaratory
relief petition for the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, one that could readily be thought of as
pertaining to the judiciary, the answer was that "unless the law speaks clearly and unequivocally, the choice
should fall on the Court of Industrial Relations."   Reference to a number of decisions which recognized in the
38

then respondent Court the jurisdiction to determine labor controversies by government-owned or controlled
corporations lends to support to such an approach.   Nor could it be explained only on the assumption that
39

proprietary rather than governmental functions did call for such a conclusion. It is to be admitted that such a
view was not previously bereft of plausibility. With the aforecited Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration decision rendering obsolete the Bacani doctrine, it has, to use a Wilsonian phrase, now lapsed
into "innocuous desuetude."   Respondent Court clearly was vested with jurisdiction.
40

3. The contention of petitioner that the Eight-Hour Labor Law   does not apply to it hardly deserves any
41

extended consideration. There is an air of casualness in the way such an argument was advanced in its petition
for review as well as in its brief. In both pleadings, it devoted less than a full page to its discussion. There is
much to be said for brevity, but not in this case. Such a terse and summary treatment appears to be a reflection
more of the inherent weakness of the plea rather than the possession of an advocate's enviable talent for
concision. It did cite Section 2 of the Act, but its very language leaves no doubt that "it shall apply to all persons
employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private ... ."   Nor are private respondents included
42

among the employees who are thereby barred from enjoying the statutory benefits. It cited Marcelo v.
Philippine National Red Cross   and Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Araos.  Certainly, the activities to which
43 44

the two above public corporations devote themselves can easily be distinguished from that engaged in by
petitioner. A reference to the pertinent sections of both Republic Acts 2265 and 2155 on which it relies to obtain
a ruling as to its governmental character should render clear the differentiation that exists. If as a result of the
appealed order, financial burden would have to be borne by petitioner, it has only itself to blame. It need not
have required private respondents to render overtime service. It can hardly be surmised that one of its chief
problems is paucity of personnel. That would indeed be a cause for astonishment. It would appear, therefore,
that such an objection based on this ground certainly cannot suffice for a reversal. To repeat, respondent Court
must be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Order of March 21, 1970 and the Resolution of respondent Court en banc of May
8, 1970 denying a motion for reconsideration are hereby affirmed. The last sentence of the Order of March 21,
1970 reads as follows: "To find how much each of them [private respondents] is entitled under this judgment,
the Chief of the Examining Division, or any of his authorized representative, is hereby directed to make a
reexamination of records, papers and documents in the possession of respondent PVTA pertinent and proper
under the premises and to submit his report of his findings to the Court for further disposition thereof."
Accordingly, as provided by the New Labor Code, this case is referred to the National Labor Relations
Commission for further proceedings conformably to law. No costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, JJ., took no part.
Teehankee J., is on leave.
1 L-21484, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 649.
2 Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172, 182.
3 It suffices to note the more detailed provisions on social justice and protection to labor in
Article II of the Constitution and the categorical requirement in Section 12 of Article XIV that
the State "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the
tenant from the bondage of the soil and achieving the goals enunciated in this Constitution."
4 Cf. Laski, The State in Theory and Practice 269 (1935).1äwphï1.ñët

5 Com. Act No. 444 (1939).

6 Cf. Petition, par. V.
7 Cf. Ibid, par. VI,
8 Cf. lbid, par. VIII.
9 Cf. Ibid, par. IX.
10 Cf. Ibid, pars X-XII.
11 Commonwealth Act No. 444 as amended by the Eight-Hour Labor Law. It was approved on
June 20, 1959.
12 It was approved and took effect on June 19, 1959.
13 Commonwealth Act No. 2265, Section 2.
14 It was approved and took effect on June 20, 1964.
15 Republic Act No. 4155, Section 1.
16 Ibid, Section 2.
17 L-21484, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 649.
18 100 Phil. 468 (1956).
19 30 SCRA 649, 661-662.
20 Ibid, 662.
21 100 Phil. 468 (1956).
22 The State (1898).
23 Ibid, 42.
24 39 Phil. 660.
25 Ibid, 717-718.
26 L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481.
27 Ibid, 491.
28 Ibid, 491-492.
29 Laski, op. cit, 75.
30 70 Phil. 726 (1940).
31 Cf. Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Air Lines Employees Association, L-24626, June
28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489 and Almira v. B. F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc., L-34974, July 25,
1974, 58 SCRA 120.
32 98 Phil. 800 (1956).
33 Ibid, 806.
34 107 Phil. 404 (1960).
35 99 Phil. 854 (1956).
36 Ibid, 411.
37 Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration v. Judge Honorato B. Masakayan, L-29538,
November 29, 1972, 48 SCRA 187.
38 Ibid, 191.
39 Cf. Price Stabilization Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-14613, Nov. 30, 1962, 6
SCRA 745; National Development Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-15422, Nov. 30,
1962, 6 SCRA 763; Manila Railroad Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-18389, Jan. 31,
1963, 7 SCRA 174; Insular Sugar Refining Corp. v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19247,
May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 270; National Shipyards and Steel Corp. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-17874, Aug. 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 781; Manila Railroad Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, L-17871, Jan. 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 120; National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority v. NWSA Consolidated Unions, L-18938, Aug. 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 766; National
Shipyards and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-20838, July 30, 1965, 14
SCRA 755; Government Service Insurance System v. Olase, L-19988, Jan. 5, 1967, 19 SCRA
1; National Shipyards and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-21675, May 23,
1967, 20 SCRA 134; National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Consolidated
Union, L-26894, Feb. 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 227; Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing
Administration v. Confederation of Unions, L-21484, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 649; National
Power Corporation v. National Power Corporation Employees and Workers Association L-
26169, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 806; Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Employees Association
v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-34688, Aug. 30, 1972 46 SCRA 754; National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Consolidated Union, L-32019, Oct. 26, 1973, 53 SCRA
432. .
40 There are overtones of the Bacani doctrine in SSS Employees Association v. Soriano, L-
18081, November 18, 1963, 9 SCRA 511 and GSIS v. GSIS Employees Association, L-
17185, February 28, 1964, 10 SCRA 269. It should be obvious that to the extent that they
relied on the distinction between constituent and ministrant functions, they are now, in the
language of Frankfurter, "derelicts in the sea of constitutional law."
41 Commonwealth Act No. 444.
42 The relevant portion of Section 2 of Com. Act No. 444 reads as follows: "This Act shall
apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with
the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, managerial
employees, outside sales personnel, domestic servants, persons in the personal service of
another and members of the family of the employer working for him."
43 101 Phil. 545 (1957).
44 102 Phil. 1080 (1958).