ENGINEERING DISASTERS

ADVANCED CIVIL AND ENVIRONMENT ENGINEERING

Taufiq (10-8705-601-88)

Master Degree Course

Faculty of Civil and Environment Engineering

YAMAGUCHI UNIVERSITY
2010

I. BHOPAL DISASTER

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The Bhopal disaster was an industrial catastrophe that took place at a pesticide plant owned and
operated by Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh - India on December
3rd, 1984. Around 12 a.m, the plant released Methyl IsoCyanate (MIC) gas and other toxins,
resulting in the exposure of morethan 520.000 people.

During the night of December 2–3, 1984, large amounts of water entered tank 610, containing 42
tonnes of methyl isocyanate (MIC). The resulting exothermic reaction increased the temperature
inside the tank to over 200°C (392 °F), raising the pressure to a level the tank was not designed to
withstand. This forced the emergency venting of pressure from the MIC holding tank, releasing a
large volume of toxic gases into the atmosphere. The reaction sped up because of the presence of
iron in corroding non-stainless steel pipelines. A mixture of poisonous gases flooded the city of
Bhopal, causing great panic as people woke up with a burning sensation in their lungs. Apart from
MIC, the gas cloud contained poisonous gases such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, carbon
monoxide, hydrogen chloride, oxides of nitrogen, MonoMethyl Amine (MMA) and carbon dioxide,
either produced in the storage tank or in the atmosphere. Thousands of people died immediately
from the effects of the gas and many were trampled in the panic.

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 Picture 1. Union Carbide MIC Plant after Tragedy (Source: Wikipedia)

Health Effects
 The initial effects of exposure were coughing, vomiting, severe eye irritation and a feeling of
suffocation.
 The acute symptoms were burning in the respiratory tract and eyes, blepharospasm,
breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting.
 The causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory collapse and pulmonary oedema.
 Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs but also cerebral oedema,
tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty degeneration of the liver and necrotizing enteritis.
 The mortality rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by 200 %.
 Birth defects among children born to affected women.
 There were several other effects such as respiratory difficulties, immune and neurological
disorders, cardiac failure secondary to lung injury and female reproductive difficulties.

The number of people affected is more than 520.000. The Tragedy killed 4.000 immediately,
10.000 within 72 hours and more than 25.000 have died since then. All leaves yellowed and fell off
within 72 hours and also water got contaminated.

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 Picture 2. Victims of Bhopal Gas Tragedy

What caused the disaster

Factors leading to this huge gas leak include:
 The use of hazardous chemicals (MIC) just for the sake of cost saving
 Storing these chemicals in large tanks instead of over 200 steel drums.
 Possible corroding material in pipelines
 Poor maintenance after the plant ceased production in the early 1980s
 Poor training of factory staff
 Failure of several safety systems (due to poor maintenance and regulations)
 Safety systems being switched off to save money - including the MIC tank refrigeration
system which alone would have prevented the disaster
 Negligence of safety standards by UCIL, even after several warnings by employee unions
 The problem was then made worse by the plant's location near a densely populated area, non-
existent catastrophe plans and shortcomings in health care and socioeconomic rehabilitation

Aftermath
The Central and State Governments tried to provide medical facilities, food and water supplies to
affected people. The effort was far inadequate compare to the real requirement. Foods were
distributed only for short period. Government was unable to provide victims proper rehabilitation.
Widows were granted a mere Rs. 200 per month as pension. After a long trialed case against UCC,
a dismal sum of $470 million (insurance sum plus interest) was paid by UCC in full and final
settlement of its civil and criminal liabilities, that too in year 1999. In 2001 Dow Chemical
Company (DCC) acquired UCC. DCC believes that all the liabilities of UCC have been fulfilled
and now there is no responsibility left for DCC. Lack of political willpower has led to a stalemate
on the issue of cleaning up the plant and its environs of hundreds of tonnes of toxic waste, which
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has been left untouched. Environmentalists have warned that the waste is a potential minefield in
the heart of the city, and the resulting contamination may lead to decades of slow poisoning, and
diseases affecting the nervous system, liver and kidneys in humans. According to activists, there
are studies showing that the rates of cancer and other ailments are high in the region. Activists have
demanded that DCC clean up this toxic waste, and have pressed the government of India to demand
more money from DCC.

II. TETON DAM FAILURE

Design and Construction

The Teton Dam was located on the Teton River, three miles northeast of Newdale - Idaho. It was
established to provide recreation, flood control, power generation, and irrigation for over 40,000
hectares (100,000 acres) of farmland. The Office of Design and Construction, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation (USBR), at the Denver Federal Center, designed the dam and the construction
contract was awarded to the team of Morrison-Knudsen-Kiewit in December of 1971.

The preparations for this dam project had been underway for many years. The first active site
investigation in the area occurred in 1932 (Teton Dam Failure @ 2002).　Between 1946 and 1961,
eight alternate sites within about 16 km of the selected site were investigated. Between 1961 and
1970, approximately 100 borings were taken at the site (Independent Panel, 1976).

The design of the foundation consisted of four basic elements: 1). 21 meter deep, steep-sided key
trenches on the abutments above the elevation of 1,550 meters, 2). a cutoff trench to rock below the
elevation of 1,550 meters; 3). a continuous grout curtain along the entire foundation; and 4). the
excavation of rock under the abutments (Independent Panel, 1976). These elements for the
foundation were important because the types of rock located in this area, basalt and rhyolite, are not
generally considered acceptable for structural foundations.

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The embankment itself consisted of five main zones. Zone 1 was the impervious center core, which
formed the water barrier of the dam. Zone 2 overlaid Zone 1 and extended downstream to provide a
layer to control seepage through the foundation. Zone 3 was downstream and its main function was
to provide structural stability. Zone 4 consisted of the storage areas downstream from the control
structure and the temporary enclosures built to permit the work to be done. Finally, Zone 5 was the
rockfill in the outer parts of the embankment (Independent Panel, 1976).

Figure 3. The details figure of Teton Dam construction

Construction of the dam began in February 1972 and the embankment would have a maximum
height of 93 meters above the riverbed and would form a reservoir of 356 million cubic meters
(288,000 acre-feet) when filled to the top. The dam was closed and began storing water on October
3, 1975, but the river outlet works tunnel and the auxiliary outlet works tunnel were not opened
(Arthur, 1977).

Due to these sections being incomplete, the water was rising at a rate of about 1 meter (3 feet) per
day, which was higher than the predetermined goal rate of 0.3 to 0.6 meters (1 to 2 feet) per day for
the first year, as set by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. However, the increased rate was expected,
due to the tunnels being incomplete, and considered acceptable by the Bureau of Reclamation as
long as seepage and the water table downstream of the dam were measured more frequently
(Independent Panel, 1976).

The Failure
On June 3, 1976 several small seepages were noticed in the north abutment wall. This led to more
frequent inspections of the dam. It was now to be inspected daily, and readings were to be taken
twice weekly instead of once a week. On June 4, 1976 wetness was noticed in the right abutment
and small springs were beginning to appear (Independent Panel, 1976).

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On June 5, 1976 the first major leak was noticed between 7:30 and 8:00 a.m. The leak was flowing
at about 500 to 800 liters per second
(20 to 30 cfs) from rock in the right
abutment. By 9:00 a.m. the flow had
increased to 1,100 to 1,400 liters per
second (40 to 50 cfs) and seepage had
been observed about 40 meters (130
feet) below the crest of the dam
(Arthur, 1977).

Picture 4. The first major leak in Teton Dam construction

Approach Bridge Construction

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 At 11:00 a.m. a whirlpool was observed
in the reservoir directly upstream from
the dam and four bulldozers were sent
to try to push riprap into the sinkhole
near the dam crest (Independent Panel,
1976). Two of the bulldozers were
swallowed up by the rapidly expanding
hole, and the operators were pulled to
safety by ropes tied around their waists
(Teton Dam
PictureFlood @ nature
5. Turbid 2002).of outflow along the abutment
construction Approach Bridge Construction

The hole continues to enlarge and rise toward the crest of the right abutment. This is happen about
11.50 am. Then, dam crest beginning to breach at 11.55 am and maximum flood discharge

emanating from gap in dam`s right abutment, just after noon on June 5 th, 1976.

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 Picture 6. Dam crest beginning to breach

Investigating Panel and Results

Following the failure, the Governor of Idaho and the Secretary of the Interior selected an
independent panel to review the cause of the failure. This independent panel was made up of
prominent civil and geotechnical engineers including Wallace L. Chadwick, a former president of
the ASCE, and eminent geotechnical engineers Ralph B. Peck, H. Bolton Seed, and Arthur
Casagrande. The panel began work almost immediately and issued its report in December, 1976
(Independent Panel, 1976).

The panel considered all possible causes of failure and tried to establish the sequence of events
leading to the failure. During the investigation, conditions favoring erosion and piping were
evaluated. Levy and Salvadori (1992) define piping as “the development of tubular leak-causing
cavities.”

One of the first possible mechanisms considered was increased settling of the structure under the
weight of the structure and the water, which would have led to cracking. It was determined that this
did not contribute to the failure, because the tunnel below the spillway would also have been
cracked. Furthermore, earthen dams are relatively flexible and tolerant of differential settlements.
The failure hypotheses eliminated included seismic activity, reservoir leakage, and seepage around
the end of the grout curtain, as well as differential settlement.

Condition favorable for erosion and piping existed in Zone 1, where the primary materials were
highly erodible silts. Wherever this material was subject to flowing water it could be attacked and
washed away. This contact could have occurred in three different possible ways. First, seepage
through the material could have caused backward erosion. This was determined not to play a major
role in the failure since this process occurs very slowly. Second, erosion by direct contact could
have occurred where water was in contact with open joints and thirdly, where there was direct
contact through cracks in the fill itself. It was determined that these last two were possible and were
probably occurring simultaneously (Independent Panel, 1976).

The key trench contained a grout cap overlying a grout curtain that was intended to stop the flow,
but the investigation found openings and windows in the grout curtain near the failure section. The

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review panel also found that the construction of the grout curtain differed from the original design.
The intended grouting procedure was to first grout the row of holes downstream, then grout the row
of holes upstream, and then grout the center row of holes. This procedure was not followed during
construction and the closure between the two outer rows, the center row of grout, was not made.
Also, the spacing between the holes was not as specified and gaps were more likely to be present
(Independent Panel, 1976). However, there is no way to determine if that had an impact on the
erosion. Another impact on the erosion was that the topography near the key trench showed that the
foundation was probably poorly compacted, which meant more rapid erosion could occur (Arthur,
1977).

Another cause of failure investigated was hydraulic fracturing near the leaks in the dam. Hydraulic
fracturing causes cracking when the sum of the normal and tensile stresses exceeds the porewater
pressure. It was determined that due to the cracks that had already existed, the pressure beneath the
key trench was less than full reservoir pressure. In other words, due to the fact that the grout curtain
was not fully effective, the failure was probably not due to hydraulic fracturing. However,
hydraulic fracturing may have been a factor in the initial breaching of the key trench fill
(Independent Panel, 1976).

Another factor was the poor compaction of the aeolian silt fill material. It was compacted at less
than the optimum moisture content. The “material, as compacted in the dam, permitted continuous
erosion channels (pipes) to be formed in the core without any evidence of their existence becoming
visible” (Independent Panel, 1976).

III. Lessons Learned

Bhopal Disaster
These days we hear a lot about growing economy, spreading businesses, surging profits, expanding
industries, shrinking distances, and improving life styles. But what about social responsibilities,
humanity, duties towards environment. What about the basic right of very human being, which is to
live, whether he is rich or poor. The focus is on earning profits, not earning pleasure or happiness.
The aim is to earn status not respect. The whole tragedy happened because of the profit oriented
outlook of the company and ignorance of safety standards. The cost saving approach costed
thousands of lives. And this outlook has not changed even today rather intensified. Every now and
then we hear about violation of human rights, child labor etc. Who is responsible for this one,
certainly is the society. Our criterion for measurement of success is money not happiness. Everyone
follows the herd mentality even without where they are heading to, where the society is leading to,
what are the implications of industrial and business activities. This Tragedy is still in the memory

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of public because of its huge toll. But society does not remember those numerous accidents and ill-
effects of industrialization that happen daily at small scale. The atmosphere is getting severely
polluted; the water of rivers is no more drinkable. Every now or then we hear about a new disease.
The government compensation can’t bring life for a dead. Money can’t buy happiness. Think about
our responsibilities, our duties towards next generation. It is high time to act for the betterment of
planet earth.

Teton Dam Failure

The lessons learned from this case may be divided into two categories. In addition to the technical
aspects of the failure, professional and procedural factors also influenced the course of events. The
lessons learned also have implications for engineering education.

 Technical Aspects
The design of Teton Dam did not provide for downstream defense against cracking or leakage,
and did not ensure sealing of the upper part of the rock under the grout cap. The dam and
foundation were not instrumented sufficiently to warn of changing conditions.

 Professional/Procedural Aspects
At the first sign of a problem the people at the dam site informed the Bureau of Reclamation.
The Bureau did not immediately inform the public due to fear of panic and there were initially
no signs of imminent danger, but the public was warned about 45 minutes before the collapse
(Arthur, 1977). It was determined that the people involved acted responsibly and were not
punished for their involvement.

 Educational Aspects
This case demonstrates the importance of engineering geology and geotechnical engineering
for civil engineering students. Engineering geology is important for evaluation of the
suitability of foundation and borrow or fill materials. In the design and construction of earth
dams, it is necessary to select proper materials that are sufficiently resistant to piping and to
ensure that they are compacted to the proper density. The design should incorporated adequate
defense against cracking and leakage. Finally, dams must have sufficient instrumentation to
provide early warning of piping and impending failure

IV. Opinion as a Government Employee

A disaster is the tragedy of a natural or human made hazard (situation which poses a threat to life,
health, property, or environment) that negatively affects society or environment. From the example
of disasters above, they can be defined as human-made disaster which are caused by human action,
negligence, or involving the failure of a system. Bhopal tragedy and Teton Dam failure are

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technological disasters which are the results of failure technology that created as the consequence
of inappropriately managed risk.

No country can afford to ignore the lessons of Bhopal Tragedy and Teton Dam failure. Government
must concern for the devastating and increasing impact of natural and man-made disasters on
human lives, infrastructure and economies. Government at the national, regional dan international
levels should have an action to strengthen disaster management through increased capacity for
disaster preparedness, early warning systems, risk mitigation and post disaster recovery and
reconstruction. Though it may not be feasible to control nature and to stop the development of
natural phenomena but the efforts be made to avoid disasters and alleviate their effects on human
lives, infrastructure and property.

However, it is possible to reduce the impact of disaster by adopting suitable disaster mitigation
strategies. The disaster mitigation works that published by the government is a systemic work
which involves with different regions, different professions and different scientific fields, and has
become an important measure for human, society and nature sustainable development.

References:
- Arthur, H.G. (1977). “Teton Dam Failure”. The Evaluation of Dam Safety: Engineering Foundation
Conference Proceedings, ASCE, New York, New York, 61-71
- Independent Panel to Review Cause of Teton Dam Failure (1976). Report to the U.S. Department of the
Interior and State of Idaho on Failure of Teton Dam. Idaho Falls, Idaho. December 1976
- Macauley, D. (2000). Building Big, Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, New York.
- “Teton Dam Disaster.” Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Government Operations House of
Representatives, 94th Congress, Second Session, August, 5, 6, and 31, 1976
- Levy, Matthys, and Salvadori, Mario (1992). Why Buildings Fall Down. W. W. Norton & Company, New
York, N. Y.
- U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Pacific Northwest Region, (1983)   Teton Basic Project, Lower Teton
Division; Idaho; Fremont, Madison and Teton Counties.
- West, Terry R. (1995) “Geology Applied to Engineering,” Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
- U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, dam web site http://www.pn.usbr.gov/dams/Teton.shtml
- “The Failure of Teton Dam,” U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, News Release (online) available 6/5/2001
(2001). < http://www.pn.usbr.gov/news/01new/dcoped.html>
- “Teton Dam Failure” (2002). <http://www.geol.ucsb.edu/~arthur/Teton%20Dam/welcome_dam.html>
- “Teton Dam Flood” (2002). <http://www.ida.net/users/elaine/idgenweb/flood.htm> (Dec. 23, 2002) -
Survivor's account

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