1. Apex Mining Co. v.

Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp

GR. No. 152613 & 152628, June 23, 2006
Doctrines:
(1) For a contract of agency to exist, it is essential that the principal consents that
the other party, the agent, shall act on its behalf, and the agent consents so as to act.
(2) Elements of agency, viz:
a. consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship;
b. the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person;
c. the agent acts as a representative and not for himself;
d. the agent acts within the scope of his authority.

Facts:
-Feb 27 1931-Proclamation no. 369 was issued (by Gov. Gen. Dwight Davis)
It establish Agusan-Davao-Surigao forest reserve.
-the disputed land is a rich tract of mineral land located at Monkayo Davao del Norte
and Cateel Davao Oriental, later known as the Diwalwal Gold Rush Area.
-Camilo Banad and his group, filed a Declaration of Location for six mining claims
over the area. They then pooled their resources and organized the Balite Communal
Portal Mining Coop.
-1983- Apex mining corp. entered into operating agreements with Balite.
-1984- Marcopper Mining Corp filed 16 DoLs for areas adjacent to the area of Balite
but after realizing that the area is a forest reserve the same abandoned the DoLs and
instead filed for prospecting permit with the BFD, which was then issued to MMC. The
permit covers the area claimed by Apex and other individual mining claimants.
-1986- Exploration Permit 133 was issued by BMG after its application in 1985 by
MMC.
-May 1986- MMC filed a petition for the cancellation of the mining claims of Apex
and other small scale mining permit. It alleges that the areas covered by EP 133 and
the mining claims of Apex is within a forest reserve under the above proclamation and
that acquisition of mining rights to the same is through a prospect permit from BFD and
not through DoLs from BMG.
-Apex filed a motion to dismiss petition.
--BMG- dismissed MMC’s petition and sustained the validity of Apex’s mining claims
-MMC appealed to be DENR
--DENR- reversed the decision of BMG and declared MMC’s EP 133 as valid and
subsisting.
-Apex filed a motion for reconsideration but the same has been denied.
-Apex appealed before the Office of the President.
--OP dismissed Apex’s appeal
- Apex filed a petition for certiorari with the SC.
--SC resolved the issue against Apex, ruling that the land was a forest reserve
therefore the permit to be taken is the prospecting permit from BFD and not DoLs from
BMG.
-1991 DAO 66 was issued declaring the areas covered by Agusan-Davao-Surigao
Forest reserve as non-forest lands and open to small scale mining purposes. With that

Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
several mining entities filed applications for Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
(MPSA).
-1993 MISSMA filed an MPSA application but the same was denied by BMG on
the grounds that the area applied for is within the area covered by MMC’s EP 133 and
that MISSMA is not qualified to the same under DAO 82.
-1994, Villaflor filed a petition for cancellation of EP 133 and for the admission of
their MPSA.
-On the same year, MMC assigned EP 133 to SEM herein petitioner, allegedly to
be 100% owned subsidiary of MMC.
-SEM filed an application for an MPSA and the same was accepted.
-other adverse claimants filed an opposition to the registration of SEM’s MPSA.
-A Panel of Arbitrators was constituted by DENR to resolve the issue.
--PA ruled that EP 133 assigned to SEM is valid and subsisting.
-adverse claimants appealed to the Mines Adjudication Board (MAB).
--MAB vacated the ruling of PA but still SEM to comply form its application but
there was also exclusion of land covered by their application.
-both parties appealed to the SC.
--SC remanded the case to the CA for proper disposition.
--CA affirmed in toto the decision MAB and declared that SEM was an agent of
MMC and that therefore concludes that the transfer of EP 133 is valid. It also deemed
EP 133 as subsisting although the same have already expired for the reason that it was
transferred to SEM prior to such expiration.
-Apex and other claimants appealed to the SC.
-in the pendency of appeal, Pres. GMA issued Proc. No. 297, ordering the
stoppage of mining activity in diwalwal.

Issues:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity and
continuous existence of EP 133 as well as its transfer to SEM;

Held:
The SC ruled that there is no evidence showing that SEM is the duly authorized
agent of MMC, SEM didn’t even claim or submit proof that it is the designated agent of
MMC to represent the latter in its business dealings and undertakings. It goes without
saying then that the transfer or assignment of the permit in favor of SEM is null and void
being that it contravenes the terms and conditions of the grant of EP 133.

3. Rallos v. Go Chan
GR. No. L-24332, Jan. 31, 1978

Facts:
Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
 It is a case about an agent who sold the undivided share of his principal after the
death of the latter. Simeon Rallos was given a special power of attorney by his
sisters, Concepcion and Gerundia Rallos, to sell for and in their behalf lot no. 5983.
On March 3, 1955, Concepcion died.
Subsequently, Simeon, sold the undivided shares of his sisters in lot no. 5983 to
Felix Go Chan & Sons Realty Corp. The deed of sale was registered in the Registry
of Deeds of Cebu.
On May 18, 1956, Ramon Rallos, the administrator of the intestate estate of
Concepcion, filed a complaint praying that the sale of the undivided share of
Concepcion in lot no. 5983 be declared unenforceable and said share be
reconveyed to her estate and that the Cert. of Title issued to Go Chan be cancelled
and another title be issued in the names of the corporation and the estate of
Concepcion.
The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of Ramon Rallos, declaring the sale
null and void insofar as the undivided share of Concepcion is concerned.
Go Chan appealed to the CA, which then reversed the trial court decision
declaring that the sale of the lot in question is valid.
Ramon Rallos moved for reconsideration but the same was denied

Issues:
Is the general rule provided for in Article 1919 that the death of the principal or of
the agent extinguishes the agency, subject to any exception, and if so, is the instant
case within that exception?

Held:
(1)The rule is that any act of an agent after the death of his principal is void ab initio
unless the same falls under the exceptions provided for in Articles 1930 & 1931.
Article 1931 is the applicable law. Under this provision, an act done by the agent
after the death of his principal is valid and effective only under two conditions, viz:
(1) that the agent acted without knowledge of the death of the principal, and
(2) that the third person who contracted with the agent himself acted in good faith.
Good faith here means that the third person was not aware of the death of the principal
at the time he contracted with said agent.
These two requisites must concur: the absence of one will render the act of the
agent invalid unenforceable.

Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
 4. Caram v. Laureta
GR. No. L-28740, Feb. 24, 1981

Facts:
On 1945, Marcos Mata conveyed to Laureta a large tract of agricultural land. The
deed of absolute sale in favor of Laureta was not registered because it was not
acknowledged before a notary public or any other authorized officer, the reason for the
latter cause, being that the civil government of Tagum, Davao was not yet organized.
-However, Marcos Mata delivered to Laureta the peaceful and lawful possession of the
land together with the pertinent papers thereof such as the Original Cert. of Title and
others.
- June 10, 1945- Laureta has been in (OCENPO) of the said land, and that he is paying
realty taxes due and introduced improvements thereon.
-May 5, 1947- same land was sold by Marcos Mata to Carman Jr. petitioner herein.
-The deed of sale in favor of petitioner was acknowledged before Atty. Aportadera.
-Subsequently, Mata, through Attys. Aportadera and Arcilla filed for the issuance of new
owner’s duplicate of OCT, alleging that they loss the title in Tagum, Davao, which then
resulted to the issuance of the new title by the ROD through the order of the court,
which then declares the lost title as null and void.
-1947- the sale to Caram Jr. was registered in the RoD and a TCT was issued in favor
of Caram Jr.
- June 25, 1959, respondent filed an action for nullity, recovery of ownership and/or
reconveyance against Marcos, Caram Jr. and the RoD.
- defendants Marcos and Caram Jr. filed an answer separately to the complaint and
added their counterclaims thereon.
--Trial Court- ruled in favor of the plaintiff and declared null and void the sale made to
Caram Jr.
-Defendants appeal the decision to the CA.
--CA – affirmed the decision of the trial court.
-Petitioner then assailed the trial court findings that the second sale of the property was
made through his representatives, Irespe and Aportadera.
-Petitioner contends that Irespe is merely a broker with the specific task and duty to pay
Mata the amount of 10,000 for the property and to ensure that Mata executes the deed
of sale, and that Aportadera merely acted as notary public in the execution of the deed
of sale.

Issues:
Whether or not Irespe and Aportadera were agents of Caram for the purpose of
buying the subject property?

Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
 Held:
Yes, the facts show that

YES. The facts show that Mata and Caram had never met. During the trial Mata
testified that he knew Aportadera but he did not know Caram. Thus, the sale of the
property could only have been through Caram’s representatives, Irespe and
Aportadera.
Even if Irespe and Aportadera did not have actual knowledge of the first sale, still
their actions have not satisfied the requirement of good faith. In the instant Case,
Irespe and Aportadera had knowledge of circumstances which ought to have put
them on inquiry. Both of them knew that Mata’s OCT together with other papers
pertaining to the land were taken by Laureta.
There is no doubt then that Irespe and Aportadera, acting as agents of Caram,
purchased the property of Mata in bad faith. Applying the principle of agency, Caram
as principal, should also be deemed to have acted in bad faith.

5. Air France v. CA
GR. No. L-57339, Dec.29, 1983

Facts:
-Feb. 1970, Jose Gana and his family purchased from Air France through
Imperial travels Inc., a duly authorized travel agent, 9 open-dated air passage tickets for
the Manila/Osaka/Tokyo/Manila route. They paid the tickets at the prevailing rate of
P3.90 per US$1.00 as well as taxes.
- April 24, 1970, Air France substituted the mentioned tickets with other ticket of
the same route and the same were to expire on May 8, 1971.
- However, they did not depart on May 8, 1970
-Jan. 1971- John sought the help of Tersita Manucdoc for the extension of the
validity of the said tickets. Teresita then enlisted the help of Lee Ella and the latter then
ultimately ask the help of the office manager of Air France for the extension of validity of
the said tickets.
-The said office manager informed Ella of the impossibility of extension unless
fare differentials and the increased travel tax first be paid. The latter informed Teresita
of the same.
- The Ganas had scheduled their departure on May 7, 1971 or one day before
the expiry date.
- Teresita requested travel agent Ella for the revalidation of the tickets but she
gave the same negative reply and warned her that the tickets may only be used for their
departure but the same could not be used for the rest of the trip. Teresita then replied
that it’s up to the Ganas to make the arrangements. With that assurance Ella on his own
attached to the tickets validating stickers for the Osaka/Tokyo flight.

Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
 - Despite the warnings, the Ganas still departed on May 7, 1971. And there is no
problem with this leg of the trip. However, for the other flight, the Japan Airlines refused
to honor the tickets because of their expiration, and the Ganas had to purchase new
tickets. The same happened for their return trip to Manila.
-Aug. 25, 1971, the Ganas commenced an action for damages arising from
breach of contract of carriage.
-May 29, 1975—Trial Court dismissed the complaint
-The Ganas appeal the decision to the CA. On the pendency of the appeal, Jose
Gana died.
-Dec. 15, 1980—CA set aside and reversed the trial court’s decision.
-Air France moved for reconsideration but it was subsequently denied, hence this
petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Ganas have made out a case for breach of contract of
carriage entitling them to an award of damages.
(2) whether or not the Ganas can avail of the defense of lack of knowledge

Held:
The Court is constrained to reverse the decision of the CA.
Pursuant to tariff rules and regulations of the International Air Transportation
Association… a ticket can no longer be used for travel if its validity has expired before
the passenger completes his trip. From the foregoing, it is clear that Air France cannot
be faulted for breach of contract when it dishonored the tickets after May 8, 1971, since
they already expired.
The Ganas cannot also defend by contending lack of knowledge of those rules
since evidence bears out that Teresita, who handled travel arrangements for the Ganas
was duly informed by travel agent Ella of the advice of the office manager of Air France,
that the tickets in question could not be extended beyond the period of their validity
without paying the fare differentials and additional travel taxes brought about by the
increased fare rate and travel taxes. To all legal intents and purposes, Teresita was the
agent of the Ganas and notice to her of the rejection of the request for extension of the
validity of the tickets was notice to the Ganas, her principals.

Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
 6. Siy v. Tomlin
GR. No. 205998, Apr. 24, 2017

Facts:
-Petitioner, Siy, filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with prayer for
Replevin against Ong, Centeno, Chua and respondent Tomlin.
-Pet. alleged that he is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover which he
purchased from Lopez on July 22, 2009 and that in 2010 he entrusted the said vehicle
to Ong, a business man who owned a second-hand car sales showroom, after the latter
claimed that he had a prospective buyer therefor; and that Ong failed to remit the
proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle and that petitioner later found out
that the vehicle had been transferred to Chua; that still fails to return the car even if
there was already an arrangement made for its return; and that petitioner learned that
the car was being transferred to the respondent.
--The Trial Court issued a Writ of replevin in favor of the plaintiff and required the
same to post a bond of 8 million
-petitioner posted the required bond.
-Respondent then filed an Omnibus motion seeking to quash the writ of Replevin
and dismiss the complaint and turn over the vehicle to him. He alleges that he is the
lawful and registered owner of the subject vehicle, having bought the same and cuased
registration thereof in his name and contending that the only proof of ownership that
petitioner could present are the manager’s check and cash voucher as proof of payment
and affidavit of Lopez attesting to the sale between him and the petitioner.
--The Trial Court ruled to deny the omnibus motion of the respondent, deciding
that the remedy is not to move to quash the writ but to post a counterbond within the
reglamentary period allowed.
-Resp. moved for reconsideration but the same is denied.
-Resp. filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA claiming that the trial court
should have dismissed the complaint for its irregularities and the fact that he is the
registered owner of the vehicle, and he also prayed for an injunctive relief.
--CA ruled that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case for the
failure of petitioner to pay the proper docket fees, and that trial court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction when it seized and detained the vehicle on the basis of improperly
served writ and that the remedy availed by the respondent is correct.
-Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence this
petition.

Issues:
Whether there exist an agency relationship between Siy and Ong.
Whether petitioner still has the right to bring an action for recovery.

Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
 Held:
The Court ruled that the arrangement between petitioner Siy with Ong, of letting
the latter to sell the vehicle of the former is a usual practice between car owners and
traders which creates an agency relationship, the owner of the vehicle being the
principal and the trader as its agent. That being the case, the sale and transfer of the to
respondent by Ong as the agent of Siy is valid and this results to the cessation of right
of ownership and possession of Siy towards the vehicle. Based on that, it can be said
that petitioner has no right when he brought up the action for recovery of possession
and that his recourse should be against Ong, who didn’t remit the proceeds of the sale
of the vehicle to him.

7. BPI v. Laingo
GR. No. 205206
Doctrines:
1. An agent is one who binds himself to render some service or to do something
in representation of another.
2. The basis of agency is representation
3. The question of whether an agency has been created is ordinarily a question
which may be established in the same way as any other fact, either by direct or
circumstantial evidence. The question is ultimately one of intention.

Facts:
-Rheozel Laingo, son of respondent, opened a platinum 2-in-1 savings and
insurance account with BPI. The platinum 2-in-1 savings and insurance account is a
savings account where depositors are automatically covered by an insurance policy
against disability or death issued by FGU Insurance.
-BPI issued a Passbook and FGU issued Personal Accident Insurance Coverage
Certificate (PAICC) to Rheozel with Laingo as the named beneficiary in the said policy.
-2000- Rheozel died due to a vehicular accident.
-Because of coming from a reputable family, his death was headlined in the local
newspaper in Davao del Norte.
-Torbanos then, the family’s personal secretary, was asked by Laingo to inquire
about the savings account of Rheozel. After such arrangements BPI accommodated
Laingo and also allowed her to withdraw P995,000 from Rheozel’s account.
-An employee of the bank also went to Rheozel’s wake to require Laingo to sign
some documents with regards to the withdrawals made.
-Jan. 21, 2003, or two years later, Rheozel’s sister found the former’s PAICC in
his room and informed Laingo about the same.
- Laingo then sent two letters to BPI and FGU respectively, requesting them to
process her claim as beneficiary.
-FGU Insurance deny her claim reasoning that the three months prescriptive
period in the policy to file the claim had already lapsed.
-Laingo filed a complaint for Specific Performance with damages against BPI and
FGU Insurance.

Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
 --Trial court ruled to dismiss the complaint on the basis of prescription.
-Laingo then filed an appeal to the CA.
--The CA reversed the ruling of the trial court and ruled that Laingo as a
beneficiary and not a party to the contract, is not bound by the 90 day prescriptive
period to file a claim.
-Petitioners BPI and FGU Insurance then filed for a Motion for Reconsideration
which was also denied by the appellate court. Hence this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not Laingo, as named beneficiary who had no knowledge of the
existence of the insurance contract, is bound by the three calendar month deadline for
filing a written notice of claim upon the death of the insured.

Held:
The Court ruled that BPI and FGU should bear the loss and that respondent is
not bound by the prescriptive period because of lack of knowledge of the existence of
the policy and that BPI as the agent of FGU in the insurance should have given notice
about the same to the beneficiary on the earliest possible time after the death of the
insured most especially those times when the beneficiary had transacted with the bank
with regards to the account Rheozel. BPI as the agent of FGU had neglected to carry
out its duty when he neglected to inform the beneficiary of the existence of the policy as
well as its terms and condition. That being said, it would be unfair for Laingo to shoulder
the burden of loss when BPI was remiss in its duty to properly notify her that she is a
beneficiary.

8. Lim v. CA
GR. No. 107898, Dec. 19, 1995

Facts:

Issues:

Held:

Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
 9. Amon Trading v. CA
GR. No. 158585, Dec. 13, 2005

Facts:
-Private respondent Tri-realty is a developer and contractor.
-Feb. 1992- Lines & Spaces represented by Sanchez, informed respondent that it
can obtain cement from petitioners Amon Trading Corp. and its sister company, Juliana
Marketing.
-Respondent then proceeded to order from Sanchez cements from Amon
Trading and Juliana Marketing respectively.
-Respondent through Sanchez, paid in advance through a Solidbank manager’s
check payable to Amon trading and Juliana marketing for the cements ordered. A
certain Weng Chua signed the check vouchers for Lines & Spaces while Sanchez
issued two receipts for the two manager’s check.
-Deliveries of the cement by both companies were made but there were still
undelivered balances which prompted Respondent to sent written demands but the
petitioners replied that they had already refunded the undelivered bags to Lines &
Spaces.
-Upon hearing that Sanchez had already fled for abroad, respondent then filed a
case for sum of money against petitioners and Lines & spaces.
-Petitioners alleges that respondents has no privity of contract with them as it
was Lines & spaces/tri-realty through Sanchez that ordered and purchased the cement
and that they have not been informed that there were arrangement between the two and
that they are distinct and separate entities.
-Lines & Spaces denied that it is represented by Sanchez.
--Trial Court found Lines & Spaces solely liable and absolved the petitioners of
the case.
-Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court which absolved petitioners
from the case.
-- The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held that Amon, Juliana,
and Lines are jointly and severally liable to the respondent for the undelivered bags of
cement.
-Petitioners then elevated the case to the SC.

Issues:
Whether or not there was a contract of agency between Lines & spaces and
respondent.

Held:
The Court ruled that there was no showing that there is a contract of agency
between respondent and Lines & Space. Sanchez/Lines & Spaces are only suppliers of
cement for the respondent. The intention of the respondent corporation was merely for
Lines & Spaces, through Sanchez, to supply them with the needed bags of cement.
Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
Sanchez represented herself to be from Lines & Spaces/Tri-Realty, purportedly a single
enity. Inasmuch as they never have directly dealt with private respondents and that
there is no paper trail on record to guide them that the private respondent in fact is the
beneficiary, petitioners had no reason to doubt the request of Sanchez later on to refund
the value of the undelivered bags of cements to Lines & Spaces.

10. Doles v. Angeles

GR. No. 149353, June 26, 2006

Facts:

Issues:

Held:

11. Sunace International Management Services v. NLRC

GR. No. 161757, Jan. 25, 2006

Facts:

Issues:

Held:

Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies
Legend:
- = move made by parties or plain reading of the facts
--= ruling of judicial or quasi- judicial bodies