THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 90625. May 23, 1991.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENEDICTO

DAPITAN y MARTIN, @ "Benny" and FRED DE GUZMAN, accused.
BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN @ "Benny" , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; REQUISITES. —

Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a court
or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; OBSERVED IN CASE AT BAR. — All the requisites or conditions of due
process are present in this case. The records further disclose that accused-appellant was
given the fullest and unhampered opportunity not only to reflect dispassionately on his
expressed desire to plead guilty to a lesser offense which prompted the court to cancel
the hearing of 10 February 1987, but also to confront the witnesses presented against him
and to present his own evidence. If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due
process, he would have faulted the trial court not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, but definitely for more. Yet, he found it futile to go any further.
3. ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPOSITION OF CRUEL, DEGRADING AND
INHUMAN PUNISHMENT; NOT VIOLATED BY IMPOSING A PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA FOR SPECIFIC CRIMES. — Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel,
degrading, and inhuman. To make that claim is to assail the constitutionality of Article 294,
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, or of any other provisions therein and of special laws
imposing the said penalty for specific crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find any
support. Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code has survived four Constitutions of
the Philippines, namely: the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom
Constitution of 1986 and the 1987 Constitution. All of these documents mention life
imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a penalty which may be imposed in appropriate
cases. As a matter of fact, the same paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment expressly recognizes reclusion perpetua.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — As to the
appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We also agree with the Solicitor General that
since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code is
now punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in view of the
abolition of the death penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the first paragraph of
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code shall apply. Consequently, reclusion perpetua must be
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 imposed in this case regardless of the presence of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR. , J : p

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Branch 75, San
Mateo) 4th Judicial Region, finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crime of Robbery
with Homicide and sentencing him to:
". . . suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and to pay the heirs of the
victim Rolando Amil in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency." 1

Only the accused-appellant was tried. His co-accused, Fred de Guzman, remained at
large and the court ordered the archival of the case as against him, to be revived upon
his arrest.
The information filed with the court a quo on 7 August 1986 against accused-appellant
and his co-accused reads in part as follows:
"That on or about the 16th day of May, 1986, in Barangay San Rafael,
Municipality of Rodriguez (formerly Montalban), Province of Rizal, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to gain, armed with deadly weapon and by means of force
and violence, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took,
robbed/stole and carried (sic) away two (2) pieces of men's watches worth One
Thousand One Hundred Eighty Eight Pesos (P1,188.00), one (1) pair of long pants
worth Two Hundred Fifty Pesos (P250.00) and cash money in the amount of
Seventy Five Pesos (P75.00) belonging to Orencia E. Amil, without the knowledge
and consent of said owner and to her damage and prejudice in the total amount
of One Thousand Five Hundred Thirteen Pesos (P1,513.00), Philippine Currency;
that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to
take, steal and carry away the above-mentioned articles, the herein accused in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and employ personal
violence upon the person of Rolando Amil (an eight year old child) by stabbing
him on the neck and hitting him several times on the head with a piece of wood,
to prevent him from making an outcry, thereby inflicting upon him physical
injuries which directly caused his death." 2

When arraigned on 25 November 1986 with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Atty.
Magsanoc, accused entered a plea of not guilty. 3
At the scheduled hearing on 10 February 1987, new counsel de oficio for the accused, Atty.
Gabriel Alberto of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) of San Mateo, Rizal,
manifested that the accused had expressed to him the desire to enter a plea of guilty to a
lesser offense. The court forthwith issued an order reading as follows:

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 "Atty. Alberto of CLAO and de oficio counsel for the accused manifested that the
accused has manifested his desire to make a plea of guilty to a lesser offense but
the circumstances are yet to be made in details. It appears that there are two
mitigating circumstances that may be applied. The Prosecuting Fiscal made no
objection but also manifested that he has to look into the penalty applicable. The
counsel for the accused and the Prosecuting Fiscal jointly moved that the hearing
of this case be reset to another date.

WHEREFORE, reset the hearing of this case for March 9, 1987 at 9:30 A.M. . . ." 4

The scheduled hearing of 9 March 1987 was cancelled and reset to April 13, 1987 in view
of the required vacation leave of absence of the judge.
On 13 April 1987, upon motion of the prosecution and the defense in view of the projected
settlement of the civil liability of this case, the hearing was reset to 19 May 1987. 5 On that
date, however, counsel de oficio for the accused did not appear, hence "a report on the
projected settlement of the civil aspect of the case cannot be made" and the hearing was
reset again to 15 June 1987, 6 which schedule was later on cancelled due to the
compulsory retirement of the presiding judge (Judge Conrado Beltran) which took effect
on 7 June 1987. 7
In the meantime, Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez, Jr. presided over the trial court. 8
The initial reception of evidence took place on 24 August 1987 with the accused-appellant
represented by Atty. Benjamin Pozon, also of the CLAO.
On various dates thereafter, hearings were had until the parties completed the
presentation of their evidence. Witnesses Orencia Amil and Cpl. Rodolfo Rivera for the
prosecution testified during the incumbency of Judge Rodriguez. The rest testified before
Judge Edilberto U. Noblejas who succeeded Judge Rodriguez.
On 5 May 1989, the trial court promulgated its Decision 9 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, after appraising the evidence presented by
the prosecution and the evidence of the defense, the Court finds the accused
BENEDICTO DAPITAN y MARTIN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, punishable under Article 294, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, and to pay the heirs of the victim Rolando Amil in the amount of
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

With respect to the case against FRED DE GUZMAN, the records of the case
insofar as he is concerned is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be revived upon his
arrest when he may be heard to answer for the offense charged."

On 11 May 1989, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal, manifesting therein that he
was appealing the decision to this Court. 1 0 However, in the Order of 11 May 1989, Judge
Cipriano de Roma erroneously directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the
Court of Appeals. 1 1 The Court of Appeals transmitted to this Court on 4 March 1989 the
records which were erroneously transmitted to it. 1 2
In this appeal accused-appellant assigns only one error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPLYING THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
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 LAW THAT FAVORS THE ACCUSED APPELLANT. 1 3

He is thus deemed to be in complete agreement with the ndings and conclusion of

facts by the trial court which We quote:
"The evidence adduced by the prosecution more than prove with moral certainty
the guilt of the accused Benedicto Dapitan for the crime of ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE. While there may be no direct evidence linking the accused to said
crime, the witnesses who testified more than fully satisfy the requirements for
conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, because it affords enough
basis for a reasonable inference of the existence of the fact thereby sought to be
proved, that the accused performed the criminal act.

Orencia Amil, principal witness for the prosecution testified that at around 8:30 in
the morning of May 16,1986, she left for her farm which was about 50 meters
away, leaving behind in her house his adopted son Rolando (the victim) very
much alive. (TSN, page 5, hearing of August 24, 1987) who refused to go with her
because he chose to play in the house instead; and that because she heard the
barking of her dog which aroused her suspicion, she immediately returned and
saw the accused Benedicto Dapitan and his co-accused Fred de Guzman passing
through her fence (TSN, pp. 5-6, hearing of August 24,1987); and that when she
entered her house calling her child's name, and seeing the backdoor open, she
entered and saw Rolando's body sprawled on the floor and his brain "scattered".
Near his body was a piece of wood, also bloodied. Thinking her son to be still
alive she took her in her arms, placed him on the table and that was the time she
realized he was dead. (TSN, pages 6-7, hearing of Aug. 24, 1987).

She likewise testified that she lost two watches worth P1,180; pants at P250.00
and cash amounting to P75.00; and after her son's burial she further found that
her child's toy worth P500.00, a flashlight and a bolo worth P45.00 and P120.00,
respectively, were missing. (TSN, pages 8-9, hearing of August 24,1987).
Orencia Amil's testimony is likewise corroborated on its material points by the
testimony of Celo Nilo, another prosecution witness. He testified that between the
hours of 8:00 to 9:00 in the morning of May 16, 1986, he saw two persons
entering the house of Mrs. Orencia Amil, one of whom he identified as Benedicto
Dapitan, (TSN, pages 4-5, hearing of October 26, 1987). He positively identified
Benedicto Dapitan who was in Court (TSN, pages 5-6, hearing of October 26,
1987). He likewise testified that when the two suspects entered the house of Mrs.
Amil, he heard the voice of a child. In the statement he gave the police
investigators (Exhibit B) which he confirmed when he testified, pertinent portions
of which are herein quoted, he said:

xxx xxx xxx

T Noong May 16, 1986, sa pagitan ng ika 8:00 ng umaga, natatandaan mo
ba noon kung saan ka naroroon?
S Ako po ay galing sa aming bahay at ako po ay patungo sa bundok para
magtanim po ng punong saging.
xxx xxx xxx
T Noong ikaw ay papadaan sa malapit sa bahay in Orencia Amil, wala ka
bang napansin na tao na nagtungo doon sa kanilang bahay?
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 S Mayroon po.
T Nakilala mo ba naman kung sinong tao ang iyong nakita na dumaan doon
sa bahay nina Mrs. Orencia Amil?

S Iyon lang pong isang tao ang aking kilala na dumaan doon sa bahay nina
Mrs. Orencia Amil na si Benny Dapitan na ang tirahan po ay doon po rin sa
Sitio Tabak, Brgy. San Rafael, R/R, pero iyon pong isa na kasama in Benny
Dapitan ay hindi ko po kilala sa kanyang tunay na pangalan.
T Ilan bang tao ang iyong nakita na nagpunta doon sa bahay in Mrs. Orencia
Amil?
S Dalawang tao po.

T Mayroon ka ba gaano kalayo doon sa dalawang tao na ang isa ay si Benny

Dapitan ng sila ay makita mo na pumunta doon sa bahay ni Mrs. Orencia
Amil?
S Mayroon po lamang na mga 10 metro ang aking layo sa kanila.

T Matapos na makita mo si na si Benny Dapitan at iyong isa niyang kasama

ay pumasok doon sa bahay, ano pa ang sunod na pangyayari?

S Akin pong nakita na matapos na sila ay makapasok sa loob ng bahay ni

Mrs. Amil ay kanila pong isinara iyong pintuan noong bahay, at hindi ko po
naman sila pinansin at ako po ay nagpatuloy na sa aking pupuntahan.

xxx xxx xxx

T Matapos na makapasok iyong sina Benny Dapitan doon sa bahay, wala ka
ba namang narinig na sigaw ng isang bata?
S Mayroon po pero hindi ko po pinansin. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
The testimonies of these two witnesses, evaluated together, on what transpired in
the morning of May 16, 1986, between the hours of 8:00-9:00 a.m. attest to the
existence of the following facts:
1. That the victim, Rolando Amil, was alive when her mother left
her as testified to by Orencia Amil and witness Celo Nilo, who cry out when
the two suspects entered the house. (Testimony of Orencia Amil)

2. That the accused Benedicto Dapitan and an unidentified

companion entered the house at a time when Mrs. Amil had already left,
and that the victim, at the time, was still alive. (Testimonies of Celo Nilo &
Orencia Amil)
3. That when Mrs. Amil returned at quarter to nine she saw
Benedicto Dapitan and Fred de Guzman leaving the premises. (Testimony
of Orencia Amil)

4. And that when Mrs. Amil entered her house, the victim,
Rolando Amil, was already dead. (Testimony of Orencia Amil).

As gleaned from the records, witness Orencia Amil was straightforward in her
testimony. She remained steadfast even on cross-examination, and there is
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 nothing on record concerning her testimony which would leave the court in doubt
as to the truth of what she testified to. Her testimony therefore, relative to the
circumstances transpiring at the time she left the house at 8:30 a.m. up to the
time she returned at quarter to nine engenders belief.

Celo Nilo's testimony was likewise made in the same vein as that of Orencia Amil.
This witness was not shown to have cause to perjure himself on a serious crime
against the accused. As the Court observed during the trial, his testimony, based
on his demeanor when he testified, is impressed with a ring of veracity.

The Court did not give credit to the testimony of Patrolman Rodolfo Rivera except
on the fact that he conducted an investigation. No value whatsoever was given to
the sworn statement of Benedicto Dapitan, even as to the portion in said
testimony, where Benedicto Dapitan admitted being present when Fred de
Guzman allegedly hit the victim on the head and that the stolen articles were in
the possession of Fred de Guzman, because as wisely put by defense counsel, the
sworn statement was taken in violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused.

In sum, therefore, there can be no other inference from the evidence presented by
the prosecution considering the short span of time the victim Rolando Amil was
left alive by his mother, and her return fifteen (15) minutes later to find him dead
and the testimony that the accused was seen entering and leaving the premises
during this intervening period, except the inevitable conclusion that the accused is
responsible for the death of Rolando Amil.
For his part, the accused Benedicto Dapitan interposes the defense of "alibi". This,
he sought to establish through the testimony of witness Ismael Anacio. Pertinent
portion of the witness' testimony, is herein quoted, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, do you remember, Mr. Witness, if this Benedicto Dapitan was present
in the said house on the period from May 16 to May 19, 1986?
A He was there, sir.
Q Was there any occasion when this Benedicto Dapitan left your house
during that period?
A None, sir.

(TSN, pages 3-5, hearing of September 12, 1988).

The testimony of witness Ismael Anacio, a salesman by occupation, that
defendant Benedicto Dapitan, from May 16 to May 19, 1986, was in his house all
the time, and that there was no occasion that he left the place during this period
does not spark belief. In the first place, the witness wants the Court to believe that
he was in his house during all the time so that he could during all the days
alluded to, be in a position to be positive as to the whereabouts of the accused.
This circumstance alone generates doubt on his testimony, because it was not
explained why the witness, a salesman by occupation, would be in his house from
the period beginning May 16-19, 1986 (TSN, pages 2-3, hearing of September 12,
1988).

Assuming though, for the sake of argument, that the witness actually monitored
the whereabouts of the accused during all the time, his testimony sustaining
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 Benedicto Dapitan's defense of "alibi" cannot defeat the positive identification
made of Benedicto Dapitan and of his presence in Montalban on May 16, 1986,
by witness Orencia Amil and Celo Nilo. Even on this score alone, without taking
into consideration that Sampaloc District where he allegedly was, is
geographically not so far from Montalban, from where he could have commuted
through the ordinary means of transportation present in the area, his defense of
"alibi" naturally falls, so that his conviction is reasonably called for." 1 4

In support of the assigned error accused-appellant argues that the imposition over him of
the penalty of reclusion temporal by the trial court is "tantamount to deprivation of life or
liberty without due process of law or is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment prohibited by the Constitution" and he submits that "the righteous and humane
punishment that should have been meted out should be indeterminate sentence" with "all
mitigating circumstances as well as the legal provisions favorable to the accused-
appellant . . . appreciated or . . . taken advantage for constructive and humanitarian
reasons." He stresses that since mitigating circumstances are based on, among others,
the lesser perversity of the offender, such should be appreciated in his favor since he had
"a companion then when he entered Mrs. Orencia Amil's house and perpetrated the
offense. 1 5 And it was his companion or mate by the name of Fred de Guzman who took
the personal belongings of Mrs. Amil as the men's watch worth P1,188.00. It was Fred de
Guzman who is still at large who stabbed and hit the head of Rolando Amil. 1 6 These facts
or circumstances reveal that accused-appellant had a "lesser perversity than his
companion Fred de Guzman." As evidence of such lesser perversity, "he did not flee or hide
himself from the authorities. . . . within two (2) days' time he surrendered voluntarily to the
police authorities . . ." Thus, the "mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender must be
considered" in his favor. 1 7

He prays that he be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from twelve (12) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua as maximum. 1 8
Meeting squarely the points raised by the accused-appellant, the People, in the Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellee submitted by the Solicitor General on 9 June 1990, asserts that the same
are without merit for the accused was not deprived of due process as he was, as admitted
by him, afforded full opportunity to be heard; for a penalty to be cruel, degrading or
inhuman, "it must take more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
severe . . .; it must be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, disproportionate to the nature of
the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community 1 9 or when they involve torture
or lingering death" 2 0 and since the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on him is
sanctioned by law, Act No. 3815 as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code,
said penalty is not cruel, degrading or inhuman. It further argues that the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide defined under Article 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal
Code is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death; with the abolition of the death penalty
by the 1987 Constitution, the only penalty imposable upon a person found to have
committed such complex crime is the single penalty of reclusion perpetua, which is an
indivisible penalty. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code it should be applied
regardless of the presence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
As regards the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the People submits that the accused-
appellant cannot avail of it since Section 2 of the law (Act No. 4103) specifically provides
that it shall not apply to, among others, persons convicted of offenses punished with death
penalty or life imprisonment.
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 We find the instant appeal to be totally bereft of merit.
There was no denial of due process.
Due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present: (1) there must be a court
or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (2)
jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired by it over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. 2 1
In People vs. Castillo, et al., 2 2 We ruled that if an accused has been heard in a court of
competent jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and
only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of the constitutional law, then he has
had due process. 2 3
We reiterated the above doctrine in People vs. Muit. 2 4
All the requisites or conditions of due process are present in this case. The records further
disclose that accused-appellant was given the fullest and unhampered opportunity not
only to reflect dispassionately on his expressed desire to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which prompted the court to cancel the hearing of 10 February 1987, but also to confront
the witnesses presented against him and to present his own evidence. llcd

If indeed accused-appellant had been deprived of due process, he would have faulted the
trial court not just for failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law, but definitely for
more. Yet, he found it futile to go any farther.
Neither is the penalty of reclusion perpetua cruel, degrading, and inhuman. To make that
claim is to assail the constitutionality of Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, or of
any other provisions therein and of special laws imposing the said penalty for specific
crimes or offenses. The proposition cannot find any support. Article 294, par. 1 of the
Revised Penal Code has survived four Constitutions of the Philippines, namely: the 1935
Constitution, the 1973 Constitution, the Freedom Constitution of 1986 and the 1987
Constitution. All of these documents mention life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua as a
penalty which may be imposed in appropriate cases. 2 5 As a matter of fact, the same
paragraph of the section of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the imposition of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment expressly recognizes
reclusion perpetua. Thus:
"Section 19(1). Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

As to the appreciation of mitigating circumstances, We also agree with the Solicitor

General that since robbery with homicide under paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code is now punishable by the single and indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua in
view of the abolition of the death penalty, it follows that the rule prescribed in the first
paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code shall apply. 2 6 Consequently, reclusion
perpetua must be imposed in this case regardless of the presence of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances. prcd

The trial court correctly imposed on the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
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 The civil indemnity awarded by the trial court should, in line with Our decision in People vs.
Sison, G.R. No. 86455, 14 September 1990, and People vs. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, 18
September 1970, be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, except as modified above in respect to the civil indemnity, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. Decision, pp. 7-8; Original record, pp. 287-288.

2. Original record, p. 1.
3. Id., 13.
4. Original Record, p. 28.
5. Id., 41.
6. Id., 50.
7. Original Record, 54.
8. Id., 55-110.
9. Per Judge Noblejas; Id., 281-88.
10. Original record, p. 290.
11. Id., 291.
12. Rollo, 1.
13. Brief for Appellant, 1; Id., 32, et seq.
14. Decision, pp. 4-7; Original record, pp. 284-287.
15. TSN, pp. 9-14, September 7, 1987.

16. TSN, pp. 18, 20-21, June 21, 1988.

17. Brief for Appellant, pp. 7-8.
18. Id., 8.
19. People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 647, [1953].
20. People vs. Preda, 133 SCRA 1; Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution: A Reviewer-Primer.

21. Banco Español de Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 934; Macabingkil vs. Yatco, et al.,
21 SCRA 150, 157; Apurillo vs. Garciano, et al., 28 SCRA 1054, 1059; Shell Company of
the Philippines, Ltd. vs. Enage, 49 SCRA 416; Lorenzana vs. Cayetano, 68 SCRA 485.
22. 76 Phil. 72, 87.
23. Citing Rogers vs. Pick, 199 U.S. 425, 435; Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78.

24. 117 SCRA 696, 705.

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 25. Article VIII, Section 2(4) of the 1935 Constitution; Article X, Section 5(d) of the 1973
Constitution; Article VIII, Section 5(2) (d) of the 1987 Constitution; the Freedom
Constitution adopted, among others, Article X of the 1973 Constitution.
26. The first paragraph provides: "In all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed."

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