FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-66371. May 15, 1985.]

ARMANDO ANG , petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO,

Regional Trial Judge, Branch LXXXIV and HON, JUDGE JOSE P.
ARRO, Branch CIII, both of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, and
ASSISTANT FISCAL NARCISO T. ATIENZA of Quezon City ,
respondents.

Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Corpuz and Padlan for petitioner.

DECISION

RELOVA , J : p

In the supplemental petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Armando Ang seeks
to set aside the order, dated February 9, 1984 of respondent Judge Jose P. Castro of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXXIV in Quezon City, denying his appeal from an order
holding him in contempt of court. Petitioner likewise asks this Court (1) to order
respondent Judge Castro to forward the records of Civil Case No. Q-35466 to the
Intermediate Appellate Court; (2) to enjoin him from enforcing his order for the arrest of
petitioner; (3) to restrain respondent Assistant Fiscal Narciso T. Atienza of Quezon City
from conducting preliminary investigation on the libel charge filed against him by
respondent judge; and, (4) to prohibit respondent Judge Jose P. Arro of the Regional Trial
Court of Rizal, Branch CIII, Quezon City from proceeding and/or conducting a hearing on
the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner in Criminal Case No. Q-31587.
In November 1983, petitioner, through the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal
Affairs, lodged with this Court an administrative complaint against respondent judge for
ignorance of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, manifest partiality,
grave abuse of discretion, grave misconduct, rendering unjust decision in Civil Case No. Q-
35466 and dereliction of duties in not resolving his motion for reconsideration of the
adverse decision in said civil case. LLphil

On December 23, 1983, upon learning of the administrative case filed against him by
petitioner, respondent judge ordered petitioner to appear before him on December 29,
1983 at 8:30 in the morning, and to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt of court, for malicious, insolent, inexcusable disrespect and contemptuous
attitude towards the court and towards him.
On January 9, 1984, respondent judge found petitioner guilty of contempt of court,
sentenced him to suffer five (5) days imprisonment and ordered his arrest for his failure,
despite notice, to appear on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge against him.
On February 3, 1984, petitioner filed his notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction
in the contempt charge but the same was denied by the respondent judge in an Order, as
follows:

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 "Considering that ARMANDO ANG was found guilty of `Direct Contempt' of court,
the notice of appeal filed by him thru counsel cannot be given due course and is
hereby denied, as the pronouncement of guilt in a direct contempt is not
appealable.

"Meantime, in view of the fact that said Armando Ang has remained in hiding and
has been eluding the officers of the law in serving the original warrant for his
arrest, let an alias warrant be issued for his arrest so that he can serve his
sentence of five (5) days imprisonment. (p. 45, Rollo)

Thereafter, respondent judge instituted before the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City a
criminal complaint (I.S. No. 83-221983 for libel against herein petitioner for using
malicious, insolent and contemptuous language against him in his letter-complaint filed
before this Court.
Hence, instant petition.
On February 20, 1984, We issued a temporary restraining order enjoining (1) the
respondent judge from carrying out the warrant of arrest issued in Civil Case No. Q-35466,
entitled: "Engson Realty Co., Inc., Plaintiff, versus Lim Eng Si, Defendant" of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch LXXXIV at Quezon City; and (2) the respondent fiscal from conducting
the preliminary investigation for libel lodged by respondent judge against petitioner in I.S.
No. 83-22198 of Quezon City.
Asked to comment why he proceeded with the preliminary investigation of the complaint
for libel filed by respondent judge against herein petitioner, despite the restraining order
from this Court, Fiscal Narciso T. Atienza explained that "long before the undersigned
receive said order, the information for libel against Armando Ang has already been filed in
court." Indeed, records show that the information for libel was lodged on February 2, 1984;
whereas, the temporary restraining order was issued on February 20, 1984. Cdpr

On February 29, 1984, upon knowing that Criminal Case No. Q-31587 for libel was
instituted against him by respondent Fiscal Atienza, petitioner filed a supplemental petition
for prohibition against respondent Judge Jose P. Arro of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
CIII, in Quezon City, who was assigned to try and hear said criminal case. Petitioner prays
for a supplemental writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Arro from proceeding with
said Criminal Case No. Q-31587.
On March 5, 1984, We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent Judge
from proceeding and/or conducting hearing on the criminal complaint for libel.
On June 4, 1984, after considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the
petition and supplemental petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, respondents'
comments thereon as well as petitioner's reply to respondent fiscal's comment with
motion to dismiss the aforesaid petition, We resolved to give due course to the petition
and required both parties to submit simultaneously their memoranda on the issues within
thirty (30) days from notice.
Despite the lapse of the period granted both parties, they failed to file their memoranda.
Thus, the case is deemed submitted for decision.
Upon a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, We found that the alleged malicious
imputations were not uttered in the presence of so near respondent Judge Jose P. Castro
as to obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before him; rather, they were contained in the
pleadings and/or letters-complaint filed by petitioner before the Office of the Presidential
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 Assistant on Legal Affairs and before this Court in the aforementioned administrative case
filed by petitioner against him.
Section 3, particularly paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the New Rules of Court, provide:
"SEC. 3. Indirect contempts to be punished after charge and hearing. — After
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be
heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for contempt:

xxx xxx xxx

"(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or

command of a court, or injunction granted by a court or judge, including the act of
a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

xxx xxx xxx

"(d) Any improper conduct tending directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or

degrade the administration of justice;

Respondent Judge Castro, in his comment, argues that failure of petitioner to appear,
despite notice, on the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge for the use of derogatory
language in his two letters addressed to the Office of the Presidential Assistant on Legal
Affairs and to his Court in an administrative complaint against him, constitutes direct
contempt as the acts actually impeded, embarrassed and obstructed him in the
administration of justice.
We do not agree. The Rules of Court cannot be any clearer. The use of disrespectful of
contemptuous language against a particular judge in pleadings presented in another court
or proceeding is indirect, not direct, contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in
the presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.
Stated differently, if the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious statements
is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct
contempt because it is equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Considering the
aforecited provisions, petitioner's conduct if at all, constitutes indirect contempt and if
found guilty, he may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, which
reads: llcd

"SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of Appeals or Supreme Court;

bond for stay. — The judgment or order of a Court of First Instance made in a
case of contempt punished after written charge and hearing may be reviewed by
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, but execution of the judgment or order
shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person in contempt, in an
amount fixed by the Court of First Instance, conditioned that if the appeal be
decided against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or order. The
appeal may be taken as in criminal cases."

Anent the ancillary action for prohibition, We find the same meritorious, considering that
the basis of the libel case (Criminal Case NO. Q-31587) filed against petitioner before the
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 respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, Quezon City was a communication addressed
to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court which was coursed through the Office of the
Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, complaining against respondent judge's ignorance
of the law, gross inexcusable negligence, incompetence, disregard for the Supreme Court
administrative order, grave misconduct, rendering an unjust decision and dereliction of
duty. It is manifest that as held in the case of Santiago vs. Calvo, 48 Phil. 922, "a
communication made in good faith upon any subject matter in which the party making the
communication has an interest or concerning which he has a duty is privileged if made to a
person having a corresponding interest of duty, although it contains incriminatory or
derogatory matter which without the privilege would be libelous and actionable; . . . that
parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words
otherwise defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the
statements are pertinent or relevant to the case."

Records show that the libel case had already been instituted in court when the restraining
order was issued by Us. Nonetheless, considering the privileged character of petitioner's
communication to the Chief Justice barring a prosecution for libel, it is proper that the
injunction against respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, Quezon City, from
proceeding with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q-31587, be made permanent pursuant
to the restraining order and established doctrine against the use of the strong arm of the
law as an instrument of arbitrary and oppressive prosecution.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition with respect to the action against respondent Judge Jose P.
Castro of the Regional Trial Court, Branch LXXXIV, Quezon City is granted and said
respondent judge is hereby ordered to elevate the records of Civil Case No. Q-35466 to the
Intermediate Appellate Court at once for disposition in accordance with the terms hereof.
Respondent trial judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the libel case (Criminal Case No. Q-
31587).
The temporary restraining order issued on February 20, 1984 enjoining respondent Judge
Jose O. Castro from enforcing or carrying out the warrant of arrest issued in Civil Case No.
Q35466 is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Alampay,
JJ., concur.

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