G.R. Nos.

120681-83 October 1, 1999

JEJOMAR C. BINAY, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and the
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 128136 October 1, 1999
MARIO C. MAGSAYSAY, FRANCISCO B. CASTILLO,
CRISTINA D. MABIOG, REGINO E. MALAPIT, ERLINDA
I. MASANGCAY and VICENTE DE LA ROSA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, HON. OMBUDSMAN and its
PROSECUTOR WENDELL BARERRAS-SULIT and
STATE PROSECUTORS ERIC HENRY JOSEPH F.
MALLONGA and GIDEON C. MENDOZA, respondents.
Facts:
Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, Presidential Decree No. 1486
created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan has undergone various
changes,  the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos. 7975  and 8249. 
In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.
In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the
proceedings in Criminal Case No 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down
in the Binay cases.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws( RA 7975 and RA 8249) , exercises exclusive
original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of
Republic Act No. 3019  and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. 

Decision:
 R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995.
While Congress enacted R.A. No. 8249,  again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court.
This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997.
According to Mayor Binay when the offense was charged he was paid a salary which merits a
grade lower than Grade "27".
The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitioners classify Grades.
The grade depends upon the nature of one's position — the level of difficulty, responsibilities,
and qualification requirements thereof — relative to that of another position. It is the official's
Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around.
It is possible that a local government official's salary may be less than that prescribed for his
Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her respective
local government unit.  Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the official's grade.
Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade "27" under the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Therefore, when the offense was charged against Mayor Binay the Sandiganbayan exercised
exclusive original jurisdiction over it.
The effects of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 may be summarized as follows:
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No.
7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975,
then R.A. No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it, then the cases shall be referred to the
Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before it, the case shall be referred to the
regular courts.
On July 27, 1988 charges were filed against Mayor Binay  with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On September 7, 1994, the informations were filed by the Ombudsman with the
Sandiganbayan. But Mayor Binay was not yet arraigned when RA 7975 took effect.  On the
case of Mayor Magsaysay the law was already in effect when the information was filed against
him in RTC of Batangas.
The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the approval of
R.A. No. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over said cases.
In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A.
No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:
Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. — This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which
trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.
The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislature's intent and in any event should
be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of
R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No.
8249, then said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then it retains
jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case pending before it, the case shall be
referred to the regular courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case pending before a regular court, the latter
loses jurisdiction and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending before it, then said court retains
jurisdiction.
Both laws RA 7975 and RA 8249 retains jurisdiction over Binay’s cases.
Mayor Magsaysay’s case:
Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the following issues
raised by them:
(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging the
same facts with the Regional Trial Court.
(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan considering
that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial
Court.
(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy.
Decision:
Petitioners invoke the rule that "the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted by
subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance."  They claim that the filing of the information in
the Sandiganbayan was a "subsequent happening or event" which cannot oust the RTC of its
jurisdiction.
This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the RTC,
R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to
the Sandiganbayan.
Office of the Ombudsman is not estopped to file the case in the Sandiganbayan after already
filing it with the RTC because it merely made a mistake in the choice of the proper forum.
Jurisdiction is determined by law and not by the consent or agreement of the parties.
  The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy
even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The
first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC  not being a court of competent
jurisdiction. 
LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [301 SCRA 298;
G.R. NO. 128096; 20 JAN 1999]
Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng

gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG).
Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-
intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of

the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a
summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a
legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s
finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six
respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein
petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the
Ombudsman filedamended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where
petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amendedinformations, the cases fall
within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A.
7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal accused” are
government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of
Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites.
However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved
amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal”
from the phrase “principal accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including

Section 7 which provides that the said law shallapply to all cases pending in any
court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues: 

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to
due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as the
provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue
to acquirejurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong
Baleleng was committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers
which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

Held: Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249

violate their right to equal protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit.
No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such
a declaration. Everyclassification made by the law is presumed reasonable and
the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.
The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1)
it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4)
must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in
this case.
Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all casesinvolving”
certain public officials and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to “all
cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument,
the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan
but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally,
provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties
for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment.
R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law,
but clearly a procedural statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by
which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not
being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged
as unconstitutional. 

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been
committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of
the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is
essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon
examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of
facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately
related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise,
the amendedinformation does not indicate that the said accused arrested and
investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The
stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have
committed in relation to his office was not established. 
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge
of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of
the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is
plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.

G.R. Nos. 122297-98           January 19, 2000

CRESCENTE Y. LLORENTE, JR., petitioner, 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARDO, J.:

The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari1 assailing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the criminal cases against then municipal mayor Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr.
for violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.X
Petitioner Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr. was elected municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga in
1988 and 1992. On May 8, 1995, he was a candidate for congressman, second district of
Zamboanga del Norte, and was duly elected.

On August 6, 1993, the Office of the Special Prosecutor2 filed with the Sandiganbayan an
information3 against Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr., municipal mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte, P/Sgt. Juanito Caboverde and Jose Dy for violation of Section 3 (e), Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, committed as follows:X
That on or about June 12, 1989, in the Municipality of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Crescente Y. Llorente, Jr., Municipal
Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte and P/Sgt. Juanito Cadoverde of the defunct
Integrated National Police and as such public officers and the other accused Jose Dy, a private
individual, conspiring with each other and acting with evident bad faith, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally seized (sic) 930 sawn knockdown wooden boxes owned by
Godofredo M. Diamante without any search and seizure warrant and without issuing any receipt
of seizure thereby causing undue damage and injury to said Godofredo M. Diamante and this
offense was committed in relation to the office of the said public officers.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, August 6, 1993.
(s/t) GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA
Special Prosecution Officer III4X

On February 2, 1994, the three accused were arraigned before the Sandiganbayan and pleaded
not guilty.

On March 31, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman5 filed with the Sandiganbayan another
information6 against petitioner for violation of Section 3 (f), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
committed as follows:X
That on or about July 5, 1993, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in Sindangan, Zamboanga
del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte,
with grave abuse of authority, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally refuse to
issue Mayor's permit to the ice plant and resawmill/box factory of R. F. Diamante and family,
without sufficient justification, after due demand and payment of license fees were made, said
refusal to grant Mayor's permit being not only personal but for the purpose of giving undue
advantage to similar businesses in town and as an act of discriminating against the interest of
the complainant to the latter's damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Manila, Philippines, March 31, 1995
(s/t) DANIEL B. JOVACON, JR.
Special Prosecution Officer I7X

The trial of both criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun.

On May 16, 1995, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7975,8 amending Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606,9 providing:X

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director or higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panglungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all other officials of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors, or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions of foundations.
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying
the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.10X

On July 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, a motion to dismiss or
transfer Criminal Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga.
On the same date, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan, First Division, a motion to refer
Criminal Case No. 22655 to the Regional Trial Court, Sindangan, Zamboanga.
Petitioner averred that the enactment of Republic Act No. 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of
its jurisdiction over criminal cases against municipal mayors for violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, who receive salary less than that corresponding to Grade 27, pursuant to the
Index of Occupational Services prepared by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).

On September 7, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, First Division11 denied the motion to refer Criminal
Case No. 22655 to the Regional Trial Court. On October 10, 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.12X

On September 14, 1995, Sandiganbayan, Third Division13 also denied the motion to transfer
Criminal Case No. 19763 to the Regional Trial Court.X

Hence, petitioner filed these petitions for certiorari.14X

On December 27, 1995, the Court consolidated the two cases.15X

On February 23, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8249, an act redefining the
jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.16X

On September 1, 1999, we gave due course to the petitions.17X

The issue raised in these two cases is whether or not Republic Act No. 7975 divested the
Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against
municipal mayors.
We have resolved this issue in recent cases ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against municipal mayors.18X

There is no merit to petitioner's averment that the salary received by a public official dictates his
salary grade. "On the contrary, it is the official's grade that determines his or her salary, not the
other way around."19 "To determine whether the official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to Republic Act No. 6758 and the Index of
Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. An official's grade is not a matter of
proof, but a matter of law which the court must take judicial notice."20X

Sec. 444 (d) of the Local Government Code provides that "the municipal mayor shall receive a
minimum monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant
thereto." Additionally, both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services,
Position Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal mayor under Salary Grade
27.21 Consequently, the cases against petitioner as municipal mayor for violations of Republic
Act No. 3019, as amended, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.X
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the consolidated petitions at bar, for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, concur.

G.R. No. 143047             July 14, 2004

RICARDO S. INDING, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for the
nullification of the September 23, 1999 Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division),
which denied the petitioner's omnibus motion with supplemental motion, and its Resolution
dated April 25, 2000, denying the petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the same.X
The Antecedents
On January 27, 1999, an Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner
Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, with violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019,2 committed as follows:X

That from the period 3 January 1997 up to 9 August 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Dapitan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking public officer, being a Councilor of
Dapitan City and as such, while in the performance of his official functions, particularly in the
operation against drug abuse, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, faked buy-bust operations against alleged pushers or users
to enable him to claim or collect from the coffers of the city government a total amount
of P30,500.00, as reimbursement for actual expenses incurred during the alleged buy-bust
operations, knowing fully well that he had no participation in the said police operations against
drugs but enabling him to collect from the coffers of the city government a total amount
of P30,500.00, thereby causing undue injury to the government as well as the public interest.3X

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116 and raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.

On June 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion4 for the dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the alternative, for the referral of the case either to
the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for appropriate proceedings. The
petitioner alleged therein that under Administrative Order No. 270 which prescribes the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, he is a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsodof Dapitan City with Salary Grade (SG) 25. He asserted that under
Republic Act No. 7975, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan
exercises original jurisdiction to try cases involving crimes committed by officials of local
government units only if such officials occupy positions with SG 27 or higher, based on Rep. Act
No. 6758, otherwise known as the "Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." He
contended that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, has original jurisdiction over the crime charged against him.
The petitioner urged the trial court to take judicial notice of Adm. Order No. 270.X
In its comment on the omnibus motion, the Office of the Special Prosecutor asserted that the
petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte, one of those public officers who, by express
provision of Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7975,5 is classified
as SG 27. Hence, the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, has original jurisdiction over the case,
regardless of his salary grade under Adm. Order No. 270.X
On September 23, 1999, the respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the
petitioner's omnibus motion. According to the court, the Information alleged that the petitioner
has a salary grade of 27. Furthermore, Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, which amended Section 4
of P.D. No. 1606, provides that the petitioner, as a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dapitan City, has a salary grade of 27.6X

On October 27, 1999, the petitioner filed a Supplemental Motion to his omnibus motion,7 citing
Rep. Act No. 8294 and the ruling of this Court in Organo v. Sandiganbayan,8 where it was
declared that Rep. Act No. 8249, the latest amendment to the law creating the Sandiganbayan,
"collated the provisions on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan," and that "the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court was made to depend not on the
penalty imposed by law on the crimes and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and
salary grade of accused government officials and employees."X
In the meantime, the petitioner was conditionally arraigned on October 28, 1999 and entered a
plea of not guilty.9X

On November 18, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's
September 23, 1999 Resolution.10 The motion was, however, denied by the Sandiganbayan in a
Resolution promulgated on April 25, 2000.11X

Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, contending as follows:
A. That Republic Act [No.] 8249 which took effect last 05 February 1997 made the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan as a trial court depend not only on the penalty imposed by law on the crimes
and offenses within its jurisdiction but on the rank and salary grade of accused government
officials and employees.
B. That the ruling of the Supreme Court in "Lilia B. Organo versus The Sandiganbayan and the
People of the Philippines," G.R. No. 133535, 09 September 1999, settles the matter on the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as a trial court which is over public officials and
employees with rank and salary grade 27 and above.
The petitioner contends that, at the time the offense charged was allegedly committed, he was
already occupying the position of Sangguniang Panlungsod Member I with SG 25. Hence,
under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, amending Rep. Act No. 7975, it is the RTC and not the
Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the offense lodged against him. He asserts that under
Adm. Order No. 270,12 Dapitan City is only a component city, and the members of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod are classified as Sangguniang Panlungsod Members I with SG
25. Thus, Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, and
retained by Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, does not apply to him.X
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, contend that
Section 4 a.(1)(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, expressly
provides that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over violations of Rep. Act No. 3019,
as amended, committed by the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, without qualification
and regardless of salary grade. They argue that when Congress approved Rep. Act No. 7975 and
Rep. Act No. 8249, it was aware that not all the positions specifically mentioned in Section 4,
subparagraph (1) were classified as SG 27, and yet were specifically included therein, viz:
It is very clear from the aforecited provisions of law that the members of the sangguniang
panlungsod are specifically included as among those falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
A reading of the aforesaid provisions, likewise, show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27
and higher applies only to such officials of the executive branch other than the regional director
and higher and those specifically enumerated. To rule, otherwise, is to give a different
interpretation to what the law clearly is.
Moreover, had there been an intention to make Salary Grade 27 and higher as the sole factor to
determine the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan then the lawmakers could
have simply stated that the officials of the executive branch, to fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should have been occupying the positions with a Salary
Grade of 27 and higher. But the express wordings in both RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249
specifically including the members of the sangguniang panlungsod, among others, as those
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only means that the said
sangguniang members shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the said court
regardless of their Salary Grade.
In this connection too, it is well to state that the lawmakers are very well aware that not all the
positions specifically mentioned as those within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan have a Salary Grade of 27 and higher. Yet, the legislature has explicitly made the
officials so enumerated in RA No. 7975 and RA No. 8249 as falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because of the nature of these officials' functions and
responsibilities as well as the power they can wield over their respective area of jurisdiction.13X

The threshold issue for the Court's resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has original
jurisdiction over the petitioner, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City, who
was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Court rules in the affirmative.
Rep. Act No. 7975, entitled "An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of
the Sandiganbayan, Amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606," took effect on
May 16, 1995. Section 2 thereof enumerates the cases falling within the original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Subsequently, Rep. Act No. 7975 was amended by Rep. Act No. 8249,
entitled "An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the
Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes." The amendatory law took effect on February 23, 1997 and Section 4 thereof
enumerates the cases now falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
For purposes of determining which of the two laws, Rep. Act No. 7975 or Rep. Act No. 8249,
applies in the present case, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of the
offense.14 Generally, the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined by the
law in force at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
crime.15 However, Rep. Act No. 7975, as well as Rep. Act No. 8249, constitutes an exception
thereto as it expressly states that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the reckoning period is the time of the commission of
the offense. This is plain from the last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of these
two provisions which reads:X

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise [exclusive]16original jurisdiction in all

cases involving:X
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, [Book II]17 of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:X
…
In this case, as gleaned from the Information filed in the Sandiganbayan, the crime charged was
committed from the period of January 3, 1997 up to August 9, 1997. The applicable law,
therefore, is Rep. Act No. 7975. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975 expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:18X

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code,19where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:X
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;20X

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;21X

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.22X

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying
the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.23X

A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of determining the government
officials that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code,
Rep. Act No. 7975 has grouped them into five categories, to wit:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher. . .
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
With respect to the first category, i.e., officials of the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, Rep.
Act No. 7975 further specifically included the following officials as falling within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
The specific inclusion of the foregoing officials constitutes an exception to the general
qualification relating to officials of the executive branch as "occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989." In other words, violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 committed by
officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or higher, and the officials specifically enumerated
in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No.
7975, regardless of their salary grades, likewise fall within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Had it been the intention of Congress to confine the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
to violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 only to officials in the executive branch with SG 27 or higher,
then it could just have ended paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, with the phrase "officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." Or the category in paragraph (5) of the
same provision relating to "[a]ll other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and up
under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989" would have sufficed. Instead, under
paragraph (1) of Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,
Congress included specific officials, without any reference as to their salary grades. Clearly,
therefore, Congress intended these officials, regardless of their salary grades, to be specifically
included within the Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction, for had it been otherwise, then there
would have been no need for such enumeration. It is axiomatic in legal hermeneutics that words
in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if a reasonable construction which will give
them some force and meaning is possible.24X

That the legislators intended to include certain public officials, regardless of their salary grades,
within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is apparent from the legislative history of
both Rep. Acts Nos. 7975 and 8249. In his sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 1353, which
was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 7975, Senator
Raul S. Roco, then Chairman of the Committee on Justice and Human Rights, explained:
Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only those
occupying high positions in the government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the
court.
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over cases
assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher by the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore,
refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the Sandiganbayan.
The President of the Philippines and other impeachable officers such as the justices of the
Supreme Court and constitutional commissions are not subject to the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan during their incumbency.
The bill provides for an extensive listing of other public officers who will be subject to the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It includes, among others, Members of Congress,
judges and justices of all courts.25X

More instructive is the sponsorship speech, again, of Senator Roco, of Senate Bill No. 844, which
was substantially adopted by both Houses of Congress and became Rep. Act No. 8249. Senator
Roco explained the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Rep. Act No. 7975, thus:
SPONSORSHIP OF SENATOR ROCO
…
By way of sponsorship, Mr. President - we will issue the full sponsorship speech to the members
because it is fairly technical - may we say the following things:
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to
concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became
effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets of
that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at
Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade
"27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in government
regardless of salary grade;26X

Evidently, the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, amended
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, were specifically included within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan because the lawmakers considered them "big fish" and their positions
important, regardless of their salary grades.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the fact that some of the officials enumerated in (a) to (g)
are not classified as SG 27 or higher under the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles
and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget and Management in 1989, then in effect
at the time that Rep. Act No. 7975 was approved. For example:
Category

New Position Title

Grade

16. FOREIGN RELATIONS SERVICE

Foreign Service
…

Foreign Service Officer,

Class II27X

2328X

Foreign Service Officer,

Class I29X

2430X

18. EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Local Executives

City Government Department Head

2431X

City Government Department Head

II

2632X

Provincial Government Department Head

2533X

…
City Vice Mayor

26

City Vice Mayor

II

28

City Mayor

2834X

City Mayor

II

30

19. LEGISLATIVE SERVICE

Sangguniang Members

Sangguniang Panlungsod Member

25

Sangguniang Panlungsod Member

II

27

Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member

2635X

Office of the City and Provincial Prosecutors36X

Prosecutor
IV

29

Prosecutor

III

28

Prosecutor

II

27

Prosecutor

26

Noticeably, the vice mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and

prosecutors, without any distinction or qualification, were specifically included in Rep. Act No.
7975 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, the consuls, city
department heads, provincial department heads and members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, albeit classified as having salary grades 26 or lower, were also specifically
included within the Sandiganbayan's original jurisdiction. As correctly posited by the
respondents, Congress is presumed to have been aware of, and had taken into account, these
officials' respective salary grades when it deliberated upon the amendments to the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Congress passed into law Rep. Act No. 7975,
specifically including them within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. By doing so, it
obviously intended cases mentioned in Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
Rep. Act No. 7975, when committed by the officials enumerated in (1) (a) to (g) thereof,
regardless of their salary grades, to be tried by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, it is a basic precept in statutory construction that the intent of the legislature is the
controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.37 From the congressional records and the
text of Rep. Acts No. 7975 and 8294, the legislature undoubtedly intended the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 a.(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by the aforesaid
subsequent laws, to be included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.X
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is
occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction,38 can only be
properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration in
Section 4 a. (1)(a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in
Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper
trial courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27
or higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in
statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole.39 And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if
at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute - its every word.40X

In this case, there is no dispute that the petitioner is a member of the Sangguniang

Panlungsod of Dapitan City and he is charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of Rep. Act No.
3019. Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod are specifically included as among those within
the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in Section 4 a.(1) (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975,41 or even Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 824942 for that
matter. The Sandiganbayan, therefore, has original jurisdiction over the petitioner's case
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25116.X
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated September 23, 1999 and April 25, 2000 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 158187             February 11, 2005

MARILYN GEDUSPAN and DRA. EVANGELYN FARAHMAND, petitioners, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a regional director/manager of government-
owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code for
purposes of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act? Petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan
assumes a negative view in the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor contends otherwise, a view shared by the respondent court.
In the instant Rule 65 petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or issuance of a temporary restraining order, Geduspan seeks to annul and set aside the
resolutions1 dated January 31, 2003 and May 9, 2003 of the respondent Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division. These resolutions denied her motion to quash and motion for reconsideration,
respectively.X
On July 11, 2002, an information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27525 for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioner Marilyn C. Geduspan and Dr.
Evangeline C. Farahmand, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) Regional
Manager/Director and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi,
Inc., respectively. The information read:
That on or about the 27th day of November, 1999, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at
Bacolod City, province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN, a public officer, being the
Regional Manager/Director, of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, Regional office No.
VI, Iloilo City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving,
confederating and mutually helping with DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, a private
individual and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc.,
Mandalangan, Bacolod City, with deliberate intent, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously release the claims for payments
of patients confined at L.N. Memorial Hospital with Philippine Health Insurance Corp., prior to
January 1, 2000, amounting to NINETY ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR and
64/100 (P91,954.64), Philippine Currency, to Tiong Bi Medical Center, Tiong Bi, Inc. despite
clear provision in the Deed of Conditional Sale executed on November 27, 1999, involving the
sale of West Negros College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. or Tiong Bi Medical Center, that the
possession, operation and management of the said hospital will be turned over by West Negros
College, Inc. to Tiong Bi, Inc. effective January 1, 2000, thus all collectibles or accounts
receivable accruing prior to January 1, 2000 shall be due to West Negros College, Inc., thus
accused MARILYN C. GEDUSPAN in the course of the performance of her official functions, had
given unwarranted benefits to Tiong Bi, Inc., Tiong Bi Medical Center, herein represented by
accused DR. EVANGELINE C. FARAHMAND, to the damage and injury of West Negros College,
Inc.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Both accused filed a joint motion to quash dated July 29, 2002 contending that the respondent
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over them considering that the principal accused Geduspan
was a Regional Director of Philhealth, Region VI, a position classified under salary grade 26.
In a resolution dated January 31, 2003, the respondent court denied the motion to quash. The
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution dated May 9, 2003.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner Geduspan alleges that she is the Regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth). However, her appointment paper and
notice of salary adjustment2 show that she was appointed as Department Manager A of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26. Philhealth is a
government owned and controlled corporation created under RA 7875, otherwise known as the
National Health Insurance Act of 1995.X
Geduspan argues that her position as Regional Director/Manager is not within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. She cites paragraph (1) and (5), Section 4 of RA 8249 which defines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758); specifically including;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
The petition lacks merit.
The records show that, although Geduspan is a Director of Region VI of the Philhealth, she is not
occupying the position of Regional Director but that of Department Manager A, hence,
paragraphs (1) and (5) of Section 4 of RA 8249 are not applicable.
It is petitioner’s appointment paper and the notice of salary adjustment that determine the
classification of her position, that is, Department Manager A of Philhealth.
Petitioner admits that she holds the position of Department Manager A of Philhealth. She,
however, contends that the position of Department Manager A is classified under salary grade
26 and therefore outside the jurisdiction of respondent court. She is at present assigned at the
Philhealth Regional Office VI as Regional Director/Manager.
Petitioner anchors her request for the issuance of a temporary restraining order on the alleged
disregard by respondent court of the decision of this Court in Ramon Cuyco v.
Sandiganbayan.3X

However, the instant case is not on all fours with Cuyco. In that case, the accused Ramon Cuyco
was the Regional Director of the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Region IX, Zamboanga City,
but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992 his position of Regional Director of LTO
was classified as Director II with salary grade 26. Thus, the Court ruled that the Sandiganbayan
had no jurisdiction over his person.
In contrast, petitioner held the position of Department Director A of Philhealth at the time of
the commission of the offense and that position was among those enumerated in paragraph 1(g),
Section 4a of RA 8249 over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Section 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense;
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘Grade 27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx
(d) xxx xxx xxx
(e) xxx xxx xxx
(f) xxx xxx xxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned and controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations." (Underscoring
supplied).
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While
the first part of the above-quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the
salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive
officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a
private individual charged together with her.
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of
Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds,
not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al.4 ruled:X

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of
the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4;
and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a
government-owned and controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those
mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she was charged was
committed in relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject matter of the case.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 147706-07             February 16, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and EFREN L.
ALAS, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the
Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act? The petitioner, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(OSP), takes the affirmative position in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Respondent Efren L. Alas contends otherwise, together with the respondent court.

Pursuant to a resolution dated September 30, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman, two
1
separate informations  for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, were filed with the Sandiganbayan on November 17, 1999
against Efren L. Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts
entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the Philippine
Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company which purportedly caused
damage and prejudice to the government.

On October 30, 2002, Alas filed a motion to quash the informations for lack of jurisdiction,
which motion was vehemently opposed by the prosecution. After considering the arguments of
both parties, the respondent court ruled that PPSB was a private corporation and that its
officers, particularly herein respondent Alas, did not fall under Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
According to the Sandiganbayan:

After a careful consideration of the arguments of the accused-movant as well as of that of the
prosecution, we are of the considered opinion that the instant motion of the accused is well
taken. Indeed, it is the basic thrust of Republic Act as well as (sic) Presidential Decree No. 1606
as amended by President Decree No. 1486 and Republic Act No. 7975 and Republic Act No.
8249 that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction only over public officers unless private persons
are charged with them in the commission of the offenses.

The records disclosed that while Philippine Postal Savings Bank is a subsidiary of the Philippine
Postal Corporation which is a government owned corporation, the same is not created by a
special law. It was organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code which is Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68. It was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission under SEC
No. AS094-005593 on June 22, 1994 with a lifetime of fifty (50) years. Under its Articles of
Incorporation the purpose for which said entity is formed was primarily for business, xxx

Likewise, a scrutiny of the seven (7) secondary purposes of the corporation points to the
conclusion that it exists for [Link], it is not involved in the performance of a
particular function in the exercise of government power. Thus, its officers and employees are not
covered by the GSIS and are under the SSS law, and actions for reinstatement and backwages
are not within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission but by the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).

The Supreme Court, in the case of Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services vs.
National Housing Corp., 173 SCRA 33, held that the Civil Service now covers only government
owned or controlled corporations with original or legislative charters, those created by an act of
Congress or by special law, and not those incorporated under and pursuant to a general
legislation. The Highest Court categorically ruled that the Civil Service does not include
government-owned or controlled corporation which are organized as subsidiaries of
government-owned or controlled corporation under the general corporation law.

In Philippine National Oil Company - Energy Development Corporation vs. Leogardo, 175 SCRA
26, the Supreme Court emphasized that:

The test in determining whether a government-owned or controlled corporation is subject to the

Civil Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporation created by
special charter are subject to its provision while those incorporated under the general
corporation law are not within its coverage.

Likewise in Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service Commission, 201 SCRA 601 it was held
that "by government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter we mean
government-owned or controlled corporation created by a special law and not under the
Corporation Code of the Philippines" while in Llenes vs. Dicdican, et al., 260 SCRA 207, a public
officer has been ruled, as a person whose duties involve the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the function of government.

Clearly, on the basis of the foregoing pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the accused herein
cannot be considered a public officer. Thus, this Court may not exercise jurisdiction over his
2
act.

Dissatisfied, the People, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), filed this
3
petition  arguing, in essence, that the PPSB was a government-owned or controlled corporation
4
as the term was defined under Section 2(13) of the Administrative Code of 1987.  Likewise, in
further defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, RA 8249 did not make a distinction as to
the manner of creation of the government-owned or controlled corporations for their officers to
fall under its jurisdiction. Hence, being President and Chief Operating Officer of the PPSB at the
time of commission of the crimes charged, respondent Alas came under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Quoting at length from the assailed resolution dated February 15, 2001, respondent Alas, on the
other hand, practically reiterated the pronouncements made by the respondent court in support
of his conclusion that the PPSB was not created by special law, hence, its officers did not fall
5
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

We find merit in the petition.

6
Section 2(13) of EO 292  defines government-owned or controlled corporations as follows:

Sec. 2. General Terms Defined - Unless the specific words of the text or the context as a whole or
a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:

xxx xxx xxx

(13) government owned or controlled corporations refer to any agency organized as a stock or
non-stock corporation vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly or through its
instrumentalities either wholly, or where applicable as in the case of stock corporations to the
extent of at least 51% of its capital stock: provided, that government owned or controlled
corporations maybe further categorized by the department of the budget, the civil service
commission and the commission on audit for the purpose of the exercise and discharge of their
respective powers, functions and responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

From the foregoing, PPSB fits the bill as a government-owned or controlled corporation, and
organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code as a subsidiary of the Philippine Postal
Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the authorized capital stock of PPSB belongs to the
government while the rest is nominally held by its incorporators who are/were themselves
officers of PHILPOST. The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Section 32 of RA 7354,
otherwise known as the Postal Service Act of 1992, for purposes of, among others, "to encourage
and promote the virtue of thrift and the habit of savings among the general public, especially the
youth and the marginalized sector in the countryside xxx" and to facilitate postal service by
7
"receiving collections and making payments, including postal money orders."

It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors or trustees,
or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters whenever
charges of graft and corruption are involved. However, a question arises whether the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the same officers in government-owned or controlled
corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code in view of the delimitation
provided for in Article IX-B Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution which states that:

SEC. 2. (1) The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies
of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters.

It should be pointed out however, that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is separate and
distinct from the Civil Service Commission. The same is governed by Article XI, Section 4 of the
1987 Constitution which provides that "the present anti-graft court known as the
Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may
be provided by law." This provision, in effect, retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft court as
defined under Article XIII, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated its creation, thus:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices
and such other offense committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined
by law. (Italics ours)

On March 30, 1995, Congress, pursuant to its authority vested under the 1987 Constitution,
8
enacted RA 7975  maintaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over presidents, directors
or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations without any
9
distinction whatsoever. Thereafter, on February 5, 1997, Congress enacted RA 8249 which
preserved the subject provision:

Section 4, Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense,

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director, and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) specifically including:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics ours)

The legislature, in mandating the inclusion of "presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of

government-owned or controlled corporations" within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
has consistently refrained from making any distinction with respect to the manner of their
creation.

The deliberate omission, in our view, clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to include
the presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of both types of corporations within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft and corruption. Had it
been otherwise, it could have simply made the necessary distinction. But it did not.

It is a basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should
not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Corollarily, Article XI
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, on the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman (the government’s
prosecutory arm against persons charged with graft and corruption), includes officers and
employees of government-owned or controlled corporations, likewise without any distinction.

10
In Quimpo v. Tanodbayan,  this Court, already mindful of the pertinent provisions of the 1987
Constitution, ruled that the concerned officers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether created by special law or formed under the Corporation Code, come under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Otherwise, as we emphasized therein, a major policy of Government, which is to
eradicate, or at the very least minimize, the graft and corruption that has permeated the fabric of
the public service like a malignant social cancer, would be seriously undermined. In fact, Section
1 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act embodies this policy of the government, that is, to
repress certain acts not only of public officers but also of private persons constituting graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.

The foregoing pronouncement has not outlived its usefulness. On the contrary, it has become
even more relevant today due to the rampant cases of graft and corruption that erode the
people’s faith in government. For indeed, a government-owned or controlled corporation can
conceivably create as many subsidiary corporations under the Corporation Code as it might
wish, use public funds, disclaim public accountability and escape the liabilities and
responsibilities provided by law. By including the concerned officers of government-owned or
controlled corporations organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the legislature evidently seeks to avoid just that.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
resolution dated February 15, 2001 of the respondent court is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 146646-49. March 11, 2005

ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, Petitioners, 
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Resolution1 dated December 18, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan (1st
Division) and Order2 dated January 11, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04.X
The instant petition stemmed from the sworn complaint3 of Ana May V. Simbajon against Judge
Rogelio M. Esteban, filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Cabanatuan City on September
8, 1997, docketed as I.S. Nos. 9-97-8239.X
In her complaint, Ana May alleged that she was a casual employee of the City Government of
Cabanatuan City. Sometime in February 1997, she was detailed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, upon incessant request of Presiding Judge Reogelio
Esteban, herein petitioner.
After her detail with Branch 1, the item of bookbinder became vacant. Thus, she applied for the
position but petitioner did not take any action on her application. On July 25, 1997, when she
approached petitioner in his chambers to follow up her application, he told her, "Ano naman
ang magiging kapalit ng pagpirma ko rito? Mula ngayon, girlfriend na kita. Araw-araw
papasok ka dito sa opisina ko, at araw-araw, isang halik."("What can you offer me in exchange
for my signature? From now on, you are my girlfriend. You will enter this office everyday and
everyday, I get one kiss.")4 Ana May refused to accede to his proposal as she considered him like
her own father.X
Petitioner nonetheless recommended her for appointment. Thereafter, he suddenly kissed her
on her left cheek. She was shocked and left the chambers, swearing never to return or talk to
petitioner.
On August 5, 1997, at around 9:30 in the morning, Virginia S. Medina, court interpreter,
informed Ana May that petitioner wanted to see her in his chambers regarding the payroll. As a
subordinate, she complied. Once inside, petitioner asked her if she has been receiving her salary
as a bookbinder. When she answered in the affirmative, he said, "Matagal na pala eh, bakit
hindi ka pumapasok dito sa kuwarto ko? Di ba sabi ko say iyo, girlfriend na kita?" ("So you’ve
been getting the salary for sometime already. Why didn’t you report here in my office? Didn’t I
tell you, you’re my girlfriend.")5X

Again, Ana May protested to his proposal, saying he is like a father to her and that he is a
married man with two sons.
Petitioner suddenly rose from his seat, grabbed her and said, "Hindi pwede yan, mahal kita."
("I can’t allow that for I love you.") He embraced her, kissing her all over her face and touching
her right breast.
Ana May freed herself and dashed out of the chambers crying. She threw the payroll on the table
of her co-employee, Elizabeth Q. Manubay. The latter sensed something was wrong and
accompanied Ana May to the restroom. There she told Elizabeth what happened.
On March 9 and July 1, 1998, two Informations for violation of R.A. 7877 (the Anti-Sexual
Harassment Law of 1995) were filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan, docketed
therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 24490 and 24702.
Also on July 1, 1998, two Informations for acts of lasciviousness were filed with the same court,
docketed as Criminal Cases. 24703-04.
On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness on the ground that he has been placed four (4) times in
jeopardy for the same offense.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash but directed the prosecution to determine if the
offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 were committed in relation to petitioner’s
functions as a judge.
On September 3, 1999, the prosecution filed Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
24703 and 24704 quoted as follows:
Criminal Case No. 24703:
That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO
M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May
V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room
daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a
bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and
malicious desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her
left cheek against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6X

Criminal Case No. 24704

That on or about the 25th day of June 1997 in in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO
M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May
V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room
daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a
bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and
malicious desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her
left cheek against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7X

On September 29, 1999, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Amended Informations on the
ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged considering that
they were not committed in relation to his office as a judge.
On November 22, 1999, before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the motion to quash, the
prosecution filed the following Re-Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 24703:
"That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO
M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May
V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room
daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a
bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and
malicious desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab private
complainant, kiss her all over her face and touch her right breast against her will and consent, to
her damage and detriment.

CONTRARY TO LAW."8X

which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan.

On December 18, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to quash the Amended
Informations, holding that "the act of approving or indorsing the permanent appointment of
complaining witness was certainly a function of the office of the accused so that his acts are,
therefore, committed in relation to his office."9X

Petitioner then moved for a reconsideration, but was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Order
dated January 11, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
The sole issue for our resolution is whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal
Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness filed against petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the alleged acts of lasciviousness were not committed in relation to his
office as a judge; and the fact that he is a public official is not an essential element of the crimes
charged.
The Ombudsman, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, maintains that the
allegations in the two (2) Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 indicate a
close relationship between petitioner’s official functions as a judge and the commission of acts of
lasciviousness.
The petition is bereft of merit.

Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,10 reads in
part:X
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.

In People v. Montejo,11 we ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in

relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the
offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This
intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information.12 This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that characterizes
the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.13 Hence, where the
information is wanting in specific factual averments to show the intimate
relationship/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official functions, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case.14X
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated April 27, 1987,15 petitioner, as presiding judge of
MTCC, Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, is vested with the power to recommend the appointment of
Ana May Simbajon as bookbinder. As alleged in the Amended Informations in Criminal Cases
Nos. 24703-04, she was constrained to approach petitioner on June 25, 1997 as she needed his
recommendation. But he imposed a condition before extending such recommendation - she
should be his girlfriend and must report daily to his office for a kiss. There can be no doubt,
therefore, that petitioner used his official position in committing the acts complained of. While
it is true, as petitioner argues, that public office is not an element of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, nonetheless,
he could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for the fact that as the Presiding
Judge of the MTCC, Branch I, Cabanatuan City, he has the authority to recommend the
appointment of Ana May as bookbinder. In other words, the crimes allegedly committed are
intimately connected with his office.X
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.16 The Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 contain allegations
showing that the acts of lasciviousness were committed by petitioner in relation to his official
function.X
Accordingly, we rule that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting the Amended Informations for acts of lasciviousness
in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Sandiganbayan dated December 18, 2000 and January 11, 2001, in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-
04 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.

G.R. Nos. 161784-86. April 26, 2005

DINAH C. BARRIGA, Petitioners, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (4TH DIVISION) and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of the
Resolution1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27435 to 27437 denying the motion to
quash the Informations filed by one of the accused, Dinah C. Barriga, and the Resolution
denying her motion for reconsideration thereof.X
The Antecedents
On April 3, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for the
admission of the three Amended Informations appended thereto. The first Amended
Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 27435, charged petitioner Dinah C. Barriga and
Virginio E. Villamor, the Municipal Accountant and the Municipal Mayor, respectively, of
Carmen, Cebu, with malversation of funds. The accusatory portion reads:
That in or about January 1996 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of
Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C. BARRIGA, both public officers,
being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant, respectively, of the Municipality of
Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and custody public funds amounting to
TWENTY- THREE THOUSAND FORTY-SEVEN AND 20/100 PESOS (P23,047.20), Philippine
Currency, intended for the payment of Five (5) rolls of Polyethylene pipes to be used in the
Corte-Cantumog Water System Project of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, for which they are
accountable by reason of the duties of their office, in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, take, embezzle and convert
into their own personal use and benefit said amount of P23,047.20, and despite demands made
upon them to account for said amount, they have failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2X

The inculpatory portion of the second Amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27436, charging the said accused with illegal use of public funds, reads:
That in or about the month of November 1995, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, above-named accused VIRGINIO E. VILLAMOR and DINAH C.
BARRIGA, bothpublic officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant,
respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and
control public funds in the amount of ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIVE PESOS
(P1,305.00) Philippine Currency, representing a portion of the Central Visayas Water and
Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund) intended and appropriated for the projects
classified under Level I and III particularly the construction of Deep Well and Spring Box
for Level I projects and construction of water works system for Level III projects of specified
barangay beneficiaries/recipients, and for which fund accused are accountable by reason of the
duties of their office, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving
and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there, willfully
unlawfully and feloniously disburse and use said amount of P1,305.00 for the Spring Box of
Barangay Natimao-an, Carmen, Cebu, a barangay which was not included as a recipient of
CVWSP Trust Fund, thus, accused used said public fund to a public purpose different from
which it was intended or appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the
government, particularly the barangays which were CVWSP Trust Fund beneficiaries.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3X
The accusatory portion of the third Amended Information, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27437, charged the same accused with illegal use of public funds, as follows:
That in or about the month of January 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Carmen, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused Virginio E. Villamor and Dinah C.
Barriga, both public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Accountant,
respectively, of the Municipality of Carmen, Cebu, and as such, had in their possession and
control public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN and 96/100 (P267,537.96) PESOS,representing a portion
of the Central Visayas Water and Sanitation Project Trust Fund (CVWSP Fund), intended and
appropriated for the projects classified under Level I and Level III, particularly the construction
of Spring Box and Deep Well for Level I projects and construction of water works system for
Level III projects of specified barangay beneficiaries/ recipients, and for which fund accused are
accountable by reason for the duties of their office, in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously disburse and use said amount
of P267,537.96 for the construction and expansion of Barangay Cantucong Water System, a
project falling underLevel II of CVWSP, thus, accused used said public funds to a public purpose
different from which it was intended and appropriated, to the damage and prejudice of the
government, particularly the barangay beneficiaries of Levels I and III of CVWSP.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4X

The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and admitted the Amended Informations. The
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the said Amended Informations on the ground that under
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8294, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes
charged. She averred that the Amended Informations failed to allege and show the intimate
relation between the crimes charged and her official duties as municipal accountant, which are
conditions sine qua non for the graft court to acquire jurisdiction over the said offense. She
averred that the prosecution and the Commission on Audit admitted, and no less than this Court
held in Tan v. Sandiganbayan,5 that a municipal accountant is not an accountable officer. She
alleged that the felonies of malversation and illegal use of public funds, for which she is charged,
are not included in Chapter 11, Section 2, Title VII, Book II, of the Revised Penal Code; hence,
the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the said crimes. Moreover, her position as municipal
accountant is classified as Salary Grade (SG) 24.X
The petitioner also posited that although the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses
committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office, the mere allegation in the
Amended Informations that she committed the offenses charged in relation to her office is not
sufficient as the phrase is merely a conclusion of law; controlling are the specific factual
allegations in the Informations that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
her official duties and the commission of the offenses charged. To bolster her stance, she cited
the rulings of this Court in People v. Montejo,6Soller v. Sandiganbayan,7 and Lacson v.
Executive Secretary.8 She further contended that although the Amended Informations alleged
that she conspired with her co-accused to commit the crimes charged, they failed to allege and
show her exact participation in the conspiracy and how she committed the crimes charged. She
also pointed out that the funds subject of the said Amended Informations were not under her
control or administration.X

On October 9, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution9 denying the motion of the

petitioner. The motion for reconsideration thereof was, likewise, denied, with the graft court
holding that the applicable ruling of this Court was Montilla v. Hilario,10i.e., that an offense is
committed in relation to public office when there is a direct, not merely accidental, relation
between the crime charged and the office of the accused such that, in a legal sense, the offense
would not exist without the office; in other words, the office must be a constituent element of the
crime as defined in the statute. The graft court further held that the offices of the municipal
mayor and the municipal accountant were constituent elements of the felonies of malversation
and illegal use of public funds. The graft court emphasized that the rulings of this Court
in People v. Montejo11and Lacson v. Executive Secretary12 apply only where the office held by
the accused is not a constituent element of the crimes charged. In such cases, the Information
must contain specific factual allegations showing that the commission of the crimes charged is
intimately connected with or related to the performance of the accused public officer’s public
functions. In fine, the graft court opined, the basic rule is that enunciated by this Court
in Montilla v. Hilario, and the ruling of this Court in People v. Montejo is the exception.X
The petitioner thus filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to nullify the aforementioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner claims
that the graft court committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the same.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Special Prosecutor averred that the remedy of
filing a petition for certiorari, from a denial of a motion to quash amended information, is
improper. It posits that any error committed by the Sandiganbayan in denying the petitioner’s
motion to quash is merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It asserts that as ruled by
the Sandiganbayan, what applies is the ruling of this Court in Montilla v. Hilario and not People
v. Montejo. Furthermore, the crimes of malversation and illegal use of public funds are classified
as crimes committed by public officers in relation to their office, which by their nature fall
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It insists that there is no more need for the
Amended Informations to specifically allege intimacy between the crimes charged and the office
of the accused since the said crimes can only be committed by public officers. It further claims
that the petitioner has been charged of malversation and illegal use of public funds in conspiracy
with Municipal Mayor Virginio E. Villamor, who occupies a position classified as SG 27; and
even if the petitioner’s position as municipal accountant is only classified as SG 24, under
Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan still has jurisdiction over the said crimes.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor further avers that the petitioner’s claim, that she is not an
accountable officer, is a matter of defense.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that based on the allegations of the Amended
Informations and Rep. Act No. 8249, it has original jurisdiction over the crimes of malversation
and illegal use of public funds charged in the Amended Informations subject of this petition.
Rep. Act No. 8249,13 which amended Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides, inter
alia, that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by
public officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories
thereunder enumerated at the time of the commission of such crimes.14There are two classes of
public office-related crimes under subparagraph (b) of Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8249: first,
those crimes or felonies in which the public office is a constituent element as defined by statute
and the relation between the crime and the offense is such that, in a legal sense, the offense
committed cannot exist without the office;15 second, such offenses or felonies which are
intimately connected with the public office and are perpetrated by the public officer or employee
while in the performance of his official functions, through improper or irregular conduct.16X

The Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes and felonies
under the first classification. Considering that the public office of the accused is by statute a
constituent element of the crime charged, there is no need for the Prosecutor to state in the
Information specific factual allegations of the intimacy between the office and the crime
charged, or that the accused committed the crime in the performance of his duties. However, the
Sandiganbayan likewise has original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving crimes or felonies
committed by the public officers and employees enumerated in Section (a) (1) to (5) under the
second classification if the Information contains specific factual allegations showing the
intimate connection between the offense charged and the public office of the accused, and the
discharge of his official duties or functions - whether improper or irregular.17 The requirement is
not complied with if the Information merely alleges that the accused committed the crime
charged in relation to his office because such allegation is merely a conclusion of law.18X

Two of the felonies that belong to the first classification are malversation defined and penalized
by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and the illegal use of public funds or property defined
and penalized by Article 220 of the same Code. The public office of the accused is a constituent
element in both felonies.
For the accused to be guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential
elements:
(a) The offender is a public officer;
(b) He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
(c) The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and
(d) He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or
property.19X

For the accused to be guilty of illegal use of public funds or property, the prosecution is
burdened to prove the following elements:
(1) The offenders are accountable officers in both crimes.
(2) The offender in illegal use of public funds or property does not derive any personal gain or
profit; in malversation, the offender in certain cases profits from the proceeds of the crime.
(3) In illegal use, the public fund or property is applied to another public use; in malversation,
the public fund or property is applied to the personal use and benefit of the offender or of
another person.20X

We agree with the ruling of the Sandiganbayan that the public office of the accused Municipal
Mayor Virginio E. Villamor is a constituent element of malversation and illegal use of public
funds or property. Accused mayor’s position is classified as SG 27. Since the Amended
Informations alleged that the petitioner conspired with her co-accused, the municipal mayor, in
committing the said felonies, the fact that her position as municipal accountant is classified as
SG 24 and as such is not an accountable officer is of no moment; the Sandiganbayan still has
exclusive original jurisdiction over the cases lodged against her. It must be stressed that a public
officer who is not in charge of public funds or property by virtue of her official position, or even
a private individual, may be liable for malversation or illegal use of public funds or property if
such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public officer to commit
malversation or illegal use of public funds or property.

In United States v. Ponte,21 the Court, citing Viada, had the occasion to state:X

Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co-perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the
crime of malversation of public funds, committed by a public officer, have the penalties of this
article also imposed upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by some jurists and
commentators (among others the learned Pacheco) we can only answer the question
affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) we have already advanced in Question I
of the commentary on article 314. French jurisprudence has also settled the question in the same
way on the ground that the person guilty of the crime necessarily aids the other culprit in the
acts which constitute the crime." (Vol. 2, 4th edition, p. 653)
The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support their views as to the correct interpretation
of the provisions of the Penal Code touching malversation of public funds by a public official, is
equally applicable in our opinion, to the provisions of Act No. 1740 defining and penalizing that
crime, and we have heretofore, in the case of the United States vs. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4),
imposed the penalty prescribed by this section of the code upon a public official who took part
with another in the malversation of public funds, although it was not alleged, and in fact clearly
appeared, that those funds were not in his hands by virtue of his office, though it did appear that
they were in the hands of his co-principal by virtue of the public office held by him.22X

The Court has also ruled that one who conspires with the provincial treasurer in committing six
counts of malversation is also a co-principal in committing those offenses, and that a private
person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of
malversation.23X

We reiterate that the classification of the petitioner’s position as SG 24 is of no moment. The

determinative fact is that the position of her co-accused, the municipal mayor, is classified as SG
27, and under the last paragraph of Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 7975, if the position of one of the
principal accused is classified as SG 27, the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the offense.
We agree with the petitioner’s contention that under Section 474 of the Local Government Code,
she is not obliged to receive public money or property, nor is she obligated to account for the
same; hence, she is not an accountable officer within the context of Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code. Indeed, under the said article, an accountable public officer is one who has actual
control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. Even then, it cannot
thereby be necessarily concluded that a municipal accountant can never be convicted for
malversation under the Revised Penal Code. The name or relative importance of the office or
employment is not the controlling factor.24 The nature of the duties of the public officer or
employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to
account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or not malversation
is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a mere clerk in the provincial or
municipal government may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public
funds and misappropriates the same.X
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur

G.R. No. 169328             October 27, 2006

JULIAN A. ALZAGA, MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO, and MANUEL S.
SATUITO, petitioners, 
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari assails the April 25, 2005 and August 10, 2005 Resolutions1 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25681-25684, which respectively reversed the May 27,
2004 Resolution2 of the court a quo and denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.3X

On October 7, 1999,4 four separate Informations for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019 were filed against petitioners Julian A. Alzaga, Meinrado Enrique A. Bello and
Manuel S. Satuito relative to alleged irregularities which attended the purchase of four lots in
Tanauan, Batangas, by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS). Alzaga was the Head of the Legal Department of AFP-RSBS when one of
the lots was purchased. Bello was a Police Superintendent and he succeeded Alzaga as Head of
the Legal Department. It was during his tenure when the other three lots were purchased. Both
were Vice Presidents of AFP-RSBS. On the other hand, Satuito was the Chief of the
Documentation and Assistant Vice President of the AFP-RSBS.5X
Petitioners filed their respective Motions to Quash and/or Dismiss the informations alleging
that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over them and their alleged offenses because the
AFP-RSBS is a private entity created for the benefit of its members and that their positions and
salary grade levels do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 4
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 (1978),6 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 (1997).7X

On May 27, 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners’ motions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.
However, in a Resolution dated April 25, 2005, the Sandiganbayan reversed its earlier
resolution. It held that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation thus
subject to its jurisdiction. It also found that the positions held by Alzaga and Bello, who were
Vice Presidents, and Satuito who was an Assistant Vice President, are covered and embraced by,
and in fact higher than the position of managers mentioned under Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, thus under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration8 was denied, hence, this petition raising the following
issues:X
I
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER
NOT ACCORD WITH LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE THAT IT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE PETITIONERS
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE THAT THE ARMED FORCES
RETIREMENT AND SEPARATION BENEFITS SYSTEM (AFP-RSBS) IS A GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION
III
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE THAT PETITIONERS ALZAGA AND
BELLO[,] WHO WERE BOTH VICE-PRESIDENTS OF THE AFP-RSBS[,] AND PETITIONER
SATUITO[,] WHO WAS ASSISTANT VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE AFP-RSBS[,] ARE COVERED
AND EMBRACED BY THE POSITION "MANAGERS" MENTIONED UNDER SECTION 4 a (1)
(g) OF PD NO. 1606, AS AMENDED.9X

The petition is without merit.

The AFP-RSBS was established by virtue of P.D. No. 361 (1973)10 in December 1973 to guarantee
continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system, as provided for in R.A. No.
340 (1948).11 It is similar to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social
Security System (SSS) since it serves as the system that manages the retirement and pension
funds of those in the military service.12X
The AFP-RSBS is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a Board of Trustees and
Management Group,13 and funded from congressional appropriations and compulsory
contributions from members of the AFP; donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the
system; and all earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.14X

Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. No. 8249, grants jurisdiction to the
Sandiganbayan over:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

In People v. Sandiganbayan,15 where herein petitioners Alzaga and Satuito were respondents,

this Court has ruled that the character and operations of the AFP-RSBS are imbued with public
interest thus the same is a government entity and its funds are in the nature of public funds.
In Ramiscal, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,16 we held that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation under R.A. No. 9182, otherwise known as The Special Purpose Vehicle
Act of 2002. These rulings render unmeritorious petitioners’ assertion that the AFP-RSBS is a
private entity.X
There is likewise no merit in petitioners’ claim that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
them since their positions as vice presidents and assistant vice president are not covered nor
embraced by the term "managers" under section 4 of RA. No. 8249.

We held in Geduspan v. People,17 that while the first part of section 4 covers only officials of the
executive branch with the salary grade 27 and higher, the second part "specifically includes"
other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. In the latter category, it
is the position held and not the salary grade which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government owned and
controlled corporations, are under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.X
In the instant case, petitioners Alzaga and Bello were Head of the Legal Department while
petitioner Satuito was Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice Presidents
and Assistant Vice President. These positions are not specifically enumerated in RA. No. 8249;
however, as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, their ranks as Vice Presidents and
Assistant Vice President are even higher than that of "managers" mentioned in RA. No. 8249.
In sum, the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation and that it has jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners who were Vice
Presidents and Assistant Vice President when the charges against them were allegedly
committed.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan dated April 25, 2005 that the AFP-RSBS is a government-owned and
controlled corporation and that it has jurisdiction over the persons of the petitioners and the
Resolution dated August 10, 2005 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario

G.R. No. 149995               September 28, 2007

ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated September 17,
2001,1 affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 91-5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with
violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".X
On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in an Information
which reads as follows:
That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on
account or for the value the check described below:

Check No. : 326317PR

Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank

Paseo de Roxas Branch

In the amount of : P590,000.00

Postdated : February 15, 1988

 Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check when presented
for payment within (90) days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or make
arrangement for full payment within five (5) banking days after receiving notice.2X

On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioner’s non-apprehension despite the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest.3 On June 27, 1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set
aside4 after petitioner posted the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5X

Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September 1987, petitioner and
his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the
loan, petitioner issued a postdated check for the same amount in favor of the
complainant.6However, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored by the
bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make
good the said dishonored check.7X

Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant was an investment by
the latter who was his business partner. He argued that the subject check was not issued in
September 1987 to guarantee the payment of a loan since his checking account was opened only
on December 1, 1987.8 He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to issue a check in his
favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who would provide the partnership with the
necessary raw materials. Petitioner alleged that when the check was issued sometime in
February 1988,9 complainant knew that the same was not funded.10X

After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September 23, 1997 a
Decision11 finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:X

Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as charged and sentences
him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to indemnify the private complainant the sum
of P590,000.00 plus legal interest from filing of this case until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s
decision in toto.12X

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was issued as a guaranty for
the loan, thereby rejecting petitioner’s "investment theory". In ruling against the existence of a
partnership between them, the trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palana’s
General Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of
petitioner.13 The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money does not necessarily
amount to an investment of capital.X
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT
DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE
SUBJECT ASIAN BANK CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS
THE ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO ISSUE THE
SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE ACCUSED TO RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN
THE PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS REVERSALS.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT
THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, DESPITE THE
FACT THAT AT THE TIME THE ACCUSED WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691
EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT WAS ALREADY
IN EFFECT.14X

The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22; and 2)
whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioner’s argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the Regional Trial Court
which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A. 7691 is without merit.
It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action15and not during the arraignment of the accused. The
Information charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19, 1991. At
that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P. Blg. 12916 which provides:X

Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or
body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.
xxxx
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. - Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more
than one year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check
which fine shall in no case exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment17 at the
discretion of the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.18 The Metropolitan Trial Court
could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal action because its jurisdiction is only for
offenses punishable with a fine of not more than P4,000.00.X
The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial
Court"19 on June 15, 1994 cannot divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioner’s
case. Where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation
placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending before its
enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions. However, these only apply to
civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by
implication can it be construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases
pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.20 The jurisdiction of the
RTC over the case attached upon the commencement of the action by the filing of the
Information and could not be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the
jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in
nature.21X

After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioner’s conviction for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the
accused makes, draws, or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused
knows at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.
Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner admitted that at the
time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for payment of such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for
payment, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, he
received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private complainant but he did not
comply with it.22X

In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals upheld private complainant’s claim that the check was issued as a guaranty
for the loan and rejected petitioner’s "investment theory". The issue as to whether the amount of
the subject check represents the amount of the money loaned by private complainant to
petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is a factual question involving the
credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is one of credibility, the appellate court will not
generally disturb the findings of the lower court considering that it is in a better position to
settle that issue since it had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their conduct
during the trial, which circumstances carry great weight in assessing their credibility. In the
present case, we see no reason to reverse the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals that the amount of the subject check was a loan and not an investment.23X

Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the
same was issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some right, interest,
profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment,
loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by the other
side. Since it was established that petitioner received money from private complainant in
various amounts,24petitioner cannot now claim that the checks were not issued for value.25X

The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential suppliers is not a valid
defense. In Cueme v. People,26 the Court held thus:X

The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be shown to prospective
investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a defense. The gravamen of the offense
punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a bad
check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being deemed pernicious and
inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is
whether the law has been breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and absence of criminal
intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed or deposited in a bank,
produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What the law punishes is the issuance of a rubber
check itself and not the purpose for which the check was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose as well as
the terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly erode the faith the public
reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about
havoc in the trading and banking communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction
as to the kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such distinction can be
made by means of interpretation or application. What is important is the fact that petitioner
deliberately issued the checks in question and those checks were dishonored upon presentment
for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and
conviction of the petitioner.27X

The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is likewise
immaterial. Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments Law, is the first delivery of
the check.28 In the case at bar, the Information alleged that the check was postdated February
15, 1988 although issued in or about September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified that the
Checking Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check was issued
sometime in February 1988.X
The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and proof adduced during
trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and prejudicial to the accused so much so
that it affects his substantial rights.29 In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the
issuance of the subject check is material since it forms part of the second element of the offense
that at the timeof its issuance, petitioner knew of the insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot
be said that petitioner was prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it. Records show
that petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that he does not have sufficient funds in the
bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he proceeded to issue the same claiming that the
same would only be shown to prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.X
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioner’s allegation that private complainant knew that the
check is not funded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the subject check
was issued as guaranty for payment of the loan hence, was intended to apply for account or for
value. As such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly covered when
presented for payment.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of fine may be imposed in lieu of imprisonment
considering that the prosecution failed to prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time
offender.30 Hence, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 shall be imposed upon
petitioner.31X

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879 dated
September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of violating Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay private
complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the value of the check, with six (6%)
percent interest from date of filing of the Information until the finality of the decision, the
amount of which, inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%) interest, from
finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment, petitioner is ordered to pay a
fine of P200,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice 
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 177960               January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner, 
vs.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE
DURAN, Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:

Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August 2006 and
Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179
entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon.
Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.X

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap
with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries,
and Damage to Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:X
That at about 11:55 o’clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan,
Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and
imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully
loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda
Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number
NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie
Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less
serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the
above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V.
Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and
the other two offended parties above-mentioned.
An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental,
petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5X

On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran
filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended information.6 They sought to add the
allegation of abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo
truck abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside
the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-standers."7X

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that
the motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC
granted the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9X

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the
prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was
granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the
prosecution’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless
imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.X

In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of
the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents
failed to establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:X
An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence
presented by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said
allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been
proven. It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative
allegations.
xxxx
Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who
committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who
has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the
accused who committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of
the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving
the truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would
prove that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it.
There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no
death certificate that was offered in evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the
bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented
to state the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to
the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this
aspect and no documentary evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution
therefore failed to establish if indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of
Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the
Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on the expenses she incurred and the shock
she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. But sad to say, she could not also
pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for it. This
Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception.
xxxx
The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecution’s [evidence] conclusively
show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is
the proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of
the defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police
blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1
swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latter’s inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7"
which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1’s
ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be
cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. The cutting of the differential guide
cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing
vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that
caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.
xxxx
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things—the fact of the
crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged,
and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has
miserably failed to prove these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of
establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO
DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary
liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized
representative.

SO ORDERED.13X

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14alleging that the MTC’s
dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should
proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil
liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.X

In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered
the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The
RTC ruled that the MTC’s recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the
allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also
demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11,
Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the
MTC gave due course to the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under
Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accused’s civil
liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of
civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive
portion of the decision states:X
WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accused’s
acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for
further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.16X

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for
lack of merit in the order17 dated 12 September 2005.X

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and
resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the
properties damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the
proceedings before the MTC are
null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case
is Cuyos v. Garcia)18 which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to
take cognizance of the case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property
resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical
injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level
courts in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the
imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no proof of the total value of the
property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount of P1,500,000.00 as civil
damages, the case falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision
dated 17 August 2006 reads:X
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper
disposition of the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.19X

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision,20arguing that jurisdiction
over the case is determined by the allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule
on Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis
of the RTC’s jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is
the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful,
felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.X
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the
criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691,22 which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the
basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment.
Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTC’s order acquitting petitioner through a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.X
The petition has merit. It should be granted.
The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense
charged pertained to the RTC.
Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29
December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of
Appeals however declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same
offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears from the
records however that respondents’ attempt to amend the information by charging the
aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor’s
motion to withdraw their motion to amend the information. The information filed before the
trial court had remained unamended.23Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged only
with the offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating circumstance.X
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence,
commits any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. When
such reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended
the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods.
The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less
serious physical injuries and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless,
imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime
is committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes
through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions
punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the
penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its
medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 6 years).X
Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case
is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004,
Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A.
No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil
liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases
for recklessX
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should
fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear
and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the
criminal case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken
cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.X
As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner’s demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of
the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal
cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the
same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its
sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case
on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by
the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the
accused in double jeopardy.29 But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to
evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive
upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal
upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of
due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.30X

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC
gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the
prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as
mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTC’s conclusions were based on facts
diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence
presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the
procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.
The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the
matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.
We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the
MTC.
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the
civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c)
the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted. 31However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist32 or where the accused did not commit the acts or
omission imputed to him.33X
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right
to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the
accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and
civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What
the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence
and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by
way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35X

A scrutiny of the MTC’s decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the
findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that
petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner’s civil liability
has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that
it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and that
accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it
was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified
petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore,
the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the
truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and
not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty
of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the trial
court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioner’s acquittal has extinguished
his civil liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 17 August 2006
and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in
Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey
Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

RENATO C. CORONA* CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO**
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

G.R. No. 180122               March 13, 2009

FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES,Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
Resolution2 dated 2 March 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
26583 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Robert P. Balao, et al.," which denied petitioner
Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr.’s Motion to Quash. The Resolution3dated 18 October 2007 of said
court denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is likewise challenged in this petition.X
The antecedents follow.
In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original contract for the
infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to
A.C. Cruz Construction. The project, with a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was funded by the
World Bank under the Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983 between the Philippine
Government and the IBRD-World Bank.4X

A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990.5 In April 1991,
the complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.(Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project Engineer of the
project.X
A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of unsuitable materials
and road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the
fourth billing and Report of Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however,
discovered certain deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some
supporting documents, such as: (1) copy of approved concrete pouring; (2) survey results of
original ground and finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of earth fill actually rendered on site;
(4) test results as to the quality of materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work instructions
attesting to the demolished concrete structures.6X
The contractor failed to comply with the work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.’s further
verification, it was established that there was no actual excavation and road filling works
undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction. Fajutag, Jr.’s findings are summarized as follows:
1. No topographic map was appended, even if the same is necessary in land development works;
a discarded drawing sheet: "Spot Elevations and Existing Gradelines" of the project site was
found, but this contrasted significantly with the alleged joint-survey results in support of the
Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1;
2. No laboratory tests were conducted to ascertain unsuitability of materials, even if the same
should have been required as essential basis thereof;
3. There were no records of the excavation and disposal of unsuitable materials and of road
filling works having been made by the previous engineers, Rodolfo de los Santos and Noel
Lobrido at the time said activities were allegedly executed;
4. The excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works were overestimated to the
prejudice of the government:
a. in a 10.00 meter right-of-way (ROW) road, the entire width of 10.00 meters was used in
calculating the volume of cut of unsuitable materials when the undisturbed natural grounds on
both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters;
b. the mathematical calculation in determining the volume of cut of unsuitable materials are
contrary to the contract’s technical specifications which provides for cut measurements, i.e.[,] by
end-area method;
c. in a 10.00 ROW road, an effective width of 8.70 meters was used in calculating the volume of
road fill when the undisturbed natural grounds on both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters
apart;
d. the mathematical calculations in determining the volume of roadfill are contrary to the
contract’s technical specifications, specifically Section 3.11 thereof, i.e., by end-area method.

5. No laboratory test was made to ascertain the quality of imported road fill materials.7X

In a Memorandum dated 27 June 1991, the Project Office recommended the termination of the
infrastructure contract with A.C. Construction.8X

In its Report dated 12 August 1991, the Inventory and Acceptance Committee determined the
total accomplishment of the contractor at 40.89%, representing P3,433,713.10 out of the total
revised contract amount of P8,397,225.09 inclusive of Variation Order No. 1 in the amount
of P710,717.54. Thereafter, said Committee recommended that the temporary project
suspension imposed by the contractor, which incurred delays in the project completion, be
referred to the Legal Department for appropriate action.9X

On 19 August 1991, the Manager of the Legal Department issued a Memorandum addressed to
the General Manager of NHA endorsing approval of the Regional Projects Department’s (RPD’s)
recommendation. The NHA General Manager through a letter dated 29 August 1991 informed
the contractor of the rescission of his contract for the development of the said project upon his
receipt thereof without prejudice to NHA’s enforcing its right under the contract in view of the
contractor’s unilateral and unauthorized suspension of the contract works amounting to
abandonment of the project. Despite the rescission notice issued by the NHA per letter dated 29
August 1991, the contractor continued working intermittently with very minimal workforce until
such time as the award of remaining infrastructure works is effected by NHA to another
contractor.10X

In March 1992, the NHA Board of Directors, per Resolution No. 2453, approved the mutual
termination of the A.C. Cruz Construction contract and awarded the remaining work to Triad
Construction and Development Corporation (Triad). The contract amount for the remaining
work was P9,554,837.32.11 Thereafter, representatives from A.C. Cruz Construction, Triad and
NHA-Bacolod conducted a joint measurement at the site to determine the total accomplishment
of A.C. Cruz Construction inclusive of accomplishments after NHA inventory.X
The Project Office was subsequently informed by the Central Office that the accomplishments
made by A.C. Cruz Construction after the NHA inventory would be paid directly to said
contractor by Triad. As of 27 March 1992, Triad had issued checks in favor of A.C. Cruz
Construction amounting to One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which were received by Arceo
M. Cruz per Official Receipt No. 3003.12X

In its Memorandum dated 22 June 1992, the Regional Projects Department recommended to
the General Manager that the fund settlement to A.C. Cruz Construction be effected.13X

Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that had been in under the inventory report
as accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Fajutag, Jr. brought these
irregularities to the attention of the Commission on Audit (COA).
After its special audit investigation, the COA uncovered some anomalies, among which, are
ghost activities, specifically the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works and
substandard, defective workmanship. Laboratory tests confirmed the irregularities.14X

Further, according to the COA, while it is true that the fourth billing of A.C. Cruz Construction
had not been paid its accomplishments after the August 1991 inventory found acceptable by
NHA amounting to P896,177.08 were paid directly by Triad. Effectively, A.C. Cruz Construction
had been overpaid by as much as P232,628.35, which amount is more than the net payment due
per the computation of the unpaid fourth billing.15X

Consequently, petitioner, as manager of the Regional Projects Department and Chairman of the
Inventory and Acceptance Committee, and other NHA officials were charged in an
Information16 dated 5 March 2001, worded as follows:X

INFORMATION
The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses
ROBERT P. BALAO, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, JOSEPHINE O.
ANGSICO, JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, NOEL H. LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e) of REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-
GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT), committed as follows:
That in or about the month of March, 1992 at Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, ROBERT
P. BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR.,
JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, and NOEL H. LOBRIDO, Public Officers, being the
General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt. Office, Division Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD,
Project Mgt. Officer A and Supervising Engineer, Diliman, Quezon City, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their official
functions, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each other and with accused
ARCEO C. CRUZ, a private individual and General Manager of A.C. Cruz Construction with
address at 7486 Bagtikan Street, Makati City with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to be paid to
A.C. Construction public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS and THIRTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P232,628.35)
PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the
Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact no such works were
undertaken by A.C. Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by the Commission
on Audit, thus accused public officials in the performance of their official functions had given
unwarranted benefits, advantage and preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction
and themselves to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.17X

On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following
grounds: (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2) the
information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them have been
violated by the inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the
individual participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience with the
Resolution dated 27 March 2005.18X

On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioner’s
motion to quash. We quote the said resolution in part:
Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the alleged offense is
specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the
Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory
and final quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations of
Lazarte that the IAC, due to certain constraints, allegedly had to rely on the reports of the field
engineers and/or the Project Office as to which materials were actually installed; and that he
supposedly affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda dated
August 12, 1991 despite his not being able to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly
saw that all the members of the Committee had already signed are matters of defense which he
can address in the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to
accused Lazarte is denied for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as follows:
(1) Accused Robert Balao, Josephine Angsico and Virgilio Dacalos’ Motion to Admit Motion to
Quash dated October 4, 2006 is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006
attached thereto, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED insofar as the said
accused-movants are concerned.
(2) The Motion to Quash dated October 2, 2006 of accused
Engr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Let the arraignment of the
accused proceed as scheduled on March 13, 2007.

SO ORDERED.19X

Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. Pertinently, it held:
The Motion for Reconsideration of accused Lazarte, Jr. merely reiterated the grounds and
arguments which had been duly considered and passed upon in the assailed Resolution.
Nonetheless, after a careful review of the same, the Court still finds no cogent reason to disturb
the finding of probable cause of the Office of the Ombudsman to indict accused Lazarte, Jr.,
Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz of the offense charged. In its Memorandum dated July 27, 2004 and
May 30, 2006, the prosecution was able to show with sufficient particularity the respective
participation of the aforementioned accused in the commission of the offense charged. The rest
of the factual issues by accused Lazarte, Jr. would require the presentation of evidence in the
course of the trial of this case.
The Court also maintains the validity and sufficiency of the information against accused Lazarte,
Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz. The information has particularly alleged the ultimate facts
constituting the essential elements of the offense charged which are as follows:
1. that accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, and Lobrido are public officers being the Department
Manager, Project Management Officer A, and Supervising Engineer of the NHA during the time
material in the criminal information; and
2. that the said accused, in their respective official capacities and in conspiracy with accused
Cruz, a private individual and the General manager of A.C. Cruz Construction, have acted with
manifest partiality or evident bad faith and have given unwarranted benefits, preference, and
advantage to Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Cruz Construction or have caused damage and prejudice to
the government, by "[causing] to be paid A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount of
Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos and Thirty Five Centavos
(P232,628.35) supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and
Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by A.C.
Cruz Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit."
The other factual details which accused Lazarte, Jr. cited are matters of evidence best threshed
out in the course of the trial.20X

Hence, the instant petition which is a reiteration of petitioner’s submissions. Petitioner ascribes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan in: (1)
upholding the validity and sufficiency of the Information despite its failure to make out an
offense and conform to the prescribed form; (2) denying his motion to quash considering that
the remaining averments in the Information have been rendered unintelligible by the dismissal
of the charges against some of his co-accused; and (3) using as bases the Prosecution’s
Memoranda dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the
Information. In addition, petitioner avers that his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him had been violated for failure of the Information
to specify his participation in the commission of the offense. Petitioner also argues that the facts
charged in the Information do not constitute an offense as no damage or injury had been made
or caused to any party or to the government. Finally, petitioner maintains that the
Sandiganbayan lost its jurisdiction over him upon the dismissal of the charges against his co-
accused as the remaining accused are public officers whose salary grade is below 27.

In its Comment21 dated 21 December 2007, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, counters that separate allegations of individual acts perpetrated by the
conspirators are not required in an Information and neither should they be covered by evidence
submitted to establish the existence of probable cause. Allegations regarding the nature and
extent of petitioner’s participation and justification for his acts which constitute the offense
charged are evidentiary matters which are more properly addressed during trial. The
Ombudsman reiterates our ruling in Ingco v. Sandiganbayan22 that the fundamental test in
reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash is the sufficiency of the averments in the
information that is, whether the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish
the essential elements of the crime defined by law. And relying on the case of Domingo v.
Sandiganbayan,23 the Ombudsman states that informations need only state the ultimate facts;
the reasons therefor are to be proved during the trial.24 The Ombudsman moreover maintains
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitioner. The Ombudsman argues that it is of no
moment that petitioner’s position is classified asX
salary grade 26 as he is a manager within the legal contemplation of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a)
of Republic Act No. 8249.25X

In his Reply26 dated 9 October 2008, petitioner strongly asseverates that, according to the
Constitution, in a conspiracy indictment the participation of each accused in the so-called
conspiracy theory should be detailed in order to apprise the accused of the nature of the
accusation against them in relation to the participation of the other accused. A general
statement that all the accused conspired with each other without stating the participation of
each runs afoul of the Constitution.27Petitioner adds that the ultimate facts intended by law refer
to determinate facts and circumstances which should become the basis of the cause of action;
statement of facts which would be in complete accord with the constitutional requirement of
giving the accused sufficient information about the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him.28 Petitioner also avers that the Ombudsman’s reliance on and citation of the cases
of Ingco v. Sandiganbayan29 and Domingo v. Sandiganbayan30 is misplaced and misleading.X

Petitioner’s main argument is that the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently
averred the essential elements of the crime charged as it failed to specify the individual
participation of all the accused.
The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by
certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied,
the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The
evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.31X
This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies.32 And in the case at bar, the Court does not find
the Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion.X
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in
law.33 Matters aliunde will not be considered.34X

Corollarily, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.—A complaint or information is sufficient if it
states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable
the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes.35X

The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to
apprise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d’etre of the
rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.36 Another purpose is to enable
accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.37X

Pertinently, Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, reads:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.—In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.38X

The essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him;
2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or
in relation to his public position;
3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or private party;
4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and
5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence.39X

The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and
Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager, Project Management Officer A
and Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense
in relation to the office and while in the performance of their official functions, connived,
confederated and mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate
intent through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter,
A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The
felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the
amount of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites
and Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by said
construction company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.
On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual participation of the accused
in the allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court underscores the fact that under
Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of
committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a
crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its
commission such as in conspiracy to commit treason, rebellion and sedition.40X

When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime
must be set forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime
in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity
of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all
the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each
participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.41X

Notably, in People v. Quitlong,42 as pointed out by respondent, the Court ruled on how
conspiracy as a mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:X
x x x Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to
perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the
others. Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal
responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.
A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all
the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence
proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web
of the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of
particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment
contains a statement of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise
language, with as much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can
enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision
that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the
same facts. It is said, generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words
of the statute and reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged
with conspiring to commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient
statement of an overt act to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and
the contemplated crime in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-
844).
x x x Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant the
plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it.
Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or
that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the
felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words
"conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the
information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to
commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be
conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by
allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just
inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is
not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it.
In establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily
be shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused.43X

In addition, the allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be confused with the
adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of
actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concerted
action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A statement of
the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the Information.44X

The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence of any damage or injury caused to any
party or the government, likewise are matters of evidence best raised during trial.
As to the contention that the residual averments in the Information have been rendered
unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused, the Court finds that
the Information sufficiently makes out a case against petitioner and the remaining accused.
With regard to the alleged irregular use by the Sandiganbayan of the Prosecution’s Memoranda
dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the Information, the
Court finds adequate its explanation in the first assailed resolution, to wit:
It may be recalled that a reinvestigation of the case was ordered by this Court because the
prosecution failed to satisfactorily comply with an earlier directive of the former Chairperson
and Members of the First Division, after noting the inadequacy of the information, to clarify the
participation of each of the accused. In ordering the reinvestigation, the Court noted that the
prosecution’s July 27, 2004 Memorandum did not address the apprehensions of the former
Chairperson and Members of the First Division as to the inadequacy of the allegations in the
information.
This time, despite a reinvestigation, the prosecution’s Memorandum dated May 30, 2006 still
failed to specify the participation of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos. The most
recent findings of the prosecution still do not address the deficiency found by the Court in the
information. The prosecution avers that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, in
determining the viability of a motion to quash based on the ground of "facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense," the test must be whether or not the facts asseverated,
if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime as defined by law.
The prosecution contends that matter aliunde should not be considered. However, in the instant
case, the Court has found the information itself to be inadequate, as it does not satisfy the
requirements of particularly alleging the acts or omissions of the said accused-movants, which
served as the basis of the allegation of conspiracy between the aforementioned accused-movants
and the other accused, in the commission of the offense charged in the information.45X

Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly
pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position
with Salary Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or
controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls within
the ambit of its jurisdiction. Apropos, the Court held in the case of Geduspan v. People46 which
involved a regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation (Philhealth) with salary grade 26, to wit:X
It is of no moment that the position of petitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While
the first part of the above-quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the
salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive
officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a
private individual charged together with her.
The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case of
Philhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds,
not her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al. ruled:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense
committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of
the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with
other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public
official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3)
the offense committed is in relation to the office.
To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, a
government-owned and controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those
mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she was charged was
committed in relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject matter of the case.47X

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated
2 March 2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
On Official Leave
REYNATO S. PUNO*
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING** CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

G.R. No. 167409               March 20, 2009

RODOLFO B. GARCIA, Retired Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, Calatrava-
Toboso, Negros Occidental, Petitioner, 
vs.
PRIMO C. MIRO, OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS, Cebu City; DANIEL VILLAFLOR,
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, Bacolod City; HON. FRANKLIN M. COBBOL, Acting
Presiding Judge, MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental; and JULIETA F.
ORTEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. The
petition seeks to impugn the Orders dated November 23, 20041 and January 26, 20052 issued by
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental.X
The antecedents are as follows:

On January 31, 2003, Julieta F. Ortega (Julieta) filed a letter complaint3before the Ombudsman-
Vizayas, Primo C. Miro (Miro), charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia, then Presiding Judge of the
MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, and Ricardo Liyage (Liyage), ambulance driver,
Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, with the crime of murder and the administrative
offenses of grave misconduct and abuse of authority.X
The complaint arose from the death of Julieta’s husband, Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., on November
12, 2002, as a result of a vehicular mishap between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by the
petitioner and the motorcycle driven by the deceased.4X

The letter complaint was treated as two (2) separate criminal and administrative complaints
docketed as OMB-V-C-03-0076-B and OMB-V-A-03-0051-B, respectively.

On February 21, 2003, Deputy Ombudsman Miro approved a Joint Evaluation Report5 dated
February 12, 2003. In said evaluation report, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Antonio B. Yap
found the letter complaint to be sufficient in form and substance. He concluded that the offense
charged is not related to the functions of petitioner as a judge and can be the subject of
preliminary investigation.6 With regard to the administrative aspect of the case, GIO Yap
recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
appropriate action.7X

GIO Yap also received information that it would be difficult on the part of the prosecutors to
conduct the investigation because they regularly appear before the sala of petitioner for their
cases. The Provincial Prosecutor of Negros Occidental also manifested that they would inhibit if
the case would be returned to them. Consequently, he deemed that it would be more appropriate
if the Office of the Ombudsman would conduct the necessary investigation.8X

Corollarilly, on March 8, 2003, petitioner compulsory retired from the service.9X

After the preliminary investigation, GIO Yap found the existence of probable cause for the crime
of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide in OMB-V-C-03-0076-B. In a Resolution10 dated
August 12, 2003, he recommended the filing of the corresponding charges against the petitioner
but dismissed the charges against Liyage.11X

On January 27, 2004, an Information12 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was

filed against the petitioner before the MCTC Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, which was
later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5982-C.X

On March 1, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information13on the following
grounds: (1) that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (2) that the court
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and over his person; and, (3) that the
officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.14 Ultimately, petitioner prayed that
the information be quashed and be referred to this Court for appropriate action.X

On August 25, 2004, the MCTC issued an Order15 granting the motion and, consequently,
quashing the information.X

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court granted in an Order16 dated
November 23, 2004. The court opined, among other things, that the case had nothing to do with
the performance of petitioner’s official functions and that an administrative complaint against
him had already been filed, as such, the purpose of referring cases against judges and court
personnel to the Supreme Court has already been served.17 Accordingly, the MCTC set aside its
earlier order and denied petitioner’s motion to quash, the decretal portion of which reads as
follows:X
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the subject motion for reconsideration
filed by the prosecution is granted. Accordingly, the order of this court dated August 25, 2004,
granting the accused’s motion to quash the information is hereby reconsidered and set aside
and, therefore, the accused’s motion to quash the information is denied.

SO ORDERED.18X

Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration,19 which was denied in the Order20 dated
January 26, 2005.X
Hence, the petition.
At the outset, it is apparent that the present petition was directly filed before this Court, in utter
disregard of the rule on the hierarchy of courts which, thus warrants its outright dismissal. In
Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,21this Court stressed that "[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is
also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of
these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented," thus:X
The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and
should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original
jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely
necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should
generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before
constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are
not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also
within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these
courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented. This is, and should
continue, to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.22X

Later, we reaffirmed such policy in People v. Cuaresma23 after noting that there is "a growing
tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly
and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land." We stressed that -X
[t]his Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. x x x It is also shared by this
Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals x x x. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level x x x courts
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court’s docket. x x x.
Notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant petition for failure to observe the doctrine on
the hierarchy of courts, this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure
question of law.
Petitioner argues that respondents violated this Court’s pronouncements in Caoibes, Jr. v.
Ombudsman,24 directing the Ombudsman to refer all cases against judges and court personnel
filed before his office to the Supreme Court;25 and, in Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao,26 restricting not only the Ombudsman and the prosecution arm of the government,
but also other official and functionary thereof in initiating or investigating judges and court
personnel.27X

Petitioner’s contentions are misplaced.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the two cases cited by the petitioner involve the
performance of administrative and professional duties of the judges that were involved. Caoibes
concerns the judge’s dealings with his fellow member of the Bench, while Fuentes touches on the
acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions, particularly the issuance of a writ of
execution.
In Caoibes, two members of the judiciary got entangled in a fight within court premises over a
piece of office furniture. One of the judges filed a criminal complaint before the Office of the
Ombudsman and an administrative complaint before this Court over the same incident. When
the Ombudsman denied the motion of Judge Caoibes to refer the case to the Supreme Court, he
filed a petition for certiorari before this Court seeking the reversal of the order. In granting the
petition, the Court held that:
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint
against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty
bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the
Supreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.
xxxx

Maceda28 is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision

over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to
the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’
and court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action
against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.29X

In Fuentes, the issue was whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over the acts
of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the
Supreme Court.30 According to this Court:X

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers.
The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take
the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the
land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a
writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order
may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order
of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the
judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. "No other entity
or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch,
not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final
and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or
administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs
to the courts alone."31X

Indeed, supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals to the lowest ranked court employee, is vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court. However, that prerogative only extends to administrative supervision. As such,
the Ombudsman cannot encroach upon this Court’s task to oversee judges and court personnel
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws
of the land.
In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was in no way related to the
performance of his duties as a judge. The Information reveals:
The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses
JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA, of the crime of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under ARTICLE 365 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of November, 2002, at about 5:15 o'clock in the afternoon, at Sitio
Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon, Municipality of Calatrava, Province of Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused JUDGE
RODOLFO B. GARCIA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, with Salary Grade 26, then driving a Land
Cruiser Toyota bearing Plate No. FDB-193, along the road at Sitio Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon,
Calatrava, Negros Occidental, a public highway, did then and there drive or operate said vehicle
in a reckless, negligent and imprudent manner without taking the necessary precaution
considering the grade, visibility and other conditions of the highway, nor due regard to the
traffic rules and ordinances in order to prevent accident to persons or damage to property,
thereby causing by such recklessness, negligence and imprudence the said vehicle to hit and
bump the motorcycle driven by Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., bearing Plate No. FH-2324, with
Josemarie Paghubasan as his backrider, thereby causing upon Francisco C. Ortega, Jr. the
following physical injuries, to with [sic]:
xxxx
which injuries resulted to the death of Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.

CONTRARY TO LAW.32X

From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges against the petitioner before the MCTC
was warranted by the above circumstances. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the
penalty for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years. Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of Republic Act
No. 7691,33 provides as follows:X
SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. - Except in cases falling within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed
within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof.
As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case is beyond contestation.
Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s allegation, the administrative aspect of the case against him
was endorsed by the Ombudsman-Visayas to the OCA for appropriate action.34 In addition, an
administrative complaint against petitioner involving the same facts was filed by Julieta Ortega
with the OCA. The case was docketed as Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 03-1403-MTJ, and
is still pending to date. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact considering that he filed a
Comment and Answer to the Complaint-Affidavit of Mrs. Julieta Ortega,35 dated March 21,
2003. Thus, the Court’s mandate, as laid down in Caoibes, was more than satisfactorily
complied with.X
To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the MCTC is a criminal case under its own
jurisdiction as prescribed by law and not an administrative case. To be sure, trial courts retain
jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by judges of the lower courts.36X

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, is ordered to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No.
5982-C with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO**

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 169519               July 17, 2009

IRENORIO B. BALABA, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:

This petition for review1 assails the 15 December 2004 Decision2 and 24 August 2005
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27178. In its 15 December 2004 Decision,
the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Irenorio B. Balaba’s (Balaba) appeal of the 9
December 2002 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Loay, Bohol, Branch 50 (trial court),
finding him guilty of Malversation of Public Funds. In its 24 August 2005 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied Balaba’s motion for reconsideration.X
On 18 and 19 October 1993, State Auditors Arlene Mandin and Loila Laga of the Provincial
Auditor’s Office conducted an examination of the cash and accounts of the accountable officers
of the Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol. The State Auditors discovered a cash shortage
of P56,321.04, unaccounted cash tickets of P7,865.30 and an unrecorded check of P50,000
payable to Balaba, or a total shortage of P114,186.34. Three demand letters were sent to Balaba
asking him to explain the discrepancy in the accounts. Unsatisfied with Balaba’s explanation,
Graft Investigation Officer I Miguel P. Ricamora recommended that an information for
Malversation of Public Funds, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, be filed against Balaba with the Sandiganbayan.5X

In an Information6 dated 26 April 1995, the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged Balaba with
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds.7 The Information against Balaba reads as follows:X
That on or about October 19, 1993, in the Municipality of Guindulman, Bohol, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Assistant Municipal Treasurer
of Guindulman, Bohol and accountable public officer for the funds collected and received by
virtue of his position, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle and take
away from said funds, the total amount of P114,186.34, which he converted to his personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8X

During his arraignment on 17 May 1996, Balaba entered a plea of not guilty. Trial soon followed.
On 9 December 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty. The dispositive portion of the 9
December 2002 Decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court resolves that the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Accordingly, pursuant to law, the Court has no
recourse but to sentence the accused, Irenorio B. Balaba, to an indeterminate sentence of 10
YEARS AND ONE DAY as minimum, to 17 YEARS, 4 MONTHS AND ONE DAY of Reclusion
Temporal as maximum. He shall suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a
fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed which is P114,186.34.

SO ORDERED.9X

On 14 January 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated that he would file his
appeal before the Court of Appeals.10 On 6 August 2003, Balaba filed his Appellant’s Brief.11X

The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Appellee’s Brief, filed a Manifestation and
Motion12 praying for the dismissal of the appeal for being improper since the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal.X
In its 15 December 2004 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed Balaba’s appeal. The Court of
Appeals declared that it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case.
On 27 January 2005, Balaba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and asked that he be allowed to
pursue his appeal before the proper court, the Sandiganbayan.13 In its 24 August 2005
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Balaba’s motion.X
On 7 October 2005, Balaba filed his present petition before this Court where he raised the sole
issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying the
case to the proper court. Balaba claims that it was due to inadvertence that the notice of appeal
was filed before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Balaba adds that his appeal
was dismissed on purely technical grounds. Balaba asks the Court to relax the rules to afford
him an opportunity to correct the error and fully ventilate his appeal on the merits.
The petition has no merit.
Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should have been an appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249),14 which further
defined the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads:X
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. (Emphasis ours)
There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s appeal
before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft
of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks to appeal.

In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan,15 we ruled:X

An error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the correction in
designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once
made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even
if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the second
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of court would apply. The second paragraph of
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads:
"An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to
the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright." (Emphasis ours)
In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the appeal only after the
expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court promulgated its Decision on 9 December
2002. Balaba filed his notice of appeal on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the
Decision declaring its lack of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error
only on 27 January 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the
trial court. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s
appeal because of lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 15 December 2004 Decision and 24
August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27178.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice 
Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 167304               August 25, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (third division) and VICTORIA AMANTE,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005
dismissing Criminal Case No. 27991, entitled People of the Philippines v. Victoria Amante for
lack of jurisdiction.X
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Province of
Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. On January 14, 1994, she was able to get hold of a cash
advance in the amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar
expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of
December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no
liquidation was made. As such, on December 22, 1995, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao
issued a demand letter to respondent Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash
advance within seventy-two hours from receipt of the same demand letter. The Commission on
Audit, on May 17, 1996, submitted an investigation report to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that respondent Amante be
further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be filed against her under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the Philippines.
Thereafter, the OMB-Visayas, on September 30, 1999, issued a Resolution recommending the
filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against respondent Amante. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, on April 6,
2001, prepared a memorandum finding probable cause to indict respondent Amante.

On May 21, 2004, the OSP filed an Information3 with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria
Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445, which reads as follows:X
That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused VICTORIA AMANTE, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense in relation to office, having
obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of SEVENTY-
ONE THOUSAND NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P71,095.00), Philippine Currency, which she received
by reason of her office, for which she is duty-bound to liquidate the same within the period
required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P71,095.00, Philippine
Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, Amante filed with
the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND MOTION FOR
REINVESTIGATION4 dated November 18, 2004 stating that the Decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas) dated September 14, 1999 at Cebu City from of an incomplete proceeding
in so far that respondent Amante had already liquidated and/or refunded the unexpected
balance of her cash advance, which at the time of the investigation was not included as the same
liquidation papers were still in the process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of
Toledo City and that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because
respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26,
whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have
original jurisdiction only in cases where the accused holds a position otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No.
6758.X

The OSP filed its Opposition5 dated December 8, 2004 arguing that respondent Amante's claim
of settlement of the cash advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be
established during the trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has jurisdiction over
respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case, she was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore, falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A.
No. 8249. According to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it
did not make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads.X

The Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution6 dated February 28, 2005, dismissed the case against
Amante, the dispositive portion of which reads:X
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this case is hereby dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The dismissal, however, is without prejudice to the filing of this case to the proper
court.
The Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the movant is hereby considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner raises this lone issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE
INVOLVING A SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD MEMBER WHERE THE CRIME CHARGED
IS ONE COMMITTED IN RELATION TO OFFICE, BUT NOT FOR VIOLATION OF RA 3019,
RA 1379 OR ANY OF THE FELONIES MENTIONED IN CHAPTER II, SECTION 2, TITLE VII
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
In claiming that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case in question, petitioner
disputes the former's appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v.
Sandiganbayan.7 According to petitioner, Inding did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606,
as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that
the enumeration in Section (a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No.
8249, which was made applicable to cases concerning violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses
committed in relation to public office.X

Respondent Amante, in her Comment8 dated January 16, 2006, averred that, with the way the
law was phrased in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, it is obvious that the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan was defined first, enumerating the several exceptions to the general rule,
while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-
paragraphs of Section 4. Therefore, according to respondent Amante, the Sandiganbayan was
correct in ruling that the latter has original jurisdiction only over cases where the accused is a
public official with salary grade 27 and higher; and in cases where the accused is public official
below grade 27 but his position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4(a)(1)
(a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and if the
indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the
general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order
that the Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. The same respondent
proceeded to cite a decision9 of this Court where it was held that jurisdiction over the subject
matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law; it cannot be fixed by the will of the parties; it
cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the
parties, neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.X

In its Reply10 dated March 23, 2006, the OSP reiterated that the enumeration of public officials
in Section 4(a)(1) to (a) to (g) of P.D. No. 1606 as falling within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan should include their commission of other offenses in relation to office under
Section 4(b) of the same P.D. No. 1606. It cited the case of Esteban v. Sandiganbayan, et
al.11 wherein this Court ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated
while he was in the performance of his official functions.X
The petition is meritorious.
The focal issue raised in the petition is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. As a background,
this Court had thoroughly discussed the history of the conferment of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,12 thus:X

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.13X
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10,
1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.14X

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x
Specifically, the question that needs to be resolved is whether or not a member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A.
No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by
R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or
about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on May 21, 2004. The
jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of
the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.15 The exception contained in R.A.
7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as
the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause
of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:X
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies committed by public
officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under the said provision, no
exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is
to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of
the offense applies in this present case. Since the present case was instituted on May 21, 2004,
the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended by R.A. No. 8249 are the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A.
The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be
committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are
classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and
exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service
occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher
rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that
other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection
(a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, respondent Amante, being a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged commission of an offense in
relation to her office, falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, the Sandiganbayan, in its Resolution, dismissed the case with the following
ratiocination:
x x x the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Inding case, stating that the Congress' act of
specifically including the public officials therein mentioned, "obviously intended cases
mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, when
committed by the officials enumerated in (1)(a) to (g) thereof, regardless of their salary grades,
to be tried by the Sandiganbayan." Obviously, the Court was referring to cases involving
violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code only because they are the specific cases mentioned in Section 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606
as amended, so that when they are committed even by public officials below salary grade '27',
provided they belong to the enumeration, jurisdiction would fall under the Sandiganbayan.
When the offense committed however, falls under Section 4(b) or 4(c) of P.D. No. 1606 as
amended, it should be emphasized that the general qualification that the public official must
belong to grade '27' is a requirement so that the Sandiganbayan could exercise original
jurisdiction over him. Otherwise, jurisdiction would fall to the proper regional or municipal trial
court.
In the case at bar, the accused is a Sangguniang Panlungsod member, a position with salary
grade '26'. Her office is included in the enumerated public officials in Section 4(a) (1) (a) to (g)
of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. However, she is charged with
violation of Section 89 of The Auditing Code of the Philippines which is not a case falling under
Section 4(a) but under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended. This being the case, the
principle declared in Inding is not applicable in the case at bar because as stated, the charge
must involve a violation of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, in the instant case, even if the position of the accused is one of
those enumerated public officials under Section 4(a)(1)(a) to (g), since she is being prosecuted of
an offense not mentioned in the aforesaid section, the general qualification that accused must be
a public official occupying a position with salary grade '27' is a requirement before this Court
could exercise jurisdiction over her. And since the accused occupied a public office with salary
grade 26, then she is not covered by the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to the
discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan16 where this Court
ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of P. D. No. 1606, as amended
are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade.
According to petitioner, the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine
the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4(a)(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. No. 3019,
R.A. No. 1379, or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. This observation is
true in light of the facts contained in the said case. In the Inding case, the public official involved
was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with
violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public
official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on
Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public
officials' office. Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:X
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The
said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are
committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that as
long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is
alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had
the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to
have been indicted for "an offense committed in relation" to his office.17 Thus, in the case
of Lacson v. Executive Secretary,18 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held that:X

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided
it was committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b,
what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender
- that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4. x x x.

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,19 where the public official was charged with grave
threats, this Court ruled:X
x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi
during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected
with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public
respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the "accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing" and that "accused’s
violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or
chief executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to
private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been
irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege
speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly
assumed jurisdiction over the case.
Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said
offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended.
According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been
to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan
could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations
of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on
the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is
essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies
involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in
relation to the public officials or employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses
deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:
In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of
the term "offense committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle laid
down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v.
Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused’s office if
"the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the
crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that
"although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a
particular case may show that
x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices
and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x20X

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with
Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,21 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words.22 The intention of the lawmakers  who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers  to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed.23X
WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES*
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO**
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 171542               April 6, 2011

ANGELITO P. MAGNO, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, MICHAEL MONSOD, ESTHER LUZ MAE
GREGORIO, GIAN CARLO CAJOLES, NENETTE CASTILLON, DONATO ENABE
and ALFIE FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 petitioner Angelito P. Magno seeks the reversal of
the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 26, 20052 in "People of
the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Augustine A. Vestil, Presiding Judge, RTC Mandaue City, Br. 56, et
al." (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79809), and its Resolution dated February 6, 20063 denying
respondents’ motion for reconsideration.4 The assailed rulings denied the petition for certiorari
filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and upheld the ruling5 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaue City, which precluded Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy from acting as private
prosecutor in Criminal Case No. DU-10123.6X

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On May 14, 2003, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an information for multiple frustrated
murder and double attempted murder against several accused, including Magno, who were
public officers working under the National Bureau of Investigation.7X

During the scheduled arraignment, Magno, in open court, objected to the formal appearance
and authority of Atty. Sitoy, who was there as private prosecutor to prosecute the case for and on
behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.8 The oral objection was reduced to writing on July 21,
2003 when Magno filed an opposition9 before Branch 56 of the RTC of Mandaue City, citing the
provisions of Section 31 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6770.10X

The Office of the Ombudsman submitted its comment,11 while the accused submitted their joint
opposition.12 The respondents likewise submitted their comments to the opposition of the other
co-accused.13X

On September 25, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, ruling that "the Ombudsman is proper, legal
and authorized entity to prosecute this case to the exclusion of any other entity/person other
than those authorized under R.A. 6770."14X

In open court, the Office of the Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of the Order, which
the RTC later denied in its October 1, 2003 Order.15X

Proceedings before the CA

On October 13, 2003, the respondents, through the Ombudsman for the Visayas and Atty. Sitoy,
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.16They contended that the RTC committed a grave
abuse of discretion in prohibiting the appearance of Atty. Sitoy as counsel for the private
offended parties, as the Rules of Court expressly provides that a private offended party may
intervene, by counsel, in the prosecution of offenses.17X

Magno, in his comment18 filed on December 15, 2003, insisted that what he questioned before
the RTC was the appearance and authority of the private prosecutor to prosecute the case in
behalf of the Ombudsman.19He stressed that while the Office of the Ombudsman can designate
prosecutors to assist in the prosecution of criminal cases, its authority in appointing, deputizing
or authorizing prosecutors to prosecute cases is confined only to fiscals, state prosecutors and
government lawyers. It does not extend to private practitioners/private prosecutors.20 He
further stressed that while the Order of the RTC states that the Office of the Ombudsman is the
proper legal and authorized entity to prosecute the case, it did not affect the right to intervene
personally, as the Office of the Ombudsman can take the cudgels for the private respondents in
prosecuting the civil aspect of the case.21X

On February 16, 2005, the CA, in its original Decision, declared that the private prosecutor may
appear for the petitioner in the case, but only insofar as the prosecution of the civil aspect of the
case is concerned.22X

The respondents moved for the reconsideration23 of the CA decision. On September 26, 2005,
the CA amended its decision,24 ruling that the private prosecutor may appear for the petitioner
in Criminal Case No. DU-10123 to intervene in the prosecution of the offense charged in
collaboration with any lawyer deputized by the Ombudsman to prosecute the case.25X

Failing to obtain a reconsideration26 of the amended CA decision, Magno elevated the dispute to
this Court through the present petition for review on certiorari27 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Procedure.X
PETITIONER’S ARGUMENTS
Magno submits that the CA did not have jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari; the
power to hear and decide that question is with the Sandiganbayan.28 To support this contention,
Magno invokes Engr. Teodoto B. Abbot v. Hon. Judge Hilario I. Mapayo, etc., et al.29 where the
Court held that the Sandiganbayan has the exclusive power to issue petitions for certiorari in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction.30X

Even if the Court were to set aside this procedural lapse, Magno adds, the private prosecutor
cannot be allowed to intervene for the respondents as it would violate Section 31 of RA No.
6770.31 Section 31 limits the Ombudsman’s prerogative to designate prosecutors to fiscals, state
prosecutors and government lawyers. It does not, Magno maintains, allow the Ombudsman to
deputize private practitioners to prosecute cases for and on behalf of the Office of the
Ombudsman.32X

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, submitted its
memorandum on February 8, 2008. Substantively, the Ombudsman maintains that Atty. Sitoy
may intervene in the case pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery
of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may
intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
The Ombudsman maintains that Section 31 of RA No. 6770 did not amend Section 16, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court.33 Section 31 merely allows the Ombudsman to designate and deputize any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or
prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution in certain cases.34 The Ombudsman
opines that the two provisions of law "are not diametrically opposed nor in conflict,"35 as "a
private prosecutor may appear for the private offended complainants in the prosecution of an
offense independent of the exclusive right of the Ombudsman to deputize."36 The Ombudsman,
however, did not address the contention that the Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate
jurisdiction over the RTC in this case.X
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to grant the petition.
The Sandiganbayan, not the CA, has appellate jurisdiction over the RTC’s decision not to allow
Atty. Sitoy to prosecute the case on behalf of the Ombudsman
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1606 created the Sandiganbayan. Section 4 thereof establishes the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction:
Section [Link]. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corruption Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
xxxx
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27"
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may
be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of
the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary
writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature,
including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that
the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or to appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where
the civil action had theretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the
case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." [emphasis and underscoring supplied]
This is clear: the Sandiganbayan has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over resolutions issued by
RTCs in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction.

We reaffirmed this rule in Abbot.37 In that case, petitioner Engr. Abbot filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion for not dismissing
the information for Malversation thru Falsification of Public Document. The CA refused to take
cognizance of the case, holding that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petition.
Recognizing the amendments made to PD No. 1606 by RA No. 7975,38 we sustained the CA’s
position since Section 4 of PD No. 1606 has expanded the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to
include petitions for "mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."39X

In the present case, the CA erred when it took cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by
Magno. While it is true that the interlocutory order issued by the RTC is reviewable by certiorari,
the same was incorrectly filed with the CA. Magno should have filed the petition for certiorari
with the Sandiganbayan, which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the RTC since the
accused are public officials charged of committing crimes in their capacity as Investigators of the
National Bureau of Investigation.40X

The CA should have dismissed the petition outright. Since it acted without authority, we
overrule the September 26, 2005 Amended Decision of the CA and the subsequent denial of
Magno’s motions for reconsideration.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law, and
the CA’s judgment, issued without
jurisdiction, is void.
There is no rule in procedural law as basic as the precept that jurisdiction is conferred by
law,41 and any judgment, order or resolution issued without it is void42 and cannot be given any
effect.43 This rule applies even if the issue on jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal
or even after final judgment.44X

We reiterated and clarified the rule further in Felicitas M. Machado, et al. v. Ricardo L. Gatdula,
et al.,45 as follows:X

Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties’ action or conduct.
Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none,
by law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC, we declared that:
Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it
appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed.
This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is
understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let
alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.
We note that Magno had already raised - in his supplemental motion for reconsideration before
the CA46 - the ground of lack of jurisdiction before the CA’s Decision became final. The CA did
not even consider this submission, choosing instead to brush it aside for its alleged failure to
raise new or substantial grounds for reconsideration.47 Clearly, however, its lack of jurisdiction
is a new and substantial argument that the CA should have passed upon.X
The Office of the Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel to cure the jurisdictional
defect of its petition before the CA
The Ombudsman cannot rely on the principle of estoppel in this case since Magno raised the
issue of jurisdiction before the CA’s decision became final. Further, even if the issue had been
raised only on appeal to this Court, the CA’s lack of jurisdiction could still not be cured. In
Machado,48 citing People of the Philippines v. Rosalina Casiano,49 we held:X

In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:

The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends
upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the
case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on
appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not
be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel." However if the lower court had
jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that
the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be
permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position - that the lower court had jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petitioner’s petition for review on certiorari, and DECLARE the
Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79809, promulgated on
September 26, 2005, as well as its Resolution of February 6, 2006, NULL AND VOID for having
been issued without jurisdiction. The respondents are hereby given fifteen (15) days from the
finality of this Decision within which to seek recourse from the Sandiganbayan. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 175457               July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., Petitioner, 
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 175482
ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR., Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Ruperto A.
Ambil, Jr.1 and petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado Sr.2 assailing the Decision3 promulgated on
September 16, 2005 and Resolution4 dated November 8, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 25892.X
The present controversy arose from a letter5 of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern
Samar Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), to the Office of the Ombudsman,
praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an
accused in Criminal Case No. 10963 for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the
residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. In a Report6 dated January 4, 1999,
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) recommended the filing of criminal charges against
petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e)7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended. On September 22, 1999, the
new President of the IBP, Eastern Samar Chapter, informed the Ombudsman that the IBP is no
longer interested in pursuing the case against petitioners. Thus, he recommended the dismissal
of the complaint against petitioners.8X

Nonetheless, in an Information9 dated January 31, 2000, petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino
R. Apelado, Sr. were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, together with SPO3
Felipe A. Balano. Upon reinvestigation, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
Memorandum10dated August 4, 2000, recommending the dismissal of the complaint as regards
Balano and the amendment of the Information to include the charge of Delivering Prisoners
from Jail under Article 15611 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (RPC) against the
remaining accused. The Amended Information12 reads:X

That on or about the 6th day of September 1998, and for sometime prior [or] subsequent
thereto, [in] the Municipality of Borongan, Province of Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, [the] above-named accused, Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr.[,]
being then the Provincial Governor of Eastern Samar, and Alexandrino R. Apelado, being then
the Provincial Warden of Eastern Samar, both having been public officers, duly elected,
appointed and qualified as such, committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping x x x each other, with deliberate intent, manifest
partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally order and
cause the release from the Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim,
accused in Criminal Case No. 10963, for Murder, by virtue of a warrant of Arrest issued by
Honorable Arnulfo P. Bugtas, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, and
thereafter placed said detention prisoner (Mayor Francisco Adalim) under accused RUPERTO
A. AMBIL, JR.’s custody, by allowing said Mayor Adalim to stay at accused Ambil’s residence for
a period of Eighty-Five (85) days, more or less which act was done without any court order, thus
accused in the performance of official functions had given unwarranted benefits and advantage
to detainee Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

BAIL BOND RECOMMENDED: P30,000.00 each.13X

On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty and posted bail.

At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however,
that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the
dangers posed by his detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalim’s sister,
Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White, had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor
Adalim was to be held.
Consequently, the prosecution no longer offered testimonial evidence and rested its case after
the admission of its documentary exhibits. Petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
to Evidence with Reservation to Present Evidence in Case of Denial14 but the same was denied.X

At the trial, petitioners presented three witnesses: petitioner Ambil, Jr., Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-
White and Mayor Francisco C. Adalim.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001.
According to him, it was upon the advice of Adalim’s lawyers that he directed the transfer of
Adalim’s detention to his home. He cites poor security in the provincial jail as the primary
reason for taking personal custody of Adalim considering that the latter would be in the
company of inmates who were put away by his sister and guards identified with his political
opponents.15X

For her part, Atty. White stated that she is the District Public Attorney of Eastern Samar and the
sister of Mayor Adalim. She recounted how Mayor Adalim was arrested while they were
attending a wedding in Sulat, Eastern Samar, on September 6, 1998. According to Atty. White,
she sought the alternative custody of Gov. Ambil, Jr. after Provincial Warden and herein
petitioner Apelado, Sr. failed to guarantee the mayor’s safety.16X

Meanwhile, Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He
confirmed his arrest on September 6, 1998 in connection with a murder case filed against him in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar. Adalim confirmed Atty. White’s
account that he spotted inmates who served as bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his
political rivals at the provincial jail. He also noticed a prisoner, Roman Akyatan, gesture to him
with a raised clenched fist. Sensing danger, he called on his sister for help. Adalim admitted
staying at Ambil, Jr.’s residence for almost three months before he posted bail after the charge
against him was downgraded to homicide.17X

Petitioner Apelado, Sr. testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. He
recalls that on September 6, 1998, SPO3 Felipe Balano fetched him at home to assist in the
arrest of Mayor Adalim. Allegedly, Atty. White was contesting the legality of Mayor Adalim’s
arrest and arguing with the jail guards against booking him for detention. At the provincial jail,
petitioner was confronted by Atty. White who informed him that he was under the governor, in
the latter’s capacity as a provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he
submitted to the governor’s order to relinquish custody of Adalim.18X

Further, petitioner Apelado, Sr. described the physical condition of the jail to be dilapidated and
undermanned. According to him, only two guards were incharge of looking after 50 inmates.
There were two cells in the jail, each housing 25 inmates, while an isolation cell of 10 square
meters was unserviceable at the time. Also, there were several nipa huts within the perimeter for
use during conjugal visits.19X

On September 16, 2005, the Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed
Decision20 finding petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled
that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him
unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television and
other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules, no person
under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court
or when he is admitted to bail.21X

The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners’ defense that Adalim’s transfer was made to
ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any actual
threat on Adalim’s life but relied simply on the advice of Adalim’s lawyers. The Sandiganbayan
also pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within the 10-meter-high
perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from other prisoners.
Finally, it cited petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s failure to turn over Adalim despite advice from Assistant
Secretary Jesus Ingeniero of the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Consequently, the Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner Ambil, Jr. to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four
(4) months. In favor of petitioner Apelado, Sr., the court appreciated the incomplete justifying
circumstance of obedience to a superior order and sentenced him to imprisonment for six (6)
years and one (1) month to nine (9) years and eight (8) months.
Hence, the present petitions.
Petitioner Ambil, Jr. advances the following issues for our consideration:
I
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3(e) REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED, APPLIES TO
PETITIONER’S CASE BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT A PUBLIC OFFICER SUCH AS PETITIONER IS A PRIVATE PARTY FOR
PURPOSES OF SECTION 3(e), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, AS AMENDED.
III
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER ACTED WITH DELIBERATE INTENT, MANIFEST
PARTIALITY, EVIDENT BAD FAITH OR GROSS INEXCUSABLE NEGLIGENCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF SAID SECTION 3(e).
IV
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER AS PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR AND JAILER UNDER
SECTIONS 1730 AND 1733, ARTICLE III, CHAPTER 45 OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF
1917 AND SECTION 61, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 6975 HAS THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE
CUSTODY OF A DETENTION PRISONER.
V
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
FULFILLMENT OF A DUTY OR THE LAWFUL EXERCISE OF A RIGHT OR OFFICE.
VI
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE BEEN ACQUITTED BECAUSE THE
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.22X
For his part, petitioner Apelado, Sr. imputes the following errors on the Sandiganbayan:
I
THERE WAS MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND/OR MISAPPLICATION OF THE LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE IN CONVICTING ACCUSED APELADO, EITHER AS PRINCIPAL OR
IN CONSPIRACY WITH HIS CO-ACCUSED AMBIL.
II
IN THE ABSENCE OF COMPETENT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF
CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN PETITIONER, THE LATTER
SHOULD BE ACCORDED FULL CREDIT FOR THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER
PARAGRAPH 6, ARTICLE 11 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
THE COURT A QUO’S BASIS IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AMBIL AND HEREIN
PETITIONER OF HAVING GIVEN MAYOR ADALIM "UNWARRANTED BENEFITS AND
ADVANTAGE TO THE PREJUDICE x x x OF THE GOVERNMENT IS, AT THE MOST,
SPECULATIVE.23X

The issues raised by petitioner Ambil, Jr. can be summed up into three: (1) Whether he is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; (2) Whether a provincial
governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner; and (3) Whether he is
entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article 11(5)24of the RPC.X

Meanwhile, petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s assignment of errors can be condensed into two: (1)
Whether he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (2)
Whether he is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6)25 of the RPC.X

Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to
his case because the provision contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary nature. Since the
law punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private person, petitioner
avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to Mayor Adalim, a public officer.
Further, he claims good faith in taking custody of the mayor pursuant to his duty as a
"Provincial Jailer" under the Administrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes
himself entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of duty.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him and
petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following the orders of a
superior when he transferred the detention of Adalim. As well, he invokes immunity from
criminal liability.
For the State, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) points out the absence of jurisprudence
that restricts the application of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 to transactions of a pecuniary nature.
The OSP explains that it is enough to show that in performing their functions, petitioners have
accorded undue preference to Adalim for liability to attach under the provision. Further, the
OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private party for purposes of applying Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019 because the unwarranted benefit redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his
person as a detention prisoner accused of murder. It suggests further that petitioners were
motivated by bad faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn over Adalim despite instruction from
Asst. Sec. Ingeniero. The OSP also reiterates petitioners’ lack of authority to take custody of a
detention prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not entitled to
the benefit of any justifying circumstance.
After a careful review of this case, the Court finds the present petitions bereft of merit.
Petitioners were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act which provides:
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
In order to hold a person liable under this provision, the following elements must concur: (1) the
accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) he
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and
(3) his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.26X

As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging
official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over public officers charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606,27 as amended by R.A. No. 8249.28 The
pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:X
SEC. [Link].—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads[;]
xxxx
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade ‘27’
or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended.
xxxx
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond question. The
same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a Certification29 from the Provincial
Government Department Head of the HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is
classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the
lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil,
Jr., over whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried
jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction over
them - the Sandiganbayan.X
The second element, for its part, describes the three ways by which a violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019 may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

In Sison v. People,30 we defined "partiality," "bad faith" and "gross negligence" as follows:X

"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and report matters as
they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature
of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently
but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property." x x x31X

In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. There is no merit to
petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s contention that he is authorized to transfer the detention of prisoners by
virtue of his power as the "Provincial Jailer" of Eastern Samar.
Section 28 of the Local Government Code draws the extent of the power of local chief executives
over the units of the Philippine National Police within their jurisdiction:
SEC. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of the Philippine National Police.—
The extent of operational supervision and control of local chief executives over the police force,
fire protection unit, and jail management personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions
shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred seventy-five
(R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known as "The Department of the Interior and Local Government
Act of 1990," and the rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto.
In particular, Section 61, Chapter 5 of R.A. No. 697532 on the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology provides:X
Sec. 61. Powers and Functions. - The Jail Bureau shall exercise supervision and control over all
city and municipal jails. The provincial jails shall be supervised and controlled by the
provincial government within its jurisdiction, whose expenses shall be subsidized by the
National Government for not more than three (3) years after the effectivity of this Act.
The power of control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.33 An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he
may even decide to do it himself.34X

On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to
see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties."35 If the subordinate officers fail or
neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power of supervision means no more than the
power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the
law.36 The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does
not lay down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them.37X

Significantly, it is the provincial government and not the governor alone which has authority to
exercise control and supervision over provincial jails. In any case, neither of said powers
authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by law. On the contrary, subordinates
must be enjoined to act within the bounds of law. In the event that the subordinate performs an
act ultra vires, rules may be laid down on how the act should be done, but always in conformity
with the law.
In a desperate attempt to stretch the scope of his powers, petitioner Ambil, Jr. cites Section 1731,
Article III of the Administrative Code of 1917on Provincial jails in support. Section 1731
provides:
SEC. 1731. Provincial governor as keeper of jail.—The governor of the province shall be
charged with the keeping of the provincial jail, and it shall be his duty to
administer the same in accordance with law and the regulations prescribed for the
government of provincial prisons. The immediate custody and supervision of the jail may
be committed to the care of a jailer to be appointed by the provincial governor. The position of
jailer shall be regarded as within the unclassified civil service but may be filled in the manner in
which classified positions are filled, and if so filled, the appointee shall be entitled to all the
benefits and privileges of classified employees, except that he shall hold office only during the
term of office of the appointing governor and until a successor in the office of the jailer is
appointed and qualified, unless sooner separated. The provincial governor shall, under
the direction of the provincial board and at the expense of the province, supply
proper food and clothing for the prisoners; though the provincial board may, in its
discretion, let the contract for the feeding of the prisoners to some other person. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This provision survived the advent of the Administrative Code of 1987. But again, nowhere did
said provision designate the provincial governor as the "provincial jailer," or even slightly
suggest that he is empowered to take personal custody of prisoners. What is clear from the cited
provision is that the provincial governor’s duty as a jail keeper is confined to the administration
of the jail and the procurement of food and clothing for the prisoners. After all, administrative
acts pertain only to those acts which are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and
purposes already declared by the legislative body or such as are devolved upon it38 by the
Constitution. Therefore, in the exercise of his administrative powers, the governor can only
enforce the law but not supplant it.X
Besides, the only reference to a transfer of prisoners in said article is found in Section
173739 under which prisoners may be turned over to the jail of the neighboring province in case
the provincial jail be insecure or insufficient to accommodate all provincial prisoners. However,
this provision has been superseded by Section 3, Rule 114 of the RevisedRules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:X
SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail.-No person under detention by legal
process shall be released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to
bail.
Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal
process is vested in the court, not in the provincial government, much less the governor. This
was amply clarified by Asst. Sec. Ingeniero in his communication40 dated October 6, 1998
addressed to petitioner Ambil, Jr. Asst. Sec. Ingeniero wrote:X
06 October 1996
GOVERNOR RUPERTO AMBIL
Provincial Capitol
Borongan, Eastern Samar
Dear Sir:
This has reference to the letter of Atty. Edwin B. Docena, and the reports earlier received by this
Department, relative to your alleged action in taking into custody Mayor Francisco "Aising"
Adalim of Taft, that province, who has been previously arrested by virtue by a warrant of arrest
issued in Criminal Case No. 10963.
If the report is true, it appears that your actuation is not in accord with the provision of Section
3, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that an arrested person be delivered to the
nearest police station or jail.
Moreover, invoking Section 61 of RA 6975 as legal basis in taking custody of the accused
municipal mayor is misplaced. Said section merely speaks of the power of supervision vested
unto the provincial governor over provincial jails. It does not, definitely, include the power to
take in custody any person in detention.
In view of the foregoing, you are hereby enjoined to conduct yourself within the bounds of law
and to immediately deliver Mayor Adalim to the provincial jail in order to avoid legal
complications.
Please be guided accordingly.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.)
JESUS I. INGENIERO
Assistant Secretary
Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer." Said
petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and willful defiance to
official advice in order to accommodate a former political party mate,41 betray his unmistakable
bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions.X
Likewise amply established beyond reasonable doubt is the third element of the crime. As
mentioned above, in order to hold a person liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, it
is required that the act constituting the offense consist of either (1) causing undue injury to any
party, including the government, or (2) giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, administrative or judicial
functions.
In the case at hand, the Information specifically accused petitioners of giving unwarranted
benefits and advantage to Mayor Adalim, a public officer charged with murder, by causing his
release from prison and detaining him instead at the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. Petitioner
Ambil, Jr. negates the applicability of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 in this case on two points.
First, Section 3(e) is not applicable to him allegedly because the last sentence thereof provides
that the "provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses, permits or other concessions" and he is not such government
officer or employee. Second, the purported unwarranted benefit was accorded not to a private
party but to a public officer.
However, as regards his first contention, it appears that petitioner Ambil, Jr. has obviously lost
sight, if he is not altogether unaware, of our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan42 where we
held that a prosecution for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of
whether or not the accused public officer is "charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions." Following is an excerpt of what we said in Mejorada,X
Section 3 cited above enumerates in eleven subsections the corrupt practices of any public
officers (sic) declared unlawful. Its reference to "any public officer" is without distinction or
qualification and it specifies the acts declared unlawful. We agree with the view adopted by the
Solicitor General that the last sentence of paragraph [Section 3] (e) is intended to make clear the
inclusion of officers and employees of officers (sic) or government corporations which, under
the ordinary concept of "public officers" may not come within the term. It is a strained
construction of the provision to read it as applying exclusively to public officers charged with the
duty of granting licenses or permits or other concessions.43 (Italics supplied.)X

In the more recent case of Cruz v. Sandiganbayan,44 we affirmed that a prosecution for
violation of said provision will lie regardless of whether the accused public officer is charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.45X
Meanwhile, regarding petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s second contention, Section 2(b) of R.A. No. 3019
defines a "public officer" to include elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent
or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal from the government. Evidently, Mayor Adalim is one. But
considering that Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes the giving by a public officer of
unwarranted benefits to a private party, does the fact that Mayor Adalim was the recipient of
such benefits take petitioners’ case beyond the ambit of said law?
We believe not.
In drafting the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private
person" to describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a
reason. The term "party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance46as
distinguished from "person" which, in general usage, refers to a human being.47 Thus, a private
person simply pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more
comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private
capacity to protect his personal interest.X
In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the provincial jail and
detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s residence, they accorded such privilege to Adalim, not in
his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus, for purposes of
applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
Moreover, in order to be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the accused has
given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative or
judicial functions.48 The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a
more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit
from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability;
choice or estimation above another.49X

Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other than the
provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters, provided better
nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch television. Petitioners readily
extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that the mayor’s life
would be put in danger inside the provincial jail.
As the Sandiganbayan ruled, however, petitioners were unable to establish the existence of any
risk on Adalim’s safety. To be sure, the latter would not be alone in having unfriendly company
in lockup. Yet, even if we treat Akyatan’s gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim as a threat of
aggression, the same would still not constitute a special and compelling reason to warrant
Adalim’s detention outside the provincial jail. For one, there were nipa huts within the
perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to separate Adalim from the rest of the
prisoners while the isolation cell was undergoing repair. Anyhow, such repair could not have
exceeded the 85 days that Adalim stayed in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. More importantly,
even if Adalim could have proven the presence of an imminent peril on his person to petitioners,
a court order was still indispensable for his transfer.
The foregoing, indeed, negates the application of the justifying circumstances claimed by
petitioners.
Specifically, petitioner Ambil, Jr. invokes the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of right or office. Under paragraph 5, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts
in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any
criminal liability. In order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must be
satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of
the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.50 Both requisites are
lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s case.X
As we have earlier determined, petitioner Ambil, Jr. exceeded his authority when he ordered the
transfer and detention of Adalim at his house. Needless to state, the resulting violation of the
Anti-Graft Law did not proceed from the due performance of his duty or lawful exercise of his
office.
In like manner, petitioner Apelado, Sr. invokes the justifying circumstance of obedience to an
order issued for some lawful purpose. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who
acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any
criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to apply, the following requisites must be
present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order must be for some lawful
purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.51 Only the
first requisite is present in this case.X
While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then
Governor, neither said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out
was lawful. In his capacity as the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado,
Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail and, unarmed with a court order, transported
him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17(1)52 of the RPC.X

An accepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one
performing one part of and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the
attainment of the same object, and their acts although apparently independent were in fact
concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments.53X

Conspiracy was sufficiently demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful cooperation in

executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court
order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the
law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under detention by legal process is
elementary. Truth be told, even petitioner governor who is unschooled in the intricacies of the
law expressed reservations on his power to transfer Adalim. All said, the concerted acts of
petitioners Ambil, Jr. and Apelado, Sr. resulting in the violation charged, makes them equally
responsible as conspirators.
As regards the penalty imposed upon petitioners, Section 9(a) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a
public officer or a private person who violates Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 with imprisonment for
not less than six (6) years and one (1) month to not more than fifteen (15) years and perpetual
disqualification from public office. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act
No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, if the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not
exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same.
Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment
for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months is in
accord with law. As a co-principal without the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance
to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr. shall suffer the same penalty.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. We find petitioners
Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner Alexandrino R. Apelado, Sr. is, likewise,
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for nine (9) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO* LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 175091               July 13, 2011

P/Chief Inspector FERNANDO BILLEDO, SPO3 RODRIGO DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE
LOPEZ, FERDINAND CRUZ, and MARIANO CRUZ, Petitioners, 
vs.
WILHELMINA WAGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Branch III,
Pasay City, Public Respondent.
ALBERTO MINA, NILO JAY MINA and FERDINAND CAASI, Private Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
At bench is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 as petitioners Police Chief
Inspector (PCI) Fernando Billedo, Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3)Rodrigo Domingo, Police
Officer 3 (PO3) Jorge Lopez, Ferdinand Cruz, and Mariano Cruz (petitioners), allege grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Judge Wilhelmina Wagan (public respondent) of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City (RTC), in issuing the Orders dated: (1)May 8,
2006;1(2) July 12, 2006,2 and (3) August 26, 2006,3 in Civil Case No. 00-0089, entitled "Nilo
Jay Mina, et al. v. Mariano Cruz, et al." for damages. The assailed orders denied the Motion to
Dismiss filed by one of the petitioners, Ferdinand Cruz.X
The Facts:
The case stemmed from the arrest of complainants Alberto Mina, Nilo Jay Mina and Ferdinand
Caasi on February 27, 2000 along an alley, Interior 332, Edang Street, Pasay City, by
petitioners-police officers. They were reported to have been caught in flagrante delicto drinking
liquor in a public place. The complainants alleged that their arrest was unlawful and was only
upon the inducement and unjustifiable accusation of Ferdinand Cruz and Mariano Cruz (the
Cruzes).4 Thereafter, they were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay
City (MeTC) with a violation of City Ordinance No. 265 (Drinking Liquor in Public Places),
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 00-621.X
On March 20, 2000, after the said incident, the complainants filed Civil Case No. 00-0089
against the petitioners for damages.
Subsequently, criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioners before the City
Prosecution Office (CPO) and the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for Unlawful Arrest
and Violation of R.A. No. 7438 (Act Defining Rights of Person Under Custodial Investigation).
The CPO dismissed the case for lack of merit while the Ombudsman, in its Joint Resolution
dated October 13, 2000,5 dismissed both complaints for lack of probable cause, but
recommended the filing of 3 corresponding criminal informations for Violation of Section 3(e),
R.A. No. 3019. Thus:X
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that an Information
of VIOLATION OF R.A. 3019, SEC. 3 (e), for three (3) counts be FILED in court
against SPO3 RODRIGO DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE LOPEZ, MARIANO
CRUZ and FERDINAND CRUZ. While the other respondents, P/CINSP. FERNANDO
BILLEDO and SPOI DANIEL OCAMPO be ABSOLVEDfrom any criminal liability for lack
of sufficient evidence. Further, there being an administrative case filed before the PLEB-Pasay
City against police respondents, let the said forum continue its proceedings, and that the same
be considered CLOSED and TERMINATED, insofar as this Office is concerned.
SO RESOLVED.
After the criminal informations for Violation of R.A. No. 3019 were filed, the cases were
remanded to the CPO for the conduct of the new preliminary investigation on motion of the
accused.
On July 27, 2001, the CPO recommended the dismissal of the cases for lack of
merit.6 Pertinently, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito Vibandor explained that there was no
fault on the part of the Cruzes when they reported a group of individuals drinking along an alley
which prompted the police officers to respond to a call of duty. The facts and circumstances
surrounding their arrest were clearly spelled out in the Affidavit of Arrest of the police officers.
While it may be argued that the Cruzes may have been biased, there appeared to be a semblance
of truth to their report when private respondents were arrested by the police officers. Besides,
the subsequent filing of the corresponding information after the inquest investigation for a
violation of a city ordinance, is per sean imprimatur of the legality of their arrest.X
On August 29, 2001, the Ombudsman recommended the approval of the CPO Resolution.
Specifically, the Review and Recommendation7 of the Ombudsman reads:X

After giving a careful look at the records of the case and the facts and incidents that transpired,
the undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor agrees with prosecutor Vibandor that there is doubtful
merit of the offenses filed for Violation of Section 3 (e), RA 3019 against the accused. It appears
that the arresting policemen have in fact filed a case for Violation of Ordinance against the three
(3) complainants which was indorsed for Inquest Investigation and later filed in court. This
shows that there was substantial basis, of their performance of official duty, for otherwise, it
would not have passed the inquest. Hence, the presence of manifest partiality or evident bad
faith is gravely questionable to warrant filing of Violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, undersigned respectfully recommends for the APPROVAL of
the instant Resolution of Atty. Vibandor and the RECALL of the Informations filed with the
Pasay City Regional Trial Court.
Meanwhile, the complainants were found guilty by the MeTC for Violation of City Ordinance No.
265.8 Their conviction was affirmed by the RTC, Branch 114, Pasay City.9 Complainants’ Motion
for Reconsideration was denied.10X

Civil Case No. 00-0089, on the other hand, proceeded with the trial with the complainants
presenting their first witness. Before cross-examination, Ferdinand A. Cruz, one of the
petitioners, filed his Motion to Dismiss,11 alleging therein that it is the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the civil case and not the RTC; and that conformably to Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249,12 the complainants are barred from filing a separate and independent civil action.X

Public respondent denied the motion to dismiss in her assailed May 8, 2006 Order stating,
among others, that under Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of "unlawful arrest" is
punishable by arresto mayorand a fine not exceeding 500 pesos which, under R.A. No. 7691,
falls within the jurisdiction of appropriate Metropolitan Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as
the case may be, contrary to the movant’s claim that it was the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the ancillary action for damages.
Public respondent further explained that had there been a criminal case for unlawful arrest filed
before the MeTC, the civil case for damages should have been transferred to it, but, there was
none. She also stated that the movant failed to attach certified copies of resolutions/orders
dismissing the complaint for unlawful arrest. Thus, she could not simply rely on bare assertions
or conjectures but must resolve the issues raised based on competent proof.

Petitioner Ferdinand Cruz then filed a motion for reconsideration13 but it was denied in the
assailed July 12, 2006 Order.14 Public respondent wrote that the situation was not within the
purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. The provision suggests of two (2) situations. First, a
criminal action has been instituted before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the
requisite preliminary investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously
instituted with it. Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case, is still pending upon the
filing of the criminal action, in which case, the civil case should be transferred to the court trying
the criminal case for consolidation and joint determination.X
Considering the circumstances surrounding the case, the public respondent opined that the case
did not fall in any of the two cited situations. Thus, she wrote:
By reason of the dismissal of the criminal complaint for unlawful arrest during the preliminary
investigation stage, there was no criminal action for unlawful arrest, from which the instant civil
case was based, that was ultimately filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay City, the
appropriate court to hear and try such offense under R.A. 8249. Consequently, there is no
appropriate court to which the instant case should be transferred as mandated under Section 4
of R.A. 8294. There should not have been any problem had the criminal case for unlawful arrest
prospered or reached the appropriate court as ratiocinated by this Court in its Order dated May
8, 2006. But there was none.
xxxx
Well-settled in our jurisprudence is the rule that a cause of action for damages arising from the
acts or omission complained of as an offense is different and distinct from the prosecution of the
offense itself. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Besides, it is elementary that an accused may be
civilly liable even if acquitted of the crime charged.15X

A Second Motion for Reconsideration16 was filed but it was also denied by public respondent in
her questioned August 26, 2006 Order.17X

Aggrieved, petitioners come before this Court. While they admit that they are aware of the
principle of the hierarchy of the courts, they opted to directly appeal before this Court
considering that the issue to be resolved entails an interpretation of Section 4, R.A. No. 8249,
otherwise known as the "Sandiganbayan Act," which provides:
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-principal, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise jurisdiction over them.
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be
simultaneously instituted with and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such
civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, that
where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been
rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the
case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise, the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." [Emphasis Supplied]
In this petition, the petitioners presented this lone
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OR ANY OTHER COURTS
HAS THE JURISDICTION TO TRY CIVIL CASE NO. 00-0089 GIVEN THE
MANDATORY SIMULTANEOUS INSTITUTION AND JOINT DETERMINATION OF
A CIVIL LIABILITY WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THE EXPRESS
PROHIBITION TO FILE THE SAID CIVIL ACTION SEPARATELY FROM THE
CRIMINAL ACTION AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT
8249?18X

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of
discretion which can be attributed to the public respondent in issuing the challenged Orders
dated May 8, 2006, July 12, 2006 and August 26, 2006.
As correctly pointed out by the public respondent, the subject civil case does not fall within the
purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 as the latter part of this provision contemplates only two
(2) situations. These were correctly pointed out by the public respondent as follows: First, a
criminal action has been instituted before the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts after the
requisite preliminary investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously
instituted with it; and Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case, is still pending
upon the filing of the criminal action, in which case, the civil case should be transferred to the
court trying the criminal case for consolidation and joint determination.
Evidently, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no application in this case. Nocriminal action has
been filed before the Sandiganbayan or any appropriate court. Thus, there is no appropriate
court to which the subject civil case can be transferred or consolidated as mandated by the said
provision.
It is also illogical to consider the civil case as abandoned simply because the criminal cases
against petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage. A reading of the latter part of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civil case will only be considered abandoned if there
is a pending criminal case and the civil case was not transferred to the court trying the criminal
case for joint determination.
The criminal charges against petitioners might have been dismissed at the preliminary stage for
lack of probable cause, but it does not mean that the civil case instituted prior to the filing of the
criminal complaints is already baseless as the complainants can prove their cause of action in
the civil case by mere preponderance of evidence.
While the dismissal of the criminal cases against them for Violation of R.A. No. 7438 (Acts
Defining Rights of Persons Under Custodial Investigation) and unlawful arrest and the
conviction of the complainants for Violation of City Ordinance No. 265 (Drinking Liquor in
Public Place),19 might be factors that can be considered in their favor, the petitioners should
have proceeded with the trial of the civil case pending before the public respondent instead of
filing this petition.X
The rule is that an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and, therefore, not
appealable,20 "even on pure questions of law."21 Neither can it be subject of a petition for review
on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from
the judgment after trial. The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall
useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders
as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single
appeal.22X

All told, the Court finds that the public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO**

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 175074               August 31, 2011

JESUS TORRES, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution1 dated
September 6, 2006 and Resolution dated October 17, 20062 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 29694.X
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

In an Information3 dated November 15, 1994, petitioner Jesus U. Torres was charged with the
crime of Malversation of Public Funds before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 42, Virac,
Catanduanes, the accusatory portion of which reads:X
That on or about the 27th day of April 1994, or sometime subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Virac, Catanduanes, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Principal of Viga Rural
Development High School, Viga, Catanduanes, and as such by reason of his office and duties is
responsible and accountable for public funds entrusted to and received by him, to wit: PNB
Checks (sic) Nos. C-983182-Q for P42,033.32; C-983183-Q for P95,680.89; C-983184-Q
for P58,940.33, all dated April 26, 1994 in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED NINETY-SIX
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTY-FOUR PESOS and FIFTY-FOUR CENSTAVOS
(P196,654.54), Philippine Currency, representing salaries, salary differentials, additional
compensation allowance and Personal Emergency Relief Allowance from January to March 1994
of the employees of the said school, taking advantage of his position and committing the offense
in relation to his office, encashed said checks with the Philippine National Bank, Virac,
Catanduanes Branch and once in possession of the money, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence, misapply, misappropriate,
embezzle and convert to his personal use and benefit the aforementioned amount of money, to
the damage and prejudice of the Government.
Contrary to law.
Upon his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial on
the merits ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution
[Petitioner] Jesus Torres y Uchi was the principal of Viga Rural Development High School
(VRDHS). On April 26, 1994, he directed Edmundo Lazado, the school’s collection and
disbursing officer, to prepare the checks representing the teachers’ and employees’ salaries,
salary differentials, additional compensation allowance (ACA) and personal emergency relief
allowance (PERA) for the months of January to March, 1994. Lazado prepared three (3) checks
in the total amount of P196,654.54, all dated April 26, 1994, viz: PNB Check Nos. C-983182-Q
for P42,033.32; C-983183-Q for P95,680.89; C-983184-Q for P58,940.33 (Exhs. "A", "B" and
"C"). The [petitioner] and Amador Borre, Head Teacher III, signed the three (3) checks (TSN,
Aug. 30, 2001, pp. 4-8).
Upon the instruction of the [petitioner], Lazado endorsed the checks and handed them to the
accused. It was the custom in the school for Lazado to endorse the checks representing the
teachers’ salaries and for the accused to encash them at PNB, Virac Branch and deliver the cash
to Lazado for distribution to the teachers (Id., pp. 12-17).
The following day, April 27, 1994, the accused encashed the three (3) checks at PNB, Virac
Branch but he never returned to the school to deliver the money to Lazado (Id., pp. 8-9).4X

Evidence for the Defense

The [petitioner] admitted that he encashed the subject checks at PNB, Virac Branch in the
morning of April 27, 1994 but instead of going back to the school, he proceeded to the airport
and availed of the flight to Manila to seek medical attention for his chest pain. Two (2) days
after, around 4:30 o’clock in the morning of April 29, 1994, while he and his nephew were on the
road waiting for a ride, three (3) armed men held them up and took his bag containing his
personal effects and the proceeds of the subject checks. He reported the incident to the police
authorities, but he failed to recover the money (TSN, Nov. 12, 2002, pp. 11-25).5X

On August 31, 2005, after finding that the prosecution has established all the elements of the
offense charged, the RTC rendered a Decision6convicting petitioner of the crime of Malversation
of Public Funds, the decretal portion of which reads:X
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jesus Torres y Uchi GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds as defined and penalized under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, and to 18
years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification; and to pay the fine of P196,654.54 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.7X

On September 8, 2005, petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal,8 where it was indicated that he was
seeking recourse and appealing the decision of the RTC before the Court of Appeals.X

On February 10, 2006, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion9acknowledging that he filed
the appeal before the wrong tribunal. Petitioner eventually prayed, among other things, that the
case be referred to the Sandiganbayan for appropriate action.X
In its Comment10 filed on June 29, 2006, the Office of the Solicitor General prayed that the
appeal be dismissed outright, since transmittal to the proper court, in cases of erroneous modes
of appeal, are proscribed.X
On September 6, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules and Section 4 of SC
Circular No. 2-90, the instant appeal hereby is DISMISSED OUTRIGHT for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.11X

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,12 but was denied in the Resolution13 dated

October 17, 2006.X
Hence, the petition raising the sole error:
Whether the honorable court of appeals erred in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal outright
instead of certifying the case to the proper court.14X

Petitioner maintains that he inadvertently filed the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals
instead of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner implores that the Court exercise its sound discretion
and prerogative to relax compliance to sound procedural rules and to decide the case on the
merits, considering that from the beginning, he has been candid and straightforward about the
fact that the case was wrongfully filed with the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan.
The petition is without merit.

Paragraph 3, Section 4 (c) of Republic Act No. 8249 (RA 8249),15 which defined the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, provides:X
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.16X

Hence, upon his conviction, petitioner’s remedy should have been an appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. There is nothing in said paragraph which can conceivably justify the filing of
petitioner’s appeal before the Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, the Court
of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment petitioner seeks to appeal.17X

It must be emphasized, however, that the designation of the wrong court does not necessarily
affect the validity of the notice of appeal. However, the designation of the proper court should be
made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of
the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the
Court of Appeals. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court would apply,18 the relevant
portion of which states:X
Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. - x x x
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court, but shall be dismissed outright.19X
In the case at bar, petitioner sought correction of the error in filing the appeal way beyond the
expiration of the period to appeal the decision. The RTC promulgated its Decision on August 31,
2005. Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal on September 8, 2005. Petitioner tried to correct the
error only on February 10, 2006 when he filed his Manifestation and Motion. Clearly, this is
beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of the trial court. Therefore, the CA did not
commit any reversible error when it dismissed petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Besides, even if we look into the merits of his arguments, the case is doomed to fail. Contrary to
petitioner’s argument, We find that he is an accountable officer within the contemplation of
Article 21720 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, is untenable.X

An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, is one
who has custody or control of public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.21 The
nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he
received public money for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor
which determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or
employee. Hence, a school principal of a public high school, such as petitioner, may be held
guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same.X
Petitioner also posits that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the Information
without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the accusations against him. He
maintains that the Information clearly charged him with intentional malversation and not
malversation through negligence, which was the actual nature of malversation for which he was
convicted by the trial court. This too lacks merit.
Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of public
funds or property, or passively through negligence.22 To sustain a charge of malversation, there
must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case
may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the
reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally
punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.23X

More in point, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through
deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor.
Even when the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of commission of
the offense.24 Explicitly stated -X

x x x [E]ven on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of
malversation by negligence, but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case, his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still
be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or
the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and
conviction thereof is proper. x x x25X

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated

September 6, 2006 and October 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29694
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

G.R. Nos. 166948-59

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
- versus -
MEINRADO ENRIQUE A. BELLO, MANUEL S. SA TUITO, **** MINVILUZ S. CAMINA,
JOELITA TRABUCO, ABEL,IO JUANEZA, ROSALINDA D. TROPEL, FELIPE Y. VILLAROSA,
RAUL APOSAGA, HERMIE BARBASA and ROSARIO BARBASA-PERLAS, Respondents.
 DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the Sandiganbayan's criminal jurisdiction over graft charges filed against the
Legal Department Head of the Armed Forces of the Philippines-Retirement and Separation
Benefit System (AFP-RSBS) and his co-accused.

The Facts and the Case

In 1998 the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (the Committee) inquired into alleged anomalies at
the AFP-RSBS. After investigation, the Committee found that when acquiring lands, the AFP-
RSBS would execute two sets of deeds of sale: one, an unnotarized bilateral deed of sale that
showed a higher price and the other, a unilateral deed of sale that showed a discounted purchase
price. The first would be kept by the AFP-RSBS Legal Department while the second would be
held by the vendors. The latter would then use these unilateral deeds of sale in securing titles in
the name of AFP-RSBS. This was done, according to the Committee, to enable the AFP-RSBS to
draw more money from its funds and to enable the vendors to pay lesser taxes.
The Committee recommended to the Ombudsman (OMB) the prosecution of General Jose
Ramiscal, Jr. (Ret.), former AFP-RSBS president, who signed the unregistered deeds of sale
covering acquisitions of lands in General Santos, Tanauan, Calamba, and Iloilo for falsification
of public documents or violation of Article 172, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 171,
paragraphs 4 to 6 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), and violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019,

 Sections 3(e) and 3(g).

Acting on the Committee’s recommendation, the OMB filed with respect to the acquisition of
lands in Iloilo City informations before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and
26826-31 against respondents Meinrado Enrique A. Bello, Manuel S. Satuito, Rosario Barbasa-
Perlas, Hermie Barbasa, Minviluz Camina, Joelita Trabuco, Rosalinda Tropel, Felipe Villarosa,
Abelio Juaneza, and Raul Aposaga for six counts of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), and six
counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, RPC.
Satuito and Bello filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to quash the informations on the
ground that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case. On February 12, 2004 the
Sandiganbayan granted the motions and ordered the remand of the records to the proper courts,
hence, this petition by the People of the Philippines, represented by the OMB, which challenges
such order.

The Issue Presented

The only issue presented in this case is whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that
it has no jurisdiction over offenses involving the heads of the legal departments of government-
owned and controlled corporations.
 The Ruling of the Court
In its February 12, 2004 decision, the Sandiganbayan held that, not being a stock or non-stock
corporation, AFP-RSBS cannot be regarded as a government-owned and controlled corporation.
Consequently, respondent AFP-RSBS legal department officers did not fall under Section 4(a)(1)
(g) of R.A. 8249 that defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

 On motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, however, the Sandiganbayan changed its position
and ruled that AFP-RSBS is after all a government-owned and controlled corporation, having been
created by special law to perform a public function.
Still, the Sandiganbayan held that Section 4(a)(1)(g) cannot apply to the accused since Bello,
who held the highest rank among those who allegedly conspired to commit the crime charged,
did not hold any of the government positions enumerated under that section, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
Sec. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Emphasis ours)
Notably, in its February 2, 2005 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan defined the word "manager"
used above as one who has charge of a corporation and control of its businesses or of its branch
establishments, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion and independent
judgment.
The Sandiganbayan cited Black’s Law Dictionary, Revised 4th Ed., 1968 to support this
definition.
After a quick check of the same dictionary source but of a later edition, however, the Court finds
this additional definition of "manager:"
A manager is one who has charge of corporation and control of its businesses, or of its branch
establishments, divisions, or departments, and who is vested with a certain amount of discretion
and independent judgment.
The Sandiganbayan apparently overlooked the above definition that includes "divisions, or
departments," which are corporate units headed by managers. The United States case of Braniff
v. McPherren
 also referred to "divisions" and "departments" in relation to the position of "manager." Under this
definition, respondent Bello would fit into the term "manager," he having charge of the AFP-RSBS Legal
Department when the questioned transactions took place.
In clarifying the meaning of the term "manager" as used in Section 4(a)(1)(g), the
Sandiganbayan also invoked the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Under this doctrine, a proper
construction may be had by considering the company of words in which the term or phrase in
question is founded or with which it is associated.

Given that the word "manager" was in the company of the words "presidents, directors or trustees," the
clear intent, according to the Sandiganbayan, is to limit the meaning of the term "manager" to officers
who have overall control and supervision of government-owned and controlled corporations.
But as the OMB puts it, the enumeration of the officials in each of the categories in Section 4(a)
(1) should be understood to refer to a range of positions within a government corporation. By
the variety of the functions they perform, the "presidents, directors or trustees, or managers"
cannot be taken to refer only to those who exercise "overall" control and supervision of such
corporations.
The directors or trustees of government-owned and controlled corporations do not, for example,
exercise overall supervision and control; when they act collectively as a board, the directors or
trustees merely lay down policies for the operating officers to implement. Since "managers"
definitely do not have the same responsibilities as directors and trustees or as presidents, they
belong to a distinct class of corporate officers that, under the definition above, has charge of a
corporation’s "divisions or departments." This brings Bello’s position within the definition.
Respondent Bello also argues that the Sandiganbayan does not exercise jurisdiction over him
because his rank at the time of the acts complained of was merely that of Police Superintendent
in the Philippine National Police. But the criminal information does not charge him for offenses
relating to the regular police work of a police officer of his rank. He is rather charged for offenses
he committed in relation to his office, namely, that of a "manager" of the Legal Department of
AFP-RSBS, a government-owned and controlled corporation.
What is needed is that the public officials mentioned by law must commit the offense described
in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 while in the performance of official duties or in relation to the office
being held.

 Here, the OMB charged Bello of using his office as Legal Department Head to manipulate the
documentations of AFP-RSBS land acquisitions to the prejudice of the government.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the Sandiganbayan decision

dated February 12, 2004 and resolution dated February 2, 2005 in Criminal Cases 26770-75 and
26826-31, and DIRECTS the Sandiganbayan to REINSTATE these cases,
immediately ARRAIGN all the accused, and resolve accused Raul Aposaga’s motion for
reinvestigation.
SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.** JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ***

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

[ GR Nos. 169823-24, Sep 11, 2013 ]

HERMINIO T. DISINI v. SANDIGANBAYAN +

DECISION
G.R. Nos. 169823-24

BERSAMIN, J.:
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal
action involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual
considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family,
subordinates and close associates.

The Case

Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorarithe

resolutions promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini,
on January 17, 2005 (denying his motion to quash the informations)[1] and
August 10, 2005 (denying his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his
motion to quash),[2] alleging that the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Antecedents

The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30, 2004
charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials,
penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code (Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (Criminal Case No. 28002).

The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 28001

That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T.
DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of
the Philippines Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting of accused DISINI's ownership of two
billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial
and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 billion) shares of stock in The
Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock having then a book value of
P100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said Ferdinand E.
Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical construction work on the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project ("Project") of the National Power
Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused
Disini seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering
and architectural design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in
fact said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and
committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the
aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said Burns
and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and
architectural design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts
constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Criminal Case No. 28002

That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T.
DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President of
the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend
and golfing partner of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the
husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini who was the first cousin of then First
Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family physician of the Marcos family,
taking advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free access,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with
the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) Project ("PROJECT") of the
National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive
from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million
U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00), more or less, and also from Westinghouse
Electric Corporation (WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen
Million U.S. Dollars ($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities
were then having business, transaction, and application with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for and in consideration
of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and
obtain, the contract for the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the
engineering and architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said
PROJECT, and subsequently, request and receive subcontracts for Power
Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and Engineering and
Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and controlled by said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts constituted
kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary advantages, for
securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain, through
the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe the
engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the
construction contract, for the PROJECT.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,[5] alleging that the
criminal actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the
informations did not conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution
opposed the motion to quash.[6]

On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for

arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan's favorable action on his motion
for permission to travel abroad.[7] He then entered a plea of not guilty to
both informations.

As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division)

promulgated its first assailed resolution denying the motion to quash.[8]

Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17,
2005,[9] but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on
August 10, 2005 through the second assailed resolution.[10]
 Issues

Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari,

alleging that:

THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE

OFFENSES CHARGED.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT

SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249
DO NOT APPLY SINCE THE INFORMATIONS WERE "FILED
PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1, 2, 14 AND 14-A".

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT ASSUMED

JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THE REQUISITE UNDER
SECTION 4 OF R.A. 8249 THAT THE ACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC
OFFICER.

THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVE ABUSE

OF DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED,
DISREGARDED, AND DENIED PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO PRESCRIPTION.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DETERMINING THE

APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DETERMINING THE
COMMENCEMENT OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DETERMINING THE

POINT OF INTERRUPTION OF THE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLY ABSENT

ELEMENTS IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED TO UPHOLD THE
'SUFFICIENCY' OF THE INFORMATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASE NOS.
28001 AND 28002, THE RESPONDENT COURT DEMONSTRATED ITS
PREJUDGMENT OVER THE SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF ITS DISCRETION.

THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE
THEIR UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PRESCRIBED FORM,
THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING THE ACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.[11]

Ruling

The petition for certiorari has no merit.

1.
Preliminary Considerations

To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in
G.R. No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,[12] which
involved the civil action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution, and damages (Civil Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v.
Herminio T. Disini, et al.) filed by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) against Disini and others.[13] The amended complaint
in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had acted in unlawful concert
with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating ill-gotten wealth
through the misappropriation of public funds, plunder of the nation's
wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption,[14] as follows:

4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant

Ferdinand E. Marcos and the husband of the first cousin of Defendant
Imelda R. Marcos. By reason of this relationship x xx defendant Herminio
Disini obtained staggering commissions from the Westinghouse in
exchange for securing the nuclear power plant contract from the Philippine
government.

xxxx

13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves

and/or in unlawful concert, active collaboration and willing participation of
defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their association and influence with the latter defendant
spouses in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets,
engaged in devices, schemes, and stratagems such as:

xxxx

(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries,
Inc. as conduits through which defendants received, kept, and/or invested
improper payments such as unconscionably large commissions from
foreign corporations like the Westinghouse Corporation;

(d) secured special concessions, privileges and/or benefits from defendants

Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, such as a contract awarded to
Westinghouse Corporation which built an inoperable nuclear facility in the
country for a scandalously exorbitant amount that included defendant's
staggering commissions defendant Rodolfo Jacob executed for HGI the
contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;[15]
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,[16] the PCGG transmitted the records
of Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit:
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319 92320) dated October 2,
1990, we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the
records of the attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said
Cojuangco case in certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are
also parts of the causes of action in the civil complaints[-] filed with the
Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties or assets of the respondents have been
sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents are also party defendants in the
civil cases.

Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court,
we are constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached
case in view of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial
investigation in cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x
Ostensibly, the PCGG's letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling
in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government (Cojuangco, Jr.),[17] viz:

x x x [T]he PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed
a civil complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially
the same illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal
complaints the Solicitor General filed with the PCGG for preliminary
investigation. x x x.

Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders
against petitioner's properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding
that the same were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal
disposition of coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG
cannot possibly conduct the preliminary investigation of said
criminal complaints with the "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge,"as it has prejudged the matter. x x x[18]

xxxx

The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the
PCGG cannot inspire belief that it could be impartial in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation of the aforesaid
complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It cannot possibly
preside in the said preliminary investigation with an even hand.

The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can
be promoted if the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting
the preliminary investigation of the complaints subject of this
petition and the petition for intervention and that the records of
the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an
independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over
cases of this nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation
and take appropriate action.[19] (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following
its conduct of the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus
transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court
in Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,[20] with the
Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations that
became the subject of Disini's motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002.

2.
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the
offenses charged

Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses

charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002. He
contends that: (1) the informations did not allege that the charges were
being filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses charged were not of the nature
contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A because the allegations in the
informations neither pertained to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth, nor
involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the Office of the
Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private individual not
charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public officer, he
should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the Sandiganbayan.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001
and Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4(c)
of R.A. No. 8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal
complaints initially filed by the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O.
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal
cases to recover ill-gotten wealth not only of the Marcoses and their
immediately family but also of their relatives, subordinates and close
associates.

We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.

Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the
Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A.
No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:

xxxx

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection

with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold
emphasis supplied)

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding

to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

xxxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or

accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed
in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxxx
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal
complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman
taking over the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued
in Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to
the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the PCGG would not be an
impartial office following its finding of a prima facie case being established
against Disini to sustain the institution of Civil Case No. 0013.

Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the
informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002
involved the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through
the intervention of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to
do the engineering and architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the
construction of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given
their sameness in subject matter, to still expressly aver in Criminal Case
No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that the charges involved the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary.[21] With Criminal Case
No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined with Civil Case
No. 0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal prosecutions
against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged
from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which
tasked the PCGG with assisting the President in "[t]he recovery of all ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether
located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled
by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking
undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted the authority of
the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos' immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as
to their private or public status.

Contrary to Disini's argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4

of R.A. No. 8249[22] applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4a and
Subsection 4b of R.A. No. 8249, the full text of which follows:

xxxx

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of

regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang

panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other
provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod,

city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position
of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent
or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or

-controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade

'27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the

Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without

prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27'

and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
(bold emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27
or higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,
signifying the plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to
such public officials. To include within the ambit of the qualifying clause
the persons covered by Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive
mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and
in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. In view of this, the
Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini's being a private individual, and
despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public official in the commission of the offenses charged.

3.
The offenses charged in the informations have not yet prescribed

In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered,

namely: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time
when the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the
prescriptive period is interrupted.[23]

The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had
offered, promised and given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that
said gifts were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts,
respectively, to do the engineering and architectural design of and to
construct the PNPPP; and that President Marcos did award or cause to be
awarded the respective contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which
acts constituted the crime of corruption of public officials.[24]

The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No.

28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the "same
penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted."[25] Under the second
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery),[26] if
the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an
act that does not constitute a crime, and the officer executes the act, he
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and minimum
periods and a fine of not less than three times the value of the gift.
Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,[27] the period of
prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against
Disini is 15 years.

As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No.
3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed
under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment,
the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It became settled in People v.
Pacificador,[28] however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15 years
would not apply to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16, 1982, because the
longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to
the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to
February 1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the
applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v.
Pacificador.

For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof

provides that prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to
offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 3326[29] states:

Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted

against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto[30] is also enlightening, viz:

Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the
crime is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no
knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,"
does not prevent the running of the prescriptive period. An exception to
this rule is the "blameless ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of
Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only
upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a
cause of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the
statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no
reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action." It was in
this accord that the Court confronted the question on the running of the
prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the cornerstone of our
1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of
prescription too. Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of
the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of
the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.

Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime
which is the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in
1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the
complaint was filed in 1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence,
prescription has not yet set in. The rationale for this was succinctly
discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA
Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among
involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another
pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during
the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of
these transactions. (Citations omitted)[31]
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period
began to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project
were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal
cases were the offshoot of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth
instead of behest loans like in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the connivance and conspiracy
among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries of the favors
illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the State,
as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes
charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly
publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or
transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG's
exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima
facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against
Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a
public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been
regularly done in the course of official functions.[32]Considering further that
during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to assail the legality
of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the discovery of
the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.

We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records
transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991
for the conduct the preliminary investigation.[33] In accordance with Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code[34] and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v.
Department of Justice,[35] the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office
of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of
prescription. According to Panaguiton:[36]

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which

involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both
special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by
the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Interport Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange
Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act, another special
law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in
criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive,

thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of

Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law,
with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the
charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the
executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either
executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted
against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.
The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense
charged is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is
the filing of the complaint or information in the office of the public
prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that interrupts the
period of prescription. Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because
only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of the discovery of the offenses
charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the criminal complaints
in the Office of the Ombudsman.

4.
The informations were sufficient in form and substance

It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact

necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss
or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no
offense may be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining
whether a motion to quash may be sustained based on this ground is
whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will establish the
essential elements of the offense as defined in the law.[37] Extrinsic matters
or evidence aliunde are not considered.[38] The test does not require
absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense;
otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to
proceed to trial.

The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public

officials) and Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.
3019) have sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or

information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall
be included in the complaint or information.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public
officers specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to
February 1986 in Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with
then President Marcos, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered,
promised and gave gifts and presents to President Marcos, who, by taking
undue advantage of his position as President, committed the offense in
relation to his office, and in consideration of the gifts and presents offered,
promised and given by Disini, President Marcos caused to be awarded to
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts to do the
engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The
felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be
awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and
promises offered by Disini to President Marcos.
The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of
the Revised Penal Code are:

That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a

public officer; and

That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a
public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable
for direct bribery or indirect bribery.

The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if

hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the
crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise,
and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration
of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of
the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his
position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed
under circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery.[39] The
second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public
officer to be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would
make him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging
that President Marcos received or accepted Disini's offers, promises and
gifts an essential element in direct bribery the allegation that President
Marcos caused the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and
Westinghouse sufficed to place him under circumstances of being liable
for direct bribery.

The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation

of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the
offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:

That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;

That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close

personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any
present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some
business, transaction, application, request, or contract with the
government;

That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal
relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request,
or contract with the government.

The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of

R.A. No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of
the offense, considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia
Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos,
and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close
personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a
public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage of such family and close
personal relations, requested and received $1,000,000.00 from Burns &
Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then having
business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection
with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini
had family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for
Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for
Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition

for certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005
and August 16, 2005 by the Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal
Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Villarama, Jr., Perez,* and Reyes, JJ., concur

G.R. No. 168539

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
- versus -
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.

DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution

 of the Third Division

 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein
respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision

 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and maintenance of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the
above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein
respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with
then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there
was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted
because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as
follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO
ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy
with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into
a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to
Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft
Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act 6957,
as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event
of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the
Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why
this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed
a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has
exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was
alleged to have conspired with a public officer.
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash

 the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not
constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the
SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom
he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any
official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it
appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-
conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the
Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
 II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF
RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED
BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY

III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT
QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses
under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to
repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt
practices act or which may lead thereto.

 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case
involving herein private respondent.
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a
private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the
public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer
who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not
prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the
allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy
is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal
liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of
conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile
does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019.
In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary
Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.

Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with
a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be
indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no
longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the
private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.

 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement
is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.

 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance
of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no
difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.

 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.

 Thus, this Court held that:

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one
person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator
does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the
offense.
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in
conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative
intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or
corrupt practices,"

 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who
conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta

 as to the nature of and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is
instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except
when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The
crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines. An
agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as long
as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the
sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or
more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in
criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a
crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a
conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered
together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the consummated
crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound
principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual
whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the
same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for
acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy."
The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where
this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator)
without taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the
criminal act, for the commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime
must therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the x x x
accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of course, as
to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn within the
enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the
rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the
crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light
that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for
collectivizing criminal liability.

xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved,
all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-
principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of
conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose is
a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal enterprise
they must be held solidarily liable.
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and
involves evidentiary matters.

 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court
during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion

 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve

 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary
Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side
Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion
to quash the Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent.
The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005,
this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution became
final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's resolution in G.R. No.
168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion
for Consolidation

 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act
of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The
rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief
is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant
of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the
court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction
of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said
jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court
jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined
to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which
called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to
deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction
of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In
fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB
issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case should not be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a
special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of
R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A.
8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under
the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly
by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done.
Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of
its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise
would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law
defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the
main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of
the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main case and it
would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2,
2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.

 GR Nos. 205963-64, Jul 07, 2016 ]

AMANDO A. INOCENTES v. PEOPLE +

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:
We resolve the Petition[1] filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court by
petitioner Amando A. Inocentes (Inocentes), assailing the Resolutions
dated February 8, 2013[2] and October 24, 2012[3] of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 entitled People of the
Philippines v. Amando A. Inocentes, et. al.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Inocentes, together with four (4) others, was charged with violating Section
3(e) or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019,[4] as amended. The informations read:

That on or about October 2001 or immediately prior or subsequent thereto,

in Tarlac City, Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Amando A. Inocentes,
Celestino Cabalitasan, Ma. Victoria Leonardo and Jerry Balagtas, all public
officers, being the Branch Manager, Division Chief III, Property Appraiser
III, and Senior General Insurance Specialist, respectively, of the
Government Service Insurance System, Tarlac City Field Office, committing
the crime herein charged in relation to and in taking advantage of their
official functions, conspiring and confederating with Jose De Guzman,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally [gave]
undue preference, benefit or advantage to accused Jose De Guzman by
processing and approving the housing loans of Four Hundred Ninety-One
(491) borrowers of [Jose De Guzman] 's housing project under the
GSIS Bahay Ko Program, with a total amount of loans amounting to Two
Hundred Forty-One Million Fifty-Three Thousand Six Hundred Pesos
(Php241,053,600.00), knowing fully well that the said borrowers/grantees
were not qualified and were not under the territorial jurisdiction of the
Tarlac City Field Office, thereby giving said borrowers/grantees
unwarranted benefit and causing damage and prejudice to the government
and to public interest in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
and

[...] processing, approving and granting loans under the GSIS Bahay Ko

Program to Fifty-Three (53) borrowers of [Jose De Guzman]'s land
development project known as Teresa Homes amounting to Fifty-
Two Million and One Hundred Seven Thousand Pesos (Php52,107,000.00),
despite the knowledge of the fact that the lots covered were intended for
commercial purposes and by causing the over-appraisal in the amount of
Thirty-Three Million Two Hundred Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-
Eight Pesos and Thirty-Six Centavos (Php33,242,848.36) of the land and
buildings offered as collaterals, thus causing undue injury to the
Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
On May 10, 2012, the Sandiganbayan issued a minute resolution finding
probable cause and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all
the accused.[7] To avoid incarceration, Inocentes immediately posted hail.
On July 10, 2012, Inocentes filed an omnibus motion (1) for judicial
determination of probable cause; (2) to quash the informations filed against
him; and (3) to dismiss the case for violating his right to the speedy
disposition of this case (omnibus motion).[8] In this motion, he argued as
follows:

First, the informations filed against him were fatally defective because they
did not allege the specific acts done by him which would have constituted
the offense. All that was alleged in the informations was that he conspired
and cooperated in the alleged crime.

Second, there is no evidence showing how he cooperated or conspired in

the commission of the alleged offense. The findings of the investigating unit
revealed that the connivance was perpetuated by the marketing agent and
the borrowers themselves by misrepresenting their qualifications. The GSIS
Internal Audit Service Group Report even said that it was the marketing
agent who had the opportunity to tamper and falsify the documents
submitted before Inocentes' office.

Third, the informations filed against him should be quashed because the
Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the case. At the time of the
commission of the alleged offense, Inocentes held a position with a Salary
Grade of 26. He likewise claims that he cannot fall under the enumeration
of managers of GOCCs because his position as department manager cannot
be placed in the same category as the president, general manager, and
trustee of the GSIS.

Fourth, Innocentes insisted that the case against him must be dismissed
because his right to the speedy disposition of this case had been violated
since seven (7) years had lapsed from the time of the filing of the initial
complaint up to the time the information was filed with the Sandiganbayan.

After the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed its opposition and
Inocentes filed his reply, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed
resolution. The Sandiganbayan maintained its jurisdiction over the case
because Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,
[9]
 specifically includes managers of GOCCs - whose position may not fall
under Salary Grade 27 or higher - who violate R.A. No. 3019. It also ruled
that the informations in this case sufficiently allege all the essential
elements required to violate Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

Further, it said that it already determined the existence of probable cause

when it issued the warrant of arrest in its minute resolution dated May 10,
2012.

Lastly, it held that the delay in this case was excusable considering that the
records of this case were transferred from the Regional Trial Court in Tarlac
City, where the case was first filed.

In his motion for reconsideration, Inocentes reiterated the same arguments

he raised in his omnibus motion. In addition, he asserted that the present
case against him should be dismissed because the Office of the
Ombudsman dismissed the estafa case against him for the same
transactions. He also filed a supplemental motion attaching a copy of the
affidavit of a certain Monico Imperial to show (1) that there existed political
persecutions within the GSIS against the critics of then President and
General Manager Winston F. Garcia, and (2) that the GSIS branch manager
relies on the recommendation of his subordinates in approving or
disapproving real estate loan applications.

The Sandiganbayan remained unconvinced. On the contents of the

affidavit, it agreed with the prosecution that these are matters of defense
that must stand scrutiny in a full-blown trial. With respect to the dismissal
of the estafa case against him, the Sandiganbayan said that the dismissal of
that case does not necessarily result in the dismissal of the present case
because the same act may give rise to two (2) or more separate and distinct
offenses.

To contest the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Inocentes filed the
present petition asserting, among others, that the quantum of evidence
required to establish probable cause for purposes of holding a person for
trial and/or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest was not met in this case.
He argued that absent any allegation of his specific acts or evidence linking
him to the anomalous transactions, probable cause can hardly exist because
it would be imprudent to insinuate that Inocentes knew of the criminal
design when all he did was only to approve the housing loan applications.
Obviously relying on his subordinates, Inocentes claimed that he could not
have conspired with them when he had no personal knowledge of any
defect.

On April 10, 2013, we required the respondents to comment on Inocentes'

petition, and deferred action on the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

In its comment, the OSP counters that what Inocentes asks at this point is
for this Court to examine and weigh all the pieces of evidence and
thereafter absolve him of all charges without undergoing trial.

The OSP said that the Office of the Ombudsman did not act arbitrarily in
conducting the preliminary investigation and finding probable cause.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan likewise found probable cause after
considering all the pleadings and documents submitted before it and saw
no sound reason to set aside its finding.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation
saying that it will no longer submit its comment as the OSP, pursuant to its
expanded mandate under R.A. No. 6770,[10] shall represent the People
before this Court and the Sandiganbayan.

OUR RULING

We find the present petition meritorious.

Preliminary Considerations

The Constitution, under Section 1, Article VIII, empowers the courts to

determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.[11] This is an overriding authority that
cuts across all branches and instrumentalities of government and is
implemented through the petition for certiorari that Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court provides.[12]

Inocentes, through this remedy, comes before this Court asserting that
there was grave abuse on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it exercised
its discretion in denying his omnibus motion. This extraordinary writ solely
addresses lower court actions rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave
abuse of discretion is a circumstance beyond the legal error committed by a
decision-making agency or entity in the exercise of its jurisdiction; this
circumstance affects even the authority to render judgment.[13]

Under these terms, if the Sandiganbayan merely legally erredwhile acting

within the confines of its jurisdiction, then its ruling, even if erroneous, is
not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari. If, on the other hand, the
Sandiganbayan ruling was attended by grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, then this ruling is fatally
defective on jurisdictional ground and should be declared null and void.[14]

In the present case, the Sandiganbayan denied Inocentes' omnibus motion

(1) to judicially determine the existence of probable cause; (2) quash the
information that was filed against him; and/or (3) dismiss the case against
him for violation of his right to speedy trial. In determining whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse in the exercise of its discretion, we
shall review the Sandiganbayan's judgment denying the omnibus motion in
the light of each cited remedy and the grounds presented by Inocentes to
support them.

The Sandiganbayan hardly committed any grave abuse of

discretion in denying the motion to quash the information.

Inocentes is unyielding in his position that the informations filed against

him should be quashed based on the following grounds: (1) that all the
information alleged is that Inocentes conspired and confederated with his
co-accused without specifying how his specific acts contributed to the
alleged crime; and (2) that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
Inocentes because he was occupying a position with a salary grade less than
27.

On the contention that the informations did not detail Inocentes' individual
participation in the conspiracy, we have underscored before the fact that
under our laws conspiracy should be understood on two levels, i.e., a mode
of committing a crime or a crime in itself.[15]

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[16] we explained that when conspiracy is

charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements and all the
elements must be set forth in the information, but when it is not and
conspiracy is considered as a mode of committing the crime, there is less
necessity of reciting its particularities in the information because
conspiracy is not the gravamen of the offense, to wit:

To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring

and all the elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or
information.

x x x    x x x    x x x

The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are different when

conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime as in the case at [Link] is less necessity of
reciting its particularities in the information because conspiracy is not the
gravamen of the offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only
because it changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy
and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of
their participation in the crime. The liabilities of the conspirators is
collective and each participant will be equally responsible for the acts of
others, for the act of one is the act of all. In People v. Quitlong, we ruled
how conspiracy as the mode of committing the offense should be alleged in
the information, viz:

A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of

conspiracy or allege all the details thereof like the part that each of the
parties therein have performed, the evidence proving the common design
or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of
conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same
degree of particularity required in describing a substantive offense. It is
enough that the indictment contains a statement of facts relied upon to be
constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as much
certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable
a person of common understanding to know what is intended, and with
such precision that the accused may plead his acquittal or conviction to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
x x x    x x x    x x x

Again, following the stream of our own jurisprudence, it is enough to

allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense in either of
the following manner: (1) by use of the word, "conspire," or its derivatives
or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by
allegations basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person
of common understanding would know what is intended, and with such
precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts.[17] [italics supplied]
With these guidelines in mind, Inocentes' challenge with respect to the
informations filed against him necessarily fails as he could gather that he is
one of those GSIS officials who conspired in approving the anomalous
transactions. Accordingly, the informations filed against Inocentes in this
case are valid because they adequately provide the material allegations to
apprise him of the nature and cause of the charge.

On the issue on jurisdiction, it is of no moment that Inocentes does not

occupy a position with a salary grade of 27 since he was the branch
manager of the GSIS' field office in Tarlac City, a government-owned or
-controlled corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which
position falls within the coverage of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.

The applicable law provides that violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
-controlled corporations, and state universities shall be within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[18] We have clarified
the provision of law defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
explaining that the Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those
officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, regardless of their salary grades.[19] Simply put, those
that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions
enumerated by the law.[20] In this category, it is the position held, not the
salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.[21]

Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even low-level

management positions fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We
settled this point in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan[22] and Geduspan v.
People[23].

Based on the foregoing, we find that the Sandiganbayan was correct in

denying Inocentes' motion to quash; hence, there was no grave abuse in the
exercise of its discretion regarding this matter.

A redetermination of a judicial finding of probable cause is

futile when the accused voluntarily surrenders to the
jurisdiction of the court.

In the present case, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan
separately found that probable cause exists to indict and issue a warrant of
arrest against Inocentes. However, what Inocentes brings before this Court
right now is only the finding of the Sandiganbayan of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.

Under our jurisdiction, any person may avail of this remedy since it is well-
established in jurisprudence that the court may, in the protection of one's
fundamental rights, dismiss the case if, upon a personal assessment of
evidence, it finds that the evidence does not establish probable cause.[24]

In People v. Castillo,[25] we discussed the two kinds of determination of

probable cause, thus:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the
public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have
committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial.
Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine
whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,
whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of
probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and
may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one

made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no
probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a

warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for
doing so, the judge in turn should not override the public prosecutors'
determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground
that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest
warrant was insufficient. It must be stressed that in our criminal justice
system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of discretion in
determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and that
courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the information
filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor.

Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the
prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge's
determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for
the purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued
against the accused. [emphasis supplied; citations omitted]
Under this ruling, we made it clear that the judge does not act as an
appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the
prosecutor's determination of probable cause; rather, he makes a
determination of probable cause independently of the prosecutor's finding.
[26]
 Despite the fact that courts should avoid reviewing an executive
determination of probable cause, we are not completely powerless to review
this matter under our expanded judicial power under the Constitution.

We are aware, however, that Inocentes availed of this remedy after he had
posted bail before the Sandiganbayan which, in our jurisdiction, is
tantamount to voluntary surrender.[27]Simply put, questioning the findings
of probable cause by the Sandiganbayan at this point would be pointless as
it has already acquired jurisdiction over Inocentes.

It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired

upon (1) his arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant, or (2) his
voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. For this
reason, in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[28] we held that even if it is
conceded that the warrant issued was void (for nonexistence of probable
cause), the accused waived all his rights to object by appearing and giving a
bond, viz:

On this score, the rule is well-settled that the giving or posting of bail by the
accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the
court. [...]

By posting bail, herein petitioner cannot claim exemption from the effect of
being subject to the jurisdiction of respondent court. While petitioner
has exerted efforts to continue disputing the validity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest despite his posting bail, his
claim has been negated when he himself invoked the jurisdiction
of respondent court through the filing of various motions that
sought other affirmative reliefs.[29][omission and emphasis ours]
Therefore, at this point, we no longer find it necessary to dwell on whether
there was grave abuse on the part of the Sandiganbayan in finding the
existence of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest. Had Inocentes
brought this matter before he posted bail or without voluntarily
surrendering himself, the outcome could have been different. But, for now,
whether the findings of probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion - thereby making the warrant of arrest void - does not matter
anymore as even without the warrant the Sandiganbayan still acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Inocentes.

The Sandiganbayan should have granted Inocentes' motion to

dismiss for violation of his right to speedy disposition of cases;
it took seven long years before the information was filed before
it.

The Office of the Ombudsman, for its failure to resolve the criminal charges
against Inocentes for seven (7) years, violated Inocentes' constitutional
right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the case against him, as
well as its own constitutional duty to act promptly on complaints filed
before it.

A person's right to a speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under

Section 16, Article III of the Constitution:

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before
all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or
administrative in nature, as well as in all proceedings, either judicial or
quasi-judicial.[30] In this accord, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action of all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice.[31]

In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,[32] we held that the long delay of close to three

(3) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by
the Tanodbayan constituted a violation not only of the constitutional right
of the accused under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but also
of the constitutional guarantee to "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied
in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights, viz:
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due process.
Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing
the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial
compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law for the
resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the procedural
due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.
Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but
under the constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of
cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the
1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative
of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3)
years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the
speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and
gruelling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high
ranking government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a
double standard of treatment, which must be emphatically rejected.
Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his
alleged failure to file his sworn statement of assets and liabilities required
by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainly did not involve complicated legal
and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" as
would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the preliminary
investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and alleged
giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the
period of three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
[33]
 [emphasis ours]
The Sandiganbayan insists that the delay in this case is justifiable because
the informations were initially filed before the RTC in Tarlac City. However,
after going over the records of the case, we find that the period of time in
between the incidents that could have contributed to the delay were
unreasonable, oppressive, and vexatious.
According to the Sandiganbayan, the complaint in the case at bar was filed
sometime in 2004. After the preliminary investigation, on September 15,
2005, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding probable
cause to charge Inocentes. Following the denial of his motion for
reconsideration on November 14, 2005, the prosecution filed the
informations with the RTC of Tarlac City. However, on March 14, 2006,
the Office of the Ombudsman ordered the withdrawal of the informations
filed before the RTC. From this point, it took almost six (6) years (or only
on May 2, 2012) before the informations were filed before the
Sandiganbayan.

To our mind, even assuming that transfers of records from one court to
another oftentimes entails significant delays, the period of six (6) years is
too long solely for the transfer of records from the RTC in Tarlac City to the
Sandiganbayan. This is already an inordinate delay in resolving a. criminal
complaint that the constitutionally guaranteed right of the accused to due
process and to the speedy disposition of cases. Thus, the dismissal of the
criminal case is in order.[34]

Moreover, the prosecution cannot attribute the delay to Inocentes for filing
numerous motions because the intervals between these incidents are
miniscule compared to the six-year transfer of records to the
Sandiganbayan.

The prosecution likewise blames Inocentes for not seasonably invoking his
right to a speedy disposition of his case. It claims that he has no right to
complain about the delay when the delay is because he allegedly slept on his
rights.

We find this argument unworthy of merit, in the same way we did

in Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan:

Records show that they could not have urged the speedy resolution of their
case because they were unaware that the investigation against them was
still ongoing. They were only informed of the March 27, 2003 resolution
and information against them only after the lapse of six (6) long years, or
when they received a copy of the latter after its filing with the SB on June
19, 2009. In this regard, they could have reasonably assumed that the
proceedings against them have already been terminated. This serves as a
plausible reason as to why petitioners never followed up on the case
altogether. Instructive on this point is the Court's observation in Duterte v.
Sandiganbayan, to wit:

Petitioners in this case, however, could not have urged the speedy
resolution of their case because they were completely unaware that the
investigation against them was still ongoing. Peculiar to this case, we
reiterate, is the fact that petitioners were merely asked to comment, and not
file counter-affidavits which is the proper procedure to follow in a
preliminary investigation. After giving their explanation and after four long
years of being in the dark, petitioners, naturally, had reason to assume that
the charges against them had already been dismissed.

On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman failed to present any
plausible, special or even novel reason which could justify the four-year
delay in terminating its investigation. Its excuse for the delay - the many
layers of review that the case had to undergo and the meticulous scrutiny it
had to entail - has lost its novelty and is no longer appealing, as was the
invocation in the Tatad case. The incident before us does not involve
complicated factual and legal issues, specially (sic) in view of the fact that
the subject computerization contract had been mutually cancelled by the
parties thereto even before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint.
Being the respondents in the preliminary investigation proceedings, it
was not the petitioners' duty to follow up on the prosecution of
their case. Conversely, it was the Office of the Ombudsman's
responsibility to expedite the same within the bounds of
reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on
all complaints lodged before it. As pronounced in the case
of Barker v. Wingo:

A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial: the State has

that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is
consistent with due process.[35]
Plainly, the delay of at least seven (7) years before the informations were
filed skews the fairness which the right to speedy disposition of cases seeks
to maintain. Undoubtedly, the delay in the resolution of this case
prejudiced Inocentes since the defense witnesses he would present would
be unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past.

Considering the clear violation of Inocentes' right to the speedy disposition

of his case, we find that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
not acting on the case within a reasonable time after it had acquired
jurisdiction over it.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Inocentes' petition is GRANTED.

The resolutions dated February 8, 2013 and October 24, 2012 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0127-0128 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For violating Inocentes' right to a
speedy disposition of his case, the Sandiganbayan is
hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the case against him.

SO ORDERED

[ GR No. 149995, Sep 28, 2007 ]

ISIDRO PABLITO M. PALANA v. PEOPLE +

DECISION
560 Phil. 558

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21879
dated September 17, 2001,[1] affirming the September 23, 1997 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, in Criminal Case No.
91-5617 convicting petitioner Isidro Pablito Palana with violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".

On August 19, 1991, petitioner was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in
an Information which reads as follows:

That on or about September 1987, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro

Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly make or draw and issue to Alex B. Carlos to apply on account or
for the value the check described below:
Check No. : 326317PR
Drawn Against : Asian Savings Bank
Paseo de Roxas Branch
In the amount of : P590,000.00
Postdated : February 15, 1988
Payable to : Dr. Alex B. Carlos
said accused well knowing that at the time of issue, he did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment in full of
the face amount of such check when presented for payment within (90)
days from the date thereof, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds and despite receipt
of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face
amount of said check or make arrangement for full payment within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice.[2]
On January 30, 1992, the case was archived due to petitioner's non-
apprehension despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest.[3] On June 27,
1995, the warrant of arrest was recalled and set aside[4] after petitioner
posted the required bail. He was arraigned on July 25, 1995 when he
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.[5]

Private complainant Alex B. Carlos testified that sometime in September

1987, petitioner and his wife borrowed money from him in the amount of
P590,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan, petitioner issued a
postdated check for the same amount in favor of the complainant.
[6]
 However, when the check was presented for payment, it was dishonored
by the bank for insufficiency of funds. Subsequent demand
notwithstanding, petitioner failed to make good the said dishonored check.
[7]

Petitioner alleged that the amounts given to him by private complainant

was an investment by the latter who was his business partner. He argued
that the subject check was not issued in September 1987 to guarantee the
payment of a loan since his checking account was opened only on
December 1, 1987.[8] He claimed that private complainant cajoled him to
issue a check in his favor allegedly to be shown to a textile supplier who
would provide the partnership with the necessary raw materials. Petitioner
alleged that when the check was issued sometime in February 1988,
[9]
 complainant knew that the same was not funded.[10]

After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court rendered on September
23, 1997 a Decision[11] finding petitioner guilty as charged, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

Wherefore, this court finds the accused Isidro Pablito M. Palana guilty as
charged and sentences him to a prison term of Six (6) months and to
indemnify the private complainant the sum of P590,000.00 plus legal
interest from filing of this case until full payment.

SO ORDERED.
Petitioner appealed but it was dismissed by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial court's decision in toto.[12]

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the check was
issued as a guaranty for the loan, thereby rejecting petitioner's "investment
theory". In ruling against the existence of a partnership between them, the
trial court noted that the so-called partnership venture, Palana's General
Merchandising, was registered on December 1, 1987 only in the name of
petitioner.[13] The Court of Appeals also held that the act of lending money
does not necessarily amount to an investment of capital.

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF
THE LOWER COURT DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE
ACCUSED THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SUBJECT ASIAN BANK
CHECK, WAS NOT FOR A CONSIDERATION OR FOR VALUE, AS THE
ACCUSED WAS ONLY TRICKED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO
ISSUE THE SAID CHECK AS A MEANS OF BINDING THE ACCUSED TO
RETURN HIS INVESTMENT IN THE PARTNERSHIP WHICH WAS
THEN SUFFERING FROM BUSINESS REVERSALS.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF

THE LOWER COURT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT AT THE
TIME THE ACCUSED WAS ARRAIGNED ON JULY 25, 1995 R.A. 7691
EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT WAS ALREADY IN EFFECT.[14]
The issues to be resolved are: 1) whether petitioner was guilty of violation of
B.P. Blg. 22; and 2) whether the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
the case.

Petitioner's argument that it is the Metropolitan Trial Court and not the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the case pursuant to R.A.
7691 is without merit.

It is hornbook doctrine that jurisdiction to try a criminal action is

determined by the law in force at the time of the institutionof the
action[15] and not during the arraignment of the accused. The Information
charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was filed on August 19,
1991. At that time, the governing law determinative of jurisdiction is B.P.
Blg. 129[16]which provides:

Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under
the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall
hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance by the latter.

xxxx

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
and the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable

with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months,
or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof:
Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the
imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is punishable with imprisonment of not less than
30 days but not more than one year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed P200,000.00, or both fine and imprisonment [17] at the discretion of
the court. In the present case, the fine imposable is P200,000.00 hence, the
Regional Trial Court properly acquired jurisdiction over the case.[18] The
Metropolitan Trial Court could not acquire jurisdiction over the criminal
action because its jurisdiction is only for offenses punishable with a fine of
not more than P4,000.00.

The subsequent amendment of B.P. 129 by R.A. No. 7691, "An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court"[19] on June 15, 1994 cannot
divest the Regional Trial Court of jurisdiction over petitioner's case. Where
a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the
cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal unless the statute expressly provides, or is
construed to the effect that it is intended to operate on actions pending
before its enactment. Indeed, R.A. No. 7691 contains retroactive provisions.
However, these only apply to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-
trial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be
construed that R.A. No. 7691 has retroactive application to criminal cases
pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity.
[20]
The jurisdiction of the RTC over the case attached upon the
commencement of the action by the filing of the Information and could not
be ousted by the passage of R.A. No. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of
inferior courts, the application of which to criminal cases is prospective in
nature.[21]

After a careful review of the records, this Court sustains petitioner's

conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The elements of the offense
penalized under B.P. Blg. 22 are as follows: (1) the accused makes, draws,
or issues any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the accused knows
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee
bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the
bank to stop payment.

Each element of the offense was duly proven by the prosecution. Petitioner
admitted that at the time he issued the subject check, he knew that he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of
such check. Consequently, when the check was presented for payment, it
was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter,
he received demand letters to pay the amount of the check from private
complainant but he did not comply with it.[22]

In ruling that the amount of the check was for consideration or value, both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld private complainant's claim
that the check was issued as a guaranty for the loan and rejected
petitioner's "investment theory". The issue as to whether the amount of the
subject check represents the amount of the money loaned by private
complainant to petitioner or as an investment in the alleged partnership is
a factual question involving the credibility of witnesses. Where the issue is
one of credibility, the appellate court will not generally disturb the findings
of the lower court considering that it is in a better position to settle that
issue since it had the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing
their conduct during the trial, which circumstances carry great weight in
assessing their credibility. In the present case, we see no reason to reverse
the finding of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals that the
amount of the subject check was a loan and not an investment.[23]

Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is

presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may
consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party
who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some
responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken by
the other side. Since it was established that petitioner received money from
private complainant in various amounts,[24]petitioner cannot now claim that
the checks were not issued for value.[25]

The allegation that the check was intended to be shown to potential

suppliers is not a valid defense. In Cueme v. People,[26] the Court held thus:

The allegation of petitioner that the checks were merely intended to be

shown to prospective investors of her corporation is, to say the least, not a
defense. The gravamen of the offense punished under B.P. Blg. 22 is the act
of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
its presentment for payment. The law has made the mere act of issuing a
bad check malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by the legislature for being
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Considering the rule
in mala prohibita cases, the only inquiry is whether the law has been
breached. Criminal intent becomes unnecessary where the acts are
prohibited for reasons of public policy, and the defenses of good faith and
absence of criminal intent are unavailing.
The checks issued, even assuming they were not intended to be encashed or
deposited in a bank, produce the same effect as ordinary checks. What the
law punishes is the issuance of a rubber check itself and not the purpose for
which the check was issued nor the terms and conditions relating to its
issuance. This is not without good reasons. To determine the purpose as
well as the terms and conditions for which checks are issued will greatly
erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of
checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in the trading and
banking communities. Besides, the law does not make any distinction as to
the kind of checks which are the subject of its provisions, hence, no such
distinction can be made by means of interpretation or application. What is
important is the fact that petitioner deliberately issued the checks in
question and those checks were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
Hence, the agreement surrounding the issuance of a check is irrelevant to
the prosecution and conviction of the petitioner.[27]

The alleged inconsistency in the date of issuance of the subject check is

likewise immaterial. Issuance, as defined under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, is the first delivery of the check.[28] In the case at bar, the Information
alleged that the check was postdated February 15, 1988 although issued in
or about September 1987. During trial, petitioner testified that the
Checking Account was opened only on December 1, 1987 and that the check
was issued sometime in February 1988.

The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information and
proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material
and prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial
rights.[29] In a prosecution for violation of B.P. 22, the time of the issuance
of the subject check is material since it forms part of the second element of
the offense that at the time of its issuance, petitioner knew of the
insufficiency of funds. However, it cannot be said that petitioner was
prejudiced by such variance nor was surprised by it. Records show that
petitioner knew at the time he issued the check that he does not have
sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount of the check. Yet, he
proceeded to issue the same claiming that the same would only be shown to
prospective suppliers, a defense which is not valid.
Moreover, there is no merit in petitioner's allegation that private
complainant knew that the check is not funded. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that the subject check was issued as guaranty for
payment of the loan hence, was intended to apply for account or for value.
As such, it was incumbent upon petitioner to see to it that the check is duly
covered when presented for payment.

Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as

clarified by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, the alternative penalty of
fine may be imposed in lieu of imprisonment considering that the
prosecution failed to prove or allege that petitioner is not a first-time
offender.[30] Hence, in lieu of imprisonment, a fine of P200,000.00 shall be
imposed upon petitioner.[31]

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.

CR No. 21879 dated September 17, 2001, finding petitioner ISIDRO
PABLITO M. PALANA guilty of violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ordered to pay
private complainant the amount of P590,000.00, representing the value of
the check, with six (6%) percent interest from date of filing of the
Information until the finality of the decision, the amount of which,
inclusive of the interest, is subject to twelve percent (12%) interest, from
finality of the decision until fully paid. In lieu of imprisonment, petitioner is
ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Austria-Martinez, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ.,concur.

 [ GR No. 154557, Feb 13, 2008 ]

PEOPLE v. The CA +

DECISION
568 Phil. 616

VELASCO JR., J.:

Where a court acquired jurisdiction over an action, its jurisdiction
continues to the final conclusion of the case. Such jurisdiction is not
affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such dispute in another
court or tribunal unless the statute provides for retroactivity.[1]

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, seeking to nullify the
June 13, 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
17275 which set aside the July 25, 1994 Judgment[3] of the Surigao City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32 and dismissed Criminal Case No.
551 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao for
violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 705,[4] as amended
by Executive Order No. (EO) 277.[5]

On February 24, 1992, private respondents Rico and Rickson Lipao were
indicted for and pleaded not guilty to violation of Sec. 68 of PD 705, as
amended by EO 277. The Information in Criminal Case No. 551 reads:

That on or about the 21st day of October 1991 in Cagdianao, Surigao del

Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao without legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess without license eight (8) pieces of round timbers and
160 bundles of firewood with a market value of P3,100.00, said forest
products not covered with legal transport document, and willfully and
unlawfully load these forest products in the pumpboat "Rickjoy" owned by
Rico Lipao, nor the accused Rico Lipao and Rickson Lipao holders of a
license issued by the DENR, to the prejudice of the government in the sum
of P3,100.00.

Contrary to law. The offense is punished with the penalties imposed under
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as provided under Section
68 of PD No. 705.[6]
The offense charged is punishable under Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides:

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

xxxx

2. The penalty of prisiÏŒn correccional in its medium and maximum

period, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does
not exceed 12,000 pesos.
PrisiÏŒn correccional in its medium period is imprisonment from 2 years,
4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months while prisiÏŒn correccional in
its maximum period is imprisonment from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6
years.

Parenthetically, during the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 551 and

before the RTC rendered its Judgment, Republic Act No. (RA) 7691[7] took
effect on April 15, 1994 or 15 days after its publication on March 30, 1994.
RA 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) in criminal cases to cover all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years irrespective of the
amount of fine and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including civil penalties arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof. Before the
amendments of RA 7691, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 provided that the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not
more than PhP 4,000, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of
other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability
arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind,
nature, value, or amount thereof.

On July 25, 1994, the RTC rendered its Judgment, finding private
respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Rico

Lipao and Rickson Lipao both guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277, Series of 1987, in relation to Articles 309 and 310
of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences each of them to an
indeterminate penalty of from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum; and each to pay one-half of
the costs.

The posts and firewood in question, or the proceeds thereof if sold at public
auction are hereby forfeited in favor of the Government.

SO ORDERED.[8]
Private respondents seasonably interposed their appeal before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 17275. They argued that private respondent
Rickson was subjected to an illegal search and seizure of the round posts
and firewood which cannot be used as evidence against him. They insisted
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
personnel together with some Philippine National Police personnel who
stopped private respondent Rickson did not have a search warrant. They
also opined that the "plain sight" or "open review" doctrine is inapplicable
as the posts and firewood are not incriminatory, more so as firewood is
available and sold in public markets without the requirement of any permit
from the DENR.

Moreover, private respondents argued that the prosecution failed to prove

their lack of license to possess timber. They contended that since private
respondent Rico is merely the owner of the pumpboat and was not present
when the posts and firewood were seized, he could never be held liable for
illegal possession of timber as he was never in possession of the round
posts. Relying on People v. Macagaling,[9] private respondents asserted that
constructive possession of forest products is no longer the rule in
successfully prosecuting offenses for violation of the Forestry Code.

On June 13, 2002, the CA rendered the assailed Decision, granting the
appeal of private respondents and dismissing the case before it on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC. The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, upon the premises, the Decision appealed from is SET
ASIDE. The instant criminal case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.[10]
In sustaining the appeal of private respondents, the CA did not rule on the
assigned errors or on the merits of the case. It anchored its dismissal of the
criminal case on the lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to hear and decide it.

Thus, People of the Philippines filed the instant petition, raising the sole
assignment of error that:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARBITRARILY AND

WHIMSICALLY DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE AGAINST PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS ON THE GROUND THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE IN VIEW OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691 WHICH BECAME EFFECTIVE ON APRIL 15,
1994.[11]
Petitioner People posits that the passage of RA 7691 did not ipso facto take
jurisdiction away from the RTC to hear and decide the instant criminal case
instituted prior to the passage of said law expanding the jurisdiction of the
MTCs.

On the other hand, in their Comment and Memorandum, private

respondents do not meet head on the sole issue raised by petitioner on
jurisdiction but instead argue that the instant petition should have been
outrightly dismissed on the grounds of noncompliance with the
requirements for a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 and the
requisites for a valid verification. Private respondents asseverate that the
instant petition cannot be entertained as no motion for reconsideration has
been filed before the CA, which is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available to petitioner and an indispensable and jurisdictional requirement
for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, relying on Labudahon v. NLRC.
[12]
 Moreover, they contend that an action for certiorari under Rule 65 is the
wrong remedy as the dismissal by the CA on lack of jurisdiction did not
constitute double jeopardy and, thus, an appeal through a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy. They maintain
that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), while undoubtedly the
counsel for the State and its agencies, cannot arrogate unto itself the
authority to execute in its name the certificate of non-forum shopping for a
client office, which in the instant case is the DENR.

The arguments of private respondents are unmeritorious.

On the issue of the propriety of the resort to a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 instead of a petition under Rule 45, we find that
Rule 65 is the proper remedy. The CA ruled that the RTC was ousted of its
jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of RA 7691. While the defense of
lack of jurisdiction was never raised by private respondents before the RTC
and the CA, the CA nevertheless proceeded to acquit private respondents
based on the new law. It is quite glaring from Sec. 7 of RA 7691 that said
law has limited retroactivity only to civil cases. As such, the CA indeed
committed grave abuse of discretion as it acted in an arbitrary and patently
erroneous exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Hence,
the use of Rule 65 is proper.

On other procedural issues, we also find for petitioner. First, we reiterate

our holding in Santiago and City Warden of the Manila City Jail that the
signature by the Solicitor General on the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this

Court is substantial compliance of the requirement under Sec. 4,[13] Rule 7

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, considering that the OSG is the legal
representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and its
agencies and instrumentalities, more so in a criminal case where the People
or the State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.
Second, while it is true that petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed CA Decision which normally is a ground for
dismissal for being premature[14] and to accord respondent CA opportunity
to correct itself,[15] yet the rule admits of exceptions, such as where, under
the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless,[16] and
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any
further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government.[17]

In the instant case, these exceptions are present; thus, the propriety of the
instant petition. The assailed CA Decision rendered on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction clearly bespeaks that any motion for reconsideration is useless.
For one, the issue of lack of jurisdiction was never raised by private
respondents in their Brief for the Accused-Appellants,[18] but was
considered motu proprio by the CA. For another, the issues and errors
raised by private respondents were not considered and much less touched
upon by the CA in its assailed Decision.

But of more importance, as this Court held in Vivo v. Cloribel,[19] a motion

for reconsideration is not necessary before a petition for certiorari can be
filed when the respondent court took almost eight years to the day to
resolve private respondents' appeal. It is not only the accused who has a
right to a speedy disposition of his case, but the prosecution or the State
representing the People also has and must be accorded the same right.
Thus, any further delay would prejudice the interest of the Government to
prosecute and bring closure to a criminal case filed way back in early 1992.

On the main issue of whether the RTC retained jurisdiction over the
criminal case, we agree with petitioner. The passage of RA 7691 did not ipso
facto relieve the RTC of the jurisdiction to hear and decide the criminal case
against private respondents.

This issue has been laid to rest in People v. Velasco, where this Court
emphatically held:

As to the issue of whether or not R.A. 7691 operated to divest the Regional
Trial Court of jurisdiction over appellant's case, we rule in the negative. It
has been consistently held as a general rule that the jurisdiction of a court
to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of
the institution of the action. Where a court has already obtained and is
exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing
jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the
rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect
that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.
Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive
effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the
enactment of a statute.

A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to
civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an
express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having
retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the Regional
Trial Courts prior to its [Link], the general rule enunciated above
is the controlling doctrine in the case at bar. At the time the case against the
appellant was commenced by the filing of the information on July 3, 1991,
the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged,
inasmuch as Section 39 of R.A. 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
prior to the amendments introduced by R.A. 7659 and R.A. 7691), provided
that:

Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. - The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court,
and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this Act:
Provided, That in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, the said courts shall take exclusive cognizance of cases
where the offenders are under sixteen years of age.

xxxx
It must be stressed that the abovementioned provision vested concurrent
jurisdiction upon the said courts regardless of the imposable penalty. In
fine, the jurisdiction of the trial court (RTC) over the case of the appellant
was conferred by the aforecited law then in force (R.A. 6425 before
amendment) when the information was filed. Jurisdiction attached upon
the commencement of the action and could not be ousted by the passage of
R.A. 7691 reapportioning the jurisdiction of inferior courts, the application
of which to criminal cases is, to stress, prospective in nature.[20] (Emphasis
supplied.)
This Court categorically reiterated the above ruling in the 2003 case of Yu
Oh v. Court of Appeals,[21] in the 2004 case of Alonto v. People,[22] and in the
2005 case of Lee v. Court of Appeals.[23]

Thus, where private respondents had been charged with illegal logging
punishable under Articles 309[24] and 310[25] of the Revised Penal Code with
imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4) months, and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction
at the inception of the criminal case. Since jurisdiction over the criminal
case attached upon the filing of the information, then the RTC is
empowered and mandated to try and decide said case notwithstanding a
subsequent change in the jurisdiction over criminal cases of the same
nature under a new statute. The rule is settled that jurisdiction continues
until the court has done all that it can do to exercise that jurisdiction unless
the law provides otherwise.[26]

While jurisdiction can be challenged at any stage of the proceedings, private

respondents did not bother to raise the issue of jurisdiction in their appeal
before the CA. In addition, private respondents did not lift a finger to
reinforce the CA decision relying on lack of jurisdiction as ground for the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 551 in their submissions before this Court.
Indeed, it appears that even respondents are not convinced of the
correctness of the CA ruling on the issue of jurisdiction.

Lastly, the CA committed reversible error in making use of the values

adduced during the hearing to determine jurisdiction. It is basic that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined both by the law in force at the time of
the commencement of the action and by the allegations in the Complaint or
Information.

Thus, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction when it heard and decided Criminal
Case No. 551. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the RTC was divested of
jurisdiction by reason of the enactment of RA 7691.

However, considering that this Court is not a trier of facts, we remand the
case to the CA to resolve the appeal in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed June 13, 2002 CA

Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 17275 is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
The CA is directed to resolve the appeal of private respondents on the
merits and with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Tinga,

JJ., concur

[ GR No. 177960, Jan 29, 2009 ]

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP v. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG +

DECISION
597 Phil. 127

TINGA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review[1] on certiorari of the Decision[2] dated 17
August 2006 and Resolution[3] dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R.
Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and
Jeffrey Reso Dayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information[4] on 29 December

2004 by the Provincial Prosecutor's Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental,
charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless
Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and
Damage to Property.  The pertinent portion of the information reads:

That at about 11:55 o'clock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy.

Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent
manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue,
fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben
Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an
automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene
R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran
and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R.
Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and
Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is
registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St.,
Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R.
Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.

An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the
charge.[5]

On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa

Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an
amended information.[6]  They sought to add the allegation of abandonment
of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck
abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was
still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-
standers."[7]

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus

Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered
withdrawn.[8]  On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and
the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.[9]

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the
prosecution.  After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought
leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted.  Petitioner filed his
Demurrer to Evidence[10]dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecution's
failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for
reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment[11] dated 25
April 2005.

In the Order[12] dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and
acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence.  The MTC found
that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the
allegations in the Information.  Pertinent portions of the order state:

An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the

same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that the
evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts and
circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. 
It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own
affirmative allegations.

xxxx

Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was
the accused who committed the crime as charged.  Its witnesses have never
identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime.  The
prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who
committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the
elements of the crime.  The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it
was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident.  The
Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There
was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as
there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence.  The alleged less
serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were
not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same
nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries.  The alleged damage
to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness
ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence was also
presented to state the damage.  The prosecution therefore failed to establish
if indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene
R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the
damage to the Colt Galant.  The mother of the victim testified only on the
expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a
result of the incident.  But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was
the accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for it.  This
Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case
from its inception.

xxxx

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecution's

[evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant]
to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the
accident.  The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the
defense.  It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated
in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of
the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting
the latter's inner fender and tires.  Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2
shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1's ramming
into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle
2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle.  The
cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the
tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left
side and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1.  It was this accident that
caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.

xxxx

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things

the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for
which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the
perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove these two things.  When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden
of establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf.
xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the

accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence.  The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby
cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized
representative.

SO ORDERED.[13]
Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,
[14]
 alleging that the MTC's dismissal of the case was done without
considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added
that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should
proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as
failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence
presented.  The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Negros Oriental, Br. 32.

In the order[15] dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of

petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect of the case.  The RTC ruled that the MTC's
recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation
that it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution.  The
records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in
the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that
the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course
to the accused's demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under
Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on
the accused's civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did
not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist.  Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability
was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC.   The
dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of

Sibulan on accused's acquittal is AFFIRMED.  The case is REMANDED to
the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil
aspect of the case.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.[16]
Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but
these were denied for lack of merit in the order[17]dated 12 September 2005.

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179.  The appellate court
subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution.   The Court of
Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties
damaged, the criminal case falls under the  jurisdiction of  the  RTC and the
proceedings before the MTC are null and void.  In so ruling, the appellate
court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos v. Garcia)
[18]
 which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, the
jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the
fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless
imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries
charged.  It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the
summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not
exceed P10,000.00.  As there was no proof of the total value of the property
damaged and respondents were claiming the amount of P1,500,000.00 as
civil damages, the case falls within the RTC's jurisdiction.  The dispositive
portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us

REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region,
Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.[19]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision,
[20]
 arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the allegations
in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure
nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act  of 1980 can be the basis of
the RTC's jurisdiction over the case.  However, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25
April 2007.[21]  It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction
considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious
killing as well as abandonment of the victims.

In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had
jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,[22] which confers jurisdiction to
first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on
the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information
alleging abandonment.  Respondents are also faulted for challenging the
MTC's order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.

The petition has merit. It should be granted.

The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.

Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the
Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious
physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however
declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the
same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the
victims. It appears from the records however that respondents' attempt to
amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was
unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutor's motion
to withdraw their motion to amend the information.  The information filed
before the trial court had remained unamended.[23]  Thus, petitioner is
deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original
Information without any aggravating circumstance.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless
imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period. When such
reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a
person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to
property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act
results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed.[24]  Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period.  Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to
crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as
"acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit
(dolo) or fault (culpa).[25]  Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner,
were he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 6 years).

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to
hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive
application thereof.[26]  When this case was filed on 29 December 2004,
Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by
R.A. No. 7691.  R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level
courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine,
and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including
those for civil liability.  It explicitly  states "that in offenses involving
damage to property through criminal negligence, they  shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not
the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained
to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal
case.[27]  Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly
taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and
legal.

As the records show, the MTC granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence

and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed
after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it
calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and
its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused."[28]  Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy.[29]  But while the dismissal order consequent to a
demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable
but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.  Thus, in such
case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the
reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order
of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial
court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void.[30]

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari
alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case
and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the
same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated
by the Rules of Court.  The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse
its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint.  The MTC's conclusions
were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that
the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution.  The
records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth
in the Rules of Court.

The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the
remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of
evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case
to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the
RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment

against him on the civil aspect of the case.  The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of
evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.[31]  However,
the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist[32] or where the accused
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.[33]

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case
unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist.[34]  This is because when the accused files a
demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal
and civil aspects of the case.  The only evidence on record is the evidence
for the prosecution.  What the trial court should do is issue an order or
partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to
adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render
judgment on the civil aspect of the case.[35]

A scrutiny of the MTC's decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal
was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts
or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioner's civil liability has been
extinguished by his acquittal.  It should be noted that the MTC categorically
stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had
been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it.  It
added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who
committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified
petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the
incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the
accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the
swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and
not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that
petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence.  Consequently, there is no
more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil
aspect of the case, since petitioner's acquittal has extinguished his civil
liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.  The Court of Appeals' Decision

dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP.
No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The Order dated 16 May 2005
of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case
No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner
Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, Acting C.J., Corona,* Carpio-Morales, and Chico-

Nazario,** JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 154473               April 24, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING
CORPORATION, Petitioners, 
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 155573               April 24, 2009
PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner, 
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and
122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 20021 and the June 23,
20022 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case
No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25, 20023 and the September
18, 20024 Orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406.X

The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual settings, thus:
G.R. No. 154473
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and
Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman
Campus, Quezon City.5 The speech was subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002
issues of the Manila Bulletin.6X

Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated
in his speech that
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a
registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that
isn’t even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now,
they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the
government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price
tag.7X

filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint8 for libel.X

Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).9 Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor
filed an Information10for libel against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-
109407, with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102.X

Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation,11contending that Judge Jaime
N. Salazar of Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case because his appointment to
the judiciary was made possible through the recommendation of respondent’s father-in-law.
Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case
[Criminal Case No. Q-02-103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending with Branch
101 of the RTC.X
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of
the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an
impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his
incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.12X

On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order13 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-
02-109407 and considering as moot and academic petitioner’s motion to inhibit. While the RTC
found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not
confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office—he
delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the
Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.X
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with
jurisdiction to hear the libel case.14X

Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of law, the instant
Petition for Review on Certiorari15 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising the following grounds:X
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION TO INHIBIT
BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS
COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;" AND
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION IN THIS
CASE.16X

G.R. No. 155573

On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner
Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon and
televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television show’s episode that day was entitled
"COMELEC Wars."17 In that episode, the following conversation transpired:X

Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for a "PR" campaign
against you? Is that what you are saying?
Benipayo: No, I think [it’s] not COMELEC funds, [it’s] Photokina funds. You know, admittedly,
according to [c]hargé d’[a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it
is what’s been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of 2.4
[m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] that’s about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?]
[T]hey wouldn’t tell me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I think it’s pretty
obvious.18X

Petitioner considered respondent’s statement as defamatory, and, through its authorized

representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit19 for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the
jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.20The City Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding Information21 with the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 101.X
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments that the
court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, even if
criminal prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.22X

On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order23 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-
02-109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further
assailed September 18, 2002 Order,24 denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.25X

Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably filed before this Court, on
pure questions of law, another Petition for Review on Certiorari26 under Rule 122 in relation to
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds:X
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT "IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE"; AND
II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF
LIBEL WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL
COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.
III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE
SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.27X

Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same issues and the same parties,
the Court, upon the recommendation of the Clerk of Court,28 consolidated the cases.29X

The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether the RTC has
jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of
whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are
of the conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which court—
the RTC or the Sandiganbayan—has jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court,
however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which
the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our current laws,
jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared by the RTC
with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the
offense, it would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to
office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case
is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof.30 Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC),31 as amended by Republic Act No. 4363,32 is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to
try cases of written defamations, thus:X
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamationsas provided for in this
chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the
Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense xxx.33 [Underscoring and italics ours.]X

More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya,34acknowledged the
unmistakable import of the said provision:X
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional
Trial Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its
meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for
interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be
followed.35X

This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo
v. Estanislao,36 where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court
even if the libelous act is committed "by similar means,"37 and despite the fact that the phrase
"by similar means" is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360.38 In these cases, and in
those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded
jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano
v. Hon. Valera,39 we explained at length that:X

The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides
that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs.
MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over
libel was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had
jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent
judge’s orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Court’s Orders dated August 14, 1995,
September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued
without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition."
Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter:
"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public
respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel
cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day
to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged
within the Municipal Trial Court’s jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law
however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs.
Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that
Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded
jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases."
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error in
ordering that the criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail
Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even
if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a
special nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in
character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts
(such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later enactment like RA 7691 does
not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction
that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail
regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC
must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or
alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have
clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect must be
given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered
by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-
condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new and prior
laws. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the
jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial
Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special
and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in
the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section 6
of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal libel.
Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated the
proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality:
"RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING,
DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.
xxxx
C
"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTSHAVING
JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS." (Underscoring supplied)40X

As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Br. 32,41 Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the
law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of
written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of
all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot
simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the
RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar
means.42 The grant to the Sandiganbayan43 of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to
(public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of
its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the
offense is committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4,
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,44 cannot be construed to
have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
RTC.45X

Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it
is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation
to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the
alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of
jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court,
therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and
their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said that,
the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are
GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(On official leave)

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the
above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[ GR Nos. 162144-54, Nov 21, 2012 ]

PEOPLE v. MA. THERESA L. DELA TORRE- YADAO +

DECISION
G.R. Nos. 162144-54

ABAD, J.:
This case, which involves the alleged summary execution of suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang, is once again before this Court
this time questioning, among other things, the trial court's determination of
the absence of probable cause and its dismissal of the criminal actions.[1]

The Facts and the Case

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine
National Police's Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP
ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat (then headed by Police Chief
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson), Traffic Management Command ([TMC]
led by then Police Senior Superintendent Francisco G. Zubia, Jr.), Criminal
Investigation Command (led by then Police Chief Superintendent Romeo
M. Acop), and National Capital Region Command (headed by then Police
Chief Superintendent Jewel F. Canson) killed 11 suspected members of
the Kuratong Baleleng Gang[2] along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City.

Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation

Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out
between the police and those who were slain.  After investigation, the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers
involved, including respondents Panfilo M. Lacson, Jewel F. Canson,
Romeo M. Acop, Francisco G. Zubia, Jr., Michael Ray B. Aquino, Cezar O.
Mancao II, and 28 others (collectively, the respondents).[3]  On review,
however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed
charges of murder against the police officers involved before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases 23047 to 57, except that in the cases of
respondents Zubia, Acop, and Lacson, their liabilities were downgraded to
mere accessory.  On arraignment, Lacson pleaded not guilty.

Upon respondents' motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their

cases to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that
none of the principal accused had the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher.  Pending the resolution of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's
motion for reconsideration of the transfer order, Congress passed Republic
Act (R.A.) 8249 that expanded the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction by deleting
the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" to apply to all
pending cases where trial had not begun.  As a result of this new law, the
Sandiganbayan opted to retain and try the Kuratong Baleleng murder
cases.

Respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of R.A. 8249 in G.R.

128096[4] but this Court upheld its validity.  Nonetheless, the Court ordered
the transfer of the trial of the cases to the RTC of Quezon City since the
amended informations contained no allegations that respondents
committed the offenses charged in relation to, or in the discharge of, their
official functions as required by R.A. 8249.

Before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, then presided over by Judge
Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., could arraign respondents in the re-docketed
Criminal Cases Q-99-81679 to 89, however, SPO2 Delos Reyes and the
other prosecution witnesses recanted their affidavits.  Some of the victims'
heirs also executed affidavits of desistance.  These prompted the
respondents to file separate motions for the determination of probable
cause before the issuance of warrants of arrests.

On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional
dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial
following the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the
desistance of the private complainants.

Two years later or on March 27, 2001 PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza
sought to revive the cases against respondents by requesting the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct another preliminary investigation
in their cases on the strength of the affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and
P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos.  In response, then DOJ Secretary Hernando B.
Perez constituted a panel of prosecutors to conduct the requested
investigation.

Invoking their constitutional right against double jeopardy, Lacson and his
co-accused filed a petition for prohibition with application for temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of
Manila in Civil Case 01-100933.  In an Order dated June 5, 2001, that court
denied the plea for temporary restraining order.  Thus, on June 6, 2001 the
panel of prosecutors found probable cause to hold Lacson and his co-
accused liable as principals for 11 counts of murder, resulting in the filing of
separate informations against them in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12
before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81, now presided over by
respondent Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
On the same day, respondent Lacson filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing the RTC of Manila's order which
allowed the renewed preliminary investigation of the murder charges
against him and his co-accused.  Lacson also filed with the RTC of Quezon
City a motion for judicial determination of probable cause.  But on June 13,
2001 he sought the suspension of the proceedings in that court.

In the meantime, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the

RTC of Quezon City from issuing warrants of arrest or conducting any
proceeding in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 before it.  On August 24,
2001 the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson's petition on the ground
of double jeopardy since, although the dismissal of Criminal Cases Q-99-
81679 to 89 was provisional, such dismissal became permanent two years
after when they were not revived.

Upon the prosecution's appeal to this Court in G.R. 149453,[5]the Court

ruled that, based on the record, Lacson failed to prove compliance with the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 governing provisional dismissals.  The
records showed that the prosecution did not file a motion for provisional
dismissal and, for his part, respondent Lacson had merely filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause.  Nowhere did he agree to some
proposal for a provisional dismissal of the cases.  Furthermore, the heirs of
the victims had no notice of any motion for such provisional dismissal.

The Court thus set aside the CA Decision of August 24, 2001 and directed
the RTC of Quezon City to try the cases with dispatch.  On motion for
reconsideration by respondent Lacson, the Court ordered the re-raffle of
the criminal cases to a heinous crimes court.  Upon re-raffle, however, the
cases still went to Branch 81, which as already stated was now presided
over by Judge Yadao.

On October 12, 2003 the parents of two of the victims submitted birth
certificates showing that they were minors.  Apparently reacting to this, the
prosecution amended the informations to show such minority and asked
respondent Executive Judge Ma. Natividad M. Dizon to recall the
assignment of the cases to Branch 81 and re-raffle them to a family court.
The request for recall was denied.

On October 20, 2003 the prosecution filed an omnibus motion before

Branch 81, praying for the re-raffle of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to12 to the
family courts in view of the changes in the two informations.  On October
24, 2003 the prosecution also filed its consolidated comment ex-abundanti
cautela on the motions to determine probable cause.

On November 12, 2003[6] Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the

prosecution's motion for re-raffle to a family court on the ground that
Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors.  She also granted the
motions for determination of probable cause and dismissed the cases
against the respondents since the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses
were inconsistent with those they submitted in the preliminary
investigations before the Ombudsman for the crime of robbery.

On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified motion to recuse or

disqualify Judge Yadao and for reconsideration of her order.  It also filed an
administrative complaint against her for dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to
the best interests of the service, manifest partiality, and knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment.[7]  On January 14, 2004, the prosecution
filed an urgent supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification with
motion for cancellation of the hearing on motion for reconsideration.

On January 21, 2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the motion to
recuse her, prompting the prosecution to appeal from that order.  Further,
on January 22, 2004 Judge Yadao issued another order, denying the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12,
2003 that dismissed the action against the respondents.  In response, the
prosecution filed a notice of appeal from the same.  Finally, on January 26,
2004 Judge Yadao issued an order, denying the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration of its January 16, 2004 Order not only for lack of merit but
also for having become moot and academic.

On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew ex-abundanti cautela the

notices of appeal that it filed in the cases.  Subsequently, on March 3, 2004
it filed the present special civil action of certiorari.
 The Issues Presented 

The prosecution presents the following issues:

Whether or not Executive Judge Dizon gravely abused her discretion in

allowing Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 to be re-raffled to other than
among the RTC of Quezon City's family courts.

Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she took
cognizance of Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 contrary to the prosecution's
view that such cases fell under the jurisdiction of family courts.

Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she did
not inhibit and disqualify herself from taking cognizance of the cases.

Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable cause and
barred the presentation of additional evidence in support of the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration.

Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she
adopted certain policies concerning the conduct of hearings in her court.

The Court's Rulings

Before addressing the above issues, the Court notes respondents'

contention that the prosecution's resort to special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65 is improper.  Since the trial court dismissed the
criminal actions against respondents, the prosecution's remedy was to
appeal to the CA from that order of dismissal.

Ordinarily, the proper remedy from an order dismissing an action is an

appeal.[8]  Here, the prosecution in fact filed a notice of appeal from such an
order issued in the subject cases.  But it reconsidered its action and
withdrew that notice, believing that appeal was not an effective, speedy,
and adequate remedy.[9]  In other words, the prosecution's move was not a
case of forgotten remedy but a conscious resort to another based on a belief
that respondent Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion in issuing her
various orders and that certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper and all-
encompassing remedy for the prosecution.  The Court is not prepared to say
that the remedy is altogether implausible as to throw out the petition
outright.

Still, the Court notes that the prosecution skipped the CA and filed its
action directly with this Court, ignoring the principle of judicial hierarchy of
courts.  Although the Supreme Court, the CA, and the RTCs have
concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, such concurrence does
not give the People the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum.[10]  In any
case, the immense public interest in these cases, the considerable length of
time that has passed since the crime took place, and the numerous times
these cases have come before this Court probably warrant a waiver of such
procedural lapse.

1. Raffle of the Cases

The prosecution points out that the RTC of Quezon City Executive Judge
gravely abused her discretion when she placed Criminal Cases 01-101102 to
12 under a separate category which did not restrict their raffle to the city's
special criminal and family courts in accordance with SC Administrative
Order 36-96.  Further, the prosecution points out that she violated
Administrative Order 19-98 when Branches 219 and 102 were left out of the
raffle.  The presiding judges of these two branches, both heinous crimes
courts eligible to receive cases by raffle, had just been appointed to the CA.
The records of the cases show nothing irregular in the conduct of the raffle
of the subject cases.  The raffle maintained a separate list for criminal and
civil cases.  Criminal cases cognizable by special criminal courts were
separately listed.  Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12 were given a separate
heading, "Re-Raffle," but there was nothing irregular in this since it merely
indicated that the cases were not being raffled for the first time.

The Executive Judge did not err in leaving out Branches 219 and 102 from
raffle since these branches remained without regularly appointed judges. 
Although the pairing judges of these branches had authority to act on
incidental, interlocutory, and urgent matters, this did not mean that such
branches should already be included in the raffle of cases.

Parenthetically, the prosecution was represented during the raffle yet it did
not then object to the manner by which it was conducted. The prosecution
raised the question only when it filed this petition, a clear afterthought.

2. Jurisdiction of Family Courts

The prosecution points out that, although this Court's October 7, 2003
Resolution directed a re-raffle of the cases to a heinous crimes court, the
prosecution in the meantime amended the informations to reflect the fact
that two of the murder victims were minors.  For this reason, the Executive
Judge should have raffled the cases to a family court pursuant to Section 5
of R.A. 8369.

The Court is not impervious to the provisions of Section 5 of R.A. 8369, that
vests in family courts jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 7610, which in
turn covers murder cases where the victim is a minor.  Thus:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:

a)   Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18)
years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age, or where one or more
of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the
offense:Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall
promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the respondent
may have incurred. (Emphasis supplied)

Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over

criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to protect their welfare
and best interests.  For this reason, when the need for such protection is not
compromised, the Court is able to relax the rule.  In several cases,[11] for
instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with
the family courts in hearing petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.

Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the
murder cases moved to a family court, are dead.  As respondents aptly point
out, there is no living minor in the murder cases that require the special
attention and protection of a family court.  In fact, no minor would appear
as party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented
by their parents who had become the real private offended parties.

3. Inhibition of Judge Yadao 

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao committed grave abuse of

discretion in failing to inhibit herself from hearing the cases against the
respondents.

The rules governing the disqualification of judges are found, first, in

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges.   No judge or judicial officer shall sit in

any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir,
legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which
he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in
which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

and in Rule 3.12, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states:

Rule 3.12. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include among
others, proceedings where:

(a)  the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts

concerning the proceeding;

xxxx

(e)  the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as
heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.  In every
instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 and Rule 3.12, Canon 3 provide
for the compulsory disqualification of a judge while the second paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 137 provides for his voluntary inhibition.

The matter of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and

sound discretion on the part of the judge since he is in a better position to
determine whether a given situation would unfairly affect his attitude
towards the parties or their cases.  The mere imputation of bias, partiality,
and prejudgment is not enough ground, absent clear and convincing
evidence that can overcome the presumption that the judge will perform his
duties according to law without fear or favor.  The Court will not disqualify
a judge based on speculations and surmises or the adverse nature of the
judge's rulings towards those who seek to inhibit him.[12]

Here, the prosecution contends that Judge Yadao should have inhibited
herself for improperly submitting to a public interview on the day following
her dismissal of the criminal cases against the respondents.  But the Court
finds nothing basically reprehensible in such interview.  Judge Yadao's
dismissal of the multiple murder cases aroused natural public interest and
stirred the media into frenzy for correct information.  Judge Yadao simply
accommodated, not sought, the requests for such an interview to clarify the
basis of her order.  There is no allegation that she gave out false
information.  To be sure, the prosecution never once accused her of making
public disclosures regarding the merits of those cases prior to her order
dismissing such cases.

The prosecution also assails as constituting bias Judge Yadao's statement

that a very close relative stood to be promoted if she was to issue a warrant
of arrest against the respondents.  But this statement merely shows that she
cannot be dissuaded by some relative who is close to her.  How can this
constitute bias?  Besides, there is no evidence that the close relative she
referred to was her spouse or child which would be a mandatory ground for
disqualification.

Further, the prosecution claims that Judge Yadao prejudged its motion for
reconsideration when she said in her comment to the administrative
complaint against her that such motion was merely the prosecution's
stubborn insistence on the existence of probable cause against the
respondents.  The comment could of course not be regarded as a
prejudgment of the issue since she had precisely already issued an order
holding that the complainant's evidence failed to establish probable cause
against the respondents.  And there is nothing wrong about characterizing a
motion for reconsideration as a "stubborn" position taken by the party who
filed it.  Judge Yadao did not characterize the motion as wholly unjustified
at the time she filed her comment.
 4. Dismissal of the Criminal Cases

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion
when she set the motions for determination of probable cause for hearing,
deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark
its evidence and argue its case.  The prosecution stresses that under Section
6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court Judge Yadao's duty was to determine
probable cause for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the
basis of the investigating prosecutor's resolution as well as the informations
and their supporting documents.  And, if she had some doubts as to the
existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order the
investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence to support the
finding of probable cause within five days from notice.

Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge Yadao dug up
and adopted the Ombudsman's findings when the latter conducted its
preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery in 1996.  Judge Yadao
gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that earlier preliminary
investigation when such documents are proper for presentation during the
trial of the cases.  The prosecution added that the affidavits of P/S Insp.
Abelardo Ramos and SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes reasonably explained the
prior inconsistent affidavits they submitted before the Ombudsman.

The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when
determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to
conduct a de novo hearing.  The judge only needs to personally review the
initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is
supported by substantial evidence.[13]

But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to
explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier
submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman.  Consequently, it was not
unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable
cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the
inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses
themselves brought up and were part of the records.  Besides, she received
no new evidence from the respondents.[14]
The public prosecutor submitted the following affidavits and documents
along with the criminal informations to enable Judge Yadao to determine
the presence of probable cause against the respondents:

1. P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu's affidavit of March 24, 2001[15] in which he said

that on May 17, 1995 respondent Canson, NCR Command Head, ordered
him to form two teams that would go after suspected Kuratong
Baleleng Gang members who were seen at the Superville Subdivision in
Parañaque City.  Yu headed the assault team while Marlon Sapla headed
the perimeter defense.  After the police team apprehended eight men inside
the safe house, it turned them over to their investigating unit.  The
following day, Yu just learned that the men and three others were killed in a
shoot-out with the police in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City.

2. P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos' affidavit of March 24, 2001[16]  in which he

said that he was part of the perimeter defense during the Superville
operation.  After the assault team apprehended eight male suspects, it
brought them to Camp Crame in two vans.  Ramos then went to the office
of respondent Zubia, TMC Head, where he saw respondents Lacson, Acop,
Laureles, Villacorte and other police officers.

According to Ramos, Zubia said that the eight suspects were to be brought
to Commonwealth Avenue and killed in a supposed shoot-out and that this
action had been cleared with higher authorities, to which remark Lacson
nodded as a sign of approval.  Before Ramos left the meeting, Lacson
supposedly told him, "baka may mabuhay pa diyan."  Ramos then
boarded an L-300 van with his men and four male suspects. In the early
morning of May 18, 1995, they executed the plan and gunned down the
suspects.  A few minutes later, P/S Insp. Glenn G. Dumlao and his men
arrived and claimed responsibility for the incident.

3. SPO1 Wilmor B. Medes' affidavit of April 24, 2001[17] in which he

corroborated Ramos' statements.  Medes said that he belonged to the same
team that arrested the eight male suspects.  He drove the L-300 van in
going to Commonwealth Avenue where the suspects were killed.
4. Mario C. Enad's affidavit of August 8, 1995[18] in which he claimed having
served as TMC civilian agent.  At around noon of May 17, 1995, he went to
Superville Subdivision together with respondents Dumlao, Tannagan, and
Nuas.  Dumlao told Enad to stay in the car and observe what went on in the
house under surveillance.  Later that night, other police officers arrived and
apprehended the men in the house.  Enad went in and saw six men lying on
the floor while the others were handcuffed.  Enad and his companions left
Sucat in the early morning of May 18, 1995.  He fell asleep along the way
but was awaken by gunshots.  He saw Dumlao and other police officers fire
their guns at the L-300 van containing the apprehended suspects.

5. SPO2 Noel P. Seno's affidavit of May 31, 2001[19] in which he

corroborated what Ramos said.  Seno claimed that he was part of the
advance party in Superville Subdivision and was also in Commonwealth
Avenue when the suspected members of theKuratong Baleleng Gang were
killed.

6. The PNP ABRITG After Operations Report of May 31, 1995[20] which

narrated the events that took place on May 17 and 18, 1995.  This report was
submitted by Lacson, Zubia, Acop and Canson.

7. The PNP Medico-Legal Reports[21] which stated that the suspected

members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang tested negative for gunpowder
nitrates.

The Court agrees with Judge Yadao that the above affidavits and reports,
taken together with the other documents of record, fail to establish
probable cause against the respondents.

First.  Evidently, the case against respondents rests on the testimony of

Ramos, corroborated by those of Medes, Enad, and Seno, who supposedly
heard the commanders of the various units plan the killing of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang members somewhere in Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon
City and actually execute such plan.  Yu's testimony is limited to the capture
of the gang members and goes no further.  He did not see them killed.

Second.  Respecting the testimonies of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, the
prosecution's own evidence the PNP ABRITG's After Operations Report of
May 31, 1995 shows that these men took no part in the operations against
the Kuratong BalelengGang members.  The report included a
comprehensive list of police personnel from Task Force Habagat (Lacson),
Traffic Management Command (Zubia), Criminal Investigation Command
(Acop), and National Capital Region Command (Canson) who were
involved.  The names of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno were not on that
list.  Notably, only Yu's name, among the new set of witnesses, was on that
list. Since an after-battle report usually serves as basis for commendations
and promotions, any omitted name would hardly have gone unchallenged.

Third.  Ramos, whose story appeared to be the most significant evidence

against the respondents, submitted in the course of the preliminary
investigation that the Office of the Ombudsman conducted in a related
robbery charge against the police officers involved a counter-affidavit.  He
claimed in that counter-affidavit that he was neither in Superville
Subdivision nor Commonwealth Avenue during the Kuratong Baleleng
operations since he was in Bulacan on May 17, 1995 and at his home on
May 18.[22]  Notably, Medes claimed in a joint counter-affidavit that he was
on duty at the TMC headquarters at Camp Crame on May 17 and 18.[23]

Fourth.  The Office of the Ombudsman, looking at the whole picture and
giving credence to Ramos and Medes' statements, dismissed the robbery
case.  More, it excluded Ramos from the group of officers that it charged
with the murder of the suspected members of the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang.  Under the circumstances, the Court cannot be less
skeptical than Judge Yadao was in doubting the sudden reversal after six
years of testimony of these witnesses.

Of course, Yu may have taken part in the subject operation but, as he

narrated, his role was limited to cornering and arresting the
suspected Kuratong Baleleng Gang members at their safe house in
Superville Subdivision.  After his team turned the suspects over to an
investigating unit, he no longer knew what happened to them.

Fifth.  True, the PNP Medico-Legal Reports showed that the Kuratong
Baleleng Gang members tested negative for gunpowder nitrates.  But this
finding cannot have any legal significance for the purpose of the
preliminary investigation of the murder cases against the respondents
absent sufficient proof that they probably took part in gunning those gang
members down.

The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action
outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to
present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable
cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the
judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint
or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt
on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue
must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the
complaint of information.

Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options
upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the
evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a
warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to
present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as
to the existence of probable cause.[24]

But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not
mandatory.  The court's first option under the above is for it to
"immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause."  That is the situation here: the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.
It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that the
judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five
days from notice.  But that is not the case here.  Discounting the affidavits
of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno, nothing is left in the record that
presents some doubtful probability that respondents committed the crime
charged.  PNP Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in
2001, six years after it happened.  It would have been ridiculous to
entertain the belief that the police could produce new witnesses in the five
days required of the prosecution by the rules.

In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of

multiple murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial.[25]

5. Policies Adopted for Conduct of Court Hearing 

The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao arbitrarily recognized only one
public prosecutor and one private prosecutor for all the offended parties
but allowed each of the counsels representing the individual respondents to
be heard during the proceedings before it.  She also unjustifiably prohibited
the prosecution's use of tape recorders.

But Section 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court ample
inherent and administrative powers to effectively control the conduct of its
proceedings.  Thus:

Sec. 5.  Inherent powers of court. Every court shall have power:

xxxx

(b)  To enforce order in proceedings before it, or before a person or persons

empowered to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
xxxx

(d)  To control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial

officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case
before it, in every manner appertaining thereto;

xxxx

(g)  To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justice;

xxxx

There is nothing arbitrary about Judge Yadao's policy of allowing only one
public prosecutor and one private prosecutor to address the court during
the hearing for determination of probable cause but permitting counsels
representing the individual accused to do so.  A criminal action is
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.[26]  The
burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is upon him,
not upon the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely in their clients'
damages claim.  Besides, the public and the private prosecutors take a
common position on the issue of probable cause.  On the other hand, each
of the accused is entitled to adopt defenses that are personal to him.

As for the prohibition against the prosecution's private recording of the

proceedings, courts usually disallows such recordings because they create
an unnecessary distraction and if allowed, could prompt every lawyer,
party, witness, or reporter having some interest in the proceeding to insist
on being given the same privilege.  Since the prosecution makes no claim
that the official recording of the proceedings by the court's stenographer
has been insufficient, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion in Judge
Yadao's policy against such extraneous recordings.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES this petition and AFFIRMS the

following assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 81 in Criminal Cases 01-101102 to 12:
the Order dated November 12, 2003 which denied the prayer for re-raffle,
granted the motions for determination of probable cause, and dismissed
the criminal cases;

the Order dated January 16, 2004 which granted the motion of the
respondents for the immediate resolution of the three pending incidents
before the court;

the Order dated January 21, 2004 which denied the motion to recuse and
the urgent supplemental motion for compulsory disqualification;

the Order dated January 22, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2003; and

the Order dated January 26, 2004 which denied the motion for
reconsideration of the January 16, 2004 Order.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin,

Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
concur.
Carpio, J., no part, prior inhibition in related cases
 [ GR No. 200465, Apr 20, 2015 ]

JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO v. PEOPLE +

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated August 31, 2011 and its
Resolution[2] dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 14

October 2008 and 12 February 2009 of Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be REMANDED to
Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, for further appropriate
proceedings.

SO ORDERED.[3]
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section

46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA]
6938).[4] The accusatory portion of the Information filed against her reads:

That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, and as such, have
a complete control and exclusively manage the entire business of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as
such and the confidence reposed on her, personal interest or equity adverse
to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by
then and there entering into a contract with Coca Cola Products at A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in her own
personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully well
knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should have accrued to A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the damage and
prejudice of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the
merits ensued.

The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then Chairperson of the A.

Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, had
entered into an exclusive dealership agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of softdrink products at the same
school. By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement between the school and
the Cooperative, Dr. Nora T. Salamanca, the school principal, directed
petitioner to submit her financial reports during her tenure as Chairperson.
Instead, petitioner claimed that the principal had no business and authority
to require her to produce financial statements, and that the said reports had
been posted on the school bulletin board.

The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the
financial reports of the Cooperative. The committee was composed of
Aurora Catabona (Chairperson), Monica Nealiga (member), with Noemi
Olazo (Chairperson-auditor) and Sylvia Apostol (auditor), who later
executed their respective affidavits in support of the charge against
petitioner. Based on the documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the
records of actual deliveries and sales, and the financial statements prepared
by petitioner, the audit committee found that petitioner defrauded the
Cooperative and its members for three (3) years in the following amounts:
School Year (S.Y.) 1998-1999 - P54,008.00; S.Y. 1999-2000 - P40,503.00;
and S.Y. 2000-2001 - P8,945.00. Despite requests for her to return to the
Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, petitioner
failed and refused to do so. Thus, the Cooperative issued a Board
Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against petitioner.

After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner

moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave
of court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the
crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a
sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.

On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,
thus:

Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original

jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offense or predicated thereon, and considering that violation of
[Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less
than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than
one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, this
Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant case
which properly pertains to the first level courts.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds that it

has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. Accordingly, the instant case is
hereby DISMISSED. This Court having no jurisdiction, further
discussions over the defense' allegation that there was a violation of the
principle of primary jurisdiction and that the private complainants used a
falsified resolution to purposely empower them to file the instant case
become moot and academic.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[6]
On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the private
prosecutor's motion for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal.[7] The
RTC held:
Nowhere in said [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal
sanctions/liability for violation of acts or omission prescribed therein. If
ever, the liability is only for damages and for double the profits which
otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative. It is a fundamental rule in
law that an act or omission is not a crime unless there is a law making it so
and providing a penalty therefor. Otherwise put, the facts charged in the
information do not charge an offense. And even assuming arguendo that
they do constitute an offense, the penalty therefor is that provided under
paragraph 4 of [Section] 124 of R.A. [6938] which is "imprisonment of not
less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
court," which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the first, not the
second level court.

Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the prosecution
is the undisputed fact that before this case was filed in Court,
conciliation/mediation process for the amicable settlement of the dispute
was not availed of by the private complainants who are all members
(directors) of the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative in accordance with the by-laws of the Cooperative and the
Cooperative Code itself and the Guidelines for the Implementation of
Conciliation/Mediation of Cooperative dispute (Memo Circular No. 2007-
05, Series of 2007). The dispute involving the parties is certainly a dispute
and issue between and among directors, officers or members of the A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative which is
governed by the Guidelines.

Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until the Office

of the President as outlined in the Cooperative Code and in its
implementing rules not having been resorted to by the complainants, the
rule on primary jurisdiction was violated and this Court acquired no
jurisdiction to hear and determine the present case.[8]
Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the order of dismissal to the CA.

On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside
the RTC Orders dated October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and
remanded the case records to the RTC for further proceedings. On January
31, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its
decision.[9]

Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court, raising the following issues:

1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S

DECISION OF DISMISSAL, HAS THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAN, UNAMBIGUOUS
AND CATEGORICAL PROVISION OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF [SECTION] 124
OF RA-6938 IN REFERENCE TO THE PENAL SANCTION FOR
VIOLATION OF [SEC] 46 OF THE COOPERATIVE [CODE], RA-6938 AND
ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE DERIVED FROM ITS
INTERPRETATION OF A SUPPOSED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
WHICH INTERPRETATION, EVEN SUBJECT PETITIONER TO A
HIGHER PENALTY OF 5 YEARS TO 10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO JUSTIFY
THAT TFIE RTC SHOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE AND
USED IT AS A GROUND TO REVERSE THE DECISION OF THE HON.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE OTHER

GROUNDS ASSIGNED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL
CHARGE OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF [SECTION] 46 OF RA-
6938, (COOPERATIVE CODE). THAT THERE WAS A VIOLATION OF
THE RULE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION - EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE COOPERATIVE LEVEL BEFORE
GOING TO COURT.

3. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS' ORDER REMANDING

THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS IGNORED THE RULE THAT DISMISSAL OF THE
CHARGE ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AMOUNTS TO AN
ACQUITTAL, AND THE DISMISSAL IS NOT APPEALABLE.

4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT THE
PETITIONER-ACCUSED TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER
PENALTY HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.

5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A NEW AND

AMENDED COOPERATIVE CODE RA-9520 COULD POSSIBLE APPLY
TO THIS CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE OF EXPOSE
(SIC) FACTO LAW.][10]
The petition has no merit.

Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead of
an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, which the OSG points out as the
proper remedy to assail the CA decision.

Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65, because
the assailed CA decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. She posits
that the Court ordered the exclusion of the CA as one of the party
respondents, and considered the petition as one filed under Rule 45, since
the focal issue raised in the petition is a question of law calling for an
interpretation of Sections 46 and 124 of RA 6938, in relation to Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by RA 7691. She adds that had she chosen to file an appeal
by certiorari, the Court would be faced with the same question of law.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[11] In Mercado v.
Court of Appeals,[12] the Court had again stressed the distinction between
the remedies provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65, to wit:

xxx [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of

Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders
or resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the
nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by
filing a petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case. On the other hand, a special civil
action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific ground
therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute
for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under
Rule 45. xxx.[13]
In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's
Association, Inc.,[14] the Court explained that one of the requisites
of certiorari is that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper,
even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. It is also well
settled that a party cannot file a petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of the
Rules of Court because said procedural rules pertain to different remedies
and have distinct applications. The remedy of appeal under Rule 45 and the
original action for certiorariunder Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or cumulative. Thus, when petitioner adopts an improper
remedy, petition may be dismissed outright.

However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons as
when the petition before it is clearly meritorious and filed on time both
under Rules 45 and 65.[15] In accordance with the liberal spirit which
pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the Court may
treat the petition as having been filed under Rule 45. Here, no justifiable
reasons were proffered by petitioner for a more liberal interpretation of
procedural rules. Although it was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65,
the petition at bench lacks substantive merit and raises only questions of
law which should have been duly made in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.[16]

On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over petitioner's

criminal case for violation of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and
Committee Members) of RA 6938, the Court affirms the CA ruling that it is
the RTC, not the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which has jurisdiction
over her case.

In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the

averments of the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing
at the time of the filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty
provided by law for the crime charged at the time of its commission.
[17]
 Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, provides that the MeTC has
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six years, irrespective of the amount of fine:

Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts

and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. - Except in cases
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

xxxx

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with

imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the
amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
thereof. (Emphasis added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of
the amount of fine, fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC,
in accordance with Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended:

Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall

exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now
falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by
the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and
Committee Members) of RA 6938 provides only for a civil liability but not a
criminal sanction, hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction over her criminal case
which is punishable under paragraph 4 of Section 124:

Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions

affecting cooperatives are hereby prohibited:

(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no

penalty is imposed shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less
than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the
court. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of Directors,
Officers and Committee Members), Section 47 (Compensation) and Section
124 (Penal Provisions) of RA 6938, are plain, unambiguous, and
categorical. She submits that statutory construction of such clear
provisions, especially if prejudicial to her rights as an accused and would
subject her to higher penalty, should not be allowed.

On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over
petitioner's case pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938:

(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated the

provisions of Section 47 (liability of directors, officers and
committee members), Section 50 (disloyalty of a director) and Section
51 (illegal use of confidential information) shall upon conviction suffer a
fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment
of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or
both at the court's discretion; (Emphasis supplied)
The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted provision is a
clerical error because the "liability of directors, officers and committee
members" is undisputedly governed by Section 46 of RA 6938, while
Section 47 thereof deals with the compensation of directors, officers and
employees, to wit:

Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee

Members. - Directors, officers and committee members, who willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as
such directors, officers or committee member shall be liable jointly and
severally for all damages or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative,
members and other persons.

When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire or

acquires, in violation of his duty, any interest or equity adverse to the
cooperative in respect to any matter which has been reposed in him in
confidence, he shall, as a trustee for the cooperative, be liable for damages
and for double the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the
cooperative.

Section 47. Compensation. - (1) In the absence of any provision in the

by-laws fixing their compensation, the directors shall not receive any
compensation except for reasonable per diem: Provided, That any
compensation other than per diems may be granted to directors by a
majority vote of the members with voting rights at a regular or special
general assembly meeting specifically called for the purpose: Provided
further, that no additional compensation other than per diems shall be paid
during the first year of existence of any cooperative.
The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to present any
compelling reason to warrant a departure from the exhaustive CA ruling on
why the RTC, not the MeTC, has jurisdiction over her criminal case for
violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, thus:

The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may
correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected, would
render the statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical or would defeat or
impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent
on the face of the whole enactment and no specific provision is abrogated.
To correct the error or mistake is to prevent the nullification of the statute
and give it a meaning and purpose. For it is the duty of the court to give a
statute a sensible construction, one that will effectuate legislative intent and
avoid injustice or absurdity. It is its duty to arrive at the legislative intent
and in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary rule under which it must
be held without variance or shadow of turning the legislature intended to
make a typographical error, the result of which would be to make nonsense
of the act, and not to carry out the legislative scheme, but to destroy it.

xxxx

Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec] 124,

paragraph 4, as the trial court did, is necessary and therefore, warranted
the dismissal of the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. To reiterate, [Sec]
46 of the Code, entitled "Liability of Directors, Officers, and Committee
Members," provides for violations under which the said officers could be
held liable for, and the corresponding liability for damages and profits from
the said violations. Since the said [section] does not provide for penal
sanction, an application of [Sec] 124, paragraph 3 should follow as the said
provision evidently refers to the penal sanction on erring directors,
officers and committee members. It would make no sense if we were
to follow what clearly appears to be a clerical error, that is, applying [Sec]
124, paragraph 4 instead, just because paragraph 3 of the same [section]
refers to [Sec] 47, which upon examination of the Code provides for the
"Compensation" of the directors, officers and other employees of the
cooperative.

We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section] 124 (3)
should refer to "[Section] 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and
Committee Members, [Section] 49 (Disloyalty of a Director) and [Section]
51 (Illegal use of confidential information)." Following this interpretation,
violation of [Sec] 46, therefore, is punishable by a fine of not less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5)
years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion,
which under B.P. Blg. 129, shall be within the jurisdiction of the RTC.[18]
It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in
Section 124 (3) of RA 6938 on the liability of directors, officers and
committee members, has been recognized and duly corrected when the
legislature enacted RA 9520, entitled "An Act Amending the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines to be known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of
2008." Pertinent portions of the corrected provision read:

ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. -

Directors, officers and committee members, who are willfully and
knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or
acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as
such directors, officers or committee members shall be liable jointly and
severally for all damages or profits resulting therefrom to the cooperative,
members, and other persons.

xxxx

ART. 140. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting

cooperatives are hereby prohibited:

xxxx

(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions

of Article 45 on the Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members, Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a Director, and Article 49 on the
Illegal Use of Confidential Information shall upon conviction suffer a fine of
not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or imprisonment of not less
than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's
discretion; [Emphasis added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated
when the Cooperative filed a criminal case against petitioner without
undergoing conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the
Cooperative Code and the By-laws of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the
negative. Conciliation or mediation is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a
criminal case for violation of RA 6938 against petitioner, because such case
is not an intra-cooperative dispute. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative
dispute and should have been resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly
argued by the People, this is not an intra-cooperative dispute. Intra-
cooperative dispute is a dispute arising between or among members of the
same cooperative. The instant case is a dispute between the Cooperative
and its former chairperson, the accused-appellee. The Board Resolution
authorizing the filing of the criminal complaint by the Board of Directors,
for and in behalf of the Cooperative, is proof that this is not an intra-
cooperative dispute, and within the jurisdiction of the regular court.[19]
Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party
is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended
party is limited to the civil liability, and her role in the prosecution of the
offense is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.[20] In petitioner's
criminal case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real
offended party, while the Cooperative and its members are mere private
complainants and witnesses whose interests are limited to the civil aspect
thereof. Clearly, such criminal case can hardly be considered an intra-
cooperative dispute, as it is not one arising between or among members of
the same cooperative.

On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to

evidence amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court
rules in the negative.

In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court stressed that demurrer to the

evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that
the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law,
whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party
demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a
verdict. The Court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in
a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

In People v. Sandiganbayan,[22] the Court explained the general rule that

the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus,
final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed
after the prosecution had rested its case" and when the same is granted, it
calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and
its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in
a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to
evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in
double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.[23]
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and
dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the
case on the merits, let alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence based on the evidence proffered by the prosecution. This being
the case, the October 14, 2008 RTC Order of dismissal does not operate as
an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.[24] As aptly noted by the CA:

The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the dismissal of the

case against her is an acquittal. It should be emphasized' that "acquittal is
always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the
evidence does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable
doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because
the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not
show that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or sufficient in form
and substance, etc."[25]
On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right
against double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative and upholds the CA in ruling
that the dismissal having been granted upon petitioner's instance, double
jeopardy did not attach, thus:

The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double
jeopardy upon this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case
against her was premised upon her filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the
finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.

The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c)
the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been
convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the
express consent of the accused.

Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with
the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the
case through a demurrer to evidence. As correctly argued by the People,
where the dismissal was ordered upon or with express assent of the
accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against doubly
jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of
petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach.[26]
The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the
prosecution of her case before the RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA
6938 in Criminal Case No. 07-197750 is barred by res judicata because the
MeTC of Manila, Branch 22, in a Resolution[27] dated August 13, 2012,
granted her demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal case for
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR.[28] In
support of her flawed argument, petitioner points out that the private
complainants [officers and directors of the Cooperative] and the subject
matter [unreported sales profits of Coca-Cola products] of both cases are
the same, and that the case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 is
actually and necessarily included in the case for falsification of private
documents.

At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing
on criminal proceedings.[29] At any rate, petitioner's argument is
incidentally related to double jeopardy which embrace's a prohibition
against being tried for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

Section 7[30] of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of
double jeopardy may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is
for the same offense as in the first.[31] As to the first requisite, the first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e)
when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.[32]

In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of
double jeopardy are present in view of the MeTC Resolution[33] dated
August 13, 2012 which granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence and
acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in
Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR. Petitioner's argument dwells on whether
the third requisite of double jeopardy — a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first — is present. Such question of identity or lack of
identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of
each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the
respective legislative definitions of the offense involved.[34]

Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged

in the information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in a crime for falsification of private document under
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). The test to
determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the other is provided under Section 5, Rule .120 of the Rules of
Court:

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of

the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against petitioner for
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and
for violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, the
Court holds that the first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does
not necessarily include and is not necessarily included in the second
offense.

The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand,

alleged that petitioner, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director
of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, as
part of her duty to prepare financial reports, falsified such report for the
School Year 1999-2000, in relation to the sales profits of Coca-Cola
products in violation of Article 172 (2)[35] of the RPC. The elements of
falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC
are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except
those in paragraph 7, Article 171;[36] (2) that the falsification was committed
in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a
third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause
such damage.

The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the

other hand, that being then such officer and director of the Cooperative,
petitioner willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse to it, in
violation of her duty and of the confidence reposed upon her, by entering
into a contract with Coca-Cola in her own personal capacity, knowing fully
well that the sales profits of such products should have accrued to the
Cooperative. The essential elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938
are (1) that the offender is a director, officer or committee member; and (2)
that the offender willfully and lcnowingly (a) votes for or assents to patently
unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the
affairs of the cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal or pecuniary interest
in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee member.

Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements

of the crimes of falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of
the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the
Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be
said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third
requisite for double jeopardy to attach—a second jeopardy is for the same
offense as in the first—is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements
different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as
what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender, while
the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special, law
enacting it.

Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,[37] the Court held:

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be

invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may
offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of
law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased
elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of
the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
[38]

Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and
distinct offenses as discussed above—the first against' Article 172 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of the Cooperative
Code (RA 6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule
on double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an
accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws
even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed
against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a special law and the
Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an
obstacle to the prosecution of the other.[39]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the

Court of Appeals Decision dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated
Jan. 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin,* Villarama, Jr., and Reyes, JJ.,

concur