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VOL. 123, JULY 25, 1983 569

De la Cruz vs. Paras

No. L-42571-72. July 25, 1983.*

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES III,

LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA
FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE
VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE
CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO
ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO
GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO,
NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO GUMATAY, ANDRES
SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ, and
PEDRO GABRIEL, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS RAMIREZ as the Municipal
Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as the Municipal Vice Mayor, and
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF BOCAUE, BULACAN,
respondents.

Municipal Corporations; Constitutional Law; When exercise of police

power by a local government council is valid.—Police power is granted to
municipal corporations in general terms as follows: “General power of
council to enact ordinances and make

_______________

* EN BANC.

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regulations.—The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make

such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
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such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein.” It is practically a reproduction of the former
Section 39 of Municipal Code. An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof,
according to Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court in the leading case of
United States v. Abendan “is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental
law of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or
unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to
legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of
such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto
must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced
invalid.”

Same; Same; A local government council cannot prohibit the

establishment of nightclubs and cabarets; it may only regulate their
operations.—If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited,
certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the two
leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations,
as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals,
a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not
encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is
characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition.

Same; Same; Courts; Judiciary may set aside legislation which clearly
invades personal or property rights, e.g., prohibition on establishment of
cabarets, dance halls and nightclubs.—The admonition in Salaveria should
be heeded: “The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action
when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.” It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation,
there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights,
personal in

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the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and
property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those
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therein employed.

Statutes; Constitutional Law; Where title of a law empowers a local

council to regulate places of amusement, its amendment to include power to
prohibit in the body of the law without change in title would give rise to a
constitutional question on titling of bills.—Then on May 21, 1954, the first
section was amended to include not merely “the power to regulate, but
likewise “prohibit * * *.” The title, however, remained the same. It is
worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as thus
amended, if only the above portion of the Act were considered, a municipal
council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were
all, then the appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not
all, however. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one
whit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of
regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by
petitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition
of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question.
The Constitution mandates: “Every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.” Since there is no dispute as the
title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the
statute being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the
operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the
exercise of a regulatory power “to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals,” in the language of the Administrative
Code, such competence extending to all “the great public needs,” to quote
from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise. In
accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that
between two possible interpretations by one of which it will be free from
constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the
former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather than one
that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself. We have done
so before We do so again.

Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; Under the Local Government

Code (Batas 337), the Sangguniang Bayan cannot prohibit establishment of
cabarets.—It is dear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of night clubs. They may

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be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be,
therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained.
All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to
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operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses

could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to
comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and continued
existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the
meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments, the
necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a
temporary termination of their business. During such time, their employees
would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an undesirable
outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should not be susceptible to
the reproach that it displays less than sympathetic concern for the plight of
those who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were thus
left without employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If
it were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture. That is
to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due process clause
with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.

PETITION for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the

decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Federico N. Alday for petitioners.
Dakila F. Castro for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is whether

or not a municipal
1
corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan, represented by
respondents, can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the
operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such
clubs employing hostesses. It is contended that the ordinance
assailed as invalid is tainted with nullity, the municipality being
devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling,
petitioners at

_______________

1 Municipal Mayor Matias Ramirez and Municipal Vice-Mayor Mario Mendoza.

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the same time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously
2
given
to them was in effect withdrawn
3
without judicial hearing.
The assailed ordinance is worded as follows: “Section 1.—Title
of Ordinance.—This Ordinance shall be known and may be cited as
the [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of Bocaue, Bulacan.
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Section 2.—Definitions of Terms—(a) ‘Night Club’ shall include any

place or establishment selling to the public food or drinks where
customers are allowed to dance. (b) ‘Cabaret’ or ‘Dance Hall’ shall
include any place or establishment where dancing is permitted to the
public and where professional hostesses or hospitality girls and
professional dancers are employed. (c) ‘Professional hostesses’ or
‘hospitality girls’ shall include any woman employed by any of the
establishments herein defined to entertain guests and customers at
their table or to dance with them. (d) ‘Professional dancer’ shall
include any woman who dances at any of the establishments herein
defined for a fee or remuneration paid directly or indirectly by the
operator or by the persons she dances with. (e) ‘Operator’ shall
include the owner, manager, administrator or any person who
operates and is responsible for the operation of any night club,
cabaret or dance hall. Section 3.—Prohibition in the Issuance and
Renewal of Licenses, Permits.—Being the principal cause in the
decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on
this community as explained above, no operator of night clubs,
cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to
operate within the jurisdiction of the municipality and no
license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality
girls and professional dancer for employment in any of the
aforementioned establishments. The prohibition in the issuance of
licenses/permits to said

_______________

2 Petition, 7. The other question raised was the jurisdiction of a municipal council
to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, it being alleged that the power of regulating
tourist-oriented businesses being granted to the then Department, now Ministry, of
Tourism.
3 Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975.

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persons and operators of said establishments shall include

prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4.—Revocation of
Permits and Licenses.—The licenses and permits issued to operators
of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are now in operation
including permits issued to professional hostesses, hospitality girls
and professional dancers are hereby revoked upon the expiration of
the thirty-day period given them as provided in Section 8 hereof and
thenceforth, the operation of these establishments within the
jurisdiction of the municipality shall be illegal. Section 5.—Penalty
in case of violation.—Violation of any of the provisions of this
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Ordinance shall be punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three

(3) months or a fine not exceeding P200.00 or both at the discretion
of the Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical entity, the
person charged with the management and/or operation thereof shall
be liable for the penalty provided herein. Section 6.—Separability
Clause.—If, for any reason, any section or provision of this
Ordinance is held unconstitutional or invalid, no other section or
provision hereof shall be affected thereby. Section 7.—Repealing
Clause.—All ordinance, resolutions, circulars, memoranda or parts
thereof that are inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance
are hereby repealed. Section 8.—Effectivity.—This Ordinance shall
take effect immediately upon its approval; provided, however, that
operators of night clubs, cabarets and dance halls now in operation
including professional hostesses, hospitality girls and professional
dancers are given a period of thirty days from the approval hereof
within which to wind up their 4
businesses and comply with the
provisions of this Ordinance.”
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with
preliminary
5
injunction were filed with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. The grounds alleged follow:

_______________

4 Ibid.
5 Vicente de la Cruz, et al. v. Matias Ramirez, et al., and Teresita Calot, et al. v.
The Municipal Mayor, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 4755-M and 4756-M,
respectively. On November 21, 1975, the petition in one of the above cases was
amended to raise the further

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De la Cruz vs. Paras

“1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no

authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. 2.
Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners’ right to due process
and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously given to
petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 3. That
under Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, by Presidential
Decree No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented
businesses including night 6
clubs, has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism.” The cases were assigned to respondent
Judge, now Associate Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, who issued a restraining order on November 7, 1975. The
answers were thereafter filed. It was therein alleged: “1. That the
Municipal Council is authorized by law not only to regulate but to
prohibit the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs
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invoking Section 2243 of the RAC, CA 601, Republic Acts Nos.

938, 978 and 1224. 2. The Ordinance No. 84 is not violative of
petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection of the law,
since property rights are subordinate to public interests. 3. That
Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal7
Councils of their jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs.”
There was the admission of the following facts as having been
established: “1. That petitioners Vicente de la Cruz, et al. in Civil
Case No. 4755-M had been previously issued licenses by the
Municipal Mayor of Bocaue—petitioner Jose Torres III, since 1958;
petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since 1960; petitioner Renato Alipio,
since 1961 and petitioner Leoncio Corpuz, since 1972; 2. That
petitioners had invested large sums of money in their businesses; 3.
That the night clubs are well-lighted and have no partitions, the
tables being near each other; 4. That the petitioners owners/operators
of these clubs do not allow the hospitality girls therein to engage in
immoral acts and to issue of lack of authority of respondent
Municipal Officials to pass the ordinance in question, since the
power to license, supervise and regulate night clubs has been
transferred to the Department of Tourism by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 189, as amended.

_______________

6 Petition, 7.
7 Ibid, 8.

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go out with customers; 5. That these hospitality girls are made to go

through periodic medical check-ups and not one of them is suffering
from any venereal disease and that those who fail to submit to a
medical check-up or those who are found to be infected with
venereal disease are not allowed to work: 6. That the crime rate there8
is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in other towns of Bulacan.”
Then came on January 15, 1976 the decision upholding the
constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing
the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
In an exhaustive as well as scholarly opinion, the lower court
dismissed the petitions. Its rationale is set forth in the opening
paragraph thus: “Those who lust cannot last. This in essence is why
the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan, stigmatized as it
has been by innuendos of sexual titillation, and fearful of what the
awesome future holds for it, had no alternative except to order thru
its legislative machinery, and even at the risk of partial economic
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dislocation, the closure of its night clubs and/or cabarets. This in

essence is also why this Court, obedient to the mandates of good
government, and cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the
current legal and social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of
police power the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84,
Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan. The
restraining orders heretofore issued in these two cases are therefore
hereby lifted, effective the first day of February, 1976, the purpose
of the grace period being to enable the petitioners herein to apply
9
to
the proper appellate tribunals for any contemplated redress.” This
Court is, however, unable to agree with such a conclusion and for
reasons herein set forth, holds that reliance on the police power is
insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It
must be declared null and void.
1 Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general
terms as follows: “General power of council to enact ordinances and
make regulations.—The municipal council shall

_______________

8 Ibid, 8-9.
9 Decision, Annex A to Petition 1.

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enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to

law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote
the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and10 the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein.” It is practically
11
a reproduction
of the former Section 39 of Municipal Code. An ordinance enacted
by virtue thereof, according to Justice Moreland, speaking 12
for the
Court in the leading case of United States v. Abendan “is valid,
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the Philippine Islands,
or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public
policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in
derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a
given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the details of such
legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto
must be a13 reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced
14
invalid.” In another leading case, United States v. Salaveria, the
ponente this time being Justice Malcolm, where the present
Administrative Code provision was applied, it was stated by this
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Court: “The general welfare clause has two branches: One branch
attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to
such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the
municipal council by law. With this class we are not here directly
concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more
independent of the specific functions of the council which are
enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall

_______________

10 Section 2238, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines (1917).

11 Act No. 82 (1901).
12 24 Phil. 165 (1913). Abendan is followed in United States v. Tamparong, 31
Phil. 321 (1915); United States v. Gaspay, 33 Phil. 96 (1915) and Sarmiento v.
Balderol, 112 Phil. 394 (1961).
13 Ibid, 168. Cf. United States v. Ten Yu, 24 Phil. 1 (1912); Case v. Board of
Health, 24 Phil. 250 (1913).
14 39 Phil. 102 (1918).

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seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein.’ It is a general
rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in
the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of the corporation,
15
and not inconsistent
with the laws or policy of the State.” If night clubs were merely
then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance
would pass the test of validity. In the two leading cases above set
forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said
that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering
public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a
measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose
sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The admonition in
Salaveria should be heeded: “The Judiciary should not lightly set
aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion 16of personal
or property rights under the guise of police regulation.” It is clear
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that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a

clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of
those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and
property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned
by those therein employed.
2. The decision
17
now under review refers to Republic Act No. 938
as amended. It was originally enacted on June 20,

_______________

15 Ibid, 109-110.
16 Ibid, 111. In Salaveria though the ordinance penalizing the playing of
panguingue on days not Sundays or legal holidays was declared as valid.
17 It was amended by Republic Act No. 979 and Republic Act No. 1224.

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1953. It is entitled: “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY

BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN 18
THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.” Its first
section insofar as pertinent reads: “The municipal or city board or
council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by
ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night
clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons,
bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other19similar places of amusement
within its territorial jurisdiction: * * *.” Then on May 21, 1954, the
first section was amended to include not 20merely “the power to
regulate, but likewise ‘‘prohibit * * *.” The title, however,
remained the same. It is worded exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It
is to be admitted that as thus amended, if only the above portion of
the Act were considered, a municipal council may go as far as to
prohibit the operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the
appealed decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all,
however. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed
one whit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted
remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for
the view advanced by petitioners that to construe Republic Act No.
938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would
give rise to a constitutional question. The Constitution mandates:
“Every bill shall embrace
21
only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.” Since there is no dispute as the title limits the
power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute
being invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the
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operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap

between the exercise of a regulatory power “to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity,

_______________

18 Title of Republic Act No. 938 as amended.

19 Republic Act No. 938, Section 1.
20 Republic Act No. 979, Section 1.
21 Article VIII, Section 19, par. 1 of the Constitution.

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22
improve the morals,” in the language of the Administrative 23
Code,
such competence extending to all “the great public needs,” to quote
from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise.
In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that between two possible interpretations by one of
which it will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other
tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A
construction that would save rather than one that would affix the seal
of doom 24certainly commends itself. We have done so before We do
so again.
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of 25a
specific provision of the recently-enacted Local Government Code.
The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the Administrative Code
provision, is set forth in the first paragraph of Section 149 defining
the powers and duties of the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows:
“(a) Enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be
necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred
upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and
order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general
welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants26
thereof, and insure
the protection of property therein; * * * ” There are in addition
provisions that may have a bearing on the question now before this
Court. Thus the sangguniang bayan shall “(rr) Regulate cafes,
restaurants, beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and
lodging houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist

_______________

22 Section 2238.
23 Otis v. Parker, 187 US 606 (1902).

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24 Cf. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111
SCRA 433. Separate opinion of Justice Makasiar. De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No.
57883, March 12, 1982, 112 SCRA 294.
25 Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (1983). Under Section 234 of the Code it took effect
one month after its publication in the Official Gazette. It was published in the issue of
February 14, 1983.
26 Ibid, Section 149 (1) (a).

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transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns of

international standards which shall remain under the licensing and
regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which shall exercise
such authority without infringing on the taxing or regulatory powers
of the municipality; (ss) Regulate public dancing schools, public
dance halls, and sauna baths or massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the
establishment and operation of billiard pools, theatrical 27
performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment; * * *.” It
is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of
night clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying
on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the
decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners would
have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs.
A refusal to grant licenses, because no such businesses could legally
open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with
the legislative will to allow the operation and continued existence of
night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to
compel petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result
of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary
termination of their business. During such time, their employees
would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if such an
undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be. The law should
not be susceptible to the reproach that it displays less than
sympathetic concern for the plight of those who, under a mistaken
appreciation of a municipal power, were thus left without
employment. Such a deplorable consequence is to be avoided. If it
were not thus, then the element of arbitrariness enters the picture.
That is to pay less, very much less, than full deference to the due
process clause with its mandate of fairness and reasonableness.
4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted as
a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining police power legislation to
promote public morals. The commitment to such an ideal forbids
such a backward step. Legislation of that character is deserving of
the fullest sympathy from the judiciary. Accordingly, the judiciary
has
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27Ibid, Section 149 (1) (rr, ss and tt)

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582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De la Cruz vs. Paras

not been hesitant to lend the weight of its support to measures that
can be characterized as falling within that aspect of the police power.
Reference is made by respondents to Ermita-Malate Hotel 28
and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. There is a
misapprehension as to what was decided by this Court. That was a
regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due
process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It
merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in
order precisely to put an end to practices which could encourage
vice and immorality. This is an entirely different case. What was
involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but
an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit. Moreover, while it was
pointed out in the aforesaid Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association, Inc. decision that there must be a factual
foundation of invalidity, it was likewise made clear that there is no
need to satisfy such a requirement if a statute were void on its face.
That it certainly is if the power to enact such ordinance is at the most
dubious and under the present Local Government Code non-existent.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision
of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside, and
nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the Municipality of
Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court is hereby made permanent. No
costs.

Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos,

Plana, Escolin, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J., reserves his right to file a dissent.
Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on official leave.
De Castro, J., is on sick leave.

Petition granted and decision reversed; set aside and nullified.

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28 L-24693, 20 SCRA 849, July 31, 1967.

583

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People vs. Manalang

Notes.—The City of Tagbilaran is not entirely without any power

to regulate the operation of tricycle within the city notwithstanding
the certificate issued by the commission. (City of Tagbilaran vs. Lim,
52 SCRA 381.)
The Mayor’s refusal to issue business permits will not be
interfered with unless abusive. (Enriquez, Jr. vs. Abdulwahid Bidin,
47 SCRA 183.)
Municipal corporations have no authority to abolish by ordinance
a position or office created by statute. (City of Basilan vs.
Hechanova, 58 SCRA 711.)
A CFI Judge has authority to pass upon the validity of a city
ordinance after its validity had been contested before the Secretary
of Justice and a decision rendered thereon by said official. (San
Miguel Corp. vs. Avelino, 87 SCRA 69.)
A City can validly tax the sales of matches to customers outside
the city as long as the orders were booked and paid for in the
company’s branch office in the City. (Philippine Match Co., Ltd vs.
City of Cebu, 81 SCRA 99.)

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