Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, TORTS_2015

Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez, Santiago

- Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the other
individual petitioners were under her direct control and supervision. Their negligent acts were done within
the scope of their assigned tasks.

United States vs. Maza (1905)

Facts:

Guillermo Maza (defendant) was sentenced to be imprisoned for the period of eight years and one day of presidio
mayor by the CFI of Batangas. From this decision the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. On April 18, 1903,
the Supreme Court affirmed the above sentence of the inferior court.

During the time the said appeal was pending in the Supreme Court the said accused was detained as a prisoner in the
provincial jail in the Province of Batangas. While the defendant was thus detained as a prisoner in the provincial jail,
he, together with other prisoners, attempted to escape from said jail. In the attempt of the defendant, together with
his companions, to escape from said jail, he inflicted wounds upon one Baltazar Ramirez, by means of a revolver
which he then and there took from the possession of one of the guards in said jail, from which wounds the said
Ramirez died.

The evidence adduced during the trial shows beyond peradventure of doubt that the defendant and his companions
inflicted wounds upon Baltazar Ramirez, from which the said Ramirez died a few hours later. The evidence fails to
disclose, however, any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in article 403 of the Penal Code. This act,
therefore, cannot be qualified as assassination, but must be qualified as the crime of homicide. It is argued on behalf
of the defendant that there was no evidence to show that he personally inflicted the wounds upon the said Ramirez
which caused the latter's death a few moments later.

Issue: WON the defendant's liability should be considered as liability of joint tortfeasors?

Decision:

The general doctrine, both by the supreme court of Spain and the courts of the United States, is that "where two or
more persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of
all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though the act or crime done or committed was by himself alone."

"If two or more persons combine in an intent to perform a criminal act jointly, the guilt of each is the same as if he
had acted alone; and the result is the same if the act is divided into parts and each person proceeds with his part
unaided"

While the evidence shows beyond peradventure of doubt that the defendant and his companions were also guilty of
the crime of robbery, as well as that of inflicting wounds, yet, by virtue of the provisions of article 89 of the Penal
Code, it is the duty of the court to impose the penalty corresponding to the more serious crime which in this case is
that of homicide. Article 89 of the Penal Code provides: "The provisions of the foregoing article are not applicable
to a case in which a single act should constitute two or more crimes, or if one of them should be a necessary means
for committing the others. “In such cases, only the penalty corresponding to the more serious crime shall be imposed
in its maximum degree." The punishment for homicide is reclusión temporal, and the penalty in its maximum degree
is seventeen years four months and one day to twenty years. It is the judgment of this court, therefore, that the
defendant be imprisoned for a period of seventeen years four months and one day of reclusión temporal, to suffer the
subsidiary penalties mentioned in article 59 of the Penal Code, to indemnify the heirs of the said Ramirez in the sum
of P1,000 to pay the said alcalde the sum of P17, and to pay the costs. So ordered.

Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc vs Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol (2005)
Facts:
“Exposé,” a radio documentary program hosted by Carmelo Rima and Hermogenes Alegre, is aired every morning
over DZRC-AM which is owned by Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. (FBNI). “Exposé” is heard over Legazpi
City, the Albay municipalities and other Bicol areas. One morning, Rima and Alegre exposed various alleged

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 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, TORTS_2015
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez, Santiago

complaints from students, teachers and parents against Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College
of Medicine (AMEC) and its administrators. Alegre said that AMEC is a dumping ground, garbage, not merely of
moral and physical misfits. Claiming that the broadcasts were defamatory, AMEC and Angelita Ago, as Dean of
AMEC’s College of Medicine, filed a complaint for damages against FBNI, Rima and Alegre. The RTC rendered a
Decision finding FBNI and Alegre liable for libel except Rima. The RTC awarded moral damages. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue: Whether AMEC, not a natural person, is entitled to moral damages
Held:
Petition DENIED.
A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a natural person, it cannot experience
physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
Nevertheless, AMEC’s claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code. This
provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. Article 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a natural or juridical person. Therefore, a
juridical person such as a corporation can validly complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for
moral damages.
Moreover, where the broadcast is libelous per se, the law implies damages. In such a case, evidence of an honest
mistake or the want of character or reputation of the party libeled goes only in mitigation of damages.46 Neither in
such a case is the plaintiff required to introduce evidence of actual damages as a condition precedent to the recovery
of some damages.47 In this case, the broadcasts are libelous per se. Thus, AMEC is entitled to moral damages.
However, we find the award of P300,000 moral damages unreasonable. The record shows that even though the
broadcasts were libelous per se, AMEC has not suffered any substantial or material damage to its reputation.
Therefore, we reduce the award of moral damages from P300,000 to P150,000.

Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the
Far Eastern Shipping, arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia. Captain Roberto Abellana
was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority (PPA) to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino
was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the
vessel. When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the
pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino
ordered the anchor dropped. The left anchor, with two (2) shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take
hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After
Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the
pier apron, noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not
take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be
dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The
vessel sustained damage too.

The Philippine Ports Authority, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for a sum of money
against Far Eastern Shipping Co., Capt. Senen C. Gavino and the Manila Pilots' Association praying that the
defendants therein be held jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff actual and exemplary damages plus costs
of suit.

RTC: Trial court ordered the defendants therein jointly and severally to pay the PPA the amount of P1,053,300.00
representing actual damages and the costs of suit.

CA: As stated at the outset, respondent appellate court affirmed the findings of the court a quo except that if found
no employer-employee relationship existing between herein private respondents Manila Pilots' Association (MPA,
for short) and Capt. Gavino.

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 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, TORTS_2015
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez, Santiago

ISSUE: Whether or not, FESC, Gavino, and MPA are solidarily liable.

RULING:

Capt. Gavino was assigned to pilot MV Pavlodar into Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Upon assuming such
office as compulsory pilot, Capt. Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence
required of a pilot, whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters
over which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. Tested thereby, we affirm
respondent court's finding that Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to such strict standard of care and diligence
required of pilots in the performance of their duties.

Our own evaluation is that Capt. Kabankov's shared liability is due mainly to the fact that he failed to act when the
perilous situation should have spurred him into quick and decisive action as master of the ship. In the face of
imminent or actual danger, he did not have to wait for the happenstance to occur before countermanding or
overruling the pilot. By his own admission, Capt. Kabankov concurred with Capt. Gavino's decisions, and this is
precisely the reason why he decided not to countermand any of the latter's orders. Inasmuch as both lower courts
found Capt. Gavino negligent, by expressing full agreement therewith Capt. Kabankov was just as negligent as Capt.
Gavino.

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the
total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the
whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint
tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code.

Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel or her owners are liable for all damages
caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the
owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages
caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.The liability of MPA for
damages is not anchored on Article 2180 of the New Civil Code as erroneously found and declared by the Court a
quo but under the provisions of Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65, supra, in tandem with the by-laws of the
MPA. Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides that there is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so
states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity. Plainly, Customs Administrative Order No.
15-65, which as an implementing rule has the force and effect of law, can validly provide for solidary liability.

Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against
any or all of the responsible persons although under circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was
culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor’s negligence ceases to be
a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible
for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution
between the tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. As a general
rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages
caused to persons or property by reason of her negligent management or navigation.

WHEREFORE, in view of all of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions for review are DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.

Dean C. Worcester vs. Martin Ocampo, et al. (1912)

Facts: Dean C. Worcester, a member of the Civil Commission of the Philippines and Secretary of the Interior
Government of the Philippines, commenced a suit against Martin Ocampo et al., the owners, directors, writers,
editors and administrators of a newspaper known as "El Renacimiento" and "Muling Pagsilang", for the purpose of

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 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, TORTS_2015
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez, Santiago

recovering damages resulting from an alleged libelous publication. Said publication entitled "Birds of Prey"
allegedly attacked the honesty and reviled the fame of Worcester with the malicious intention of inciting the Filipino
people to believe that Worcester was a vile despot and a corrupt person, unworthy of the position which he held.
Although Worcester was not named in the article, he proved that the article had the intention of it being understood
as referring to him as the acts stated in said article were publicly known as Worcester's acts (went to the mountains
of the province of Benguet to study the Igorots, had under his control and direction laws and ordinances relating to
the slaughtering of cattle, a man devoted to the study of science, at one time caused the importation of fish eggs in
the Philippines, among others). The trial court rendered a decision ordering Ocampo et al. jointly and severally
liable for the damages claimed by Worcester.

Issue: Whether Ocampo et al. are jointly and severally liable

Decision: The appellants discussed the eight and ninth assignments of error together, and claim that the lower court
committed an error in rendering a judgment jointly and severally against the defendants and in allowing an
execution against the individual property of said owners, and cite provisions of the Civil and Commercial Codes in
support of their contention. The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the
basis of the present action is a tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only
individually liable for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. The defendants
might have been sued separately for the commission of the tort. They might have been sued jointly and severally, as
they were. (Nicoll vs. Glennie, 1 M. & S. (English Common Law Reports), 558.) If several persons jointly commit a
tort, the plaintiff or person injured, has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them
separately, because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chiddey, Common Law Pleadings,
86.) It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act, for, to give an example, in a case of
assault and battery committed by various persons, under the common law all are principals. So also is the person
who counsels, aids or assists in any way he commission of a wrong. Under the common law, he who aided or
assisted or counseled, in any way, the commission of a crime, was as much a principal as he who inflicted or
committed the actual tort. (Page vs. Freeman, 19 Mo., 421.)

It may be stated as a general rule, that the joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if
they had performed the wrongful act themselves. (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir vs. Hopkins, 16 Ill., 313 (63 Am.
Dec., 312 and note); Berry vs. Fletch, 1st Dill., 67; Smithwick vs. Ward, 7 Jones L. 64; Smith vs. Felt, 50 Barb. (N.
Y.), 612; Shepard vs. McQuilkin, 2 W. Va., 90; Lewis vs. Johns, 34 Cal., 269.)

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person injured may sue all of
them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage caused by all, and all together are jointly
liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act
are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant
as compared with that of the others. (Forebrother vs. Ansley, 1 Campbell (English Reports), 343; Pitcher vs. Bailey,
8 East, 171; Booth vs. Hodgson, 6 Term Reports, 405; Vose vs. Grant, 15 Mass., 505; Acheson vs. Miller, 18 Ohio,
1; Wallace vs. Miller, 15 La. Ann., 449; Murphy vs. Wilson, 44 Mo., 313; Bishop vs. Ealey, 9 Johnson (N. Y.),
294.)

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among
themselves. They can no insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are
jointly and severally liable for the full amount. (Pardrige vs. Brady, 7 Ill. App., 639; Carney vs. Read, 11 Ind., 417;
Lee vs. Black, 27 Ark., 337; Bevins vs. McElroy, 52 Am. Dec., 258.)

A payment in full of the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might
exist against the others. There can be but one satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement,
generally operates to discharge all. (Wright vs. Lathrop, 2 Ohio, 33; Livingston vs. Bishop, 1 Johnson (N.Y.), 290;
Brown vs. Marsh, 7 Vt., 327; Ayer vs. Ashmead, 31 Conn., 447; Eastman vs. Grant, 34 Vt., 387; Turner vs.
Hitchcock, 20 Iowa, 310; Ellis vs. Esson, 50 Wis., 149.)

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 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, TORTS_2015
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez, Santiago

This same principle is recognized by Act 277 of the Philippine Commission. Section 6 provides that:

Every author, editor or proprietor . . . is chargeable with the publication of any words in any part . . . or number of
each newspaper, as fully as if he were the author of the same.

Vicente Verzosa and Ruiz , Rementeria Y Cia vs. Silvino Lim and Siy Cong Bieng and Company, Inc.
G.R. No. L-20145 November 15, 1923 (Street, J.)
Facts:
This action was instituted in the CFI of the City of Manila by Vicente Versoza and Ruiz, Rementeria y
Compania, as owners of the coastwise vessel Perla, against Silvino Lim and Siy Cong Bieng & Company, Inc., as
owner and agent, respectively, of the vessel Ban Yek, for the purpose of recovering a sum of money alleged to be the
damages resulting to the plaintiffs from a collision, between the two vessels mentioned, it being alleged that said
collision was due to the experience, carelessness and lack of skill on the part of the captain of the Ban Yek and to his
failure to observe the rules of navigation appropriate to the case. The defendants answered with a general denial, and
by way of special defense asserted, among other things, that the collision was due exclusively to the inexperience
and carelessness of the captain and officers of the steamship Perla; for which reason the defendants in turn, by way
of counterclaim, prayed judgment for the damages suffered by the Ban Yek from the same collision. At the hearing
the trial judge absolved the defendants from the complaint and likewise absolved the plaintiffs from the defendants'
counterclaim. From this judgment both parties appealed.
It appears in evidence that at about 5pm the coastwise steamer Ban Yek left the port of Naga on the Bicol
River, in the Province of Camarines Sur, with destination to the City of Manila. At the time of her departure from
said port the sea was approaching to high tide but the current was still running in through the Bicol River, with the
result that the Ban Yek had the current against her. As the ship approached the Malbong bend of the Bicol River,
another vessel, the Perla, was sighted coming up the river on the way to Naga. While the boats were yet more than a
kilometer apart, the Ban Yek gave two blasts with her whistle, thus indicating an intention to pass on the left, or to
her own port side. In reply to this signal the Perla gave a single blast, thereby indicating that she disagreed with the
signal given by the Ban Yek and would maintain her position on the right, that is, would keep to the starboard.
The Ban Yek made no reply to this signal. As the Perla was navigating with the current, then running in from the
sea, this vessel, under paragraph 163 of Customs Marine Circular No. 53, had the right of way over the Ban Yek, and
the officers of the Perla interpreted the action of the Ban Yek in not replying to the Perla's signal as an indication of
acquiescence of the officers of the Ban Yek in the determination of the Perla to keep to the starboard.
The river at this point is about two hundred and fifty feet wide, and the courses thus being respectively
pursued by the two vessels necessarily tended to bring them into a head-on collision. When the danger of such an
occurrence became imminent, Captain Garrido of the Perla, seeing that he was shut off by the Ban Yek from passing
to the right, put his vessel to port, intending to avoid collision or minimize its impact by getting farther out into the
stream. An additional reason for this maneuver, as stated by Captain Garrido, is that the captain of the Ban
Yek waived his hand to Garrido, indicating that the latter should turn his vessel towards the middle of the stream. At
about the same time that the Perla was thus deflected from her course the engine on the Ban Yek was reversed and
three blasts were given by this vessel to indicate that she was backing.
Now, it appears that when the engine is reversed, a vessel swings to the right or left in accordance with the
direction in which the blades of the propeller are set; and as the Ban Yek began to back, her bow was thrown out into
the stream, a movement which was assisted by the current of the river. By this means the Ban Yek was brought to
occupy an oblique position across the stream at the moment the Perla was passing; and the bow of the Ban
Yek crashed into the starboard bumpers of the Perla, carrying away external parts of the ship and inflicting material
damage on the hull. To effect the repairs thus made necessary to the Perla cost her owners the sum of P17,827,
including expenses of survey.

Issue:
Whether or not both the owner (Lim) and the agent (Siy Cong) are solidarily liable for damages.

Ruling:
Upon the point of responsibility for the collision we have no hesitancy in finding that the fault is to be
attributed exclusively to the negligence and inattention of the captain and pilot in charge of the Ban Yek. The Perla
undoubtedly had the right of way, since this vessel was navigating with the current, and the officers in charge of
the Perla were correct in assuming, from the failure of the Ban Yek to respond to the single blast of the Perla, that
the officers in charge of the Ban Yek recognized that the Perla had a right of way and acquiesced in her resolution to

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 Pascual, Quinto, Mabalot, Roraldo, Leongson, Quibod, Carillo, Lim, Caoagas, Santos, Liwag, Maronilla, Perola, TORTS_2015
Crescini, Diosomito, Javier, Magculang, Lasam, Palma, Bongalon, Ongtioco, Casungad, Villamayor, Lopez, Santiago

keep to the right. The excuse urged for the Ban Yek is that this vessel is somewhat larger than the Perla and that it
was desirable for the Ban Yek to keep on the side of the long arc of the curve of the river; and in this connection it is
suggested that the river is deeper on the outer edge of the bend than on the inner edge. It is also stated that on a
certain previous occasion the Ban Yek on coming out from this port had gotten stuck in the mud in this bend by
keeping too far to the right. Moreover, it is said to be the practice of ships in navigating this stream to keep nearer
the outside than to the inside of the bend. These suggestions are by no means convincing. It appears in evidence that
the river bottom here is composed of mud and silt, and as the tide at the time of this incident was nearly at its flood,
there was ample depth of water to have accommodated the Ban Yek if she had kept to that part of the stream which it
was proper for her to occupy. We may further observe that the disparity in the size of the vessels was not such as to
dominate the situation and deprive the Perla of the right of way under the conditions stated. Blame for the collision
must therefore, as already stated, be attributed to the Ban Yek.

But while it is thus demonstrated that Silvino Lim is liable for these damages in the character of owner, it
does not necessarily follows that Siy Cong Bieng & Co., as character or agent (casa naviera), is exempt from
liability; and we are of the opinion that both the owner and agent can be held responsible where both are impleaded
together. In Philippine Shipping Co., vs. Garcia Vergara (6 Phil., 281), it seems to have been accepted as a matter of
course that both owner and agent of the offending vessel are liable for the damage done; and this must, we think, be
true. The liability of the naviero, in the sense of charterer or agent, if not expressed in article 826 of the Code of
Commerce, is clearly deducible from the general doctrine of jurisprudence stated in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
and it is also recognized, but more especially as regards contractual obligations, in article 586 of the Code of
Commerce. Moreover, we are of the opinion that both the owner and agent (naviero) should be declared to be
jointly and severally liable, since the obligation which is the subject of this action had its origin in a tortuous
act and did not arise from contract. Article 1137 of the Civil Code, declaring that joint obligations shall be
apportionable unless otherwise provided, has no application to obligation arising from tort.

34