Revised compilation/reviewer f or Introduction to Law

Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila College of Law

Atty. Mel
THE STUDY OF LAW
- Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harvard L., Rev 457 (1897)
BASIC LEGAL TERMS
- What is Advocate? An advocate is a professional in the field of law. A Lawyer.
- What is Attorney-in-Law? An attorney in law is permitted to represent another individual
in the practice of la w but is not allowed to make decisions on their behalf. This includes
any decision-making, such as whether or not to settle.
- What is Attorney-in-Fact? An attorney in fact is an agent who is authorized to act on behalf
of another person but is not necessarily authorized to practice law. Their responsibilities
and power depend on what's specifically stated in the power of attorney document.
- What is Concurring Opinion? Agreest with the result, but for different reasons
- What is Dissenting Opinion? Objects to the result of the majority opinion.
- What is Interlocutory Order? An order that doesn't finally dispose of the case and also not
end the court’s task of adjudicating
- What is a Law? According to Justice Bradley of US Supreme Court: Law is a science of
principles by which the civil society is regulated and held together, by which right is
enforced, and wrong is detected and punished.
- What is Law of the Case? The law of the case expresses the rule that the final judgment of
the highest court is the final determination of the rights of the parties. The doctrine of "law
of the case" is one of policy only, however, and will be disregarded when compelling
circumstances require a redetermination of the point of law decided on the prior appeal.
- What is a Lawyer? A lawyer is someone who is learned and trained in law. Yet, they may
not actually practice law. They often give legal advice.
- What is a Leading Case? A case decided by a court in the last resort, which settles a
particular point or question; the principles upon which it is decided are to be followed in
future cases, which are similar to it.
- What is Landmark Decisions? A legal decision that sets a precedent for how similar cases
are to be resolved in the future.
- What is Mutatis Mutandis? Is a Latin phrase that means "by changing those things which
need to be changed.” The phrase can also mean “having substituted new terms.” Mutatis
mutandis relates to due alterations to be made in similar statements.
- What is Obiter Dictum? (plural obiter dicta) is an opinion or a remark made by a judge
which does not form a necessary part of the court's decision. The word obiter dicta is a
Latin word which means “things said by the way.” Obiter dicta can be passing comments,
opinions or examples provided by a judge. Statements constituting obiter dicta are
therefore not binding.
- What is Ratio Decidendi? (plural rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning “the reason
for the decision.” Ratio decidendi refers to the legal, moral, political and social principles
on which a court’s decision rests. It is the rationale for reaching the decision of a case. It is
binding on lower courts through the principle of Stare decisis.
 - What is Res Judicata? Is a Latin term meaning "a thing decided". It is a common law
doctrine meant to prevent relitigation of cases between the same parties regarding the same
issues and preserve the binding nature of the court's decision. Once a final judgment has
been reached in a lawsuit, subsequent judges who are presented with a suit that is identical
to or substantially the same as the earlier one will apply the doctrine of res judicata to
uphold the effect of the first judgment.
- What is Stare Decisis? is a Latin term meaning "to stand by things decided". It is a legal
doctrine in which courts generally follow the application of the law as decided in similar
prior cases, which is referred to as following precedent. The requirement that a lower court
must follow a precedent is called stare decisis.

Precedent means that the principle announced by a higher court must be followed in later
cases. A recent decision in the same jurisdiction as the instant case will be given great
weight. Decisions of lower courts are not binding on higher courts, although from time to
time a higher court will adopt the reasoning and conclusion of a lower court.

- What is Stare Decisis Et Non Quieta Movere? Stand by what has been decided and do not
unsettle the established. The idea is that by following precedents, which are the previous
decisions of judges, fairness and certainty will be provided.

Precedents can only operate if the legal reasons for past decisions are known. Therefore, at
the end of a case (civil) there will be a judgement in which the judge will give not only the
decision but also the legal reasoning which lies behind it.

Associated Cases:
Bernardo Manalang, Et Al. Vs. Elvira Tuason De Rickards, Et Al. 104 Phil 254
BERNARDO MANALANG, ET AL., petitioners-appellants, vs. ELVIRA TUASON DE
RICKARDS, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-11986 | 1958-07-31

DECISION

FELIX, J.:

Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards is the owner of a private subdivision located at Sampaloc, Manila,
with an area of 44,561.80 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title N o. 40961 (Exhibit
13). In 1954, the lots therein were leased to various tenants among whom were Bernardo Manalang,
Vicente de Leon and Salvador de Leon occupying Lots Nos. 174 - C, 160 and 158, respectively. As the
City of Manila allegedly increased the assessment of said land effective January 1, 1954, the
administrator thereof notified the tenants of the corresponding increase of the rentals of the lots
therein, such that the rental for the lot occupied by Bernardo Manalang was raised from P36 to 80; the
rental for Lot No. 160 was raised from P10 to P43.12; and from P24 to P51.24 for Lot No. 158. The said
tenants, however, insisted on paying the former rate, and as the landowner refused to accept the
same, the former consigned them in court.
On April 27, 1954, Elvira Vidal Tuason de Rickards, assisted by her husband, Jose A. Rickards,
instituted with the Municipal Court of Manila Civil Case No. 31401 against Bernardo Manalang; Civil
Case No. 31406 against Salvador de Leon; and Civil Case No. 31411 against Vicente de Leon, all for
ejectment. Therein defendants filed separate motions to dismiss invoking the provisions of Republic
Act No. 1162, which was approved on June 18, 1954. The matter was duly heard and on July 14, 1954,
the Municipal Judge of Manila issued an order denying the motions to dismiss and suspending the
proceedings for 2 years from the enactment of Republic Act No. 1162 or until further order from the
Court.

On April 13, 1955, upon motion of the plaintiffs, the Municipal Judge issued an order setting the cases
for hearing on the merits. Defendants tried to secure a reconsideration of the aforesaid order, but as
their motion was denied, they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of First
Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 26135) against the spouses Rickards and the Judges of the
Municipal Court of Manila, alleging that the order of the same Court of July 14, 1954, already
disposed of the action and determined the rights of the parties. It was thus prayed that a writ
enjoining the respondent Judges from proceeding with the hearing of the cases be issued; that said
respondents be declared without jurisdiction to hear the same; and that the orders of Municipal
Judge Estrella Abad Santos setting the case for hearing on the merits and the order of Acting Judge
Sumilang Bernardo denying their motion for reconsideration be set aside and declared null and void.

To this petition, the respondent spouses filed their answer denying some of the averments of the
same. And as special defenses, it was contended that the order of July 14, 1954, did not settle the
controversy it being merely an interlocutory order, and as such could not be reviewed by a petition
for certiorari. It was, therefore, prayed that the petition be dismissed and the Municipal Judges be
ordered to hear the cases on the merits.

On February 6, 1956, the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petition on the ground that
the order of the inferior court was merely interlocutory in nature, and that the statements contained
in the body thereof were the basis of the court's ruling, as embodied in the dispositive part thereof
denying the motion to dismiss and suspending the proceedings therein for 2 years or until further
order from the court. From this decision, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
tribunal certified the case to Us on the ground that it involves only a question purely of law.

The main issue presented by the instant action is whether the order of the inferior court of July 14,
1954, is interlocutory or not and consequently, whether the lower court erred in dismissing the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed therein. The aforementioned order of the Municipal Judge
dated July 14, 1954, is hereunder copied in full:

"ORDER

"After a thorough consideration of the Motion to Dismiss and the opposition thereto, this Court is of
the opinion and so holds that from the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceedings
should be instituted or prosecuted against any tenant or occupant and that the unpaid rentals of the
tenants, if any they have, shall be liquidated and shall be paid in 18, equal monthly installments from
the date or time of liquidation and that the landlord cannot charge more than the amount being
charged or collected by them from their tenants as of December 31, 1953.

"It is undisputed fact that the premises occupied by the herein defendants have been and are actually
being leased to tenants, for which reason it is governed by the provisions of the aforesaid Act. But
inasmuch as these three cases of ejectment have been instituted before the approval of said Act, it is
the considered opinion of this Court that its prosecution should be suspended. As to the motion to
dismiss same is untenable and without merit, for if these cases of ejectment will be dismissed as
claimed by the herein defendants, the liquidation of the unpaid rentals could not be carried out
effectively as provided by said Act. "As to the unconstitutionality of section 5 of the Republic Act in
question, the presumption is that same is valid and constitutional until it is declared otherwise by the
competent tribunal, for which reason we deem it our bounden duty to enforce the avowed policy of
the Republic of the Philippines, as expressed in said Act (Pastor Mauricio et al. vs. Hon. Felix
Martinez et al., CA-G. R. 5114-R, promulgated January 31, 1952).

"WHEREFORE, this Court orders the denial of the motion to dismiss, and the suspension of the
proceedings in the three above- entitled cases during the period of two years from the approval of
Republic Act No. 1162 or until further order of this Court".

We see no reason why the ruling of the lower Court should not be affirmed. The order of the
Municipal Judge of July 14, 1954, is clear enough to call for any construction or interpretation, for
while it opens with the paragraph stating that it was the opinion of the court "and so holds that from
the approval of Republic Act No. 1162 no ejectment proceedings should be instituted", etc., the
dispositive portion of the order decreed the denial of the motion to dismiss which was based on the
same Republic Act No. 1162. And this ruling is understandable. It appears that the actions for
ejectment were filed before the enactment of Republic Act No. 1162 and conceivably under the
general principle that laws can only be enforced prospectively, the Municipal Judge for one reason or
another saw it fit to suspend the proceedings for quite a long period, probably with the expectation
that the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1162 might be in the meantime duly
passed upon.

It can be seen from the foregoing that the issues presented in the ejectment proceedings were not
settled thereby, for precisely the motion to dismiss filed by defendants based on the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1162 was denied. Certainly, said actions having been merely suspended, and the
jurisdiction of the court over said proceedings not having been assailed, the said court has the power
to reopen the same for trial on the merits in order that the rights of the parties therein could be finally
determined. It is argued, however, by appellants that the body of the order recognized the
prohibition laid down by Republic Act No. 1162 against the institution of ejectment proceedings after
the effectivity of said Act. It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the Court
on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or
controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented
therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declarations in the body of said order that
may be confusing. In the case at bar, considering that the dispositive part of the order merely
suspended the proceedings without touching on the merits of the case or disposing of the issues
involved therein, said order cannot be said to be final in character but clearly an interlocutory one
which in this case cannot be the subject of an action for certiorari.
Wherefore, and acting merely on the question of procedure submitted to Us by the instant appeal, We
have to affirm, as We do hereby affirm, the order of the lower Court dismissing appellant's petition
for certiorari and prohibition. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

J.M. Tuason & Co. Inc., vs. Mariano

J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA
TUASON, petitioners, vs. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, MANUELA AQUAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and
SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.

- | 19 78 -1 0- 2 3

D E C I S I O N

AQUINO, J:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original
Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and Diliman Estates of the Tuason
mayorazgo or Entail with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barretto vs.
Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).

On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be
declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon
City) and bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio
Tiburcio, on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat. The land,
which has an area of three hundred eighty-three quiñones, was allegedly acquired by their
father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).

They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered
upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in
OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of
defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusto, all surnamed Tuason, pursuant to
a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.

They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were
issued to defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to
defendant Capitol Golf Club.

Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void
due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.

Defendant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs
opposed that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were
pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.

On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had
bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in
the case.

On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer
certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the
production in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the
purpose of determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are
included therein.

On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to
dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners
had filed the proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial
and Cordova answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu
of oral argument.

The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this
late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land
registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735
was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower
court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, invalidating OCT No.
735, is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their action
and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.

On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the
titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs.
Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA
531).

The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-
40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of
the holding in the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of
the P. I. vs. Acuña, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 477; Galvez and Tiburcio vs.
Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc., 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99
Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity
Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.

Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents
Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the
long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

"It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again
and again, consuming the courts' time and energies et the expense of other litigants: Interest
rei publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).

Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is
directed to dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.

SO ORDERED

Aroc vs. People's Homesite and Housing Corporation, et al

URBANA VELASCO AROC assisted by her husband CELESTINO AROC, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
PEOPLE'S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION and CIRILO B. GARCIA and
FELICIANA BITO, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-39674 | 1978-01-31

DECISION

GUERRERO, J:

This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals 1 G.R. No. 46525-R entitled "Urbana Velasco
Aroc assisted by her husband Celestino Aroc, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation and Cirilo B. Garcia and Feliciana Bito, Defendants-Appellees," pursuant to the
provisions of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended, and Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised
Rules of Court per its Resolution dated October 31, 1974 since the appeal involves pure questions of
law.

Plaintiff-appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
Civil Case No. Q-11807 dismissing on the ground of res judicata the complaint to declare null and
void the award and sale of a parcel of land, known as Lot 6, Block E-144, Piñahan Subdivision,
Quezon City, to defendants-appellees Cirilo B. Garcia and his spouse, Feliciana Bito, by the other
defendant-appellee PHHC, and the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said spouses.

The facts are stated in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, thus:

"From the allegations of the complaint we gather that as early as 1952 plaintiff and her family started
occupying one-half of the lot in controversy while a certain Alfonso Naparan and his family occupied
the other half. In 1956 plaintiff constructed a house of strong materials worth P3,270, planted fruit-
bearing trees and fenced the portion occupied by her. In May 1956 she filed with defendant
corporation an application for the award and sale of said portion to her. She filed another application
in January 1957. Later she discovered that both applications were missing from the files of defendant
corporation. Upon suggestion of an official of the latter, she re-applied for the same portion of Lot 6
on February 3, 1966. However, Lot 6 was unlawfully and in bad faith awarded and sold to
defendants-spouses who were disqualified from purchasing it, since they had previously purchased a
1,450-square meter lot (Lot 12, Block W-28) from defendant corporation and already owned several
lots in Greater Manila.

It is further gathered that plaintiff formally protected the award and sale of Lot 6 to defendants
spouses with the Board of Directors of defendant corporation. The investigating officer recommended
the rescission of the conditional sale of Lot 6 and the award of the lot to plaintiff and Alfonso
Naparan. In spite of said recommendation defendant corporation executed a deed of sale in favor of
defendants-spouses. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106146 covering the lot was subsequently issued
to them by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.

At the time of the filing of the complaint on January 22, 1968, plaintiff and her family were still
occupying one-half portion of the lot.

In its answer with counterclaim, defendant corporation denied the material allegations of the
complaint and, as special and affirmative defenses, alleged that the complaint stated no cause of
action; that plaintiff was a mere squatter of Lot 6; that the award and sale of said lot to defendants-
spouses was legal and valid, for they had complied with the requirements imposed by defendant
corporation for its acquisition; and that plaintiff's claim had been passed upon by an investigating
committee which found the same to be without basis.

Defendants-spouses likewise denied the material allegations of the complaint. They set up as special
and affirmative defenses the following: that there was a pending action to quiet title and/or recovery
of possession of Lot 6 with preliminary injunction and damages filed by them against Alfonso
Naparan and herein plaintiff (Civil Case No. Q-10442) and in her answer she raised the same issues of
fact and law alleged by her in the present complaint; that there was a valid ground to dismiss the
new complaint due to the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-10442 between the same parties for the same
cause of action; that Lot 6 was lawfully awarded and sold to them by defendant corporation and if
ever plaintiff suffered damages her action should be against the corporation; that plaintiffs could no
longer question the validity of the award and sale, since it was duly approved by the General
Manager of defendant corporation after three investigations on plaintiff's protest had been conducted
and she had been given the opportunity to air her grievances, but her protest was dismissed for lack
of merit.

Defendants-spouses later amended their answer to include the following allegation:

"6-A. That on December 26, 1968, the Honorable Judge Honorato B. Masakayan, Branch V of this
Court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. Q-10442, the dispositive portion of which is quoted as
follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Cirilo B. Garcia and against
defendants Alfonso Naparan and Urbana Velasco Vda. de Aroc, declaring plaintiff Cirilo B. Garcia
the rightful and legal owner of Lot 6, Block E-144, Piñahan Subdivision, Quezon City, and ordering
the defendants Alfonso Naparan and Urbana Velasco Vda. de Aroc and all persons claiming rights
under them to vacate the premises in question and restore the possession thereof to the plaintiff, and
to pay the plaintiff the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of suit.
"'SO ORDERED.'

so much so that the above decision having become final and executory, there is nothing left for this
Honorable Court to do except to dismiss the instant complaint based on the doctrine of res judicata,
otherwise there will be no more end to the controversy, as the parties will be litigating all over again
on the same issues.

Two days after the filing of the amended answer, defendants-spouses moved for the dismissal of the
action on the ground of res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Attached to their motion were the
complaint, answer and decision in Civil Case No. Q-10442. The court granted the motion and
dismissed the action.

Appellant now assails before this Court the order of dismissal, claiming that the principle of res
judicata is not applicable, the requisite that there must be identity of cause of action between the two
cases not being present, since the case on appeal is for annulment of the award and sale of Lot 6 to
defendants-spouses while Civil Case No. Q-10442 was for quieting of title and/or recovery of
possession. Thus, the sole issue to determine is whether or not the final judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-10442 is a bar to the case before us. This involves a question of law (Bengua vs. Abay, CA-G.R. No.
19408-R, July 30, 1959) which is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. It is for the
Supreme Court to pass upon the issue in accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act No. 296, as
amended. Said section vests in the Supreme Court exclusive appellate jurisdiction over cases in which
only errors or questions of law are involved."

Plaintiff-appellant, litigating this case on appeal as a pauper-litigant, contends that the trial court
erred in dismissing her complaint on the ground of res judicata. We find the contention to be
meritorious.

In determining whether the final judgment in the first case, Civil Case No. Q-10442 for quieting of
title and/or recovery of possession, constitutes res judicata as would bar the appellant's complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-11807, now subject of this appeal, for annulment of award and deed of sale and
cancellation of the certificate of title to the land, We must examine if between these two cases the
requisites of res judicata are present, namely: 1) The former judgment must be final; 2) It must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties, 3) It must
be a judgment on the merits; and 4) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter and cause of action. 2 It is only in the identity of cause of action that the
parties; dispute and disagree.

The term "cause of action" has been defined as "an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." 3

Is there identity of cause of action between the two aforementioned cases, the first case for quieting of
title and/or recovery of possession and the second case for annulment award and deed of sale and
cancellation of certificate of title? This query can be answered by a searching look into and a careful
perusal of the records of said two cases.

In the first case, the records disclose that on Sept. 16. 1966 defendant-appellee, Colonel Cirilo V.
Garcia, filed against plaintiff-appellant Urbana Velasco Aroc and Juan Alfonso Naparan the
complaint alleging that plaintiff therein is the absolute owner in fee simple of the parcel of land, Lot
No. 6 Block E-144 Piñahan Subdivision; that he acquired the land by way of purchase from the PHHC
on December 8, 1965; that said lot is now titled in the name of the plaintiff and is covered by TCT No.
106146 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City; that defendant therein, Urbana Velasco Aroc, asserts
a claim of ownership and right of possession to the land and in fact still occupies the land; that
defendant's claim of ownership and possession is invalid, ineffective and prejudicial to plaintiff's title
as owner in fee simple, consequently entitling plaintiff to bring an action to remove the cloud on and
to quiet his title; that defendant owns a house constructed on the western portion of the land and
refuses to demolish or remove the same notwithstanding plaintiff's demand therefor. The above
allegations state the basic or ultimate facts which constitute complainant's cause of action.

Defendant Urbana Velasco Aroc having filed her answer on November 29, 1966 out failed to appear
at the trial of the case, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, declaring him the rightful and
legal owner of the land, and ordering defendant to vacate the premises in question and restore
possession thereof to the plaintiff plus the payment of attorneys fees and costs. The above judgment
became final and executory during the pendency of the pendency of the present case.

In the second case, now subject of this appeal in Civil Case No. 11807 instituted on January 22, 1968,
the plaintiff therein (Urbana Velasco Aroc) alleged that she is a bonafide occupant and possessor of
the one-half portion of Lot 6, Block E-144 Piñahan Subdivision; that she started occupying the lot as
early as 1952; that in 1956, she built her own house therein made of strong materials, introduced
improvements and fenced the area; that she applied for the award and subsequent sale to her of the
one-half portion in May, 1946, reiterated in January, 1957 and re-applied on Feb. 3, 1966; that the lot
was, however, awarded later to the defendant Cirilo V. Garcia and his wife Feliciana Bito in bad faith,
contrary to law and public policy.

The complaint further alleged that the awardees Cirilo V. Garcia and Feliciana Bito are disqualified
from purchasing Lot No. 6 because they had earlier purchased a parcel of land formerly belonging to
the PHHC, consisting of 1,450 sq. meters, known as Block 12, Lot W-8, covered under TCT No. 31596
of the land records of Quezon City, aside from the fact that they are already owners and possessors of
several other lots in Manila and in the suburbs; and that the award to the spouses Cirilo V. Garcia
and Feliciana Bito was in violation of the charter provisions of the PHHC. The above allegations
likewise establish the ultimate facts that constitute the cause of action of plaintiff (now the appellant),
entitling her to the one-half portion of Lot 6.

Considering now the cause of action in the first case and the cause of action in the second case, the
conclusion is inevitable that one is different from the other; that they are not one and the same cause
of action. The first seeks only to remove the cloud on the title of the land. The action is premised on
Art. 476, New Civil Code, which provides:

"Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable and may be prejudicial to said title,
an action may be brought remove such cloud or to quiet the title.

An action may be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
 
The second seeks not only the nullification of the award and sale to the awardees the cancellation of
the Certificate of Title but also places in issue the power and authority of the grantor (PHHC) to make
the award and sell the land to one disqualified to purchase the same, the awardee being a Colonel in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as admitted by the PHHC. 4 The qualification of the purchaser is
likewise placed in issue. These issues are more basic and fundamental than the quieting of the title
and the removal of the cloud on such title.

In the application of the doctrine of res judicata, if it is doubtful whether a second action is for the
same cause of action as the first, the test generally applied is to consider the identity of facts essential
to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same within the rule that the judgment in the
former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the two actions rest upon different states of
facts, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the two actions, a judgment in one is no bar
to the maintenance of the other. It has been said that this method is the best and most accurate test as
to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequent proceedings between the same parties and it has
even been described as infallible. 5

Applying the test accordingly, We hold that the evidence needed to prove the allegations of the
second cause of action must necessarily be more than that in the first case herein second case,
additional evidence must be adduced to prove that the PHHC acted in violation of its charter; that
the PHHC made the award in violation of the presidential directive alleged in plaintiff's "Opposition
to Motion and to Reinstate Writ of Preliminary Injunction," evidenced by a letter dated January 12,
1967 of the President of the Philippines to the General Manager of the People's Homesite and
Housing Corporation, directing the Board of said corporation to award the lots in the Piñahan Area,
Quezon City, to the actual and bona fide occupants thereof; 6 that the awardees have previously
purchased another lot from the PHHC and were the owners of several other lots in Manila and
Quezon City which disqualified them from acquiring the lot in controversy, evidenced by Annexes A
& B. 7

There is merit to the claim of the appellant that the legality of the award and sale of the lot in
controversy was not directly litigated in the first case not only because the defendant therein did not
appear at the trial to adduce evidence, but also because the PHHC, the grantor and vendor of the
property, was not impleaded as a party litigant in the case.

"It is also a general rule that a judgment in an action to quiet title is not conclusive as to matters not in
issue as determined, particularly where such matters could not have been determined in such action."
8
Since the power or authority of the PHHC was not in issue in the first case to quiet title, and neither
was the qualification of the awardee, the plaintiff therein, directly determined, judgment in said case
is not conclusive and binding in the sent case for annulment of the award and sale, and the
cancellation of the title of the awardee or purchaser.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case
No. Q-11807 dated February 19, 1970 is hereby reversed and the records remanded to the said court
for further proceedings. No costs.

Petition granted.

SO ORDERED.
Cayana, Rabina, et al vs CA, Sps Cayabyab, Insurance Corp of the Phils, et al
RUFINA C. CAYANA, JOSEFINA C. RABINA, MERCEDES C. DE GUZMAN, and SUSANA C.
SAMBALE, Petitioners, versus COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. PASTOR & ROSITA CAYABYAB,
SPS. MARCELIANO & ROSALIA CAYABYAB, SPS. RAFAEL & ROSEMARIE CAYABYAB and
INSURANCE CORP. OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 125607 | 2004-03-18
Related keywords

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

The instant case involves an unfortunate, albeit all too common, property dispute among siblings.

The petitioners, Rufina Cayana, Josefina Rabina, Mercedes de Guzman and Susana Sambale, and
respondents Pastor and Marceliano Cayabyab are children of the spouses Raymundo and Eulalia
Cayabyab. The other respondents, Rosita and Rosalia Cayabyab are the wives of Pastor and
Marceliano Cayabyab, respectively. Respondent Rosemarie Cayabyab-Ramos is the daughter of
Marceliano Cayabyab, while respondent Rafael Ramos is the former's husband. Their dispute
involves two parcels of land[1] specifically described thus:

First Parcel ¾ A parcel of land Lot A, (LRC), Psd-231284, being a portion of Plan Psu-136181, LRC
Rec. No. N-8805, situated in Rosario, Lingayen, Pangasinan. Bounded on the E by Mactec River; SE
by Agapito Cabrera; SW by Anselmo Cabrera; NW by Lot B of the subdivision plan, containing an
area of 11,735 square meters, more or less. Covered by TCT No. 29332 and assessed at P1,730.00; and

Second Parcel ¾ A parcel of land Lot 2-A of the subdivision plan Psd-36621, being a portion of
Lot 2 described on Plan Psu-70452, GLRO Rec. No. 41762, situated in Rosario, Lingayen, Pangasinan.
Bounded on the N by Ludovico Cayabyab & Agapito Cabrera; E by Eduvejas Cabrera and Lot 2-B of
subdivision plan; S by Lot 2-B and W by Clemente Cruz, containing an area of 20,000 square meters
more or less. Covered by TCT No. 117094, declared under Tax Decl. No. 29333 and assessed at
P2,600.00.

It appears that Raymundo Cayabyab, with the marital consent of Eulalia Cayabyab, sold the First and
Second Parcels to Pastor Cayabyab by virtue of two Deeds of Absolute Sale[2] respectively dated
March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965. Thereupon, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 117134 and
117094 covering the First and Second Parcels, respectively, were issued in the name of Pastor
Cayabyab.

After the death of Raymundo Cayabyab on March 20, 1976, his wife Eulalia Cayabyab executed an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim,[3] dated June 4, 1976, on the subject parcels of land, alleging that the
Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab were forgeries. However, on June 17, 1976, she
executed another Affidavit[4] recognizing Pastor Cayabyab's title and requesting the cancellation of
the adverse claims earlier annotated on the titles of the subject properties.

On February 9, 1977, Eulalia Cayabyab, together with her children, Marceliano, Mercedes, Rufina,
Josefina, Susana and Alfredo, filed a Complaint[5] against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab for the
annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 and the
corresponding TCT Nos. 117134 and 117094, and reconveyance of the First and Second Parcels. They
alleged that both parcels were fraudulently registered in the name of Pastor Cayabyab by means of
the forged Deeds of Absolute Sale. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 15298.

On February 28, 1977, Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab entered into an agreement of counter guaranty
with the Insurance Corporation of the Philippines (ICP) with respect to the Second Parcel.

On June 12, 1977, Pastor Cayabyab mortgaged[6] the First Parcel to the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo.

On October 10, 1977, Pastor Cayabyab sold the First Parcel to Rosafina Reginaldo for P15,000.00 by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale.[7] Subsequently, TCT No. 117134 was cancelled and TCT No.
124304[8] was issued in the name of Rosafina Reginaldo on October 11, 1977. On the same day, the
mortgage over the First Parcel was cancelled.[9]

On December 23, 1977, Rosafina Reginaldo mortgaged[10] the First Parcel to the Rural Bank of
Urbiztondo to secure a loan in the amount of P5,000.00.

Meanwhile, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 15298 proceeded. Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab filed an
Answer asserting the validity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale but were subsequently declared in
default after failing to appear at the pre-trial conference. Thus, the plaintiffs were allowed to present
evidence ex-parte.

In a decision[11] dated June 17, 1978, the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared the
Deeds of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 3, 1976, and the corresponding TCT Nos.
117094 and 117134 covering the Second and First Parcels, respectively, null and void. The court,
however, denied the prayer for reconveyance in view of the plaintiffs' evidence attesting to the fact
that Eulalia Cayabyab is still the owner and possessor of the subject properties. No appeal was taken
and the decision consequently became final.
On April 21, 1981, the mortgage over the First Parcel was foreclosed and the Rural Bank of
Urbiztondo, as the highest bidder, bought the property.[12] The bank consolidated its title on August
2, 1982[13] and TCT No. 142479[14] cancelling TCT No. 124304 was issued in its name on August 19,
1982.

In a Deed of Absolute Sale[15] dated September 3, 1982, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo sold the First
Parcel to Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab for the amount of P7,221.95. Two days later, the latter
were issued TCT No. 142887[16] cancelling TCT No. 142479.

For the amount of P10,000.00, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab sold the First Parcel to Rafael and
Rosemarie Ramos by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate Property[17] dated January 14,
1983. On January 25, 1983, TCT No. 143859[18] cancelling TCT No. 142887 was issued in the name of
the Ramos spouses.

On June 8, 1983, the petitioners herein as plaintiffs, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 37, a Verified Complaint[19] docketed as Civil Case No. 15937 against Pastor and
Rosita Cayabyab, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos and ICP. They
prayed for the annulment of the deeds of sale in favor of Rosafina Reginaldo, Marceliano and Rosalia
Cayabyab, and Rafael Ramos and Rosemarie Cayabyab; cancellation of TCT Nos. 124304, 142479,
142887, and 143859 issued in favor of Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, Marceliano
and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos, respectively; and recovery of possession of
the First and Second Parcels by virtue of an alleged deed of donation inter vivos purportedly
executed by Eulalia Cayabyab in favor of the petitioners herein.

As regards the Second Parcel, the plaintiffs prayed that ICP or Pastor Cayabyab, in whose name TCT
No. 117094 remained, be ordered to surrender the title. It appears that ICP was not served with
summons because it had already ceased to exist due to bankruptcy.[20]

The plaintiffs theorized that the documents sought to be annulled are fictitious, simulated and
entered into in bad faith as the defendants had full knowledge of the pendency of, as well as the
consequent decision in, Civil Case No. 15298.

On the other hand, the defendants claimed that all the transactions over the First Parcel were entered
into free from all liens and encumbrances not inscribed in the title.

Recognizing the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 on the nullity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale
and the corresponding TCTs issued in favor of Pastor Cayabyab, the trial court rendered on August
22, 1989, a Decision in Civil Case No. 15937 in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of which
provides:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering:

1. The plaintiffs to be the true and lawful owners over the landholdings in question;
2. The annulment of all documents pertaining thereto; namely, Exhs. C,D, & E;

3. The cancellation of TCT No. 124304, TCT No. 142479; TCT No. 142887 & TCT No. 143859;

4. The defendants restore possession of the landholdings in question to plaintiffs;

5. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P20,000.00 as moral
damages;

6. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P5,000.00 as/for attorney's
fees;

7. The defendant Pastor Cayabyab and/or Insurance Corporation of the Philippines to surrender TCT
No. 117094 free from all liens and encumbrances;

8. The defendants to pay the plaintiffs jointly and severally the amount of P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages;

9. The dismissal of defendants' counterclaim; and

10. The defendants to pay the costs of this suit.[21]

The respondents herein as appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial
court erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the judgment in Civil Case No. 15298.
According to them, the institution of Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues and
allowed them to adduce evidence to prove ownership and possession of the subject parcels of land.

Agreeing with the appellants, the appellate court in its Decision[22] dated August 21, 1995, held that
the principle of res judicata is inapplicable, there being no identity of the causes of action in Civil
Case No. 15298 and Civil Case No. 15937. While both cases were for the annulment of public
documents, the former covered only the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13,
1965 and the corresponding TCTs for the First and Second Parcels. On the other hand, the latter case
covered not only the annulment of the subsequent transactions over the subject parcels of land but
also the recovery of possession on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos executed by
Eulalia Cayabyab.

The Court of Appeals also upheld the validity of the deeds of sale and the corresponding TCTs in
favor of the appellants, declaring that the affidavit cancelling the adverse claim annotated in TCT No.
117134 was duly admitted; that the subsequent sales transactions have not been proven to be
simulated or fictitious; that no notice of lis pendens was recorded in the title; and that the appellees
were not able to prove their claim of title having failed to present the original or certified true copy of
the alleged deed of donation inter vivos or to prove the existence and due execution of the original
deed.

Hence, the appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court, accordingly declaring that the
deeds of sale as well as the TCTs which emanated from them valid and enforceable, and the
appellants the true and lawful owners and possessors of the properties in question. The Court of
Appeals denied the appellees' Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution[23] dated July 11, 1996.

In the instant Verified Petition[24] dated July 30, 1996, the petitioners reiterate their argument that the
Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965, the corresponding TCTs covering the
First and Second Parcels, and the subsequent transfers of the subject properties are all null and void
by virtue of the final judgment in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring them to be so. They allege that a
notice of lis pendens and an affidavit of adverse claim were duly annotated on the TCTs covering the
two parcels of land. Hence, Rosafina Reginaldo, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael and
Rosemarie Ramos should be considered purchasers in bad faith. The petitioners further claim that the
considerations for the subsequent transfers were grossly inadequate leading to the conclusion that the
respondents were motivated by a desire to execute fictitious deeds of conveyance. The petitioners
also insist that the First and Second Parcels were donated to the petitioners by their mother, Eulalia
Cayabyab, through an alleged Donation Inter Vivos attached to the petition as Annex "F". Finally,
they reiterate that Pastor Cayabyab and ICP entered into a contract of guaranty over the Second
Parcel despite the adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the title.

In their Comment[25] dated October 8, 1997, the respondents contend that whatever doubts may
have been raised by Eulalia Cayabyab on the validity of Pastor Cayabyab's title were removed when
she executed the Affidavit requesting the cancellation of the adverse claims inscribed in the titles.
Hence, the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1976 and May 13, 1965 in favor of Pastor Cayabyab
are legal and valid. The deed of donation inter vivos allegedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab did not
vest ownership and possession over the subject properties in favor of the petitioners because of the
prior sale to Pastor Cayabyab. Besides, Eulalia Cayabyab did not have the right to donate the subject
properties to the petitioners because there was no previous partition of the intestate estate of
Raymundo Cayabyab.

In a Resolution dated July 27, 1998, the Court denied the instant petition for non-compliance with the
Resolution of February 25, 1998, requiring the petitioners to file a reply to the respondents' Comment.
The petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Reply[26] dated September 21, 1998. In our
Resolution of November 16, 1998, we granted the motion, reinstated and gave due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda.[27]

The pivotal issue is whether the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 operates to bar the respondents'
defenses and counterclaims in Civil Case No. 15937.

The petitioners insist that the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 15298 has settled with
finality the nullity of Pastor Cayabyab's title. Following the principle of res judicata, the respondents,
as transferees of Pastor Cayabyab, should not have been allowed to adduce evidence to prove their
ownership of the subject parcels of land.

The appellate court, however, ruled that the principle of res judicata does not apply there being no
identity of causes of action in the two cases.

The trial court and the appellate court both erred in the manner by which they treated and applied
the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 to the instant case. This error apparently stems from a
misreading of the provisions in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the effect of judgments. Section
47, Rule 39 thereof provides:

SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.-The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or
the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal
condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall
only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or intestate;

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to
any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement to the action or special
proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed
to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been
so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessarily thereto.

The distinction between the doctrine of res judicata, or bar by prior judgment, under paragraph (b)
above and conclusiveness of judgment under paragraph (c) is well-laid. In Gamboa v. Court of
Appeals,[28] we held:

There is 'bar by prior judgment' when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case which is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action. The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as
to the claim or demand in controversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only
as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to
any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that
could have been adjudged in that case. But where between the first and second cases, there is identity
of parties but no identity of cause of action, the first judgment is conclusive in the second case, only
as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein.[29]

For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the
court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and, (3) identity of parties,
subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. According to the appellate
court, the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in this case.

In order to determine the identity of the causes of action in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and 15937, and
consequently, the application of the doctrine of res judicata, it is essential to consider the identity of
facts essential to their maintenance, or whether the same evidence would sustain both causes of
action. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same and
covered by the rule that the judgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action. If, however, the
two actions rest upon different states of fact, or if different proofs would be required to sustain the
two actions, a judgment in one is no bar to the maintenance of the other.[30]

We find that the evidence required to prove the allegations in Civil Case No. 15937, which involves
the annulment of the subsequent transactions and TCTs covering the subject parcels of land and the
recovery of possession thereof on the basis of the alleged deed of donation inter vivos, is necessarily
more than that required in Civil Case No. 15298, which involves only the annulment of the Deeds of
Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs covering the First and Second
Parcels. Furthermore, the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 necessarily turned only upon whether the
Deeds of Absolute Sale were fictitious or simulated, while that in Civil Case No. 15937 will also have
to include a determination of the good or bad faith of the subsequent purchasers. Res judicata,
therefore, does not apply.

Nonetheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals should have applied the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment. In Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City,[31] the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment was explained, thus:

xxx conclusiveness of judgment-states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and
there was judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them
are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies,
in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order
that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between
the same parties or their privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or
question is in issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final
and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issues.[32]

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298 declaring
null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and the corresponding TCTs
covering the subject parcels of land precluded the Court of Appeals from further adjudicating on the
validity of the said deeds and titles.

The appellate court's pronouncement that "the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 which declares null
and void the deeds of absolute sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 20, 1976 and the corresponding
TCT is not conclusive upon the action in Civil Case No. 15937"[33] is, therefore, flawed.

It is likewise utterly erroneous for the appellate court to have disregarded the final judgment in Civil
Case No. 15298 declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and
the corresponding TCTs covering the two parcels of land. It is axiomatic that decisions which have
long become final and executory cannot be annulled by courts and the appellate court is deprived of
jurisdiction to alter the trial court's final judgment.[34]

The issue concerning the validity of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated May 13, 1965 and March 3, 1976
and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject properties must be laid to rest. These documents
cannot be relied upon by Pastor Cayabyab and his successors-in-interest as the basis of their claim of
ownership over the First Parcel.

Having said that, we find it necessary still to determine whether the respondents who take title over
the First Parcel from Pastor Cayabyab were purchasers in good faith, i.e., whether they bought the
property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property, and paid a
full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase or before they had notice of the claim or
interest of some other person in the property.[35] If so, their rights will be protected and the nullity of
the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the corresponding TCTs covering the subject properties cannot be
successfully invoked to invalidate the titles subsequently issued, for it has been consistently ruled
that a forged deed can legally be the root of a valid title when an innocent purchaser for value
intervenes.[36]

As a general rule, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to
determine the condition of the property.[37] However, this principle admits of an unchallenged
exception:

...a person dealing with registered land has a right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further except when the party has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the
purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. The
presence of anything which excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look
beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate.
One who falls within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a
purchaser in good faith; and hence does not merit the protection of the law.[38] [Emphasis supplied]

A judicious evaluation of the records and the applicable legal principles leads us to the conclusion
that the subsequent purchasers of the First Parcel were not purchasers in good faith.

First. The Court notes-and it is not disputed-that Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo,
Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab, and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos are successors-in-interest of
Pastor Cayabyab, having purchased the First Parcel after the filing of the Complaint in Civil Case No.
15298. In the case of the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo and Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos, they even
purchased the property after the decision in Civil Case No. 15298 had been rendered.

The records reveal that a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,[39] dated November 18, 1985, was
filed by Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie
Cayabyab assailing the order and resolutions of the trial court in Civil Case No. 15937, delegating the
reception of the plaintiffs' evidence ex-parte to the Branch Clerk of Court and denying the
defendants' motions for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals[40] set aside the questioned order and
resolutions and directed the respondent Judge to allow the defendants to adduce their evidence. The
decision was anchored, among others, on the defendants' representation that the plaintiffs were
neither parties nor intervenors in Civil Case No. 15298 but have only laid claim on the subject
properties as donees.[41] This allegation is patently false since, as previously mentioned, Eulalia
Cayabyab and her children, Marceliano, Mercedes, Rufina, Josefina, Susana and Alfredo Cayabyab,
were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15298. Even so, the decision apparently became one of the bases
for the respondents' claim that the institution of Civil Case No. 15937 resulted in the joinder of issues
thereby allowing them to adduce evidence in support of their claim of ownership and possession of
the subject properties, a stand sanctioned by the appellate court in the instant case.

Second. It is important to emphasize that Marceliano Cayabyab was among the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 15298, contrary to the vehement denial in his Answer,[42] dated July 21, 1983, in which he
claimed that "answering defendants (Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab) are not parties to the said
case and are totally strangers as regards the same."[43]

Third. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 15298, Eulalia Cayabyab and her children Alfredo,
Ludovico, Marceliano, Mercedes, Susana, Rufina, Buenaventura and Josefina, filed a new case[44] for
the annulment of certain documents affecting several parcels of land, including the two parcels
subject of the instant petition, against Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab and Rosafina Reginaldo. This was
revealed by the respondents themselves in their Comment[45] dated October 8, 1997 and
Memorandum[46] dated January 20, 1999.

Parenthetically, in order to bolster their claim of valid title, the respondents constantly underscore the
fact that Eulalia Cayabyab executed an Affidavit[47] dated June 17, 1976, affirming the genuineness
of the Deeds of Absolute Sale in favor of Pastor Cayabyab and requesting the cancellation of the
adverse claims annotated on the TCTs covering the First and Second Parcels. It should be noted,
however, that after executing the Affidavit on June 17, 1976, Eulalia Cayabyab herself filed a
Complaint (Civil Case No. 15298) for the annulment of the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the
reconveyance of the subject properties on February 9, 1977. It is beyond this Court's power to
hypothesize on the reasons for Eulalia Cayabyab's change of mind. What is clear is that the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 15298 which subsequently became final. Eulalia Cayabyab's
Affidavit which was executed before the institution of Civil Case No. 15298 cannot, by any means, be
construed as a bar to the final decision declaring Pastor Cayabyab's titles null and void.

Curiously, the respondents never questioned the petitioners' assertion that a notice of lis pendens
was annotated at the back of the TCT covering the First Parcel. The trial court did not rule on this
point but the Court of Appeals declared that there was no such notice annotated on TCT No. 117134.
Whether there was an annotation inscribed in TCT No. 117134 will not, however, affect the Court's
finding that the respondents are not purchasers in good faith.

To summarize, the records disclose circumstances indicating that Rosafina Reginaldo, the Rural Bank
of Urbiztondo and the respondents Marceliano and Rosalia Cayabyab and Rafael and Rosemarie
Ramos were not purchasers in good faith.

Rosafina Reginaldo purchased the First Parcel during the pendency of Civil Case No. 15298.
Moreover, she was one of the defendants, together with Pastor and Rosita Cayabyab, in Civil Case
No. SCC-552 filed by Eulalia Cayabyab and her children Alfredo, Ludovico, Marceliano, Mercedes,
Susana, Rufina, Buenaventura and Josefina for the annulment of certain documents concerning
several parcels of land, among which was the First Parcel.

As for the Rural Bank of Urbiztondo, it became a mortgagee of the First Parcel initially on June 12,
1977 and later, on December 23, 1977, after the filing of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 15298 on
February 9, 1977. After the decision in the case became final, the bank purchased the property during
foreclosure proceedings. It later sold the property to Marceliano Cayabyab, one of the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 15298.

As regards Marceliano, his participation in Civil Case Nos. 15298 and SCC-552 seals his knowledge of
the petitioners' claim over the subject properties.

Likewise, Rafael and Rosemarie Ramos cannot feign ignorance of the proceedings in Civil Case No.
15298 and the final decision therein declaring null and void the Deeds of Absolute Sale and the
corresponding TCTs issued in the name of Pastor Cayabyab. The fact that the parties are family
members also convinces the Court that the respondents' assertion of lack of knowledge of Civil Case
No. 15298 and the petitioners' claim over the subject properties is a mere pretext.

As regards the Second Parcel, it is not disputed that TCT No. 117094 is in Pastor Cayabyab's name
and possession. Emanating, as it did, from the final decision in Civil Case No. 15298, Pastor
Cayabyab's title is null and void.

The final issue pertains to the deed of donation inter vivos allegedly executed by Eulalia Cayabyab in
favor of the petitioners. The trial court sustained the existence and validity of the deed and declared
the plaintiffs, the petitioners herein, to be the true and lawful owners of the subject properties.

Interestingly, petitioner Rufina Cayana verified the existence of the deed of donation inter vivos on
direct examination. She declared:

Q: You said, you know the two parcels of land, subject of this litigation, why do you know them?
A: I know them, sir, because I am one of the owners of said parcels of land.

Q: Who are your co-owners?

A: Mercedes C. de Guzman, Josefina C. Rabina and Susana C. Sambale, sir.

Q: How did you and your co-owners acquire these two parcels of land?
A: By way of donation intervivos executed by our mother, Eulalia Aquino Vda. De Cayabyab,
sometime on January 5, 1980, sir.

Q: Do you have a copy of that donation intervivos?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Showing to you this document, entitled 'Donation Inter-Vivos", will you go over this if this is the
same document you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir, that is the one.
ATTY. PALMA:

May we pray that this document be marked as Exh. A.[48] [Emphasis supplied.]

Petitioner Josefina Rabina also confirmed the existence of the deed. She testified:

Q: Is there any document regarding the donation?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Showing to you this deed of donation, is this the deed of donation you are referring to?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: There is a signature above the typewritten name 'Eulalia Aquino Vda. De Cayabyab,' do you know
those (sic) signature is that?
A: Yes, sir, this is the signature of my mother.[49] [Emphasis supplied.]

The appellate court, however, pronounced that the petitioners were not able to prove their claim of
ownership of the subject properties as they failed to present the original or certified true copy of the
deed of donation inter vivos. The Court of Appeals, in fact, held that the purported Exhibit "A" is
actually the allegation on the existence of the alleged deed contained in the complaint itself.[50]

Due to the conflicting findings of the trial court and the appellate court, we requested[51] the
transmittal to this Court of, among others, the deed of donation inter vivos marked as Exhibit "A" for
the plaintiffs during the direct examination of Rufina Cayana. In her reply dated September 2, 2002,
the clerk of court informed the Court that the entire original records of Civil Case No. 15937,
including Exhibit "A," were listed in the trial court's records as among the exhibits forwarded to the
Court of Appeals.

However, except for the Index of Exhibits for the Plaintiffs-Appellees[52] which lists Exhibit "A," the
records of this case are bereft of any showing that the plaintiffs formally offered in evidence the
original or certified true copy of the deed of donation inter vivos purportedly executed by Eulalia
Cayabyab. The fact that it was only when they filed the instant petition that the petitioners actually
attached as Annex "F"[53] a copy of the said deed is further proof of the petitioners' lapse. As a rule,
the court shall not consider evidence which has not been formally offered.[54] This being so, the
donation in favor of the petitioners cannot be upheld.

This leaves us with the question of who the rightful owners of the subject properties are. The Court
holds that the First and Second Parcels properly belong to the estate of Raymundo and Eulalia
Cayabyab, the same to be partitioned in accordance with the law on succession.

WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and the
Decision of the trial court is accordingly REINSTATED but with the modification that the First and
Second Parcels should be included in the estate of Raymundo and Eulalia Cayabyab and partitioned
in accordance with the law on succession.
SO ORDERED.

Case Summary
Genaro Gerona vs. Secretary of Education 106 Phil 2
G.R. No. L-13954 | 1959-08-12

Subject:
Freedom of Belief vs. Exercise of Belief; Flag Not an Image but a Symbol of the Republic of the
Philippines; Courts Determine Whether a Certain Ritual is Religious or Not; Nothing in the Patriotic
Pledge or National Anthem was Objectionable; No Compulsion in Enforcement of Flag Salute;
Practice of Religious Belief Subject to State Intervention; Freedom of Religion Does Not Mean
Exemption from Reasonable Laws

Facts:

Republic Act No. 1265 took into effect on June 11, 1955. By virtue of Section 2 of the said law, the
Secretary of Education issued Department Order No. 8, which were the rules and regulations for the
proper conduct of the flag ceremony. In effect, all educational institutions were mandated to observe
daily flag ceremony, which included the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem. A
department order was also issued to implement the mandate of the law.

The children of the petitioners were attending the Buenavista Community School in Masbate. They
were members of the religious group Jehovah’s Witnesses. They believed that the laws of God were
superior to the laws enacted by the State. Being so, they refused to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, which were all contrary to the provisions of the law. They
were then expelled from the school for failing to follow the law.

Petitioners then asked the Secretary of Education to exempt from the implementation of the law.
They pleaded that they be allowed to remain silent and just stand in attention with their arms and
hands down and straight at the sides. Further, they asked that they be exempted from reciting the
patriotic pledge. The Secretary of Education denied their petition and ruled that the expulsion was
final and absolute.

Petitioners went before the trial court and argued that the compulsion brought about by the law and
the orders of the department were invalid and contrary to the Bill of Rights. The trial court dismissed
their complaint. Thereafter, petitioners went before the Supreme Court and asseverated that the law
was invalid as it impeded their freedom of religious belief and right to practice such. For them, the
flag was an image, prohibited by their religion to be saluted. Further, they mentioned that the flag
salute was a religious ceremony, participation in which was not allowed in their religion.

Held:
Freedom of Belief vs. Exercise of Belief

1. The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and
thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One
may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to
others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards.

2. Between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of society and
with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The Government steps in and
either restrains said exercise or even prosecutes the one exercising it.

Flag Not an Image but a Symbol of the Republic of the Philippines

3. The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty which it and the Constitution
guarantee and protect. Considering the complete separation of church and state in our system of
government, the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance.

4. Saluting the flag consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute,
particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious ceremony than the taking of an
oath of office by a public official or by a candidate for admission to the bar.

Courts Determine Whether a Certain Ritual is Religious or Not

5. The determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious ceremony must rest with the
courts. It cannot be left to a religious group or sect, much less to a follower of said group or sect;
otherwise, there would be confusion and misunderstanding for there might be as many
interpretations and meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious groups
or sects or followers.

Nothing in the Patriotic Pledge or National Anthem was Objectionable

6. After a careful and conscientious examination of the patriotic pledge as reproduced at the
beginning of this decision, frankly the SC found nothing objectionable, even from the point of view of
religious belief.

7. The school child or student is simply made to say that he loves the Philippines because it is the
land of his birth and the home of his people, among others.

8. The student was not even made to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic for which it
stands. Even if it was to be assumed that the flag were in image, connoting religious and veneration
instead of a mere symbol of the State and of national unity, the religious scruples of appellants
against bowing to and venerating an image were not interfered with or otherwise jeopardized.

No Compulsion in Enforcement of Flag Salute

9. In enforcing the flag salute on the petitioners, there was absolutely no compulsion involved, and
for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute they were not being
persecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they
chose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being
maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more.

Practice of Religious Belief Subject to State Intervention

10. A citizen may retain his freedom or religious belief, but as to practicing the same, he would have
to give up some of those practices repugnant to the general welfare and subordinate them to the laws
and sovereignty of the State. The practice of religion or religious belief is subject to reasonable and
non-discriminatory laws and regulations by the state.

11. In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State was not imposing a religion or
religious belief or a religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-discriminatory
school regulation applicable to all alike whether Christian, Moslem, Protestant or Jehovah's Witness.

Freedom of Religion Does Not Mean Exemption from Reasonable Laws

12. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not and cannot mean
exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and non-discriminatory laws, rules and
regulations promulgated by competent authority.

13. The constitutional protection of religious freedom gave religious equality, not civil immunity. Its
essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because
of religious dogma.
Case Summary
Ebralinag vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
G.R. No. 95770 | 1993-03-01

Subject:

Compulsion to Perform Patriotic Acts Alien to the Bill of Rights; Freedom to Believe and Freedom to
Act on One’s Belief; Grave and Present Danger Justifies Prior Restraint on Exercise of Religious
Freedom; Compelling the Jehovah’s Witnesses Group Violates Religious Freedom

Facts:

Petitioners were minors, who were all high school and elementary school students in the Cebu
province. They were represented by their parents in filing the case, who were all members of the
religious group Jehovah’s Witnesses. All the petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public
school authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the
patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 and by Department Order No. 8 of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all
educational institutions.

The Jehovah's Witnesses taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and
recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those were acts of worship or religious devotion. They
considered the flag as an image or idol representing the State and though that the action of the local
authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcended constitutional limitations on the
State's power and invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects
against official control.

The students and their parents went before the Supreme Court, alleging that the public respondents
acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in ordering their
expulsion without prior notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to due process, their
right to free public education, and their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.

Held:

Compulsion to Perform Patriotic Acts Alien to the Bill of Rights

1. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the
patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from one's job or of being
expelled from school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their
teeth on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of
religious profession and worship.

2. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator.

Freedom to Believe and Freedom to Act on One’s Belief

3. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect: freedom to believe and
freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of
thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect
the public welfare.

Grave and Present Danger Justifies Prior Restraint on Exercise of Religious Freedom

4. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the
existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to
public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a
right and duty to prevent. Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from
the schools is not justified.

Compelling the Jehovah’s Witnesses Group Violates Religious Freedom

5. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation
that this Court had feared in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education. Forcing a small religious group,
through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will
hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.

6. “Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, assuming that
such unity and loyalty can be attained through coercion, is not a goal that is constitutionally
obtainable at the expense of religious liberty. A desirable and cannot be promoted by prohibited
means. (Meyer vs. Nebraska)

7. The expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will
violate their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it
is the duty of the State to protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education and to
make such education accessible to all.

8. The SC held that exemptions may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs, however bizarre those
beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag ceremony does not
give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.

BASIC CONCEPTS OF LAW

- Elements of Law
 Culture
 Codification
 Control
 Enforcement
 Acceptability
- Classification of law
- Source of Law
 The Constitution
 Statutes
 Treaties and conventions
 Judicial Decisions
- Municipal Law vs. International Law

INTERNATIONAL LAW MUNICIPAL LAW

International Law is the law of nations, Municipal Law is the law of State regulating the
regulating the relations between the member conduct of individuals and deal with the relation
States of the family of nations. between individual and the State.
International Law is concerned mainly with Municipal Law is infra-state affairs concerned with
foreign affairs or inter-state affairs. domestic affairs.
International Law is a nature of consent and Municipal Law is of command and sanction.
 consensus.
International Law is a decentralised system Municipal Law is a centralised acting horizontally.
acting vertically.
International Law applies on individual mediate. Municipal Law applies on individuals immediate.

Discussion by Ruben E. Agpalo (Statutory Construction, 2003 ed.)

What is a Law? In its jural and generic sense, it refers to the whole body or system of law.
In its jural and concrete sense, it means a rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by
legitimate power of the state.
Are executive issuances of the President and the rulings of the Supreme Court be considered laws?
Yes. Laws includes statues enacted by the legislature, presidential decrees and executive orders
issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative power, other presidential issuances in the
exercise of his ordinance power, rulings of the Supreme Court construing the law.
Are rules and regulations promulgated by administrative officers included? Yes. Rules and
regulations promulgated by administrative or executive officers pursuant to a delegated power are
considered laws. Same applies to ordinances passed by sanggunians of local government units.
What is a Statute? It is an act of the legislature as an organized body, expressed in the form, and
passed according to the procedure, required to constitute it as part of the law of the land.
Who enacted statutes by the legislature?
1. Philippine Commission
2. Philippine Legislature
3. Batasang Pambansa
4. Congress of the Philippines
What are the executive issuances made during the (1) martial law and (2) the revolutionary period
under the Freedom Constitution? (1) Presidential Decrees issued by the President in the exercise of
his legislative power (2) Executive Orders issued by the President in the exercise of his legislative
power
What is a public statute? It is one which affects the public at large or the whole community.
What is a private statute? It is one which applies only to a specific person or subject.
What is a general law? It is one which applies to the whole state and operates throughout the state
alike upon all the people or all of a class.
It is one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally
belonging to such class.
What is a special law? It is one which relates to particular persons or things of a class or to a
particular community, individual or thing.
What is a local law? It is one whose operation is confined to a specific place or locality.
What is a permanent statute? It is one whose operation is not limited in duration but continues until
repealed. It does not terminate by the lapse of a fixed period or by the occurrence of an event.
What is a temporary statute? It is a statute whose duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the
statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event.
What are Public Acts? Statues passed by the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Legislature
from 1901 to 1935.
What are Commonwealth Acts? Laws enacted during the Commonwealth from 1936 to 1946.
What are Republic Acts? Laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines from 1946 to 1972 and from
1987 under the 1987 Constitution.
What is a Batas Pambansa? Laws promulgated by the Batasang Pambansa.
What is Legislative Power and to whom is this power vested? Legislative power is the power to
make, alter and repeal laws. It is vested in the Congress.
Do sanggunians of local government units have legislative power? Yes. Sangguniang barangay,
sangguniang bayan, sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang panlalawigan have legislative
powers, within their respective jurisdictions, to enact ordinances enforceable within the local
government units concerned.
Is the legislative power of Congress plenary in character? Yes. The legislative power is plenary for
all purposes of civil government, subject only to such limitations as are found in the Constitution.
Is there a procedure that must be followed for a bill to be passed as a law? Yes. A bill may be
enacted into law only in the manner the Constitution requires and in accordance with the procedure
therein provided. Congress also provides in detail the procedure by which a bill may be enacted into
law. Detailed procedures are embodied in the Rules of both Houses of Congress.
What is a bill? It is a proposed legislative measure introduced by a member of Congress for
enactment into law.
Can a bill embrace more than one subject? No. A bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
Can a private bill originate from the Senate? No. It must originate from the House of
Representatives. Appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives.
May a bill be approved in 2 readings? No. The Constitution provides that no bill passed by either
House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days.
What happens in the (1) First Reading, (2) Second Reading, and (3) Third Reading? First reading
consists of reading the number and title of the bill, followed by it referral to the appropriate
Committee for study and recommendation.
On second reading, the bill shall be read in full with the amendments proposed by the Committee, if
any, unless copies thereof are distributed and such reading is dispensed with. The bill is subject to
debates, pertinent motions, and amendments.
On third reading, the bill as approved on second reading will be submitted for final vote by yeas and
nays.
What happens if the other House approves the bill without amendment? The bill is passed by
Congress and the same will be transmitted to the President for appropriate action.
What is the function of the Conference Committee? It settled the differences if the other House
introduces amendments and the House from which it originated does not agree with said
amendments.
When may a bill passed by Congress becomes a law? (1) When the President signs it; (2) When the
President does not sign nor communicate his veto of the bill within thirty days after his receipt
thereof; (3) When the vetoed bill is repassed by Congress by two-thirds vote of all its Members, each
House voting separately.
How is the Bill authenticated? The system of authentication devised is the signing by the Speaker
and the Senate President of the printed copy of the approved bill.
What is the purpose of the authentication? It is to signify to the President that the bill being
presented to him has been duly approved by the legislature and is ready for his approval or rejection.
What is the value of a Journal? The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect.
What is an Enrolled Bill? It is the bill passed by Congress, authenticated by the Speaker and the
Senate President and approved by the President.
What is the Enrolled Bill Doctrine? It provides that the act as passed and approved is deemed
importing absolute verity and is binding on the courts.
Why is the enrolled bill accorded with conclusive verity? It is because of the fact that the enrolled
bill carries on its face a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the
government, charged respectively with the duty of enacting and executing laws, that it was passed by
the assembly.
In case of a discrepancy between the journal and the enrolled bill, which will prevail? The enrolled
bill prevails, particularly with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered into the
legislative journal.
When may there be withdrawal of authentication? The Speaker and the Senate President may
withdraw their signatures from the signed bull where there is serious and substantial discrepancy
between the text of the bill as deliberated in the legislature and shown by the journal and that of the
enrolled bill.
What is the effect of the withdrawal of authentication? Such withdrawal renders the bill without
attestation and nullifies its status as an enrolled bill. In such a case, the bill is no longer accorded
absolute verity as regards its text.
What are the two constitutional limitations upon the legislature with regard title of statute? (1) The
legislature is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
(2) The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public
and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
What are the purposes of the constitutional requirement that a bill shall embrace only one subject?
(1) To prevent hodgepodge or log-rolling legislation; (2) To prevent or surprise fraud upon the
legislature, by means of provisions in bills of which the title gave no information, and which might
therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; (3) To fairly apprise the people,
through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of the
legislation that are being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire; and (4) The
title of a statute is used as a guide in ascertaining legislative intent when the language of the act does
not clearly expresses its purpose.
How is the constitutional requirement as to title of a bill construed? It shall be construed liberally.
It should not be given a technical interpretation.
It is necessary that the Legislature employ precise language in the title of an enactment? No. The
language used will suffice if the title should meet the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
informs the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed measure and its operation.
For amendatory acts, is it needed to state the precise nature of the amendatory act? No. A title
which states that it is an act to amend a specific statute is a sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
Does the constitutional requirement that a bill shall embrace only one subject have a retroactive
effect? No. The requirement only applies to bill which may thereafter be enacted into law. It does not
apply to laws in force and existing at the time the 1935 Constitution took effect.
The constitutional requirement has also no application to municipal or city ordinances.
What is the effect of non-compliance by a statute to the constitutional requirement on title? A
statute whose title does not conform to the constitutional requirement or is not related in any manner
to its subject is null and void.
Is the effect the same if the subject matter of a statute is not sufficiently expressed in its title? No.
Where the subject matter of the statute is not sufficiently expressed in its title, only so much of the
subject matter as is not expressed therein is void, leaving the rest in force. UNLESS the invalid
provisions are inseparable from the others, in which case the nullity of the former vitiates the latter.
What is an Enacting Clause? It is that part of a statute written immediately after the title thereof
which states the authority by which the act is enacted.
What is a Preamble? It is a prefatory statement or explanation or a finding of facts, reciting the
purpose, reason, or occasion of remaking the law to which it is prefixed.
What is the Purview of Statute? The purview or body of a statute is that part which tells what the
law is all about. It should embrace only one subject matter.
What is a Separability Clause? It is that part of a statute which states that if any provision of the act
is declared invalid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby.
It is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity of one provision shall not invalidate the other
provisions of the act.
What are Presidential Issuances? What do they include? Presidential issuances are those which the
President issues in the exercise of his ordinance power.
They include executive orders, administrative orders, proclamations, memorandum orders,
memorandum circulars, and general or special orders.
What are Executive Orders? Executive Orders are acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in the implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers.
What are Administrative Orders? Administrative Orders are acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as administrative head.
What are Proclamations? Proclamations are acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a statute
or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a specific law
or regulation is made to depend.
What is a Memorandum Order? It is the act of the President on matters of administrative detail or of
subordinate or temporary interest which only concerns a particular officer or office of the
Government.
What are Memorandum Circulars? They are acts of the President on matters relating to internal
administration which the President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus, or offices of the Government, for information or compliance.
What are General or Specific Orders? They are acts and commands of the President in his capacity
as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
May the Supreme Court promulgate rules which are substantive in nature? No. Unlike legislature
which may enact laws which are substantive and procedural, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule- making power, does not have the power to promulgate rules which are substantive in nature.
Is a rule or regulation which restricts or enlarges a statute valid? No. The rule-making power of a
public administrative agency is a delegated legislative power. It may not issue rules and regulations
which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, or which are in derogation
of, or defeat, the purpose of the statute which created it.
What are the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power? (1) It must be complete in
itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate;
and (2) It must fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable – to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
What are examples of adequate standards? (1) Simplicity and dignity; (2) Public interest; (3) Public
welfare; (4) Interests of law and order; (5) Justice and equity and substantial merit of the case; (6)
Adequate and efficient instruction.
Can there be a rule promulgated to amend an Act of Congress? No. The power to promulgate rules
in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment. Its terms must be followed for an administrative agency cannot amend an Act of
Congress.
In case of a discrepancy between the law and an implementing rule and regulation, which will
prevail? The law prevails.
What is the difference between the (1) promulgation of rules and regulations by the
administrative agency, and (2) rendition of an opinion by an administrative agency? When an
administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it makes a new law with the force and
effect of a valid law. On the other hand, when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law.
What is the value of an administrative interpretation of the law? It is at best merely advisory, for it
is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
What is the smallest legislative body? Sangguniang barangay.
Which bodies review a barangay ordinance? A barangay ordinance is subject to review by the
sangguniang bayan or sangguniang panlungsod, as the case may be, to determine whether it is
consistent with the law or with municipal or city ordinance.
To whom is the power to enact municipal ordinance given? The power to enact municipal
ordinance is lodged with the sangguniang bayan.
What is the require vote for the passage of an ordinance? Majority vote of the members of the
sangguniang bayan present and voting, there being a quorum.
Can the veto of the mayor be overridden? Yes. The sangguniang bayan may, by two-thirds vote of
all members, override the veto of the mayor. In which case, it shall become effective for all legal
intents and purposes.
Who reviews the approved municipal ordinance? The sangguninang panlalawigan.
To whom is the power to pass city ordinance given? The power to pass city ordinance is vested in
the sangguniang panlungsod. The required vote to pass an ordinance is the same as that of the
municipal ordinance.
To whom is the power to pass provincial ordinance given? The power to pass provincial ordinance
is vested to the sangguniang panlalawigan, as the legislative body of the province.
Can the sangguniang panlalawigan override a vetoed ordinance? Yes. A vetoed ordinance may be
repassed by the sangguniang panlalwigan by a two-thirds vote of all its members.

Discussion by Joaquin G. Bernas (An Introduction to Public International Law, 2002 ed.)
What is the traditional definition of international law? It is a body of rules and principles of action
which are binding upon civilized states in their relations to one another.
What is the (modern) defition of international law according to the Third Restatement? It is the
law which deals with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations
inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.
What is the Command Theory? In this view, international law is not law because it does not come
from a command of a sovereign.
What is the Consensual Theory? Under this theory, international law derives its binding force form
the consent of the states.
What is the Natural Law Theory? This theory posits that law is derived by reason form the nature of
man. International law is said to be an application of natural reason to the nature of the state-person.
What is Public International Law? This governs the relationships between and among states and
also their relations with intenational organizations and individual persons.
What is Private International Law? It is really domestic law which deals with cases where foreign
law intrudes in the domestic sphere where there are questions of the applicability of foreign law or
the role of foreign courts.
How are sources of international law classified? (1) Formal and (2) Material
What are formal sources? It refer to the various processes by which rules come into existence.
What are material sources? It is concerned with the substance and content of the obligation.
Sometimes referred to as the evidence if international law.
What are the sources of international law? (1) International conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by contesting states; (2) International custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) General principles of law recognized by civilized
nations; (4) Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
What is Custom or Customary International Law? It means a general and consistent practice of
states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.
What are the 2 basis elements of Custom? (1) Material Factor (usus) – how the states behave (2)
Subjective Factor – why they behave the way they do
What are the elements of usus? (1) duration, (2) consistency, and (3) generality of practice of states.
What is Opinio Juris? It is the belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory.
Would dissenting states be bound by custom? Yes, unless they had consistently objected to it while
the custom was merely in the process of formation.
Who has the burden of prooving the existence of opinio juris? The existence of opinio juris is a
matter of proof. The burden of proving its existence falls on the state claiming it.
What is Instant Custom? It comes about as a spontaneous activity of a great number of states
supporting a specific line of action.
If a treaty comes later than a particular custom, as between the parties to the treaty, which should
prevail? The treaty.
If a later treaty is contrary to a customary rule that has the status of jus cogens, which will prevail?
Custom will prevail.
Is Equity a source of law? Yes. The Permanent Court of Justice had occasion to use equity as a source
of law in one case. Equity, when accepted, is an instrument whereby convetional or customary law
may be supplemented or modified in order achieve justice.
What is a Soft Law? It is an international agreement no concluded as treaty and threfore not covered
by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
What is the dualist or pluralist theory? It holds that international law and mnicpal law are
essentially different from each other.
How does municipal and international law differ with regard to what they regulate? Municipal
law regulates relations between individual persons under the state whereas international law
regulates relations between states.
For dualists, when international law and municipal law conflict, which must prevail? Municipal
Law must prevail.
What is the monistic theory or monism? Under this theory, international law and domestic law
belong to only one system of law.
How does international law become part of domestic law for dualists? (1) Doctrine of
transformation. – for international law to become part of domestic law, it must be expressly and
specifically transformed into domestic law through the appropriate constitutional machinery.
(2) Doctrine of incorporation, - the law of natons, wherever any question arises which is properly the
object of its jurisdiction, is here adopted in its full extent by the common law, and it is held to be part
of the law of the land.
Which law prevails in a domestic court? Municipal Law for the domestic courts are bound to apply
the local law.
Which law prevails in an international tribunal? International Law. It is an established principle
that, before an international tribunal, a state may not plead its own law as an excuse for failure to
comply with international law.
Should a conflict arise between an international agreement and the Philippine Constitution,
which should prevail? Philippine Constitution. The treaty would not be valid and operative as
domestic law.
- Article II, section 2 of 1987 Constitution
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
acceptable principle of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amidity with all nation.
ASSOCIATED CASES:
COURTS AND JURISPRUDENCE
- What is Judicial Power? The constitutional authority vested in courts and judges to hear
and decide justiciable cases, and to interpret, and enforce or void, statutes when disputes
arise over their scope or constitutionality.
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- What is Judicial Review? 1. A higher court's review of a lower court's (or an administrative
body's) factual or legal findings. Upon the review, the court may issue a prerogative or
prohibitive order or may award damages.

2. The power of the Supreme courts’ to decide whether a law enacted by a legislature is
constitutional or not. All unconstitutional laws are de facto null and void, until the
constitution itself is amended to accommodate them.
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- Separation and Blending of Powers
[1] The general rule is separation of powers. The exceptions are blending of powers and checks
and balances.

[2] Constitutional entities blend powers when they put their powers together to achieve a goal.
When the President signs a bill, there is a blending between the Executive Branch and the
Legislative Branch. When the President vetoes, there is checks and balances.

[3] When the Commission on Appointments confirms the President's appointment, there is
blending of powers. When it does not confirm, there is checks and balances.

[4] Checks and balances occur between and among the Three Great Branches and other
constitutional bodies.
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- Third Level Courts
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- Court of Tax Appeals
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- Sandiganbayan
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- Second Level Courts
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- First Level Courts
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- En Banc and Division Cases:
- Rule Making Powers
 ASSOCIATED CASES:
- Jurisdiction:
- Basis of decisions:
- Political question:
- Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality:
- Grave Abuse of Discretion:
ASSOCIATED CASES:
- What is Jurisprudence?
- Finality of decision:
PARTS OF A CASE
Dispositive portion:
Separate opinions:
Obiter Dictum:
LAWYER, JUDGES, and the LEGAL PROFESSION
What is Practice of Law?
Lawyer’s Oath
The Concept of Good Moral Character
- Fernandez vs. Grecia
- Regala vs. Sandiganbayan