HISTORY AND

WARFARE IN
\ \sT

HISTORY
AND WARFARE IN
RENAISSANCE
EPIC
 )

i
 HISTORY
A N D WARFARE IN
RENAISSANCE
EPIC

M J " H U R R I N

THE U N IVERSITY OF CH ICAG O PRESS

Chicago and London
The University o f Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University o f Chicago Press, Ltd., London
© 1994 by The University o f Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 1994
Paperback edition 1997
Printed in the United States o f America

03 02 01 00 99 98 97 54 3 2

ISBN (doth): 0-226-55403-1

ISBN (paperback): 0-226-55405-8

Graceful acknowledgment is made to the Program for C u l­

tural Cooperation between Spain’s Ministry o f Culture and
United States’ Universities and to the Division o f the Humani­
ties o f the University o f Chicago for their generous contribu­
tions toward the publication o f this book.

Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Murrin, Michael.
History and warfare in Renaissance epic / Michael Murrin.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISB N 0-226-55403-1
1. Epic Literature— History and criticism. 2. European
literature— Renaissance, 1450-1600— History and criticism.
3. History in literature. 4. War in literature. I. Title.
PN56.E65M87 1994 94-20498
809'.93358— dc2o CIP

© The paper used in this publication meets the minimum require­

ments o f the American National Standard for Information Sci­
ences— Permanence o f Paper for Printed Library Materials, AN SI
Z39.48-1984.
 To my teachers and to the scholars,
some o f whom I have never met and never could,
who have helped me in my work
 CONTENTS

List o f Illustrations xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Abbreviations xv

Introduction
i

-------Part One-------
W AR W IT H O U T T H E G U N
The Romance Tradition

ONE
The Tactics o f Roncesvalles
Luigi Pulci
21

TWO
Arthur’s Rise to Power
Sir Thomas Malory
40

THREE
Agramante’s War
Matteo Maria Boiardo
57
-------Part Two-------
T H E M O V E M E N T IN T O R E A L IS M A N D H IS T O R Y

FOUR
The Siege o f Paris
Ludovico Ariosto, Torquato Tasso, and Alonso de Ercilla y Zuniga
79
viii Contents

FIVE
The Problems History Makes for the Poet
Torquato Tasso
103

-------Part Three-------
TH E G U N , O R TH E NEW T EC H N O LO G Y

s ix
Negative Critiques
Ludovico Ariosto and John Milton
123

SEVEN
Positive Evaluations
Alonso de Ercillay Zuniga and Luis Vaz de Camoes
138

EIGHT
The Heroic Few
Alonso de Ercillay Zuniga and Gaspar Perez de Villagra
160

NINE
The Officers Take Over
Juan Rufo and Pedro de Ona
179

------- Part Four-------

V IO L E N C E

TEN
Are There Limits to Violence?
Matteo Maria Boiardo, Torquato Tasso, and Alonso de Ercilla y Zuniga
199

ELEVEN
Acoma
Gaspar Perez de Villagra
216
 Contents lx

------- Part Five-------

T H E E P IC W IT H O U T W AR

TWELVE
The English
Sir Philip Sidney, Michael Drayton, and Samuel Daniel
231

Appendixes 247
Notes 255
Bibliography 343
Index 361
 ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Map o f the siege o f Rhodes 3

2. View o f the England-Aragon sector o f the walls o f
Rhodes 4
3. The Tower o f Spain 6
4. The Ramparts o f Spain with ravelins (view from the
Tower o f Spain) 6
5. The Ramparts o f Spain with ravelins (view from the
Tower o f the Virgin) 7
6. Diagram o f the comparative widths o f the walls o f
Rhodes 7
7. Drawings o f pedreros, culverins, and esmerils 11
8. Map of the fictional England o f the Vulgate Merlin and
the Suite du Merlin 49
9. Malory’s England 52
10. Mauro’s map o f North Africa 64
11. Places in Agramante’s empire 65
12. Herodotus’s map o f North Africa 66
13. Porte Saint-Michel, Paris 82
14. Map o f Paris in the early sixteenth century 88
15. The old palace on the lie de la Cite 91
16. Jerusalem under the Latin kings 93
17. Map o f the war zone in Chile 99
18. Harquebus 129
19. Lepanto, battle of the flagships 140
20. Rogers, map o f Mozambique 147
21. Two views o f Acoma 217
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I OWli MUCH TO THE HELPFUL CRITIQUES OF INDIVIDUAL

chapters I received from colleagues at my university: Janel Mueller,
loslma Scodel, and Richard Strier in English; Peter Dembowski and
I lissa Weaver in Romance Languages; and Robert DankofFin Near East­
ern Languages and Civilizations. Outside the University o f Chicago,
( '.liarles Ross at Purdue University, Michael Saida at the University of
Southern Mississippi, Peter DeSa Wiggins at the College o f William and
Mary, J. R. Hale at the University o f London, and Dave Henderson in
Sonoma, California, have offered both advice and bibliographical help
lor particular chapters and topics. I also am grateful to the readers for the
University o f Chicago Press, who guided m y final revisions.
I read an early draft o f chapters 6 and 7 to the Davis Seminar (then
presided over by Lawrence Stone) at Princeton University in 1983, and
the members gave me encouragement and useful suggestions. I also thank
(hose who attended oral presentations o f chapter 6 at conferences held in
Tempe, Arizona, and at Ball State University, especially Constance Jor­
dan, who gave me an extended verbal critique after I read m y paper at
Tempe.
I also wish to thank the members o f the Ariosto and Tasso Seminar,
organized by Albert Ascoli and David Quint at Northwestern University,
and the faculty and students o f the Divinity School at the University o f
Chicago, assembled for the Nuveen Lecture, to whom I read a version o f
chapter 10.
Most o f all, I owe a profound debt to David Quint, who first suggested
I look at the Spanish poets, read all my chapters as I wrote them, and
encouraged me to persevere in an enterprise that ultimately took more
than a decade to complete.
I have published two sections o f this book previously: chapter 3 on
Boiardo appeared in Annali d ’ltalianistica 1 (1983), and the first half of

Yltt
XI V Acknowledgm ents

chapter 4 appeared in Modern Language Notes 103 (1988). They are re­
printed here by permission o f the publishers.
 ABBREVIATIONS

Ah Pedro de Ona, Arauco domado

Ahiucuria Alonso de Ercilla y Zuniga, La Araucana
A tie Niccolo Machiavelli, Arte della guerra
A m iriiu la Juan Rufo, La Austriada
Am triiuiis libri duo Juan Latino, Austriadis libri duo
IIW Michael Drayton, The Barons Warns
I IV Samuel Daniel, The Civile Wars between the Two
Houses o f Lancaster and Yorke
/ h'/riur Sir Philip Sidney, The Defence o f Poesie, or An Apologie
for Poetrie
1bagontea Lope de Vega, Dragontea
hayttes Christine de Pisan, The Book ofFayttes ofArmes and o f
Chyvalrye, trans. William Caxton
K> Edmund Spenser, The Faerie Queene
I 'V Hieronimo Corte Real, Felicissima victoria concedida
del cielo al senor don Juan dAustria, en elgolfo de
Lepanto. . .
<;i. Torquato Tasso, Gerusalemme liberata
HR William of Tyre, Historia rerum in partibus transmar-
inis gestarum
1 Iuth Merlin Merlin, ed. Gaston Paris and Jacob Ulrich, a vols.
Paris: Firmin Didot, 1886.
Lusiadas Luis de Camoes, Os Lusiadas
M Luigi Pulci, Morgante
Morte Sir Thomas Malory, La Morte Darthur
NA Sir Philip Sidney, New Arcadia
NM Gaspar Perez de Villagra, Historia de la Nueva Mexico
OD Don Juan de Ohate, Colonizer o f New Mexico, 1595-

vu
xvi Abbreviations

1628, ed. George P. Hammond and Agapito Rey. Al­

buquerque: University o f New Mexico Press, 1953.
OF Ludovico Ariosto, Orlando furioso
OI Matteo Maria Boiardo, Orlando innamorato
PL John Milton, Paradise Lost
PR John Milton, Paradise Regained
Suite Suite du Merlin. Cambridge University Library, Addi­
tional M S 7071, fols. 202v—3 4 3 V .
Tirant Joanot Martorell and Marti Joan de Galba, Tirant lo
blanc
UT Thomas Nashe, The Unfortunate Traveller
Vulgate Merlin L’Estoire de Merlin. Vol. 2 o f The Vulgate Version o f the
Arthurian Romances. Ed. H. Oskar Sommer. Wash­
ington, D .C .: Carnegie Institution o f Washington,
1908.
 INTRODUCTION

LITERATURE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY UNDERWENT A

profound change, and we still live with its consequences. The change
occurred within heroic narrative, the socially and critically privileged
form o f the period, and involved an exclusion that was also a contradic­
tion. By the end o f the century heroic narrative had begun to drop war
as its subject matter, even though military strife, actual or threatened,
was present throughout the period. The contradiction o f such writing
avoiding its proper subject matter may have led eventually to the demise
o f the form in the following century. A t the same time this change deter­
mined the parameters o f the genre that replaced it. Despite efforts by
writers like Tolstoy and Hemingway, warfare has never been a standard
subject for major novelists; modern literary culture tacidy assumes an
exclusion made four to five centuries ago.
Yet the shift, while in process, gave rise to a fascinating series o f experi­
ments in heroic poetry and prose. A critic who takes a long view o f the
tradition (all the way back to the Gilgamesh epic and to Homer) would
find many o f these efforts strange, although artistically excellent. Yet
many o f these experiments are considered classics in the various vernacu­
lar traditions. Paradise Lost is a good example: a poem in which all the
wrong people glorify heroic activity. Compared to the Iliad or Gerusa-
lemme liberata, Milton’s epic seems almost a generic contradiction. Even
intelligent students, however, often do not see its peculiarity, since they
have grown up in a different literary culture and generally do not read
the older languages. As a result, they are unable to appreciate the rich
eccentricity o f their own tradition. I hope my book helps to remedy this
accidental blindness.
To understand this shift in sixteenth-century literature, one must ex­
amine many epics and romances, now largely forgotten. One must also
study the warfare that ultimately caused these changes. Military art itself
 z Introduction

went through a slow revolution, one determined in large part by techno­

logical changes. I begin here.

t h e ja n is s a r ie s held part o f the Aragon bastion (fig. i),1 and the

Greek population o f Rhodes refused to support further fighting. The
weather intensified the war-weariness. December 1522 had been wet and
cold, and the Carian Mountains across the channel had snow. O n Christ­
mas Eve the sultan made an offer, and two days later the grand master o f
the Knights Hospitallers, Philippe Villiers de I’Isle Adam, surrendered.
On N ew Year’s D ay the last o f the Knights sailed away from Rhodes,
never to return.2
Yet they had almost won. They had defended the city o f Rhodes suc­
cessfully for five months, resisting many cannonades in which the Otto­
mans used bombards that were able to shoot balls nearly three meters
in circumference.3 The Ottomans had concentrated on the English and
Aragonese sectors using guns and exploding mines, and they had tried
thirteen assaults in that area o f the walls (fig. 2). O n 4 September 1522 a
stretch of wall twelve meters wide fell by the Tower o f the Virgin, and
the troops who attacked managed to plant seven banners on the walls
before they were repulsed. Five days later a mine blew open another
breach, two to three meters wide, and two assaults followed, the first o f
which set nine banners on the walls; the Knights repulsed them both. On
24 September the Janissaries struck again at the breach in the Aragonese
sector and took its tower temporarily, but cannon fire from the neigh­
boring walls cut off reinforcements, and the Ottomans suffered severe
losses.4 By the end o f the month the many tunnels and counter tunnels
under the bulwark o f the English sector caused it to fall down. Worse
followed. In October the Turks had earthworks that protected them from
flank fire, so they could approach the wall in relative safety. They began
pulling down stones from the walls by ropes. They made seven assaults
that month, yet still none succeeded. In November the Knights had to
evacuate the bastion o f Aragon, and its tower fell as a result o f mining on
the fourteenth. Then another mine brought down part o f the fortifica­
tion and widened the old breach, and on 29 November the Ottomans
tried another assault. Heavy rain washed away their earthworks, leaving
them once again open to flank fire, and they left behind in the mud three
thousand o f their dead. A t this point Christopher Waldner, chief o f the
German-speaking Knights, wrote home saying that the city had been be­
sieged for five months and had endured twenty-five assaults made in three
different places, two o f the attacks terrible, one o f them lasting seventeen
 INTRODUCTION 3

Figure i. Map of the siege of Rhodes. Courtesy Ekdotike Athenon S.A. Copyright
© 1991.

hours. The last try, that o f 17 December, at last won the Ottomans a
toehold on the Aragonese bastion and led to the surrender. So ended a
drama not o f five months but o f seventy years. It was a technological race
between the Hospitallers and the Ottomans, with the Knights winning
most o f the time until that fateful December.5
By the mid-fifteenth century the Knights, following the best medieval
thinking, had rebuilt or mostly built anew the whole defense system o f
Rhodes.6 Cannon, however, had just become effective in sieges. The
French pioneered the new technology, and the Knights, most o f whom
were French, understood the danger it posed. The Mamluks in their last
siege o f the city, in 1444, had already used cannon, but the danger really
came from the expanding Ottoman Empire.7 In 1453 the Turks blew their
way into Constantinople, and Mehmed II began systematically conquer­
ing all the Greek and Latin principalities in the area. He ended his reign
with a massive attack on Rhodes in 1480. T h e modern tourist still sees
cannonballs everywhere in the city, now mostly used for decoration or
Figure 2. View of the England-Aragon sector of the walls of Rhodes. Courtesy De Boccard Editio
Diffusion, Paris.

kept in orderly piles: the results o f this and the last siege in 1522.8 The
siege o f 1480 still showed the marks o f a transitional phase in warfare
because the Ottomans used old siege engines alongside their cannon: the
mangonel, which shot jars o f “wild fire” that was the medieval equivalent
o f napalm, and the trebuchet, which lobbed rocks.9 T h e Knights with­
stood the assault, but the city and fortifications sustained terrible damage.
An earthquake the next year completed what the Ottomans had begun,
and the Hospitallers had to rebuild everything, both the walls and their
buildings. In the next forty years they redid almost their entire land de­
fenses. They were still working on the bastion o f Auvergne when the
Ottomans returned in June 1522.10
The Knights tried to adapt a traditional style o f defense to a com­
pletely new kind o f threat. Cannon had changed all the rules. Gone were
 INTRODUCTION 5

the old scaling ladders and movable towers. Cannons simply knocked
down portions o f a wall, opening a breach that made possible an assault.
The high thin walls o f the medieval enceinte were especially vulnerable
to cannon, so the Hospitallers frantically worked to make the old walls
into something quite different. They began with a rampart more than
two meters thick and a parapet o f nearly half a meter but ended with a
rampart o f more than twelve meters and a parapet four meters across.
Great mass and low towers could better resist direct hits by cannonballs.
The Towers o f Aragon and the Virgin show the new system. Polygonal
bastions with low loopholes through which cannon could shoot into the
dry moat transformed the old towers; the Knights constructed a network
o f galleries under them to ward o ff mining. Soon after the Knights added
ravelins within the moat itself: these were freestanding walls that paral-
Figure 3. The Tower o f Spain. Courtesy De Boccard Edition-diffusion, Paris.

Figure 4. The Ramparts o f Spain with ravelins (view from the Tower o f Spain). Cour­
tesy De Boccard Edition-Diffusion, Paris.

leled the main wall and would make a direct assault difficult, since they
flanked the approaches to the gates and blocked the way to the curtain
(figs. 3 -6 ) .11
T h e French thinking that governed these alterations was well ex­
pressed by Robert de Balsac in his Nefdesprinces (ca. 1500).12 He stressed
flank fire along the moat, and the Knights put ravelins in front o f the
curtain to get at attackers who might assemble at the salient or blind
 INTRODUCTION 7

Figure 5. The Ramparts of Spain (view from the Tower of the Virgin). Courtesy De
Boccard Edition-Diffusion, Paris.

Figure 6. Diagram of the comparative widths of the walls of Rhodes, before and after
gunpowder. Courtesy De Boccard Edition-Diffusion, Paris.

angles o f the bastion. Medieval ideas, unfortunately, still governed this

modernization. The Knights wanted to annihilate the enemy at the walls,
but the Ottomans nullified the flank fire by constructing earthworks to
protect their approaches.13 It was precisely the modernized sectors o f the
walls, the southwest section with the Towers o f the Virgin and o f Aragon,
that the Ottomans penetrated in 1522. De Balsac and the Knights had
not yet found the proper use o f cannon in a modern defense system.
The Italians, however, were developing a new and effective defensive
system that became standard during the 1530s. The Knights themselves
8 Introduction

used this new thinking when they successfully defended Malta against
their old enemy Suleyman, forty years after the fall o f Rhodes.14

in t h is bo o k I study a literary response to the same crisis the Knights

faced, one less dramatic but no less significant culturally. The old medi­
eval order, which had produced the Knights o f Saint John, had a fully
developed literary genre through which it expressed military engage­
ments: the romance. This genre, particularly when it was composed in or
represented actions in the Mediterranean zone, normally imagined the
same kind o f war the story o f Rhodes illustrates: the clash between Chris­
tian and Muslim. The majority o f the authors covered in this book came
from this zone and specialized in such stories, even though later they
might transplant the scene to the Americas, where Indians replaced Mus­
lims as the enemy. In all cases these writers had to adjust their narratives
to the Gunpowder Revolution. Some tinkered with the old genres, as the
Knights did with their medieval walls; others opted for a different form,
that o f classical epic, which came into Italy along with the star-shaped
forts of the new military system. This period o f experimentation and re­
action to the gun is half o f m y story.
On the military side the art o f war underwent a slow but complete
revolution, mostly but by no means solely through the development o f
firearms. The new technology made war first offensive and then defen­
sive. Initially, it led to a century o f expansion from the 1440s to the 1530s
and produced the so-called gunpowder empires. The Ottomans con­
quered the Balkans and united the Arabs under their rule, the Portuguese
sailed east and west, and the Spaniards occupied much o f Mexico and
Central and South America. During this period the gun gradually be­
came effective in all kinds o f warfare, from sieges to open field engage­
ments. The same technology determined the defensive posture o f the
later sixteenth century. Once the Italians turned forts into gun platforms,
the defense could accumulate more guns and destroy an attacker.15 War
then returned to the traditional methods o f siege and attrition, which
had dominated the Middle Ages and quattrocento Italy. Since the gun
ultimately generated opposite effects, I had to study both phases, the
offensive and the defensive periods. This explains the time span under
study, roughly the sixteenth century or, more precisely, 1483-1610.
I have, however, left the boundaries elastic. The first romancers, Mar-
torell and Malory, really bring us back to the mid-fifteenth century. Mar-
torell, who composed most o f Tirant lo blanc, died in 1468, although the
romance was not published until 149 0 ,16 and Malory dates his book to
 INTRODUCTION 9

1469 -70 , though Caxton published it many years later.17 Similarly, at the
other end I include Milton with Ariosto in chapter 6 to show the tenacity
o f the conservative rejection o f firearms. T h e sixteenth century, neverthe­
less, remains m y focus, and I do not deal with Percefbrest and other ro­
mances written before 1450 or with the L ’A done and other seventeenth-
century epics.
Both aspects o f the Gunpowder Revolution, the offensive and the de­
fensive, affected heroic narrative and require the kind o f informed read­
ing a student o f literature often lacks. In m y teaching o f comparative
epic I have found that literary students frequently shy away from military
narrative, even when it determined a text or gave authors one o f their
principal topics. Sometimes this reluctance seems to manifest a post-
Vietnam distaste for war and stories o f war, yet such moral revulsion,
however highly principled, can lead to a serious misunderstanding o f the
past. It could be said that war was the main activity in the West during
the early modern period. The sixteenth century, for example, enjoyed less
than ten years o f complete peace.18 O n the other hand, students and crit­
ics who try to work with military narrative often lack the necessary back­
ground. They may not know how to read maps or assess fortifications,
armor, and weapons, or they may read the past in light o f the present.
Often they try to interpret a story before they understand what they have
read. For these reasons I have tried to cover most aspects o f early modern
warfare in this book, including regular field battles (chapter 1), strategy
(chapter 2), sieges (chapter 4), guerrilla tactics (chapter 8), and the two
kinds o f naval war, involving galleys and sailing ships (chapter 9).
The following passage from the Arauco domado illustrates the need for
an informed reading o f military poetry. Pedro de Ona is here describing
the guns and shot that the viceroy, Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza, pro­
vided in 1594 for the flotilla he had put together to fight Richard
Hawkins’s Daintie, which had just appeared in the sea off Peru:

La maquina artillada file tan buena

Que deshiciera torres diamantinas:
Pedreros, esmeriles, culebrinas,
Con balas de navaja y de cadena;
El salitrado povo mas que arena.
(AD 18.97, P- 642)19
The artillery was so good that it could unmake towers o f adamant:
pedreros, esmerils, culverins with sharpened balls and chain shot, more
gunpowder than sand.
IO Introduction

A reader would probably wonder first whether O na in this octave gives

anything more than a list o f names. In an age o f nonstandardized equip­
ment people did not always use terms precisely, and o f course poets
tended to be even less precise than most.20 Ona himself had an academic
and legal training, rather than a military education.21 Yet other informa­
tion indicates that the reader should take the poet’s details seriously. He
came from a military family stationed on the Chilean frontier, a zone o f
permanent war, and lived there long enough to learn the local natives’
language.22 He certainly would have known about guns, and for his de­
scription o f the Hawkins affair he used the military report o f the incident,
provided by Balaguer de Salcedo (A D 18.48, p. 6z 6n). As a result, preci­
sion marks all aspects o f this episode in the Arauco domado, even to
phrases borrowed from Salcedo’s Relation, a precision not always evident
elsewhere in the poem.23
Precision characterizes the rest o f the information the poet gives us
concerning the little fleet. The two lead galleons shared sixty bronze guns,
and the poet specifies their maker, the “famous Tejeda.” 24 T h e third gal­
leon, the San Juan, had fourteen large pieces.25 Finally, each o f the three
packet boats or patajes had four versos in front (A D 18.69, 7 L PP- 632,
633). In such a narrative as this, then, we can trust the poet’s list o f guns
and shot and see what it tells us.
Ona specifies culverins, pedreros, esmerils, and versos. Culverins used
light iron shot, and the poet later shows us an old man pushing one across
the deck o f the second ship.26 T h e pedreros were short-barreled rock
throwers. The esmerils shot iron or lead balls and were also carried in the
patajes (fig. 7).27 Like the versos, which shot iron balls, they were small
pieces. For the shot O na specifies “ balas de navaja y de cadena.” 28 The
former were sharpened or pointed balls; the latter, two half-balls con­
nected by a small chain.
These specifics tell us two important things about the fleet. First o f all,
versos were obsolete by the late sixteenth century.29 One might expect the
colonies to use such weapons, but their presence also might reveal the
desperation felt over Hawkins’s arrival. His was the third English break
into the Pacific zone, an area as yet almost undefended.30 The viceroy
collected what he could, including old as well as new guns.
More significant, Ona mentions no really large guns. Esmerils were
intended to kill men, not to sink ships,31 and chain shot was designed to
sweep a deck. The armament presupposes the standard Spanish tactic
o f grapple and board— something Philip II specifically told the Armada
Figure 7. Drawings o f pedreros, culverins, and esmerils. Reprinted from Martin and
Parker, Spanish Armada, with the permission o f W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., and
Hamish Hamilton, Ltd. Copyright © 1988 by Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker.
12 Introduction

commanders to do32— and the Spaniards were still using this method as
late as 1639.33
As I argue in chapter 9, this tactical attitude had important conse­
quences for poetry and, in fact, made Ona’s narrative possible. If he had
shared Hawkins’s view o f naval fighting, he might not have written up the
battle at all. An old-style conflict like Lepanto produced much narrative
poetry; a new-style engagement like that o f the English with the Armada,
none.34 A list o f guns, thus, can tell us much and actually imply a sort o f
gunpowder poetics.
The core o f this book, chapters 6 and 7, treats the poets’ own reactions
to the Gunpowder Revolution. The improvement o f firearms led to a
crisis, which Ariosto signaled in the last version o f his Furioso— a crisis
made more intense by the movement into history. O f course, other fac­
tors also contributed to it. The Swiss, for example, won battles with in­
fantry, not cavalry, and by the time Ariosto wrote, something closer to
the modern army already existed, with infantry, artillery, and heavy and
light cavalry, all in their own units. The whole practice o f war had drifted
far from traditional narrative modes. The poets, however, focused on the
gun, which stood for all these changes by synecdoche. They understood
that they faced a crisis that called into question the future o f heroic narra­
tive as well as the heroic code such stories express. Some tried to accom­
modate the new warfare and worked out a “modernist” position, which
anticipated Charles Perrault by a century.35
I begin back in the period o f the Knights o f Rhodes, in the late fif­
teenth century, to show how traditional romance ignored or adapted to
the earlier stages o f the technological revolution. Poets like Luigi Pulci,
for example, could afford to ignore guns as they affected regular battles.
Handgunners fought like crossbowmen, and large guns, although they
were used, had not yet produced new tactics. Moreover, the Italians, un­
like the Swiss, still favored cavalry. I discuss this matter in chapter 1. More
dangerous was the (perhaps willful) ignorance writers showed o f the
modern Muslim enemy, who bore no resemblance to the Saracen warriors
commemorated in medieval romance. I analyze this blindness in chapter
3, where I discuss Matteo Maria Boiardo and the traditional view o f M us­
lim enemies in Western narratives. But quattrocento writers sometimes
tried to incorporate some aspects o f contemporary warfare. In chapter 2
I focus on Malory’s attempt to work out a new military strategy appro­
priate to his period and his realization that his romance sources resisted
modernization. In all these chapters, I also talk about history and the
written forms o f history.
 INTRODUCTION 13

I'll'TEEN TH - AN D S IX T E E N T H -C E N T U R Y WRITERS Were obsessed

with history, a literary preoccupation that both parallels and interacts
with their attempts to cope with the Gunpowder Revolution. A literary
change, for example, paralleled the shift from offense to defense in the
waging o f war, as the writers o f romance and epic switched from the fic­
tional use o f historical forms to something resembling actual history.
Malory and Boiardo assumed the role o f historians and spoke o f their
narratives as history, but Boiardo at least understood that he was compos­
ing fiction. The Iberian poets o f the later sixteenth century, however,
wrote something more like actual history. The poets o f Lepanto and Luiz
Vaz de Camoes chose the recent past, but Alonso de Ercilla and others
like Gaspar Perez de Villagra who imitated him, went further and com­
posed eyewitness history. Ercilla fought in the war he narrated, and histo­
rians as well as literary critics still study his Araucaria as a primary source.
I am pleased to draw attention to these Iberian poets in m y book and
to expand the canon normally studied by scholars o f comparative epic.36
The typical scholar travels north from Italy to England by way o f France,
bypassing Spain and Portugal. In this book I have attempted to remedy
this omission. I treat the changeover from the pretence o f history to the
use o f actual historical sources most explicitly in chapters 3—5, but this
theme runs throughout the book.37
W ith eyes on Italy, scholars have usually explained this transformation
generically, as a move from romance to epic. Such a thesis ignores two
central issues discussed in this book. The first concerns the Gunpowder
Revolution. To m y knowledge, critics so far have not recognized or ac­
knowledged that the two genres present different kinds o f war. The war­
rior in romance usually fights on horseback, while in classical epic Achil­
les and Aeneas chase their enemies about the field on foot.38 Romance I
thus fits the old cavalry battles o f the Middle Ages, while classical epic
better accommodates the new styles o f infantry fighting adopted by the j
English, Swiss, and Spanish. Tasso’s heroes, accordingly, do most o f their j
fighting on foot.
More telling for us, however, are the Iberian poets who composed he­
roic narratives o f colonial enterprise. They clearly show the military sig­
nificance behind this generic change. Spanish poets like Ercilla stuck to
the old romance form, imitating Ariosto not just in specific passages but |
in their chronological order, varied with inset stories. Ercilla could do so j
because the Spaniards, though they pioneered infantry tactics in Italy, |
continued to fight on horseback in America. The genre fit the style o f 1
fighting. Camoes, however, celebrating Portuguese achievements in the
 14 Introduction

Indian Ocean, opted for epic. The Portuguese troops there were mostly
naval and amphibious forces, who regularly fought on foot when they
had land battles, so once more the choice o f genre fit the mode o f combat.
O f course, it is unlikely that poets thought through the matter in the way
I have just described it. I speak o f a tendency and not a developed, self-
conscious theory o f generic choice.
The second issue concerns the poets’ long flirtation with history,
which the traditional or generic argument does not fully explain. Ercilla,
| who stayed within the old romance genre, was probably closer to the
‘ historical facts o f his story than either Tasso or Camoes, who opted for
classical epic. In this respect the change in military practice refines the
old theory and explains issues it does not cover. Heroic narrative and
modern warfare were diverging in the sixteenth century. Outside the Ibe­
rian colonies the old representations o f warfare by heavy cavalry no longer
related to current practice. The move to the classics helped forge a new
link with an audience trained in those same classics, and thus we find
classical formulas and echoes in Ercilla as well as in Camoes.
Aristotle’s Poetics, which spurred the revival o f classical epic around
mid-century, could theoretically have led poets in one o f two opposite
directions, since Aristotle located poetry between history and philosophy.
Nonetheless, both the poets who followed his theory and those who did
not looked toward history. Indeed, Aristotle’s famous ladder o f history,
poetry, and philosophy encouraged scholars o f Italian neoclassicism to
look for differences between these disciplines, to create dichotomies. In
the early 1960s Bernard Weinberg and Baxter Hathaway opposed fiction
and history,39 a dichotomy adopted by later critics who were not espe­
cially concerned with Aristotle, such as William Nelson and Ronald
Levao.40 The writers o f heroic poetry, however, moved in the opposite
direction and tended to blur the distinction between their own and his-
Itorical narratives.41 Rhetoric suggests a possible explanation for this
' trend. The Renaissance tended to conceive o f art rhetorically; theorists
spoke o f audience and worried about the relation between word and ob­
ject, narrative and fact. Tasso, the only writer who theorized the poets’
preference for history over philosophy, appealed to rhetoric and not to
poetics to explain the choice. Writers want to deceive readers with a
semblance o f truth, he said, a purpose they can best attain if they use
documents that readers can check.42 Here Tasso tacitly assumes that he
can no longer take his audience for granted. History makes the poet’s
stories plausible. To preserve heroic narrative the poet must establish a
bond with the audience, one taken from history. In fact, to continue to
 INTRODUCTION IS

exist heroic narrative underwent a radical change irrespective o f generic

choice. Both Tasso and Ercilla, who wrote no theory and preferred ro­
mance, adopted a historical approach.
The question o f history invites comparison between historical texts
and those of the poets, and at the same time it leads us back to the Gun­
powder Revolution. As the poets concentrated more and more on recent
or even contemporary history, they had to respond directly to military
developments. Juxtaposition is one o f the most effective and economical
ways to show this double issue o f the relation o f heroic poetry to war and
io history. In my analyses, therefore, I switch back and forth between
historical and poetic battles. W ith the Iberian poets the difference be- ]
i ween the two sometimes approaches the vanishing point, since they give :
us poetic versions o f real battles. Aristotle would probably have dismissed
eyewitness narrators like Ercilla and Villagra as historians, but he might
finally have passed the same judgment on Camoes and the Lepanto poets
as well.
If I were a N ew Historicist, such juxtapositions would contextualize a
literary work as one more product o f its historical culture. Following that
movement’s lead, Beverly Kennedy in her Knighthood in the “Morte
I kirthur” (1985) has tried to do this with Malory. Like her, I owe a pro-
limnd debt to the N ew Historicists, particularly to Stephen Greenblatt,
Richard Helgerson, and Frank Whigham. Thanks to their work, litera-
1u re departments for the first time in decades have become more tolerant
of historical work. I am really an “ Old Historicist,” however, since I still
privilege the poets and their compositions and worry about how they
struggled to accommodate or deny the new military reality and how they
thought their poetry related to history writing. This concern has led me
closer to the methods o f empirical history than to the anthropological
approaches favored by the New Historicists.431 not only juxtapose docu­
ments o f differing provenance or genres or disciplines, I also use historical
and legal documents to reconstruct a practice or a battle, or else I follow
historians who have already done so.
M y goal o f understanding the relation between a poetic and a real war
has involved much travel. I tried to visit the sites of the various battles,
fictional or real, and test my impressions against those given by the poet.
I have looked at many battlefields and at many towns and forts that were
once besieged, from the Levant to Chile. Occasionally my attempts
proved frustrating. The opportunity to visit Chile, for example, came
before I knew exactly which battles from the Araucana I would study. I
visited as many places in the old war zone as I could, but road repairs and
16 Introduction

time did not allow me to see Puren and Tucapel (Canete), and I was able
to determine the sites of two battles only long after my visit. Yet the trips
taught me much about the texts I was studying. Ariosto clearly describes
Paris, though he never visited the city, but Villagra, who wrote an eyewit­
ness account o f the killings at Acom a Pueblo, presents a town quite
different from the one the Indians rebuilt afterward and that tourists now
visit in N ew Mexico.
The preceding summary o f my argument involves considerable simpli­
fication. The chapters that follow provide the nuances and suggest the
complications. The move to history, for example, initially created many
problems, even though it ultimately helped heroic narrative to survive for
as long as it did. Poets now had to worry about verisimilitude, an issue
exacerbated by the imitation o f Roman poets like Virgil and Ovid, who
favored an illusionist realism in their descriptions. Verisimilitude as well
as the new warfare made Ariosto try to describe a Paris he had never seen,
a topic I explore in chapter 4. Later poets like Camoes and Tasso, who
worked directly with chronicles, had to decide how a poet should give an
artistic arrangement to such material. This is an issue I discuss in chap­
ter 5.
N o single explanation can rationalize a complex series o f changes.
Throughout this book I have argued a double, not single, hypothesis.
One involves the Gunpowder Revolution, while the other concerns the
poets’ fascination with written history and with history in the making.
Even a double hypothesis, however, oversimplifies reality. This investiga­
tion supplements other more strictly literary studies o f romance and epic;
it does not replace them.
Ultimately, the poets, like the Knights o f Rhodes, had to give up their
attempt. Neither effort can simply be dismissed as a failure. By their fe­
verish efforts to modernize the defenses o f Rhodes, the Knights won an­
other seventy years for themselves (1453-1523). Moreover, their heroic de­
fense in 1522 cost the Ottomans untold numbers o f soldiers44 and elicited
this praise from the young emperor Charles V : “Nothing in the world
was ever so well lost as Rhodes.” They won more than praise: Charles
gave them a new home to the west, the island o f Malta. W hen the
Knights left Rhodes on that wintry morning, they had in their ranks a
young Proven9al, Jean Parisot de la Valette, who lived to defeat Siileyman
in their new island home.45
Poets, responding to the same crisis— the new warfare— prolonged
the life o f heroic narrative for another century and made possible a kind
o f afterlife in the seventeenth century. Their efforts preserved not only a
 INTRODUCTION 17

*
kind o f story telling but the old chivalric code implied in it. Intense ethi-
i .il debate informed heroic poetry in the sixteenth century. Writers ar­
gued how or whether the new warfare fit the military code— a subject I
analyze in chapters 6 and 7 — and whether ethical limits existed for vio­
lence committed in wartime, the topic o f chapters 10 and n . A s so often
happens in such circumstances, continuity masked an important change.
I’oets shifted their emphasis from the individualistic, rampaging heroes
ol medieval romance to officers or to a group seen as a heroic unit, an
issue I explore in chapters 8 and 9. This development anticipates the way
we conceive o f war today.
Ily the end o f the sixteenth century signs o f surrender were clear. The
laiglish tradition, from Spenser to Milton, reveals this situation, as its
writers developed what one might call the peaceful epic. Although prece­
dents could be found in Ovid or in some medieval Arthurian romances,
such works were something o f an anomaly. This was in no way an ethical
evolution away from the militarism o f the Western past. Instead, the
transformation signaled the death o f the genre, as Milton indicates in the
Proem to book 9 o f Paradise Lost {27—31), saying that he was

Not sedulous by Nature to indite

Wars, hitherto the only Argument
Heroic deem’d, chief maistry to dissect
With long and tedious havoc fabl’d Knights
In Battles feign’d . . .

Such an attitude requires a new genre altogether, and in fact the novel
soon replaced the epic as the major narrative mode in the West. I consider
die beginnings o f this new development in chapter 12, but I do not go
l it into the seventeenth century.
xis P A R T O N E (Six

War
without
the
Gun
The Romance Tradition
 -----O N E -----

The Tactics of Roncesvalles

Luigi Pulci

IN T H E S E C O N D H A L F OF T H E FIFTEENTH CENTURY CHIVAL-

i ic romance determined the literary representations o f war, just as it had
lor the whole later Middle Ages. Five authors, writing in three languages,
illustrate this point: Luigi Pulci and Matteo Maria Boiardo in Italy, Sir
Thomas Malory in England, and Joanot Martorell and Marti Joan de
( ialba on the Catalan-speaking coast o f Aragon. Taken together, these
live writers offer a reasonably complete picture o f the kind o f warfare that
romances normally presented. In part i o f this book I discuss romance
military tactics and strategy, and the writers’ conception o f the men who
did the fighting. I begin with tactics, since field encounters posed the
most severe test o f skill for both commander and writer. The poet had to
create a plausible narrative for a battle, that most complicated o f military
actions, involving simultaneous movements o f masses o f troops and re­
quiring a chain o f command. For this purpose I have chosen to focus
upon Pulci, since the poet devotes several cantari, or cantos, o f his M or-
gante to the battle o f Roncesvalles, which he describes in detail, including
an elaborate tactical plan for the Saracen attack. His narrative also most
clearly attests to the longevity o f the romance tradition.
In Morgante Pulci reworked two fairly recent texts, the Spagna in rima
and the Rotta di Roncisvalle, but these two in turn had reworked the En­
tree dEspagne, itself a rifacimento o f the Chanson de Roland.1 If one juxta­
poses the poems at either end o f this line, the Roland and the Morgante,
one can easily see that the essentials o f the story did not change through
all the intermediate versions. That a story composed about noo, re­
counting an event o f the eighth century, could be redone without major
changes in the late fifteenth century shows the continued viability o f tra­
ditional vernacular forms.2 T h e same observation applies to the authors
22 War w ithout the Gun

who used Arthurian romance, though the time span is shorter. Malory
abbreviated texts o f the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.3 Boiardo
mixed Arthurian and Carolingian materials. The battle narratives in both
Malory and Boiardo resemble Pulci’s because Arthurian romance origi­
nally modeled its military sequences on those in the chansons de geste.
They all go back to the same sources, the oldest o f which is the Chanson
de Roland. In m y discussion o f the Morgante and o f these related texts, I
emphasize continuity, Pulci’s debt to traditional methods, and the impact
o f contemporary warfare upon his narrative.
Pulci may or may not have had direct experience o f war, but he cer­
tainly completed the last five cantari, or cantos, o f the Morgante in war­
time. His employer, the condottiere Roberto da San Severino, served
against the poet’s native Florence during the War o f the Pazzi Conspiracy,
leading raids out o f Serazzano during the winter and spring o f 1479. That
August and September San Severino helped Ludovico Sforza capture M i­
lan and take power there, and he then went into Venetian service, fighting
in the Ferrara War (1482-84).4 Pulci published the final version o f the
Morgante, including the new cantari, in 1483, the same year that Boiardo
(whose patron, the condottiere Ercole d’Este, fought as San Severino’s
opponent in both wars) came out with the first two parts o f his Orlando
innamorato,5 Both poets were connected with the same set o f wars.
Four condottieri tracts illustrate the tactical thinking o f the command­
ers involved in these wars and thus help us to see how romance battles
relate to contemporary warfare. Chiereghino Chiericati published his
“Trattatello della milizia” in 1471 and dedicated it to Cardinal Orsini.6 A
professional soldier, Chiericati had recently served as “revisore generale,”
or military inspector, for the papacy (1465—71).7 Pulci’s patron San Sev­
erino had himself collaborated with other captains over the Christmas
holidays o f 1472—73 to produce the bulk o f the documents that Filippo
degli Eustachi compiled for Galeazzo Maria Sforza in Milan and called
the “ Ordine dell’ esercito ducale. ”8 Sforza had asked the captains to esti­
mate the size and kind o f army needed for a possible war with Venice,
now distracted by the Long War against the Ottoman Empire. Soon after,
on 2 January 1477, Orso degli Orsini completed the “ Governo et exercitio
de la militia” for King Ferrante in Naples, who then sent him as an adviser
to Alfonso, duke o f Calabria, who commanded the troops o f the Regno
during the Pazzi War.9 Finally, in 1478 and 1479 Diomede Carafa sent
two memorials to Alfonso that were intended to guide his conduct for
the same war.10 Together these treatises represent the views o f an older
generation o f condottieri, who still controlled the conduct o f war.11 They
 THE TACTICS OF RONCESVALLES 13

adhered to the Sforza school o f military theory, then dominant in the

peninsula12 and as yet unaffected by contemporary developments in the
north.13

T H E SA R A C E N PLA N FO R R O N CESV A LLES

( iano (Ganelon) sets the tactics for Roncesvalles { M 25.102-7). He would

have the Spanish Saracen army attack in three waves, on an ascending
scale: the vanguard with 100,000, the second group with 200,000, the
third with 300,000. He assumes that the French rear guard will repel the
first two attacks but fail before the third. Thus, the Saracens will first tire
out their enemies and then overwhelm them. The Saracen king, Marsilio,
carefully follows these instructions with a twist that fits Gano’s intention
(M 25.175-80). He surrounds the valley, intending to annihilate the
French (A f 26.72). All this corresponds to the arrangements in the Chan­
son de Roland. There Guenes (Ganelon) again wants 100,000 men to de­
liver the first attack, but he thinks the second group will guarantee Ro­
land’s death {Chanson de Roland, 4 4 ).14 O n the battlefield, as in Pulci, the
Saracens actually come in three groups {Chanson de Roland, 9 3 ,113 ,14 3 ).
The two poems thus present the same tactics.
Both poets assume a series o f wave attacks, delivered by battles. In the
later Middle Ages the term designated a continuous shallow line o f cav­
alry, three or four ranks deep, which charged in close order but normally
engaged section by section, often starting at the right.15 Pulci translates
1lie term by schiera.16 Malory has batayle {Morte, 1.14), and Martorell and
( ialba in their Catalan romance Tirant lo blanc use batalla ( Tirant,
187.1031). The continuity in terms reflects a continuity in tactical
thinking.
Condottieri thinking uses a sophisticated form o f medieval tactics; it
did not envisage a new order o f things.17 The Sforza school in some re­
spects stood closer than that o f Braccio da Montone18 to these medieval
modes, with its emphasis on large masses, used cautiously— a characteris-
t ic o f Gano s plans in both poems. Like Gano the Sforzeschi worked with
prearranged battle plans. Carafa, for example, provides Duke Alfonso
with a detailed blueprint, for use i f a battle— as opposed to skirmishes—
should occur during the Pazzi War.19 He assumes a straight frontal clash,
as does Gano. The wings protect the center but have no autonomous
function, no massive maneuvers. Carafa similarly limits the reserve to
reinforcement o f the front ranks. The battle o f Fornovo (1495) well illus-
1 rates this approach. Philippe de Commynes, who was an eyewitness,
 War w ithout the Gun

complained that the Italians fought squadron after squadron and that, as
a result, the fighting could continue all day with neither side winning.20
A n y Italian who read Pulci would have understood Gano s arrangements
for Roncesvalles because contemporary commanders thought in a similar,
if more complex, way.
The other romancers likewise assume wave tactics. Such tactics charac­
terize every engagement in Boiardos Orlando innamorato, and the ar­
rangements are often elaborate. A t Barcelona, for example, both sides
prepare six battles (O /1.4 .27—35).21 In 7 mr«rGalba imagines a still larger
series for Caramen, the last battle o f his African war. The Christians have
seven battles, the Moslems, nine (384.1025-387.1034).22 Malory, when he
describes an engagement, likewise has waves o f cavalry clash in succes­
sion. A t Bedgrayne the French ambush comes in the standard three
battles (Morte, 1.15-16 ).23 T h e number o f battles varies from writer to
writer, but the tactical thinking remains the same.
The historian Francesco Guicciardini, discussing the battle o f For-
novo, revealed the logic behind these tactics. A commander tried to wear
down the enemy, reinforcing his fighting groups only as they tired and
massing them at the end for a final blow. T h e side that still had fresh
troops won. This assumption governed the thinking o f both condottieri
schools. Montone, for example, divided his men into small companies
for the battle o f San Egidio (1416) and committed them piecemeal, using
a rotation system. Soldiers would fight hard for a brief interval and then
fall back. Since it was a hot day, Montone kept water barrels behind the
lines. After he had worn down the army o f Carlo Malatesta and saw it
becoming somewhat disorganized, he threw in the reserves and routed
his opponent.24
The romancers imagined similar situations. In the Morgante the Sara­
cens oppose their main army to the French rear guard. Gano would have
them attack in three ascending waves, because the French would have to
commit all they had at once. Tired by a battle growing increasingly un­
equal, the French should collapse at the third wave. In the two battles
with Gradasso, Boiardo has the French side break through all the ranks
o f the enemy but the last, where the pagan king has his own troops.25
This reserve then sweeps back the French (O I 1.4.38-5.8, 6.62—7.36). In
Malory’s work Merlin achieves the same result for Bedgrayne, when he
conceals the French allies in a wood. T h ey enter battle only after the
troops o f Arthur and the northern kings have worn each other down.
T h e opposing commander, King Lot, meanwhile, tries to initiate a pla­
toon system, somewhat like the one Braccio da Montone used for San
 THE TACTICS OF RONCESVALLES 25

Kgidio (Morte, 1.15-16 ).26 Plans vary in detail, but their objectives do
not change.
In such engagements the king normally commanded the last battle.
Marsilio leads the third, or the reserves, in the Morgante. Boiardo simi­
larly has Gradasso preside over the last rank o f horsemen at Barcelona
and Paris.27 This positioning fit some contemporary practice. Carafa
would have the general stand above his men, as eagles do above their prey.
The men would then perform well because they would know that their
commander was watching them.28 Pulci’s Marsilio indeed watches Ron-
cesvalles from a high mountain (M 26.72). Robert de Balsac in La nefdes
princes et des batailles de noblesse (1502) recommended much the same.
The commander should sit on horseback with his advisers so that he can
see everything. The French, in fact, tried not to risk their king or prince
after Poitiers, so he did not appear with the first battle.29 Again, romance
narrative and military practice coincide.

T H E B A T T L E IT S E L F

Caught off guard by the Saracen surprise attack, Orlando orders a seem­
ing anarchy for the French (M 26.50). He tells everyone to act on their
own, saying that they are all accomplished knights. He counts on his
veteran troops knowing what to do— and condottieri mercenaries cer­
tainly did, since they stayed together over long periods o f time. The
French government had an equivalent situation, once Charles V II insti­
tuted the nucleus o f a standing army with his Ordonnance Companies
(1439, 1445).30 Pulci knew about this innovation and used its technical
terminology. A t Paris Orlando summons the “franchi arcier” (M 24.55),
or crossbowmen who served in the Ordonnance Companies. In his “ G o-
verno” Orsini argued in favor o f a similar institution for Naples, claiming
that a good small army serves the state more effectively than masses raised
suddenly during a crisis.31 Pulci’s Roncesvalles would illustrate his thesis,
since the tiny veteran French rear guard repels the attacks o f a huge
enemy host.
Orlando follows his own advice. He does not try to direct the battle
but fights in front, enacting an older and competing theory o f the com­
mander, whose example animates his men. In the earlier battle o f Saint-
Denis, in fact, his action turned around the fighting. Carlo had fallen,
and the pagan Sicumoro had seized the royal standard. Warned by
Baldwin, Orlando charged. He cut o ff Sicumoro s hand, which held the
26 War w ithout the Gun

banner, and the Saracens fell back. Then Orlando found horses for Carlo
and other paladins, and soon the Saracens began to flee {M 24.133-44).
This scenario presupposes the older medieval situation that underlay
the chansons de geste and romances. A medieval army was a grouping of
soldiers o f diverse training, so it could not execute complex and coordi­
nated tactics.32 Nervous and unequal troops like these could easily swing
between enthusiastic attack and panic.33 The warriors looked to their
leaders and responded accordingly. A t Bouvines (1214), where the rulers
on both sides fought, the French won, in part because Emperor Otto and
his ally, the duke o f Brabant, fled.34 The romances present similar cases.
The Suite du M erlin, a direct source for Malory, has King Lot animate
the men o f Orkney, fighting Arthur. Once Pellinor kills Lot, Lot’s men
flee at a gallop and are slaughtered on the road or captured by the En­
glish.35 Just as a leader’s death could sow panic, his prowess and courage
could win battles; individuals who showed those characteristics could
gain the right to lead men.36
Fifteenth-century romancers kept alive this idea o f the leader. Malory
might be expected to do so because he abbreviates older material. In the
civil war the English army looks to Gawain and their opponents to
Lancelot. A t Joyous Garde Lancelot’s men claim that he does not fight
hard enough (Morte, 20.13). On the second day he exerts himself, and
they win. W hen Gawain is wounded at Benwick, the English lose confi­
dence {Morte, 20.22). M alory has Merlin explain to a bedridden Uther,
“ [Y]e may not lye so as ye doo, for ye must to the feld, though ye ryde
on an hors-lyttar. For ye shall never have the better o f your enemyes but
y f your persone be there, and thenne shall ye have the vyctory” {Morte,
1.3-5). Uther goes, and his army wins a great victory at St. Albans.37 Mart-
orell and Galba stress the same point for their invented romance. Tirant
regularly leads the fighting, and his men win only when he is present. In
one action the Greek emperor is assaulting a town ( Tirant, 161.504, 50 8-
9). The Saracens knock down Tirant’s ladder, but he merely gets another,
explaining to the emperor that he encourages his troops by such deeds.
And at the next assault the town falls.
Even seasoned troops need leaders to follow. It was the better trained
armies o f the fifteenth century and not the medieval levy that provoked
Machiavelli s sarcastic remark that the turning o f a horse’s head or rump
meant victory or defeat.38 Carafa accordingly wants his officers to set an
example (first “Memoriale,” 2.182). They must go first in their units, so
that their actions can substitute for commands and their valor can win a
battle (second “Memoriale,” 3.20 2-3, 5.205). Carafa develops a compro-
 THE TACTICS OF RONCESVALLES 27

Ml Ur Ihi ween the two conceptions o f the leader, Pulci s Marsilio directing
hvimiin liom his hilltop and Orlando fighting out in front. He would have
lll«> king or general adopt Marsilios role and would assign Orlandos part
•11 Niihordinate officers. A t Pulci’s Roncesvalles, Orlando is just such
HI 1 olliicr, presiding over the rear guard while Carlo holds supreme
[Link].
A 1 ommander who fights in the front rank cannot direct tactics, nor
ill irn ( hlando try. His approach, however, and not the plan o f Gano and
Mmsilin, determines the fighting.39 A series o f duels heralds both stages
ill (hr conflict, as the Saracens commit their battles, the second two at
• li«* Mi n e time. In the melee that follows each set o f duels, Pulci describes
only 1 he actions o f the leaders and principal knights, so the whole battle
w in s an affair o f individual encounters, much like a tournament. Pulci
emphasizes the initial duels: Orlando himself climaxes the first series,
when he kills Falserone (A /26.64—72). The Saracen wanted to avenge his
Non I'crrau, though he had publicly made peace with Orlando over the
Umic. Seeing Orlando come, Falserone loses heart and prays to his god.
i hlando calls him traitor and then kills him with a lance thrust through
shield, mail shirt, and breast. N ot realizing he has killed his enemy, who
still sits on his horse, Orlando taunts him and, o f course, gets no re­
sponse. He then touches Falserone with his sword, and the body o f the
[Link] falls to the ground. Orlando’s men, however, find nothing inside
the armor: his corpse has disappeared. Such duels form little vignettes,
made memorable here by the demonic marvelous and always by concrete
details (for example, Pulci informs us that Falserone’s shield is made of
the bone o f a certain fish).
All this fits the pattern set initially by the Chanson de Roland, which
ritualized the process. Before the battle twelve Saracens vow to kill Ro­
land, and they meet the twelve peers in the opening duels. Roland begins,
killing Aelroth, a nephew o f Marsilie, with a thrust through the breast
that simultaneously overturns and kills his horse ( Chanson de Roland, 69—
70, 93). Like his counterpart in Pulci, Roland follows his victory with a
vaunt, a variant o f his famous claim that Christians are right and pagans
wrong. The French poet stresses the ritual character o f these duels by
keeping the same order in a double series, the first when the pagan cham­
pions make their vows (69-78), and the second when they come to joust
(93-103). Duels likewise initiate the second wave o f fighting and signal
an increasing difficulty for the Franks. In the first round the peers killed
eleven o f the twelve Saracen champions. N ow a Saracen kills a Frank
before he dies (112—24). The whole is an affair between heroes. In this
28 War w ithout the G un

sense Pulci, though he did not follow a ritual mode o f presentation, re­
mained true to the spirit o f the Chanson.
The other quattrocento romancers kept the same formula but some­
times stressed different stages o f the combat. For Bedgrayne Malory pre­
ferred the melee, when waves o f cavalry swirl about after the initial duels.
Malory’s narrative follows the leaders, who want to unhorse the enemy
and get their friends on horseback again. First the northerners must re­
mount their kings, then it is Arthur’s coterie (Morte, 1.14-15). In contrast,
Boiardo emphasized the end o f every wave. The Spanish phase o f M on-
tealbano concludes with five combats: Carlo and Marsilio, Ogier and Ser-
pentino, Oliviero and Grandonio, Orlando and Rodamonte, Ranaldo
and Feraguto ( 0 1 2.25.2). T h e African eruption then sets up a new series
(2.30.52—54). Wherever the stress falls, the manner does not change. All
the romancers resolve battles into duels between leaders and heroes.
Battles generate the same descriptive pattern whether someone plans
them or not. So far I have discussed conflicts where leaders had time to
prepare and arrange their army, but Malory includes for his Roman wars
three clashes that occur suddenly, with no or little planning, and yet fol­
low the same pattern. The battle o f the Embassy provides an example
(Morte, 5.6).40 Gawain, who leads an embassy to Emperor Lucius, resents
a remark made by a certain Gaius and beheads him. The ambassadors
flee, pursued by Roman foot and horse troops. Duels start the skirmish,
as Bors kills a knight in gold who left his companions behind and then a
knight in purple who overturned many knights. Meanwhile Gawain cuts
down Felderake, who wanted to avenge Gaius. The Romans try to re­
treat, but Gawain has an ambush ready, the only plan made by anyone
before the skirmish. Eventually more troops coming from the Roman
camp capture Bors and Borel, but then Idres, Yvain’s son, shows up with
500 men. Gawain and Idres rescue the prisoners, and the English manage
to reach their own camp, keeping all their prisoners. Everything in this
engagement is improvised except the ambush, but the pattern holds: ini­
tial duels followed by a melee in which knights kill or capture each other.
In this respect battles follow the same pattern, planned or not.
This descriptive procedure both fits and has helped to create the mod­
ern notion of medieval warfare. Piero Pieri, for example, describes real
engagements succinctly. Armies in two or three groups charge each other
successively, the first wave against the first, the second against the second.
The cavalry attack fractions at contact, some knights ahead, others be­
hind. Or as one historian put it, “the battle was a collection o f individual
combats in which the commander o f the army participated as a simple
 THE TACTICS OF RONCESVALLES 29

1 ombatant.” Philippe Contamine tries to modify this view but must

.illnw that it accurately characterizes many a battle.41 These analyses re­
semble my characterization o f romance representations o f battle, which
either indicates how close romance was to reality in the high Middle Ages
or, more likely, shows that romance narrative technique affected the his­
torical records. In any case, the two corresponded closely during the gen­
erative period o f the chanson de geste and romance.

R O M A N C E A N D C O N T E M P O R A R Y W ARFARE

Parallels

Many readers and critics forget that although the Franks lost the real
battle o f Roncesvalles, they won the Active versions. Pulci’s Orlando turns
the tide o f the conflict when he finally blows his horn (M 27.6 9 -72 ). The
sound causes the enemy to panic.42 Marsilio, Bianciardin, and Balugante
Ilee immediately, and the Franks slaughter the masses as they try to follow
1heir leaders (M 2 7 .7 3-7 6 , 81-94). In the Chanson de Roland the pagan
collapse occurs in two stages. W hen Roland reaches Marsilie, cutting off
his right hand and killing his son, Jurfaleu the Blond, the main army
llees, leaving behind the Algalife and his blacks to eliminate the few sur­
viving Franks ( Chanson de Roland, 14 2-4 4 ). The arrival o f Charlemagne
chases off these Saracens, most o f whom drown in the River Sebre (180).
In either version the French win a technical victory because they occupy
1 he battlefield afterward. This scenario illustrates a major point in medi­
eval and condottieri tactics, the assumption that the attacker will lose.
I''tench experience in the Hundred Years War provides the historical ana­
logue: at Crecy, Poitiers, and Agincourt, the French attacked.43
The would-be victor in a battle had to lure the enemy into making an
attack. Carafa says that it is better to have the enemy come and find you.
Fieri interprets this advice to mean that the commander should begin
with light troops to draw the enemy into an unfavorable position and
then commit his main force.44 Tirant provides an exact equivalent
(157.485—87). A t Malvei Tirant uses a cavalry screen to draw the Saracens
into a charge. Once their pursuit has lost formation and the cavalry has
left the infantry behind, Tirant has his horse wheel about and attack.45
Agincourt illustrates the historical basis for such thinking. The English
took up a defensive position, making a narrow front on land made slip­
pery by fall rains. Tall stakes protected the archers, whom Henry V pro­
jected forward on the flanks o f his three battles. Yet to provoke the French
30 War w ithout the Gun

attack, Henry had to advance, putting his archers in an unprotected posi­

tion.46 A t the same time the French commander, Constable d’Albret,
would have found it difficult not to attack, since the odds favored him at
three or four to one.47 The English victory despite these odds explains
w hy Carafa prefers defensive tactics.
Such thinking does not encourage battle, and there were but two regu­
lar field engagements in the Pazzi War. Prudence ruled the military manu­
als. The “ Ordine” advises Duke Galeazzo Maria always to choose the
more secure alternative in dubious matters.48 Carafa gives the most ex­
treme expression o f this approach. He tells the duke o f Calabria never to
offer or accept battle unless he has all the advantages in the world.49
Commanders wished to avoid battle for two reasons, both o f which
Roncesvalles illustrates. They did not wish to risk so many lives, and they
wanted to avoid the political consequences o f a defeat. Machiavelli’s fa­
mous remark that the condottieri fought battles without deaths seems to
contradict the first reason, since commanders need not have feared heavy
losses in a field engagement.50 Two facts, however, qualify Machiavelli’s
generalization. First, his remark applies only to intra-Italian conflicts.
W hen outsiders were involved, casualty rates rose. Thus, at Genoa in 1461
the French lost 2,500 o f 6,000 knights when they attacked a prepared
position.51 Second, gunpowder caused the death ratio to rise in the fif­
teenth century. For example, Pieri argues that the Pazzi War was bloody.52
High casualty figures mark especially the conflicts between Christian
and Muslim, and Roncesvalles is just such a battle. After the battle Pulci’s
Carlo looks at the dead knights, piled one on top o f the other, some
under horses, others overturned in muddy ditches. He sees so many bod­
ies cut to pieces or mutilated, so many intestines or brains outside that
the bodies seem splinters and stumps. Shields and broken lances cover
the bloody ground; round about are scorched trees and rocks dripping
blood (M 27.198—200). Pulci’s recurring epithet is bloody Roncesvalles.53
A t the end Orlandos squire finds himself stuck in blood, kicking about
like a cooking lamprey {M 27.99).
The Chanson de Roland indicates the reason for the high number of
casualties in interfaith conflicts. After the capture o f Zaragoza Charle­
magne sends 1,000 Franks through its streets to the synagogues and
mosques. Pagans must either accept baptism or die by hanging, burning,
and slaughtering ( Chanson de Roland, 266). Similarly, we learn that earlier
the population o f Cordres were told they must either convert or die
( Chanson de Roland, 8). The other romancers show the same lack of
mercy. In the battle o f Sessoyne Malory, who turns Romans into Sara-
 THE TACTICS OF RONCESVALLES 31

V piix, lux Arthur, angry over Sir Kay’s injury, order that his knights take
Ho piisoners.54 The Roman Saracens lose 100,000 slain (Morte, 5.8). In
I Hum 1he Christians capture a fleet o f sleeping Saracens, who surrender
bill iirr beheaded anyway ( Tirant, 418.1091-92).
Keality supports the romancers. At Negroponte (1470) the victorious
I Inks enslaved the Greeks but killed the Italians. They sawed in half those
who surrendered, including Paolo Erizzo, who had been guaranteed his
|iPitd.v' Christians and Muslims both valued mercy, but they did not of­
ten extend it to enemies outside their own religion.
In all battles the loser could expect to sustain many more casualties
than the victor. Contamine observes that the defeated generally lost 2 0 -
Ui percent o f the army.56 A t Poitiers (1356) and Agincourt (1415), the
I'i f licit lost 40 percent o f their cavalry, while the English in the latter
hat lie lost only 100 out o f around 10,000 men, or 1 percent. During the
Wars o f the Roses the victors generally killed all defeated knights.57 Ron-
1 esvalles falls into line with these examples. In the Chanson de Roland
only 20,000 survive o f 400,000 Saracens ( Chanson de Roland, 68, 187),
the same number as the whole French rear guard (41—42, 63). Pulci gives
no figures but has Carlo destroy the Saracen survivors on the third day
aller the battle, so the Saracens lose virtually their whole army. The other
k nuances provide analogies. In Tirant the Saracens at Malvei lose
101,700, and their dead make the road to the next town impassable ( 77-
rant, 159.497-99). The Christians have only 1,234 casualties.
Such figures suggest the political risks involved in a battle. The
1 ondottieri theorists assumed that the state could gamble its existence on
a single battle. Orsini, for example, argues that the army is the basis o f
die state, so a defeated army is a ruined state.58 Carafa tacitly understands
that a major military defeat would cause a revolt.59 Both theorists had
experience in Naples and had fought through one o f its many wars o f
succession (1460—62). They knew the insecurity o f its central government
in relation to the barons. Other states, though better organized, had rul­
ers who lacked tradition and legitimacy, like the Medici in Florence and
the Sforza in Milan, The condottieri rightly argued, therefore, that a ruler
or his commander ought to avoid the hazards o f battle.
Roncesvalles again bears out this thinking. The Chanson de Roland em­
phasizes its dangers for the French; the Morgante, its results for the Span­
ish Saracens. T h e Guenes o f the Chanson argues that Charlemagne, los­
ing Roland, loses his right arm (Chanson de Roland, 4 4 -4 5) and will never
collect such an army again. T h e Chanson constantly associates 20,000
men with Roland. These knights follow the leader who favors continued
3* War w ithout the G un

war (Chanson de Roland, 14, 4 1-4 2 ) and fight at Roncesvalles (63-64).

T h ey make up Charlemagne’s strike force, which Marsilie annihilates.
Pulci shows the price Marsilio pays. Having lost his army, he has nothing
left to defend Zaragoza, nor will any o f the other peninsular powers,
shocked at his treason, support him {M 27.237). For Roncesvalles Mar­
silio pays with his capital, his kingdom, and ultimately with his life.60

O ld Disjunctions

Although romance reflects current military practice in many matters, it

also keeps a certain distance from that practice. Some o f the disjunctions
between romance and reality are traditional, and some are new. Among
the traditional differences are the romancers’ use of hyperbole and the
aristocratic viewpoint.
Hyperbole in the romances concerns both time and numbers. At
Roncesvalles noon has passed before Orlando sounds his horn, and Carlo
must ask God to stop the sun so that he can reach the battlefield that
same day (M 2 7 .17 1-7 4 ). In the Chanson de Roland the sun stops so Char­
lemagne can finish the battle (Chanson de Roland, 180). In contrast the
real engagement there probably was quite short;61 most cavalry battles
took only one to three hours.62 The poets lengthen the time to indicate
the importance o f the event. The battle o f Salisbury, which destroys A r­
thur’s chivalry, lasts all day (Morte, 21.4). Such a long battle was uncom­
mon, but it could occur. I noted earlier Commynes’s complaint that con-
dottieri armies could fight indecisively all day. Galba, in his part of
Tirant, stretches even these possibilities. The battles that turn the tide o f
the African war precede and follow a truce. Five days o f fighting precede
it, the first lasting from dawn to dusk ( Tirant, 339.938-340.944). A two-
day battle follows the truce, both fights lasting most o f the day ( Tirant,
343.949-349.964).
Hyperbole strains temporal probability, but when applied to the size
o f armies, it far exceeds any possibility. The romancers especially exagger­
ate the size o f Saracen armies (see chapter 3), but even the much lower
totals for Christian armies are excessive. The French rear guard at Ronces­
valles numbers 20,000 in both the Chanson de Roland (41-42, 6 3-64) and
the Morgante (27.78). This total equals Orsini’s suggested number for the
whole Neapolitan army.63 Milan under Galeazzo Maria projected a giant
army by Italian standards— 43,000 men— yet Carlo’s main army at Paris
numbers more than twice as many (100,000).64 N o French army ever
reached anywhere near this size in the Middle Ages, and in any case a
round number like 100,000 inspires skepticism. Mordred brings 100,000
 THE TACTICS OF RONCESVALLES 33

In Salisbury Field (Morte, 21.3), and 100,000 die there (21.4, 8). One sus­
pects that the repeated round number merely means “many.” Pulci him-
sell throws doubt on his statistics (A f 27.76,113). Tirant, as usual, exceeds
even these numbers. The tiny Greek Empire, fighting Turks near C on ­
stantinople, is said to have 60,000 soldiers on the frontier, 80,000 in the
1 ity, and 25,000 on its ships ( Tirant, 123.327). Time and size both grow
witli the tactical importance o f a battle and can reach beyond the medi­
eval and early modern imagination in the poet’s attempt to convey the
1 ragedy o f a Salisbury or a Roncesvalles.
Although one cannot construe them literally, hyperbolic numbers do
have meaning. As we have seen, they can indicate the importance o f a
battle. Sometimes they are used to convey a sense o f odds. A t Bedgrayne
the army o f the northern kings outnumbers Arthurs two to one {Morte,
1.11—12). We might expect a greater disproportion at Roncesvalles, where
the Saracen main army attacks the French rear guard, but odds o f twenty
to one {Chanson de Roland, 43, 55, 68) and thirty to one { M 27.78) clearly
exceed the possible, at least when we recall that the Franks won the battle,
lb take a more modern example, Davout’s brilliant action at Auerstadt
in 1807, where a French advance guard defeated the bulk o f a retreating
Prussian army, had odds o f less than one to three.65 The exaggerated
numbers o f Roncesvalles communicate rather the emotional sense o f the
battle, the feeling that the enemy had far too many men, the sense that
prompted Oliver to ask Roland to blow his horn.
As customary as the poets’ use o f hyperbole is their portrayal o f events
dirough an aristocratic bias that controls what we see o f these battles.
With the exception o f Orlando’s squire, Pulci shows us only men-at-arms,
lighting on horseback.66 He mentions no bowmen or infantrymen o f any
kind, though such fighters were rarely absent from battles, whether in the
quattrocento or in earlier periods.67 The poet inherited this bias from his
sources. The Chanson de Roland likewise ignores all but knights.68 Yet
ibis aristocratic mode bore a different relation to military practice in the
quattrocento than in the twelfth century. To properly appraise Pulci’s de­
scriptive technique, we must see precisely what he excludes from his ac­
count.
The man-at-arms in the fifteenth century never fought alone but func-
1ioned as the officer o f a lance or platoon. His heavy armor caused him
to have to change mounts frequently, so he needed extra horses as well as
attendants, some o f whom participated in the fighting.69 The number o f
attendants per man-at-arms rose gradually during the quattrocento. Or-
sini assumes that a man-at-arms needs three horses, so he also has two
 34 War w ithout the Gun

servants or a servant and a boy. The man-at-arms and the servant both
have a crossbow and ride horseback, while the boy looks after the supply
wagon, where he keeps his own crossbow.70 Orsini thus assumes earlier
practice, when a lance included three persons: a capo-lancia, or man-at-
arms, a page, and a piatto, or boy.71 Orsini does not include a squire, who
reappears, however, once the lance reaches four, as it did in Florence at
least by 1483.72 Pulci reflects this stage when he assigns the squire, Terigi,
to Orlando, but in fact the lance had already reached six in Milan, as it
had long since done in France.73
A t times, amid all the individual heroics, Pulci lets us glimpse this late
medieval knight, the commander o f a lance. Orlando in particular has an
entourage and moves with a group. Normally his companions are other
heroes like Anselmo (M 26.76, 134) or Sansonetto (26.134), but some­
times the poet mentions Terigi, who functions as synecdoche for the rest
o f the lance. Normally Terigi fights, following his lord through the press,
“stinging” in his relief (26.134), but he also performs other services.74 He
takes Sansonetto’s corpse to Orlandos pavilion ( M 27.16) and carries the
news o f the battle to Carlo (2 7 .16 0 ,177-8 5).75
Just as Terigi stands for the other subordinates in a lance, it is logical
to see in Orlando, who commands the group, the symbol o f its deeds.
Vico made just such an analysis, talking o f the Homeric heroes but draw­
ing parallels to Norman crusaders. The socii or plebs defend their lord but
give him the glory, so an Ajax or Orlando masks the exploits o f his house
or in this case o f a lance.76
This narrative mode o f aristocratic bias possesses a certain justice be­
yond the rhetorical rationale usually assigned to it.77 Other soldiers,
shooters o f various kinds and infantry, still lacked an independent exis­
tence. Orsini, for example, mixes the infantry with the lances. His col­
umns combine men-at-arms, crossbowmen, and foot soldiers.78 Carafa’s
armies ride, they do not march, even though they included many infan­
trymen.79 The romancers found it more efficient to narrate the deeds o f
the men-at-arms, since their actions automatically involved those o f
others and ultimately the deeds o f the whole army.

New Disjunctions

In addition to the disjunctions traditional to romance, two other depar­

tures from actual practice set the Morgante securely in its fifteenth-
century context. The first, which Pulci himself discusses, concerns forti­
fied camps. The second, which Pulci never mentions, has deeper implica-
 THE TACTICS OF RONCESVALLES 35

Him* i lie Iact that condottieri armies fought in a coordinated fashion and
HIM in llir old manner through individual duels.
Ai U. •iicesvalles Orlando allows the men o f his old brigade to scatter
tltPliitrlves as they camp (M 25.181—82). The old Burgundian Guotti-
liliolli says that they should set up a fortified camp, and Olivieri wants
Hllf loo (in fact, he tries to strengthen their position on his own; M 26 .5 ,
H i l l ir 1wo men recommend what had become standard practice by the
lllltl lifteenth century. Every army fortified its camp, especially in hostile
IUHliity."" The condottieri all advised field fortifications, though they
ffiommended different means. Those in Milan wanted a Wagenburgon
llir I lussitc model, with the wagons o f the small artillery chained to-
ItMliri.'" Ca rafa thought the commander should know ahead o f time
wllfir 10 camp but need strengthen the place artificially only if it lacked
[Link] defenses.82 Orsini, influenced by classical precept and practice,
Itflil 11 ic most elaborate model.83 He wanted a deep ditch with bastions,
tfivllmi (ravelins) to protect the gates, palisades, and the small artillery
MM u p at the ditch. Everyone talked o f fortified camps, everyone built
llii'in, and they determined much o f the fighting in the later fifteenth
1 ♦,ii»iiry.H1 Castillon (1453), which ended English rule in France and killed
I11I111 Talbot, earl o f Shrewsbury, provides the most famous example.
Firm li cannon decimated the small English force, massed together and
1 [Link] the French defenses.85 Twenty-six years later the storming o f the
I Inicniine camp at Poggio Imperiale decided the Pazzi War.86
( [Link] might have averted his own death and the terrible losses the
1'iriu li suffered if he had fortified his encampment. Orsini, for example,
make's a long list o f batdes determined by the presence or adequacy o f
held lortifications.87 Maclodio (1427) stands out as the most disastrous.
Ai that battle Filippo Maria Visconti, seeing that Francesco Bussone,
1 .illcd Carmagnola, had a smaller army, did not fortify his position and
in lust the battle. He was never afterward able to overcome the Venetians
,ind Florentines because o f the disparity in numbers, and Venice annexed
Ihiscia and Bergamo. Pulci himself cannot make sense o f Orlandos care­
lessness. He suggests that the hero realized his end was near and argues
1I1.11 a person in great peril has difficulty making proper decisions (M
it*:/). Such an argument, however, merely turns Orlando into a bad gen­
ii .il. C)rlando himself says that he had trusted Marsilio and did not expect
liim to attack ( M 26.24). 1° feet, the day before the battle Bianciardin
[Link] come to Roncesvalles, bringing camels laden with food, a gesture
1l1.1t encouraged Orlando in his mistake ( M 25.183—84). Neither explana­
36 War w ithout the G un

tion would have convinced a quattrocento reader, since the French were
camping in hostile territory after a long war. N o argument can excuse
Orlando’s mistake, and Olivieri cannot resist reminding his friend o f his
error, as the Saracen army draws near. Orlando does not answer, and Pulci
remarks that the truth has no reply (M 26 .20 -23).
This issue shows well how some parts o f an old story can clash with
current practice and defy rationalization. According to Leo the Wise,
writing ca. 900, Frankish troops did not make fortified camps.88 The
Chanson de Roland has them camp throughout the country (Chanson de
Roland, 55), and so it ultimately forces Pulci to say the same. The issue
does not, however, point to any problems in romance as such. In the
invented tale o f Tirant, Martorell and Galba, unlike Pulci, are free to
emphasize the importance o f such camps. William, count o f Warwick,
defends his camp near the enemy with a trench and a stockade ( Tirant,
24.56). Tirant himself sets up elaborate patrols so no one can surprise
his encampment ( Tirant, 133.36 9 -70 ,14 5.4 29 ). The day guard consists o f
2,000 horse and 1,000 foot, the cavalry serving in twelve-hour rotation.
A t night he has 2,000 horse and 2,000 foot with a guard change at mid­
night.
The question o f the fortified camp, although it created difficulties for
Pulci, did not challenge his chosen literary form. The change in the man­
ner o f fighting did. Fifteenth-century theory and practice emphasized co­
ordination and timing for an army rather than a series o f duels between
individuals. O f course, earlier commanders also sought coordinated
movement— there was a clear tradition o f communal valor— but the
background and training o f their warriors made such an objective diffi­
cult. The Italian mercenary groups, in contrast, were professionals, and
the North had already developed the predecessor o f the standing army
in the Ordonnance Companies.89 The quattrocento commander could
expect a certain coordination from his troops, and he developed his tac­
tics accordingly. The Sforzeschi used battle plans that required carefully
disciplined troops. Federigo o f Urbino, who led the allies against Florence
during the Pazzi War, followed this school.90 Tirant has the romance ana­
logue at the battle o f Malvei. Tirant explains to his men that victory de­
pends on their keeping formation ( Tirant, 156.484), and later he harshly
criticizes his close friend and subordinate, Diaphebus, for disobeying or­
ders (157.493).91 The other school o f thought, that o f the Bracceschi, ad­
vocated coordination through many small battle units, and this emphasis
also had its effect.92 Pulci, for example, mentions schiere or battles, terms
that designate large numbers o f men, but he also speaks o f squadrons and
 THE TACTICS OF RONCESVALLES 37

4
Hilumns, quattrocento terms for much smaller units (M 24.143-44). In
llie earlier part o f the century Micheletto had set up his mercenaries for
liaiile in squadrons o f 25 lances each, or about 150 people.93 A t the same
lime the French were organizing their men into companies o f equal size.
This trend continued, and the condottieri who compiled the “Ordine”
assumed Micheletto’s number for a squadron and added the post o f colo-
tifllo for the commander o f a column. Orsini assumes 10 columns to 100
squadrons.94 Smaller units o f uniform size permit coordinated tactics of
a complexity not possible to earlier armies and not envisaged in medieval
romance. The authors o f the Vulgate Cycle would have found the battle
plans o f Charles the Bold or Ridolfo Gonzaga complicated, and a
thirteenth-century commander could not have executed them.95
This new situation challenged traditional story telling. Romance pre­
supposed simpler tactics, and the narrator related the activities o f several
heroes— not just Orlando and Rinaldo, but also many other secondary
persons, such as Anselmo and Astolfo. The new tactics emphasized
the commander instead. The change is evident in the condotte. The
lourteenth-century contract mentioned corporals as well as the com­
mander, recognizing that the condottiere governed by aid o f “caporales
ei consiliarii.” Companies at that time were a union of smaller companies
1hat elected their leaders. Quattrocento contracts, however, name only
1he captain.96 Tirant once again documents the change for romance. At
Malvei Tirant alone has the traditional series o f heroic duels ( Tirant,
157.487-90). Others appear only to assist him when he falls or to get him
a horse.97
In Tirant Martorell and Galba really present the biography o f a com­
mander, one who fights like a quattrocento condottiere. The authors had
read Frontinus’s Stratagems, then the second classical manual in popular­
ity and a study in deceptions.98 Tirant and William, count o f Warwick,
win battles by surprise and by clever devices. For example, William coor­
dinates a midnight attack with an explosion o f Greek fire set up in the
enemy camp ( Tirant, 10 .27-28, 12.31-32). A t Fairdale Tirant greases the
enemy bombards with an ointment that causes them to crack at their
next firing (Tirant, 302.853-55). Under siege he fills a countermine with
brass bowls that rattle at every blow o f a pickax and reveal the enemy’s
tunneling activity (Tirant, 339.937-38). Tactically, both William and
Tirant bluff effectively, using women disguised as soldiers so that the
enemy will overestimate their numbers (Tirant, 14.34; 343-948-49, 951;
344.953—54; 349.962). Tirant also knows how stampedes can disrupt an
opponent.99 Martorell and Galba thus anticipate later developments in
38 War w ithout the Gun

their own peninsula, when Iberian poets would limit heroism to officers
(see chapter io).
For a time the tournaments and duels o f contemporary life masked
this growing rift between romance narrative and military practice. Martin
de Riquer and Larry Benson have shown that quattrocento nobles pat­
terned their lives on romance models (see chapter 2). Martorell exempli­
fies both sides, since he involved himself in two lengthy challenges and
wanted others to learn chivalry from Tirant.'00 Like the author, Tirant
has difficulty extricating himself from a cycle o f challenges, as he proves
himself initially in the duels and tourneys that celebrate the English mon­
arch’s coronation and marriage.101 The place held in life by individual
heroics allowed contemporary audiences to enjoy this feature o f tradi­
tional romance, even though such deeds no longer played a major role in
military practice.
T h e writers o f romance may have further smoothed over the rift by
means o f an effective literary device, abbreviation. Pulci abridges two o f
the three battles he presents in the five cantari added later to the M or­
gan te. He shortens the battle o f Saint-Denis so much that a reader can
get no sense o f its tactics ( A / 24 .12 3-4 4 ).102 T h e battle with Balugante is
recounted in only twelve ottave (M 27.223—34). Together these battles add
up to a tiny portion o f the ottave devoted to Roncesvalles (34 as opposed
to 219). Malory shows the same trend over time. Early in his work
o f translation and abridgment, he presented in reasonably full detail the
batdes that brought Arthur to power and won him an empire.103 Later
he practically eliminates such descriptions. Four field encounters mark
Arthur’s fall: Joyous Garde, Dover, Barren Down, and Salisbury. Only
Joyous Garde and Salisbury receive any attention, and that very little.
Salisbury in particular dramatically demonstrates abbreviation. The
Vulgate author presented an elaborate engagement. He enumerated the
battles, had readers follow five successive waves o f attack, described
the make-up o f particular batdes, highlighted certain commanders, and
even recounted what the lookout boy said.104 Malory reduces this narra­
tive o f many pages to a few small paragraphs, and he has no word about
tactics, dispositions, or troop movements (Morte, 21.4). Most extreme are
Martorell and Galba, who narrate numerous battles and abbreviate all o f
them.105 The hero, moreover, wins his eastern war in condottieri fashion,
by maneuver and not by battle. Having destroyed the Saracen fleet, he
blockades the army and forces a capitulation ( Tirant, 418.1091-94,
4 22 .110 1-2 , 448.1150-51).
Only Boiardo does not participate in this trend toward abbreviation,
 THE TACTICS OF RONCESVALLES 39

lor lie narrates in full all his battles: Barcelona, Paris, those around Al-
Itraca, and Montealbano. One could, o f course, argue that artistic neces-
si ly determined much o f this abbreviation and that Boiardo did not re-
i|iiire it because he alternated his battle descriptions with blocks o f
narrative about the wanderings o f his characters and their magical adven­
tures. Pulci, in contrast, had to abbreviate to avoid tedium, since the
battles with Antea and Balugante flank Roncesvalles.106 Martorell and
( ialba similarly have sequences o f battles, which they must abridge. But
this explanation o f artistic necessity does not account for the abbreviation
ol ////battles by Martorell and Galba, and it does not apply to Malory,
wlio either presents in detail the different battles in a series or shortens
i hem all.
The social and military hypothesis can account for all these examples.
The romancer o f the later fifteenth century abbreviated when he could
because he sensed a rift between his traditional manner o f narration and
uirrent military practice. He probably felt that such descriptions were
less relevant to his audience and to his own circumstances than other
parts o f his story, so he tended to drop them. A t the same time one must
noi overemphasize this trend. None o f the romancers expresses discom-
lort with the current conduct o f war, and we have seen that condottieri
tactics, however elaborate, still had the man-at-arms on horseback like
(lie medieval knight. Similarly, condottieri tactics allowed for the officer
to light in front o f his men, encouraging them by his example, not unlike
ilie medieval hero. Tactical complexity alone did not provoke a crisis in
mmance. Heavy cavalry had to decline further (see chapter 3), and the
new technology o f firearms had to change field tactics. Another forty
years passed before Ariosto sounded the warning bell.107
 -----T W O -----

Arthurs Rise to Power

S ir Thomas M alory

WHEN ROMANCERS TURNED FROM TACTICS TO STRATEGY,

from battles to the plan o f a campaign, they found little direct assistance
in the military manuals and histories.1 Am ong the classical writers they
really had only Frontinus, whom they could read either directly or
through extracts in Vegetius and his many vernacular adaptations.2 Yet
even Frontinus sketches not strategy but stratagems, or specific applica­
tions o f strategy. The reader must infer the plan o f campaign. Frontinus
did offer many hints, and one modern historian has characterized the
Stratagems as a casebook o f deceptions and psychological warfare. His
work was especially popular in the fifteenth century with the other writ­
ers o f military manuals, such as Christine de Pisan, and with romancers,
such as Martorell and Galba.3 Frontinus’s work also illuminates the war
plan Malory presents when he narrates Arthur s struggle to establish him­
self as a ruler.
The romancers also turned to other romancers for assistance with mili­
tary strategy. Malory, for example, found in his source, the Cambridge
version o f the Suite du M erlin, a coherent strategy behind Arthurs early
wars inherited from the Vulgate M erlin.1' The magician works out for
Arthur what we would call today a strategy o f the inner lines, the kind
familiar to modern readers from the plans devised by the German general
staff during the two world wars. W hat a Schlieffen or Manstein devised
was implemented, however, while Merlins strategy fits rather the fantasy
world invented for Britain by the French romancers. It had no practical
applications.
This situation changed in the book-based culture o f the fifteenth cen­
tury, when people, north and south, began to design their lives according
to their reading. Some southerners might prefer classical texts, and north-
 ARTHUR S RISE TO POWER 41

ri lu r.v, the vernacular literature o f the high Middle Ages, but the impulse
was 1 he same.5 For the North Jacques de Lalaing provides a good example
11I 1lie tendency. In 1450 he defended the Pas de la Fontaine aux Pleurs
iu mi ( 'halon-sur-Saone in Burgundy for a year, just as Alexander the Or-
|[Link] had defended the grounds o f a ruined castle in the Prose Tristan
iiiid would do again in Malory.6 Jacques was just one o f those who made
[Link] fiction real.
I bis trend brought the writing and reading o f romance and history
1 lose to each other. Most people at that time still considered Arthur a real
pm on, however wildly imaginative the romances might be.7 The English
i hmniclers might have questioned the authenticity o f Geoffrey o f M on­
mouth, but they never doubted Arthurs historicity.8 Malory, though
it romancer, can thus pose as a historian. He has a chronicler’s style
illul handles his source materials in such a way as to enhance the
historical status o f his story.9 He also speaks o f his sources as a historian
would. For example, he notes that they disagree on the identification
ol |oyous Garde, and he prefers the French to the English authorities
when he discusses the after-history o f Lancelots kin (Morte, 21.12.1257,
11.11.1260).10
The same process also worked in reverse. It allowed Jean de Bueil to
disguise his military manual, Lejouvencel, as a romance. A respected cap-
1,tin under Charles V II, he designed a guide to the military education o f
.1 young gentleman, which he based partly on his own wartime experi­
ences. His romance thus had a certain historical status, besides its techni-
I .il nature, and modern historians regularly cite it in discussions o f the
Li 1cr fifteenth century.11 De Bueil composed Le jouvencelm the 1460s, at
die same time that Malory was abridging his set o f Arthurian romances,
t he work o f both men shows that clear generic distinctions between fic-
iinn and fact, romance and history, did not exist for them.
I11 fact, the Catalan scholar, Martin de Riquer, remarks that at times
one cannot distinguish formally between the romance and the history
written in this period. He cites the example o fJehan de Saintre by Antoine
de la Sale. A reader unfamiliar with French history could not tell the
dillerence between this fictional romance and histories like the Livre des
fails de Jacques de Lalaing. Antoine actually borrowed an episode from the
/ ivre.12 In this case the literary presentation is identical, and only external
I I itcria can separate history from romance.
This rapprochement between romance and history had serious impli-
1.11 ions for a writer like Malory. He had to treat the strategic problems of
An bur’s early wars with the same seriousness Jean de Bueil devoted to
42 War w ithout the Gun

contemporary warfare. Therefore, Malory had to bring strategy out of

the realm o f fairy tale into something resembling the real world. In this
endeavor he encountered problems he did not meet when he realistically
recounted the peacetime activities o f Arthurs knights, their duels, tour­
naments, and journeys. The very closeness between romance and history
helped reveal a rift that might have remained concealed longer, if ro­
mance had stayed safely in the fantastic realm.

S T R A T E G Y IN T H E V U L G A T E M E R L IN

Romancers followed a conventional format in describing a campaign.

Typically, a campaign description begins with the siege o f a castle or forti­
fied town: Bedgrayne,13 Castle Terrable in the Suite du M erlin, Albraca in
the Orlando innamorato, and Paris in the Innamorato and the Furioso. The
opposed armies resolve the siege by one or more battles. W hen the siege
involves a castle, as it normally did in Arthurian romance, a single battle
suffices: Bedgrayne, Castle Terrable. W hen a city is besieged, as at Albraca
or Paris, a series o f battles follows.14 The side with the larger army nor­
mally starts the war and begins the siege, as in all the cases just men­
tioned. The writer and reader or hearer, however, usually view the aggres­
sor as the enemy and sympathize with the defender. Thus, our sympathy
lies with Arthur rather than the kings, with Charlemagne rather than
King Agramante and his Saracens.15 As a consequence, the strategy we
follow is that o f the defense, which grows out o f weakness. Strategic de­
fense is especially characteristic o f Arthur s rise to power.
This blueprint for a campaign involved issues that had dominated
warfare in its high and later medieval phases and still concerned com­
manders in the years when Malory was growing up.16 A t the same time
it provided a critique o f the way generals preferred to fight, since those
in the north were as reluctant to risk battle as the condottieri in the
south.17 Actual sieges normally dragged on through the campaign season.
Castles and towns fell not to assault but to mining or starvation. C o n ­
versely, the besieging army might melt away or return home with the
onset o f winter. Romance commanders, unlike their real counterparts,
resolved a siege quickly and decisively, risking battle.
Even with battle the romance formula reversed the chronological pat­
tern that had marked the two major English invasions o f France. Victory
in the field, at Crecy and Agincourt, gave the English army freedom to
besiege Calais or to reduce the fortified places in Normandy. Where the
romancer assumed that a battle could decide a war, for Edward III and
 ARTHUR S RISE TO POWER 43
*

11 airy V victory in the field started the war in earnest, which was an
[Link] of sieges.
My the 1450s and 1460s, however, the romance formula had gained new
ii'lcvance. A single field engagement decided the English fate in Aqui­
taine, and battles regularly determined the many campaigns o f the Wars
ul the Roses. A strategist could no longer assume that castles would resist
the new siege artillery; instead, he had to plan for battle. Accordingly, for
Malory, the old romance blueprint seemed to apply more exactly than
perhaps it ever had before.
In the Vulgate M erlin the enemy kings initiate both phases o f the cam­
paign, trusting to odds. A t Caerleon, where they defy the new High King,
they outnumber Arthur’s knights seven to one, a ratio M alory reduces to
lilt- more probable three to one.18 W hen they later invade Arthur’s terri-
lory at Bedgrayne, the kings have a two-to-one advantage, which Malory
laiscs to three to one. Merlin, nevertheless, has Arthur attack them in
both places, and both decisions, although risky, follow sound strategic
thinking. A t Caerleon Merlin’s logic corresponds to what Jean de Bueil
outlines in his guide, based on the French campaign against the Swiss in
t.|.|4 (Jou ven cel3.1.197.0). The inferior force, having a friendly town at
us hack, can risk an attack and count on its shock value, because the
larger enemy army does not anticipate an engagement and has not pre­
pared for one { Jouvencel^.1 .19 7-20 2 ). A t Caerleon, moreover, the towns­
folk, emboldened by Arthurs daring, come out with axes, maces, and
i lubs to help him. They probably would not have intervened if Arthurs
knights had not first shown their will to fight and their ability to hold
die field.19
For the second and decisive encounter, that at Bedgrayne, Merlin ar-
[Link] a double ambush. The royal army attacks the enemy camp by
night. The kings, confident in their superiority, have not posted guards;
warned too late, they are attacked while arming.20 Next morning Merlin
siations Arthurs Breton allies in a wood and lures the enemy once more
into battle with a supposedly inferior force. Since the kings do not know
1lie Bretons have come to England, the ambush has maximum effect.21
Malory could take over the ambushes with only light revision, because
imnancers and commanders in the field still relied on such arrange­
ments.22 In Tirantlo blanc both Christian and Saracen armies constantly
stage ambushes.23 Martorell has William o f Warwick defeat Saracen in­
vaders much as Merlin in the Vulgate works to defeat Arthur’s enemies
( iirant, 10 .27-28 ).24 Frontinus sketches an ambush tactically similar to
the day battle Merlin directs at Bedgrayne (Stratagems, 1.6.2), but he also
44 War w ithout the G un

indicates the difficulties such maneuvers involved.25 In two places he dis­

cusses Claudius Nero’s movement o f a relief army into a camp facing the
Carthaginian Hasdrubal (Stratagems, 1.1.9, 2.9). Nero would not let the
camp be enlarged, lest Hasdrubal suspect something, but when the C ar­
thaginian saw horses lean from travel and men somewhat sunburned, as
happens during a march, he knew reinforcements had arrived. Such oper­
ations absolutely depend upon secrecy and deception.
Night maneuvers best achieve this goal, but they carry their own risks.
In the Vulgate the night attack essentially wins the campaign.26 Tirant
likewise favors night operations. He breaks the Saracen siege o f Pelidas by
a night attack ( Tirant, 133.373-75), and his great victory at Malvei requires
crossing a bridge by night (155.481). T h e military manuals encourage such
operations. Christine de Pisan prefers ambushes and skirmishes to open
battle (Fayttes, 1.18.64). She shows how the Romans defeated a tired en­
emy by a night attack (Fayttes, 1.18.63—64) and recommends that one am­
bush a sleeping enemy (1.15.51). Jean de Bueil gives the logic behind this:
in the dark a small force can defeat a large one (Jo u ven cel2.2.71). Night
maneuvers, however, also encourage confusion. Drawing on his experi­
ences fighting Gilles de Rais in 1430, Jean shows two armies passing each
other by night. His hero, the Jouvencel, must turn his own about and
rushes ahead o f it to warn his castle. He is captured in the process ( Jou­
vencel, 2.2.63—70).
Surprise requires an intelligence network. In the Vulgate, Arthur for­
bids all road travel, once he has his army in Bedgrayne W ood and his
supplies delivered.27 A battle o f scouts follows, and Arthurs men over­
power those o f the enemy, so that Merlin and the king know where the
enemy camp is and can prepare their trap accordingly.28 In Tirant lo
blanc, Tirant has a spy in the enemy council, who informs him o f their
plans.29 Similarly, the manuals constantly stress the importance o f espio­
nage. Christine de Pisan, drawing on Vegetius, recommends that a com­
mander have informers in the enemy army and take precautions against
enemy spies (Fayttes, 1.15.52—53). The commander should send agents
ahead, disguised as pilgrims or laborers, who can look for ambushes. If
they do not return, he should choose another route, since captured spies
talk (Fayttes, 1.16.56). Christine would have faulted Arthurs enemies, who
took no precautions even after their scouts failed to return. Jean de Bueil
favors a combination o f scouts and spies. Scouts regularly precede his
army (for example, Jouvencel, 3.1.192), and spies inform them o f the
enemy’s moves during the night operations in which the Jouvencel is cap­
tured (2.2.67). Jeanwould in fact allot one-third o f his expenses for an
 ARTHUR S RISE TO POWER 45

intelligence service.30 Carafa in the south gives the most elaborate set of
instructions. T h e commander must pay informers well, but he must be­
ware o f double agents (first “Memoriale,” 7.184—85). Would-be deserters
should stay in the enemy camp and become informers (second “ Memori­
ale,” 9—10.211). A t the same time the general should not rely too much
on spies, should use his own officers if possible, and should multiply spies
and make certain one does not know the other (first “ Memoriale,”
10.187). In one way the medieval commander needed an intelligence ser­
vice even more than his sixteenth-century counterpart did: the medieval
commander lacked maps.31
The logic behind Merlin’s strategy is that o f the inner lines. He has
Arthur summon the Breton rulers Ban and Bors to aid him against the
enemy kings. Arthur needs the support o f the Breton rulers, and they
more than double the size o f his army.32 Even so he goes to Bedgrayne
outnumbered two to one, because the enemy kings have likewise in­
creased their alliance, from five to eight rulers.33 A t the same time the
Breton monarchs have a dangerous enemy in Claudas, whom they have
just defeated; they assume he will attack again. Together Arthur and the
Bretons will defeat first Arthur’s enemies and later King Claudas. Malory
makes the situation more dramatic. Arthur must face eleven kings at Bed­
grayne, and the situation in France is more perilous.34 Ban and Bors are
losing their war with Claudas (Morte, 1.10.20), and they must return
home after the Camylarde expedition because Claudas has once more
invaded their lands (1.18.39). The drama clarifies the logic behind Merlins
strategy. The weak must ally against the strong, bur united action involves
a risk. The allies must leave one frontier without an army, while they
concentrate on the other opponent.
In his anecdote about Claudius Nero, Frontinus provides an exact par­
allel to this strategy, drawn from the Second Carthaginian War (207
u.c .e .). Hasdrubal is bringing a relief army through northern Italy to link
up with Hannibal in the south, so the Romans have armies on two fronts.
( 'laudius Nero wishes to join with Livius Salinator in the north, so that
together they can crush Hasdrubal before he reaches Hannibal. Nero
leaves a screen o f elite troops facing Hannibal, who maintain the usual
number o f patrols and sentries and light the same number o f fires. He
(lien goes to Umbria by secret marches, and the combined Roman army
destroys Hasdrubal. Nero has his troops back in the south before Hanni­
bal learns o f the battle (Stratagems, 1.1.9).
The strategy o f the inner lines, though based on weakness, encourages
expansionism. Christine de Pisan warns a commander not to let an
46 War w ithout the G un

enemy invade his country: better to hurt the enemy land than to let your
own suffer harm (Fayttes, 1.18.61). Arthur meets the hostile kings at his
frontier in Bedgrayne, protecting his zone, as Christine advises. At the
same time Merlin has already planned an extension o f Arthurs rule.
W hen Arthur summons Kings Ban and Bors, Merlin lectures the council
on an expedition to Camylarde, a foreign venture to follow this year’s
defensive campaign (Vulgate M erlin, 167). Merlin explains to King Ban,
who fears what Claudas might do while he stays in England, that a man
must draw back to make a great jump (Vulgate Merlin, 107—8). He is jus­
tifying the expedition to Camylarde, which has the same strategic basis.
T h e district o f Camylarde separates Arthur’s lands from those o f King
Ryons, a man who has subdued many kings already, is currently fighting
King Lodegreaunce o f Camylarde, and, if victorious, would attack Arthur
(Vulgate Merlin, 9 2 ,10 7). The Knights o f the Round Table, who left En­
gland after Uther’s death, defend Camylarde. Arthur must help Lode­
greaunce defeat Ryons and must marry the king’s daughter and heir, G ui­
nevere. The expedition and marriage together will rid Arthur o f a
dangerous neighbor,35 increase the royal domain, and bring back to his
family the fellowship o f the Round Table.36 Both here and at Bedgrayne
an alliance defeats an otherwise superior enemy and secures the realm. At
the same time such alliances expand the realm. Arthur inherits Cam y­
larde through marriage, and Ban and Bors do him homage.37 The great
kingdom is the secure one.
The financing o f the war likewise presupposes expansion. Arthur be­
gins the war with an empty treasury. As Merlin explains in council, the
king is young, the nobles disdainful, and the lesser people would have
been suspicious but for the great gifts he has distributed (Vulgate Merlin,
h i —12). W ith no money, Arthur must somehow finance a war. He does
so partly by use o f a great treasure, buried near Bedgrayne and known
only to Merlin (Vulgate M erlin, 112), but mostly by plunder. A t Caerleon
Arthur pays his soldiers with the horses and apparel won at the battle,
and with the gold, silver, and money left by the kings in their camp (Vul­
gate M erlin, 9 5-96). H e thus wins the love o f poor soldiers, who were his
army at Caerleon, and makes new knights the following September, to
whom he gives rents and gifts. After Bedgrayne the three kings distribute
all the booty (Vulgate M erlin, 122). Malory varies the distribution but
makes the same point. Arthur gives the spoils to Ban and Bors, who can
use the wealth to finance their war with Claudas. Arthur presumably can
use the hidden treasure to pay the English (Morte, 1.17.37).
This seemingly reckless spending is prudent. If Arthur had been cau-
 A R T H U R S R IS E T O P O W E R 47

nous and tried to build up his treasury, he would have had no political
iiud military support. His generosity wins an army. W hen the enemy
kings later are fighting the Saxons, they can attract no soldiers from A r­
thur's land because his men are too well paid (Vulgate M erlin, 126). A t
1lie same time the policy presupposes victory. Arthur pays his men not
110111 what he has but from what he will win. His security thus depends
on warfare, which in turn expands the kingdom. The logic is typical. The
Hrowulfprologue gives it in its clearest form: Scyld began defending his
house. His success frightened others, and the tribes o f the neighboring
scacoasts sent tribute. Scyld thus built up a treasury, which his son Beo­
wulf used to win trustworthy friends, who would support him in time o f
war. And he too prospered (Beowulf, 4—25).38
The thinking o f the Vulgate author still applied in the fifteenth cen-
lury, though appropriately modernized. Kennedy shows how Malory
models the Round Table, which Arthur acquires in Camylarde, on the
royal retinues maintained by Lancastrian and Yorkist monarchs.39 Such
arrangements involved money as well as land. In Tirantlo blanc, Marto-
icll emphasizes the need for money, especially for war. His hero states
llatly that war requires troops, money, and provisions ( Tirant, 123.327).40
Martorell shows the recruiting tables in Sicily and gives the pay scales for
soldiers ( Tirant, 116.303).41 The feudal warrior has become the soldier in
1lie root sense o f the word, a person fighting for pay. Condottieri theory
emphasized the need for regular pay, and the inspector, Chiericati,
wanted them well paid, like Arthur’s men.42 A Venetian himself, Chieri-
»ati cites Venetian examples. Well-paid troops conquered Verona and
I’adua, but badly paid soldiers failed at Trieste. In other words a well-paid
army expands the realm.43
The logic is really the same in the old and the new romances and man­
uals, only the fifteenth-century author adopts the specifics o f the merce­
nary armies in Italy and o f “ bastard*feudalism” in the north.44 Exploding
war costs in the fifteenth century made the whole question more acute.
Mallett gives some figures for Italy. In the late 1440s Venice spent its en­
tire state revenue on the army, and the Papal States for one siege in 1469
spent twice their annual revenue.45 In this respect finance determined
strategy. The romance Arthur had no alternative but to pursue an expan­
sionist policy. His actions would resemble well enough the building of
large states that occurred in the fifteenth century: the expansion o f the
Ottoman Empire, the conquest o f the terra firma by Venice, the union
o f Castile and Aragon, and the failed English attempt on the Continent,
which led instead to a greater France.
48 War w ithout the Gun

It still remains true that Merlin set up a very risky plan for the young
Arthur. Malory, taking up the old story, might have thought o f John Tal­
bot, earl of Shrewsbury. Much outnumbered at Bordeaux, with three ar­
mies approaching from different directions, he followed a daring offen­
sive strategy that ended in the disaster o f Castillon (1453). He began it
with a night march and a surprise attack at dawn.46 The parallel between
the fictional and the real campaign is sufficient to show what else Merlin
and Arthur needed for victory. Martorell provides a hint in his prologue
to Tirant: “ Fortitud corporal e ardiment se vol exercir ab saviesa: com per
la prudencia e industria dels batallants, diverses vegades los pocs han ob-
tesa victoria dels molts, la saviesa e astucia dels cavaliers ha bastat aterrar
les forces dels enemies” (“ Physical strength and courage should be em­
ployed with wisdom, for through prudence and strategy, the few at times
have vanquished the many, laying low their enemies through astuteness
and cunning” ; Tirant, prol.9).47 Merlin had the time to plan with pru­
dence, something Talbot did not have, and careful calculation marks
Merlin’s war aims. Malory had to revise these aims, but to understand
what he did, we must first look at the Vulgate solution to Arthurs first
war, for its ghost haunts Malory’s version.
In the Vulgate, Merlin’s political and military strategy exactly fits A r­
thur’s needs and achieves its ends in every detail. The Vulgate author
establishes a situation in which plot and theory correlate precisely. Its
precondition is the fantastic geography o f Britain, where the dilemma o f
the enemy kings and Merlin’s policy o f military audacity and political
restraint make sense. Fantasy then does not exclude the political and the
military, nor does it idealize the real, at least in this case. Rather its imag­
ined setting encourages the play o f theory, allowing the author to develop
the detailed implications o f a particular military or political strategy.
The authors o f both the Vulgate and the Suite du M erlin inherited
from Robert de Boron a fanciful geography for England. Robert took
place names from English chronicle but fit them to his own map. Logres,
for example, becomes a town, and Winchester a seaport.48 The Vulgate
author makes this fantasy into a clear schema (fig. 8). All the places
named are near each other. Logres is close enough to Bedgrayne that A r­
thur’s army can return there after the battle (Vulgate M erlin, 122). The
enemy city o f Sorhaut, to which the kings withdraw, is a similar distance
from the battlefield, and the kings themselves live near each other, despite
their titles.41'' An enemy force can simultaneously threaten Cornwall and
Orcanie (Vulgate M erlin, 124).
Recognition o f this smallness is essential to understand Merlin’s mili-
 Ar t h u r ’s r is e t o po w er 49

filt v .strategy and hence his war aims. Arthur rules an inner area. Beyond
ll'f |>city but independent principalities that separate his kingdom from
liiltir potentially dangerous enemies, who are not far distant from Ar-
lltui's i apital. Ryons, for example, is making a mantle from the beards of
iuiii|iicred kings, which he has carried before him on the days when he
Itulds court. He rules over a land o f giants and shepherds, a land unculti-
VIled because no farmer dares live there (Vulgate Merlin, 92, 107). He
himself is o f giant lineage and has corresponding ambitions. O n the other
tide arc the infidel Saxons, who wish to occupy and settle the land and
who arc Arthur’s traditional enemies in the chronicle tradition.
Such a situation explains Merlin’s aggressive policies. A larger, unified
kingdom would overawe the enemies beyond the borders. Merlin par­
tially secures this aim in Camylarde by military aid and a political mar-
llagc. Arthur inherits the kingdom and integrates its army with his own.
The other kings, however, must be persuaded that submission to Arthur
will serve their interests better than independence. Here the Saxons pro­
vide the necessary pressure.
I Jcfeated by Arthur, the kings find the Saxons threatening all their
lauds at once. The Saxons raid, devastate zones, burn towns, and kill
many of their subjects. Currently, they are besieging Vandaliors in “Corn­
wall" (Vulgate Merlin, 113). The expanded version o f the Vulgate makes
the threat plainer. King Brangoires says they must chase the Saxons out
01 lose everything, for the Saxons have come to occupy the land and to
cupel the natives. The enemy already has a fortified base, the Roche as
Scsncs, well supplied and defended by magic. T h e British kings do what
du y can and fight a defensive guerrilla-style war, which forces them to
turn their own area into a wasteland (Vulgate M erlin, 125,131). They do
not have the strength to expel the enemy.

foreign lands King Ryons Saxons

Camylarde Enemy kings

Marches
• Sorhaut

• Bedgrayne
Arthur’s realm
• Logres (London)

figure 8. Map of the fictional England of the Vulgate Merlin and the Suite du Merlin.
50 War w ithout the Gun

This threat eventually converts the kings into loyal subjects. The au­
thor shows the logic through a conversation between Lot’s wife and sons
(Vulgate M erlin, 130-31). She tells Gawain that he should serve Arthur
and win peace for his father. Then together the two kings could expel the
Saxons. Agravain adds that the Saxons, who are only a day away, could
otherwise trap them like birds. The family decides that the sons shall
serve Arthur. The assumed situation is circular. T h e kings need Arthurs
help against the Saxon invader, while Arthur needs their armies to create
the great realm envisaged by Merlin, a realm so strong that the enemies
beyond the frontier will no longer trouble it.
This process can occur only if Arthur treats the other kings with re­
straint. Merlin accordingly does not allow Arthur to exploit the victory
o f Bedgrayne. There is no invasion o f enemy territory, not even a pur­
suit.50 Merlin here follows a standard strategy. Frontinus cites the example
of Pyrrhus, who advises a commander never to press relentlessly after a
fleeing enemy. Such leniency avoids driving the enemy to desperation
and makes him more inclined to withdraw another time, knowing that
the victor would not try to destroy him in flight (Stratagems, 2.6.10).51 By
this strategy Merlin allows the kings to escape with an army and so defend
themselves against the Saxons. He sends Arthur to Camylarde and waits
for events to bring the enemy kings around. The children o f the enemy,
impressed by Arthur’s heroic victory against odds, turn to him for knight­
hood. Their leaders are Gawain and Galescins, themselves nephews of
the king.52 The political marriages arranged earlier by Uther thus work
for Arthur. The sons choose the Arthurian not the paternal side o f the
family, the great not the petty king. Merlin predicts that they will draw
the other sons after them and that Gawain and Yvain will be Arthurs
strongest support (Vulgate M erlin, 9 6 -9 7). A t the same time the barons
from the inner realm now do homage voluntarily, lest Arthur take away
their lands (Vulgate Merlin, 124). Military dynamism and political pa­
tience make Arthur the great ruler.
T h e Merlin o f the Vulgate followed a consistent and successful strat­
egy. He wished to defeat but not wreck the army o f the rival kings because
he anticipated eventual political union rather than conquest. Malory,
writing more than two hundred years later, had no such clear option.

M A L O R Y ’S A L T E R E D S T R A T E G Y

For Malory, Arthur’s enemies exist in a real, not a fantasy, England. This
change in the legend had mostly already occurred before Malory com-
 Ar t h u r ’s r is e t o po w e r

*
posed his one-volume abridgment. English authors had done much o f
tin- work, reinterpreting the geography o f the French romancers. The
|imh css began, however, with the author or scribe o f the Cambridge
Suite. ''' He checked the chronicles against the Vulgate M erlin and so rein-
1 mi Ineed Aurelius Ambrosius and corrected the spelling o f the usurper’s
[Link] to Vortiger (Suite, 20 71). Such details fit into the later tendency
to historicize all the Arthurian place names, a tendency well developed
in the fourteenth century. For example, Dover had its Arthurian relics,
idiil a traveler could assume that the King o f the Hundred Knights
ImiI ruled the Isle o f M an.54 The Stanzaic Morte Arthur (ca. 1350),
which was Malory’s source for the fall o f Arthur, turns a tendency
duo a method.55 Winchester, Rochester, Carlisle, and Glastonbury now
appear on the map.56 The process was simple and logical; it united the
Arthurs o f fantasy and chronicle and assumed for England what the
Vulgate author had already assumed for France, a real geography. It
irstored to Arthur the historicity he had lost when he left the chronicles
lor the romances.
Malory accordingly gives the royal opposition a precise geographical
location (fig. 9). The kings come from the north and the Celtic west, and
Hi her and Arthur have to fight on both frontiers.57 Westward, Uther
wages war in Cornwall, and Arthur later meets all his enemies there in a
single battle.58 The north, however, is our immediate concern because it
is (here that Arthur fights the battle o f Bedgrayne. Lot has his lands in
Scotland, and the king o f Northumberland is one o f the enemy mon-
anlis. The area o f Arthurs secure control stops, therefore, at the River
I rent, and M alory identifies Bedgrayne with Sherwood Forest.59 This re­
alistic geography automatically changes the strategy behind Arthur’s
lust campaign.
On the new historical map Arthur’s enemies do not form a coherent
group. Some are widely separated from each other, such as Cornwall and
I othian; hence, the chances o f unified action are limited and would not
he o f long duration. As a result, the kings act quickly and fight in mid­
winter. Armies normally avoided conflict in winter, but desperation could
lorce one.60 The Lancastrians took over northern casdes in October 1462,
.md the Yorkists had to fight a winter war there, much as the enemy kings
forced Arthur into Sherwood sometime between November 1 and Febru­
ary 3.61 Merlin’s strategy o f patience here takes on a new meaning. Arthur
need only survive their attack, and his power will grow, while theirs de­
clines. A t Caerleon 300 o f the best knights desert to Arthur (Morte,
1.9.18-19). Later Arthur’s barons think they are already a match for the
5* War w ithou t the Gun

Figure 9. Malory’s England.

kings (Morte, 1.10.19). After Bedgrayne the kings must fight Saracens,
while other lords submit to the new monarch.
Survival, however, does not end the war or conclude the story. Merlin’s
advice not to pursue the defeated now has a different strategic meaning,
geared not to war aims but to the immediate needs o f the campaign. In
his speech to Arthur he makes two points: “ Thou has never done. Hast
thou nat done inow? O f three score thousande thys day hast thou leffte
on lyve but fyftene thousand! Therefore hit ys tyme to sey ‘W ho!’ for
 A R T H U R S R IS E T O P O W E R 53
#
(ilttl y* wroth with the for thou woll never have done. Foryondir a eleven
W * til i liys tyme woll nat be overthrowyn, but and thou tary on them
MMp Inip,ri ihy fortune woll turne and they shall encres” {Morte, 1.17.36).
Ill# i|»ri [Link] triumph o f the Vulgate dwindles to a Pyrrhic victory in
Mutiny. Alter 45,000 casualties the enemy kings, though defeated, have
Mpi llirii army intact. To pursue them is dangerous, and Merlin argues
Hilt ill Vcgetius. To leave no avenue o f escape encourages desperate fight-
lll|t tiiu! could turn around the battle.62 A t Bedgrayne Arthur repels an
iHVmimi hut accomplishes no more. Malory shows nothing o f the greater
fill 1n glimpsed through Merlin’s plans in the Vulgate. The reader, there-
tiiir, (h >c\s not see an end to the state o f war between Arthur and his rivals,
•ml l lie story thus lacks closure. This problem was exaggerated by an-
•lllirr aspect o f the same trend that gave Arthur a realistic geography.
Romancers normally modernized their stories, bringing them closer to
llirl r audience. Critics have shown how Malory adds contemporary de­
tail* to the tournaments and other peacetime activities o f his knights, and
hr does the same for war, when possible.63 To protect against spies the
Vl 11gate Arthur had ordered that all travelers be sent to him (Vulgate M er­
lin, 109). In Malory, Merlin merely requires that all men o f arms who
Havel in Arthur’s zone carry royal passports {Morte, 1.11.25). More to the
pi uni, Malory modernizes the Saxons, who become Saracens, the only
(mown infidels o f the fifteenth century.
Saracens, however, live far away.64 They do not occasion the fear
I [Link] by the old pagan Saxons, who had crossed the North Sea to con­
quer kngland and settle down. In M alory the Saracen attack distracts the
II irmy kings for three years, but the Saracens are not threatening enough
in cause the kings to reconcile their differences with Arthur. Malory in­
stead has the kings plan a renewed war. They draw Ryons into their alli­
ance: “All thys whyle they furnysshed and garnysshed hem o f good men
ol armys and vitayle and o f all maner o f ablemente that pretendith to
wane, to avenge hem for the batayle o f Bedgrayne” {Morte, 1.18.41). The
kings, not the Saxons, are the problem.
This reinterpretation destroys the logic o f the old story.65 The Vulgate
kings had to join Arthur eventually or be conquered by the Saxons. M al­
ory imagines a very different situation. The kings o f the north and west,
who reject Arthur’s claim to the throne, had fought his father as well.
I Jther warred with the duke o f Cornwall and ended his reign defeating a
northern host at Saint Albans.66 N or does their enmity cease after Bed­
grayne. W hen Arthur faces and defeats a foreign invasion, his victory
makes the kings unhappy: “And all the kynge Arthurs enemyes, as the
54 War w ithout the Gun

kynge o f North Wals and the kynges o f the Northe, knewe o f this batayle;
they were passynge hevy” (Morte, 4.4.130). These kings would oppose any
member o f Uther s family, and the Bedgrayne campaign becomes just one
in a series o f conflicts, part o f the long attempt by Uther and Arthur to
bring order to the realm.
Unending hostilities o f the sort M alory imagines befit his period. M e­
dieval wars generally had resisted closure,67 but the giant conflict we call
the Hundred Years War far exceeded anyone’s nightmares. The English
could win battles and capture towns but could not stop the struggle.
Then came the Wars o f the Roses, which continued throughout the time
Malory composed the Morte Darthur. N or were the English alone; Venice
was currently mired in its Long War with the Ottomans, which lasted
from 1463 to 1479.
Yet M alory needed an end to the young Arthur’s wars because the bulk
o f his stories occurred in peacetime and presupposed a powerful and
stable system in England. Unable to. use the Vulgate blueprint, Malory
opted for a contemporary solution, that of annihilation, the normal prac­
tice in the Wars o f the Roses.68 His immediate source, the Suite du Merlin,
had Arthur win a great double battle by Castle Terrable against King
Nero and eleven lesser monarchs. Lot also brings an army to the battle,
and the kings die there. Arthur has them buried in Camelot and erects a
victory memorial. The king stands with drawn sword over the portrait
statues o f his enemies (Huth M erlin, 245-63).
Malory carefully adapts this battle to the Vulgate war. A t Bedgrayne
he changes the number o f the enemy kings from eight to eleven, and he
adds a prediction by Merlin, who anticipates the battle at Castle Terrable
and the deaths o f the kings {Morte, 1.18.40, 2.10.77). Malory later notes
the fulfillment o f this prediction. Moreover, he makes Castle Terrable the
property o f the duke o f Cornwall and has Uther besiege this castle when
he makes war for Igrayne. In fact, Malory did all he could to integrate
the battle at Castle Terrable with the Vulgate war. It, not Bedgrayne, con­
cludes the fighting and brings a kind o f peace to Arthurs England.
Unfortunately this solution, although it made strategic sense, wrecked
his story, for the author o f the Suite did not connect Nero and his kings
with those who opposed Arthur at Bedgrayne.69 He continued to envis­
age the old Vulgate solution to the war, the eventual voluntary union
between Arthur and his enemies. M alory following his lead, also pre­
serves this assumption. We see the sons o f the enemy at Arthurs court.
The king knights Gawain {Morte, 3.2.99) and makes King Uriens a
Knight o f the Round Table (4.4.130-31).70 Malory gives the theory its
 A R T H U R S R IS E T O P O W E R S5

uiosi elaborate presentation later, when he returns to Vulgate material in

(lie book of Sir Lancelot and Queen Guinevere. The enemy kings now
tosponsor the tournaments, where Lancelot wins glory for the queen.
Sides change from one tournament to another, and chivalric play replaces
wai. 1 T he kings are by now all members o f the Round Table. Malory
i mu hides the book with an invented episode in which Sir Urry comes to
Aithiir’s court for healing. One hundred ten Knights o f the Round Table
dir present, and M alory gives the list. It begins with the kings o f the north
•md ihe west.72
The solutions by the authors o f the earlier M erlin books and by Mai-
m y mutually exclude each other. Kings killed at Castle Terrable reappear
in laier episodes. But more important, the logic o f one solution contra-
ilu is the other. In the one a weak monarch and his adviser preside over a
Iminidable army made by the voluntary union o f French and English
Ioivcs and those o f the kings o f the north and west. In the other the
monarch with French allies first defeats and then destroys the enemy
longs. He assures his own power, but how or whether he creates a larger
km Im is unclear. Here we have one o f those discrepancies in M alory— or
Milier a whole set o f them— which scholars have debated in a different
• mitcxt. They have argued over whether Malory wrote one work or com­
piled an anthology. That dispute does not concern us here because the
• muradictions we have found exist within the limits o f a single tale. Nor
would an appeal to multiple and conflicting sources help. Here Malory
worked from a single source, the Cambridge manuscript, and he is re­
sponsible for the discrepancies, not the Cambridge scribe.

T H E R IF T

flic rapprochement between romance and history, which worked so well

in other areas o f aristocratic life, such as tournaments and duels, created
unexpected strains when it concerned military campaigns.73 It forced
Malory first to reinterpret and then to rework the old story he was abridg-
mg. Yet he still could not make it fit. The threads o f the tapestry crossed
in the wrong places, and the edges tore. Pulci in the south provides a
contrasting example. Although a considerable distance separated his
story, likewise rooted in traditional romances, from contemporary war­
fare, the distance was not so great that he had to discard his narrative,
and contemporary warfare did not ruin the plot.
Malory was less fortunate. Modern warfare messed up his story of Ar-
iliur’s early wars, and he also maintained the old narrative o f Arthurs
56 War w ithout the G un

fall at a price. H e had to know that Lancelot’s whole strategy o f passive

resistance— staying in his castles and refusing to fight— no longer corres­
ponded to contemporary practice. Malory identifies Joyous Garde either
with Alnwick or with Bamborough Castle (Morte, 21.12.1257), but neither
place effectively resisted Yorkist armies. Alnwick held out for a cold win­
ter month in 14 6 2 -6 3 but did not resist a second time (1464). Bambor­
ough fell quickly to cannon and assault that same year.74 T h e strategy
involved was the opposite o f that used by Lancelot, who holds o ff A r­
thur’s forces fifteen weeks into harvest time {Morte, 20.10—11.1187). The
Lancastrians would seize border castles, which they could not hold but
which would force the Yorkists to considerable expense, bringing cannon
up from London, and would then make them destroy their own national
defenses.75 Lancelot’s strategy against Arthur must have appeared archaic
to both Malory and his readers. And in fact, in this section o f his work
he stresses the distance between the Arthurian world and contemporary
reality. A n example is his apostrophe to Guinevere {Morte, 18.25.1119—20)
or his observations on the law o f treason (20.7.1174). This stress on histor­
ical separation contradicts his efforts to modernize his sources else­
where.76 Thus, two of the three military sequences that M alory presents,
those o f Arthur’s initial and final wars, show signs o f strain, though in
different ways. The first disturbs the story line, while the second cannot
be connected to the fifteenth-century present.77
 THREE

Agramante’s War
Matteo M aria Boiardo

IN ONE RESPECT MATTEO M ARIA BOIARDO D IFFERS FROM

ill her writers o f romance in the late fifteenth century, for he invented a
|iiirely fictional world. He did not abbreviate or rework older stories, as
illtl Malory and Pulci, nor did he model the career o f his fictional hero
i mi i hat of a historical person, as Martorell did to some extent in modeling
his I'irant after Roger de Flor.1 Both Pulci and Boiardo wrote about
( [Link], but where Pulci ended at least with a historical event, the
Imiit le of Roncesvalles, Boiardo told a story without precedent in the old
• hronicles.2 It is doubtful that anyone in his audience would have be­
lieved that Agramante had ever existed or led a huge African army into
I [Link].3
Yet Boiardo too imitated history, its formal devices rather than its con­
ic in. He discusses his romance as if it were history, exploiting the ambigu-
n y o f the term storia or istoria, which can mean simply “a narrative” or “a
history.” He begins his Orlando innamorato by saying that a “bella istoria”
moves his song, and he repeats the phrase often throughout the romance.
I le develops this claim when he introduces his first catalogue ( O I2.22.1—
1).1 He cannot climb Parnassus for the laurel, he says, but rather will sing
,11 the bottom o f the hill “questa istoria.” Although humble, his song too
serves a purpose, for no one would remember the valor o f Alexander or
( .lesar without history. The poet’s patron Ercole preferred history, and
boiardo adjusts his form accordingly.5 His style is “low,” like the prose of
a historian; his order is chronological; and when he presents catalogues
and councils, which are common to the epic poet and to the classical
historian, he follows the historian rather than the poet.6
formal imitation lent a certain verisimilitude to this, the most fantas-
1n o f the late fifteenth-century romances. Boiardo has the leaders o f a
5» War w ithout the Gun

Saracen army debate the pros and cons o f a possible invasion o f France,
and his catalogues give precise details about the soldiers and their lands
o f origin. This trend to historical verisimilitude grew in the years after
Boiardo composed his work.7 It affected Ariosto’s presentation o f the
siege o f Paris and reached its Italian climax with Tasso, who encouraged
the use o f historical chronicles for verisimilitude, though he carefully
avoided the vanishing point himself. He never let the Gerusalemme libe-
rata become indistinguishable from history. The conventions o f historical
writing helped make romance more probable, even believable.
The kind o f history Boiardo imitated signals the Renaissance and sepa­
rates him from his quattrocento contemporaries north and south. True
to his humanist education, the poet looked to Livy and Herodotus rather
than to medieval chronicles, thus lending dignity to his romance.8 More
especially he used Herodotus when he tried to assess the goals and the
power o f King Agramante, whose invasion o f France is the public focus
for books 2 and 3 o f the InnamoratoP Boiardo constructed his analysis
through the same means the Greek historian had used for Xerxes’s inva­
sion. Giovanni Ponte has already sketched briefly the extent o f this debt.10
Here, I wish to flesh it out and suggest the relationship between this clas­
sical vision o f war and military practice in the quattrocento. Historical
form came easily to the man who had already translated Herodotus.11
(For a discussion o f the translation, see appendix 2.) Certain peculiarities
of geographical reference link the translation to the poem. For example,
in his translation he calls the Ethiopians whom Cambyses fights Macrotpi
{Hist. 7.18; Boiardo, 119V), and they reappear as troops who serve Gra-
dasso when he invades Spain ( 0 / 1.4 .3 4 ) .12 Next the poet puts a wood
with serpents and lions on the south slope o f the Atlas range or Mount
Catena {Hist. 7.191; Boiardo, i54r), the kind o f area in which Rugiero
grows up (O /2.1.74, 3.5.35-37). More important than borrowed words or
phrases, however, is the understanding Boiardo gained from his work on
Herodotus, one possible only to a translator. This understanding helped
him compose his original variations when he turned to the Innamorato.
Herodotus gave Boiardo his conception o f the Saracen enemy, and it
is the Saracens on whom I focus in this chapter: both the leaders and the
soldiers who followed them to war. The price o f this classical imitation
came perhaps too high. It reinforced old stereotypes o f the Saracen and
thus promoted a dangerous military illusion, one Italians could not afford
in the 1480s. The imitation o f history, in fact, allowed Boiardo to evade
contemporary reality.
The poet’s use o f Herodotus necessitates a literary discussion, for the
 AGRAM ANTE S W AR 59

*)«*( ails o f the imitation reveal the poet’s attitude to the enemy. I will focus
on the councils of war that begin book 7 o f Herodotus and book 2 of the
Inimmorato and the military catalogues given later in the same books,
which define the empires and war potential o f the invaders {Hist. 7.61-9 9;
( )l 2.22.4-18). Throughout, however, one must remember that Boiardo
used many sources, even for single scenes. Rodamonte may take Mardon-
1ns’s place at the first council, but he hardly resembles the Persian
general.13

T H E C O U N C IL S O F W A R

Although Boiardo does use Herodotus elsewhere in his romance, he con-

1 nitrates on the parallel between Agramante and Xerxes, their war delib------
erations and army.14 The two monarchs deliver similar speeches before a
imincil o f advisers. Each gives two speeches, which open and close the
debate. Both rulers appear as young men, eager to act in a manner worthy
of their ancestors and to surpass them, for they dream o f world conquest.
Herodotus has Xerxes constantly talk like a young man, though in fact
lie has grown children. He treats his elders with a mixture o f respect and
short temper.15 Agramante similarly begins speaking with great politeness
to his advisers, but can only end the debate by a fiat. Boiardo makes his
king twenty-two years old, so he was a boy o f seven when his father died
lighting Charlemagne in Burgundy ( 0 7 2 .1.14 -16 ).16 Neither mler has
experienced warfare with his European enemy. Both dwell on family
precedent. Xerxes sees the Achaemenid past as a pattern o f expansion that
lie projects on his own future. He must make a conquest worthy o f C y­
rus, Cambyses, and Darius (Hist. 7.8.1). For Agramante the family past
is more distant and yet more visible. H e appeals to the founder o f his
family, Alexander the Great, whose story appears sculpted on the walls of
1 he hall where the Africans deliberate ( O il. 1.22 -3 0 ).17 It is the romance
story o f Alexander, which surpasses in extravagance the historical record,
lor he concludes his conquests with a tour o f the sky, flying behind two
griffons, and descends in a glass compartment to view the whales and
great fishes o f the sea. Balas rubies and sapphires decorate the frieze and
make this past even more splendid.
Both kings misunderstand their past. Persian expansion, at least in the -
West, had stopped with Darius, who faced rebellion in Babylon, Egypt,
and Ionia, and whose campaign beyond the frontiers ended unsuccess­
fully.18 Where Xerxes misreads, Agramante ignores the immediate past,
lor three previous kings have died fighting Charlemagne (O /2.1.14). Both
6o War w ithout the Gun

kings would reopen wars with enemies who have previously defeatc
their armies.
Applied to the future, this family pattern causes hubris.19 After
conquest o f Greece, Xerxes intends to march throughout Europe, so i
sun will not look upon any land beyond the Persian borders (H ist j
7.8.g.2). Certainly his preparations suggest that he wishes for a perma
nent conquest: the new royal road through Thrace (Hist. 115.3),
bridges of boats at the Hellespont and the Strymon, the canal at Atholj
Agramante, as befits a romance hero, has a still wilder vision: first France,]
next the world, finally Paradise ( 0 1 2.1.64).20
The kings provoke a battle o f youth and age. In Herodotus the ruler]
and his cousin Mardonius speak for the young and argue for war, while]
Xerxes’s uncle Artabanus opposes them. In Boiardo it is Agramante and]
the young Rodamonte against Sobrino, a veteran o f the previous war; ]
Branzardo who carried the baby Agramante in his arms and regards him 1
as a son (01 2.1.43); and especially the king o f Garamanta, now over]
ninety, who dies during the second council (2.1.57, 62). The y o u n g ;
speak first.
Mardonius has supplied Xerxes with some o f his arguments and
dreams o f ruling Hellas.21 His speech in council, however, is contradic­
tory. O n the one hand, he argues that the Persians need not fear the
Greeks in battle, thus ignoring the defeat at Marathon; on the other, tac­
itly admitting the defeat, he recommends that Xerxes bring a large army
and navy (Hist. 7.9). Agramante will similarly go to France with a huge
land army, by which arrangement he recognizes the European tactical
superiority demonstrated in the previous wars, though he never refers to
it. His own supporter in council is the giant Rodamonte, who hopes to
be crowned king in France ( 0 1 2.3.35). Otherwise he resembles Mardon­
ius not at all and presents no practical arguments for the war. Instead he
argues for royal authority ( 0 1 2.1.53—56): whoever contradicts the royal
mandate is a traitor. A t the oath taking he reinforces this appeal, saying
that he will follow or even go before Agramante wherever he leads, even
to heaven or hell ( 0 1 2.1.65). 1 ° fact> it is not clear that he follows his
own precepts. Later, dissatisfied with the postponement o f the war, Roda­
monte leaves the second council without a goodbye ( 0 1 2.3.36) and leads
his own expedition to France. Perhaps this constitutes “going before” the
monarch, but it hardly fits the royal politics he argued at the first council.
His actions seem as contradictory as Mardonius’s speeches.
Artabanus opposes the war against Greece, both at the council and at
Abydos, using three arguments that Boiardo in his poem assigns to several
 a g r a m a n t e ’s w a r 6i

Iiim Artabanus warns o f divine anger, explains the geographic prob-

41 nl begins an assessment o f Hellene military power, which Demara-
MHiiinues at Doriscus and Thermopylae. Boiardo has the king o f Ga-
ftHl4 lii>i argue the first, Sobrino o f Garbo the second, and Branzardo of
lUjllil (lie third.
fltilb authors express the first point in contemporary terms. Artabanus
U N ( it k1 as a Greek tyrant who does not bother with little lives but thun-
fct* against the high, hurling his “arrows” at great houses and trees.
Wtirn the envious deity, like Zeus in the Ilia d (8.66—77), throws panic or
ihltiulrr, a large army can be destroyed by a small one. G od allows great
lltiMlgliis only to himself and does not tolerate fantasizing (Hist. 7.10.e).22
Allalunus directs this argument at the hubris he perceives in his royal
Hpplirw, who wishes to conquer all o f Europe. Mardonius, he warns, will
foil the birds and dogs, either in Greece or on the way there (Hist.
I M ii.r ) .
I lie king o f Garamanta takes up these points but modernizes them.
Kiiiliiiiionte will indeed feed the crows in France, but for the rest the king
If [Link] an envious deity with an unfavorable disposition o f the stars (01
t .1.V/-59). The king is an astrologer and a priest o f Apollo, the sun god,
4 inl his desert kingdom has clear skies by night.23 Saturn is in the ascen-
1litn1 and will destroy the Africans. The army, large or small, will not
iciiirn. A t best, if Rugiero joins the Africans, they will win honor and
wime victories ( 0 1 2.1.70). Agramante accepts the practical suggestion for
[Link] that reinforce the astrologer’s authority: the old man has always
1 Directly forecast the future ( 0 1 2 .1.76 -77). Agramante thus unwittingly
guilts the old man his major premise, that the Africans will lose the war.
The argument from geography concerns the enemy land and is clearer
111 Herodotus, since he works with real and not romance landscapes. At
Abydos Artabanus argues that the great size o f Xerxes’s forces does not fit
( ireece (Hist. 7.49). The coast does not afford the navy a port capable of
saving the ships in a storm. A storm ruined Mardonius’s previous expedi-
lion, and another one will hit at Cape Sepias. The land presents a differ­
ent problem: the farther the army advances, the more hostile the land
becomes. Artabanus presumably alludes both to the military opposition
and to supplies.
Sobrino likewise speaks o f sea and land, but the application is purely
tactical ( O /2 .1.4 4 -51). The Africans could sail directly to France and land
at Aquamorta (Aigues-Mortes), a swampy district southwest o f Arles.
There, however, ten Christians would be worth a hundred Saracens, pre­
sumably because the latter would be struggling out o f the water. Roda-
61 War w ithout the Gun

monte proves Sobrino’s point, at least partially. A four-day storm forces

him to sail direcdy on the rocks at Monaco, and he loses two-thirds o f
his men ( 0 1 2.6.41) and more than two-thirds o f his 190 ships with their
supplies and horses (2.6.48—49). This total does not include casualties
from the battle that follows. Sobrino thinks the land route by Spain
would be easier initially but would end up being even more difficult than
the naval route. T h e Africans would have to confront first Ranaldo at
Montealbano and then Orlando. In the event, by good luck Agramante’s
forces win at Montealbano, and Orlando is diverted from the war, but
the Saracens fail at Paris. The main invasion supports Sobrino’s analysis.
Sobrino emphasizes the quality o f the Christian soldiers, which improves
as the Africans advance, a point parallel to Artabanus s and one that leads
logically to an analysis o f the enemy army.
In council Artabanus states that the Hellenes are best on land or sea
(Hist. 7.10). He warns that a naval defeat could leave the Persians
stranded in Europe and reminds the councilors that the Athenians by
themselves destroyed the army o f Datis and Artaphrenes on land. Demar-
atus, the exiled Spartan, later continues this second argument. Am ong
other points he says that although a single Spartan does not surpass an­
other soldier in strength, as a group the Spartans fight more effectively
than any other company o f soldiers. He attributes this group coordina­
tion to the rule o f law and contrasts it implicitly with Xerxes’s mass levies,
driven into battle by whips (Hist. 7.10 2 -4 ). A t Thermopylae the Spartans
illustrate his point. By keeping a tight organization they can simulate
flight. W hen the enemy pursues and presumably loses order, the Spartans
turn and cut down great numbers (Hist. 7.211.3).
In Boiardo’s work King Branzardo demonstrates the same point in a
triple manner: by reason, example, and experience ( 0 1 2.1.39—43). By rea*
son Agramante should not attack France because he would have to use
untrained masses against veterans who stand by each other in battle.
Branzardo’s example turns around one o f the young king’s own claims.
Agramante does not resemble another Alexander, setting off to conquer
the world, but the Darius whom Alexander defeated. The Greek had old
and seasoned troops, but in the Persian army one soldier did not know
another. Experience reinforces the point, for the Africans failed in their
last attack, fifteen years previously. Tactically, neither o f the invading
armies, the Persian or the African, has the requisite skill to win a war
against professional soldiers.
Through the council scenes both writers show young people who plan
badly through inexperience. This explains why they misread the past and
 a g r a m a n t e ’s w a r 63

ilmik that a large enough army will remedy the failures o f earlier cam­
paigns. Inexperience likewise explains their willingness to begin aggres­
sive wars and their unrealistic dreams o f world conquest. On the other
side, the older men have all the caution that experience o f defeat can
pioduce. They know the enemy, his army and his land, and they con­
st met an array o f practical arguments against this new enterprise. Finally,
11u y fear the supernatural and wish to rest with what they have. The
young, however, win the meetings, for the kings are young and desire
glory. Nevertheless, the military catalogues that follow the councils show
ilui in this case the old men are right.

T H E CATALO GU ES

Boiardo indicates two o f the three sources for his catalogues when he
1 1aims that Agramante had collected together the largest army ever (01
;.2.y. 1-2 ).24 N o t Hannibal when he brought all Africa and Spain to Italy,
not Xerxes who took Scythians and Ethiopians to Thermopylae, had an
army of this size. Livy and Herodotus, the classical historians o f a Europe
invaded by foreigners, provide his model. Boiardo’s third source comes
Irom the romancers’ practice o f modernization. Charlemagne’s enemies
had to be Saracens, not the old pagan Persians and Carthaginians, and
the towns and districts o f Islamic Africa had to be given their current
names. Boiardo thus had to use portulans,.contemporary nautical maps,25
lather than that o f Ptolemy, which copyists also continued to reproduce
digs. 10, 11). The conception is classical, but many o f the details are
modern.
Livy gave Boiardo his notion o f political Africa and the grand outlines
of the war. Agramante’s family comes from Tarabulus, or Tripoli (Livy,
.’ .1.9), and he has his own capital at Bizerte (Biserta). The two towns
define roughly the coastal limits o f the old Carthaginian homeland, and
half o f Agramante’s elect troops come from this area: Bizerte, Tunis, and
Iarabulus, not to mention others from Jerba (Alzerbe).26 Westward Agra­
mante’s control extends at least as far as that o f the old Punic colonial
system: on the Mediterranean coast Bejai'a (Bugia), Algiers, Bellama-
rina,27 and Oran; Ceuta (Septa, Sette) and Alcazar el-Saghir (Alghezera) at
(he Pillars o f Hercules; then down the Atlantic coast with Asilah (Arzila),
Lirache (Alvaracchie),28 and Azemmour (Azumara, Zumara). The cam­
paign resembles the Second Punic War, for Agramante joins a Spanish
army, and together they win a great initial victory and occupy most o f
die enemy’s territory. The outcome, however, will resemble the last Punic
 64 War w ithout the Gun

War, for it is predicted that Orlando will level Bizerte and leave it in ruins,
as the second Scipio demolished Carthage ( 0 1 2.1.19).
Herodotus’s influence can be seen in the catalogues by the inclusion
o f a naval as well as an army catalogue. Similarly, the poet’s emphasis on
the exotic in his presentation o f the diverse contingents reveals the histo­
rian’s influence. More important, however, the Greek gave Boiardo his
sense o f the oasis kingdoms (fig. 12).
Boiardo includes an unnecessary catalogue o f ships (O I 2.29.3-20 ),
unnecessary because the ships serve only as troop transport, from Bizerte
to Malaga (Maliga). Herodotus had described both land and sea forces
because Persian strategy required their cooperation.29 The Persians fought
simultaneously on both, as the battles o f Thermopylae and Artemisium
indicate. Boiardo imagines only a land war but includes the naval cata­
logue for two purposes: he wants to remind his audience o f the enemy
leaders, just before they take part in the battle o f Montealbano, and he

Figure 10. Mauros map of North Africa (1459). Courtesy the University of Chicago
Libraries.
Figure n. Places in Agramante’s empire that can be exactly located on a modern map.
66 War w ithout the Gun

likes color and exotic detail, so he enumerates all the ensigns o f the Sara­
cen leaders.30 This color becomes traditional in the first catalogue {01
2.22.4-28), where Boiardo imitates Herodotus’s descriptions o f exotic
peoples.31 The people from Alcazar el-Saghir (Alghezera), for example,
use dragon bones for iron and substitute lion heads for helmets { 0 1
2.22.17—19).32 So far Herodotus influenced the poet’s form, but the Greek
also influenced Boiardo’s content.
Boiardo turned to Herodotus for material when he needed informa­
tion on the desert oases in “ Getulia.” 33 T h e portulans gave few precise
locations for places in the African interior, and Boiardo had to look else­
where for the information. This situation explains some peculiarities in
Boiardo’s catalogues, for the Renaissance text o f Herodotus had doublets
that required interpretation. Farthest east was Siwa (Amonia), the place
where Zeus Am m on had his temple, followed by Awjilah (Augila), the
oasis where the Nasamones harvested dates {Hist. 4.172). Next came the
Garamantes, listed twice but only once for the oasis, which, however,
Herodotus located too far west.34 In between, Boiardo put Fizano (the
modern Fezzan in western Libya). N ow the Garamantes o f Herodotus
hunt the Ethiopian troglodytes, who live on serpents and lizards. J ’hey
become Boiardo’s people o f Bulga, a place in the deep desert {01
2.22.10).35 Next Herodotus has the Atlantes, listed twice {Hist. 4.184).36
 a g r a m a n t e ’s w ar 67

lloiardo took the description o f the first but the location o f the second,
/.ti diest west under Mount Atlas. Herodotus says that they are blameless
hm curse and revile the sun while it is high, because its burning wears
mil their land and them. The Italian poet keeps the detail but reverses
the judgment: there is no group worse ( 0 1 2.22.11). He also incorrectly
modernizes their name, for they become the people o f Fez (Fiessa).37
The rest o f Agramante’s kingdom can be briefly told. Boiardo has some
sense o f the cities o f the Tell (Constantine, Tlemcen or Tremison)38 and
0/ die Atlas district (Mount Carena),39 and he adds the Canaries and the
black kingdoms o f West Africa, which the Portuguese were exploring.40
I le thus conveys a sense that Agramante brings all o f Africa west of
Egypt— all o f it that Europeans knew about— to the great war (01
1.12.28). Agramante’s realm thus equals in extent the earlier empires in
die area. Its center and policies are Carthaginian, but the king controls
die whole o f North Africa, as had the Almohads, and his rule extends as
Zar south as that o f the Almoravids.41 In this fashion Boiardo creates an '
imaginary rival o f the historical Persian empire that invaded Greece.
Militarily, both Herodotus’s and Boiardo’s catalogues describe armies
1hat consist mostly o f light troops and must fight heavily armored sol­
diers: the phalanx o f the Greeks and the mailed cavalry o f medieval Eu­
rope. Xerxes has hardly any hoplites or heavy infantry in his army.42 The
Persians themselves set the standard: armored archers who could serve as
infantry.43 Otherwise the king has archers who wear no armor, and javelin
dirowers from Anatolia.44 The Persian tribes likewise provide the heavy
cavalry.45 Agramante’s army shows the same pattern exaggerated. Nine of
his contingents are well armed.46 O f the rest, where Boiardo gives infor­
mation, none has any value militarily.47 There are the nomads and oasis
dwellers, who wear no armor (nine contingents);48 the people of the A t­
lantic seaboard, whom Boiardo imagines living in Stone Age condi­
tions,49 and the black troops.50 Finally, he dismisses those from Norman-
dia as deaf, lame, and cross-eyed (O I 2.22.19).
Few o f these troops could face heavily armed Europeans. Both kings,
1he real and the Active, discover this fact quickly. Xerxes sends Medes and
( iissians (Elamites) to capture the diminutive force at Thermopylae alive.
The Asiatics, o f course, cannot advance in the narrow pass, and the Per­
sian Immortals who replace them fare no better. Courage cannot com­
pensate for shorter spears (Hist. 7 .2 10 -12 ).51 A t Montealbano Boiardo
constructs a variation on this scene. Agramante tells Pinadoro o f Con­
stantine to get information on the battle below. He is to go where the
battle is fiercest and capture one to six prisoners alive and bring them
68 War w ithout the Gun

back for interrogation. Instead Orlando unhorses him, leans over, picks
him up, and does his own interrogating (O I 2.29.32-36). H e sends the
shaken youth back to Agramante, and Pinadoro now argues against the
battle, saying that, i f the other warriors resemble the one he met, their
own fate will be terrible.
T h e invaders o f necessity must rely on numbers. Xerxes regularly as­
sumes that the size o f his army obviates combat and brings to Thermopy­
lae a land army that Herodotus estimates at 2.1 million {Hist. 7.184).52
Boiardo gives few numbers, but one is telling: 100,000 ships bring the
army to Spain ( 0 /2 .29 .22). This total does not include King Marsilio’s
army, which Agramante finds fighting at Montealbano. Both rulers in­
tend to overwhelm their opponents.
The two authors have the same military analysis o f this strategy. At
Thermopylae Xerxes learns that he has many people but few men (Hist.
7.210.2). The judgment is harsh because the king has used only his best
troops that day. Boiardo is, as usual, more explicit. Contempt marks his
first catalogue. A t one place he says that he does not give numbers because
Orlando could easily chase such a rabble ( 0 1 2.22.7), and in the battle
the Africans are simply canaille.53
Good fortune accounts for the initial victories won by the invaders.
Xerxes finds a way around Thermopylae, and the Africans arrive late in
the day at Montealbano, while the French have been fighting for many
hours. In both cases numbers win, but the military future remains uncer­
tain.54 Victory allows the invaders to occupy much enemy territory, but
they lose the next battle. Hardly any Persian who fought at Plataea sur­
vived the battle.55 In Boiardos work, Agramante fails in his initial assault
on Paris, but he keeps his army intact. The poet has told us, however,
that this army will perish in France. The many may win the first battle,
but they will inevitably lose the war.

S I G N I F I C A N C E O F B O IA R D O ’S IM IT A T IO N
OF H ERO D O TUS

B o ia r d o ’s c la ssic iz in g a n a ly sis h a s a d o u b le fo c u s a n d re q u ire s a d o u b le

e v a lu a tio n . Its e x p lic it c o n c e r n is A f r ic a , b u t its real a p p lic a tio n a n d th e
fo rc e o f th e H e r o d o te a n m o d e l a p p ly to th e T u r k s , th e n e w th re a t to
E u r o p e fr o m th e E a s t.
T h e th re at fr o m B a r b a r y w a s fic tio n a l in th e q u a ttr o c e n to . T h e w e a k
su lta n ate s o f N o r t h A f r ic a th re a te n e d n o o n e , a n d se rio u s p ir a c y h a d n o t
y e t b e g u n .56 B o ia r d o im a g in e d fo r h is b a c k g r o u n d th e m a tte r o f th e A s-
 a g r a m a n t e ’s w a r 69

ftlrnwni, in which Saracens from Africa invade southern Italy. It recalled

llir Iasi period during which Islam threatened Italy, the long-ago days of
ttiHtiiil raids and the Muslim occupation o f Sicily. Andrea da Barberino
ImiI m ently put the story into Italian prose, and Boiardo made his Agra-
IIMliir the successor o f its African leaders, the young king who would
tvviigc the previous defeat.57
I Irrodotus helped Boiardo to evaluate such a kingdom correcdy, not
|||*l lor details o f geography but also for a sense o f its military potential.
I Irtmlotus had known a land where the cities on or near the coast had
1 iirrk hoplites, while the interior had nomadic tribes with little or no
Minor. Despite all the changes o f the intervening two millennia— the
(ill induction o f the camel, the coming o f the Arabs— the model still had
I tenain validity. Boiardo turned the hoplites into the elite troops around
Ajtramante, coming from the coastal cities o f modem Tunisia and Libya,
Kliil lie kept Herodotus’s nomads for inner Africa. In fact, the sultans of
lillrcnth-century Barbary ruled from towns, such as Fez, Tlemcen, and
llmis, and surrounded themselves with a core o f mercenaries. However,
lliey themselves were tribal and depended ultimately on the nomadic
ll^lil cavalry o f the countryside, the Arab and the Berber tribesmen who
Imiglit with short lances and used a dagger and a sword for close fighting.
I'liese nomads wore no real armor and so invited Boiardo’s negative pre-
d'liiation. The tribes simply came together for war in spring and summer,
wnliout a fixed command system or strategy, and were no match for the
llu-rian troops that were beginning to seize the coastal cities.58
This use o f Herodotus, though valuable, cannot by itself account for
1lie historian’s importance to Boiardo’s narrative. The poet could have
limnd similar material on Africa in other classical writers and geogra­
phers, whose works were available in the ducal library.59 Moreover, Boi-
itrilo imagines a Muslim threat to Europe, not merely to Italy, and Africa
hail never so menaced Europe, at least not since the days o f Hannibal.
I lie Almoravids and Almohads had fought defensive actions in Spain,
Imi the great cavalry charge that stopped only at Tours had emanated
IInm Asia and the Umayyad administration in Damascus. Boiardo
mined to Herodotus primarily because he and his contemporaries wor-
1 ied about a new threat from the East that concerned many kingdoms
besides the Italian states and seemed invincible in the 1470s: the Turkish
armies o f Mehmed II Fatih, the Conqueror.60
Ottoman troops had already reached the Danube before Mehmed II
t ame to power. He began his reign by the capture o f Constantinople in
1453 and soon had occupied the other Greek states (1453—61). W ith Bosnia
70 War w ithout the Gun

(1463) he began his approach to Italy. Albanians fled there in 1467, and
their state began to collapse in the following year. The Turks were now
on the Adriatic and raiding Venetian territory in Dalmatia ( 1 4 6 7 ,1469).61
They were in Istria in 1471, and Turkish cavalry raided the Friuli several
times in the 1470s. Venetians could climb their campanile and glimpse
the smoke o f burning villages.62 Finally, the Turks reached Otranto in the
south, which Gedik Ahmed Pa$a captured in 1480. This threat to Italy
coincided with the years when Boiardo wrote most o f his poem. Venice
was the great neighboring power, and its misfortunes would not pass un­
noticed in Ferrara, since the Friuli was less than 300 kilometers away.
Otranto concerned the house o f Aragon, which Boiardo had praised in
his poem and which had given Ferrara its duchess. The concern and the
fear that were felt during the 1470s recalled for a classically trained poet
the original East-West conflict chronicled by Flerodotus, when the mere
appearance o f a Persian army could cause panic (Hist. 6.112.3) and the
enemy zone o f control ultimately included all the cities o f the Asiatic
Greeks, those o f the Aegean islands, and most o f the European homeland.
Boiardo’s use o f Herodotus is an indication o f his sense o f a threat to the
very existence o f his culture, quite as fundamental as that o f the Persian
to the Hellene, and perhaps without parallel in the intervening millennia.
For a century the clash o f Muslim and Christian dominated Italian epic.
There is a further, more precise reason for Boiardo’s use o f Herodotus.
Certain actions in the Long W ar between Venice and Turkey (1463—79)
paralleled closely some events in Xerxes’s invasion o f Greece. Like the
Spartans and their allies before them, the Venetians and insurgent forces
o f the Morea in 1463 thought to prevent an enemy invasion by the con­
struction of the Hexamilion, a wall across the Isthmus o f Corinth. In
both cases the defenders labored feverishly.63 In a mere fifteen days Vene­
tian sailors as well as soldiers— about 30,000 men altogether— managed
to reerect the whole wall. They made it three and a half meters high and
more than a meter thick, with 136 towers and a moat on both sides. He­
rodotus points out the futility o f such a defense, though the Persians
never tested it.64 The Turks did, and, at the approach o f the main army,
the Venetian admiral Alvise Loredano ordered a withdrawal to Navplion,
and the whole defense o f the Morea collapsed. W ith the failure went
Venice’s one serious chance o f victory in the war.65 This parallel alone
need not have recalled Herodotus, because military thinking in any age
would suggest a wall at the isthmus, and the Turks had already crossed tlye
Hexamilion when they first conquered the Morea. However, the parallel
supports another, which is striking enough to make a classically trained
 a g r a m a n t e ’s w a r
71

vviiicr think about historical repetition. This is the crucial action o f the
w.u that destroyed Venice’s status as a great power: the siege o f Chalkis
m Negroponte (1470).
The year before, the Venetian admiral Niccolo da Canale had raided
in the northern Aegean and provoked Mehmed II sufficiently that he
personally led a massive counterattack the following year. Galley warfare
inpiires nearby bases, and the Venetian port for the central and northern
Aegean was Negroponte, on the island o f Euboea. To take it, Mehmed
led a combined land and sea offensive, the size o f which recalled the old
Persian invasion. In both cases exaggerated numbers given by the Euro­
pean historians indicate the panic it caused. Mehmed II led an army over­
land o f 120,000 men, but it was the size o f his fleet that shocked the West.
Venice had counted on its naval superiority, but what could Canale with
ss galleys do against 300 ships and 70,000 men?66 Eyewitnesses called it
a forest at sea, stretching across nearly twelve kilometers o f water. The
Persians had assumed that an overwhelming force would make combat
unnecessary. They guessed wrong for the Greeks, but the same policy
worked against the Venetians. Although the garrison defended Negro­
ponte brilliantly, the Venetian fleet achieved nothing and failed to relieve
Ilie town in time.67 Venice continued to fight for another nine years, but
II had lost the war and no longer ruled the sea.
The actions at the Hexamilion and Negroponte seemed to be a repeti-
lion o f Herodotus— with the wrong ending. Nevertheless, the warfare
had not ended, and the action involved Italy and the Balkans as well as
( ireece. The Herodotean scenario might still apply, and that is the em­
phasis o f Boiardo’s fantasy war. However many battles the Europeans
might lose initially, however much territory the enemy might occupy, the
elite soldiers o f Europe would finally win and expel the invader. The pat­
tern forecasts the failure o f the enemy even in his successes. Catalogues
of the hostile forces at the battles o f Thermopylae, Roncesvalles, and
Montealbano all showed his weakness.
This pattern, though comforting, was false. It had been true for He­
rodotus and for the writers o f the chansons de geste, who signaled the
(Christian offensive in Spain, but by the fifteenth century it no longer
applied, at least not for the Italians and eastern Europeans. Yet this think­
ing persisted in people’s minds, and not only in their fantasies. Machia-
velli, drawing on the Roman historians, still assumed the pattern in the
generation after Boiardo’s. It is well, then, to clarify its assumptions so as
to see more clearly the illusions involved.
Herodotus and Boiardo present variations on a single theme: the clash
 72 War w ithout the Gun

o f foreigner and European. T h e foreigner can be Asiatic and eastern or

African and southern, but he is invariably alien and aggressive. H e prac­
tices another religion and initiates the war. Young people, dreamers o f
impractical dreams, lead this attack. T h ey rule vast but polyglot empires
that produce a mass o f untrained light troops that depend upon a core
o f elite soldiers and commanders. They attack smaller but more racially
homogeneous areas.68 While the Greeks consist o f independent and often
warring city states, the Franks serve a single ruler, though the lords are
feudal and can act on their own. The army, though small, consists in both
cases o f heavily mailed troops, soldiers with extensive military experience.
Machiavelli, thinking o f the classical and contemporary worlds, gives
political reasons for the superiority o f European soldiers. Although his
argument would not apply directly to the real or fictional empire o f Char­
lemagne, it shares illusions with Boiardo’s fantasy. Machiavelli assumes
that the more states there are in an area, the more valiant the men will
be. Europe is the best because it has many kingdoms and states to culti­
vate virtue. Africa has fewer good soldiers, and those in the past mostly
came from the republic o f Carthage. Asia, a single vast kingdom, has
even fewer. The constitution o f a state also makes a difference. A republic
encourages virtue, but kings fear virtue. Asia, since it has only one king­
dom and one ruler, has the least active men.69
This thinking rests on three illusions. T h e first concerns the kind o f
soldier involved. Like Pulci and the other romancers, Boiardo portrays
clashes of heavy cavalry between Christian and Saracen, whether in Cen­
tral Asia or in France. In fact, war with the Saracen did not resemble this
paradigm very closely. Cavalry was important, but not the heavy cavalry
o f the West, as the French knights discovered at Nicopolis. In that batde
the knights were annihilated by the Janissaries and Spahis, the infantry
and light horsemen o f the Turks. The latter conducted the great Ottoman
raids in Yugoslavia and Albania, and Venice had its own version, the
Stradiots, whom it brought to Italy for the Ferrara War (1482-84) 7° These
were mostly Greek-speaking Albanians from the Morea who wore breast­
plates, had shields, and carried light lances pointed at both ends and
sometimes a crossbow. Their horses, lacking armor, moved swiftly.71
Italian writers were quick to see the parallels between these light
horsemen and the Eastern enemies o f Rome. Machiavelli, speaking o f the
— Parthians, at the same time envisaged for contemporary cavalry essen­
tially the role o f the Stradiots. Horsemen were to scout, raid, cut«ofF
enemy supplies, and pursue the enemy after a battle (Arte, 2.368-69).
Writing after the Ferrara War, Boiardo likewise introduced Parthian tac-
 a g r a m a n t e ’s w a r 73

lit s 111 book 3 o f the Innamorato. He invented an episode that portrayed

Ilif frustrations o f the heavily mailed cavalry soldier before the fast light
iiiulcrs o f the enemy (O /3.6 .16 -27). Old Daniforte ofTunis draws Brada-
iiituue away from an ambush by a feigned flight. Daniforte goes at a trot,
lomplainingand pretending exhaustion. He slows, letting her approach,
Utillops ahead, slows again, till he has lost her in the wild, far from Ru-
Ulrm. Bradamante forces her tired horse over a mountain ridge and down
In a plain, only to lose it in a ditch. Daniforte now circles around her,
attacking at unexpected points. Bradamante finally wins by a ruse. She
ilay.s dead, and even then the old man spears her experimentally before
I
ir dismounts. The episode demonstrates the difficulties o f Roman versus
I'rtiiltian, medieval knight versus Mongol or Turk. The enemy keeps out
III range and draws the Westerner into a trap.72
The critique does not go far enough because Boiardo still ignores in-
Idiuiy, and this, the despised class o f the romances, dominated the colo­
nial wars o f Venice. The sultans Janissaries were infantry, and like any
Western commander he especially needed infantry for an attack on forti­
fied positions and for mountain warfare.73 Infantry won the Albanian
IMsscs and fought the Venetians at the Isthmus o f Corinth. Naval warfare
likewise required infantry. Venice used foot soldiers for its naval raids,
mid die force it sent to conquer the Morea was predominantly infantry.74
Hie Venetian troops were bowmen, drawn mostly from Venice itself,
wlirir any citizen had to learn to use the crossbow and many had fought
nil die galleys.75 Bowmen and light cavalry determined the war in the
l iin . "

Between his catalogues and batde narratives Boiardo does address this
•lltiaiion indirectly.77 Herodotus again provides the model. Soldiers tend
In wear clothing and adopt modes o f fighting suitable to the climate and
topography o f their home areas. Oasis dwellers and African nomads, for
Maniple, would not wear armor, since they operate in the Sahara. Now,
llii ides of fighting that fit one zone may not work in another. The Per­
sians, who won Asia on horseback, had to fight the Spartans on foot. The
lliniiiuains o f Greece, although they allowed for the use o f light cavalry,
Idvnird infantry. The Italians o f Boiardo’s day preferred heavy cavalry,
lilll they had to adapt to these same conditions. The Venetians hired local
W » horsemen and brought their own infantry with them. Technology
III lIns case reinforced topography. Galleys were not good horse trans-
|«iiis. and Venetian overseas troops had to be prepared to fight on land
III mm. " The colonial from across the sea can hardly avoid fighting like
lilt' lot al.
74 War w ithout the Gun

Boiardo imagines a series o f battles fought, not overseas in Africa, but

within France, where Africans become the invading would-be colonials
and must fight like Franks. In France, Saharan nomads or the light armed
troops o f the Tell and o f the Atlantic coasts could not cope with Frankish
heavy cavalry. Agramante must depend upon his elite troops to do the
fighting, as Xerxes had had to do in Greece. Following this logic Boiardo
shows only cavalry duels because the other soldiers took a negligible part
in combat. By the same token, the Ottomans if they invaded Italy would
suffer defeat— as happened at Otranto (1480-81)— because they would
have to adopt Italian modes o f fighting. This argument does have force,
but it still does not escape other misconceptions.
A second illusion involves a special use o f numerical hyperbole. Pulci
had assumed that Marsilio, trying to expel the invading Franks from
Spain, mobilized all the forces o f his realm, which he brought to Ronces-
valles. Boiardo and his model, Herodotus, imagine much less plausible
scenarios. Herodotus assumes that Xerxes brought the whole army o f the
empire against Hellas, and this is what he catalogues rather than the ac­
tual invading force.79 He thus gives enormous figures, which conform to
earlier opinion. Aeschylus had made the same assumption, and Simon­
ides estimated the army at 3 million.80 Th e Greeks forgot that the Persians
would need troops to protect a very extended frontier, particularly in the
northeast, and others to control restless provinces.81 Boiardo thinks in
the same erroneous fashion. He has King Agramante bring the forces o f
his entire empire to Europe, and he explains the French defeat at M on-
tealbano by numbers. Numbers are finally necessary because they allow
the defeated Europeans to continue to assume that they were qualita­
tively superior.
This is the third illusion.82 Herodotus had described a military revolu­
tion; with Xerxes’s defeat the military advantage shifted to Europe and
remained there for eleven centuries. By the fifteenth century, however,
Europeans were losing more often than they won. Victory in the West—
the recovery o f the Iberian peninsula, the Balearics, and Sicily— did not
balance the loss o f Anatolia, Greece, and the Balkans. The Turks had
demonstrated their military superiority at Nicopolis (1396) and Varna
(1444), and Constantinople now belonged to them.83 Venice’s defeat in
the Long War confirmed a long-term trend in the East. Europeans could
not rely on quality. *
T h e reason s are clear. T h e e n e m y h a d n o t a ra b b le b u t an a r m y as
w e ll train ed a n d e x p e r ie n c e d as a n y th a t I t a ly o r E u r o p e c o u ld fie ld . T h e
Ja n issa rie s, fo r e x a m p le , w e re p ro fe ssio n a l so ld ie rs, re m o v e d fr o m c iv ilia n
 AGRAM ANTE S W AR 75

lilr .uid material cares, who won advancement through merit. They were
only the largest and most famous contingent among the sultans slave
so Idiers.84 Moreover, in the colonial wars they faced mostly Venetian mili­
tia and conscripts, not the condottieri companies o f Italy. A well-trained
lew can defeat a mob but not an army equal in training and superior in
numbers. In fact, Western leaders and soldiers had become so demoral­
ized by constant defeat that Scanderberg, the famous guerrilla leader in
Albania, asked for an escape galley and a guaranteed pension from Venice
helore he would participate in the Long War.85
Such misconceptions and illusions, especially the last, were comfort­
ing, but they were particularly dangerous in the crisis Italians thought
i hey were facing. Circumstances, however, spared them disillusionment.
[Link], the next sultan, did not pursue an expansionist policy; Selim
mined east and south; and Suleyman looked north to Hungary. The
I labsburgs fought the Western defense at Vienna, and the Ottomans
never seriously attacked Italy.
Undispelled, these illusions had a strange afterlife. The fiction that
Westerners with small armies could defeat alien multitudes became a real­
ity once more shortly after Boiardos death, though in a transformed situ­
ation. Small bands o f Spaniards succeeded in conquering much o f
America, their victories made possible by a technological superiority that
negated the need to fight like the locals. The old paradigm, wrongly ap­
plied in Europe, worked quite well on the other side o f the Atlantic.
 P A R T T W O &x

The Movement into

Realism and History
 ■FOUR-

The Siege of Paris

udovico Ariosto, Torquato Tasso, and Alonso
de Ercilla y Zuniga

'$* 1 M O D E R N C R I T IC S H A V E S T R E S S E D T H E F A N T A S Y IN T H E
iHtiii fiirioso, but it was rather the realism o f certain scenes that
ilml, perhaps even generated, a new approach to heroic poetry in the
I tlmrcnth century.' An outstanding example o f Ariostos realism is
Mliiuiite’s assault on Paris, which Ariosto presented with a plasticity
|llf’i edented in previous romance.2 Tasso, Ercilla, and Ercilla’s imita-
M pushed this new realism ever further but never quite to the point
H v die distinction between poetry and history disappears.3 They too
7|lli Ini sieges— Tasso o f Jerusalem, Ercilla o f a fort at Penco in Chile,
> ir lie had his own first experience o f war. Sieges, in fact, were a literary
tally o f the Renaissance; medieval romancers, although they presup-
pHMil sieges, did not describe them.
I have arranged this material in a logical rather than in a chronological
{Htlei In ilia and Tasso developed Ariostos innovations independently o f
H i ll oilier.'1 The second installment o f the Araucana, in which Ercilla
(Imi i ihes the siege o f Penco, appeared in 1578, several years before Tassos
ht/rmme liberata (1580—81), but it brings poetry closer to history than
ftnr* l asso’s work. Ercilla, therefore, comes last. I have not, however, ig-
gnieilTlmmology where it is crucial to m y analysis. In the case o f Ariosto,
fit? 1111 mil date is 1515, the year he sent the first edition o f the Furioso to
|l» (Hint cr/’ and not 1532, the year o f the third edition. Throughout his
1( visions the poet left his scenes o f siege as they had been in the
Mill edii ion, limiting himself to stylistic changes. T h e date thus makes a
(4111. M. 11 e for any historical analysis, most especially because technologi-
(#1 development was so rapid but also because the military and political
(MMies differed profoundly from 1515 to 1532. M y historical argument is
|lil*rii on the situation that prevailed in 1515.

70
8o The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

A R IO S T O

Boiardo began a siege o f Paris that Ariosto had to complete. He had

models elsewhere in Orlando innamorato for such a sequence: an earlier
siege by Gradasso and more especially the warfare around Albraca, which
he used for the later parts o f his own story (O F 27, 30—31) .s Boiardo did
not provide a model for the kind o f literary art Ariosto used to transform
the poetry o f war, but the earlier poet did find the sources that made
Ariosto’s achievement possible.
Boiardo tended to use Statius and Virgil for scenes o f siege. For ex­
ample, Turnus’s rampage in the Trojan camp set the pattern for Agricanes
in Albraca, but Boiardo cut most o f the details. He strove for economy
and swiftness o f presentation and limited his particulars to the duel o f
the Tatar king that begins the sequence. Agricane slices through the mace
and chain o f King Bordacco. Virgil in contrast had filled his scene with
precisely described kills, such as Antiphates, hit by a javelin that goes
through his belly into his lungs (Ae. 9 .6 9 6 -70 1), or young Pandarus, who
wants revenge and first talks with Turnus, before the Latin warrior lands
a downward blow that slices his head in half so that the Trojan falls, stain­
ing his armor with his own brains (9.735—55).
W hen he had Rodomonte rage down a Paris street, Ariosto used both
the Latin poets and Boiardo as models.7 His classical sources clearly had
the greater impact on him, for he made a mosaic imitation o f Virgil and
Statius, line by line, image by image.8 He followed Virgil in his precision
violence but then sketched in everything else. He states the width o f the
ditch at the city walls, knows just where Rodomonte runs in Paris, and
mentions the building materials used for the houses.9 As a result, Ariosto
creates a complete picture, more detailed and comprehensive than any­
thing in his sources, Latin or Italian.
Angelo Poliziano with his Stanze had pioneered this shift to realism.
His classical imitation produced the illusion in his readers that they saw
what he described.10 Giraldi Cinzio, Ariostos great apologist, later dis­
cussed the technique at length and gave numerous examples, one o f
which glances at Virgil: *
Queste ci fanno vedere le citta andare a ruba, ci pongono innanzi agli
occhi le fiamme sparse per gli tempj, per le torri, per le case private, ci
fanno udire le mine dei tetti, udir le grida degli impauriti e malmenati
popoli, vedere le madri stringersi i figliuoli al seno con suono di amaro
pianto; i rubatori pel contrario allegri spogliare i tempj degli iddj immor-
 T H E S I E G E O F P A R IS 8l

uli, c le case dei cittadini, e cacciarsi tuttavia gli incatenati prigioni

innanzi.
I'lay make us see cities sacked, put before our eyes flames spread through
temples, towers, and private houses. They make us hear the collapse o f
tools, hear the screams o f terrified and ill-used people, see mothers press
i Itildren to their breasts with the sound o f bitter lament; the looters, on
the contrary, joyfully spoil the temples o f the immortals and the houses of
citizens, and chained prisoners, nevertheless, press ahead.11

Ariosto’s predecessor, Boiardo, toward the end of his life had also experi­
mented with this new style,12 but he shied away from it for scenes of
warfare. Here it was Ariosto who followed through on Poliziano’s experi­
ments.13
Ariosto made a threefold contribution to military poetry. First, with
i lassical clarity he described war in all its diverse aspects. Some brief ex­
amples will suffice. A single ottava effectively evokes panic {O F 18.159).
Hie broken Saracens do not hear trumpet, drum, or signal for retreat:
lei l ifted, many drown themselves in the Seine. O n a humorous note, the
king of Oran wishes to joust with Rinaldo (O A 16.47) but though strong-
honed, he is small o f stature and so has to aim at Rinaldo’s shield. Finally,
Ariosto conveys the horror o f battle. The night after the great assault,
( loridano and Medoro come to the army where amid swords, arrows,
shields, and lances the poor and rich, king and vassals, lie in a red lake,
horses on top o f men {O F 18.182). So vivid were his descriptions that
1 litics quickly noticed parallels between Ariostos poetry and painting.
I udovico Dolce said that one seems to see more than read the poem, and
1 lilies o f the present century continue to make the same point.14 Ariosto
makes his audience feel that they have been spectators at a war in
progress.15
The poet extends this realism to the way the seasons set the rhythm o f
.1 war. He describes spring {O F 12.72) because it introduces a new cam­
paign, and troops that had gone into winter quarters are returning to
AgrarTTante’s camp.16 Similarly, the heavy rain that saved Paris the year
be fore, suddenly turning the plain into a lake and putting out fires that
were beyond control (O A 8.6 9 -70 ), probably signaled the onset o f winter
and the end o f the previous campaign.17 The poets who followed him
look this insistence on weather and developed it much further for their
own presentations o f war.
Second, this revived classical technique enabled Ariosto to represent
an assault on a fortified town. Virgil had shown the Greeks sacking Troy
82 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

mm

Figure 13. Porte Saint-Michel, Paris. Photograph: Roger-Viollet, Paris. Lithograph of

Nouveaux and Fourquemin (1839), after Pernot.

and Latins attacking a fort, and Ariosto now did the same for Paris. H i||
romance predecessors had avoided such scenes, despite the importance
o f sieges to warfare in the high and late M iddle Ages, the period that j
generated the literary form o f romance. T h ey did not have the old classi­
cal means to describe such scenes, and they may have passed over sieges j
for social reasons as well. Romance was an aristocratic form, but knights
had little to do in a siege. In sieges, pioneers and infantry, drawn from
the lower classes, did the essential work.18 Romancers normally presup­
posed a siege but assumed that a battle or duel resolved it. Boiardo so
handled both the earlier attack on Paris by Gradasso and the long drawn-
out siege o f Albraca.
Finally, Ariosto described the war at Paris without the element o f the
marvelous. Aside from Rodomonte’s prowess and the personification
comedy o f Discord, none o f the wonders for which the Furioso is famous
appears here. Although his plastic style could heighten the marvelous—
as it does, for example, in the knights’ fight with the hippogrif (2.48—
53)— here it accentuates the realism o f war instead.
T h e result o f these innovations was a series o f stunning scenes, mostly
involving Rodomonte.19 Two will suffice to show what Ariosto achieved
at Paris. In the first {O F 14.126—34 ,15 .3-5 ) Rodomonte leaps the ditch to
the inner wall, landing silently, as if he were wearing felt on his feet (fig.
13).20 Meanwhile his men, numbered precisely at 11,028, suffocate in a
 T H E S I E G E O F P A R IS 83

i f * Hitp below. The dying make a horrible harmony of screams with the
mg llames, and Rodomonte, looking back, blasphemes heaven
fellli let 1 dying cries.21 In the second (O .F16.21-28), Rodomonte goes ber-
tk, lushes down a street, and slaughters all he meets. The old, who had
C *11 waiting for news, now raise a loud cry. People try to flee to houses
•Hii 1 lunches, but few succeed. Rodomonte kills them all from behind,
|| limy 1un. One leaves half his legs; another’s head flies from his body;
•It* 1* 1111 crosswise and another vertically from head to flanks. The Sara-
Iftl kills without distinction o f age or social position: servant and lord,
Mllll and sinner, priest, boy, lady, old man. Not content with murdering
(WopIf, he also attacks buildings, setting fire to the wooden houses and
kltllii lies, shaking pieces out o f roofs. Ariosto concludes with a contem-
fNMMiy illustration: no bombard— which his patron Cardinal Ippolito
♦ I'lUlr saw at Padua, so large that it could make a wall fall— could do
It mini).
These scenes spoke directly to the experience o f Ariosto and his audi-
•lli e and marked the difference between the cinquecento and quattro-
HMim. Virgil’s Turnus and Boiardo’s Agricane, the heroes in the scenes
llui served as models for Ariosto, fight other soldiers.22 Rodomonte
daughters civilians. T h e French had shocked the Italians in 1494, when
Ihey killed all their prisoners.23 These executions were mere preludes to
the agonies o f cities they took, while Ariosto was writing his poem. Guic-
1 iiiidini says that after 1509 civilians “saw nothing but scenes o f infinite
tiling,liter, plunder and destruction o f multitudes o f towns and cities, at­
tended with the licentiousness o f soldiers no less destructive to friends
ih.m foes.” 24 The poet himself criticized the French for their treatment
11I Brescia and Ravenna, where the soldiers robbed and raped indiscrimi­
nately (O A 14.8—9). Rodomonte merely did more spectacularly what sol­
diers in the sixteenth century did as a matter o f course.25 The power o f
tin- scenes involving Rodomonte comes not only from Ariosto’s plastic
style but also from the reality o f contemporary warfare. These two factors
also explain the special difficulties Ariosto faced.
The relationship o f romance to contemporary warfare was already
dilficult in the fifteenth century, and the realism o f Ariosto’s chosen style
made it a critical issue. He had to keep his fiction reasonably close to
1lie experience o f his audience, which had an intimate knowledge o f war.
Ariosto himself casually refers to his own military experience {O F 19.83)
when he says that he has seen a bombard open squadrons the way Marfisa
did.26 Normally the romance poet discreedy updated his fiction. Under
84 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

the pretense that it happened long ago, he described a more or less con­
temporary form o f fighting. Ariosto had the same intent but experienced
serious difficulties in its execution.
Contemporary warfare varied from one region to another. Ariosto’s
fiction presupposed the war o f Christian and Saracen, but this was a false
model for at least two reasons. First, the Ottomans did not at present
menace Europe. The new sultan had turned east, attacking Persians and
Mamluks. Ariosto accordingly represents the Levant benignly, as a Da­
mascus o f tournaments and chivalric enterprise.27 Second, actual warfare
in the Levant differed from the persistent fighting that convulsed Italy at
that time. Venice, for example, did not campaign in the Levant in the
same w ay as in Italy. The quick attacks and fast sieges o f an amphibious
strategy had marked the previous war between Venice and the Ottoman
Empire (1499-1503).28 N or did the colonial wars fought by Venice re­
semble those in North Africa, where the Spaniards enjoyed a technologi­
cal superiority they did not have in Italy.29 In such wars cities like Modon,
and even great ones like Constantinople and Granada, could not resist a
determined siege, yet Ariosto’s fiction required just that for Paris.30
In Italy, however, a good-sized town could still survive a siege, and the
attackers could not assume that their cannon would blow up the walls.
Padua, for example, successfully withstood Maximilian’s forces. The Este
served there under the emperor, and Ariosto refers to the bombards used
(O F 16.17), tacitly paralleling the efforts o f unsuccessful besiegers,
whether Imperials or Saracens.31 The Italian wars made sense out o f Ari­
osto’s plot, and in any case they were the background required by the
poet’s rhetorical situation. The Italian style o f warfare had determined
the expectations both o f the poet32 and o f most o f his audience.
Although the Italian wars fit Ariosto’s plot, th^y involved him in fur­
ther difficulties, since Italy served as the proving ground for all the latest
experiments in offense and defense. Ariosto tried to make his warfare as
modern as possible, but he could only go so far with technology.33 Still,
he did what he could. Armies had used fortified camps since the mid-
fifteenth century; Agramante has one at Paris with an embankment and
a ditch (O A18.157), and his defeated troops spend the night digging more
ditches and shelters and molding bastions (18.163).34 All this fits contem­
porary procedure. Piero Pieri cites the condottieri Orso Orsini and Dio­
mede Carafa, who would use the earth dug out for the trench to make
the walls, often with stakes. Machiavelli was soon calling a camp a mobile
fortress city and advising that the bastions provide cross fire into the
ditch.35
 T H E S IE G E O F P A R IS 85

Aiiosto extends his references to other technological developments.

Kliuldo takes the British across the Seine on a pontoon bridge, which
lip 1lien breaks up afterwards (O /716.31).36 The poet alludes to the new
exploding mines ( O F 27.24):

Come quando si da fuoco alia mina,

pel lungo solco de la negra polve
licenziosa fiamma arde e camina
si ch’occhio a dietro a pena se le volve;
e qual si sente poi l’alta ruina
che ’1 duro sasso o il grosso muro solve . . .
As when they set fire to a mine, the impetuous flame burns through the
long furrow o f the black powder and travels so that the eye can barely
lollow it, and as one then feels the high ruin that unlooses hard rock and
.1 thick w a ll. . .

( ustel Nuovo in Naples had fallen to an exploding mine (1503), and

IVtlro Navarro and Antonello da Trani won Cephalonia from the Turks
In tlie same way.37 Mobile forts, special bridges, modern explosives— Ari-
iMiio puts them all into his poem.
Ihit all his efforts were not enough. The siege o f Padua illustrates the
dilliculty. The key issue here is not cannons (see chapter 6) but rather
lilt military architecture that artillery warfare generated. W hen Emperor
Maximilian finally collected enough heavy guns to mount a serious attack
mi 1 he city, he failed in three assaults on the Porta Codalunga. All three
filleted at an advance bastion and were destroyed by fire and a counter-
ill lack o f pikes. The Venetians had better artillery and Fra Giocondo to
direct repairs on the walls. The building and use o f the bastion help to
explain the victory o f the defense. A bastion was a platform for heavy
guns, designed to break up concentrations o f the besiegers and dismount
the artillery.38 If it functioned properly, the attacker never approached the
my walls, and the Venetians so used it at Padua.39 Pedro Navarro ex-
[Link] principle to Machiavelli, when the two inspected the walls o f
I lorence: “A city can expect to have more guns than an army can carry
wuh it; whenever you can present more guns to the enemy than he can
[Link] against you, it is impossible for him to defeat you.” 40 In its mature
lonn the enceinte became a continuous gun platform, and the Este—
,11ready leaders in cannonry— had Biagio Rossetti put round bastions on
1lie walls o f Ferrara (ca. 1500-1506). They then added three angle bastions
(1x12-18), the form that dominated military architecture for centuries.41
Such developments were beyond the limits o f Ariostos art. The prob-
86 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

lem was not just anachronism— the concern that cannons and gun plat­
forms would not fit a fiction about Charlemagne— for Malory had not
hesitated to give Mordred what might have been cannon, when he be­
sieged Guinevere in the Tower o f London (Morte, 21.1).42 It was also that
Ariosto’s classical models could not help him here. The revived realistic
style presupposed massed action close by the walls o f the kind cannon
made impossible. Boiardo, however, had pointed out a way to disguise,
if not eliminate, the rift between the poet’s fiction and contemporary
reality.
In describing Paris Ariosto departed from his common practice, a
practice that Simon Fornari claimed the poet followed elsewhere. He did
not describe an Italian town and call it Paris, the way he described Flor­
ence and called it Damascus.43 Instead, he assumed the real Paris o f his
own day. Boiardo had made gestures in this direction. His idea was to
increase the apparent realism o f the scene by including mention o f spe­
cific, real places. For example, in presenting the second siege o f Paris he
mentioned the Seine { 0 1 3.8.11), and for both sieges he named a real gate,
that o f Saint-Denis, as well as a series o f fictional ones.44
The mixture o f real and fictional places would not have troubled
Boiardo’s audience. Although the Ferrarese o f his day might read chan­
sons de geste and French romances, these literary sources would not have
given them a precise sense o f French geography, and guidebooks for Paris
were not yet available.45 A few famous names sufficed for the poet, who
invented the rest. All this had changed by the time Ariosto wrote the
Furioso. During the long French occupation o f northern Italy, the Ferrar­
ese had developed close connections with them, cultural as well as politi­
cal and military.46 Ariosto himself tried to learn French and had met
Louis XII and Chevalier Bayard.47 Probably through such contacts, oral
rather than literary, Ariosto learned enough to produce what Bertoni con­
sidered an exact description o f Paris, sufficient to make one think he had
visited the place.48
In two stanzas Ariosto sets up the topography o f Paris and with it
establishes the military logic o f his plot (O F 14 .10 4 -5 ):49

Siede Parigi in una gran pianura,

ne l’ombilico a Francia, anzi nel core;
gli passa la riviera entro le mura,
e corre, et esce in altra parte fuore.
Ma fa un’isola prima, e v’assicura
de la citta una parte, e la migliore;
 T H E S I E G E O F P A R IS 87

l’altre due (ch’in tre parti e la gran terra)

di fuor la fossa, e dentro il fiume serra.
Alla citta, che molte miglia gira,
da molte parti si puo dar battaglia;
ma perche sol da un canto assalir mira,
ne volentier l’esercito sbarraglia,
oltre il fiume Agramante si ritira
verso ponente, accio che quindi assaglia:
pero che ne cittade ne campagna
ha dietro, se non sua, fin alia Spagna.
Paris sits on a great plain, in the navel o f France, or rather in its heart. The
river passes between its walls and runs and comes out on the other side,
but first makes an island, and there secures one part o f the city, and the
better [part]. The other two, for the great city is in three parts, are enclosed
by a fosse outside and the river inside.
One could assault the city, which circles around for many miles, from
many directions, but because he intends to attack from one side only and
would not voluntarily close off his army, Agramante retires across the river
toward the west, so that he might attack from there, since he has behind
[him] neither city nor land, except his own, as far as Spain.

Such stanzas became standard for later historical epic. They were the
poet’s equivalent o f the maps the French used for their campaigns and
introduced to Italy.50 A t the same time Ariosto reflected the visual illustra-
110ns o f battles, which became detailed and meticulous with Pavia a de-
1 .ule later.51
With these stanzas Ariosto establishes two factors that make a military
action believable, and at the same time he tacitly corrects Boiardo’s pre­
sentation. First o f all, Paris is a huge city, far larger than any in northern
Italy, and no army could surround it, as Boiardo imagines for both his
sieges, much less assault it from all sides.52 Second, the Seine is too deep
west o f the city. Rinaldo needs a bridge to cross it, Rodomonte must
swim that way out o f Paris, and the defeated regularly drown there.53
Agramante, therefore, must attack the Latin Quarter. As Ariosto explains,
a defeat on the Right Bank could leave his army cut off from its zone of
occupation to the south.54
Clear topographical description like this makes it possible to diagram
the battle o f Paris on a map, stage by stage, and Barbara Reynolds has
done this. Although I disagree with her on details, she has made the es­
sential point (fig. 14).55 Ariosto gave his fictional war not just visual real­
88 The M ovem ent into Realism an d H istory

ism b u t th e d e tails th a t m a r k a h is to r y o r m ilit a r y re p o rt. A read er c a n

still tr a c e , fo r e x a m p le , R o d o m o n t e ’s ro u te acro ss P aris. H e fo llo w e d th e
o ld R u e d e la H a r p e , w h i c h still exists in p a rt, a n d c ro ssed o v e r to th e lie
d e la C i t e b y th e P o n t S a i n t - M i c h e l .56 T h i s k in d o f m e th o d ic a l realism
h e lp e d A r io s t o b r in g h is fic t io n c lo se r to h is a u d ie n c e , d e sp ite th e d iffe r­
e n c e s b e tw e e n h is in h e r ite d c h iv a lr ic w a r fa r e a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y m ilit a r y
p r a c tic e .
P aris d id e v e n m o r e fo r A r io s t o , fo r th e c it y still fit p e r f e c tly th e o ld -
sty le w a r A r io s t o h a d to p re se n t. Its a r c h ite c tu re w a s still as m e d ie v a l as
A r io s t o s r o m a n c e p lo t .57 T h e v ista s o f th e la te m e d ie v a l c it y g iv e n b y
H u g o a n d S te v e n s o n in th e n in e te e n th c e n t u r y a p p ly as w e ll to th e P aris
o f A r io s t o s tim e . H e r e is H u g o ’s s u m m a r y :

Refaites le Paris du quinzieme siecle, reconstruisez-le dans vorre pensee,

regardez le jour a travers cette haie surprenante d’ aiguilles, de tours et de
clochers, repandez au milieu de l’immense ville, dechirez a la pointe des
lies, plissez aux arches des ponts la Seine avec ses larges flaques vertes et
jaunes, plus changeante qu’une robe de serpent, detachez nettement sur
un horizon d’azur le profil gothique de ce vieux Paris, faites-en Hotter le
contour dans une brume d’hiver qui s’accroche a ses nombreuses chemi-

Figure 14. Map o f Paris in the early sixteenth century.

 T H E S I E G E O F P A R IS 89

nets, noyez-le dans une nuit profonde, et regardez le jeu bizarre des te-
nebres et des lumieres dans ce sombre labyrinthe d’edifices; jetez-y un
rayon de lune qui le dessine vaguement, et fosse sortir du brouillard les
grandes tetes des tours; ou reprenez cette noire silhouette, ravivez d’ombre
les mille angles aigus des fleches et des pignons, et faites-la saillir, plus
dentelee qu’une machoire de requin, sur le del de cuivre du couchant.58

Remake the Paris of the fifteenth century, reconstruct it in your thought,

look at the day across that surprising hedge of spires, of towers and belfries;
spread out amid the immense city; tear at the point of the isles; at the
arches of the bridges fold the Seine with its large pools, green and yellow,
more changing than a snakeskin; render clearly on the blue horizon the
Gothic profile of this old Paris; make its contours float in a winter mist
that clings to its many chimneys, plunge it in deep night and watch the
strange play of darkness and light in the somber labyrinth of structures;
throw there a ray of moonlight that vaguely outlines it and makes the great
tops of the towers rise from the mist; or return to that black silhouette,
revive with shadow the thousand sharp angles of the spires and gables, and
make it project, more indented than the jaw of a shark, under a coppery
sunset sky.

The public buildings erected early in the sixteenth century did not alter
ibis Gothic appearance, even when the architect was Italian. Giovanni
Giocondo designed the Cour des Comptes in the Gothic style to harmo­
nize with Sainte-Chapelle and the east wing o f the old palace in which
Ariosto has the Parisians take refuge and resist Rodomonte’s attack.59 All
new churches, furthermore, followed Gothic models throughout the six­
teenth century.60
Private houses as much as public buildings gave Paris its characteristic
medieval appearance. Ariosto remarks that Paris formerly had almost all
wooden houses and that at present the proportion is still six out o f ten
(Of7 16.26). He alludes three times to the fire hazard they might pose
during a siege. The city might have burned down after one assault, if rain
had not come (O F 8.69-70). Rodomonte threatens to burn Paris (O F
14.65) and later runs through the city, setting fires (16 .26 -27). The houses
were mostly, in fact, what Americans would call Tudor; they had wood
beams and frame, with stone or loam between, covered with plaster, and
saw-toothed roofs.61 We must then imagine Rodomonte on a narrow,
unpaved street, trying to tear down the narrow houses o f two to four
stories on either side.62 He would have had little difficulty, not only be­
cause he was a giant but also because the upper stories projected over the
street, with timbered overhanging roofs blocking out the sky.63
90 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

T h e city walls, however, determined the military pattern. Ariosto cor­

rectly describes those with which Etienne Marcel and Charles V ringed)]
Paris in the later fourteenth century (fig. 13).64 Rodomonte first wadesl
through a moat o f mud and water up to his neck {O F 14.119) and reaches]
the bertresche (14.121), or overhang o f the wall.65 This outer wall has cren-J
elations, and the Saracen throws two men from its merli, or battlementsjj
into the water moat {O F 14.124). His own soldiers mount this wall behind
him by ladders { O F 14.126), only to find a deep dry moat beyond, be*!
tween them and the main wall. Rodomonte leaps this ditch, where hil
men die by fire. The inner wall likewise has an overhang { O F 14.132)
Such a system was designed to repel direct assaults o f the sort that Ariostd
describes. The walls were wide enough so that the defenders could move!
about on top. T h ey had crenelations so the men could safely shoot at
the attackers, machicolations to allow them to drop things, and high,]
unscalable towers so they could provide flank fire.66 Ariosto vividly evokes]
this kind o f assault in canto 14. Agramante has collected from the areal
round about innumerable ladders, axes, logs, and matting, plus bridges]
and boats.67 Carlo, on the other hand, has had communication trenches ]
run to the water moat, chains fastened at the river entrances, and matting]
prepared to dull the impact o f missiles and rams { O F 106). The French]
throw down on the Saracens rocks, the crenelations themselves, boiling]
water, lime, burning oil, sulfur, turpentine, pitch, and fire balls ( O T 1 1 1 - ]
12). It is all very medieval and could have occurred at any time in the !
centuries before the 1440s, when large cannon finally began to blow the \
old castles to pieces.68
Paris, still so very Gothic, made Ariosto’s fictional war plausible and ]
softened the tension between romance and contemporary siege warfare.'
The contrast might have been glaring if he had assumed for Paris a mod­
ern city wall like that o f his own Ferrara.
Ariosto’s achievement also had limits that were unconnected to tech­
nology. First, he made mistakes about Paris. His oral sources did not warn j
him o f all the buildings and enclosures outside the walls. Much o f the ]
fighting takes place within the gardens, buildings, and property o f Saint- 1
Germain-des-Pres, and Carlo assembles his men outside the Gate o f f
Saint-Marcel or Bordelles, where Ariosto says there is open space { 0 F \
18.39) t>ut where the Faubourg Saint-Marcel then spread out along the J
road.69 One could imagine that Carlo would have had such structures]
removed, but one would still have to explain why Ariosto depicts a typical!
romance landscape outside town and not the devastated zone regularly!
created by a siege.70
 T H E S I E G E O F P A R IS 91

nr is. The old palace on the lie de la Cite. Photograph: Roger-Viollet, Paris. Litho-
||lii|i!i o f Nouveaux and Fourquemin (1839), after Pernot.

Ariosto makes other mistakes as well, o f the sort already noticed by

»lilies, such as the internal inconsistencies that make the dead rise
dHtiiu.n On the way to the lie de la Cite Carlo sees the evidences o f Rodo-
liinnic’s rampage: men cut up, palaces burned, churches ruined, much of
llir city desolate (O F 17 .6 -7 ) . He could have seen none o f this, o f course,
ilme he has crossed over to the Right Bank to welcome the English at
llir dates o f Saint-Denis and Saint-Martin (O F 16.30, 85), and Rodo-
iimiite never reached that sidp/of the river.72 Then there is the bridge (O F
1 /.\i). During a later battle many French, fleeing outside Paris, drown in
llir Seine, since the bridge cannot allow so many. N ow Ariosto regularly
lias 1he defeated drown in the Seine, but all bridges are inside the city
walls, unless we take him to mean the water moat and a gate bridge.73
l iterary imitation causes other mistakes, mostly in the scene at the
palace. Ariosto here follows two scenes in Virgil, that o f Pyrrhus before
Pi lam’s palace (Ae. 2) and that o f Turnus’s escape from the Trojan camp
(•»). 1 As Rodomonte cuts away at the palace gate, the people in the palace
murtyard all lament. Women run through the house, embracing the
doors and beds they will have to leave (O F 17 .9 ,1 2 —13). This picture fits
Pi iam’s palace, which had fifty bedrooms for his children (Ae. 2.503), but
[Link] fits the Palais de Justice, even when the royal family lived there
(lig. 15).75 Rodomonte next swims downstream to safety, as had Turnus
on the Tiber (O A18.2 1-2 4 ; Ae. 9.815-18). Unfortunately, the lie de la Cite
92 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

then ended in the palace wall and had two islets at its tip,76 plus a gre
chain across the river, which Ariosto remembered earlier (O F 14.106)
None o f these mistakes is serious, but taken together, they reduce th
poet’s realism more than he would have wished.
The second major limit was self-imposed. Ariosto confines his realis
to an episode, which he interweaves with Eastern stories (cantos 14—18)
Afterward he reverts to standard romance technique and follows th
model o f Albraca. The arrival o f six heroes suffices to defeat the Frenc
and drive them back into Paris ( O F 27.18-34), as nine had convulsed 1
Tatar armies in Boiardo ( 0 1 1.14.56-15.39).77 One group, then anothe
reverses the military situation, and the siege ends in a series o f ope
battles, briefly narrated, and in duels between heroes.
Boiardo determined the third limit for Ariosto. Though he might pr-
tend he was versifying Turpins history and use many historical tech
niques, Boiardo wrote fiction. Ariosto, as his continuator, could not alter
this fact, however close he might bring his story to life in the early cinque*
cento. Yet his insistence on a real Paris and on a war that could be dia­
gramed led his followers in a very different direction, as they tried to
transcend all three limits. They wanted to remove errors, extend the real-,
ism, and minimize the fictional element. For both Ercilla and Tasso, this
meant insisting on history.

TASSO

Tasso inherited from Ariosto both a realistic visual style and methodical
attention to the topography and architecture that determined the nature
o f the military action he wished to represent. He developed the first, but
with regard to the second he found himself in difficulties similar to those
Ariosto had experienced when he chose to represent a real Paris.78
Stylistically, Tasso greatly developed Ariostos concern for the seasons.
In the Furioso the seasons determined the rhythm o f the campaign. Now
they affect tactics. Tasso would have writers carefully attend to the meteo­
rological circumstances o f an action:79 “ Simile avertimento potrebbe
mostrare ove descrive la fame, la sete, la peste, il nascer de l’aurora, il cader
del sole, il mezzo giorno, la mezza notte, le stagioni de l’anno, la qualita de’
mesi o de’ giorni, o piovosi o sereni o tranquilli o tempestosi” (“ He should
show similar care where he describes hunger, thirst, disease, dawn, sunset,
midday, midnight, the seasons o f the year, the quality o f the months or o f
the days, whether rainy or clear or calm or stormy” ; Discorsi delpoema eroico
2.555). 1° canto 7, for example, the Crusaders lose a skirmish. A sudden
 T H E S I E G E O F P A R IS
93

c .
^ S io t

'8
^ tL
c /enaculum C
j5?
i-i i *,v A y

.itH' ■ V a le o fG e h e n ^ , /

I igmc 16. Jerusalem under the Latin kings. From Sir Steven Runciman, A History o f
il'r ( imades, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952). Reprinted with the
l'i (mission o f the Syndics o f Cambridge University Press.

hailstorm blows into their faces, blinding them, as Clorinda charges down­
hill and breaks their attack ( G L 7.114—20). A t the same time the wind causes
much damage to the Crusader camp, ripping canvas, breaking tent poles,
and even blowing away whole tents (6Z. 7.122).80
I ike Ariosto, Tasso gives just enough topography to explain the strat­
egy and tactics o f the siege (G L 3.55—56). The two hills o f Jerusalem make
1lie city impregnable on all but one side, the north, where Goffredo sets
Ins camp and where most o f the action occurs (fig. 16).81 Then there is
die problem o f water. The city has water from fountains and reservoirs,
hut outside there is nothing.82 Tasso later describes the terrible thirst dur­
ing the heat wave that follows the first assault (G L 13.58—60). Like Paris,
h'liisalem had not changed significantly over the years. T h e Mamluks
94 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

and Turks had worked on the walls, but they still followed the old lines,
and their crenelations and square towers presupposed an old style o f at­
tack.83 Modern notices would have confirmed what Tasso read in the
Crusader chronicles for all but the “torre angolare,” from which Clorinda
shoots so many leaders in the first assault (G L 11.27-28 ) and which no
longer existed. Tasso’s descriptions thus fit reasonably well both contem­
porary and Crusader Jerusalem.
Nevertheless, Tasso experienced the same problems Ariosto had. Dis­
crepancies came about either through his sources or through literary imi­
tation. For example, Tasso assumes Aladino lived in the old Fortress A n ­
tonia, which Herod had built (G L 10.30-31) and which he himself read
about in Josephus.84 This structure vanished long before the Crusaders
arrived in Palestine.85 Tasso’s sources mentioned the Aqsa Mosque in the
southwest corner o f the Temple area, which the Christian rulers made
into their palace, but the Fortress Antonia stood north o f the Temple. Yet
Tasso tried to make his presentation accurate, even after he had com­
pleted the poem; he asked Luca Scalabrino in Rome to find him a map
o f Jerusalem, since he could get none in Venice.86
Literary imitation accounts for the other mistakes. Galileo complained
that Erminia on the walls could not possibly distinguish individual Chris­
tian knights during a dusty skirmish.87 Tasso, o f course, had a passage
from the Iliad (II. 3.161—244) in mind, where Helen from the walls o f
Troy points out to Priam the Achaean chiefs. Basically, Tasso erred when­
ever he wanted women to watch chivalric action. Erminia‘stands on the
tower o f the Fortress Antonia and sees the whole battlefield north o f the
city (G L 6.62), and Clorinda watches Tancredi and Argante duel from a
hillock (6.26).88 None o f these vantage points exists.
T a s so n e ve rth e le ss s u c c e e d e d w e ll e n o u g h to c o n v in c e C h a t e a u b r ia n d ,
w h o w a lk e d a b o u t Je r u s a le m a n d c h e c k e d T a sso ’s re feren c es .89 T h e p o e m
assu m es a sp e c ific city, w i t h its w a lls , its s u r r o u n d in g s , a n d w e a t h e r c o n ­
d itio n s , w h ic h to g e th e r e x ist n o w h e r e else a n d d e te r m in e th e m ilit a r y
n a r r a tiv e .90
Tasso made two specific contributions to the poetry o f war. Looking
to the Iliad, he made a siege his plot,91 and he based his narrative on
written history. In canto 3 he has the Crusaders begin a formal siege o f
Jerusalem, which ends only with the last canto, when Tancredi captures
the Tower of David.92 The poet thus risked his whole epic on the presen­
tation o f a military situation that Ariosto himself had confined to a few
cantos. This innovation alone indicates the stature o f the later poet and
differentiates the Gerusalemme from previous epic and romance. Yet the
 T H E S I E G E O F P A R IS 95

puei took less o f a chance than it might seem to one looking solely at
IIInary traditions.
My Tasso’s day military defense once more prevailed over offense. A l-
leady in the late 1520s engineers had begun to surpass the achievements
•if 1 lie artillerists, and sieges grew longer and longer every year, culminat­
ing in the three-year siege o f Ostend (1601-4). The Dutch War, which
tri the pattern for the late cinquecento, consisted mostly o f sieges.93
Through the siege o f Jerusalem Tasso could reflect many problems famil­
iar'to contemporary soldiers: famine, weather conditions, desertion, sup­
plies, and technology. He developed the last in a particularly striking
manner.
l asso puts much emphasis on technical paraphernalia. Siege towers in
particular dominate the second half o f his plot. In the first assault
( ioffredo’s tower and a battering ram below start cracking the north wall,
hut the tower breaks two wheels near town (G L 11.83-86), enabling Clo-
linda and Argante to burn it that night. Demons^then possess the only
wood that can supply the needed lumber,94 and the Christians must wait
lor Rinaldo before they can make new engines some weeks later. For the
second and successful assault, Guglielmo, a Genoese sailor, constructs
ihree iron-plated towers, which move on a hundred wheels and have rams
.11 the bottom, a bridge at the middle, and a tower above, and which can
shoot up higher than the city wall (G L 18.41-45). A war o f machines fol­
lows. The enemy has canvas out to deaden missile blows and a giant ram,
which can swing out and smash GofFredo’s tower (G L 18 .6 8 -72, 80-101).
The Crusaders cut its cords with scythes. Then comes fire; the Chris-
1ians have almost used up the little water they have, and the steel cover­
ing o f the tower is beginning to curl, when the wind blows the fire back
against the canvas protection o f the walls and starts a conflagration that
scatters the defenders. N ow the bridge goes down; the tower goes up,
overawing the Saracens (G L 90—91, 97—101); and the Crusaders gain the
wall and the city. W hen he presents the fighting around Paris, Ariosto
has nothing like this and never even mentions anything so unchivalric
as a siege tower. Tasso, in contrast, had to emphasize them because the
chronicles did, and he was determined to follow the historical record.95
Tasso believed that writers must base their plots on documented his­
tory.96 True events, lost in legend, are not enough; the poet needs the
authority o f written records. For the Gerusalemme Tasso indeed went
back to primary sources, in particular to William o f Tyre, the best o f the
Crusader historians.97 The poet thus had highly accurate chronicles to
draw on, and these all required a battle o f machines. Tasso has Argante
 96 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

spell out the moral for Tancredi: you come with all your men not
warriors but as inventors o f machines (G L 19.2—3).
Written records also served to limit the prowess o f his heroes. Tass
says to Scalabrino, “ Io non ricevo affatto nel mio poema quell’eccesso
bravura che ricevono i romanzi; cioe, che alcuno sia tanto superiore
tutti gli altri, che possa sostener solo un campo: e se pure il ricevo, e sol
ne la persona di Rinaldo” (“ I do not indeed allow in my poem that exces"
o f valor which the romances allow; i.e., that someone is so superior to alt
the others, that he alone can sustain a field. And if I do, nevertheless*;
allow it, it is only in the person o f Rinaldo”)-98 History does not allow
for the nine in Boiardo, who convulsed a million soldiers at Albraca (01
1.14.56-15.39), or for Ariostos six, who chased the French back to Paris
( O F 27.18-34). Even Tasso’s dynastic hero, the one exception to his rule,
at times merely exaggerates the brilliant fighting o f the historical Tan­
credi.99
W ith Tasso the poetry o f war comes very close to versified history. The
reader can compare his poem with the Crusader chronicles, and his he­
roes do not surpass the efforts o f ordinary mortals. His plot concerns
a siege with all its mechanical details, and it is the technology, specific­
ally the siege towers, that raises a new issue in the relationship o f epic
to reality.
The Crusaders used no more than ladders for their first assault on
Jerusalem, a venture made quickly and without adequate equipment. On
the other hand, the successful second assault took two days, divided by a
night o f anxious waiting, with the siege towers close to the walls.100 Tasso
moved the events o f this first day back to the first assault and so gave it
epic stature. A t the same time, by making this change he further accentu­
ated the importance o f siege towers, and the towers themselves indicate
a limit to his war poetry that he himself does not discuss.
Tasso had to describe the towers as carefully as he did because no one
used such devices any more and had not done so for more than a century.
In fact, the more the poet emphasized technology, the more he revealed
how much the age o f the Crusaders differed from his own. N or could the
anachronisms required to put Italian (as opposed to Norman) characters
in his poem counteract this sense o f long ago.101 Ariosto tried to preserve
a sense o f contemporaneity by his talk o f current wars, his use o f similes
involving guns and mines, and his inclusion o f the story o f Cimosco.
Tasso, however, could not use his methods. Classicism did not allow the
author speeches in his own right, and the sources predated artillery.
 T H E S I E G E O F P A R IS 97

W lti'i c A r io s to o n ly p r e te n d e d to w r it e u p p a s t eve n ts, T a s s o t r u ly d o es

Ahil th e reb y a n tic ip a te s th e h is to ric a l n o ve l.
11 is audience probably would have expected as much. They themselves
Writ- becoming more and more civilian; the last tumults o f the Hapsburg-
Vrtlots duel died out when Tasso was still a teen-ager.102 The great battles
Willi the Saracens occurred, as always, outside Italy (at Malta, Famagusta,
| rpanto, and Tunis), though Tasso had reason to remember a pirate raid
tin his hometown (1558).103 Ferrara in particular stayed quiet. W hen all
(lie Italian princes followed Don Juan to Lepanto, Alfonso remained at
home. Although the duke did mobilize a force to help the emperor in
Hungary, Tasso did not travel with the army, and in the event the soldiers
did not see any fighting.104 Tasso’s audience lacked that sense o f war all
itinund, which Ariostos readers had possessed. The absence o ra modern
let hnology, the sense that the warriors fought in an older world— all this
would have come to them naturally.
Iberia n p o e ts lik e E r c illa , o n th e o th e r h a n d , e x p e r ie n c e d n o n e o f th ese
t iilm ra l lim ita tio n s . U n a ffe c t e d b y n e o c la ssic ism , E r c illa still w r o te in th e
lo m an ce f o r m , a n d h e h a d d ir e c t e x p e rie n c e o f w a r fa r e fr o m fig h t in g in
Sp ain ’s c o lo n ia l w a rs. H e h a d n o n e e d o f th e p a st as a b asis fo r h is sto ry.

E R C IL L A

I' 11 ilia n arrates h o w 130 select y o u t h s ,105 u n p r o te c te d b u t la n d e d b y

n igh t, h u r r ie d ly c o n s tr u c t e d a fo r t o n a sm a ll h ill b y th e B a y o f C o n c e p -
« uin (Araucana, 2.17.18-28, p p . 285-87). W i t h i n a sin g le d a y th e y h a d
m ad e th e essen tia ls w i t h w h a t e v e r to o ls th e y c o u ld f in d .106 S o m e d u g
d eep d e fe n s iv e tren ch e s w it h b a rs, h o e s, a n d p ic k a x e s, w h ile o th e rs c u t
logs fo r a c u r ta in w a ll, u s in g lo n g k n iv e s, h a tc h e ts, a n d sa w s. T h e S p a n ­
iards so o n h a d e ig h t p ieces o f a rtille ry m o u n t e d a n d h a d raised th e sta n ­
d ard o f Philip I I .107
One morning the Indians came in three squadrons {Araucaria, 19.4,
p. 312) but attacked from all sides (19.25-29, pp. 3 16 -17 ), trying every
point, however strong or rugged.108 Some filled up the fosse with earth
and logs, but it filled more quickly with those who fell or were shot by
harquebus. Some leaped over it, others climbed by pikes. T h e Spaniards
repelled them with fire and lance, but the Indians persisted. Meanwhile
a parallel action developed on the beach, as Spanish sailors tried to land
and help the beleaguered garrison. The Indians attacked them as well
{Araucana, 19 .37-39, P- 3X9 )> but soon they had to give way, both at the
 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

fort (19.51, p. 321) and on the beach (20.14, P- 32.6), where they had heavy
losses.109 They retreated in order, however, and the Spaniards followed
them at a moderate pace. T h e victors soon returned, fearing ambush. By
this time it was noon {Araucana, 20.18—19, P- 327). A n d so Ercilla closed
his account o f the action at Penco Fort, which began Mendoza’s cam­
paign to reconquer Araucania (southern Chile).
In his story Ercilla shares with Tasso three developments o f Ariosto’s
technique, which the Spanish poet worked out independently: the precise
topography, the realistic style with its concern for weather, and the insis­
tence on historical fact.
For the first, Ercilla describes the great Bay o f Concepcion economi­
cally (Araucana, 16.17—18, p. 267) and gives sufficient geographical details
for the reader to understand the assault on the fort (fig. 17). But while we
can still check Ariosto and Tasso on Paris and Jerusalem, it is more
difficult to do so with Ercilla, since an earthquake in 1835 changed the
landscape o f the area.110
For the second, Ercilla inherited Ariosto’s realistic style and developed
a sense for seasons and weather much as did Tasso. A winter storm nearly
destroys the flagship as it approaches the bay, and the very next night
another flattens the encampment on Quiriquina Island (Araucana, 16 .3 2 -
33, p. 270). Winds and rains then keep the Spaniards detained on this
sterile island for two months (Araucana, 17.18, p. 285), during which pe­
riod they must live on ship’s rations and sleep on wet ground (20.23-34,
p. 328).111 Winter floods likewise delay the reinforcements that were to
come by land {Araucana, 21.14, P- 344 )- The men finally construct the
fort in August (early spring), when the days lengthen {Araucana, 17.23,
p. 286).
Like Tasso, Ercilla insists on historical truth, and contemporary chron­
icles confirm his presentation o f the battle.112 This insistence on history
has the same consequences for Ercilla as for Tasso. The poet keeps heroic
action within probable bounds, and here he allows no exceptions. For
example, in the episode o f Julian de Valenzuela, who fights Feniston by
the ships {Araucana, 19 .4 0 -4 4 , pp. 319-20 ), the whole action is probable.
The Indian jumps suddenly, striking with his club, a move Julian parries
by holding up his shield with both hands. Even so the club knocks the
shield on his head and stuns him. Valenzuela barely jumps to avoid a
second blow, which sinks deep into the ground. Meanwhile Julian scores
the Indian’s breast with his sword, and a reverse gets the middle o f the
jaw. Feniston waves his arms, but Julian stabs him three times with a
 T H E S I E G E O F P A R IS 99

l if'iire 17. Map o f the war zone in Chile (Carahue is the old Imperial, Penco is the old
i tmcepcion). Courtesy the University o f Chicago Libraries.

dagger, killing him. Neither warrior has the prowess o f an Orlando, yet
the poet makes the encounter exciting by his clear visual style.
Ercilla’s major contribution to the poetry o f war also concerns history:
he writes an eyewitness report o f the battle at Penco. As far as I know, no
other poet— at least no other poet o f comparable reputation— had ever
done this before. Where Tasso with his epic o f a past war could look to
the classical precedent o f a Lucan or a Silius Italicus, not to mention
I rissino and the tradition o f the poemetti bellici among the Italians, Ercilla
claims he had no model but his own experience. H e tells us he helped
build the fort (Araucana, 17.19, p. 285) and did sentry duty the night after
IO O The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

the battle (20.21, p. 327). H e says elsewhere that he wrote up events at'
night on whatever he could find: pieces o f letters, even leather, some
pieces so small they hardly held six verses.113 O f course, scholars have
qualified these claims. Like Tasso, Ercilla had his eye on Lucan.114 More­
over, whatever versifying Ercilla may have done in Chile, he published;
the Araucaria in installments years later and so had time to elaborate on1-
his original material. The passage in which he claims to have written the
poem while on campaign, for example, came out two decades later.
These qualifications to the poet’s claim do not diminish his achieve­
ment. Ercilla’s narrative differs in kind from that o f previous historical
epic, since he does not versify someone else s history. His epic itself func­
tions as a primary source and has been used by historians, just as classi­
cists use Xenophons Anabasis or Caesars Commentaries. His efforts h ad .
some influence, for other Spanish poets in their turn became wartime
correspondents. In his Historia de la nueva Mexico, for example, Captain
Gaspar de Villagra composed an epic that was also the basic account of
Onate’s colonization o f the upper Rio Grande. For these soldier-poets the
old debate between the sword and the pen ceases, for the two have be­
come one.115 This development alone makes Ercilla the most original epic
poet o f his period, if not o f the tradition.
Ercilla’s innovation carried with it a far-reaching consequence, which
the duel o f Valenzuela and Feniston illustrates. The Spaniard’s victory
lacks tactical significance, for the Indians do not fall back when they see
their hero fall.116 N or do the much more elaborate heroics o f Gracolano
and Martin de Elvira affect the fighting at the fort (Araucana, 19.5—14,
19 -2 4 , pp. 312-14 , 315-16). In the Furioso, by contrast, during the last
stages o f the battle o f Paris, Dardinello’s heroics and speech alone restrain
his African troops from panic. W hen Rinaldo kills him, the Saracens flee
{OFi%.4 5-58 ,155—64), and the whole army must fall back on its fortified
camp. Heroic actions have consequences in Ariosto’s fiction, but not nec­
essarily in Ercilla’s history.
Technology provides a partial explanation for this difference, since ar­
tillery won the battle o f Penco.117 Ercilla acknowledges this in several
ways. Young Pinol seizes Martin de Elvira’s pike from the ditch and tries
to escape but gets only four steps before two large balls cut him in two,
from shoulder to breast {Araucana, 19 .15-17, pp. 314 -15 ).118 Guns quickly
fill the fosse with the dead. O ld chief Peteguelen climbs to the highest
part o f a bastion, only to have a ball take his head off and another kill the
four who follow him {Araucana, 19.35-36, p. 318).119 Afterward Ercilla
patrols a connecting slope, one side o f which is filled with the dead, shot
 T H E S IE G E O F P A R IS IO I

liy harquebus and cannon (Araucana, 20.21, 25, 27, pp. 327-29 ). Spanish
Hiins simply blow the enemy away, and yet, paradoxically, these same
Huns help explain the persistence o f fiction in Ercilla’s narrative, when we
have expected it to disappear altogether.
I'he poet invents a heroic rampage for Tucapel, one o f the main char-
iu lers on the Indian side {Araucana, 19.31-34, 51-52, 2 0 .7 -17 , pp. 317-18,
!>i 22, 325-27). He runs with his club on the wall o f the fort, breaking
up men and arms. W hen the other Indians retire, he is rambling about
inside the fort, then retreats to a precipice and jumps, followed by a cloud
n! missiles. Hit in ten places, he turns in rage, vainly tries five or six times
10 find a way back up, while the missiles rain down upon him, and finally
lushes to the beach and breaks through to the Indians retreating there.
Krcilla models this scene on Ariosto as well as on Virgil, for it is Rodo-
monte and not Turnus who wants to return and who exits to a cloud of
similes as well as missiles. Moreover, where Virgil gestured toward legend­
ary history, Ariosto presented a purely fictional character, and so does
I'.icilia. I will argue later that Tucapel is a fictional character (see chapter
H). Certainly his action at Penco is fictional, whether the character is~oE
not. And so we have come full circle. Virgilian imitation initially signaled
.1 movement toward realism. It now indicates the persistence o f the fic-
lional even in this most historical o f epics.
For an explanation one can appeal again to the problem o f artillery.
My this argument the poet wants heroes whose actions count, like those
of romance. Ercilla finds such warriors on the Indian side, because they
do not have firearms and prefer to fight at close quarters.120 He can there­
fore project on them literary models. The fictional Tucapel, like Turnus
or Rodomonte, has the prowess that might have turned around a battle.
I bis argument by itself, however, does not account for the poet’s literary
imitation. The Indian victory games o f cantos 1 0 - n and the dialogue
between Lautaro and Gualcolda do not present warfare, and Ercilla does
not use such inventions in all his narratives o f battle.121 Mareguano and
I'uren, for example, lack them. He does require fiction for Penco, and the
example o f Tasso points to a further reason.
Sieges as well as firearms require a certain amount o f fiction from a
poet. Like Ercilla, Tasso uses literary imitation to intimate that a hero’s
action can determine the outcome o f an assault. He uses Clorinda and
Rinaldo for this purpose and invents actions for his siege, even though it
occurred long before the development o f the gun. In the first assault on
(erusalem Clorinda determines its outcome. She wounds or kills a long
list o f Christian leaders ( G L 11.41—45)122 and eventually turns the assault
102 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

back when she hits Goffredo in the leg (11.54-59). A ll see him leave, and:
the Crusaders lose heart. T h ey recover somewhat when he returns, but
not enough to reach the walls, and Clorinda instigates the burning o f the
siege tower that night. She is, o f course, an invented character, and Tasso'
imitates both II. 11.2 4 8 -32 7 and Ae. 12 .311-4 4 0 for the wounding of'
Goffredo. As with Ercilla, literary imitation indicates fiction.
For the second assault Tasso uses his dynastic hero and ascribes all
decisive actions to him. Rinaldo leads his adventurers by ladder up the
toughest part o f the wall, clearing the way for the rest (G L 18 .72-79 ) and
then, rushing along that wall, breaks up Solimano’s defense against the l
great siege tower so the historical Goffredo can reach the wall (99) and
plant his banner.123 The Crusades provide examples o f heroism that made
a tactical difference, and Tancredi is Rinaldo’s historical model. Sieges,
however, whether in the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, did not nor­
mally allow for spectacular acts by individuals, and Jerusalem was no ex­
ception. Tasso therefore resorts to fiction, just as Ercilla does at Penco.
Perhaps there was something quixotic in the whole Renaissance at­
tempt to depict sieges realistically. Homer, some medieval romancers,
Boiardo, and Ariosto had plots that presupposed sieges, but the poets
avoided their representation.124 Tasso and Ercilla, on the other hand,
needed fiction to maintain epic heroism. Yet Virgil had sieges, and it is a
strength of Roman epic that it did present such scenes. War, at least in
the West, has more often been an affair of sieges than the fast-moving
offense popular since Frederick the Great. And war was the principal sub­
ject o f epic and o f many Renaissance romances. These poets, Roman and
Renaissance, tried to give a rounded picture o f war, and sieges provided
some o f their most powerful scenes: the fall o f Troy, Rodomonte in Paris.
Chateaubriand’s praise o f Tasso indicates the goal these poets shared:
“ C ’est surtout le poeme des soldats; il respire la valeur et la gloire; et,
comme je l’ai dit dans Les martyres, il semble ecrit au milieu des camps
sur un bouclier” (“ It is above all the poem o f soldiers. It breathes valor
and glory; and, as I said in The Martyrs, it seems written in the midst of
armies on a shield”) .125
 -----F I V E -----

The Problems History

Makes for the Poet
Torquato Tasso

All THE POETS OF HISTORICAL EPIC AND ROMANCE HAD

|iinhlems with their plots. These difficulties came from the material, and
hoi from the possible ordering o f that material, since all the poets faced
lliein, whether they began their plots at the beginning o f the story, ro­
mance fashion, or started in the midst o f things and presented only a
single set o f interlocked events, after the classical manner. The success o f
[Link]’s Gerusalemme liberata and o f Camoes s Lusiadas might lead one to
associate the historical heroic poem with Renaissance neoclassicism, since
lioili poets began “ in medias res” and generally followed the recommen-
il.i lions o f Aristotle and Horace for a tighdy knit plot. The case o f Ercilla,
however, who followed the romance model and arranged his plot chrono­
logically, starting at the historical beginning o f the Araucanian wars,1 in­
dicates that neoclassicism cannot be held responsible for the difficulties
history posed for story telling.2
I have chosen Tasso rather than his contemporaries Ercilla or Camoes
as my focus in this chapter, not because the Italian poet was an Aristote­
lian but because more is known about the composition o f the Liberata
i han about the writing o f either the Lusiadas or the Araucana. I believe
i hat Tassos Aristotelian theory, though it justifies what he did, masks the
iatlical nature o f his experiment. In particular, his notion o f transposi-
i ion, which he developed in the Discorsidell’artepoetica, concerns history
and provides a focus for this discussion.
One needs a context for such an analysis, and I will begin by compar­
ing Tasso briefly with his two great contemporaries: Camoes and Ercilla.
An Aristotelian frame befits an Aristotelian poet— in this case, the notion
of the mean and its extremes, deflected, however, from ethics to art.
104 The M ovem ent into Realism an d H istory

Am ong the three major poets o f historical heroic poetry during the
Renaissance Camoes maintains the mean. He kept fiction to a minimum
in Os Lusiadas, mostly confined to his epic machinery,4 and had the gods
in turn allegorize aspects o f his narrative, whether as planets,5 elements,6
or ethical qualities.7 For his main plot Camoes chose Vasco da Gama’s ,
great voyage o f discovery, the journey to India. For the rest he covered'
the history o f Portugal,8 announcing this intent in his invocation (Lusia- 1
das, 1.2) and presenting it through flashbacks and prophecies. The recall T
o f medieval history takes up roughly one-third o f the epic,9 and prophecy ’
o f the imperial future occupies much o f canto 10 .10 He thus produced a J
national epic in which plot and history blend almost without difficulty.
I say “almost” because Camoes does not provide rhetorically convincing j
situations for his medieval retrospectives. It is natural to have the Catual
ask Paulo da Gama about the banners on his ship,11 yet this is the same
person who later takes bribes from the Muslim merchants in Calicut
(Kozhikode) and tries to block the Portuguese return (Lusiadas, 8.56). He
might make a curious but hardly a sympathetic listener. Much less plaus­
ible is the situation Camoes imagines for Malindi. It is one thing for I
Dido, already falling in love, to ask Aeneas about his escape from Troy,
quite another for a local African ruler to sit through a long recital o f
Portuguese history that continues across three cantos o f the epic.12
Camoes thus shows, if only slightly, the strain history places on the narra­
tive poet. This becomes much more evident in Ercilla and Tasso.
Don Alonso de Ercilla began his Araucana with the initial Indian re­
volt in Chile and followed a chronological order. He promised to sing
how the Spaniards with their swords forced unconquered Arauco to bow
its neck to a hard yoke (Araucana, 1.1.1, p. 1). Later, however, when he
published part 2 o f his poem (1578), he remarked that the Araucanians
were still fighting and the war incomplete.13 N o r had they stopped a
decade later, at the time Ercilla published part 3 (1589). The young poet-
soldier of the late 1550s could not have guessed that he had chosen one o f
the three wars that continued through the forty-year reign o f Philip II.14
The Araucanian war long outlasted both the poet and his king.
Ercilla died, leaving his poem unfinished, or so it is believed, because
the Araucana promises more to come: the election o f a new leader to
replace Caupolican and the battles that followed (Araucana 3.36.43,
p. 586). In its present form the romance concludes with a canto justifying
Philip’s invasion o f Portugal, an action that unfortunately has nothing to !
do with the Araucanian wars. One can only speculate where Ercilla him-
 PRO BLEM S FO R T H E PO E T lO J

sell would have ended his romance.15 The assault on Quipeo and the
poet’s departure would have provided logical closure o f sorts. Quipeo
ended Don Garcia’s campaign and put a temporary stop to hostilities,
•ind Ercilla refers to it. But these events occurred after the poet’s arrest
.md threatened execution, a painful matter to which he alludes in the
same passage (Araucana, 3.36.34-36, p. 584).16 Ercilla would have had to
describe both Don Garcia’s personal heroism at Quipeo and his own de­
parture for trial in Lima, sent there by this same hero. The juxtaposition
would have ended the romance in dissonance.
Whatever the conclusion he might have provided for the Araucana,
Krcilla would still have been open to criticism by contemporaries for his
1 lioice o f subject. Tasso, developing an Aristotelian point, argued that a
writer should not choose a topic like a whole war, since it was too large
even for epic.17 His argument would apply doubly to the Araucana, since
Ilie war Ercilla chose to narrate had no natural closure.
Tasso himself faced the opposite problem. Where Ercilla struggled
with too much material, Tasso did not have enough. He wanted to por-
II ay the First Crusade, but if he did so, he would have to cover the capture
nl Jerusalem, which was the goal o f the First Crusade and the emotional
appeal behind all later crusades as well. The earlier story o f that expedi-
1ion, the struggles and march across Anatolia and the long siege and battle
.11 Antioch, while more varied and exciting in themselves than the action
.11 Jerusalem, would not have compelled attention from an audience that
Mill considered the recovery o f Jerusalem a legitimate goal. The poet had
10 concentrate on the capture o f the holy city.
Jerusalem did not offer Tasso much historical material. The siege had
l isted only a month, and the Christians had spent most o f that time
building siege machines.18 Tasso’s friend, the Latin poet Pier Angeli da
[Link], who wrote a competing epic on the First Crusade, the Siriade,
ixached the siege only in his last 143 verses.19 This brevity reflected the
sources available to both poets. The chroniclers Robert o f Rheims and
Paolo Emilio each devoted only one to two pages to the siege, and even
William o f Tyre, Tasso’s principal source, had to^expand his account arti-
lidally to give Jerusalem proper emphasis.20 Rhetorical amplification, un-
i liaracteristic for William, marks book 8 o f his Historia rerum in partibus
transmarinis gestarum, where he narrates the siege, and in book 9, which
lovers the battle o f Ascalon, he adds biographical anecdotes about
( ioffredo. By careful use o f these sources, Tasso found enough material
Ior about five cantos (G L 1, 3 ,1 1 ,1 8 —19), or a quarter o f his epic— enough
io 6 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

to make a brief narrative poem, but hardly enough for a major work that
would make his reputation as a great artist. In contrast, the voyage o f I
Vasco da Gama takes up more than half o f Os Lusiadas.21
Tasso could not avail himself o f the means Camoes used to fill up the ]
rest o f his epic. Since the individual Crusaders came from all over western
Europe, Tasso could not turn the expedition into a national epic.22 He
could not appeal to an Italian past or future; moreover, the First Crusade
did not invite such a technique, even if conceived on an international]
scale. Prophecies would have revealed the long defeat that marked later,
crusades, a retreat before Mamluks and Ottomans that ultimately led to !
naval battles close to Italy itself. A n d o f course the expedition o f the
1090s, the first such venture attempted, had no prehistory. Tasso needed
to look elsewhere for historical material.
Tasso solved his difficulty with historical material by a means I have*
called transposition. As he explained in the late 1560s, in his Discorsi deU
I'arte poetica, the poet can change the means and circumstances in the
historical record and confound the times and order o f events.23 The Cru­
sader assaults on Jerusalem provide an example. T h e ajrmy made two at­
tacks, separated by a month. Since the first attack, in early June, ended
quickly and lacked excitement, Tasso transposed to it details from the
first day o f the second assault, such as the elaborate struggle around
Goffredo’s siege tower and the end o f that day’s fighting, with the tower
stalled near the walls and under guard.24 Tasso thus kept the chronology
o f two assaults, separated by a month’s time, but made the first one
grander, more worthy o f epic, by moving to it particulars from the sec­
ond, successful attack. So explained, transposition seems a fairly straight­
forward procedure. This kind o f transposition, however, involving only
details from the historical siege of Jersulaem, could not have solved
Tasso’s problem o f the lack o f sufficient historical material for a long
poem. In fact, Tasso went much further.
Canto 9, which presents Solimano’s night attack on the Crusader
camp, shows how far reaching and complicated transposition could be in
Tasso’s hands. In this respect the canto resembles an archaeological site
where a grand superstructure masks a series o f previous buildings that
form its base and to an extent determine its shape. Patient digging reveals
three levels o f occupation below the present, going backwards in time,
and four structures, two on the highest or most recent level. In other
words, Tasso based his narrative on two actions that occurred during the
siege o f Jerusalem (the most recent level), on another that took place at
Antioch, and finally (the lowest level, which determines the contours o f
 PRO BLEM S FOR T H E PO ET 107

11if site), on the battle o f Dorylaeum, in which the Crusaders fought Soli-
11 m h o , who tried to block their passage across Anatolia. I will follow the
wine procedure as the archaeologist, beginning with the superstructure,
01 l asso’s version o f the military engagement.
l asso assumes that the Crusaders’ old enemy, Solimano, now leads a
kind o f Arab irregulars in Palestine. The Egyptian caliph sent him there
with much gold to draw Arab support and to organize raids for plunder
(< 11. 9.6), and Solimano presents the attack on the Crusader camp in such
liT in s, telling the Arabs that the Crusaders have the spoils o f Asia (9.17).
So far, Solimano has done well. Although the Arabs have mostly burned
Imvels and carried off cattle and sheep (G L 9.10), they have managed to
nit Christian communications with the coast (9.7) and have stolen the
supplies intended for the army, which a fleet had brought into Jaffa (5.87-
NH). The Crusaders now must worry about famine, and they have been
wilding foragers as far as Gaza (G L 8.51). Solimano, moreover, has de-
Mtoyed the Danish party under Sveno that was coming to Jerusalem—
mu escalation o f guerrilla activity that leads to the ambitious attempt in
tiin io 9.
l asso conveys the military logic behind the attack mostly through the
ilr vil’s agent, the Fury Aletto. The demon acts out o f desperation, for the
( fusaders have finished constructing siege machines (G L 8.85) and will
shortly attack Jerusalem. Because the Egyptian army has not yet as­
sembled, Aletto uses the available means. Knowing that the Arabs have
ill ready arranged to run supplies into the city (G L 6 .10 -n ), Aletto decides
10 1urn this event into a surprise attack. T h e Arabs will assault the Cru­
sader camp from the west,25 at the same time as the Jerusalem garrison
,11 lacks it from the south. Such an assault would serve a double strategic
objective. First o f all, Aletto wants at all costs to upset the Crusader time­
table and to delay the assault. Second, she hopes to drive them out of
ilicir fortified camp, north o f the city. The invaders have surrounded this
1 amp with a ditch and a wall (G L 3.6 6 ,9.19, 9.54) to enable them to resist
incursions from any direction. The Saracens must break up this defense,
if they hope ever to dislodge the Crusaders from Jerusalem by force.
Such an attack has little chance o f success. Although Solimano still has
with him a band o f Turks who wear proper armor, a thousand in all (G L
>1.89), his Arabs lack armor (9.77) and the Crusaders regard them with
i ontempt. Goffredo calls them a vile mob (G L 9.47), and Argillano dis­
misses them as an inept people, the dregs o f the world (9.7 6). Only coor­
dination with the city garrison and the element o f surprise give them any
i lunce whatever. Aletto and Solimano see to the latter. The audacity o f
io8 The M ovem ent into Realism an d H istory

the attack surprises Goffredo (G L 9.42), as Aletto guessed it would (9.11),

and Solimano moves his force to Jerusalem with speed. T h ey arrive ahead
o f any news o f their coming {G L 9.13), and Solimano has them attack
while it is still dark so as to minimize the difference between the armed
and the unarmed, as Argillano remarks (9.77). Unfortunately for them,
the sentinels give the alarm, so the Arabs do not really surprise their foes
after all.
T h e double attack works to the extent that the Saracen troops on both;
sides manage to break through the Crusader defenses and get inside the!
camp. On the west Solimano puts to flight the camp guards, and Arab
and Christian enter the camp together {G L 9 .22-24 ). On the south Ar-
gante chases off the guard, leaps the ditch, and fills it with bodies, so the
garrison troops have a level road into the camp {G L 9-54).26 Goffredo, as
soon as he hears o f the fighting, sends Guelfo against Clorinda and Ar-
gante, and he stiffens the resistance there.27 A t the same time Goffredo
takes men to face Solimano, since the Franks have mn as yet offered
effective resistance on the west. A s he goes in that direction, he collects
fugitives, so that he has a large troop when he confronts Solimano. The
clash o f leaders signals the turning point o f the battle, and the Saracen
attack breaks. The plight o f his page, Lesbino,28 distracts Solimano, who
leaves his duel with Goffredo, allowing the enemy to attack his elite corps
o f a thousand Turks {G L 9.88). A t this point the fifty champions, whom
Armida had lured away from camp, arrive unexpectedly on the west and
attack both the unwarlike Arabs and the warlike Turks {G L 9.91-92).
They turn a probable defeat into a rout. Solimano exits anonymously,
amid a cloud o f arrows and lances {G L 10 .1-3), and must later watch the
corpses o f his men burn (10.26—27). On the south Aladino has just come
out o f Jerusalem with more Saracens. W hen he sees his army, though
larger, already bent, he orders Clorinda and Argante to collect their sol­
diers and withdraw. Since they are as yet undefeated, the two obey reluc­
tantly, but it is not always easy to withdraw troops already in combat.
The garrison soldiers panic, throwing away their shields and swords, and
flee not to the city but into Hinnom, the steep valley west and south of
Jerusalem {G L 9.95). Guelfo does not pursue them, however, since the
king still has his uncommitted troops at the city above. And the brief
battle ends.
The defeat gravely weakens the Saracen cause. Although the city has
received supplies, its garrison has failed to break up the Crusader camp;
or slow down the enemy timetable. After the battle Goffredo sets the
assault for the second day {G L 10.57). G n the other side the force o f Arab
 PRO BLEM S FO R T H E PO ET 109

liicgulars has disintegrated, and the Christians can reopen communica­

tions with Jaffa. T h e offensive has definitely passed to the Franks, and
they now have most of their heroes back. Solimano must bear full respon­
sibility for this debacle. He initiated the attack, and his love for Lesbino
11tew him away from his entourage just at the crisis.
lasso used a variant o f this pattern for the other and larger battle o f
(lie epic, that with the Egyptians in canto 20. In that battle, the Persians
1111 1he left, who have so far with difficulty held their own against the
In trainers, collapse once their leader, Altamoro, deserts them to succor
Armida (G L 20.69). F ° r both battles, Tasso had in mind the pattern o f )
Ai bum, and in both he contrasted Goffredo/Augustus with an opponent
Weakened by love.
In fact, Solimano and the Arabs never had much o f a chance. Tasso
admitted as much in a letter he wrote to Luca Scalabrino on 2 June 1575.
I Ile poet could not prolong the fighting much beyond nighttime because
ill*' Crusaders— an army o f well-armed veterans that had never lost a
lialile— were fighting a rabble. Daylight would have revealed to the Cru-
w i Icts their advantage, and they would have quickly scattered Solimano’s
liicgulars. The poet, therefore, times the assault to a slow-motion dawn,
which marks every stage o f the battle and emphasizes the shift o f fortune
[Link] from the Arabs and to the Christians.
lasso dramatizes the dawn mostly through his epic m achinerythe I
1 lash o f demon and angel. A t the beginning red vapor tinges the shadows —7
ihkI the dew looks bloody as hell empties its monsters into the air and
(tinisis scream (G L 9.15). A t the crisis Michele descends and chases away
llic demons, making a path o f light from the sky like a rainbow after a
*101111 or a falling star. W ith his golden wings he shakes away the thick
•liirkness, and his face scatters sparks (G L 9.62).29 Argillano, who now
[Link] prison, taunts the Arabs, saying that they work by night but will
now need arms and valor (G L 9.77). He is the one who kills Lesbino,
[Link] Solimano away from his duel with Goffredo, the action that
liclps turn around the battle. Finally, the fifty appear in silver armor, like
light ning in a cloud, displaying the red cross o f the French Crusaders ( GL
•j 91 92) .30 Tasso thus integrates the battle into one o f his dominant im-
iigr patterns, the war o f light and darkness, and dawn as the place where
light conquer? the dark. The late Fredi Chiappelli has carefully studied
this pattern.?.1 Spenser later imitated it for book 1 o f The Faerie Queene.
Iasso bases this elaborate action on very slender historical evidence, at
liMsi as far as he draws details from the actual siege o f Jerusalem. Two
unrelated skirmishes suggested material for canto 9. The first he found
no The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

in Robert o f Rheims and the mysterious Procoldo, count o f Rochese.32 ]

will give Robert’s version o f the first incident as related in his Histor
iherosolimitana and use William o f Tyre, always Tasso’s first choice amor
his sources, for the second.
Robert tells how Raimundus Piletus, Raimundus de Taurina, an<|
others left camp to reconnoiter the nearby area, lest some enemies comfl
on the Crusaders unexpectedly.33 They found 200 Arabs, whom the
fought and defeated, killing many and taking thirty horses. Robert’s ac
count provides the indication that Crusader troops fought with Arab ir l
regulars, but otherwise it has nothing to do with canto 9 o f Gerusalerm
liberata. Tasso could not have found here the topography o f his batde-
an action involving a city garrison as well as irregulars— the presence 1
the Crusaders’ great foe, Solimano, or the fact that Goffredo’s Lorrainersj
and then still more Crusader troops, appearing unexpectedly, decided
the battle.
Another skirmish, which also occurred near Jerusalem, did contributi
something to Tasso’s tactical presentation and may have suggested to the
poet his whole practice o f transposition. William o f Tyre says that when
Genoese ships came into Jaffa (Yafo) with supplies, Raimondo (of Tou-;
louse) stingily sent only thirty horse and fifty foot to get the provisions. 1
He was later persuaded to send an additional fifty cavalry. Six hundredl
Saracens ambushed the first group near Lydda (Lod) and Ramla, but the 1
second group arrived just in time to rout the Saracens, who lost one-third 1
o f their force (H R 8.9.336—37). Tasso found in this story the fifty]
horsemen who come onto the battlefield at the last minute and provoke,!
panic in the enemy. Perhaps more important, the incident suggested to]
the poet a similar episode that happened during the siege o f Antioch, and!
he used that episode to set up the topography o f his battle.
He found the story in William o f Tyre, and also in Paolo Emilio, who j
wrote a history o f the French arranged by monarchs.34 A Genoese fleet
had come with carpenters and smiths, and Boemondo and Raimondo led
an armed group to bring back the supplies. Raimondo commanded the 1
van, and Boemondo, the rear. Yaghi-Siyan sent out a force from Antioch, j
which successfully intercepted the Christian party, seized the supplies, fl
and scattered the drovers and foot soldiers.35 T h e knights, however, es- j
caped, and Boemondo reached the camp, which had already been roused!
by Goffredo. The Crusaders then caught the Turks trying to get back to)
Antioch and slaughtered them, while the citizens, mobilized at the town j
above with the gates open, deterred their pursuit. The Turks nonetheless;!
sustained heavy casualties, including Yaghi-Siyan’s son, and the Crusaders 9
 PROBLEM S FO R T H E PO ET III

mi ovcred their supplies. They also regained their morale, which had been
diiiken by, among other things, the destruction o f Sveno’s party crossing
Anatolia. They sent part o f the spoils back to the fleet, and the local
Sytian Christians began to help the Latins once again.
Antioch thus provided Tasso with a general model for his battle. It
Involved two enemy forces, one inside and one outside a city; was fought
within view o f the city, near the Crusader camp; and required the inter­
vention o f Goffredo. Furthermore, the presence o f the city forces limited
Ilie ( Christian victory, which at the same time involved a moral reversal
rttid the passing o f the initiative to the invaders. Tasso simply substituted
Arab irregulars for the Turks who attacked the supply train.
Although it provided a model, the Antioch episode does not explain
the tactical development o f the battle, stage by stage. In Tassos version
whole armies fought. Solimano attacked the Crusader camp itself, timing
Ins assault for dawn. A series o f late arrivals determined the Crusader
vu tory: first Goffredo, then the fifty heroes. All this Tasso found at Dory-
Iftru m rather than Antioch.36
After the capture o f Nicaea (Iznik), the Crusaders divided their army
into two parts for the march across Anatolia. In this fashion they would
imsc the supply problem. Boemondo led the van, which consisted o f Nor­
mans from both southern Italy and northern France, plus the troops o f
ilie counts o f Flanders and Blois, and the Byzantine escort led by Taticius
( Iasso’s Tatino). Behind came the men from Toulouse, Lorraine, and Ver-
mandois, led by Raimondo. Meanwhile Kilig: Arslan ibn Siileyman ibn
Kmlumish (Solimano) had prepared a trap for them by Dorylaeum (near
the modem Eskisehir). His army, screened by a line o f hills, waited for
the Crusaders to come over a pass to a plain, following the old Byzantine
military road. Solimano did not realize, however, that another group was
approaching behind the Normans. He thought he would trap the whole
< fusader force, and this mistake explains the Turkish defeat.37
[Link] his namesake in the Liberata, Solimano hoped to surprise his
enemy with a dawn attack, and as in the poem, he failed. Scouts picked
up the Turkish presence the night before,38 so Boemondo had the Nor­
mans camp by the Sari-su or River Bathys and sent a messenger to Rai-
mondo for aid.39 Emilio, assuming Renaissance procedure, claims that
Boemondo tried to fortify the camp but had not completed the defenses
when the Turks hit them.
The Turks used their normal tactics, shooting clouds o f arrows at the
Normans and attacking them from all sides.40 A detachment crossed the
liver and broke into the Christian camp, killing the women and children
112 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

who were there. Meanwhile the Crusader front line, half panicked,
back on the camp. T h e rliere mass o f the troops relieved the enemy pre
sure there.41 A t the same time the Turks found to their dismay that the
arrows could not harm those wearing armor, but they still kept up
arrow shower for some hours.
A t this point the other part o f the Crusader army, which Boemond
had summoned the night before, began to arrive. Goffredo and U go <
first, appearing on the pass above, and charged, clearing away the Turlfl
from the area by the camp. T h e other Crusaders heard the Lorraineti
battle cry and recovered confidence, while the surprised Turks lost the
impetus. N o w Raimondo showed up, while Ademaro, bishop o f Le Fuji
brought his army around behind the Turks.42 T h e Franks charged, and
the Turks, upset by Ademaro’s group, fled eastward. T h ey never cha
lenged the Crusaders again.
Dorylaeum gave Tasso a tactical model for canto 9. Solimano leads I
surprise attack, timed for dawn, on a fortified Crusader camp. Scout)
pick up the advance, and word gets back to Goffredo. Meanwhile th|
Saracens hit the Crusaders from more than one direction and break into
the camp, provoking a crisis in morale. The arrival o f Goffredo reinvigo
rates the Christians, and the later appearance o f still more Crusader!
troops panics the enemy troops, who now flee. Afterward Solimano
no longer lead his own troops against the invaders.
In addition to the tactics Tasso would have found in his sources a siz-J
able Arab contingent serving under Solimano. Robert o f Rheims gives!
lists o f the enemy forces, which include Saracens, Arabs, and Agarenes, j
all terms for the same people.43 Moreover, after the battle Solimano turn
back a party o f Arabs from Syria coming to his aid.44 Dorylaeum thus!
probably suggested to Tasso the whole idea o f making this Seljuk Turk!
the leader o f an Arab force.
Dorylaeum further allowed Tasso to aggrandize the skirmishes by Jeru- j
salem and make them worthy o f epic.45 One o f five major military actions j
in the First Crusade, Dorylaeum probably so shocked everyone in the]
area— it involved the complete defeat o f Seljuk Turks, who controlled'I
much o f the Near East and had recently conquered Anatolia— that no 1
Muslim army put up a serious fight afterward. It is the equivalent in plot]
to what Virgilian imitation did for Tassos style.46 A n example that unites!
both is the poet’s remark that Solimano and Goffredo duel for the rule o f l
Asia (G L 9.50), a grandiose statement that hardly fits a struggle in Pales-T
tine, where Solimano was not even a ruler, but would fit Asia M inor and|
Dorylaeum, at least as a pardonable exaggeration.
 PRO BLEM S FO R T H E PO ET 113
*
Idealization often follows from elevation in plot and style, but Tasso
IihiiuI this already in his sources. William o f Tyre makes a hero o f
I 11til 1cdo not only at Dorylaeum but throughout his narrative o f the First
I l made. He introduces the Lorrainer as a “vir quoque strenuus et in-
djptis dominus” (“a man also active and a distinguished lord” ; H R
hi /..|5), stresses the honor he receives in Hungary (2.3.75) and his delicate
htle at Constantinople (2.6—12.90), and concludes his story with bio-
|laphical anecdotes about the duke.47 For the First Crusade William used
Alhrn o f Aix almost exclusively,48 who in turn drew on an eyewitness
It 11 Hint by one o f Goffredo’s soldiers for the march across Anatolia.49
The idealization o f Goffredo thus goes back ultimately to original oral
Iftiimony o f the First Crusade. Tasso simply developed it. He had to
llinke some adjustments, however, to fit this material to his epic.
Western epic and romance traditionally scorned missile shooters (see
tllttpier 6), so the writers imagined the Eastern enemy fighting more or
If** in Western fashion. Tasso does the same in the Liberata, this time,
however, with a basis in reality. Tasso assigns to Solimano an Arab not a
llukish army, and Arab horsemen, like the Frankish, fought at close
i|liartcrs with lance and sword.50
liisso also struggled to eliminate anachronisms. This is clear from a
I nmparison o f the earlier draft o f canto 9 to the vulgate, or printed, text.
(>1 die three manuscripts that preserve the earlier version, I cite from the
Angelini manuscript (An), since it alone has been frequently printed.51 In
li liisso tends to think o f Solimano and the Arabs as foot soldiers. The
Imsi marches to the Crusader camp (An 9 = vulg. 13), and Solimano
walks quickly, getting near the camp (12 = 16). Twice the poet has the
iiiiibiguous term corre (runs), which could describe movement by either
>1 loot soldier or a cavalryman. Solimano runs before'the rest against the'
guards (18 = 22) and runs to Lesbino’s aid (77 = 85). Tasso probably
was thinking o f the contemporary situation, both militarily and socially.
Militarily most soldiers now fought on foot, and socially only aristo-
II .its in Italy could afford a horse. The poet would have to remind himself
dial Arabs rode to battle and that Bedouin tribes, though poor by
Western standards, regularly used horses and camels. O f these slips Tasso
1 aught only the last, putting Solimano on a horse when he goes to Les-
Ilino’s aid.52 ^ ____ ___
Canto 9 shows that/transpositiommeant much more for Tasso than
die brief description in his Academy lectures might indicate. He did not
simply change the means and circumstances o f some skirmishes by Jeru­
salem or confound their order in time. Rather, the poet superimposed
114 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

one event on another, and in canto 9 he did so with several o f them,

a result, a series o f events originally separate in time blend together 1
form a new pattern identical to no single historical event, yet with all 1
particulars that give a story historical verisimilitude. If there were a sing
major source for canto 9, it would be the battle of Dorylaeum, itself il
volving a massive transposition. W hen Tasso said the poet could
found thfc time and sequence o f events, who among his listeners in F ij
rara would have realized that he meant the whole First Crusade, not jli
the siege o f Jerusalem?
Solimano best exemplifies this larger sense o f transposition.53
though he dominated events early in the Crusade, he disappeared
Antioch and had nothing to do with the invasion o f Palestine. Tasso 1
that some explanation was needed for his presence in the poem. He to
Scipione Gonzaga that he here imitated Virgil and Homer, who unit
enemies— presumably alluding to the presence in the Aeneid o f Die
who lived centuries after Aeneas and whose curse on the hero Virgil co^j
nects to the Carthaginian Wars.54 Again the reference, though corre
masks the exact nature o f Tassos transpositions and especially the
he superimposes events. Transposition or superimposition, in fact, ma
much o f his epic.
Mostly Tasso thinks o f Antioch, that longer and more difficult sie
in the north. We have already seen that it provided the poet with
topography for his battle in canto 9; it also determined the sequent
he presupposes in cantos 8 and 9. News o f Svenos catastrophe dismay
the Crusaders before the Genoese fleet sailed in and Christian foug
Saracen over its supplies.55
Tasso thought o f Antioch in part because the two sieges had sever
parallel events. W hen two episodes, one at Jerusalem and one at Antic
resembled each other, he tended to combine them. In both cities, fig
example, the Saracens considered massacring the Christian populatic
and looked for provocation to do so. Tasso derived his novella o f Sofror
and Olindo from an incident that occurred before the arrival o f the C r
saders at Jerusalem. A Saracen, seeking to incite retaliation against Chri(j
tians, took a dead dog and threw it into the Haram esh-Sharif by nig
Next morning angry Muslims were ready to have the Christians execute
as a judgment for desecration, but instead a teenager offered himself i
was killed for the people. In place o f the dog, Tasso substitutes a statu
which Ismeno takes from the Church o f the Dormition and tries to
for magical purposes ( G L 2.5-7). Here, the poet is clearly thinking I
 PRO BLEM S FO R T H E PO E T H5

luikish iconoclasm in the churches o f Antioch, the violation and mutila­

tion of the images o f the saints.56
lasso made use o f Antioch especially to set up the climax o f the Libe-
hihi In the first place, the batde with the Egyptians did not qualify for
fpu treatment, particularly as William o f Tyre tells it. Late on the previ­
ous day the Crusaders met huge herds o f domestic animals— catde,
louses, and camels— belonging to the enemy, which followed them the
IO'M day to battle. The Egyptians thought that the whole host ap-
([Link], both the men and the domestic herds, was one immense army,
(tod they mosdy ran away (H R 9.12.380-82). Instead o f this inglorious
lale. l asso turned to the battle with Karbuqa (28 June 1098), the atabeg
ol Mosul (Al Mawsil) who led the huge Muslim relief force to Antioch,
Ini much o f his material.57 Like the caliph (G L 17.8), Karbuqa ran the
hill lie through delegates. The Crusaders in both the history and the epic
lined a hill on the left to anchor their line and make an outflanking ma­
neuver by the much larger enemy force difficult (G L 20.8-9). In both
Mimano came from behind, just as the battle began to turn in favor of
lilt' ( hristians (G L 20 .9 2-107). A n d finally, Tasso made use o f the dew
lliiii fell before the battle, only he transferred it to Rinaldo on Olivet (G L
[Link] 17). Dew fell gently on the Crusaders as they went out to battle,
mid moved everyone, because they sensed the presence o f the Holy Spirit
mol now hoped for victory.58
liven more, the siege o f Antioch set the strategy and timing o f the last,
lim e cantos and gave Tassos epic an exciting climax. The actual battle
with the Egyptians occurred more than a month after the fall o f Jerusalem.
(it August 1099) and in another place, near Ascalon. Vincenzo Vivaldi
long ago noted that Tasso here assumed the Antioch model instead,
wlu-re the siege and the battle followed each other closely.59 In both the
Urge of Antioch and the Liberata, the Crusaders have to capture the city
lii-liirc the relief army arrives, and in both they barely do.60 T h ey must go
out 10 battle with the relief force, leaving Raimondo behind, watching an
mu aptured tower (which Robert o f Rheims claimed he took by assault).61
I lie siege o f Antioch was the crisis o f the First Crusade; the whole
niiei prise might have collapsed there. The Crusaders’ success at Antioch
Hiiuianteed the rest. A t Jerusalem, however, the Egyptians lacked the
links’ military skill and could not prevent the fall o f the city once the
Miny moved south. By drawing so heavily on Antioch, Tasso thus came _
4* 1 lose as he could to imitating the Iliad.62 Horace had defined it as a
historical epic, or the “res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella”
ii6 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

(“the deeds o f kings and leaders and the sad wars”), which began “ in me-|
dias res.” 63 Homer did not narrate the whole war or the fall o f Troy, but
rather confined his tale to the crisis o f the siege, when the Achaeans, frus*|
trated over the long delay, were ready to go home, and quarreling ha
deprived them o f their greatest warrior.64 The Trojan failure to expel the
Achaeans under these conditions led directly to the death o f their owii
greatest hero and forecast the fall o f their city. Tasso imitates this patterna
Though he must concentrate on Jerusalem and the end o f the First Cru-^
sade, he presents it as if it were Antioch, the siege that determined th<|
success or failure o f that campaign.
Critics have long noted Tassos imitation o f the Iliad, and the poetl
himself said that the Gerusalemme resembles the Greek epic for the action!
at Jerusalem.65 Certainly both poems concentrate their main action in a]
small area: Troy and its coastal zone, Jerusalem and the plain north of
town. Tasso further imitates the central plot o f the Iliad, when he begins|
“ in medias res” and has Rinaldo withdraw from camp because o f a quar­
rel.66 Finally, the poems are about the same length, considerably longer 1
than other classical epics, such as the Odyssey, Aeneid, Lusiadas, and Para-1
dise L o st?
This massive transposition and the imitation o f the Iliad had impli- 1
cations for Tasso’s neoclassicism. Aristotle preferred the complex to the f
simple plot, the Odyssey to the Iliad.6* The complex plot often involved j
flashbacks and prophecies. Odysseus, for example, narrates his previous
adventures at Phaiakia ( Od. 9 -12 ) and hears o f the future from Teiresias
(11.90-151). Virgil also used retrospectives and views o f the future for his j
Aeneid, and his choice had great importance for Tasso, since the Italian 1
poet derived his notion o f epic style from that work, which he often imi- i
tated, line by line, word by word. We have also seen that Camoes used ;
the same technique to integrate Portuguese history with his epic,69 yet
Tasso has no temporal excursus other than the obligatory dynastic proph­
ecy connected to Rinaldo’s shield. Instead he follows the Iliad and pro­
duces a plot that begins “ in medias res” but thereafter follows a chrono­
logical order with only the briefest references to past or future.70
Tasso’s own use o f transposition prevented him from imitating the
backward and forward movement o f an Odyssey or Aeneid, even if he had
desired to do so. H ow could he have composed a flashback, when he had
already crammed so much o f the First Crusade, so many particulars o f j
the whole campaign, into that brief month at Jerusalem? The prehistory
had become part, o f the present.71 The poet’s whole procedure goes back
to the very beginnings o f the composition o f the Liberata.
 PRO BLEM S FO R T H E PO E T 117

When the sixteen-year-old Tasso composed the abbozzo, or draft, of

his epic in 1559-60, he was already practising transposition and super-
imposition.72 The teenager had there the embassy o f Alete and Argante,
which he took over with only slight changes into the vulgate version o f
1he Liberata. The Egyptians had actually sent two embassies to the Cru­
saders, one at Antioch and one after Arqa, just before the Crusaders
reached Egyptian territory.73 The second concerned Jerusalem and the
fgyptian demand that the Franks not invade Palestine.74 Tasso duly re­
produces this (G L 2.65), but the counteroffer made by Alete fits Antioch
lather than Jerusalem.75 He suggests an alliance against the Turks (of
Anatolia and Antioch) and the “ Persians” (the Turks o f Mosul, or al-
Mawsil).76 Shiite Egypt had reason to fear the Sunni Turkish states, and
Ibn al-Athir suggests they wanted a Syrian cushion between themselves
and their Sunni rivals.77 Such an offer makes no sense after Antioch, when
the Crusaders had defeated the Turks from both regions and thought
instead o f Jerusalem, but Tasso already had Antioch in mind and was
practising transposition. The technique underlay his whole approach to
historical epic.
Even Tasso’s heavy reliance on transposition Eould not furnish him
with all the material he needed for his poem. T h e problem o f history—
that is, the paucity o f material— still remained. Together, the Jerusalem
siege and the technique o f transposition gave Tasso slightly more than
half o f his poem: cantos 1—3, half o f canto 5 (the quarrel), half of canto
8 (Sveno), canto 9, half o f canto 10 (the political analysis or council in
Jerusalem), canto 11, half o f canto 13 (the drought), half o f canto 17 (the
muster o f Egyptian troops), and cantos 18—20, which conclude the poem.
This count gives a total o f ten and a half cantos. The rest o f the poem
is fiction,.
Though Tasso began by relying only on history in 1559—60, when he
wrote his draft o f what became cantos 1-3 o f the vulgate text, he had
already introduced fiction by 1566, when he told Ercole Tasso that he had
reached the sixth canto o f his “ Gottifredo.” 78 This fiction involved the
introduction o f Armida and Clorinda and thus prepared the ground for
much o f the love plots.79 Tasso then justified this mixture o f history and
fiction in the Discorsi dell’ artepoetica, where he argued that fiction keeps
the poet from becoming a mere historian and that Italian as a language
favors love.80 Yet he still kept his fiction subordinate to the history, using
Armida as a way to explain the defection and apostasy that plagued the
Crusaders both at Antioch and at Jerusalem.
This restraint disappeared when Tasso composed the latter part o f the
n8 The M ovem ent into Realism a n d H istory

Liberata.81 Fantasy, not merely fiction, dominates cantos 12 -16 and takes
up significant portions o f cantos 17 and 18. Tasso had anticipated these
wonders already in his Discorsi dell'artepoetica, when he argued that epic
required marvels (1.354—55). This development linked him securely to the
earlier romance tradition, to Pulci, Boiardo, and Ariosto, who all in­
cluded magical operations, enchanted gardens, and exotic locales in their
poems. Tassos audience would have expected such scenes, and this mate­
rial probably accounts in no small way for the popular success o f the
Liberata.
Even Tassos Iberian counterparts, with their severer experiments in
historical epic and romance, did not altogether escape the influence o f
the love god and his fantasies. Ercilla began by rejecting love from the
Araucana, revising Ariostos opening lines:82

N o las d a m as, a m o r , n o g e n tile z a s

d e C a b a lle ro s, c a n to e n a m o r a d o s .
(A raucana, 1.1.1, p . 1)
I s in g n e ith e r w o m e n , lo v e , n o r t h e n o b le a c ts o f k n ig h ts in lo v e.

He had to admit, however, that verse needs love to please an audience

{Araucana, 1.15.1-5, pp. 239 -4 0 ),83 and he introduced amatory episodes
into the second and third parts o f the Araucana,84 He begins the Dido
episode by saying that he has followed such a narrow road that he needs
breadth o f subject matter and an open field. He tells his story o f the Phoe­
nician widow to divert the tired mind {Araucana, 3.32.50-51, p. 521).
Love also appears twice in Os Lusiadas: the vignette o f Ines de Castro
at the end o f canto 3 and the Island o f Love, which overlaps cantos 9 and
10. Ines’s story qualifies the opposition between love and war, fiction and
history, that we have seen in Tasso. Ines was a historical figure, and she
reminds one that love can be as much a matter o f history as war can be.
Ercilla too suggests a historical dimension to some o f his love episodes.
He tells the Dido story to correct Virgil and give an accurate history
{Araucana, 3.32.43-46, 52-53, pp. 520, 522), and he claims to have met
the war widow, Tegualda,85 though the details o f her story are clearly fic­
tional.86
Tasso himself argues that his love fictions have at least some basis in
history, citing remarks by the count of Rochese.87 Given the nature o f
war, it is understandable that in military epic love episodes tend to be
fictional, yet here especially the poet needs relief from scenes o f fighting
and killing. Ercilla, for example, tells the Dido story to the soldiers in his
group, who are tired from the pursuit after Canete {Araucana, 3.32.47,
 PRO BLEM S FO R T H E PO ET ny

p. 521).88 Like Tasso the Spanish poet requires diversion. Camoes, in con-
1l ast, does not. He could mostly ignore love fictions or histories, since he
chose a voyage and not a war for his topic.
Although both war poets, Tasso and Ercilla, included love stories, they
differed radically in the proportions they allotted to love and fiction in
their poems. Roughly three o f thirty-seven cantos in the Araucana con­
cern love, and another three and a half present Indian athletics and Fiton’s
marvels, so a total o f six and a half, or about one-sixth o f the whole.89 As
brcilla explains in one place (Araucana, 1.15.4-5, p. 240), he simply has
too much material to cover. Tasso, as we have seen, did not, and as a
result he ended up balancing the two, making his epic an equal blend of
the historical and the fictional, o f war and love.
P A R T T H R E E &x

The Gun,
or the New
Technology
 -----S I X -----

Negative Critiques
Ludovico Ariosto and John M ilton

THE G U N POSED A PROBLEM FOR THE W RITERS OF R O M A N C E

and epic that had no parallels in tradition. Crossbows and the heavier
armor they necessitated or the enceinte castles o f the thirteenth century
had not much altered the romancers’ craft. But writers in the fifteenth
and early sixteenth centuries were faced with the new technology o f fire­
power, developed between 1440 and 1530. The use o f the gun in warfare
challenged the basis o f their fictions and provoked strong responses. Not
surprisingly, most writers reacted negatively, like the majority o f their
contemporaries. They worked out a negative critique o f the gun that is
the focus of this chapter. Fortunately, J. R. Hale has already described
public reaction to the introduction o f guns in a long and careful article,
and this frees me to concentrate on the poets, specifically Ariosto and
Milton.1 The Olimpia episode in Ariostos Orlando furioso presented the
negative critique o f the gun in its classic form and set the model for
writers outside o f Italy. Milton, who comes after the period covered in
this study, demonstrates the strength o f the negative tradition. By the
1660s the gun had long been a standard weapon in warfare, yet the En­
glish poet in book 6 o f Paradise Lost could still make the same complaint
against firearms that Ariosto had uttered more than a century before.
A few poets opposed this negative line in varying degrees. Some at­
tempted to assimilate guns somehow within their poems, while others
espoused what I will call a modernist position. The latter group wrote not
about the deep past but about contemporary naval warfare and colonial
struggle. Most prominent among them were the Iberian poets Camoes
and Ercilla, whose work I analyze in chapter 7. To the present-day reader,
it is both fascinating and confusing that the modernists shared the same
value system as the other poets— a chivalric code inherited from the

TM
12 4 The N ew Technology

Middle Ages. T h e works o f both groups embodied this code. Thus, the
poems o f such writers as Camoes and Ercilla present a mirror image of
the romance world created by poets who espoused the negative critique.
H ow could the chivalric code support both o f the opposed positions?
The concept o f fraud, the vice traditionally opposed to the chivalric code
in the older poetry, provides a key. Ariosto was the first to work out its
problematic.
T h e epic poet was not obliged to reflect contemporary events, so Ari­
osto’s inclusion o f the gun in the Furioso is unusual. His ostensible topic,
the wars o f Charlemagne, long predated the age o f the gun, and even his
romance sources o f the high and later Middle Ages came from a time
before the use o f cannon. Romance writers generally included present
customs by a practice o f discreet anachronism. Malory, for example,
presupposes fifteenth-century-style tournaments in his translation of
thirteenth-century texts. The gun, however, did not fit readily into this
practice, because the changes it introduced in warfare were fundamental
and far-reaching. Nonetheless, Ariosto began by presupposing the pres­
ence o f cannonry, much as M alory had assumed tournaments. He made
direct references to guns in the personal introductions he gave to his
cantos. These remarks could have encouraged the positive or modernist
position that Camoes later argued. Afterward, however, Ariosto decided
to introduce the gun directly to his plot, and when he did so he judged
it negatively. This is his most important contribution to the literature o f
firearms, and it provides the focus o f this chapter. .
Ariosto had good reason to support the modernist position. His lord,
the Ferrarese ruler Alfonso I d’Este, encouraged technological experi­
ment. Ferrara was the first city to have angle bastions on its walls— that
is, the first to use guns aggressively.2 By his death Alfonso had collected
300 cannon, had personally supervised the casting o f some, and had done
his own shooting at Legnago, where his guns gave thirty to forty shots a
day.3 His cuirass bore the design o f a flaming bombshell when he fought
at Ravenna, and Titian portrayed him with his hand on a gun muzzle.4
Ariosto himself knew o f two battles where the Este artillery was decisive.
At the second battle o f Polesella (22 December 1509), the Este cannon
destroyed a Venetian fleet on the Po.5 The battle o f Ravenna (1512)
marked his poetry, even though he visited the battlefield only on the day
after the event.
Alfonso and his cannon made victory possible for the French in their
battle with the Spaniards at Ravenna. The duke contributed two-thirds
 N E G A T I V E C R I T IQ U E S I2 J

ill ilie cannon. After the initial barrage he turned them sideways to shoot
,u toss the field and forced the Spanish heavy cavalry to charge. This ac-
i um in turn made the Spanish light cavalry opposite the cannon attack
i lie Este artillery. In both cases the Spaniards left a strong defensive posi-
lion and attacked a superior force. Ariosto twice compliments Alfonso
lor his tactics (O F 14.2, 33.40). They demonstrated what Cerignola
(1103), Genoa (1507), and Agnadello (1509) had already intimated, that
guns could turn around a battle. This time artillery broke up the then
standard defensive-offensive strategy, whereby a smaller army took a forti­
fied position and destroyed its larger enemy as the enemy attacked. The
Spaniards at Ravenna were following this principle and had some o f their
guns placed defensively, as support for the infantry. By turning his guns,
Alfonso forced them to leave a favorable position.6 Ariosto assumes this
technology in the Olimpia tale. Cimosco’s gun is o f the new versatile
type, light enough so that Orlando can pick it up. Cimosco uses it for
sieges, against field camps ( O F 9.30—31),7 and tactically against a horse­
man. Such uses, as much as Ariostos comments, show the new style of
warfare.
Ariosto wrote in a city that could have encouraged a positive attitude
10 innovation. N o t only was Ferrara quick to adopt the gun, it also was
where the modernists later defended Ariosto himself against the an-
i ients.8 Cinzio and others argued that the ancients had not anticipated
romances because they had a different culture and language. The new
society justified new literary forms, and Ariosto’s romance served broader
purposes than the epics o f Homer and Virgil. Gunpowder and cannon
suggested a similar argument, for the technology was unknown to antiq­
uity.9 T h e new warfare and the new poetry could have supported each
other, and Ariosto might have anticipated Camoes by forty years. He did
not do so, however, and his comments on Ravenna reveal some o f his
reasons for adopting the negative critique o f the gun.
Ravenna was perhaps the bloodiest battle o f the century. Fourteen
thousand people died, and at one point Alfonsos guns shot down men
on both sides. Jacopo Guicciardini wrote to his brother the historian about
these guns: “ It was a horrible and terrible thing to see how every shot o f the
artillery made a lane through those men-at-arms [the Spanish heavy cav­
alry], and how helmets with the heads inside them, scattered limbs,
halves o f men, a vast quantity, were sent flying through the air.” In Elegy
10 Ariosto described what he had seen the day after: the dead so crowded
that no earth was visible for miles.10 The major impact o f Ravenna on
 126 The N ew Technology

Ariosto’s poetry is seen not in his stray comments but in his descriptio
o f the carnage at Paris, the central military action o f his epic. He mak
the comparison explicit:

N e i m o lti a s s a lti e n e i c r u d e l c o n f litti,

c h ’a v u ti a v e a c o n F ra n c ia , A f r ic a e S p a g n a
m o r t i e r a n o i n f in id , e d e r e litti
a l lu p o , a l c o v ro , aH’a q u ila g riffa g n a ;
e b e n c h e i F r a n c h i fo s s e ro p iu a fflitti,
c h e t u t t a a v e a n p e r d u t a la c a m p a g n a ,
p iu si d o le a n o i S a ra c in , p e r m o lti
p r in c ip i e g r a n b a r o n c h ’e r a n lo r to lti.
E b b o n v itto r ie c o s i s a n g u in o s e ,
c h e l o r p o c o a v a n z o d i c h e a lle g ra rs i.
E se a lle a n t iq u e le m o d e r n e c o se ,
in v itto A lfo n s o , d e n n o a ss im ig lia rs i;
la g r a n v itto ria , o n d e a lle v ir tu o s e
o p e r e v o s tr e p u o la g lo ria d a rs i,
d i c h ’a v e r s e m p r e la c rim o s e c ig lia
R a v e n n a d e b b e , a q u e s te s’a s s im ig lia .
(OF 14.1-2)
I n t h e m a n y a ss a u lts a n d c r u e l c o n flic ts t h a t A f r ic a a n d S p a in h a d w ith
F ra n c e , th e d e a d w e re i n n u m e r a b le , le ft f o r t h e w o lf, c ro w , a n d te a r in g
e a g le . A n d a lth o u g h t h e F r e n c h s u ffe re d m o r e , s in c e th e y lo s t t h e w h o le
fie ld , th e S a ra c e n s s o r r o w e d m o r e , f o r t h e m a n y p rin c e s a n d g r e a t b a r o n s
w h o m th e y lo s t.
T h e r e a re v ic to rie s s o b lo o d y t h a t th e y b r in g l it d e jo y to t h e v ic to rs . A n d
i f I m a y c o m p a r e m o d e r n th in g s to a n c ie n t, u n b e a t e n A lfo n s o , t h e g re a t
v ic to ry , th e g lo ry o f w h ic h c a n b e g iv e n to y o u r a c ts o f p o w e r, f o r w h ic h
R a v e n n a m u s t a lw a y s h a v e te a r f u l e y e lid s, is lik e th is o n e .

Ravenna both justifies the modernist position and explains Ariostos re­
luctance to develop its implications.11
W hen Ariosto, now retired, revised his poem the last time for publica­
tion, he introduced to it the Olimpia story plus a direct meditation on
guns, which he inserted at canto 11. In these passages he argues the stan­
dard negative theory o f the gun: that it was a demonic invention made
in the north.
Orlando says, when he throws Cimosco’s gun into the North Sea:

O m a le d e tto , o a b o m in o s o o r d ig n o ,
c h e f a b r ic a to n e i ta r ta r e o f o n d o
 N E G A T IV E C R I T IQ U E S 127

fosti per man di Belzebu maligno

che ruinar per te disegno il mondo,
all’inferno, onde uscisti, ti rasigno.
(OA9.91)
( ) c u r s e d , a b o m in a b le e n g in e , w h ic h m a lig n B e e lz e b u b p u t to g e th e r in
1lie T a r ta r e a n d e p th , w h o i n t e n d e d t o r u i n t h e w o r ld t h r o u g h y o u , I re a s­
sig n y o u t o t h e h e ll f r o m w h ic h y o u c a m e .
Al iosto continues the story in a monologue: recently a necromancer drew
Ilie gun back out o f the ocean, and the devil helped the Germans learn
how to use it (O F 11.22 -2 8).12 This theory was old already when Ariosto
expressed it, as Hale indicates, and it represented the majority literary
opinion in the period.13
The English later adopted the same position, composing variations on
Ariosto’s discourse. In his Civile Wars Samuel Daniel, speaking about
York’s entrenched camp near London, called artillery an instrument new
brought from hell, framed to terrify men, to tear the earth, and to rend
si nmg towers (6.26-27). A character named Nemesis later says that artil­
lery enables people to scourge each other in a way a tyrant could never
devise ( C W 6 . 39-40). Two generations later Milton developed the story
Iurther; he had the devil both stimulate the invention o f artillery among
men (PL 6.501-6) and invent it himself, before human history and during
the second day o f the heavenly war (6.469-608).14
The story o f the origins o f gunpowder likewise assumed that northern­
ers discovered the technology. For example, Ariosto sets his tale in
I lolland, and Cimosco rules Friesland. Practically everyone thought a
( ierman had invented gunpowder,15 and elaborate accounts about its in­
vention existed forty years before Ariosto wrote his novella. For Italians
die belief could also form part o f a larger theory, which credited all mili-
lary innovation to the north. The poet here would be one with his con­
temporary Machiavelli.16
By coincidence this story exactly fits the biblical traditions behind the
legend o f Satan’s revolt,17 so that Milton had no difficulty assimilating it
10 Paradise Lost. The enemy god Baal built his palace on Mount Zephon
or Casius in the extreme north o f Syria,18 and Isaiah parodied the story
in his attack on the king o f Babylon, who says he will ascend heaven,
exalt his throne above the stars o f God, and sit on the mountain o f con­
gregation in the north (Isaiah 14:12-15). Origen then applied the passage
to Satan, and a northern location for Satan’s revolt soon became com­
monplace for the biblical and literary trad itio n ^N ear the beginning o f
128 The N ew Technology

Paradise Lost Milton compares Satan’s troops to the Germanic tribes that
swept away the western Roman Empire:

A m u lt it u d e , lik e w h ic h th e p o p u lo u s N o r t h
P o u r ’d n e v e r f r o m h e r fro z e n lo in s , t o p ass
Rhene o r t h e D a n a w , w h e n h e r b a r b a r o u s S o n s
C a m e lik e a D e lu g e o n t h e S o u th , a n d s p re a d
B e n e a th G ib ra lta r to t h e L yb ia n s a n d s .
{ P L 1.351-55)

The poet closes the passage alluding to the Vandals, themselves bywords
for the destruction o f art.20
T h e hint o f barbarism suggests in classical form the main critique o f
the gun, which again Ariosto originally expressed in very clear terms. The
destructive power o f the gun, however, did not by itself bring about the
poet’s denunciation, which he wrote long after Ravenna. Rather, the de­
velopment o f the harquebus, which immediately preceded the composi­
tion o f the Olimpia episode, gave rise to his moral analysis that modern
technology was incompatible with chivalry (fig. 18).
Ariosto never describes Cim oscos gun except by periphrasis, and al­
though these descriptions indicate a cannon (O A 9 .75), the imprecision
allows him to have it function differently. It does not blow o ff hands and
scatter half-bodies, the way Alfonsos cannon did at Ravenna. Instead it
kills people the way a bullet would. Olimpia’s father dies, shot between
the eyes. Her first brother, defending their field camp, receives a stroke
that breaks through his armor and goes into his heart. During another
battle her second brother is hit fleeing. A ball goes through his shoulder
and out his breast (O A 9 .30-31). This sort o f thing happened frequently
in the mid-i520s, when the harquebus replaced crossbows and all other
missile-throwing devices as a tactical weapon.
The harquebus had long been an important military weapon, but ini­
tially it was used more for harassment o f the enemy than for precision
fire, and it was more important in sieges than in battle.21 The matchlock,
introduced at the end o f the fifteenth century, gave the weapon greater
accuracy. The gunner could now shoot from the shoulder and sight along
the barrel, and by the 1490s groups o f mounted harquebusiers appeared.22
In the next decade they took important roles in major battles, beginning
with Cerignola (1504).23 Further technological refinements gave the har­
quebus in the 1520s a new and decisive importance. The harquebus now
had a greater range (200 meters), and its bullets could pass through any
cuirass.24 Harquebusiers formed their own companies and used alternat-
 N E G A T I V E C R I T IQ U E S 129

figure 18. Harquebus, with its trigger mechanism. Reprinted from Pepper and
Adams, Firearms and Fortifications. Copyright © 1986 by The University of Chicago,

ing fire.25 W ithin a few years they had proved their worth against every
olher tactical arm: the pike (Bicocca, 1522, and Landriano, 1529), heavy
cavalry (Pavia, 1525, and Gavinana, 1530), and light cavalry (Gavinana).
lor the romancer Pavia was the most serious event because it involved
1lie heavily armed aristocrat on his horse. A t that battle, the French were
winning the battle o f the knights, and Francis I had already told the sei­
gneur de Lescun that he was now lord o f Milan. Then the marquis of
Pescara moved 1,500 Spanish harquebusiers and caught the French horse
by flank fire. The first volley hit many French nobles, who were conspicu­
ous by their dress. It caused confusion and panic, and allowed the Impe­
rial cavalry to re-form and counterattack. In the end the Imperials annihi­
lated the French knights: the king was a prisoner, and generals Bonnivet,
I .a Tremouille, La Palice, and Lescun were dead, along with 6,000 other
men. Paolo Giovio complained that cavalry, which had never fought so
well, went down before ignoble infantry.26 But Pavia was not the only
alarming event for the romancers. Harquebus fire killed Bayard, the most
130 The N ew Technology

famous o f knights, on his horse at Romagnano Sesia, and an accurate

volley from the trees killed the prince o f Orange at Gavinana and put to
flight his 400 men-at-arms.27
It is not surprising then that Ariosto finds the gun unchivalric and has
Cimosco kill Orlando’s horse. Orlando later says that it enables the bad
to prevail over the good {O F 9.90). In his meditation on artillery Ariosto
generalizes this observation. T h e gun destroys military glory. No mastery
in arms, no courage or strength avails now, since the worse can win by
the gun. A soldier, if he wants employment, should toss his weapons,
even his sword, into the forge and shoulder a scoppio, or harquebus ( O F
11.25—27). And this is what Ariostos son did, when he became an artil­
lery captain.28
This opinion o f the poet, like his others, was a common one, and later
writers like Cervantes returned to it.29 Perhaps a more significant ex­
ample, though not well known, is Juan Rufo. In his epic Austriada he
celebrates the contemporary victory o f Lepanto, a battle prominent for
its cannonades. Yet Rufo introduces a denunciation o f artillery into his
discussion o f the fighting on the Turkish royal galley {Austriada, 2 4 .15 -
18), and he alludes to Ariosto. The horrendous artifice o f Cimosco with
its crude violence had no place there, Rufo says, for it was all sword work.
Sword and lance are the crucible o f valor and require a combination o f
mind, force, and dexterity to use them accurately. Artillery, on the other
hand, is the epilepsy o f fortitude.
The gunner, like the Germanic barbarian, operated outside civilized
modes o f warfare. For the romancers this meant outside their inherited
chivalric code. The poets therefore assimilated firearms to a standard me­
dieval category. Guns were held to exemplify fraud, the vice traditionally
opposed to chivalry.
Ariosto associates Cimosco consistently with deceit. Olimpia correctly
fears treachery (O F 9 .51). W hen Orlando challenges Cimosco to a duel,
the king instantly thinks o f fraud. He sends a company o f thirty horse
and foot out another gate to ambush the hero (O A 9.63-65). M alory simi­
larly connects cannon to fraud and treason: Mordred uses guns when he
besieges Guinevere in the Tower o f London {Morte, 21.1).30 Those who
cheat, those who do not follow the chivalric code, use guns.
Fraud, on the other hand, makes those who follow the chivalric code
look innocent and inexperienced. Ariosto gives his characters a naive view
o f technology. The poet twice describes Cimosco’s gun, both times by
periphrasis {O F 9.28—29, 73—75). He has to use circumlocution because
he is describing the first gun, so that no one in his poem could experience
 N E G A T IV E C R I T IQ U E S 131

h other than naively. Olimpia’s father did not know what a gun could do
•uul was shot down on the walls o f a castle, walking in full view. There is
.1 significant difference, however, between artistic and true naivete. The
Incas who first saw the Spaniards with their horses and guns thought
they were gods. They called the harquebuses yllapas, or “thunder from
heaven,” and thunder was their second most important deity.31 In con­
trast, Ariostos characters see the same fraud that educated opinion o f his
day found in artillery.
Through this story Ariosto creates a sense o f ethical outrage. He has
( amosco direct his weapon against innocent victims, people who know
nothing about guns. The poet thus invents an unfair situation based on
.1 false premise, since both sides used artillery in contemporary Europe.
( )n the battlefield a tactical rather than an ethical question applied. One
asked which side had the better guns, or which had more guns, or which
side used them more effectively. Artificial naivete, moreover, does not
capture the Amerindian response to guns. In fact, the gun abroad rein­
forced rather than called into question the old ethical code, a topic I dis­
cuss in chapter 7.
Milton repeated Ariosto’s scenario but in a more extreme form. Ariosto
had posited the invention o f artillery in the Middle Ages, but Milton had
ii happen before human history and outside our universe. He further
modeled his story on what he believed to be the first tactical use o f can­
non in warfare. He read in Paolo Giovio’s life o f Bartolomeo Colleoni
1hat for one battle the condottiere had spingards, an early type o f gun,
drawn up on small wagons behind his line.32 A t a trumpet signal the front
opened on either side, leaving the wagons and guns facing the enemy,
and the salvo shocked the enemy with a storm o f projectiles. Milton as­
sumes that Satan uses the same tactical maneuver, but he modernizes the
(echnology. The devils have powder in grains {P L 6.575), and Milton
imagines them using the new light field artillery introduced by Gustavus
Adolphus, three rows deep and mounted on gun carriages.33 Once the
vanguard divides to the right and the left, the salvo has the same shock
effect Colleoni produced in the mid-fifteenth century {P L 6.56 9-70, 589—
90). Milton thus had Satan anticipate the historical invention o f field
artillery. T h e English poet replaced Ariostos fictional version with an ac­
count derived from what he considered to be fact.
Milton also fit Ariostos story into a different political and moral con­
text. W hen Satan reveals his cannon on the second day o f the heavenly
war, the loyal angels maintain close formation {P L 6.581), and so the vol­
ley easily knocks them over. N ot knowing what to expect, the good angels
132 The N ew Technology

react like the members o f Olimpia’s family faced with Cimosco’s gun.
Naivete invites deception, and Milton follows Ariosto in associating the
gun with fraud {P L 6.5 55).34 He could also have made a similar political
application, if he had wished. James Freeman has shown that the Renais­
sance generally accepted fraud as a legitimate part o f warfare, citing Ari­
osto’s contemporaries, Machiavelli and More, and seventeenth-century
treatises, including Milton’s De doctrina christiana,35 Yet the English poet
provides a different political context, one that reveals the roots o f this
tradition in a way that Ariosto’s work does not.
In the Furioso Cimosco resembles a condottiere lord or a Cesare Bor­
gia. H e tries to enforce debatable claims outside his inherited lands, and
others see his actions as both tyrannical and aggressive. Satan in contrast
is punished for sedition and rebellion against his legitimate overlord. G od
later calls the angelic revolt an act o f fraud {P L 7.143—44). The technologi­
cal fraud o f artillery grows out o f an original political fraud, fitly indi­
cated by the night scene in which Satan initiates his action. N o one ever
mentions rebellion, yet Beelzebub understands Satan, and both generals
talk ambiguously and play on angelic jealousy {P L 5.657-710). Milton
thus understands the demonic revolt in terms o f the fascination with
fraud and sedition, which marked both Tudor and Stuart England.
Daniel gives the Tudor version, when he associates cannon with York’s
rebellion (CW"6.26 -2 7 ), but it was the Gunpowder Plot that most deeply
impressed the English and linked the new technology to sedition. As a
student Milton had already worked out for his poems on that topic the
very scenario he would later use for Paradise Lost. In In quintum novembris
Satan again starts the plot by night, this time appearing to the pope in a
dream (92-96) and telling him that he may use fraud against heretics
(113—15), even as he himself deceives the pope under the false image o f a
Franciscan friar. In Paradise Lost Satan also manipulates Beelzebub, in­
fluencing his emotions {P L 5.694-95). In both scenes fraud breeds fraud,
and ultimately politics and technology together outline a moral evil.
For epic and romance, however, the idea has ancient roots, far older
than the period o f the Tudors and Stuarts. Malory associates fraud with
Gawain and his brothers, and Mordred comes from that family. In the
Chanson de Roland it is Ganelon, and in the Nibelungenlied, Hagen.
These men do not follow the chivalric code, and those who do—
Lancelot, Roland, and Siegfried— can only see their activity as false and
yet very dangerous. Mordred, and not the barons, Romans, or Saxons,
brought down Arthur’s kingdom.
The English writers followed Ariosto in another respect when they
 N E G A T IV E C R I T IQ U E S 133

i onnected artillery to the construction o f larger states. Cimosco is trying

10 unite some provinces o f modern Holland into a single entity. For the
liuglish Daniel provides the most extensive discussion in his long excur­
sus on Nemesis and Pandora. He begins with an idealized picture o f me­
dieval Europe, just before the development o f firearms (CUT'6.28-33).
I'.urope had many states, none swollen out o f form so as to disturb the
rest. His note explains that Italy had more states then, as did the Germa­
nics; France had free princes; and Iberia contained several kingdoms.
I iunpowder, however, enabled larger states to expand, seizing smaller
ones, so that a few great states appeared, like Spain and France, which
could slaughter each other with greater power ( 0 ^ 3 9 —41). The gun cer­
tainly enabled the Spaniards to conquer Granada and permitted both
Frenchman and Spaniard to range freely through Italy. Monster states led
to what modern historians have called the gunpowder empires, and Ray
Wolper cites both French and English opinion from the 1660s that
connects the gun to empire building.36 Milton turns the argument into
.1 moral analysis. As we have seen, he links cannon to fraud and to its
master, Satan, and then shows how Satan conquers our universe by fraud.
I lie poet returns to this theme many times in Paradise Lost and Paradise
Regained?7 most especially in the passage where Satan relates to the fallen
angels his successful temptation o f Man:

. . . H i m b y f r a u d I h a v e s e d u c ’d
F r o m h is C r e a to r , a n d th e m o r e to in c re a se
Y o u r w o n d e r , w ith a n A p p le ; h e th e r e a t
O f f e n d e d , w o r th y o u r la u g h te r, h a th g iv ’n u p
B o th h is b e lo v e d M a n a n d all h is w o r ld ,
T o S in a n d D e a th a p re y , a n d so to u s,
W i t h o u t o u r h a z a rd , la b o r, o r a la rm ,
T o ra n g e in , a n d to d w e ll, a n d o v e r M a n
T o ru le , as o v e r all h e s h o u ld h a v e r u l ’d .
{PL 10.485-93)
All three poets, Ariosto, Daniel, and Milton, react to periods of accel­
erated technological advance. Ariosto wrote the Olimpia story after the
evolution o f the gun was complete and after it had proved its worth in
Held engagements as well as in sieges and naval battles. By the time Daniel
wrote the Civile Wars England had become a leading producer o f iron
cannon. The English founders had become the rage on the Continent by
1570 and made better guns than the Swedes.38 In fact, mass production
in Sweden and England began to alter the balance o f power in favor o f the
Protestant north, and Milton saw its consequences. The Parliamentary
134 The N ew Technology

armies, considered rebels by the Royalists, won the English Civil W ar t

also initiated the most spectacular expansion o f English power since \
days o f Henry V. Under Cromwell English soldiers occupied both Sc
land and Ireland, and the navy seized Jamaica. Yet neither Daniel
Milton adopted a modernist position, any more than Ariosto had do
All three denounced the gun and in so doing expressed their sense i
crisis that was literary as well as social and military.
Ariosto does not have Orlando simply defeat Cimosco, the agent)
fraud, as Charlemagne punished Ganelon in the Chanson de Roland. \
stead, he has Orlando take the gun and throw it into the sea, put it i
o f his world. By this action he signals the crisis. Ariosto is aiming at I
whole new technology. It is not just Cimosco’s gun but gunpowder1)
well. The poet puts a gunpowder explosion in a simile, which he applil
however, to Orlando:

C h i v id e m a i d a l ciel c a d e re il fo c o
c h e c o n si o r r e n d o s u o n G io v e d is s e rra ,
e p e n e tr a r e o v e u n ric h iu s o lo c o
c a r b o n c o n z o lfo e c o n s a ln itr o se rra ;
c h ’a p e n a a rriv a , a p e n a to c c a u n p o c o ,
c h e p a r c h ’a v a m p i il c ie l, n o n c h e la te rra ; *
s p e z z a le m u r a , e i g ra v i m a r m i sv e lle ,
e fa i sassi v o la r s in a lle ste lle .
(OA9.78)
W h o e v e r s a w fire fall f r o m h e a v e n , w h ic h J o v e u n lo c k s w i t h te r r if y in g
s o u n d , a n d p e n e tr a te w h e r e a n e n c lo s e d p la c e s h u ts u p c a r b o n w i t h s u l­
p h u r a n d s a ltp e te r s a w t h a t as s o o n as i t a rriv e s, a s s o o n as i t to u c h e s th e
p o w d e r e v e n a little , it s e e m s a s i f t h e s k y as w e ll as t h e e a r th b la z e s. It
b re a k s w a lls, s p lin te r s h e a v y m a r b le b lo c k s , a n d m a k e s t h e s to n e s fly to
t h e s ta rs .39

Cimosco’s gun has just struck Orlandos horse, so the simile carries ove
that sense o f artificial lightning to the explosion o f stored gunpowderd
struck by natural lightning. Such an event occurred at the first battle off
Polesella, when the Este cannon blew up a Venetian gunpowder ship
(1509).40 The simile also resembles another, which describes an explosiv
mine (O/727.24).41
Ariosto suggested the various uses o f gunpowder because he realiz
that it now affected every kind o f warfare. T h e harquebus in the 152c
was the last in a series o f developments. It began with sieges, when Jea
Bureaus artillery blew the English out o f France and Mehmed U s cannon
pounded the walls o f Constantinople. Then it was ships (Diu, 1509), field
 N E G A T I V E C R I T IQ U E S 135
*

IHlIIrry (Ravenna, 1512), and finally the harquebus. In response to these

developments, the new armies had to be versatile. They had to include
MtiUr than one kind of infantry (pike and harquebus), plus light cavalry.
(Vvia, however, showed that heavy cavalry had a doubtful future, and this
lim lud been the traditional basis for romance epic.42
Romance began in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries as a
tflrlirntion o f a military aristocracy, the knight on horseback. In the en­
tiling 300 years this form survived major changes in the conduct o f war,
bill could it survive the disappearance o f the knight himself? The Olim-
|ilii episode indicates Ariostos consciousness of the problem and answers
llie question in the negative.43 The episode thus functions as an exorcism.
[Link]’s action indicates that the gap between the poet’s fiction and
uiiuemporary warfare had become too great. To survive, romance had
(•lllicr to ignore the present or to undergo a change.
The poets did have more time to adjust than Ariosto may have
thought. Matters that Ariosto could not anticipate softened the impact
ill li rearms for another century. First o f all, there was what Frances Yates
In Astraea called the refeudalization o f Europe, an escape into a medieval
liiniasy world, encouraged by aristocrats and government alike. The Furi-
m0 itself gave significant impetus to this movement, which had such suc-
1 css that later writers who talked about medieval manners or literature
nltcii tacitly assumed the sixteenth century, at least in northern Europe.44
I igliteenth-century critics defended Spenser as a Gothic writer,45 and in
fiance, where neoclassicism made such a severe break with the past, later
writers could assimilate the sixteenth century to their own medieval
past.46 France, in fact, experienced something o f a medieval revival.47
I luring the Wars o f Religion the French manufacture o f cannon dropped
nil, so cavalry could enjoy a partial recovery. Alessandro Farnese, duke o f
I'.mna, later dismissed Henri I V with the famous remark that he thought
lie was fighting a general, not a horse captain.48 Finally, there was the slow
pace o f the military revolution itself. “ Rifles” did not become generally
practical until the next century, when they helped account for the suc-
1 esses o f Gustavus Adolphus. Field artillery came to be distinguished
Imm siege guns somewhat earlier but had to wait till the middle o f the
seventeenth century before it came into its own. T h e process o f evolution
did not reach completion until the bayonet replaced the sword in the late
seventeenth century.49 Ariosto had analyzed a revolution in slow motion,
and later poets had sufficient time to experiment with a range o f form
and content perhaps more varied than at any earlier period in the history
of romance and epic. Heroic poetry finally died at the end o f the Renais­
136 The N ew Technology

sance, but its death resembled the supernova formed by a supergiant s

a brilliant burst going in all directions and widely observed.
Formal change involved the shift from romance to classical epic. Cri
ics correctly explain this shift as a result o f the revived Aristotelianism
the mid-century, but the new form also answered the military probler
Classical heroes fought on foot, and so do Tassos. Rinaldo storms Jeru
lem and rages through its streets on foot, and Tancredi is on foot wh
he kills Argante and Clorinda. The romance model for the latter fig
was Boiardo’s cavalry duel between Orlando and Agricane. Camoes t
uses a classical form, and his Portuguese, having no horses on their ship
use the infantry rush instead.
T h e change in content was more important. Poets responded to Ar:
osto’s dilemma in three ways, though the categories are not mutually ex
elusive. Tasso maintained the old chivalry by going back to the time b
fore the gun. He revived historical epic*,51* and his evocation o f a heroi
past aroused feelings o f nostalgia in his audience. The Italians o f his dajf
lived under the “pax hispanica,” and warfare was becoming a memory;
Tasso thus responded to the gunpowder revolution in a highly original
way, and his attempt anticipated the modern historical novel.
A second group o f writers, mostly English, either limited the presenta­
tion o f war as much as possible in their compositions or dropped it alto­
gether. Those who limited their battle scenes still tried to maintain ties
with the older tradition. Milton, although he confines war to a portion
o f a single book, nevertheless shows a very militarized heaven, as Hippo-
lyte Taine complained in the nineteenth century:

What a heaven! It is enough to disgust one with Paradise; one would rather
enter Charles Is troop of lackeys, or Cromwell’s Ironsides. We have orders
of the day, a hierarchy, exact submission, extra-duties, disputes, regulated
ceremonials, prostrations, etiquette, furbished arms, arsenals, depots of
chariots and ammunition. Was it worthwhile leaving earth to find in
heaven carriage-works, buildings, artillery, a manual of tactics?51

Satan arranges a military review in hell, which the poet describes in tech­
nical vocabulary; an angelic garrison guards Paradise; and the good angels
regularly go in armed companies to visit Chaos. Robert Fallon correctly
expresses the impression given by Paradise Lost: a stage crowded with mil­
itary uniforms.52
More radical were those writers, like Spenser, who avoided war alto­
gether, yet even he drew back from a decisive break with the past. A t one
 N E G A T IV E C R I T IQ U E S 137

point he promises something more like the old military poetry, when he
dtl«Itosses his Muse before the dragon fight:

Faire Goddesse lay that furious fit aside,

Till I o f warres and bloudy Mars do sing,
And Briton fields with Sarazin bloud bedyde,
Twixt that great faery Queene and Paynim king,
That with their horrour heauen and earth did ring,
A worke o f labour long, and endlesse prayse.
(AQ 1.11.7)

Nrilher the extant fragments o f The Faerie Queene not the version pro-
jrc led in the letter to Raleigh, however, would allow for such a story. The
pool postpones warfare to an indefinite future, perhaps to the epic of
King Arthur, where he would celebrate the public virtues o f his hero.53
Meanwhile he compensates for the lack o f war in The Faerie Queene by
allinning throughout a code based on the old chivalry, which he illus­
trates constantly through the duels and adventures o f his heroes.
No one else went as far as Marino, who both avoided war and did not
maintain the old chivalric values in his L ’Adone. In canto 16 he had the
political issue decided not by combat but by a male beauty contest.
I he Spanish and Portuguese worked out the third response to the new
military technology and advocated the modernist position. Camoes,
where he depicts war, Alonso de Ercilla y Zuniga in his Araucana, and
also Gaspar de Villagra in his Historia de la Nueva Mexico all accepted the
gun and yet maintained the medieval military code. They found their
subjects in the colonies, where a warfare closer to that o f the old chivalry
still persisted. A characteristic example is Ercilla’s young man who lets
down the drawbridge and challenges the Araucanian Indians to fight.
When so many respond, he does not falter but goes forward alone to
meet them (.Araucana, 1.2.78-80, pp. 35-36). The conquistadors recalled
the situation o f the late eleventh century, when a few knights could con­
quer and hold Sicily and Palestine from the Muslims. This kind o f epic
resembled the first epics in one important respect: it too was chivalry at
.1 distance, in space rather than time.
 SEVEN

Positive Evaluations
Alonso de Ercilla y Zuniga
and Luis Vaz de Camoes

T H E P O E T S W H O D E F E N D E D T H E G U N OJ t A T L E A S T T R I E D T O
find room for it dealt with the same issues as those who adopted
the negative critique. They had to understand the use o f guns within the
medieval military code, so they too raised the question o f fraud. The
conclusion they reached, however, was very different. Where the majority
saw the ruin o f heroism, these poets celebrated achievements they
claimed surpassed those o f antiquity or any other period.
The poets who defended and even celebrated modern firepower fall
into two categories. The first is the Spanish poets who wrote o f the battle
at Lepajtfo (7 October 1571) and who limit the guns role in their work to
decoration. They assume— plausibly enough for a battle that marked the
climax and end o f a long tradition o f naval war— that firepower did not
essentially change the nature o f battle. Therefore, they did not need to
raise the difficult moral questions that troubled Ariosto or M ilton.1 The
poets involved are three: Juan Latino, Hieronymo Corte Real, and Juan
Rufo. Latino, a high-school teacher o f black African descent in Granada,
was the first to publish. He composed a brief epic in Latin that came out
in 1573 with the title Austriadis libri duo. Five years later the Portuguese
Corte Real published Felicissima victoria, a fifteen-book epic written in
Spanish and covering the Cypriot War through the battle o f Lepanto.
Finally, Rufo o f Cordoba released the Austriada in 1582, though he
claimed to have composed it a decade earlier.2 His epic was a military
biography o f Don Juan o f Austria and covered both the Morisco Revolt
and Lepanto.
T h e second category concerns the poets o f colonial enterprise, espe­
cially Ercilla in his Araucaria and Camoes in Os Lusiadas. Both men es-
 P O S I T IV E E V A L U A T IO N S 139

Iloused the modernist position, facing the moral issue and its corollary:
1he fraud that subverts chivalry. Their resolution o f this difficult question
established some o f the basic assumptions that determined later imperial­
ist literature.

LEPAN TO

All the poets who wrote o f modern warfare used the gun decoratively,
not just those who narrated Lepanto. A cannonade, especially, provided
an occasion for sublimity or for elaborate pictorial effects. For example,
( lamoes s most celebrated commentator, Manuel de Faria e Sousa, praised
the poet’s description o f the bombardment o f Mozambique:

Eis nos bateis o fogo se levanta

Na furiosa e dura artilharia;
A plumbea pela mata; o brado espanta;
Ferido, o ar retumba e assovia.
(Lusiadas, 1.89)
Behold, the fire raises itself in the boats in a furious and hard artillery. The
leaden ball kills; the roar terrifies; the air, struck, echoes and hisses.I

I aria e Sousa said that Camoes described the salvo as if he had seen and
heard it, and he especially praised the fourth line o f the stanza for its use
of onomatopoeia and gradation: the strike, the sound, then the echoing
air.’ The Portuguese poet in this brief passage certainly maintained the
1 (impression useful for the sublime.4 Ercilla, in contrast, opted for an
elaborate picture, modeling a description on the passage in the Aeneid,
where Allecto, blowing a rustic horn, summons the Latins to battle
(7.511—21). In the Araucana (2.16.36—38, p. 271) the Spaniards decide to
test their artillery, while winter weather confines them to Quiriquina Is­
land by Concepcion. A t the salvo the sea and ground tremble; the alpacas,
vicunas, tigers, and lions run about terrified; dolphins, Nereids, and Tri­
tons hide in their deep sea caverns; rivers and fountains, confused, hold
back their currents; and some Indians, awestruck, bow necks never bent
before. Guns by their sound, fire, and smoke naturally fit an epic style
and helped raise the narrative above the ordinary. W hat distinguished the
Spanish Lepanto poets, however, was the central importance they gave to
such aural and visual effects.
Most often the poets compared a cannonade to a storm. Latino uses
ibis comparison three times in his Austriadis libri duo. One example will
suffice: “ Imbrem de coelo spissam cecidisse putares” (2.23r; “You would
14 0 The N ew Technology

Figure 19. Lepanto, battle o f the flagships. Photograph: Roger-Viollet, Paris. Engraving
in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris.

think a dense rainstorm to have fallen from heaven” ). He reserves his

most elaborate comparison for the initial barrage {Austriadis libri duo,
2.20v). Rufo likewise compares the barrage to a storm, both implicitly
and then by simile (Austriada, 23.23, p. 126A), but a later passage in Rufo
reveals the modernist point hidden in this group o f metaphors and simi­
les.5 Rufo is describing the last salvo in the duel o f the two royal galleys
(fig. 19):

,;Quien hay entre los hombres que posea

Animo tan feroz y escandaloso,
Que al son terrible de un corrusco trueno
Se halle de temor libre y ajeno,

Con ser verdad que el rayo acelerado,

Rompiendo por lo flaco de la nube,
Las mas veces por alto levantado
A buscar su elemento proprio sube;
Y si alguno a bajar precipitado
Hay que violentamente desennube,
No puede a todo el mundo hacer guerra,
Siendo tan ancho el globo de la tierra?
 P O S I T I V E E V A L U A T IO N S 14 1

Pues: que haria donde cada instante

M il y mil rayos contra cada uno
Volaban con estruendo resonante
Sin podelles dejar reparo alguno?
Ya el sol se les quitaba de delante,
Ya arder se via el reino de Neptuno,
Y ya del ejercicio violento
Andaban todos casi sin aliento.
(.Austriada, 24.8-10, p. 131A)
Who is there among men who has a mind so fierce and boisterous that at
the terrible sound o f a flashing thunderbolt feels free and detached from
fear?
As a lightning bolt, breaking through the side o f a cloud, most often
climbs to seek its own element in the raised height, and if there is one,
flung down, that violently unclouds itself, it cannot make war on the
whole world, the globe o f the earth being so broad, can it?
Then what will it be where each instant a thousand and a thousand rays
against each one fly with resounding roar, without any defense being pos­
sible? Already the sun left them in front; already one sees the kingdom o f
Neptune burn; and already all went as if breathless from the violent ex­
ercise.

Earthly cannon outdoes heavenly thunder, and man by his own invention
surpasses one o f natures most deadly weapons. Milton later attacked this
modernist view, when he contrasted demonic artillery with the divine
thunder, which chases the rebel angels to hell.6 T h e modernist point
stung the traditionalists, and it is most clearly seen in the battle o f Le-
panto. That event, which occasioned perhaps more poetry than any pre­
vious battle, also surpassed all earlier galley conflicts by the number o f its
guns and the intensity o f its bombardment.
Guns were crucial at Lepanto and may have decided the outcome of
the battle. Italian eyewitnesses support such an interpretation; they em­
phasize the initial barrage and the clash o f the reales. In his letter to Ser-
moneta written just after the battle (9 October 1571), Onorato Caetani, a
papal commander, says that the Turks shot from too far away and hit no
one, while the Christians waited till the last minute and so inflicted the
greatest damage on the enemy. The firepower o f the galleasses at the cen­
ter, moreover, sank three galleys immediately and forced the Turks out o f
formation.7 Modern research indicates that the six galleasses may have
actually sunk seventy enemy vessels.8 The Venetian commander Seba-
stiano Veniero, argued that guns enabled Don Juan to win the battle o f
142 The N ew Technology

the reales,9 The Christians, in fact, though outnumbered in ships, had an

overwhelming superiority in firepower: 1,815 guns to 750 for the Turks.
T h e Ottomans, moreover, did not have guns o f the same quality. The
Venetians captured 225 bronze cannon, which they later had melted
down and remade because the metal was o f such poor quality.10 Venetians
and scholars who study Venice tend to emphasize the technology o f the
battle, while the Spanish view emphasizes the quality o f the soldiers who
captured the enemy ships.11
T h e Iberian poets who celebrated Lepanto naturally tended to focus
on the boarding o f ships, but they by no means ignored the gun. Rufo
more or less repeats Caetani’s analysis o f the initial barrage (Austriada,
23.29—31, p. 126A—B), adding further points. The Turks were intent on
boarding and not on shooting, and the Christian galleys had lower prows,
which made their gunnery more accurate (each galley carried a long gun
in its prow). Rufo, indeed, never lets his audience forget the guns, and the
repeated descriptions and references emphasize their importance. Other
poets hint at the same point in a grander though less precise fashion,
using apocalyptic rhetoric. For example, Ercilla twice compares the battle
to the Last D ay (Araucana, 2.24.52, 64, pp. 398, 400), and the initial vol­
ley seems to shake the world.12 There is the smoke, fire, and noise, all the
cries, and the smashing together o f the prows as the galleys collide. It
seems that the sea burns, the land collapses, and the heaven falls (Arau­
cana, 2.24 .4 0 -4 2, pp. 395-96).
N o other poet goes so far as Corte Real in pointing up the importance
o f guns. In his narrative missiles account for most o f the casualties. Can­
non fire sinks and cripples enemy ships as well as men.13 Turkish harque­
bus balls kill or wound a whole series o f prominent individuals, whom
the poet names.14 Although Corte Real mentions swordplay when he can,
in his narrative it is missiles that decide the outcome at Lepanto. It is not
surprising that Corte Real should give more attention to firepower than
the other Iberian poets. Though he wrote in Spanish, Corte Real was
Portuguese and published the Felicissima victoria in Lisbon. Portugal per­
haps more than any other nation had pioneered the use o f the gun at sea.
Moreover, Corte Real composed his poem under the influence o f
Camoes, whose Lusiadas had come out six years earlier.15 Yet Corte Real
draws no conclusions from his data and never states openly that firepower
was decisive at Lepanto. H e also does not develop the comparison to
Actium the way the other poets do to emphasize the newness o f Lepanto
and its importance.16
 P O S I T IV E E V A L U A T IO N S 143

I lie writers on Lepanto were almost forced to compare it to Actium,

tin- greatest sea battle o f antiquity, for the two conflicts took place in
almost the same location.17 Such a comparison invited a development of
Ilie modernist position, and writers in both prose and in poetry worked
II out. The Venetian Tiziano Vecelli, for example, argued that cannon
nude Lepanto superior to Actium .18 Among the poets Rufo comes closest
10 the full modernist position. He makes a triple argument (Austriada,
i (.1-5, p. 125A) concerning why the past has no record o f a similar con-
llict. First, the practice o f the art o f naval warfare in antiquity had not
advanced so far.15 Second, the defensive equipment with modern steel
surpassed earlier technology. Third, and most important, the moderns
lud gunpowder, an argument that Rufo amplifies. He later correctly
guesses that Lepanto will live in fame even without the poets (Austriada,
*4.2—4, p. 130B ), and in the argument to canto 24 he calls it the greatest
naval action ever. Yet he ignores the implications o f his argument and
denounces cannon in another section o f his epic (Austriada, 24.15—18,
p. 13 1A -B ), repeating the standard points made by the majority o f writers
and poets, who saw in firepower the ruin o f the old military ethos (see
discussion in chapter 6). Such ambivalence was common, though not
universal (Corte Real, for example, nowhere denounces the gun). Ariosto
also bemoaned guns and yet praised the Este cannon, and Blaise de Mon-
luc could command harquebusiers and still condemn the weapon.20 Such
a position did not necessarily involve a contradiction. Rufo and Ariosto
do not like guns but insist, nevertheless, that their states have the best
and most advanced types. This ambivalence does, however, soften the
poet’s praise o f Lepanto and blunt the modernist point.
The Lepanto poets did not need to consider the implications o f the
gun because the ramming and boarding among the galleys maintained
continuity with traditional Mediterranean warfare.21 Since boarding still
involved swordplay, cannon and harquebuses made wonderful decoration
without raising the ethical issues other poets had to consider. Alone
among the Lepanto poets Ercilla analyzed the charge o f fraud, which
others like Ariosto commonly brought against the use o f firearms. He did
not use the case o f Lepanto, however, but rather the example o f a land
battle, the Araucanian attack on Canete, a fort in Chile. I reserve for
chapter 10 my discussion o f the actual battle with its shooting, since the
slaughter there raised yet another moral question, that o f the limits o f
violence in the conduct o f war. Here I concentrate on Ercilla’s presenta­
tion o f fraud, which he detaches from the issue o f technology.
14 4 The N ew Technology

CANETE

In cantos 30 and 31 o f the Araucana Ercilla uses the opposed characters]

o f Andresillo, a yanacona (Indian in the Spanish service), and Pran, ana
Araucanian spy, to present a drama o f fraud that implicates both sides in]
the war. Ariosto anticipated this drama when he had Olimpia respond]
with deceit to the fraud she perceived in Cim oscos harquebus. She goes]
through a marriage ceremony with the son o f her enemy, only to have ]
him murdered in the bedroom. She stations a man behind a curtain, who ]
strikes the youth over the head with a hatchet. Olimpia herself then'
jumps up and cuts his throat {O F 9.41-43). She thus fights fraud with
fraud, just as Andresillo does when confronted by Pran.
Ercilla had Ariostos story in mind when he composed his narrative o f ]
Canete. O n that occasion, he was in Canete for only one full day. The
battle took place on 5 February 1558. Ercilla arrived the day before, one
o f thirty cavalrymen rushed north, and left with his comrades the day
after.22 The story o f intrigue he recounts is one he heard from members
o f the garrison {Araucana, 3.30.34, p. 492), yet his version differs from
others’. For example, there is the question o f the name o f the yanacona
who arranged the deception for the Spaniards. Geronimo de Bibar, who
wrote the earliest chronicle, leaves him unnamed; Ercilla calls him Andre­
sillo (another chronicler, Captain Alonso de Gongora Marmolejo, gives
the name Andrescio). But the later writers, Pedro Marino de Lovera and
Suarez de Figueroa, who follow the report o f the garrison commander,
Alonso de Reinoso, call the yanacona Baltazar.23 Historically, a yanacona
did help the garrison at Canete, but which yanacona or what name he
bore remains in doubt. This is not the only or the most important detail
that distinguishes Ercilla’s version.
All the others limit the fraud to the Spanish side, in particular to the
yanacona who suggests the Indian plan o f attack. O nly the degree o f his
collusion with the local commander, Reinoso, is open to question. In
Bibar’s chronicle the yanacona alone sets the tactics. He had fled the fort
and was captured by the enemy. Thinking quickly, he offered to betray
Canete to the Indian leader, here named Teopolican, and so escaped
death. He received a reward instead and was allowed to return to the fort,
where he informed Reinoso o f what he had arranged.24 Marmolejo credits
Reinoso with the tactics instead. The commander draws the Indians into
what he knows is a feigned peace, and then the yanacona sounds out one
o f the Indians and sets up a meeting for the following day. Reinoso tells
the yanacona what to say and outlines the plan o f attack the Indians
 P O S I T I V E E V A L U A T IO N S 145

duuild follow.25 In between but closer to Marmolejo are Lovera and Fi­
gueroa.26 None o f these historians credits the Indians with the tactics of
Iheir attack or implicates them in fraud.
Their version would fit the model Ariosto established in his story of
t Himpia. There the gun illustrates a pattern o f fraud that characterizes
( iimosco and his Frisians, who have invaded the province o f Holland and
oiler the occasion for the poet’s diatribe against firearms. Similarly here,
die Spanish invader has the guns and sets up the elaborate deception that
destroys the native opposition. Ercilla himself includes a severe denuncia-
Iion o f the yanacona at the beginning o f canto 31, so he could have made
IIis account follow much more closely that o f Olimpia in the Furioso.
Instead he develops a different narrative and denounces not the gun but
baud, which he finds and criticizes on both sides.
This insistence on mutual guilt produces a curious redundancy in Er-
1 ilia’s narrative, as one character after another repeats and amplifies the
same plan o f attack. In the first place an unnamed spy gives the Indian
leader Caupolican the information that leads him initially to suggest the
surprise attack during siesta.27 He then coaches an intermediary, Pran,
whom Ercilla describes as subtle, false, and malicious (Araucana, 3.30.43,
p. 494). Pran repeats this tactical plan to the yanacona Andresillo (Arau-
cana, 3.30.54—55, p. 496). Next Caupolican himself outlines it to Andre­
sillo (Araucana, 3.31.13, p. 502), who in this version merely urges its imme­
diate implementation and sets the time for the following day (3.31.24, 26,
l>. 504). He cleverly advises what the enemy already intends.28 Ercilla has
die Spaniards deceive a deceptive enemy, find out his plans, and destroy
him.29
Even with this significant difference, one could argue that Ercilla out­
lines the same circle o f fraud that Ariosto had for his story. In Ariostos
version chronology is essential and shows that in a conflict where only
one side has firearms, the guns give it such an advantage that the opposi­
tion has no recourse but fraud. This was Olimpia’s answer, and it became
that o f the Araucanians. They fought their last open battle at Millarapue.
After this, the fourth major defeat in three months, they resort to ambush
at Puren, and Caupolican advises a scorched-earth policy (Araucana,
2.29 .5-7, PP- 4 7 0 -7 1). arguing that they should burn their houses, cloth­
ing, and furniture. W hen honor no longer pertains to a place, he says, it
is not good to have one. Soldiers should worry only about vengeance,
while property would make them lukewarm. Soldiers must concentrate
on taking honor, property, and life from the enemy: it is kill or be killed.
He follows this speech with the sneak attack on Canete and then has to
146 The N ew Technology

hide in the woods, his army temporarily dispersed. Tactical inequality 1

forces the Indians to guerrilla tactics, and their new methods in turn sug­
gest fraud to the Spaniards, who use it at Canete and later habitually.30
Ercilla, however, will have none o f this. He condemns fraud on both
sides. His Indian heroes do not take part in the assault on Canete, since
they consider fraud vile and cowardly and see such a victory as being
without praise or glory {Araucaria, 3.32.21—22, pp. 515—16).31 We have al­
ready seen that the poet especially objects to the actions o f the yanacorut,
Andresillo, for the Spaniards. Despite the gun Ercilla insists that neither
Spaniard nor Indian use fraud. He does not allow that Spanish guns
might justify fraud on the other side. He does not, in fact, see in firearms
a subversion o f the old military code but instead maintains that ethic in
all its force.
Ercilla can do so because neither he nor his Indians connect the gun
to fraud. Ercilla denounces fraud only here,32 yet the Spaniards used guns
in all their battles. General Mendoza filled a galleon with supplies, artil­
lery, and ammunition, enough to supply the war needs o f Chile for thirty
years after Canete.33 Firepower was essential to many or all o f his victories
that Ercilla recounts: Penco (1557) in all versions and, as I show elsewhere,
Puren (1558) and Canete (1558).34 Since there is no innate connection be­
tween firearms and fraud, Ercilla cannot allow fraud to the opposition.
The poet has all the items o f Ariostos story, but he keeps them separate.
Where Ariosto dramatized a threat to the chivalric code, Ercilla uses the
same kind of story to reinforce the code. He insists that it applies both
to those with and to those without guns. Ariostos warning that firepower
would subvert chivalry was not fulfilled. This is true both for Ercilla, who
saw military action in Spanish America a generation later, and also for
Camoes, who served in the Portuguese colonies at the same time.
Camoes, in fact, revived the whole medieval set o f oppositions between
the chivalric hero and the practitioner o f fraud, between Roland and Ga-
nelon— only this time the hero carried a gun.

M O Z A M B IQ U E

Camoess episode takes place in southeast Africa (Lusiadas, 1.86-93). The

sheik o f the island city o f Mozambique has arranged an ambush for the
Portuguese (fig. 20). He knows that they need water, so he stations his
men by the only springs in the area. The men are armed with shields,
assegais, and poisoned arrows.35 He keeps a small band visible to provoke
the sailors and lure them into the ambush. For his part the Portuguese
 P O S I T I V E E V A L U A T IO N S 147

I'igure 20. Rogers, map o f Mozambique (the springs are by Cabciceira on the mainland
at the right). Reprinted from Linschoten, Discourse o f Voyages. Photograph courtesy the
Newberry Library.

leader Vasco da Gama is suspicious and sends his men armed in three
boats that carry bombards. The challenge works. The Portuguese rush
onto land and simultaneously open fire.36 A t the great noise the “Moors”
lose courage. Those in front die, those in ambush flee. The Portuguese
now bombard the town, which lacks walls or any kind o f defense. Some
o f the Moors curse amid the flames o f the burning village, while others
flee. In fury they shoot arrows and throw rocks and wood at their pursu­
ers, but their terror makes this effort ineffectual. The Moors crowd into
almadias (narrow boats like canoes that can carry sails) or try to swim
across the narrow channel to the mainland, but the Portuguese bombard­
ment blows up some o f the boats, and some o f the swimmers drown.37
Rich with spoil, the victors can now draw water at leisure, and the de­
feated sheik must sue for peace.
In these few stanzas Camoes presents the essentials o f imperialist nar­
rative and fiction. A few Europeans clash with men who speak a strange
language and practice a different religion— in this case Islam— and
whom the Portuguese, therefore, call Moors. The few Europeans easily
148 The N ew Technology

defeat a force much superior in numbers. Ariosto, talking o f the Span*]

iards overseas, catches the scene with a biblical phrase: and ten shall chase
a thousand (O F 15.23). For the Spaniards it suffices to recall Cajam arcaJ
that first battle between the Incas and Pizarro’s band o f 150 men. A t i
trumpet signal the Spaniards charged and fired point-blank at a crowd of|
five or six thousand Indians. In the ensuing slaughter each Spaniard avef
aged fourteen or fifteen kills, and the main army o f eighty thousand Indi­
ans fled as the Spanish soldiers approached.38 Such victories are fantastic!
and become comprehensible only after we remember the technological!
superiority of the Europeans. Camoes carefully indicates this technologi-I
cal advantage. For example, the people o f Mozambique are said to wear j
no armor, though they carry shields. Their cotton clothes (Lusiadas, 1.47) |
would not stop a spear, much less a cannonball. O n the other hand, the |
sheik had asked to see Portuguese weaponry the day before (Lusiadas,■
1.6 7-6 8 ), and they had shown him everything.39 D a Gama, however, did 1
not demonstrate the firearms, so the M oor did not know what to expect
on the following day. The surprise was as complete as that which the
Incas experienced at Cajamarca, and the actual destruction was extensive:
many dead, the straw houses o f the town on fire, and boats smashed.40
The incident, however, did not really happen that way. It was messier,
more protracted, and far less stunning. It is exemplary for the literature
o f conquest because Camoes made it so.
First of all, the poet reduced four military incidents to one, itself a
mixture o f two o f the four. Fernao Lopes de Castanheda and Joao de
Barros, his sources, narrate these two clashes as follows.41 Having failed
to find water the previous night, late in the afternoon da Gama sends out
armed boats with a Moorish pilot. This time the pilot finds the springs,
but they are defended by twenty Moors armed with assegais. D a Gama
orders three bombards to shoot. The Moors, amazed and frightened by
the noise, flee into the bushes. The Portuguese now land and collect as
much water as they want. This incident provokes the second, for the
Moors now challenge the Portuguese, and da Gama and his captains de­
cide to bombard the town.42 T h ey set o ff again in longboats with armed
companies, and bombards in the prows. T h e Moors have hastily erected
a palisade that conceals 2,000 men, and they leave 100 in front to guard
the beach.43 There is a parley first, in which the Moors call the Portuguese
pirates. Talk fails, and the Moors start the fight. The 100 advance closer,
knowing little about guns. Bombard fire quickly drives them behind the
palisade and then flattens the palisade itself. The Portuguese continue the
 P O S I T I V E E V A L U A T IO N S 149
4

barrage for three hours, while the Moors flee to town and leave two men
ili'.ul on the field. The sailors now return to the ships for their noon meal,
Imii (hey sail out afterward to take hostages. They find the Moors in boats,
Hiring to the mainland, and overtake two. In one the Moors escape but
leave some o f the sheik’s belongings. The other boat gives da Gama the
hostages he wants, especially an old man who knows about the trading
nysiem. The sheik negotiates, however, only after the town suffers a sec­
ond barrage.
Camoes has reduced a military confrontation that extended over sev­
eral days to one. H e has also combined two places, for the island o f M o­
zambique lacks water, and the springs are on the mainland. Castanheda
is dear on this fact, and Camoes probably knew Mozambique firsthand.44
( Condensation o f this kind marks his treatment o f the whole episode, not
just o f the military encounter. T h e many meetings between the Moors
,md the Portuguese become two, and Camoes reduces the various pilots
involved to one. D a Gama had hired two for the India voyage, but one
had run away, and his attempt to get another helped provoke the armed
1 lashes. Camoes keeps the problem o f the pilot but detaches it from the
military encounter. Finally, he abbreviates the events that helped the
Moors discover the religious identity o f their visitors. They at first
(bought the well-armed strangers must be Turks and only gradually
lound out that they were Christians, their traditional enemy. Camoes
lias da Gama explain his faith immediately, when he meets the sheik.
< Condensation marks every aspect o f the epic version.
This abridgment serves to exalt the picture o f Portuguese power. Since
1hey were a few explorers in East Africa, da Gama and his sailors had tried
10 avoid clashes with the local powers. Camoes eliminates all this. The
Portuguese do not attempt first to get water during the night, as they did
in fact, nor do they sail earlier to the islet o f Sao Jorge, out o f fear o f the
Muslims.45 Moreover, the poet ignores the fact that the Portuguese were
100 few to risk a landing at the town.46 There was no ruined town, no
smashed boats. Victory depended on the psychological effect o f the bom­
bards rather than on gunfire accurate enough to sink canoes. It was the
noise that scared the guards away from the springs, and the three-hour
barra