Phoenix Construction v.

IAC The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us
adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the defendant has created
Facts: only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is
said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it
At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations,
on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his boss. He was proceeding particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active
down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford dump truck parked askew, partly forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which
blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with no lights or early warning reflector devices. the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause" and
The truck was driven earlier by Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now
company. Dionisio tried to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type
some physical injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
against Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases,
the accident to respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without curfew it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the
pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause.
ruled in favor of private respondent.
We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and
Issue: static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The improper
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving
Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked, or by down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must
respondent’s own negligence be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time
than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an
Held: efficient intervening or independent cause.

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a substantial
curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the plaintiff has
shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. It is the petitioners' indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original
contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed
intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the
(being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe defendant's responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by private plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy
respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is
moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the highway without lights at
off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds night is not relieved of responsibility when another negligently drives into it. We hold
before contact with the dump truck. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the
to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due
driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw care" and that consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such
from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio was damages are subject to mitigation by the courts.
negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster
than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine.
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a
dump truck that was parked askew and sticking out onto the road lane. plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction
Court that the legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to
the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the
the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical
truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence. terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's - was the
legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the continuum of time of
the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are
the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it
of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged
quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate with carelessness:
them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must
tend to weaken the very bonds of society. First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and

[Link] he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of
the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages awarded by the respondent the boards, either before or behind it.
appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the
P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent
slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute negligence,
Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and
Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff and his
damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way, but
Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the company
sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition frequently made
respondent appellate court. known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and the foreman swears
that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this particular load. On this
contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor of the defendant's
Rakes v Atlantic (Torts)
contention to the extent of the general order being made known to the workmen. If so,
the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some
degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
RAKES v ATLANTIC [G.R. No. 1719. January 23, 1907.] M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. THE ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
FACTS: entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the displacement
of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event giving occasion
he plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of the defendant, for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron rails.
was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to the company's yard
near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this
work. The defendant has proved that there were two immediately following one
another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so 1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer
that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first
without side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping off. According to the prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with the
testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may proceed to
According to that defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a judgment.
certain spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car either
canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was
afterwards amputated at about the knee. 2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer
to his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in
Philippine jurisprudence.
ISSUE:

Whether the company is liable

3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the
"Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred through
the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in
RULING: Philippine jurisprudence.
Calalas v CA. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000 VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA,
respondents. RULING:

No.

FACTS: The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable
for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage.
G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at
the rear end of the vehicle. Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a 1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio 2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As action
a result, Sunga was injured.
3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
another party, obligation is created by law itself)
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.

Breach of contract / culpa contractual

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: 1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation
1. RTC – Dumaguete – rendered judgment against Salva holding that the driver of the 2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the
Isuzu truck was responsible fact that the obligor (here, the common carrier) failed to transport his passenger safely
to his destination
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against
Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva 3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and the function
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his jeepney. of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created
2. CA – reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in an
action for breach of contract of carriage since the cause of action was based on such
and not quasi delict. In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently
Hence, current petition for review on certiorari. unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733
and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the
burden of proof.
ISSUE:

Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of
Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost diligence.
the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers 1. Jeepney was not properly parked;
In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply? 2. Overloading of passengers
PCIB v CA [G.R. No. 121413. January 29, 2001.] PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL page5image54520 page5image54680
INTERNATIONAL BANK (formerly INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA),
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FORD PHILIPPINES, INC. and CITIBANK, RULING:
N.A., respondents.

A. Citibank Check No. SN-04867

FACTS:

Ford Philippines drew and issued Citibank Check. No. SN 04867 on October 19,
FORD
1977, Citibank Check No. SN 10597 on July 19, 1978 and Citibank Check No. SN-
16508 on April 20, 1979, all in favor of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) Ford, is guilty of the "imputed contributory negligence" that would defeat its claim for
for payment of its percentage taxes. The checks were crossed and deposited with the reimbursement, bearing in mind that its employees, Godofredo Rivera and Alexis
IBAA, now PCIB, BIR's authorized collecting bank. The first check was cleared Marindo, were among the members of the syndicate.
containing an indorsement that "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsements
guaranteed." The same, however, was replaced with two (2) IBAA's managers' although the employees of Ford initiated the transactions attributable to an organized
checks based on a call and letter request made by Godofredo Rivera, Ford's General syndicate, in our view, their actions were not the proximate cause of encashing the
Ledger Accountant, on an alleged error in the computation of the tax due without checks payable to the CIR. The degree of Ford's negligence, if any, could not be
IBAA verifying the authority of Rivera. These manager's checks were later deposited characterized as the proximate cause of the injury to the parties.
in another bank and misappropriated by the syndicate. The last two checks were
cleared by the Citibank but failed to discover that the clearing stamps do not bear any
initials. The proceeds of the checks were also illegally diverted or switched by officers IBAA/PCIB
of PCIB — members of the syndicate, who eventually encashed them. Ford, which
was compelled to pay anew the percentage taxes, sued in two actions for collection As agent of the BIR (the payee of the check), defendant IBAA should receive
against the two banks on January 20, 1983, barely six years from the date the first instructions only from its principal BIR and not from any other person especially so
check was returned to the drawer. The direct perpetrators of the crime are now when that person is not known to the defendant. It is very imprudent on the part of the
fugitives from justice. defendant IBAA to just rely on the alleged telephone call of one (Godofredo Rivera
and in his signature to the authenticity of such signature considering that the plaintiff
is not a client of the defendant IBAA."
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: Even considering arguendo, that the diversion of the amount of a check payable to
the collecting bank in behalf of the designated payee may be allowed, still such
1st case:
diversion must be properly authorized by the payor. Otherwise stated, the diversion
(1) Trial Court: Citibank and IBAA were jointly and severally liable for the checks (2) can be justified only by proof of authority from the drawer, or that the drawer has
CA: only IBAA (PCIB) solely liable for the amount of the first check clothed his agent with apparent authority to receive the proceeds of such check.

2nd case: The crossing of the check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only," is a warning that
the check should be deposited only in the account of the CIR. Thus, it is the duty of
(1) Trial Court: absolved PCIB from liability and held that only the Citibank is liable for the collecting bank PCIBank to ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's
the checks issued by Ford account only. Therefore, it is the collecting bank (PCIBank) which is bound to
scrutinize the check and to know its depositors before it could make the clearing
(2) Court of Appeals: held both banks liable for negligence in the selection and
indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of indorsement guaranteed".
supervision of their employees resulting in the erroneous encashment of the checks.
PCIBank is liable in the amount corresponding to the proceeds of Citibank Check No.
ISSUE:
SN-04867.
Has petitioner Ford the right to recover from the collecting bank (PCIBank) and the
drawee bank (Citibank) the value of the checks intended as payment to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue? Or has Ford's cause of action already Citibank
prescribed?
None
 that failure of the drawee bank to seasonably discover irregularity in the checks
constitutes negligence and renders the bank liable for loss of proceeds of the checks;
B. Citibank Check Numbers SN-10597 and 16508 that an action upon a check prescribes in ten (10) years; and that the contributory
negligence of the drawer shall reduce the damages he may recover against the
collecting bank.
PCIBank
Since a master may be held for his servant's wrongful act, the law imputes to the
Section 5 31 of Central Bank Circular No. 580, Series of 1977 provides that any theft master the act of the servant, and if that act is negligent or wrongful and proximately
affecting items in transit for clearing, shall be for the account of sending bank, which results in injury to a third person, the negligence or wrongful conduct is the
in this case is PCIBank. negligence or wrongful conduct of the master, for which he is liable. The general rule
is that if the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the
concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latter's negligence
is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior's action against the third person,
Citibank
assuming, of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the
negligent in the performance of its duties. Citibank failed to establish that its payment injury of which complaint is made.
of Ford's checks were made in due course and legally in order. In its defense,
Given these circumstances, the mere fact that the forgery was committed by a
Citibank claims the genuineness and due execution of said checks, considering that
drawer- payor's confidential employee or agent, who by virtue of his position had
Citibank (1) has no knowledge of any infirmity in the issuance of the checks in
unusual facilities for perpetrating the fraud and imposing the forged paper upon the
question (2) coupled by the fact that said checks were sufficiently funded and (3) the
bank, does not entitle the bank to shift the loss to the drawer-payor, in the absence of
endorsement of the Payee or lack thereof was guaranteed by PCIBank (formerly
some circumstance raising estoppel against the drawer. This rule likewise applies to
IBAA), thus, it has the obligation to honor and pay the same.
the checks fraudulently negotiated or diverted by the confidential employees who hold
As the drawee bank breached its contractual obligation with Ford and such degree of them in their possession.
culpability contributed to the damage caused to the latter. It failed to perform what
As a general rule, however, a banking corporation is liable for the wrongful or tortuous
was incumbent upon it, which is to ensure that the amount of the checks should be
acts and declarations of its officers or agents within the course and scope of their
paid only to its designated payee.
employment. A bank will be held liable for the negligence of its officers or agents
Invoking the doctrine of comparative negligence, we are of the view that both when acting within the course and scope of their employment. It may be liable for the
PCIBank and Citibank failed in their respective obligations and both were negligent in tortuous acts of its officers even as regards that species of tort of which malice is an
the selection and supervision of their employees resulting in the encashment of essential element. A bank holding out its officers and agents as worthy of confidence
Citibank Check Nos. SN 10597 and 16508. Thus, we are constrained to hold them will not be permitted to profit by the frauds these officers or agents were enabled to
equally liable for the loss of the proceeds of said checks issued by Ford in favor of the perpetrate in the apparent course of their employment; nor will it be permitted to shirk
CIR. Time and again, we have stressed that banking business is so impressed with its responsibility for such frauds, even though no benefit may accrue to the bank
public interest where the trust and confidence of the public in general is of paramount therefrom. For the general rule is that a bank is liable for the fraudulent acts or
importance such that the appropriate standard of diligence must be very high, if not representations of an officer or agent acting within the course and apparent scope of
the highest, degree of diligence. A bank's liability as obligor is not merely vicarious but his employment or authority. And if an officer or employee of a bank, in his official
primary, wherein the defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and capacity, receives money to satisfy an evidence of indebtedness lodged with his bank
supervision of its employees is of no moment. Banks handle daily transactions for collection, the bank is liable for his misappropriation of such sum.
involving millions of pesos. By the very nature of their work the degree of
responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees and officials is far
greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. Banks are expected to exercise CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF SHALL REDUCE DAMAGES HE
the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. MAY RECOVER. — Finally, we also find that Ford is not completely blameless in its
failure to detect the fraud. Failure on the part of the depositor to examine its
The relationship between a holder of a commercial paper and the bank to which it is
passbook, statements of account, and cancelled checks and to give notice within a
sent for collection is that of a principal and an agent and the diversion of the amount
reasonable time (or as required by statute) of any discrepancy which it may in the
of the check is justified only by proof of authority from the drawer; that in crossed
exercise of due care and diligence find therein, serves to mitigate the banks' liability
checks, the collecting bank is bound to scrutinize the check and know its depositors
by reducing the award of interest from twelve percent (12%) to six percent (6%) per
before clearing indorsement; that as a general rule, banks are liable for wrongful or
annum. As provided in Article 1172 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, responsibility
tortuous acts of its agents within the scope and in the course of their employment;
arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also Yes, he is liable.
demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the
circumstances. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall The control of the situation had then passed entirely to the defendant; and it was his
reduce the damages that he may recover. duty either to bring his car to an immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other
persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the
PICART V SMITH G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918 AMADO PICART, plaintiff- horse to avoid the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight
appellant, vs. FRANK SMITH, JR., defendant- appellee. on until he was almost upon the horse.

The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the

personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
FACTS: would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.
The plaintiff was riding on his pony over the Carlatan bridge in La Union. Before he
had gotten half way across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was
an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or twelve miles per hour. As the guilty of antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But
defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give as we have already stated, the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It
he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous,
before him was not observing the rule of the road. Seeing that the pony was since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with
without diminution of speed. the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

The plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. Del Prado v. Meralco
However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the
approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the Facts:
bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he
thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The automobile
passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its
Teodorico Florenciano, Meralco’s motorman, was driving the company’s street car
body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. The horse fell and its rider was
along Hidalgo Street. Plaintiff Ignacio Del Prado ran across the street to catch the car.
thrown off with some violence.
The motorman eased up but did not put the car into complete stop. Plaintiff was able
As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which to get hold of the rail and step his left foot when the car accelerated. As a result,
caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. plaintiff slipped off and fell to the ground. His foot was crushed by the wheel of the
car. He filed a complaint for culpa contractual.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

Issues:
1. CFI – La Union – absolved the defendant from liability.

(1) Whether the motorman was negligent

ISSUE:

whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the manner above described
was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage (2) Whether Meralco is liable for breach of contract of carriage
done

(3) Whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff
RULING:
 Torts And Damages Case Digest: Taylor V. Manila Electric Railroad And Light Co.
(1910)
Held:

(1) We may observe at the outset that there is no obligation on the part of a street
railway company to stop its cars to let on intending passengers at other points than G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
those appointed for stoppage. Nevertheless, although the motorman of this car was
not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do no act that would have the Lessons Applicable:
effect of increasing the plaintiff's peril while he was attempting to board the car. The
premature acceleration of the car was, in our opinion, a breach of this duty. Elements of quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

Good Father of a Family (Torts and Damages)

(2) The relation between a carrier of passengers for hire and its patrons is of a
contractual nature; and a failure on the part of the carrier to use due care in carrying
FACTS:
its passengers safely is a breach of duty (culpa contractual). Furthermore, the duty
that the carrier of passengers owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding the September 30, 1905 Sunday afternoon: David Taylor, 15 years of age, the son of a
cars as well as to those alighting therefrom. mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having
considerable aptitude and training in mechanics with a boy named Manuel Claparols,
about 12 years of age, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose
Where liability arises from a mere tort (culpa aquiliana), not involving a breach of of visiting Murphy, an employee of the defendant, who and promised to make them a
positive obligation, an employer, or master, may exculpate himself by proving that he cylinder for a miniature engine
had exercised due diligence to prevent the damage; whereas this defense is not
After leaving the power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy, they walked
available if the liability of the master arises from a breach of contractual duty (culpa
across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped
contractual). In the case before us the company pleaded as a special defense that it
in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces
had used all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage suffered
by the plaintiff; and to establish this contention the company introduced testimony they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground
showing that due care had been used in training and instructing the motorman in
charge of this car in his art. But this proof is irrelevant in view of the fact that the These caps are approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges
liability involved was derived from a breach of obligation. and each has attached to it 2 long thin wires by means of which it may be discharged
by the use of electricity

They are intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have
(3) It is obvious that the plaintiff's negligence in attempting to board the moving car in themselves a considerable explosive power
was not the proximate cause of the injury. The direct and proximate cause of the
injury was the act of appellant's motorman in putting on the power prematurely. Again, the boys picked up all they could find, hung them on stick, of which each took end,
the situation before us is one where the negligent act of the company's servant and carried them home
succeeded the negligent act of the plaintiff, and the negligence of the company must
be considered the proximate cause of the injury. The rule here applicable seems to After crossing the footbridge, they met Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and they
be analogous to, if not identical with that which is sometimes referred to as the went to Manuel's home
doctrine of "the last clear chance." In accordance with this doctrine, the contributory The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps
negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the
defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the trust the ends of the wires into an electric light socket - no result
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. The negligence of the plaintiff
was, however, contributory to the accident and must be considered as a mitigating break the cap with a stone - failed
circumstance.
opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish
substance they got matches
David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three employed or on account of their duties.
Jessie, who when the boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, xxx xxx xxx
became frightened and started to run away, received a slight cut in the neck
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein
Manuel had his hand burned and wounded prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the
damage.
David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which
injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the
surgeons
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused —
Trial Court: held Manila Electric Railroad And Light Company liable
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due
ISSUE: diligence, and for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed
in a safe and proper place.

1. W/N the elemnents of quasi-delict to make Manila Electric Railroad And Light
Company liable - NO in order to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
2. W/N Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. sufficiently proved that they employed Damages to the plaintiff
all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage - NO
Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for
whose acts it must respond, was guilty.

The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
HELD: reversing the judgment of the court below while we hold that the entry upon the property without express invitation or permission
would not have relieved Manila Electric from responsibility for injuries incurred,
without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to his negligence, the
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit negligence in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause
acts and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs. of the injury received

cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the proximate
cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. Manila Electric is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred

2 years before the accident, David spent 4 months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of
the interisland transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only mechanical drawing and mechanical engineering. About a month after his accident he
for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and continued in that employment
should be responsible. for 6 months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of more
than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than
most boys of 15
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages
The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as
caused by the minors who live with them.
described by Jessie who even ran away
xxx xxx xxx
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the
explosion which might be expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of
course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries which he incurred; but he well knew
that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act, and yet he
willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to Issues:
say that "according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and
caution" as might reasonably be required of him, or that defendant or anyone else
should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him under such (1) Whether the petitioner can be held liable even though the coming of the typhoon is
circumstances. a fortuitous event
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary
capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts,
so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in (2) Whether a notice was sent to the residents
the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps
impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence
necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own (3) Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria
acts and their consequences

he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution Held:
which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and
that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate
result of his own willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries
(1) The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or
would not have been incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving
an act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention
the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate
in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil
and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury
Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation
rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law on
sentire quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay
just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own for the damage done." Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary
fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should not
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it. have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
NPC v. CA strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature.
Facts: Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the
mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of man,
whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of
At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat God. In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God, petitioners
Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents can not escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of the loss
blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by and damage.
petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity of the dam.
Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a
safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises
diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the (2) The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL CONCERNED", would not strike one
residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal relationship between to be of serious importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and cause people to take
the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents assumed the precautions for their safety's sake. The notices were not delivered, or even addressed
risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of to responsible officials of the municipalities concerned who could have disseminated
the nature of damnum absque injuria. the warning properly. They were delivered to ordinary employees and policemen. As
it happened, the said notices do not appear to have reached the people concerned,
which are the residents beside the Angat River. The plaintiffs in this case definitely did
not receive any such warning. Indeed, the methods by which the defendants allegedly
sent the notice or warning was so ineffectual that they cannot claim, as they do in
their second assignment of error, that the sending of said notice has absolved them
from liability.

(3) We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage
caused by the opening of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which
presupposes that although there was physical damage, there was no legal injury in
view of the fortuitous events. There is no question that petitioners have the right, duty
and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat Dam, but their
negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end
does not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than
simultaneously opening the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are
not entitled to counterclaim.