RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

1. Vidallon-Magtolis vs Salud
The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
“ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence, and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot
and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the
sender of the first three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

2. Ang vs Court of Appeals; GR. No. 182385, April 20, 2010

Issue: Whether or not the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an
electronic document
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit
A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the
admission of the picture on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic
Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceeding

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
1. GR. No.133739, May 29, 2002, PP vs Coca Jr
Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness have
identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the
malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight
is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight
may, in proper situations, be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the
credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.

Qualifications of Witness
1. Sanson vs Court of Appeals, GR. No. 127745, April 22, 2003
Issue:
Whether or not presumption of consideration may be rebutted even if the heirs did not present
any evidence to controvert it.

Held:
When the fact was established by a witness that it was the deceased who signed the checks
and in fact who entered into the transaction, the genuineness of the deceased signature having
been shown, the latter is prima facie presumed to have been a party to the check for value,
following Section 24 of NIL which provides that “every negotiable instrument is deemed prima
 facie to have been issued for a valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears
thereon to have become a party thereto for value.”

Since the prima facie presumption was not rebutted or contradicted by the heirs, it has become
conclusive.

2. Zulueta vs Court of Appeals, GR. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

ISSUE: whether or not documents and/or correspondence taken by one spouse without the
consent of the owner spouse may be used by former against the latter as evidence in an action for
disqualification to practice a profession.

HELD: The documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband’s
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only
exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital
infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to
privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of
the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another
is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do
with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

3. Gonzales vs CA, GR. No. 117740, October 30, 1998

First, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 are, to
say the least, far from conclusive. Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one's parent is
"deceased" is not necessarily proof that said parent was still living during the time said form was
being accomplished. Furthermore, the joint affidavit of Juan Quiambao and Alejandro Ramos as
to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent evidence to prove the latter's
death at that time, being merely secondary evidence thereof. Jose Libunao's death certificate
would have been the best evidence as to when the latter died. Petitioners have, however,
inexplicably failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said death certificate has
been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao's death. More telling, while
the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried
there in 1971, this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynado's first husband, the
latter's name being Jose Santos Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose Bautista
 Libunao's wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria
Empaynado.

As to Dr. Arenas' affidavit, the same was objected to by private respondents as being
privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 11 The rule on
confidential communications between physician and patient requires that: a) the action in which
the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case; b) the relation of
physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal representative
and the physician; c) the advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the
physician while professionally attending the patient; d) the information was necessary for the
performance of his professional duty; and e) the disclosure of the information would tend to
blacken the reputation of the patient.

4. Lim vs CA, GR. No. 91114, September 25, 1992

In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be successfully
claimed, the following requisites should concur: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the
person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5)
the information was confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.

The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to
the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would
have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are
covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that
is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and
the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject
communicated is not stated." One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these
aforementioned requisites.

Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She did not disclose anything
obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover,
the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no bearing
on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is,
as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to
the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information obtained from the petitioner.
Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had
about the petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship
existing between them. As an expert witness, her testimony before the trial court cannot then be
excluded.

5. Krohn vs CA, GR. No. 108854, June 14, 1994

Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is the patient’s husband who testifies
on a document executed by medical practitioners, his testimony does not have the force and effect
 of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Plainly, this
does not fall within the prohibition.
6. People vs Invention, GR. No. 131636, March 5, 2003
The competency of Elven to testify is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
otherwise known as the rule on “filial privilege.” This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification
because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule
refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As
correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he
chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared
that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only “to tell the truth.”
Hence, his testimony is entitled to full credence.