I Don’t Think the CHR is Toothless: Evaluating the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) of the
Philippines in light of the Paris Principles and other Scholars' Functions of National Human
Rights Institutions (NHRIs) under the Duterte Administration
A Reflection by Irvin Christian D. San Pedro of 3A
What are the Standards?
One of my takeaways from last meeting’s readings and discussions is that in order to
effectively evaluate NHRIs, there must be a proper standard to evaluate it with. To recall, the
Paris Principles requires that NHRIs be given a broad mandate, adequate funding, adequate
powers of investigation, autonomy from government, guaranteed independence, and have
pluralistic membership.1 While this may be a good starting point by which to evaluate NHRIs, it
may be insufficient. As Petersen observes in his article, the Paris Principles fail to require that
NHRIs be endowed with any particular powers.2 Hence, I looked into other another scholarly
works that may supplement the Paris Principle.
In his article entitled National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance
Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human Rights, Kumar stated the variety of functions that
NHRIs perform, particularly investigation of human rights (HR) violations, conducting public
inquiries, exercising advisory jurisdiction, enforcing HR in prisons, providing assistance to
governments, promoting HR education and awareness, promoting interaction among other
NHRIs and with NGOs, and publication of annual reports. 3 While Kumar did not particularly
mention these functions as the standard by which NHRIs shall be evaluated, it shall nonetheless
provide a decent guide for purposes of this reflection paper. In sum, I will reflect on and evaluate
the CHR based on the Paris Principles and Kumar’s functions.
1
Carole J. Petersen, Bridging the Gap?: The Role of Regional and National Human Rights Institutions in the Asia
Pacific, ASIA PACIFIC LAW & POLICY JOURNAL 175, 198 (2011).
2
Id at 176.
3
C. Raj Kumar, National Human Rights Institutions: Good Governance Perspectives on Institutionalization of Human
Rights, American University International Law Review 259, 283 (2003).
The Legal Backbone of the CHR
Legally speaking, the CHR satisfies many of the above Paris Principles and Kumar’s
functions. Among others, the 1987 Constitution provides that the CHR shall have independence 4,
fiscal autonomy5, investigatory powers on HR violations6, recommendatory functions to
Congress on HR promotion7, and provide legal measures for the protection of HR in the
Philippines8, jail visitations9, among others. E.O. No. 163 No. 167 s. 1987, referring to E.O. 8 s.
1986, even provides for the powers of CHR to report its findings to the President, making them
public, suggesting actions to be taken.10
On paper then, the CHR is legally equipped. There can be no doubt that based on the
standards set forth by the Paris Principles, the CHR delivers; the CHR is even an “A” accredited
NHRI,11 upholding all of the abovementioned characteristics. In fact, the CHR satisfies not only
the Paris Principles, but also Kumar’s functions as stated above. Legally speaking therefore, the
CHR is definitely empowered to have an impact on the human rights discourse and enforcement
in the speaking.
I Don’t Think the CHR is Toothless
If the CHR is empowered by law to perform all of these things, then why is the
Philippines in the dire state that it is now in terms of HR? In response to such query, it’s easy to
4
PHIL. CONST. art. XIII § 17(1).
5
PHIL. CONST. art. XIII § 17(4).
6
PHIL. CONST. art. XIII § 18(1).
7
PHIL. CONST. art. XIII § 18(6).
8
PHIL. CONST. art. XIII § 18(3).
9
PHIL. CONST. art. XIII § 18(4).
10
Creating the Presidential Committee on Human Rights, E.O. No. 8. S. 1986, § 4 (1986).
11
Commission on Human Rights, About Us, available at http://chr.gov.ph/about-us/ (last accessed September 11,
2018).
dismiss the CHR as toothless, especially because of the current state of things under Duterte.
However, I would like to give the CHR a chance and reconsider things in a different light.
I consider the Duterte Administration as sui generis, rivalled only by the Marcos
Dictatorship. While it is beyond the scope of my reflection to argue and substantiate the truth of
this opinion, I nonetheless believe in the narrative that various governmental institutions, while
supposedly independent, or supposedly presumed to be operating regularly, have fallen under the
control and extralegal agenda of President Duterte – the Supreme Court, the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC, the PNP and the AFP, and even the Media. Among these
victims is, of course, the CHR, with the recent news of the substantial reduction of CHR’s
budget and Duterte even threatening the institution’s abolishment.
In essentially totalitarian governments, like those of Duterte and Marcos, I concede that
the above institutions are severely crippled and heavily pressured by politicking. However, this is
not to say that these institutions are toothless, i.e. completely powerless. These institutions, and
especially the CHR, have survived and served their functions prior to the Duterte reign – not
perfectly, of course, but with enough teeth; and I believe these teeth will be ready once we get
through these tough times. And this is not to say that the CHR is toothless now. I believe that
while the agenda of Duterte may restrict the institutional powers of the CHR, the CHR is in a
unique opportunity to enrich the political discourse on human rights, which according to Kumar
may just empower individuals and institutions,12 and help get us through.
12
Kumar, National Human Rights Institutions, at 278.
