G.R. No.

179370               November 19, 2009

EUGENIO S. CAPABLANCA, Petitioner, 
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,* Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Uniformed members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) are considered employees of the
National Government, and all personnel of the PNP are subject to civil service laws and
regulations.1 Petitioner cannot evade liability under the pretense that another agency has primary
jurisdiction over him. Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the
law.2 When it clearly declares that a subject matter falls within the jurisdiction of a tribunal, the party
involved in the controversy must bow and submit himself to the tribunal on which jurisdiction is
conferred.

Factual Antecedents

On October 3, 1996, the PNP-Regional Office 10 appointed petitioner Eugenio S. Capablanca into

the PNP service with the rank of Police Officer 1 (PO1) with a temporary status3 and was assigned at
the PNP Station in Butuan City. On November 29, 1998, petitioner took the PNP Entrance
Examination conducted by the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)4 and passed the same.
On July 28, 2000, he took the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test
(CSP-CAT) given by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)5 and likewise passed the same.
Thereafter, or on October 3, 2000, the Regional Director of Police Regional Office XIII conferred
upon petitioner the permanent status as PO1.6

Proceedings before the Civil Service Commission

On October 15, 2001, the CSC Caraga Regional Office XIII (CSC Caraga) through its Regional
Director Lourdes Clavite-Vidal informed PO1 Capablanca about certain alleged irregularities relative
to the CSP-CAT which he took on July 28, 2000. According to the CSC, the "person in the picture
pasted in the Picture Seat Plan (PS-P) is different from the person whose picture is attached in the
Personal Data Sheet (PDS)" and that the signature appearing in the PS-P was different from the
signature affixed to the PDS.7 The CSC further informed petitioner that such findings of alleged
examination irregularities constituted the offense of dishonesty if prima facie evidence was
established.

A Preliminary Investigation was scheduled on November 16, 2001;8 petitioner failed to appear but
was represented by counsel who moved to dismiss the proceedings. He argued that it is the
NAPOLCOM which has sole authority to conduct entrance and promotional examinations for police
officers to the exclusion of the CSC, pursuant to Civil Service Commission v. Court of
Appeals.9 Thus, the CSP-CAT conducted on July 28, 2000 was void. Moreover, he alleged that the
administrative discipline over police officers falls under the jurisdiction of the PNP and/or
NAPOLCOM.10

In an Order11 dated November 16, 2001, the CSC Caraga held that there was no dispute that it was
the NAPOLCOM which had the sole authority to conduct the entrance and promotional examinations
of police officers. However, since petitioner submitted a CSC Career Service Professional eligibility
and not a NAPOLCOM eligibility to support his appointment on a permanent status, then the CSC
had jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation.

The dispositive portion of the CSC Order dated November 16, 2001, reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Atty. Poculan, for his client, Eugenio S. Capablanca is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, Capablanca is directed to submit his counter-affidavit
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.12

Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court

To prevent the CSC Caraga from further proceeding with the conduct of the administrative
investigation, PO1 Capablanca filed on January 16, 2002 a Petition13 for prohibition and injunction
with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction with
the Regional Trial Court of Butuan. The said court issued a 20-day temporary restraining order and
set the case for summary hearing on February 8, 2002 to resolve the application for preliminary
injunction.14

Instead of filing its Answer, the CSC Caraga moved to dismiss the case,15 arguing inter alia that: a)
PO1 Capablanca failed to exhaust administrative remedies by appealing before the CSC Central
Office instead of filing a petition before the trial court; b) PO1 Capablanca’s reliance on Civil Service
Commission v. Court of Appeals16 was misplaced because what he took was a career service
professional examination and not a police entrance examination; and c) the CSC was not stripped of
its original disciplinary jurisdiction over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies.
1avvphi1

In its March 8, 2002 Resolution,17 the trial court denied CSC’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit. It
held that the CSC had no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation, much less to
prosecute PO1 Capablanca. The dispositive portion of the Resolution, reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent’s motion to dismiss is denied for lack of
merit. As a consequence and for want of jurisdiction, herein respondent, its Regional Director,
Region 13 Caraga, or its officers, attorneys’ agents, or any person acting for and its behalf, is hereby
ordered to finally, permanently and perpetually desist, cease and stop from proceeding or
conducting any administrative investigation against the petitioner Eugenio S. Capablanca.

No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.18

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Its Motion for Reconsideration19 unheeded,20 the CSC Caraga filed a Petition

for Certiorari21 before the Court of Appeals praying for the nullification of the Resolution of the trial
court, and at the same time insisting on its jurisdictional power to prosecute the administrative case
involving dishonesty and that PO1 Capablanca failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

In his Comment,22 the petitioner contended that there was no need to exhaust administrative
remedies because the proceeding before the CSC was an absolute nullity, and that it was the
NAPOLCOM, the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), or PNP which had primary jurisdiction
over the alleged irregularities in the CSP-CAT. He alleged that the case involved a purely legal issue
and that he would suffer irreparable injury if he should still await the outcome of the administrative
action before the CSC Central Office. PO1 Capablanca stressed that the July 28, 2000 CSP-CAT
was ineffectual as far as he was concerned, because it was in the nature of a promotional
examination for policemen and was solely within the province of NAPOLCOM.

On March 22, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision23 granting CSC’s petition. The Court
of Appeals found that PO1 Capablanca prematurely resorted to court intervention when the remedy
of appeal to the CSC Central Office was available. Upholding the jurisdiction of the CSC Caraga, the
appellate court declared that the subject of the latter’s preliminary investigation was not with respect
to PO1 Capablanca’s acts in the conduct of his duties as a police officer, but with respect to the
authenticity of the documents he submitted before the CSC Caraga in support of his application for
permanent status as well as the veracity of its contents. It held that pursuant to the CSC's
constitutional duty to protect the integrity of the civil service system, it acted within its authority to
investigate irregularities or anomalies involving civil service examinations, and to ascertain whether
a prospective civil service appointee is qualified in accordance with all the legal requirements.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner PO1 Capablanca assigns the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, GRAVELY ERRED IN

DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT CSC HAS JURISDICTION AND DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY
OVER HEREIN PETITIONER, A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE.

1-A

GRANTING THAT IT HAS, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THAT IT HAS ONLY APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE AND IT IS THE
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION (NAPOLCOM) WHICH HAS THE JURISDICTION TO
CONDUCT INITIATORY INVESTIGATION OF THE CASE, AS HELD IN THE CASE OF MIRALLES
VS. GO, G.R. NO. 139943, JANUARY 18, 2001.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT GRAVELY ERRED IN

DECLARING THAT HEREIN PETITIONER FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.24

Respondent’s Arguments

The CSC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that in pursuing a case against
one who undermines the integrity of the CSC examinations, the CSC Caraga was only acting within
its mandated powers and duties. The OSG clarifies that the PNP does not have exclusive jurisdiction
over disciplinary cases. Rather, its jurisdiction over such cases is concurrent with that of the CSC. It
also argues that Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals 25 is irrelevant to petitioner's situation
because the ruling therein does not affect the authority of the CSC to conduct the CSP examination
and to investigate examination anomalies. Lastly, the OSG contends that petitioner should not have
directly resorted to court action, because the CSC proper could still review the decisions and actions
of the CSC Caraga.26

Issue

The case at bar boils down to the issue of whether the CSC Caraga has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation of a possible administrative case of dishonesty against PO1 Capablanca for
alleged CSP examination irregularity.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the Government, is mandated to establish a career
service, to strengthen the merit and rewards system, and to adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency and integrity in the civil service.27 The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.28 Specifically, Section 91 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6975 (1990) or
the "Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990" provides that the "Civil Service Law
and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department," to which
herein petitioner belongs.

Section 12 of Executive Order (EO) No. 292 or the "Administrative Code of 1987," enumerates the
powers and functions of the CSC, to wit:

SEC. 12. Powers and Functions. - The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

(1) Administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory provisions on the merit system for all
levels and ranks in the Civil Service;

xxxx

(7) Control, supervise and coordinate Civil Service examinations. x x x

xxxx

(11) Hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal,
including contested appointments, and review decisions and actions of its offices and of the
agencies attached to it. x x x

In addition, Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations specifically
confers upon the CSC the authority to take cognizance over any irregularities or anomalies
connected with the examinations, thus:

Sec. 28. The Commission shall have original disciplinary jurisdiction over all its officials and
employees and over all cases involving civil service examination anomalies or irregularities.

To carry out this mandate, the CSC issued Resolution No. 991936, or the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, empowering its Regional Offices to take cognizance of
cases involving CSC examination anomalies:
SECTION 6. Jurisdiction of Civil Service Regional Offices. - The Civil Service Commission Regional
Offices shall have jurisdiction over the following cases:

A. Disciplinary

1. Complaints initiated by, or brought before, the Civil Service Commission Regional Offices
provided that the alleged acts or omissions were committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Office, including Civil Service examination anomalies or irregularities and the persons complained of
are employees of agencies, local or national, within said geographical areas;

xxxx

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it initiated the
conduct of a preliminary investigation on the alleged civil service examination irregularity committed
by the petitioner.

However, petitioner contends that a citizen who has complaints against a police officer should bring
his complaint before the following, citing Section 41 of RA 6975,29 to wit:

(a) x x x x

(1) Chiefs of police, where the offense is punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction
to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof for a period
not exceeding fifteen (15) days;

(2) Mayors of cities or municipalities, where the offense is punishable by withholding of

privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or forfeiture of salary, or any combination
thereof, for a period of not less than sixteen (16) days but not exceeding thirty (30) days;

(3) People's Law Enforcement Board, as created under Section 43 hereof, where the offense
is punishable by withholding of privileges, restriction to specified limits, suspension or
forfeiture of salary, or any combination thereof, for a period exceeding thirty (30) days; or by
dismissal.

xxxx

(c) Exclusive Jurisdiction. - A complaint or a charge filed against a PNP member shall be heard and
decided exclusively by the disciplining authority who has acquired original jurisdiction over the case
and notwithstanding the existence of concurrent jurisdiction as regards the offense: Provided, That
offenses which carry higher penalties referred to a disciplining authority shall be referred to the
appropriate authority which has jurisdiction over the offense.

Based on the foregoing, petitioner avers that the CSC does not have the authority to conduct an
initiatory investigation of the case, but it only has appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of any
of the disciplining authorities above mentioned. Petitioner anchors his argument on the following
provisions of EO 292 stating that the heads of departments, agencies, offices or bureaus should first
commence disciplinary proceedings against their subordinates before their decisions can be
reviewed by the CSC:

Section 47, Book V of EO 292:

 Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty
days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office x x x

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary
action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in
case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount
not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is
appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the
penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the
Secretary concerned.

Section 48, Book V of EO 292:

Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees. - (1) Administrative

proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the Secretary or
head of office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies, or regional
directors, or upon sworn, written complaint of any other person.

We are not persuaded. It has already been settled in Cruz v. Civil Service Commission30 that the
appellate power of the CSC will only apply when the subject of the administrative cases filed against
erring employees is in connection with the duties and functions of their office, and not in cases
where the acts of complainant arose from cheating in the civil service examinations. Thus:

Petitioner’s invocation of the law is misplaced. The provision is applicable to instances where
administrative cases are filed against erring employees in connection with their duties and functions
of the office. This is, however, not the scenario contemplated in the case at bar. It must be noted that
the acts complained of arose from a cheating caused by the petitioners in the Civil Service
(Subprofessional) examination. The examinations were under the direct control and supervision of
the Civil Service Commission. The culprits are government employees over whom the Civil Service
Commission undeniably has jurisdiction. x x x

Moreover, in Civil Service Commission v. Albao,31 we rejected the contention that the CSC, under
the aforestated Sections 47 and 48 of Book V of EO 292, only has appellate disciplinary jurisdiction
on charges of dishonesty and falsification of documents in connection with an appointment to a
permanent position in the government service. We enunciated, thus:

Pursuant to Section 47 (1), (2) and Section 48 above, it is the Vice President of the Philippines, as
head of office, who is vested with jurisdiction to commence disciplinary action against respondent
Albao.

Nevertheless, this Court does not agree that petitioner is helpless to act directly and motu proprio,
on the alleged acts of dishonesty and falsification of official document committed by respondent in
connection with his appointment to a permanent position in the Office of the Vice President.

It is true that Section 47 (2), Title I (A), Book V of EO No. 292 gives the heads of government offices
original disciplinary jurisdiction over their own subordinates. Their decisions shall be final in case the
penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty
days’ salary. It is only when the penalty imposed exceeds the aforementioned penalties that an
appeal may be brought before the Civil Service Commission which has appellate jurisdiction over the
same in accordance with Section 47 (1) Title I(A), Book V of EO No. 292, thus:

SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or
fine in an amount exceeding thirty days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from office. x x x

The present case, however, partakes of an act by petitioner to protect the integrity of the civil service
system, and does not fall under the provision on disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the
provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases instituted by it directly. This is an integral part
of its duty, authority and power to administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as
provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those who
falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary proceedings intended to
discipline a bona fide member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the
law or the rules of the service. (Emphasis Ours)

Incidentally, it must be mentioned at this juncture that citizen’s complaints before the PLEB under
RA 6975 pertain to complaints lodged by private citizens against erring PNP members for the
redress of an injury, damage or disturbance caused by the latter's illegal or irregular acts, an
example being that of a policeman who takes fish from the market without paying for it.32 Clearly, the
PLEB has no jurisdiction concerning matters involving the integrity of the civil service system.

Finally, petitioner’s reliance on Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals,33 is misplaced. In said
case, the NAPOLCOM assailed Item 3 of CSC Resolution No. 96-5487, which provides:

3. Appointees to Police Officer and Senior Police Officer positions in the Philippine National Police
must have passed any of the following examinations:

a) PNP Entrance Examination;

b) Police Officer 3rd Class Examination; and

c) CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination.

The NAPOLCOM took exception to this provision, particularly letter (c), arguing that the requirement
of taking a CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination is only applicable to entrance in the first-level
position in the PNP, i.e., the rank of PO1.34 NAPOLCOM stressed that what would entitle a police
officer to the appropriate eligibility for his promotion in the PNP are the promotional examinations
conducted by the NAPOLCOM, and not the CSC Police Officer Entrance Examination.

The Court of Appeals found in favor of the NAPOLCOM and held that the CSC, by issuing Item 3 of
CSC Resolution No. 96-5487 encroached on the exclusive power of NAPOLCOM under RA
697535 to administer promotional examinations for policemen and to impose qualification standards
for promotion of PNP personnel to the ranks of PO2 up to Senior Police Officers 1-4. Thus:

Admittedly, the CSC is mandated to conduct the qualifying entrance examination (CSC Police
Officer Entrance Examination) for Police Officer 1. However, when the CSC prescribes the same
examination for appointment of Senior Police Officer (SPO) under the questioned Item 3, it in effect
imposes an examination for promotion (appointment) of a policeman to PO2 up to other higher ranks
up to SP04. Thus Item 3 encompasses examinations for the positions of Police Officer as well as
that of Senior Police Officer, meaning examination not only for appointment to PO1 but promotion to
PO2 and PO3 up to the four SPO ranks.36

The Court of Appeals thus ordered the CSC to desist from conducting any promotional examination
for Police Officers and Senior Police Officers.

In a Minute Resolution dated September 25, 2001 in G.R. No. 141732, we affirmed the Court of
Appeals thereby sustaining the authority of the NAPOLCOM to administer promotional examinations
for policemen.

It must be stressed however that the subject matter in the above cited case was the conduct of
promotional examination for policemen. On the contrary, the issue in the instant case is the
jurisdiction of the CSC with regard to anomalies or irregularities in the CSP-CAT, which is a totally
different matter.

In fine, we find that CSC Caraga acted within its powers when it instituted the conduct of a
preliminary investigation against herein petitioner. In view of the foregoing, we need not anymore
attend to the issue of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 174312 : September 22, 2008]

CAPT. ERNESTO S. CABALLERO, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD EFFICIENCY AND

SEPARATION BOARD (PCG-ESB), COMM. ELPIDIO B. PADAMA, CAPT. ALEJANDRO N. FLORA, CAPT.
ANTONIO LALISAN, CAPT. CESAR A. SARILE, CDR. EDUARDO DUMLAO, CDR. LUIS TUASON, JR.,
AND LT. LAZARO ERNESTO C. VALDEZ, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITY AS MEMBERS OF THE PCG-ESB,
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD (PCG), DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
(DOTC) AND JENNIFER G. LIWANAG, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

BROUGHT to fore is the administrative disciplinary system of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) for erring
members. We trace the transition of the PCG from a component of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
to an adjunct of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). We also set straight
questions on administrative disciplinary procedures for uniformed personnel of the PCG.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 92951. The CA reversed the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Manila in Civil
Case No. 03-107563 granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition lodged before it by PCG Captain
Ernesto S. Caballero.

The Facts

In August 2002, petitioner Captain Ernesto S. Caballero, Commander of the Internal Affairs and Service
Headquarters Group of the PCG, became the subject of a sexual harassment complaint filed by Dr. Jennifer
Liwanag. Dr. Liwanag is a dentist and a civilian employee of the PCG assigned at the dental detachment of
the PCG Headquarters located in Port Area, Manila. In her affidavit-complaint, Dr. Liwanag alleged:
 3. On or about February, 2002, at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon, Capt. Caballero entered
the dental detachment of the Philippine Coast Guard to obtain a treatment with Dr. Donna
B. Dinglasan, a dentist and also a civilian employee of the Philippine Coast Guard;

4. While he was in the receiving area waiting for Dr. Dinglasan, he was talking to me and
other personnel of such clinic/detachment;

5. As I was sitting at the bench listening to him, he walked towards me and, he suddenly
touched my thighs. I was shocked and was not able to react with his advancement;

6. He sat beside and very close to me on my right side and put his left hand at the side of my
leg, touching and rubbing it in a back and forth motion. I was surprised that I immediately
stood up and walk (sic) away from him;

7. I went directly to the treatment room and talked about the incident to Lt. Rodolfo S. Ingel,
Jr., but he just told me to forget about it and said, "Hayaan mo na, matanda na yon";

8. At around three o'clock in the afternoon, that same day, on my way to my locker room,
which is located at the far end of the hallway to get something, I chanced upon Capt.
Caballero who came from the toilet which is also located near the locker room;

9. He noticed me. Since the locker room is open, he entered such room and said, "Patingin
naman ng locker mo." He closed the door and suddenly embraced and pulled me towards
him. He kissed me on the cheek, then he forcefully moved his lips towards my lips;

10. I right away pushed him and drove him back and resisted his advances. Then, he left me;

11. I was stunned, shocked and trembling;

12. I really felt insulted, disgusted, humiliated and sickened of what Captain Caballero did to
me; afterwards I went to Lt. Ingel crying. I told him what transpired in the locker room;

13. I can hardly sleep for so many nights after the incident;

14. Since May 2002, there were already bad rumors going on at the headquarters, which put
me on the (sic) bad light and the center of the controversy and mockery;

15. I am executing this affidavit-complaint to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts for the
purpose of instituting formal criminal and administrative charges against CAPTAIN
ERNESTO S. CABALLERO PCG (CSG) with postal address at Philippine Coast Guard
Headquarters Support Group, 139 25th Street, Port Area, Manila for the acts described
above.3

Liwanag's complaint was eventually referred to the Office of the Coast Guard Judge Advocate (OCGJA).
However, despite the issuance of a subpoena directing him to appear before the investigating officers and
submit his counter-affidavit and any evidence on his behalf, petitioner failed to appear. Instead, petitioner
questioned the proceedings, claiming that the OCGJA was not the proper office to conduct the investigation.
Despite his protest, the investigation proceeded in due course, based mainly on Dr. Liwanag's evidence.

The investigating officers, Lt. Fedelyn A. Santos and Ens. Mitzie S. Silva, recommended that petitioner be
tried before the Philippine Coast Guard Efficiency and Separation Board (PCG-ESB) for misconduct on the
ground of sexual harassment.4 Acting Coast Guard Advocate Lt. Lazaro Ernesto C. Valdez, Jr. endorsed the
investigation report to PCG Commandant Reuben Lista. Lt. Valdez recommended that petitioner be tried
before the PCG-ESB, despite the pendency of a criminal complaint against petitioner for acts of
lasciviousness before the Department of Justice. On April 11, 2003, PCG Commandant Lista approved the
recommendation. Petitioner's administrative case was then referred to the PCG-ESB.

In April 2003,5 the PCG-ESB submitted its report with the following observations, among others:
 3. Capt. Ernesto S. Caballero was holding a very sensitive position and a member of the PCG
Promotions Board B when the incident happened. His acts constitutes misconduct as he
abused his authority and moral ascendancy over a female Civilian Employee who has been
working in the PCG organization for the last four (4) years and the wife of a PCG Junior
Officer whose promotion falls under the jurisdiction of the said Board.

4. Pursuant to DOTC Department Order No. 2000-61 and Memorandum Circular No. 2000-64,
this case is submitted to this Board to determine the respondent Officer's fitness and
suitability to remain in the service.6

On August 14, 2003, petitioner filed before the RTC in Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition with an
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against respondents PCG-ESB, its members and Dr.
Liwanag. Petitioner sought to nullify and set aside the orders7 issued by the PCG-ESB in relation to ESB Case
No. 003-03, entitled "Re: Capt. Ernesto S. Caballero," for misconduct. He also sought the nullification of
DOTC Department Order (DO) Nos. 2000-618 and 2002-769 as well as Memorandum Circular No. 2000-
64.10 The DOs were the basis for the constitution of the PCG-ESB. In essence, petitioner argued that the
PCG-ESB acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the administrative complaint for
sexual harassment filed by Dr. Liwanag.

RTC Judgment

On September 9, 2003, the RTC issued an Order granting petitioner's application for a writ of preliminary
injunction. On August 2, 2005, a Decision11 was rendered in favor of petitioner, with the following fallo:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. The creation of
ESB and its procedure are hereby declared IMPROPER and IRREGULAR and the proceeding had thereon
against petitioner is declared NULL and VOID as such Board has no jurisdiction over the complaint of Dra.
Jennifer G. Liwanag.

The preliminary injunction is hereby made PERMANENT, and the respondent board and all its members as
well as private respondent Dra. Jennifer G. Liwanag are hereby directed to cease and desist from continuing
the questioned proceedings.12
Following are pertinent segments of discussion by the RTC:
The primordial issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the instant petition;

2. Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of estoppel;

3. Whether or not the validity of DOTC Department Order Nos. 2000-61 and 2002-76 and
Memo Circular No. 2000-64 was seasonably raised to this Court; and

4. Whether respondent board has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction.

The first issue has been squarely passed upon by this Court in its order dated September 9, 2003. To
reiterate, the jurisdiction of this Court over the subject case springs from Section 4 Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court on Civil Procedure which unequivocally provides that petition shall be filed in the Regional
Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area if it relates to the acts or omissions of a board,
among others.

What is involved in this case is a board exercising administrative discipline over the PCG officers created by
the DOTC. While it is true that petitioner alleged that ESB is a quasi-judicial body exercising quasi-judicial
function, such allegation is not sufficient to confer or loss jurisdiction. The crucial matter is the real import of
such board to determine which court has jurisdiction. This is so because the legal precept is that jurisdiction
is conferred by law and cannot be acquired by mere acquiescence of the parties. Respondent board not
being co-equal body of the Regional Trial Court, the instant petition is validly filed to this Court.

Anent the second issue, the Supreme Court has frequently declared a long standing rule that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the
parties; it cannot be acquired through waiver, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties
(Mun. of Sogod v. Rosal, G.R. No. L-38204, Sept. 24, 1991, 201 SCRA 632). Thus, the fact that petitioner
had once sat as member of ESB, by itself, could not prevent him from questioning the jurisdiction of
respondent board.

xxxx

Department Order No. 2000-61, creating the PCG-ESB, was issued on November 6, 2000 by the DOTC
pursuant to the Executive Order No. 477, series of 1998 promulgated by then President Fidel V. Ramos. It is
undisputed, however, that with the advent of said EO 477, the PCG has ceased to exist as a major unit of
the Philippine Navy and they were, as a consequence, separated from the command of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP). Not being part of Phil. Navy or AFP, PCG loses its military character and civilianized in
the process.

However, subsequently, the DOTC issued the questioned circular, Memorandum Circular No. 2000-64, which
outlined the rules and regulations on the discharge or separation by administrative action of all PCG officers.
This circular was made and adopted pursuant to Executive Order No. 337, series of 1998.

xxxx

Thereafter, on December 9, 2002, the DOTC issued Department Order No. 2002-76 regarding re-
composition of PCG-ESB pursuant to Department Order No 2000-61, which created the PCG-ESB.

xxxx

As borne out by the records, it is no less than the General Headquarters of the AFP, through the Deputy
Chief of Staff of Personnel (J-1) who categorically stated and confirmed that PCG has ceased to be a major
unit of the Philippine Navy, AFP.

xxxx

Moreover, in the cited case of ELPIDIO SORIANO v. REUBEN S. LISTA, et al., G.R. No. 153881, March 24,
2003, the Supreme Court has made an express pronouncement that the PCG is under the DOTC and no
longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines. And while public respondents may
argue that such ruling refers to the promotion of PCG Officers, this court could not see any reason why such
pronouncement could not be applied on the appropriateness of continuous adaptation of military system in
the PCG notwithstanding the irreversible fact that it is no longer part of the military establishment.

xxxx

This Court is not saying that the DOTC cannot issue a Department Order or Circular for the discipline of PCG
officers. The DOTC has all the rights to do so being tasked of the administrative supervision over PCG. But
as manifested by private respondent's counsel on their comment, it is the Civil Service Administrative
Disciplinary Rules on Sexual Harassment that should govern because DOTC is a civilian component of
government such that the DOTC Secretary should create the Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(CODI) of the PCG, which should handle all cases of sexual harassment pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 01-
0940.

This Court does not agree with public respondent's view that PCG-ESB could proceed independently of
another PCG Administrative proceeding. As there is only one act complained of, there must be only one
administrative proceeding in the PCG against petitioner, which regrettably, ESB, a military type proceeding
is not appropriate.13
Public respondents moved for reconsideration.14 The motion was, however, denied in an Order15 dated
October 28, 2005.

Representing public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed to the CA, submitting
the following issues:
(I) Does the trial court have jurisdiction to pass upon PCG-ESB orders dated
July 10, 2003 and July 31, 2003 and to enjoin the administrative
proceedings being conducted by the PCG-ESB which, according to Capt.
 Caballero's judicial admission, is a quasi-judicial body exercising quasi-
judicial functions?;
(II) Was the petition below questioning the validity of DOTC Department
Orders Nos. 2000-61 and 2002-76, as well as Memorandum Circular No.
2000-64 filed seasonably?;
(III)Are DOTC Department Order No. 2000-61, which created the PCG-ESB,
and DOTC Department Order No. 2002-76, which recomposed the PCG-
ESB lawful?;
(IV) Is DOTC Memorandum Circular No. 2000-64, which prescribes the rules
and regulations for the discharge or separation by administrative action
of PCG uniformed personnel lawful?; and,
(V) Does the PCG-ESB have jurisdiction to conduct administrative
proceedings against Capt. Caballero?16
CA Disposition

On June 19, 2006, the CA gave judgment in favor of public respondents, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED and the appealed Decision dated
August 2, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37 in Civil Case No. 03-107563 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the petition for certiorari and
prohibition for lack of merit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.17
Issues

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner has resorted to the present recourse under
Rule 45, raising twin issues:

I. WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

PREVAILING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE, PARTICULARLY THE RULING OF THIS COURT IN
THE CASE OF SORIANO III VS. LISTA, (399 SCRA 437), WHEN IT HELD THAT UNIFORMED
PERSONNEL OF THE PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD (PCG) ARE STILL COVERED BY THE
MILITARY LAW ON ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE, THEREBY VESTING JURISDICTION TO
PCG-ESB.

II. WHETHER THE MANIFEST BIAS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PCG-ESB AGAINST THE
PETITIONER HAS OUSTED THEM OF ITS JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE THE CASE OF
THE PETITIONER.18 (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

Before discussing at length the issues hoisted by petitioner, it would be instructive to look into the
background relating to the establishment of the PCG.

The PCG was established by virtue of Republic Act (RA) No. 5173.19 This Republic Act institutionalized the
PCG as a major unit of the Philippine Navy. The relevant provisions of the said law read:
SECTION 1. Coast Guard Objectives. - There is hereby created in the Philippine Navy a major unit to be
known as Philippine Coast Guard which shall have the following general objectives:

xxxx

SECTION 4. Organization; Administration. - The Philippine Coast Guard shall be headed by a Commandant
who shall be a Flag Officer. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of National Defense, the Flag Officer-in-
Command, Philippine Navy, shall organize the Philippine Coast Guard into operational units of subordinate
commands and equip the same as may be necessary for effective exercise of the functions and duties vested
upon it by law, and shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for its administration. The Philippine
Coast Guard shall be administered and maintained as a separate unit of the Philippine Navy, and it shall be
specially trained and equipped for the effective discharge of police duties at sea.20 (Underscoring supplied)
On March 30, 1998, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Executive Order (EO) No. 47521 which transferred
the PCG from the Department of National Defense (DND) to the Office of the President. The
transfer was made pursuant to the President's authority under Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III,
Book III of EO No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) to reorganize the Office of the President
through the transfer of any agency or function to the Office of the President. EO No. 475 contains
a third "whereas" clause,22 which states that the Philippine Coast Guard remains a subordinate
unit of the Philippine Navy. Further, Sections 3 and 6 of EO No. 475 states:
SECTION 3. Implementing Requirements. - There is hereby created a Transition and Liquidation
Committee to be composed of the DOTC as Chairman, the Philippine Navy, PCG, Department of
Budget and Management and the Office of the President as members. These agencies shall
designate their respective representatives to this Committee which shall recommend to the
President the necessary plans and measures to effect the transfer within 30 days from the
signing of this EO. The Committee shall likewise, undertake the appropriate inventory and
disposition of all PCG properties.

xxxx

SECTION 6. Pay, Allowances, and Retirement of Uniformed Personnel. - PCG uniformed personnel
shall continue to receive the same base bay, longevity pay, and other allowances and benefits as
authorized for corresponding grades and ranks in the AFP. PCG uniformed personnel shall
continue to be covered by PD 1638 (AFP Retirement Law), as amended, until such time as the
PCG is able to establish its own retirement system under a regime and timetable agreed upon by
the Committee.23
Subsequently, President Ramos issued EO No. 477 on April 15, 1998 transferring the PCG to the
DOTC. Section 1 of EO No. 477 states:
Section 1. Transfer. - The PCG is hereby transferred from the Office of the President to the
DOTC. The DOTC shall exercise administrative supervision over the PCG. (Underscoring supplied)
EO No. 477 also provided that the Transition and Liquidation Committee (TLC) created pursuant
to EO No. 475 shall continue to exercise its functions. Section 3 of EO No. 477 specifically
provided:
The Committee shall likewise prepare plans and measures to ensure the smooth transfer of
personnel from the PN to the PCG. Such plans and measures shall include the rules and
guidelines covering matters pertaining to the transfer of commissionship of PCG officers, the
administration and discipline and order during the transition period and appointments and
promotions and benefits of officers and enlisted men of the PCG, among others. 24 (Underscoring
supplied)
Section 6 of EO No. 477 further provided that PCG uniformed personnel shall continue to receive
the same base pay, longevity pay and other allowances and benefits authorized for
corresponding grades and ranks in the AFP. The same section likewise declared that PCG
uniformed personnel shall continue to be covered by the AFP Retirement Law until such time as
the PCG is able to establish its own retirement system as provided for by the transition
committee.25

On May 15, 1998, in accordance with the directives contained in both EO Nos. 475 and 477,
Arturo T. Valdez, DOTC Undersecretary and Chairman of the PCG Transition and Liquidation
Committee (PCG-TLC), submitted to then President Ramos a report on the plans and measures to
effect the implementation of PCG's transfer to DOTC. Noteworthy is Section A(5) and (6) of the
said report which states:

PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD TRANSITION AND 

LIQUIDATION COMMITTEE
(EO 475 & EO 477)

PLANS AND MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT EXECUTIVE  

ORDERS 475 & 477
 CONCERN
PLAN/MEASURE
IMPLEMENTING
DOCUMENT

A. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

xxxx

5. Administration of Discipline and Order

Under Section 4 of RA No. 5173, the PCG shall, "subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
National Defense, promulgate rules and regulations necessary for its administration." Since
Section 1 of EO No. 477 transfers administrative supervision over the PCG to the DOTC, approval
for the promulgation of such rules and regulations now rests upon the Secretary, DOTC. A PCG
Code of Discipline for Uniformed Personnel shall therefore be formulated and promulgated
subject to the Secretary's approval.
By DOTC (being formulated)
6. Procurement, Promotion, Separation and Attrition
Under Section 4 of RA No. 5173, the PCG shall "subject to the approval of the Secretary of
National Defense x x x promulgate rules and regulations necessary for its administration." Since
Section 1 of EO No. 477 transfers administrative supervision over the PCG to the DOTC, approval
for the promulgation of such rules and regulations now rests upon the Secretary, DOTC. Coast
Guard/DOTC guidelines covering procurement, promotion, separation and attrition shall
therefore be formulated and promulgated subject to the Secretary's approval. Until such
guidelines are promulgated, however, the PCG shall remain covered by pertinent AFP/PN rules
and regulations.
PCG/DOTC guidelines (being formulated by the PCG for the approval of the Secretary, DOTC)

Subsequently, the DOTC issued the following DOs relative to the exercise of its administrative
supervision over the PCG:

First, on November 6, 2000, the DOTC issued DO No. 2000-61 creating the PCG-ESB. DO No.
2000-61 was issued by the DOTC by virtue of EO No. 477 which provided for the transfer of the
PCG to the DOTC and DND Memorandum Circular No. 30 which provided that all applicable laws
pertaining to discipline, law and order shall remain applicable to the PCG.

Second, the DOTC issued Memorandum Circular No. 2000-64 which provided for the discharge or
separation by administrative action of PCG officers. Pertinent provisions of the said order are as
follows:
1. Purpose. - Pursuant to paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 337 dated 13 September 1998
hereby prescribed are the rules and regulations as well as the procedures governing the
discharge or separation from the Coast Guard service of PCG Officers.

2. Discharge or Separation from the Service. - PCG Officer shall be administratively discharged or
separated from the service as provided in EO# 337, series of 1998 and these implementing rules
and regulations.

a. Referral  of Case for Misconduct. - When a PCG Officer commits any act of misconduct of such a
nature and gravity as to warrant his/her discharge or separation from the service, his/her name
and record shall be referred by the Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard to the PCG Efficiency
and Separation Board for the determination of his/her suitability or fitness for retention in the
service.

xxxx

4. PCG  Efficiency and Separation Board. -

a. Designation. - The Efficiency and Separation Board established under Executive Order No. 337,
s-88 shall be officially designated as the Philippine Coast Guard Efficiency and Separation Board.
I. Being now subject to the administrative supervision of the DOTC, the PCG has become a
civilian agency with a distinct administrative disciplinary system for its uniformed personnel
administered by the PCG-Efficiency and Separation Board.

Petitioner essentially argues that the PCG-ESB is devoid of any authority to conduct
administrative disciplinary proceedings against him. According to petitioner, the transfer of the
PCG to the DOTC has stripped the ESB, which adopts military rules of procedure in the conduct of
its proceedings, of authority and jurisdiction over him. It is asserted that civil service law and
rules should be adopted in the conduct of any administrative disciplinary measures against PCG
personnel, uniformed or non-uniformed.

We are not persuaded. EO No. 477 vested the DOTC with administrative supervision over the
PCG. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, administrative supervision covers the following:
(2) Administrative Supervision. - (a) Administrative supervision which shall govern the
administrative relationship between a department or its equivalent and regulatory agencies or
other agencies as may be provided by law, shall be limited to the authority of department or its
equivalent to generally oversee the operations of such agencies and to insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day
activities; or management audit, 
performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department; to take such action as may be necessary for the proper
performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of
maladministration; and to review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not
increase or add to them;

(b) Such authority shall not, however, extend to: (1) appointments and other personnel actions x
x x.26
Pursuant to this authority, the DOTC via Memorandum Circular No. 2000-61 created the PCG-
Efficiency and Separation Board to oversee the promotion, discharge or separation from the
service of PCG uniformed personnel. The memorandum circular likewise prescribed the rules,
regulations and the procedures to be adopted by the ESB in the performance of its functions.

It bears stressing that the authority of the ESB extends only to the promotion, discharge or
separation from the service of uniformed personnel. The non-uniformed or civilian complement
of the PCG became subject to the disciplinary rules pervading in the mother department, DOTC,
which of course are the pertinent civil service laws, rules and regulations.

That the ESB rules of procedure are akin to the rules permeating administrative proceedings
adopted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Navy does not remove the PCG
from the ambit of a civilian agency. It remains a civilian component of the DOTC regardless of the
nature of the rules of procedure of the ESB. This is because the PCG is a distinct instrumentality
performing an essential function - that of enforcing the country's maritime laws. As such, its
officers are not similarly situated as ordinary civil service employees. The adoption of a
distinctive administrative disciplinary mechanism different from that of other government
agencies is clearly justified.

This is not a novel issue. In the recent Manalo v. Calderon,27 this Court recognized that the
Philippine National Police has an administrative disciplinary system distinct from that of ordinary
agencies. Its personnel are different from ordinary civil service employees. We held then:
Lastly, petitioners contend that by placing them under restrictive custody, they are made to
suffer lesser rights than those enjoyed by private citizens. On this score, the Court's
pronouncement in Canson, et al. v.  Hidalgo, et al. is categorical. It was held there that although
the PNP is civilian in character, its members are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Chief,
Philippine National Police, under the National Police Commission. Courts cannot, by injunction,
review, overrule, or otherwise interfere with valid acts of police officials. The police organization
must observe self-discipline and obey a chain of command under civilian officials.

Elsewise stated, police officers are not similarly situated with ordinary civil service employees.
The PNP has its own administrative disciplinary mechanism different from those of other
government employees. Sa ibang salita, ang kapulisan ay hindi katulad ng karaniwang kawani ng
pamahalaan. Ang  PNP  ay may sariling mekanismo ng pagdisiplina na kaiba sa ipinatutupad sa
ibang empleyado ng gobyerno.
In Fianza v. The People's Law Enforcement Board, et al., we ruled:
x x x although respondent policemen continue to be citizens, as public respondents contend, they
are not the `private citizens' referred to in the laws cited above. Clearly, the term `private
citizens' does not ordinarily include men in uniform, such as the respondent PNP men. This is
particularly evident in the PNP law which uses the term `members of the PNP' as well as
`private citizens' to refer to different groups of persons and not interchangeably. The `plain
meaning rule' or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this situation. When the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its interpretation.
The term `private citizen' in the PNP Law and PLEB Rules is used in its common signification and
was not meant to refer to the members of the PNP, such as respondent policemen. 28
We take the same position here. The Philippine Coast Guard is a distinct agency. Its uniformed
personnel ought not to be treated in the same manner as other civil servants.

Too, petitioner's reliance on Soriano III v. Lista29 is misplaced. There is nothing in the said case
that would indicate that the administration and discipline of PCG uniformed personnel should be
patterned after pertinent civil service laws and rules. Said the Court in Lista:
x x x As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the PCG used to be administered and
maintained as a separate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 4 of RA 5173. It was
subsequently placed under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary of the Department
of National Defense (DND) pursuant to Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it was integrated into the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as a major subordinate unit of the Philippine Navy under
Section 54 of Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of EO 292, as amended.

However, on March 30, 1998, after the aforesaid changes in the charter of the PCG, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, in the exercise of his statutory authority to reorganize the Office of the
President, issued EO 475 transferring the PCG from the DND to the Office of the President. He
later on again transferred the PCG from the Office of the President to the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC).

Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or
any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation
by the CA.30 (Underscoring supplied)
The issue in Lista was the legality of the PCG officers' appointments by the President in the
absence of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The case did not tackle discipline
and order among PCG uniformed personnel.31 As aptly observed by the OSG, nowhere in the said
decision did the Court rule that PCG officers should be covered by civil service rules.

Incidentally, there were bills filed in the Thirteenth Congress seeking to amend the PCG Charter,
like Senate Bills 1287 and 208132 and House Bill No. 5304.33 As noted by the appellate court:
That the PCG uniformed personnel is treated as a separate class - insofar as the maintenance of
discipline and efficiency within the said institution - from that of non-uniformed civilian
employees, can be gleaned from those proposed bills still pending in both the Senate and House
of Representatives. Senate Bills 1287 and 2081, for instance, categorically provide that in the
investigation of administrative cases against PCG officers and enlisted personnel, the PCG shall
adopt the military justice system until such time that it has promulgated the provisions of the
PCG Code of Discipline, Order, and Justice for PCG officers and enlisted personnel. On the other
hand, the applicable rules, regulations, and guidelines promulgated by the Civil Service
Commission shall govern the investigation of administrative cases against PCG non-
uniformed/civilian employees. A similar provision is found in the proposed consolidated House
Bill No. 5304. Significantly, HB No. 5304 and SB 1287 also contained a proviso that in times of
war as declared by Congress, or the President, the PCG or parts thereof, shall be attached to the
DND as a support unit.

Though indeed, the foregoing are just legislative proposals, it is an undeniable reality that the
transfer of administrative supervision over PCG to the DOTC did not result in transferring
jurisdiction over disciplinary actions or administrative cases involving PCG officers and enlisted
personnel to the Civil Service Commission as in the case of its ordinary employees falling under
the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Commission. 34
Until these bills get approval and ripen into law, the jurisdiction and authority of the ESB over
uniformed personnel, including its rules of procedure, should be respected. Otherwise, this Court
would be jumping the gun on Congress. That would be indulging in impermissible judicial
legislation.

II. There is no manifest bias or prejudice of the members of the PCG-ESB.

Anent the imputation of prejudice and bias on the part of the PCG-ESB Board, We rule in the
negative. Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the exercise of their functions.
Absent any proof to the contrary, We cannot sustain the bare allegation of petitioner that the
Board acted with prejudice.

The general rule is that the findings of facts of administrative bodies are conclusive and not
subject to review by the Court. In proceedings before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies,
substantial evidence is sufficient to establish a fact in issue. Said quantum of evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.35

Contrary to the assertion of petitioner, We find that the evidence on record overwhelmingly
establishes his administrative liability. In addition to the affidavit submitted by Dr. Liwanag, the
complaint against petitioner was duly supported by the individual sworn statements of Dr. Donna
B. Dinglasan, Dr. Angelita P. Costa, and Lt. Rodolfo S. Ingel, who were all detailed in the PCG
Dental Detachment, where the incident complained of transpired.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017

CINDY SHIELA COBARDE-GAMALLO, Petitioner, v. JOSE ROMEO C. ESCANDOR, Respondent.

GR. NO. 184469

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. JOSE ROMEO C. ESCANDOR, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Challenged in these consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the Decision1 and the Resolution2 dated March 25, 2008 and August 28, 2008, respectively, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02886.

These two cases arose from an administrative complaint for Violation of Republic Act No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995) filed by Cindy Sheila Cobarde-Gamallo (Cobarde-Gamallo), a contractual employee
of the National Economic Development Authority, Regional Office No. 7 (NEDA 7), for the UNICEF-assisted
Fifth Country Program for Children (CPC V), against Jose Romeo C. Escandor (Escandor), Regional Director
of NEDA 7, before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas (OMB-Visayas), docketed as OMB-V-
A-04-0492-I.

In a Decision dated March 21, 2007, there being substantial evidence, the OMB-Visayas, through Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer II Cynthia C. Maturan-Sibi, adjudged Escandor guilty of grave
misconduct and meted him with the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory
penalties.3 This OMB-Visayas Decision was later approved by the then Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N.
Gutierrez (Gutierrez) on June 14, 2007. Pursuant to Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order (AO) No. 17,4 the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) issued on even date an Order directing the implementation of the aforesaid Decision, particularly
Escandor's dismissal from the service, through the then Director General/Secretary of NEDA Romulo L. Neri
(Neri).5

Aggrieved, Escandor went to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari (with application for Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside, reverse and
declare null and void the OMB Order dated June 14, 2007 directing the immediate implementation and
execution of the OMB-Visayas Decision dated March 21, 2007 (approved on June 14, 2007) dismissing him
from the service.6 In support of his petition, Escandor claimed that he timely moved for reconsideration of
the said Decision; thus, it would be premature for the OMB and the NEDA to dismiss him from the
service.7 Escandor also cited several rulings8 of this Court to sustain his position that the penalty of dismissal
cannot be immediately executed pending any appeal or motion for reconsideration. Lastly, Escandor sought
the nullification of Section 7, Administrative Order No. 17 of the OMB for being allegedly contrary to this
Court's ruling in the cases cited by him.

Finding merit in Escandor's petition, the CA, in its now assailed Decision dated March 25, 2008, partly
granted the same, and, thus, enjoined Ombudsman Gutierrez and Secretary Neri from executing the
Decision dated March 21, 2007, as well as the Order dated June 14, 2007, in OMB-V-A-04-0492-I until after
the said Decision becomes final and executory. The CA held that there are good grounds to prevent
Ombudsman Gutierrez and Secretary Neri from enforcing the Decision dated March 21, 2007, as it has not
yet become final and executory considering the pendency of Escandor's Motion for Reconsideration thereof.
The CA based its Decision from the same cases cited by Escandor in his petition where this Court declared
that penalties other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine
not equivalent to one month salary, cannot be immediately executed pending any appeal or motion for
reconsideration. With these, the CA considered it grave abuse of discretion to insist Escandor's dismissal
from the service despite the unequivocal pronouncements of this Court on the matter and Escandor's
pending motion for reconsideration with the OMB. The CA, however, declined to nullify Section 7,
Administrative Order No. 17 of the OMB.9

Cobarde-Gamallo, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Secretary Neri sought reconsideration of the aforesaid CA
Decision but it was denied for lack of merit in the now questioned CA Resolution dated August 28, 2008.

Hence, these consolidated Petitions.

Both Cobarde-Gamallo and the OMB insist that the CA committed an error of law in enjoining the immediate
implementation of the Decision dated March 21, 2007 despite the clear provision of Section 7, Article III, of
the OMB Rules of Procedure, as amended, that decisions, resolutions and orders of the OMB are immediately
executory even pending appeal. They also argue that the CA's reliance on this Court's rulings in Office of the
Ombudsman v. Laja, et al., Laxina v. Office of the Ombusdman, et al., Lopez v. Court of Appeals, et
al., and Lapid v. Court of Appeals, et al.,10 is likewise an error of law as these cases have already been
superseded by the ruling in Buencamino v. Court of Appeals, et al.,  11 where this Court declared that Section
7, Rule III of the OMB Rules of Procedure, was already amended by AO No. 17, where it is categorically
stated that the appeal shall not stop the decisions of the OMB from being immediately executory.

On the contrary, Escandor maintains the correctness of the CA's ruling enjoining the immediate execution of
the Decision dated March 21, 2007. Escandor believes that the amendment of Section 7, Rule III of the OMB
Rules of Procedure by AO No. 17 cannot overturn the doctrinal pronouncements in Lapid, Laxina,
Lopez and Laja  that penalties other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary cannot be immediately executed pending any appeal or
motion for reconsideration. Escandor also holds that the immediate implementation and execution of the
order of dismissal pursuant toAO No. 17 deprive him of his rights without due process of law.

Given the foregoing arguments of the parties, the sole issue that must be addressed in these consolidated
petitions is whether the OMB's Decision and Order of Dismissal against Escandor can be immediately
implemented despite the pendency of his Motion for Reconsideration and/or Appeal.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

The issue presented in these consolidated petitions is not novel. In fact, it has long been settled in a number
of cases, to wit: Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego,12Villaseñor, et al. v. Ombudsman, et al., 13 and The
Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina, 14 stating that the OMB's decision, even if the penalty imposed is
dismissal from the service, is immediately executory despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration or
an appeal and cannot be stayed by mere filing of them.
Section 7, Rule III of the OMB Rules of Procedure, as amended by AO No. 17 dated September 15, 2003,
explicitly provides:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case
of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In
all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under
the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter
of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and
properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the
Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary
action against said officer. (emphases supplied)

It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted provision that the OMB's decisions in administrative cases may
either be unappealable or appealable. The unappealable decisions are final and executory, to wit: (1)
respondent is absolved of the charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3)
suspension of not more than one month; and (4) a fine equivalent to one month's salary. The appealable
decisions, on the other hand, are those falling outside the aforesaid enumeration, and may be appealed to
the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within 15 days from receipt of the written notice of the decision
or order denying the motion for reconsideration. Section 7 is categorical in providing that an appeal
shall not stop the decision from being executory, and that such shall be executed as a matter of
course.15

Also, Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 01, Series of 2006, of the OMB states:

Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, otherwise known as, the "Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure" provides that: "A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be
executed as a matter of course."

In order that the foregoing rule may be strictly observed, all concerned are hereby enjoined to implement all
Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions in administrative disciplinary cases, immediately upon receipt
thereof by their respective offices.

The filing of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review before the Office of the
Ombudsman does not operate to stay the immediate implementation of the foregoing
Ombudsman decisions, orders or resolutions. (emphases supplied.)

Here, Escandor was ordered dismissed from the service. Undoubtedly, such decision against him is
appealable via Rule 43 to the CA. Nonetheless, the same is immediately executory even pending appeal or
in his case even pending his motion for reconsideration before the OMB as that is the clear mandate of
Section 7, Rule III of the OMB Rules of Procedure, as amended, as well as the OMB's MC No. 01, Series of
2006. As such, Escandor's filing of a motion for reconsideration does not stay the immediate implementation
of the OMB's order of dismissal since "a decision of the [OMB] in administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course" under the afore-quoted Section 7.16

Further, in applying Section 7, there is no vested right that is violated as the respondent in the
administrative case is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the event he
wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of
the suspension or removal.17 To note, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Except for constitutional offices that provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office.18 Hence, no vested right of
Escandor would be violated as he would be considered under preventive suspension and entitled to the
salary and emoluments that he did not receive, by reason of his dismissal from the service, in the event that
his Motion for Reconsideration will be granted or that he wins in his eventual appeal.

Now, as regards the earlier pronouncements in Lapid, Laxina, Lopez and Laja  that penalties other than
public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month
salary cannot be immediately executed pending any appeal or motion for reconsideration, which relied upon
by both Escandor and the CA, this Court explained in The Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina 19 thus:

x x x the previous ruling in Lapid v. CA  (as quoted in Lopez v. CA and OMB  v. Laja)  wherein the Court,
relying on the old OMB Rules of Procedure, i.e., Administrative Order No. 7 dated April 10, 1990, had opined
that "the fact that the [Ombudsman Act] gives parties the right to appeal from [the OMB's] decisions should
generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal," cannot be successfully invoked by
Valencerina in this case for the reason that the said pronouncement had already been superseded by
the more recent ruling in Buencamino v.  CA (Buencamino). In Buencamino, the Court applied the
current OMB Rules of Procedure, i.e.,  Administrative Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003,
which were already in effect at the time the CA assailed Resolutions dated June 15, 2006 and
April 24, 2007 were issued, and, hence, governing x x x. (emphases supplied)

Having been superseded by this Court's recent rulings declaring that the OMB's decisions, resolutions and
orders are immediately executory pending motion for reconsideration or appeal, it is, therefore, an error on
the part of the CA to still rely on those old rulings and make them its bases in granting Escandor's writ of
certiorari and enjoining the OMB from implementing its Decision and Order dismissing Escandor from the
service. Notably, the assailed CA Decision and Resolution were rendered in 2008 while the ruling
in Buencamino  was made in 2007 and the amendments to the OMB Rules of Procedure stating that the
OMB's decisions, resolutions and orders are immediately executory pending appeal were already in effect as
early as 2003. Yet, the CA still enjoined the implementation of the OMB Decision and Order on the ground
that the same were not yet final and executory as Escandor has pending motion for reconsideration before
the OMB. This is a clear error on the part of the CA, which this Court now corrects.

As a final note.  The OMB is authorized to promulgate its own rules of procedure by none other than the
Constitution, which is fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, otherwise known as
"The Ombudsman Act of 1989" empowering the OMB to "promulgate its rules of procedure for the effective
exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and duties" and to accordingly amend or modify its n1les
as the interest of justice may require. With that, the CA cannot just stay the execution of decisions rendered
by the OMB when its rules categorically and specifically warrant their enforcement, else the OMB's rule-
making authority be unduly encroached and the constitutional and statutory provisions providing the same
be disregarded.20

WHEREFORE, premises considered, these consolidated petitions are hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated

March 25, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 28, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 02886 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J               September 23, 2014

[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain
allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie
violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The
investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of administrative
supervision over members of the Judiciary. 1

Factual Antecedents

In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds
channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork barrel scam," as the money was
sourced from the Priority Development Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of
Representatives and Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country.
In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and
other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged
mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities
identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and
events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein
respondent.

Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years with the Napoleses,
filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who accused him of double-dealing. When Luy
went public with his story about Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of
arrest was issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for them
not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving and distributing the money.

Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement  before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
2

on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:

32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and other
special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our office or join our events
and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator Bong
Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa, Congressman Pichay and
Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine
Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene
Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.

34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case
could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko
para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa
Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim Napoles
called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that we should stay
together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo
kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."

xxxx
 38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI. He
said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala
naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-
utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang pera." (Emphasis supplied.)
3

The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by Aries Rufo entitled
"Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy
Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together
with Mrs. Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly denied
knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably taken in one of the parties
frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly
admitted that given the ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context;
nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he was the
one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she
was acquitted by a Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then
Acting Presiding Justice.4

On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay "  wherein she gave
5

details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have visited their office or
attended their events, thus:

63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may petsang 29 Agosto
2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya
naman sa tuwing may party o special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests
kayo na kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa
gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila
sa iyong pagkaka-alala?

S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko po ang mga taong
nabanggit ko:

xxxx

w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa 2501
Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET NAPOLES sa
conference room.

xxxx 6

In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26, 2013, Sula was asked
to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.

Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.

Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO
galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS.
SULA. Hindi ko po alam.

THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –

MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –

THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

x x x  (Emphasis supplied.)
7

In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his
integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan'
s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted
Mrs. Napoles.

Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of Senator Estrada in
February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he
could vaguely remember the circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest
from posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party. On the nature of his association with
Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:

(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any party or social event
hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she had a case with our court, or while she
already had a pending case with our court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of
Mr. Rufo in his article, "partied" with the Napoleses. (Emphasis supplied.)

As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to have been advising Mrs.
Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother,
Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan. He stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan,
acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the decision. Respondent thus
submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such that even without being required to
submit an explanation, he voluntarily did so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the
Sandiganbayan as an institution from unfair and malicious innuendos."

On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court, citing the testimonies of
Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs.
Janet Lim-Napoles, Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other
perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the intervention of Justice Gregory S. Ong of the
Sandiganbayan", to wit:

SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi napakaraming
koneksiyon, 'di ba?
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.

MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan

SEN. ANGARA. Okay.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya "Malapit
na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa
Sandiganbayan?

xxxx

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA. Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

Xxxx8

Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio
under this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members
of the legal profession (referring to notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their
specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs. Napoles to facilitate the incorporation of
non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved in the scam). 9

Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required respondent to submit his
comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On
November 21, 2013, the Court received respondent's Comment.  Respondent categorically denied
10

any irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made to Mrs. Napoles as
testified by Sula.

On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal knowledge whether
respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she
supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter
is based purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually made the statement, respondent
believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage of the pork barrel scam exploding at
the time. With the consciousness of a looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the
Ombudsman and later before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure
Sula and others involved in their business operation that she would not leave or abandon them and
that she would do all that she can to help them just so they would not turn their backs on her and
become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding
respondent as her "connection", she only had to do so in order to convince Sula and her co-
employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time visiting Mrs. Napoles at
her office and having a meeting with her at the conference room, respondent said that at the birthday
party of Senator Estrada where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him
in a casual conversation during which the miraculous healing power of the robe or clothing of the
Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close
friend of the Quiapo Church's parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black
Nazarene icon. Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was
undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to drape
the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body and also receive a fragrant
ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe
any ailing part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of
courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent stressed that that was the
single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit when she said she saw
respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.

Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to have personally seen
Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her, considering that she no longer had any pending case
with his court, and to his knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and
even until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus prays that this Court duly note his
Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with the Court's Resolution dated October
17, 2013.

This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible transgressions of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on
January 21, 2014 stating that:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative matter RE-DOCKETED
as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Hearing held on September 26, 2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan),
and ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for
investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty. Joffre Gil C. Zapata,
Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, in compliance with the resolution of the
Court En Banc dated December 3, 2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos.
26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is no more need to transmit to this Court
the post-sentence investigation reports and other reports on the supervisory history of the accused-
probationers in Criminal Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted her report with the
following findings and conclusions:

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

1. THE KEVLAR CASE

Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 - Criminal Case No. 26768
for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of
the AntiGraft Law. Charged were several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian
employees including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother Magdalena Francisco (now
deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three
employees.

These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the same - the
questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine Corps in the amount of
₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies owned by Napoles.

The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy, released the payment
although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies of
Napoles; and that the helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.

Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two Informations in an Order issued
by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.

Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the lesser crime of
Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of
prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all
underwent probation.

Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both cases.

The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the transaction in question. Even
if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks were later deposited, this does not in itself
translate to her conspiracy in the crimes charged x x x."

xxxx

THE INVESTIGATION

xxxx

I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second cousins. After passing
the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002, he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim
Napoles) Corporation as Napoles' personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of
her personal funds and those of her office. He was also in charge of government transactions of the
corporation and kept records of its daily business activities.

In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar
case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying she has a "connect" in that court who would help
her.

When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee concerning the Kevlar
case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:

Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I quote, "Kailan ho
lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms.
Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara
referred to both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi
napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso
na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do you remember that question being asked from
you?
 xxxx

A Yes po.

Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon Committee that Ms.
Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was this connect you were talking about, if
you remember?

Witness Luy

A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan?

A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So kinuwento talaga
sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari.
Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala
raw sa kanya po ay si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.

Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated, Napoles
and respondent were already communicating with each other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she
was sure the decision would be in her favor:

Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was promulgated?

A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.

Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?

A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam (Ms. Napoles) kasi
kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.

Q That was after the decision was promulgated?

A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila ni
Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles. Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam
niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles.

Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told Senator Angara that
Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect" in the Sandiganbayan:

"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon (Kevlar case). Sige
huwag kang matakot Benhur."

Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan."

On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of the
Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P 100 million pesos. He was
surprised why she would spend such amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case
was only ₱3.8 million. She explained that she gave various amounts to different people during the
pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the decision in the Kevlar case was
released, she also gave money to respondent but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew
she would be acquitted.

Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago, "Alam ko inayos ni
Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is
Justice Ong. Can you explain before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What
do you mean by that "inayos"?

A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng nagastos ni Ms. Janet
Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si
Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala
yung Kevlar. So, mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman po
si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...

xxx

Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?

A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ... kasi si madam
hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako, nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong.
Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung
magkano yung amount.

xxx

Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?

A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).

Q To you?

A Yes, madam.

Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?

A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si Ms. Napoles bago
lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa Kevlar case.

xxx

Justice Gutierrez

Continue counsel.

Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang nagastos niya. Tapos ang
sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa halagang ₱3.8 lang na PO (purchase order)
sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100 million na ang nagastos mo?"

Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How was it spent?

A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi parang staggered. May
₱5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam,
eh.

Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?

A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya kay Justice Ong,
but she never mentioned the amount.

Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went twice to Napoles'
office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles
introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other employees.

Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles has so much money
being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent
would like to avail of such interest for his BDO check of ₱25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles
informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondent's ₱25.5 million in her personal account with
Metro bank. Then she would issue to respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to
₱282,000.00 as monthly interest, or a total of ₱3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon
Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the
corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:

Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there was any?

Witness Luy

A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of Ms. Napoles), so
kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po
sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles, may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa
AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po.
So, ang nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong magkaroon din ng
interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say,
Justice Ong would like to deposit money?

A Opo.

Q So he could get 13% interest?

A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa kanyang opisina.
Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles,
yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni
Justice Gregory Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...

Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?

A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay ₱25.5 million ang amount noong BDO check na
inissue ...

Q That belongs to Justice Ong?

A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13% interest ang ino-offer
ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na lang muna natin yung check niya sa
personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para
maavail ni Justice Ong yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in madam, ₱25.5 million times 13%
interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas ₱282,000.00 or ₱283,000.00 or ₱281,000.00 po madam
kasi naground off kami sa ₱282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11)
checks ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako
pa nga po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So,
pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya,
pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang ₱25.5
million na amount sa kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke na ₱282,000.00
na eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong
buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.

Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was deposited at the bank but the
interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the
advanced interest she paid to Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you
understand me?

A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung ₱25.5 million ipinasok sa personal account ni Ms.
Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in conversation. She ordered
Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his (respondent's) favorite.

On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the NBI, he did not mention
respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that
Napoles issued ₱282,000.00 (the amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention
the name of the payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew that the
checks were issued to respondent.

II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN Corporation. Her duties
included the formation of corporations by making use of the forms, applying for business licenses,
transfer of properties, purchase of cars, and others.

Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of Napoles twice sometime
in 2012.

Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee during the hearing on
September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:

The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)

Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang lumabas yung TRO
galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxx

Ms. Sula

Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.

The Chairman

Gregory Ong?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Sa Sandiganbayan?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the hearing.

Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be issued by the
Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion PDAF scam against her is filed with
that court; and that Napoles told Sula and the other employees not to worry because she has
contact with the Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:

Q Not the illegal detention case?

Witness Sula

A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Okay, again?

A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so hihintayin niya na

maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang
pagkakaintindi namin na sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Yung PDAF?

A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?

A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol sa PlO billion scam.
So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat
ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan?
Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon
sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Is that in your affidavit?

A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan.
Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.

Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?

A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other employees, she would say that
Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case. Sula's testimony is as follows:

Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong
ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she will fix (aayusin) the
"PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest that her acquaintance in that court is
respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."

xxxx

III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave him the photograph
[of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he
has to protect his source.

When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:

Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the members of the
division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity why he was in that picture. Second,
because in journalism, we also get to practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a
Justice or a lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a party or be in an event where
respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should not be in a situation that
would compromise the integrity of his office.

Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his side about
the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office and showed it to him. Respondent was
shocked. He explained that it must have been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend
Senator Jinggoy Estrada; that he did not know that the woman in the picture is Napoles because she
did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that such picture must have been taken in
one of those instances when a guest would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.

xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.

1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the

Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar
case;

2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent
claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a
collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente)
and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could not be
pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;

3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior
to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that
Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable
for him to have received money from Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and
sister-in-law were convicted;

4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the
decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do
so, thus:

At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles approached him
and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual conversation and thanked him for her acquittal
in the Kevlar case. Respondent replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the
court found enough evidence against her, she would have been convicted. She talked about her
charity works like supporting Chinese priests, building churches and chapels in China, and
sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He was not interested though in what she was saying until she
mentioned the name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.

Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy Black Nazarene since
he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez has with him the robe of the Holy Black
Nazarene which has a healing power if one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access
to the robe so he can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself and to
the immediate members of his family. Napoles made arrangement with Msgr. Ramirez until
respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for about one or two minutes in Quiapo
Church. He also received a fragrant ball of cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of
his body. That was a great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and
thanked her. That was his first visit.

Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but he kept on declining.
Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just
engaged in a small talk for about 30 minutes and had coffee.

5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced interest consisting of
eleven (11) checks in the amount of ₱282,000.00 each and that he issued to her his BDO check of
₱25.5 million which she deposited in her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he
did not intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have any money deposited there. Inasmuch
as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that Napoles could not have given him those eleven
(11) checks representing advanced interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that
in AFPSLAI, an investor can only make an initial deposit of ₱30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00
per year. The limit or ceiling is ₱3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula testified
that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a case involving the pork
barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both
whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan.

With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating four things: 1.
That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;

2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar case.
Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual basis." As to the last
insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case,
respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial body and that he never interceded on
her behalf.

EVALUATION

xxxx

It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur initially testified that
Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the Sandiganbayan,
referring to respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.

Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The witnesses and
everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected to difficult questions propounded by
the Senators, supposedly intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And
they can easily detect whether a person under investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering
this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable that the two whistle blowers would
testify false! y against respondent.

Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid,
straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear, unequivocal,
and carried with it the ring of truth.

In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their testimonies
before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did not waver or falter.
The undersigned found the two whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with
bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.

The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula were lying.

. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the Kevlar case
considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted.

Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-preservation. Hence, she
would avail of every possible means to be exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the two
members of his Division are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.
 xxxx

With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of Benhur and Sula, there is
no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case,
money could be the consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of
expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for the Sandiganbayan during the
pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years; and that Napoles told him she gave
respondent an undetermined sum of money.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay, inadmissible in
evidence:

Justice Ong

Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and according to Luy and
Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always their statements were ... they do not have
personal knowledge, it was only told to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so
that the truth will come out? If. ..

xxxx

Justice Gutierrez

That is your prerogative.

Justice Ong

I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of Napoles. Just to clear my
name whether I should be hung or I should not be hung.

xxxx

Atty. Geronilla

I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)

Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.

However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's suggestion. They
did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed
to consider that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez and
Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding their role which enabled him to wear the robe of
the Holy Black Nazarene.

x x xx
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the
fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

xxxx

That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed to respondent led
the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that
Benhur could devise or concoct his story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events,
concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent ₱3, 102,000.00 as advanced interest.

According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for making it possible for
him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true
that during that visit, respondent could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles
pay respondent an advanced interest of ₱3,102,000.0 with her own money if it were not a
consideration for a favor?

Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to his judicial function.
It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is unquestionably disgraceful and renders him
morally unfit as a member of the Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him.
Furthermore, respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that he received money from
Napoles.

Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code providing in part that
judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach and must reaffirm the people's faith in the
integrity of the Judiciary.

Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.

xxxx

...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles twice in her office
considering that the visits took place long after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.

Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct in violation of
Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities .

. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in making it possible for
him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead of visiting her, respondent could have
extended his gratitude by simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may
think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He was seen by the whistle
blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at
the Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.

Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly perceived as
the visible personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only while in the performance
of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes
a personal conduct and imposes a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one
has to pay for holding an exalted position.
 xxxx

On the photograph showing respondent

with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.

xxxx

This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. This exacting standard of
decorum is demanded from judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.

In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a ground for reproach
by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1) on Propriety of the same Code which
provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she was not present
before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar case for she must have waived her
appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction
over her if she did not appear personally for arraignment.

Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent has been charged
administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices
Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme
Court found respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606 and The Revised Internal Rules of
the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice,
Davao City. Instead of siting as a collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division
adopted a different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the
Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

xxxx

...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of Napoles. The
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the Chairman, held that Napoles did not
conspire with the suppliers in the questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of
the "dealer-payees" in the transaction in question and that there was no proof of an overt act on her
part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion? The Decision itself indicates clearly
that ( 1) Napoles was following up the processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge of
the delivery of the helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to ₱3,864,310.00 as payment for the
helmets were deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank Account No. 512-000-
2200, in the name of Napoles.

Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed respondent has a hand in the
acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle blowers were telling the truth.

xxxx

RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration of the Honorable
Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty,
and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and
be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits,
excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

xxxx

The Court's Ruling

This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice which
are well-supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice formulated the charges
against the respondent, as follows:

1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it was
pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;

2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case resulting
in her acquittal;

3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the

promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her
acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll)
checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total of ₱3,102,000.00, as advanced interest
for his ₱25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account; and

5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada and
Napoles. 11

Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the
pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles
after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26,
2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he
vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while ·"gross"
has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is
not to be excused."  We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with
12

Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting
in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of
corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, is required. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant. 13
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent
("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially
Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly
updated them of developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect"
or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and
some employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be
acquitted even prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she
was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy
categorically testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the
amount. There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger
detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information
about her association with respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010
and when they saw respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in
2012.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no personal
knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them by Napoles.
Specifically, he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but
"contact persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have been other individuals,
not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really
disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their
conversations Napoles even supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is
committed when a public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of
official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received.  Ajudge who extorts
14

money from a party-litigant who has a case before the court commits a serious misconduct and this
Court has condemned such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been
committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering justice, it
quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.15

An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a
panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the
respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than
substantial.  Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and
16

corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent
actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had
confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.

Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find
credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt
inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process.
By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the
suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which
was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the
public disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and
Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy,
made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the present
administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of the public revelations of what
they know of that government corruption controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the
Judiciary.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close
relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with government officials,
dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez,
the "challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings where they first testified, made it highly
improbable that these whistle blowers would testify against the respondent. During the investigation
of this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid,
straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these are consistent with their
previous testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or faltered even during cross-
examination.

It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great weight by
the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the witnesses as they
testified.  The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of
17

witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to administrative cases.  In
18

particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and
Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his
association with Napoles.

Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever Napoles talked about
her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan
was concerned, it was understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may have
initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting
with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding the Kevlar case not
just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from
Sula's testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the
Kevlar case:

Atty. Benipayo

Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles regarding her
involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address the problem with the Kevlar case
pending before the Sandiganbayan?

Witness Sula

A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na binabayaran niya para
tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na
mcron na po siyang nakilala sa Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos,
sabi niya, siya po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din
pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga empleyado niya, bale apat,
dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung
mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale
makli-clear sa kaso.

Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one brother will answer for the
case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be acquitted, is that right?

A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung mga officemates ko.
Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron silang probation period.

xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya na si Justice Ong
ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.

x x x x  (Emphasis supplied.)
19

As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations while her mother, brother
and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge of falsification of public documents. Apparently,
after her acquittal, Napoles helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier
resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits of the Kevlar case as the investigation will
focus on respondent's administrative liability.

Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two occasions was grossly
improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which
took effect on June 1, 2004.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and that fraternizing with
litigants tarnishes this appearance.  Public confidence in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
20

improper conduct of judges. A judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being
the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. 21

In Caneda v. Alaan,  we held that:

22

Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid
not just impropriety in their conduct but even the mere appearance of impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for reproach.
[Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have kept himself free from any
appearance of impropriety and endeavored to distance himself from any act liable to create an
impression of indecorum.

xxxx

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay
for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of
judicial duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a
manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis supplied.)

On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid association or socializing
with persons who have pending cases before their court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v.
Mania, Jr.  where this Court did not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his
23

lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:

Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989 when they were both
RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo
hitched rides with respondent to Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.

In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers open to lawyers or
parties with official court business, whose requests and complaints regarding their cases he listens
to in full view of his staff, who are witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting such
dialogues. He also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on several occasions, but only to
make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro Manila. He, however, denies that he
and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and drinking together in public places.

We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on this point was
insufficient, viz.:

"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public functions where Atty.
Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been in his house twice or thrice and used his
telephone; and that he receives lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers,
the door to which is always open so that [the] staff could see that no under the table transactions are
taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty. Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former
colleague and friend whenever they meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are
not in any manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics provides:

'30. Social relations

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will
permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge should, however, in pending
or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably
tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element
in determining his judicial course.'"

The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case because Napoles was
not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth
Division chaired by respondent and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent
perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in pending or prospective litigation before them,
to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus,
he emphasized in his Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was
still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted Sula's testimony
expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with respondent going to Napoles' office
because at that time, the Kevlar case had already been terminated.

We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and
prospective litigations.

Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of
partiality and impropriety.  Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and
24

the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section
2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana 25

... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before
them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of
course, that judges should live in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may
be desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments permitting, to relate to
members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in such fields of interest, in general, as are in
keeping with the noble aims and objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective
litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may
tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their
objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and
behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the
judges' competence, integrity and independence.

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were
committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of
a case will not deter public criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or
resolution. As what transpired in this case, respondent's association with Napoles has unfortunately
dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which initially involved only legislative and
executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice
of the Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot, by any stretch
of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's transgression as a simple misconduct.

During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics and its serious
repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice
Gutierrez

What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it not be possible for you
to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest there to help you or assist you, no longer
through Ms. Napoles?

Justice Ong

You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got near the image of
the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make the proper request.
Why did you not do that?

Justice Ong

I don't know, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that you are a devotee
of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of the priest there and had that request for
you to wear that robe of the Black Nazarene?

Justice Ong

Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during that conversation.
Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I known that there is such a robe, maybe I
will do that.

Justice Gutierrez

Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you should have been very,
very careful about your actuations. You should not have been seen in public, you know, with a
woman like her who was an accused before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You
could have relayed to her your true feelings that you are so grateful because of her assistance. Were
it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy Robe of the Black Nazarene. You could have simply
called her instead of going to her office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de
San Antonio in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the public
with her considering that she was a former accused in that case.

Justice Ong

I will heed to that advice, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries Rufo that. "That is a
lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you know, with a former respondent or accused in
a case before me." You admitted that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you
learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before you took your oath as a member of the
Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or was that the first time? That is why you associated
yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was accused before of plunder?

Justice Ong

Your honor, talking about ....

Justice Gutierrez

Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?

Justice Ong

A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.  (Emphasis supplied.)
26

In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for visiting
Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest were not
presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand,
Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office
appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent denied having issued
a BDO check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any
money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as
previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were shredded
upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.

Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of ₱282,000.00 supposed advance interest
for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as consideration for the
favorable ruling in the Kevlar case.  Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles
1âwphi1

spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to
believe that respondent went to Napoles office the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act
of again visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first
visit, tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding
advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles
extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar
case? Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the
media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.

Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty
and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before
this Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less
than candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having attended parties or
social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her
office. Far from being a plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his
social calls to Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as
the "contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he
visited Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was talking about in her supplemental affidavit
x x x." ).
27

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the
administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of
Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity;

lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition
to defraud, deceive or betray." Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of
28

dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and
with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a
malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary. 29

Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty of a serious charge
may be penalized as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the
forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
 3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Considering that
respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and dishonesty
are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the special graft
court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong
GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the
service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or -controlled corporations.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.