Study Guide # 1 (Civil Code)

Article 1754

 Classes of baggage of passengers:

- Not in the custody of passengers (Art. 1733 -1753)
- In the custody of the passengers or its employees (apply
the rules in Article 1998, 2000, 2001,2002, 2003)
 Article 1998 as applied to common carriers – common carriers
responsible as depositaries.
Is notice required?
 Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Sesante (G.R. No. 172682, July 27,
2016) – NO.
The rule that the common carrier is always responsible for the passenger's
baggage during the voyage needs to be emphasized. Article 1754 of the Civil
Code does not exempt the common carrier from liability in case of loss,
but only highlights the degree of care required of it depending on who
has the custody of the belongings. Hence, the law requires the common
carrier to observe the same diligence as the hotel keepers in case the baggage
remains with the passenger; otherwise, extraordinary diligence must be
exercised. Furthermore, the liability of the common carrier attaches even
if the loss or damage to the belongings resulted from the acts of the
common carrier's employees, the only exception being where such loss
or damages is due to force majeure.

In YHT Realty Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we declared the actual

delivery of the goods to the innkeepers or their employees as unnecessary
before liability could attach to the hotelkeepers in the event of loss of personal
belongings of their guests considering that the personal effects were inside the
hotel or inn because the hotelkeeper shall remain accountable. Accordingly,
actual notification was not necessary to render the petitioner as the
common carrier liable for the lost personal belongings of Sesante. By
allowing him to board the vessel with his belongings without any
protest, the petitioner became sufficiently notified of such belongings.
So long as the belongings were brought inside the premises of the vessel, the
petitioner was thereby effectively notified and consequently duty-bound to
observe the required diligence in ensuring the safety of the belongings during
the voyage. Applying Article 2000 of the Civil Code, the petitioner
assumed the liability for loss of the belongings caused by the negligence
of its officers or crew.

RULES ON NECESSARY DEPOSIT

 Article 2000 as applied to common carriers

 o X x x shall include loss of, or injuries to the personal
property of the guests caused by the servants or employees
pf the keepers of hotels or inns as well as by strangers; but
not that which may proceed from, any force majeure. The
fat that travelers are constrained to rely on the vigilance of
the keeper of the hotel or inn shall be considered in
determining degree of care required of him.
 Article 2001 as applied to common carriers
o The act of thief or robber, who has entered the hotel is not
deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of arms
or through an irrisistable force.
 Article 2002 as applied to common carriers
o The hotel-keeper is not liable for compensation if the loss is
due to the acts of the guests, his family, servants or visitors,
or if the loss arises from the character of things brough into
the hotel.
 Article 2003 as applied to common carriers
o The hotel keeper cannot free himself from responsibility by
posting notices to the effect that he is not liable for the
articles brought by the guest. Any stipulation between the
hotel-keeper and the guest whereby the responsibility of
the former as set forth in Artcles 1998 to 2001 is
suppressed or diminished shall be void.

 Note that stipulations diminishing the liability or responsibility

stated in the foregoing provisions shall be void (Article 1745)

SAFETY OF PASSENGERS
(Article 1755 – 1763)

Article 1755 – memorize

A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as

human care and foresign can provide, using the utmost diligence of a
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
  Rosito Z. Bacarro v. Castañ o (G.R. No. L-34597, November 5,
1982)
Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to exercise mere ordinary
diligence a common carrier is exhorted to carry the passengers safely as
far as human care and foresight can provide "using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons." (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the course of
travel is injured, or does not reach his destination safely, the carrier and driver
are presumed to be at fault.

 Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 118126,

March 4, 1996)
Under Article 1733 of the Civil Code, the petitioner was bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in ensuring the safety of the private respondent. That
meant that the petitioner was, pursuant to Article 1755 of the said Code, bound
to carry the private respondent safely as far as human care and foresight could
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for
all the circumstances. 

The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel

involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of is duty prescribed in Article
1755 of the Civil Code.

 Who are considered passengers?

 Dangwa Transportation Co, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No.95582,
October 7, 1991)
 When the bus is not in motion there is no necessity for a person who wants to
ride the same to signal his intention to board. A public utility bus, once it
stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders. Hence, it
becomes the duty of the driver and the conductor, every time the bus
stops, to do no act that would have the effect of increasing the peril to a
passenger while he was attempting to board the same. The premature
acceleration of the bus in this case was a breach of such duty. 

It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common

carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their
conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers
an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries
suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up
or jerking of their conveyances while they are doing so. 

 La Mallorca v. CA (G.R. No. L-20761, July 27, 1966)

 It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and
passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights from the
carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of
destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time
or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is
a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances.

And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is

to be determined from all the circumstances. Thus, a person who, after
alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is considered
still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his
destination and is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's
premises, but before actually doing so is halted by the report that his
brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in good faith and
without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his
brother, he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus
continues to be a passenger entitled as such to the protection of the
railroad company and its agents.

 Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v. CA (G.R. No. 84458, November 6, 1989)

– passenger’s reasonable presence within the carrier’s premises.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the
passenger has been landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel
owner’s dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily
terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely
alighted from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and
what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be
determined from all the circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see
after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger
relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has
been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the
carrier’s premises to claim his baggage.

That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending

circumstances of the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its
business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a
consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such other
factors. x x x The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable
 cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We
believe there exists such a justifiable cause.

***In this case, Aboitiz failed to prove that the victim had already disembarked the
premises of the vessel one prior to the accident. Therefore, the victim was considered as a
passenger of the Aboitiz still. Hence, as common carrier, Aboitiz is still liable in lieu of
presumption of negligence.

- Note that passenger also was negligent. If you were counsel for the carrier, what
factual circumstances would you establish to prove that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence?

As counsel, circumstance of precautionary measures and exercise of extraordinary

diligence. Moreover, claim that the act of the victim was grossly negligent can also
be raised as valid defense.

(*The SC stated that “there was no showing that precautionary measures were
strictly and actually enforced to prevent entry into the forbidden area”)

 Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 106279, July 14, 1995)

x x x It is true that under Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, only deaths caused
by a crime as quasi delict are entitled to actual and compensatory damages without the need
of proof of the said damages.x x x one can conclude that damages arising from culpa
contractual are not compensable without proof of special damages sustained by the heirs of
the victim.

However, the Civil Code, in Article 1764 thereof, expressly makes Article 2206 applicable "to
the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier."
Accordingly, a common carrier is liable for actual or compensatory damages under Article
2206 in relation to Article 1764 of the Civil Code for deaths of its passengers caused by the
breach of the contract of transportation.

A common carrier is obliged to transport its passengers to their destinations with the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person (Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Tiongson, 16 SCRA 940
[1966]). The trial court found that petitioner failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence
required of a common carrier, which resulted in the sinking of the M/V Dona Marilyn.

 When is there a contract of carriage?

***By its nature, contracts are deemed perfected consent of the parties.
Hence, there already exist contract of carriage upon meeting of the minds.

 Carlos Singson v. CA (G.R. No. 119995, November 18, 1997)

A contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Imbued with public interest, common carriers are
required by law to carry passengers safely as far a human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with due regard for all the
 circumstances. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. And this because its business is mainly with the
traveling public. In invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Failure of the carrier to observe this high degree of care and extraordinary diligence
renders it liable for any damage that may be sustained by its passengers.

*** Respondents bought roundtrip tickets to Manila to Sanfo with 6

coupons. Cathay mistakenly taken their coupon hence, was not able to
book flight back to Manila.
CATHAY undoubtedly committed a breach of contract when it refused to confirm petitioner's
flight reservation back to the Philippines on account of his missing flight coupon. Its
contention that there was no contract of carriage that was breached because petitioner's
ticket was open-dated is untenable.

To begin with, the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in
itself a complete written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It has
all the elements of a complete written contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting
parties manifested by the fact that the passenger agreed to be transported by the
carrier to and from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hongkong back to the
Philippines, and the carrier's acceptance to bring him to his destination and then back
home; (b) cause or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated
in his ticket; and, (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the
place of departure to the place of destination and back, which are also stated in his
ticket.

 Singapore Airlines Limited v. Andion Fernandez (G.R. No. 142305,

December 10, 2003)

When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular

flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger then
has every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on
that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a
breach of contract of carriage.

 Japan Airlines v. Jesus Simangan (G.R. No. 170141, April 22, 2008) – “in
an action for breach of contract, all that is required of plaintiff
(passenger) is to prove the existence of such contract and its non-
performance by the carrier through the latter’s failure to carry the
passenger safely to his destination.”

 What is the extent of the obligation to observe extraordinary diligence

over passengers?
 Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger
has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier’s
conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises
(Aboitiz Shipping v. CA)
Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. CA (G.R. No. 60501, March 5, 1993) – duty of
carriers to provide assistance to passengers.

***Petitioner breached its contract of carriage with private respondent

when it failed to deliver his luggage at the designated place and time, it
being the obligation of a common carrier to carry its passengers and their
luggage safely to their destination, which includes the duty not to delay
their transportation, and the evidence shows that petitioner acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.

 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 82619, September 15, 1993)

Cebu – Ozamis – Cotabato. But due to inclement weather, the PAL directly
went to Cotabato. Private respondent was not given a seat back to Cebu
when it opted to avail such option by PAL. Worst, he was not
accommodated after being stranded on the airport. He tried to stop the
plane back to Cebu because his camera from japan and other belongings
was still in the plane. Yet it was left unheeded.

 Japan Airlines v. CA (G.R. No. 118664, August 7, 1998) – “airline

passengers must take risks incident to the mode of travel. xxx. After all,
common carriers are not the insurers of all risks.”

Private respondents boarded a JAL flight in San Francisco, California

bound for Manila. It included an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan at
JAL’s expense. Due to the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, private respondents’ trip
to Manila was cancelled.

The predicament of the private respondents was not due to the fault or
negligence of JAL. JAL had the duty to arrange the respondents’ flight back
to Manila. However, it failed to look after the comfort and convenience of
its passengers when it made the passengers arrange their flight back to
Manila on their own and after waiting in the airport for a whole day.

- Distinguish the two cases.

In PAL vs CA, case there was indeed a fortuitous event resulting in the
diversion of the PAL flight. However, the unforeseen diversion was
worsened when "private respondents (passenger) was left at the airport
and could not even hitch a ride in a Ford Fiera loaded with PAL
personnel," 10 not to mention the apparent apathy of the PAL station
manager as to the predicament of the stranded passengers. In light of
these circumstances, we held that if the fortuitous event was accompanied
by neglect and malfeasance by the carrier's employees, an action for
damages against the carrier is permissible. Unfortunately, for private
respondents, none of these conditions are present in the instant petition.

***In the 2 cases, PAL was found negligent in a way that it exhibited lack of
care towards its passenger. It must be noted that the responsibility of
common carriers does not end at the exercise of extraordinary diligence ,
but also extends to the comfort and convenience of its passengers.

Article 1757 – general rule

The responsibility of the common arrier for the safety of passengers as
required in Articles 1733 and 1755 cannot be dispensed with or
lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on
tickets, or otherwise.

Article 1758 – exception to Article 1757.

When a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the
common carrier’s liability for negligence is valid but not for willful acts
of gross negligence.

The reduction of fare does not justify any limitation of the common
carrier’s liability.

- Note that the provision only provides for stipulation to “limit”

liability NOT to “eliminate” liability”
- 2nd paragraph – stipulation limiting carrier’s liability applies
only in gratuitous carriage. Reduction of fare would not justify
any limitation of carrier’s liability.
- QUESTION: In a contract of carriage of passengers signed by the
parties, it was stipulated that in consideration of a reduced fare,
the common carrier shall transport the passengers but its
 liability for negligence shall be limited. Is the stipulation valid?
– NO. 2nd paragraph of Article 1758.

- Distinguish Article 1758 from Article Article 1744. – Art. 1757

speaks of limitation on liability over passengers whilst Art. 1744
speaks of limitation on liability over goods.

Article 1759
Common carriers are liable for the death or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees
although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of common carrier.

This liability of common carriers does not cease upon proof that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of their employees.

 Common carrier’s liability for acts of its employees

 Antonia Maranan v. Perez (No. L-22272, June 26, 1967)
- What is the basis of the carrier’s liability under Article 1759?
The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers are new and were taken from
Anglo-American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on passengers
committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the
principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.

Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the
employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within
the course of employment only.

Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough that
the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the
carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's
orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures
the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.

As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the rule
based on the second view.

- According to the case, what are the three very cogent reasons
underlying this rule?
 (1)the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its
passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise
of the high degree of care prescribed by the law, inter alia from
violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers, but
above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the
passenger's safety;

(2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to
passengers, is the result of the formers confiding in the servant's
hands the performance of his contract to safely transport the
passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger
with the utmost care prescribed by law; and

(3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear
the risk of wrongful acts or negligence of the carrier's employees
against passengers, since it, and not the passengers, has power to
select and remove them.

Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and

similar employees with due regard not only to their technical
competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their
total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and
social attitude.

 Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. Sesante (G.R. No. 172682, July 27, 2016)
 That the carrier exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employees – not a valid defense to
a common carrier. Such defense is available in tort or quasi-delict
(Article 2176).

 Understand and distinguish applicability of the foregoing defense –
Tort v. breach of contract of carriage. Under Torts, there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties. Moreover, under torts,
it applies the first view on liability towards acts of its emplooyees or
respondiat superior where the employers may raise extraordinary
diligence on selection of its emplooyes, whereas these principle does not
apply to breach of contract of carriage.
 TORT – Philippine National Railways v. CA (G.R. No. 157658, October
15, 2007)

As the action is predicated on negligence, the relevant provision is

Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, which states that:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault

or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there was no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.

 Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 116110, May 15, 1996)

George was a paying passenger of Baliwag. He met an accident, which
causes him multiple injuries. His parents filed a case against Baliwag. On
the other hand, Baliwag alleges that George signed a release of Claims
after receiving 8k.

We hold that since the suit is one for breach of contract of carriage, the
Release of Claims executed by him, as the injured party, discharging
Fortune Insurance and Baliwag from any and all liability is valid.

Significantly, the contract of carriage was actually between George, as

the paying passenger, and Baliwag, as the common carrier. Since a
contract may be violated only by the parties thereto, as against each
other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties in interest, either
as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to said contract. In the
absence of any contract of carriage between Baliwag and George's
parents, the latter are not real parties-in-interest in an action for breach
of that contract.

Oligario Brito Sy v. Malate Taxi Cab & Garage, Inc. (G.R. No. L-8937,
November 29, 1957)
Taxi collided with an army wagon. Unlike in torts, no need to prove
negligence for breach of contract of carriage because the presumption
of negligence already arises the moment the common carrier fails to to
its obligation.
“Under the provisions of law, the court need not make an express finding
of fault or negligence on the part of the defendant appellant in order to
hold it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the plaintiff, for
the action initiated therefor is based on a contract of carriage and not
on tort. When plaintiff rode on defendant-appellant's taxicab, the latter
assumed the express obligation to transport him to his destination safely,
and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger is
right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier”

 Travel & Tours Advisers, Incorporated v. Cruz (G.R. No. 199282, March
14, 2016) – Note the award of damages and splitting of liability between
common carrier and third party (50/50).

- The bus bumped the rear portion of the jeepney causing it to ram into
an acacia tree which resulted in the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. and the
serious physical injuries of Virginia Muñ oz.
- In the present case, it has been established that the proximate cause of
the death of Alberto Cruz, Jr. is the negligence of petitioner's bus driver,
with the contributory negligence of respondent Edgar Hernandez, the
driver and owner of the jeepney, hence, the heirs of Alberto Cruz, Jr. shall
recover damages of only 50% of the award from petitioner and its driver.
Necessarily, 50% shall be bourne by respondent Edgar Hernandez. 

 Larry Estacion v. Bernardo (G.R. No. 144723, February 27, 2006) – Note
the award of damages
Respondent Noe’s act of standing on the rear carrier of the Fiera
exposing himself to bodily injury is in itself negligence on his part. We
find that the trial court and the CA erred when they failed to consider
that respondent Noe was also guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection.

Since there was contributory negligence on the part of respondent Noe,

petitioner’s liability should be mitigated in accordance with Article
2179 of the Civil Code
The underlying precept of the above article on contributory negligence
is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not
be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of
his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the
damages actually caused by his negligence.

Article 1763
A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or
strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through the exercise
of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or
stopped the act or omission.

GR: Common carrier is liable for willful acts of strangers or other

passengers.
Exception: When the employees exercised diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent or stop the acts or omission.

 Note the degree of diligence required.

 Jose Pilapil v CA (G.R. No. 52159, December 22, 1989)
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation company
makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal injuries
sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the degree of
diligence that the law requires.

Although the suggested precaution could have prevented the injury complained of, the
rule of ordinary care and prudence is not so exacting as to require one charged with its
exercise to take doubtful or unreasonable precautions to guard against unlawful acts of
strangers. The carrier is not charged with the duty of providing or maintaining vehicles as
to absolutely prevent any and all injuries to passengers.

 Herminio Mariano, Jr. v. Callejas (G.R. No. 166640, July 31,

2009)

While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common
carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a
presumption of negligence against them, it does not, however, make the
carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.

Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care,
vigilance and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common
carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. What
constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all
the circumstances.

Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or

negligence on the part of the common carrier when its passenger is
injured, merely relieves the latter, for the time being, from introducing
evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the
presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption,
however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had
exercised extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance
of its contractual obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger
was solely due to a fortuitous event.

 Caso Fortuito/ Force majeure (memorize elements)

 Franklin G. Gacal v. PAL (G.R. No. L-55300, March 5, 1990)
In order to constitute a caso fortuito  or  force majeure that would
exempt a person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is
necessary that the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of
the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor);
(b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and
(d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would

prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.

 Fortune Express, Inc. v. CA (G.R. No. 119756, March 18,

1999)
 Bachelor Express, Incorporated v. CA (G.R. No. 85691, July
31, 1990) – “it is not enough that the accident was
 caused by force majeure, the common carrier must still
prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries
resulting from such accident.”

COMMON PROVISIONS
(Article 1764 – 1766)
Article 1764

 Damages

Title XVIII, Civil Code

Art. 2206, Civil Code

1. Actual or compensatory damages

 Competent proof of the injury: Baliwag Transit v CA (G.R. No.
116110, May 15, 1996)
 Hospital and funeral expenses: Victory Liner v Heirs of
Malecdan (G.R. No. 154278, Dec. 27, 2002)
 Medical expenses: Sps. Ong v CA, G.R. No. 117103, Jan. 21,
1999
 Interest: Briñ as v People, G.R. No. L-30309, Nov. 25, 1983

2. Moral damages
 Art. 2219, Civil Code
 Art. 1764 in relation to Art. 2206(3), Civil Code
Death of passenger
 Art. 2220 Civil Code: Fraud, Bad faith even if death does not
result: Calalas v CA, G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
 Gross negligence amounting to bad faith: PAL v CA, G.R. No.
123238, Sept. 22, 2008
 Recoverable with exemplary damages: Cathay Pacific v CA,
G.R. No. 60501, March 5, 1993
 Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employee: PAL v CA,
 G.R. No. 120262, July 17, 1997
 Brother/sister of deceased passenger in breach of contract of
carriage not entitled to moral damages: Sulpicio Lines v
Curso, G.R. No. 157009, Mar. 17, 2010

3. Nominal damages
 Cathay Pacific v Reyes, G.R. No. 185891, June 26, 2013

4. Temperate damages
 Pleno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-56505, May 9, 1988 - in
lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity
because the income of the victim was not sufficiently
proven

5. Liquidated damages:

6. Exemplary or corrective damages

 Serious misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses of carrier’s employees: Sps Fernando v Northwest,
G.R. No. 212038; Northwest v Sps Fernando, G.R. No. 212403,
Feb. 8, 2017

 Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation: Art. 2208, Civil Code

- Not awarded in the absence of moral, exemplary damages

 Basis of the carrier’s liability:

- Culpa contractual (breach of contract): No need to prove

fault or negligence of carrier
- Culpa aquiliana (tort or quasi-delict):
 Liability for tort even if there is a pre-existing
contract: Air France v Carrascoso, G.R. No. L-
21438, Sept. 28, 1966
- Culpa criminal (criminal liability): Subsidiary, Direct
liability of the Carrier: Art. 100, 103 Revised Penal Code

 Extent of Liability, Amount of Damages Recoverable

 Indemnity for death: Heirs of Ochoa v VS.G & S Transport, G.R.
No. 170071, March 9, 2011
  Damages, Computation of indemnity, life expectancy and
earning capacity: Villa Rey Transit v CA, G.R. no. L-
25499, Feb. 18, 1970;
 Loss of earning capacity: Heirs of Ochoa v VS.G & S Transport,
G.R. No. 170071, March 9, 2011
 Loss of earning capacity even if unemployed: Baliwag Transit v
CA, G.R. No. 116110, May 15, 1996; computation
based on prevailing minimum wage: Pereñ a v Zarate,
G.R. No. 157917, Aug. 29, 2012
 Should not be palpably and scandalously excessive: Singson v
CA, G.R. No. 119995, Nov. 18, 1997
 Net earnings recoverable, not gross earnings: Dangwa
Transportation v CA, G.R. No. 95582, October 7, 1991
 Factors to be considered in award of damages to accident
victim: Alcantara v Surro, G.R. No. L-4555, July 23,
1953
 Commensurate to the loss or injury suffered: PAL v Lopez, G.R.
No. 156654, Nov. 20, 2008
 Waiver of claims valid: Baliwag Transit v CA, G.R. No. 80447,
Jan. 31, 1989

Article 1765. Functions now being exercised by the Land

Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board

Article 1766. As already discussed in class