JCMS 2010 Volume 48 Annual Review pp.

95–118

Institutions and Governance: A New Treaty,

a Newly Elected Parliament and a
New Commission jcms_2096 95..118

DESMOND DINAN
George Mason University

Introduction
Elections for the European Parliament (EP) and the nomination of a new
European Commission made 2009 a particularly important year with regard
to European Union institutions and governance. More significant than these
five-yearly events, however, was the long-delayed ratification and implemen-
tation of the Lisbon Treaty. In June 2009, EU leaders approved a Decision ‘on
the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon’, which they annexed
to the European Council conclusions. They also agreed that ‘at the time of the
conclusion of the next accession Treaty [. . .] the provisions of the annexed
Decision’ would be included ‘in a Protocol to be attached [. . .] to the Treaty
on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union’ (Council, 2009a). The purpose of the promised Protocol was to facili-
tate a second referendum in Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty and to help ensure
a successful outcome. The Irish government soon announced that the refer-
endum would take place on 2 October.
The prospect of a favourable result looked bright, thanks to the global
economic crisis, which hit Ireland particularly hard. Although ratifying the
Treaty would not make a material difference, it would send a positive signal
to international investors and affirm Ireland’s good fortune to be in the euro
area at a time of global financial turmoil. Armed with legally binding guar-
antees from the EU to allay the concerns of many who opposed the Treaty in
the first referendum, and the decision by the European Council to retain one

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USA
96 DESMOND DINAN

commissioner per Member State provided that the Lisbon Treaty entered into
force, the Irish government conducted a more vigorous campaign the second
time around in an effort to increase the turnout and change the minds of as
many naysayers as possible. As expected, the Treaty passed by an impressive
majority of 67 per cent, with a 59 per cent turnout.
Ireland was not the only country not to have ratified before the end of
2009. President Lech Kaczyński of Poland, who strongly opposed the Treaty,
reluctantly signed the instrument of ratification on 10 October. Czech presi-
dent Václav Klaus, an ardent Eurosceptic, refused to sign the instrument of
ratification until the last possible moment. Klaus raised an eleventh-hour
concern that the treaty could open the way for property claims by ethnic
Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia after World War II. EU leaders
appeased Klaus by giving the Czech Republic an opt-out from the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. Having milked the ratification procedure for all it was
worth, Klaus finally signed on 3 November, allowing the Treaty to come into
effect on 1 December 2009.
Germany’s parliament had voted in good time to ratify the Treaty, but the
president was unable to sign the instrument of ratification pending a ruling by
the Constitutional Court on the compatibility of the Treaty with Germany’s
Basic Law. The Court finally ruled in June 2009 that the Lisbon Treaty was
indeed compatible, subject to a change in Germany on the role of parliament
in EU decision-making. Although proponents of the Treaty breathed a sigh of
relief, a closer look at the lengthy court ruling revealed that it raised several
red flags about the direction of European integration (see Dougan, this
volume). In particular, the court emphasized the limits of EU competence and
the existence of a ‘structured democratic deficit’ which only national parlia-
ments, not the EP, could possibly close (Federal Constitutional Court, 2009).
If anything, the ruling should have reassured Eurosceptics as to the limits of
European integration.
This article begins with a comment on the lengthy treaty reform process,
the significance of the Lisbon Treaty and the steps taken in 2009 to prepare for
its implementation. The article then looks at the conduct and outcome of the
EP elections, followed by the nomination of the second Barroso Commission.
A final section examines the implications of the financial crisis and economic
recession for EU governance and institutions.

I. The Lisbon Treaty

The Lisbon Treaty, the latest and probably the last major revision of the
foundational treaties, is highly consequential for the EU. It was also politically

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costly, having taken eight years to complete, beginning with the Constitutional
Convention and ending with the protracted ratification procedure. The saga of
the Lisbon Treaty shows how fraught the process of treaty reform has become
and the touchiness of European integration for politicians and the public alike.
The background to the Treaty was the determination of EU leaders – in national
governments and EU institutions – to streamline the EU; revise its institutional
arrangements; strengthen its decision-making capacity; make it a more cred-
ible international actor; clarify and in some cases extend its scope; and make
the EU more accountable, appealing and comprehensible to its citizens. EU
leaders were reacting to the organization’s manifest inadequacies in the face of
growing public disillusionment with European integration; a membership that
had more than doubled in less than 15 years; rapid socio-economic change; and
a radically altered international environment.
Although a tall order, the rationale for a new round of reform seemed
reasonable, even sensible. Yet the process became extraordinarily prolonged
and painful, while the outcome – the Treaty itself – was dense and difficult to
read. Clearly, the saga and substance of the Lisbon Treaty and the Constitu-
tional Treaty before it reveal much about the nature of the EU more than 60
years after the first, tentative steps toward ‘ever closer union’. Treaty reform
– changing the rules of what the EU does and how the EU does it – had
become exceedingly difficult as governments, keenly aware of the potential
losses and gains and of the high domestic political stakes, paid extremely
close attention to the form and scope of European integration.
With the intensification of European integration, the EU’s impact on
policy and politics has become far more conspicuous in everyday life. Ref-
erendums on treaty reform give people an opportunity to express their con-
cerns about European integration and dissatisfaction with the EU by either
voting against the proposed change or not voting at all. Not that referendums
on treaty change always end in defeat (voters in Luxembourg and Spain
approved the Constitutional Treaty). Nevertheless fear of defeat has made
governments wary of putting painstakingly negotiated treaty changes before
the electorate, and fear of challenges before national supreme courts has
further curbed governments’ appetites for far-reaching treaty reform.
Given the difficulties inherent in the reform process, the Lisbon Treaty is
far from ideal. Nevertheless, as noted in the 2007 JCMS Annual Review, it
represents a definite improvement for the EU. The revised foundational treaties
– the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (formerly the Treaty Establishing the European Community)
– are long and complex, yet the EU that they describe is more coherent and
comprehensible than the pre-Lisbon EU. The treaty unequivocally states that
the EU is rooted in democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and
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98 DESMOND DINAN

fundamental freedoms; its organizing principles are conferred powers, subsid-

iarity, proportionality and co-operation between Member States; and its com-
petences vis-à-vis national competences – exclusive, shared or supporting – are
clearly spelled out. The pillar structure is gone, but different decision-making
procedures remain for foreign and security policy. The confusing distinction
between Union and Community is abolished, with the word ‘Union’ replacing
‘Community’ throughout the text. The EU finally acquires legal personality.
The Lisbon Treaty strikes a reasonable balance between institutional
efficiency and democratic legitimacy. The double majority system for quali-
fied majority voting, due to come into effect in 2014, is more equitable than
its predecessor, which was based on a relatively arbitrary allocation of votes
per Member State. The EP, the EU’s only directly elected body, has additional
budgetary authority and a greater legislative role, thanks to the widespread
applicability of what is now called the ordinary legislative procedure.
Keeping the Commission at one member per Member State – a late revision
brought about by Ireland’s initial rejection of the Treaty – is arguably good
for the EU. Perhaps it is better to have a Commission in which every country
is represented than a smaller Commission from which, at any given time,
some countries are bound to feel alienated. National parliaments acquire a
formal role in the EU legislative process as gatekeepers of the subsidiarity
principle, a function that will be interesting to observe in the years ahead.
The institutional innovations in the Treaty portend an improvement in the
effectiveness of EU policy, especially in the areas of external relations and
justice and home affairs. The treaty recasts the balance among the institutions,
with the European Council clearly in the ascendant. Apart from being given
responsibility for decision-making in specific, politically sensitive areas other
than law-making, the creation of the full-time Presidency is particularly
significant for the future of the European Council. Although the Treaty says
little about the powers or prerogatives of the new office, experience suggests
that it will evolve into an important and influential post. Overall, the Lisbon
Treaty reinforces the trend within the EU toward the emergence of a com-
manding European Council, a confident Council and Parliament sharing
legislative responsibility, and a politically constrained Commission.

Implementing the Treaty

EU institutions had begun preparatory work in 2008 on implementing
the Lisbon Treaty, but acted discretely pending the outcome of the second
Irish referendum. Preparations for the entry into force of the Treaty became a
priority of the Swedish Council Presidency in late 2009. At its regularly
scheduled meeting soon after the second referendum, the European Council

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took note of the preparatory work and endorsed the Presidency’s report
on guidelines for the External Action Service, a particularly important inno-
vation that was already causing friction among Member States as well as
between the Council, Commission and EP.
As noted by Tony Barber elsewhere in the Annual Review, national
leaders reached a political agreement on 19 November 2009 to name Herman
van Rompuy as the first full-time President of the European Council and
Catherine Ashton as the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy. Two weeks later, on 1 December, the day on which the
Treaty entered into force, the European Council formally elected van
Rompuy and appointed Ashton, and also appointed Pierre de Boissieu as
Secretary-General of the Council for the period from December 2009 until
June 2011. De Boissieu, formerly France’s Permanent Representative in
Brussels, had been Deputy Secretary-General to Javier Solana, who had held
the combined positions of Council Secretary-General and High Representa-
tive for the Common Foreign and Security Policy since 1999. With the
Secretary-Generalship now separated from the High Representative’s office,
de Boissieu, who under Solana had been the de facto Secretary-General,
could formally assume that position.
At the end of 8 December 2009 the Council of Ministers took a formal
decision, based on a political agreement among national leaders, that Uwe
Corsepius, head of the European Policy Division in the German Chancellery
and a close adviser to Chancellor Angela Merkel, would take over from de
Boissieu (Council, 2009b). This was a good example of a Franco–German
deal on top-level EU appointments, which the other leaders had little choice
but to accept.
In addition to electing van Rompuy and appointing Ashton, the European
Council took formal decisions on 1 December concerning its rules of proce-
dure and the exercise of the Presidency of the Council. At the same time, the
Council of Ministers took a raft of decisions relating to Council formations,
the rotating Presidency, and the conditions of employment of the European
Council President, the High Representative, and the Council Secretary-
General. The Lisbon Treaty established two Council configurations, General
Affairs (chaired by the rotating Presidency) and Foreign Affairs (chaired by
the High Representative), and allowed for additional formations (chaired by
the rotating Presidency) to be established along sectoral lines. In effect, EU
leaders retained the existing Council formations (see Table 1).
On 10–11 December 2009, the European Council met for the first
time following implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Van Rompuy was
present but not in the chair, national leaders having previously decided that
Sweden would chair the European Council until the end of its Presidency.
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Table 1: Council Configurations

1. General affairs*
2. Foreign affairs**
3. Economic and financial affairs (including budget)
4. Justice and home affairs (including civil protection)
5. Employment, social policy, health and consumer affairs
6. Competitiveness (internal market, industry and research) (including tourism)
7. Transport, telecommunications and energy
8. Agriculture and fisheries
9. Environment
10. Education, youth and culture (including audiovisual affairs)
Source: Decision of the Council (General Affairs) of 1 December 2009 establishing the list of Council
configurations, Official Journal, L 315/46, 1 December 2009.
Notes: * Established by Article 16(6), second subparagraph, of the Treaty on European Union.
** Established by Article 16(6), third subparagraph, of the Treaty on European Union.

Nevertheless van Rompuy spoke at dinner about his plans for the European
Council and the entire Council apparatus, suggesting that he would attempt to
streamline procedures and greatly improve efficiency. By virtue of convening
under the rules of the Lisbon Treaty, which restricts the European Council to
the heads of state or government and the Commission President, plus the High
Representative, the December summit was the first to which foreign ministers
were not automatically invited. This seemed to come as a shock to many of
them (European Policy Center, 2009).
On 8 December, the newly configured Foreign Affairs Council met for the
first time, although the Swedish foreign minister presided (Ashton delayed
presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council until January 2010). Having the
High Representative chair the Foreign Affairs Council would deprive foreign
ministers of the opportunity to represent the EU internationally with regard to
foreign and security policy. Similarly, members of the High Representative’s
office would assume responsibility for chairing the Political and Security
Committee, which prepares meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council, and of the
foreign affairs working groups. The transition would not be easy for foreign
ministers and their officials, especially for the countries coming into the
rotating Presidency in 2010, and would likely affect domestic bureaucratic
politics with regard to EU policy formulation and representation. Nevertheless
the benefits of the new arrangement, in terms of the operation of the European
Council and the Council of Ministers and the continuity and consistency of EU
foreign, security and defence policy, were manifest and welcome.
In an effort to improve co-ordination among succeeding Presidencies,
each country in the Presidency develops a specific six-month work pro-
gramme within the framework of an 18-month work programme drawn up
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by a ‘trio’ of successive Presidency countries. Spain, the first country to hold

the Presidency following implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, formed a
Presidency trio with its successors, Belgium and Hungary. The three
countries published a draft programme in June 2009 of the ‘Spanish-Belgian-
Hungarian trio presidency’, covering the 18-month period January 2010 to
June 2011 (Council, 2009c).

II. The European Parliament

The June 2009 elections to the EP took place under the rules of the Nice
Treaty, thereby limiting the EP’s size to 736 seats rather than the 751 provided
for in the Lisbon Treaty. Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in December
2009 paved the way for 18 additional seats, distributed among 12 Member
States, as well as the loss of three of Germany’s seats, thereby bringing the
EP to 751 members (see Table 2). Because of a political agreement to allow
Germany to retain its extra three seats throughout the mandate of the newly
elected Parliament, the arrival of the 18 additional members would push the
size of the EP to 754, in violation of the Lisbon Treaty. Accordingly, govern-
ments would have to amend Protocol 36 on the transitional provisions of
the Treaty to enable the new MEPs to take their seats.
There are two methods of treaty reform under the Lisbon Treaty. Both
require an intergovernmental conference (IGC) but only in one case – intended
for more far-reaching changes – would a Convention have to precede the IGC.
In early December 2009, the Spanish government formally proposed a treaty
amendment with regard to the size of the EP, which the European Council
endorsed. The European Council then requested consultation with the EP on
the suggested treaty change and the consent of the EP not to convene a
Convention. The EP was unlikely to hold out for a Convention for such a
specific treaty change. Regardless of how the change came about, however, the
ratification process would probably revive opposition to the Lisbon Treaty and
give Eurosceptics another opportunity to rail against the EU.
In its ruling of June 2009 on the Lisbon Treaty, the German Constitutional
Court castigated the appropriation of seats in the EP. ‘Measured against
requirements placed on democracy in states’, the court wrote, elections do
‘not take due account of equality, and [the EP] is not competent to take
authoritative decisions on political direction in the context of the suprana-
tional balancing of interest between the states’ (Federal Constitutional Court,
2009). In other words, the fact that the EU is not a federation undermines the
EP’s claim to democratic legitimacy, and even if the EU were a federation a
disparity such as one MEP to 66,000 people in Malta and one MEP to 860,000

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Table 2: Seats in the European Parliament, 2009–19*

Member Population % of Seats at Seats at Transitional 2014–19
State (in millions)** EU end of start of arrangement mandate
2004–09 2009–14 2010–14 (Lisbon)
mandate mandate
(Nice)

Germany 82,438 16.73% 99 99 99 96

France 62,886 12.76% 78 72 74 74
United Kingdom 60,422 12.26% 78 72 73 73
Italy 58,752 11.92% 78 72 73 73
Spain 43,758 8.88% 54 50 54 54
Poland 38,157 7.74% 54 50 51 51
Romania 21,61 4.38% 35 33 33 33
Netherlands 16,334 3.31% 27 25 26 26
Greece 11,125 2.26% 24 22 22 22
Portugal 10,57 2.14% 24 22 22 22
Belgium 10,511 2.13% 24 22 22 22
Czech Rep. 10,251 2.08% 24 22 22 22
Hungary 10,077 2.04% 24 22 22 22
Sweden 9,048 1.84% 19 18 20 20
Austria 8,266 1.68% 18 17 19 19
Bulgaria 7,719 1.57% 18 17 18 18
Denmark 5,428 1.10% 14 13 13 13
Slovakia 5,389 1.09% 14 13 13 13
Finland 5,256 1.07% 14 13 13 13
Ireland 4,209 0.85% 13 12 12 12
Lithuania 3,403 0.69% 13 12 12 12
Latvia 2,295 0.47% 9 8 9 9
Slovenia 2,003 0.41% 7 7 8 8
Estonia 1,344 0.27% 6 6 6 6
Cyprus 0,766 0.16% 6 6 6 6
Luxembourg 0,46 0.09% 6 6 6 6
Malta 0,404 0.08% 5 5 6 6
TOTAL 492,881 100.00% 785 736 754 751

Source: Adapted from European Parliament (2007; 2010).

Notes: * For the EU-27, not taking into account post-2010 enlargement.
** Population figures as officially established on 7 November 2006 by the Commission in Doc. 15124/06 on the basis of
Eurostat figures.

people in Germany (following implementation of the Lisbon Treaty) would

be democratically unsustainable.
If national governments were to abandon the principle of digressive pro-
portionality and simply divide the number of seats in the EP among the entire
population, Germany’s delegation would completely dominate the EU and
some small Member States would have no representation at all. Based on such
an allocation, the possibility of Turkey – a country almost as populous as
Germany – joining the EU would be even more worrisome for most Member
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States. The current arrangement for the distribution of seats in the EP is far
from ideal but is politically sustainable – as long as the EP does not continue
to argue that it is the epitome of representative democracy in the EU and
that giving it more power is the answer to the EU’s democratic deficit. The
German Constitutional Court demolished that argument, but the EP is
unlikely to cease its political posturing.

The 2009 Elections

Although the EP’s profile and power have increased greatly since the first
elections in 1979, the experience of direct elections themselves – in terms of
national political party behaviour and voter turnout – has been hugely disap-
pointing. The EU-wide turnout has declined consistently over time. Voters
seem unaware of or unimpressed by the EP’s undoubted importance in the EU
system. Much to the dismay of EU leaders, most voters continue to view
elections for the EP as second-order or even third-order contests, being less
salient than national or regional elections.
The turnout in 2009 was a mere 42.9 per cent. Although high by the
standards of mid-term US congressional elections (a point that Europeans like
to make), it is low by the standards of national elections in the Member States.
The result was especially disappointing because of the Commission’s and the
EP’s efforts to generate voter interest, especially in light of the fate of the
Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties. More than anything else, the EP wanted to
turn the tide of declining turnout and, if possible, break the 50 per cent
threshold. As noted in last year’s JCMS Annual Review, the EP launched
a public relations campaign in 2008 to apprise voters of the institution’s
relevance. At the same time, leaders of the two main political groups, the
European People’s Party (EPP) and the Party of European Socialists (PES),
sharpened their attacks against each other in order to heighten interest among
the electorate. In a further effort to woo voters, the EP highlighted its major
accomplishments since the previous elections, notably the enactment of
complex legislation on the control of chemical substances, an issue of great
environmental and commercial concern; laws making cell phone calls cheaper
by capping roaming charges; and an ambitious energy-climate change
package.
Whereas most candidates campaigned to some extent on EU issues and
proclaimed their political group affiliation, national political parties and
issues predominated during the 2009 elections which, as in EP elections past,
were really a set of separate national elections. Just as they dominated the
European election campaigns, national political parties also dominated
the selection of the approximately 9,000 candidates who stood for election

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to the EP. The European elections became informal referendums on the

performance of national governments, especially in coping with the financial
crisis and economic recession. Accordingly, the governing parties in France
and Poland did well; those in Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland and Spain did
not. Germans used the European elections to indicate how they would vote in
the forthcoming national elections, due three months later (they favoured the
Christian Democratic party of Chancellor Merkel).
The Group of the European People’s Party-European Democrats EPP-
ED), an alliance of Christian Democrats and conservatives, went into the
2009 elections with the largest number of seats (288). Regardless of the
vagaries of electoral politics, they were bound to come out of the election
with fewer seats for the simple reason that the British Conservatives, the main
party in the European Democrats wing of the EPP-ED, had decided before-
hand to pull out of the combined political group. The decision was driven by
domestic politics – in an effort to appeal to Eurosceptics during his successful
campaign to become Conservative Party leader in 2005, David Cameron
promised that he would withdraw the Conservatives from a political group
whose largest component, the Christian Democrats, was avowedly Euro-
federal. Once elected, Cameron seemed far from enthusiastic about carrying
through his promise, but did so nevertheless. The formation by the British and
other conservatives of a new group (see below) robbed the EPP-ED of its ED
wing. With barely disguised relief, the Christian Democrats reverted simply
to the EPP group. Moreover, they emerged from the election with the largest
number of seats (265) in the EP (see Table 3). The EPP group fits under the
umbrella of the transnational European People’s Party which, according to its
website, has 74 constituent parties from 38 countries; includes 20 government
leaders and a majority of commissioners (including the president); and ‘is the
leading political force on the continent’ (European People’s Party, 2009).
The PES fared poorly in the elections, having failed to turn voters’ con-
cerns about the dire economic situation into strong electoral support. To be
more precise, the PES failed to convince voters that their Christian Demo-
cratic rivals, being economically more liberal and mostly in government
throughout Europe, were to blame for the financial crisis and should not be
trusted to put Europe back on its feet. Instead, the Christian Democrats turned
the tables by convincing voters that the socialists lacked the experience and
ability to right the economy and by casting themselves as best able to defend
the much-cherished European social model. Having gone into the elections
with 217 MEPs, the PES came out with only 161, albeit in a Parliament with
fewer seats to contest. Nonetheless the PES was buoyed by the decision of
Italy’s Democratic Party, with 21 MEPs, to join forces with it. As a condition
of membership, the Democratic Party pressed the PES to change its name to
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Table 3: Results of the 2009 European Parliament Elections

Political Group Abbreviation No. of
Seats

Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) EPP 265

Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in S&D 184
the European Parliament
Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe ALDE 84
Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance Greens/EFA 55
European Conservatives and Reformists Group ECR 55
Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left GUE/ NGL 35
Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group EFD 32
Non-attached NA 26
TOTAL 736
Source: European Parliament, Results of the 2009 European elections available at «http://www.europarl.
europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/index_en.html».
Note: The EP’s rules of procedure and allocation of resources strongly encourages members to join
transnational political groups. The rules governing the formation of political groups have changed over the
years, in keeping with the changing size and composition of the EP. After the 2009 elections, the minimum
number of MEPs allowed to form a political group was 25, from at least seven Member States.

reflect the combined group’s broader political base. After some confusion,
PES leader Martin Schulz proposed the ‘Group of the Progressive Alliance of
Socialists and Democrats’, which became known as the Socialists and Demo-
crats or the S&D (Parliament.com, 2009). Following the adhesion of two
additional MEPs, the group had 184 seats in the newly elected Parliament.
The Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)
fared better in the elections than they had hoped, given the unpopularity of
economic liberals during the economic crisis, winning 84 seats. Once again
the liberals emerged as the third-largest group, far behind the Christian
Democrats and socialists, with MEPs from 19 Member States. The group’s
new leader is Guy Verhofstadt, a former prime minister of Belgium and an
ardent Euro-federalist.
The Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance, a marriage of conve-
nience between the environmentalist Greens and ‘representatives of stateless
nations and disadvantaged minorities’, won 55 seats (Greens/European Free
Alliance, 2009). The Greens, a well-organized transnational party and by far
the largest component of the group, fared extremely well, winning 48 seats.
The group includes a member of Sweden’s Pirate Party, whose sole interest
is Internet freedom and which came into existence in 2005 to oppose the
proposed EU software patent law.
A new group, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR),
came into existence after the elections with 55 seats, consisting mostly of
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106 DESMOND DINAN

disaffected conservatives (the former European Democrats). The British

Conservative Party has by far the largest contingent (25 members) in the
ECR group, which includes Poland’s Law and Justice Party and the Czech
Republic’s Civic Democrats. The ECR oppose Euro-federalism and want
fundamental reform of the EU ‘to make it more accountable, transparent and
responsive to the needs of the people’ (European Conservatives and Reform-
ists, 2009). Being in such an openly Eurosceptical group as the ECR dem-
onstrates how far the British Conservatives have veered from mainstream
European political opinion. It was difficult for the Conservatives to have been
allied with the Christian Democrats, who openly espouse a federal Europe,
but it is striking that they have relegated themselves to a small group that
includes parties noted for political intolerance and extreme nationalism
(Bale et al., 2009).
The European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) calls itself a
‘confederal group’ in order to emphasize the autonomy of its constituent
national parties. It is a collection of 35 far-leftists who oppose the way in
which mainstream European politics, society and economics are organized.
The largest constituent party, with eight members, is Germany’s Die Linke,
which includes the remnants of the Communist party of east Germany. The
group also includes some high-profile former German social democrats.
Two parliamentary groups could not sustain themselves after the 2009
elections: the Independence/Democracy Group and the Union for Europe of
the Nations Group. Many of the remnants of these groups decided to come
together in a new formation, the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD)
group, with 32 seats. Despite its innocuous name, the group consists largely
of virulent Eurosceptics, who want their countries to leave the EU or want the
EU to cease to exist. Its members are in the unusual position of serving in a
parliament whose legitimacy they reject. The largest and most striking con-
tingent in the group is the UK Independence Party, which won 13 seats in
the elections, beating the governing Labour party into third place in Britain
(the Conservatives came first).
The EP after the elections also had 26 non-attached MEPs, mostly indi-
viduals or a handful of party members whose far-right, racist views were so
objectionable that none of the groups would have them. The independents
included MEPs in such notorious parties as Britain’s National Party, France’s
National Front and Hungary’s Jobbik. By virtue of being non-attached,
however, these MEPs have limited access to parliamentary funds and other
resources and could never get into leadership positions.
Although organized into political groups, MEPs remain acutely aware
of their national identity and allegiance to national political parties. MEPs
caucus in national delegations within their respective groups. Obviously,
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some national delegations are larger and more influential than others. German
MEPs comprise the largest national delegations in five of the EP’s political
groups; they are especially preponderant in the EPP, S&D and Liberal groups.
Britain is not represented at all in the EP’s largest group, the EPP, and is
poorly represented in the second-largest group, the S&D, having only 13 of
the group’s 184 seats (this reflects the poor showing of Britain’s ruling
Labour Party in the elections). Most national delegations are concentrated in
the EPP and S&D groups, but some are more diffused than others. Spain’s is
an example of a highly concentrated delegation: of its 50 members, 23 are in
the EPP group and 21 in the S&D group. By contrast, the Dutch delegation
(25 members) is spread out in all seven groups, and even includes four
independents (this reflects the fragmentation of Dutch politics on EU issues).
One of the most striking results of the elections was the failure of Libertas,
the anti-Lisbon Treaty movement led by British-born Irish millionaire Declan
Ganley, to win more than one seat. Ganley had become prominent by spear-
heading the successful campaign against the Treaty in the first Irish referen-
dum in June 2008. Yet the successful Libertas candidate was not Ganley but
Philippe de Villiers, whose Mouvement pour la France had joined forces with
Ganley during the election campaign. The collapse of Libertas, which hoped
to become a large, pan-European political group in the EP, reflected dissat-
isfaction in Ireland and abroad with Ganley as well as the fractiousness of
those anti-Lisbon groups throughout the EU not already part of larger politi-
cal parties or tendencies. Ganley’s poor showing in the election was a har-
binger of the outcome of the second Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty
(Irish Times, 2009).

New Leadership
As part of a pre-elections pact, the two biggest groups agreed that a member
of the EPP would be elected President of the European Parliament in July
2009, with a socialist to follow in December 2011 until June 2014, when the
next elections would take place. It was up to the EPP to decide which of its
members to put forward for the post. There were two contenders, an Italian
and a Pole, both strongly supported by their national governments. Eventually
the Italian withdrew and the Pole, Jerzy Buzek, a former prime minister, was
elected president.
Buzek’s election, which for the first time placed someone from central
Europe in a top EU leadership position, was hailed as a breakthrough. Yet it
came about as a result of deal making between the EPP and the PES (as it then
was) and backroom bargaining among national leaders. Buzek soon proved
himself forceful and energetic, especially in presenting the EP’s views at the

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beginning of meetings of the European Council (being a former prime

minister among national leaders undoubtedly enhanced his stature).
The outcome of the Presidential election determines the outcome of the
elections for other EP leadership positions (except for political group leaders,
who are elected by political group members). Although leadership elections
are supposedly open, the political groups decide among themselves who gets
what. The leadership’s composition following the 2009 elections reflected the
distribution of seats by political group and national delegation. For instance,
the EPP took ten seats on the powerful Conference of Committee Chairs
(three German MEPs, three Italian, two French, one Polish and one Spanish).

III. The Commission

There was growing certainty throughout 2009 that José Manuel Barroso
would be nominated by the European Council to serve a second term as
Commission President and approved by the EP, unless the socialists won a
majority in the June elections and confronted the European Council by
opposing Barroso, a centre-right politician. Realizing the unlikelihood that
they would beat the EPP in the elections, the socialists did not bother to put
forward a candidate for Commission President. Most national leaders were
lukewarm about Barroso, but agreed unanimously in the European Council
in June 2009 that he was ‘the person they intend to nominate as President of
the European Commission for the period 2009–14’, and asked the current
and incoming Presidents of the European Council (the prime ministers of
the Czech Republic and Sweden) to ‘have discussions with the European
Parliament in order to determine whether the Parliament is in a position to
approve that nomination at its July plenary session’ (Council, 2009a). Having
become the accidental Commission President for the period 2004–09,
Barroso looked set to become the inevitable Commission President for the
period 2009–14.
The Lisbon Treaty was not yet in force when Barroso was being reap-
pointed. Nevertheless the EP pressed the European Council for a political
agreement to abide by the Lisbon Treaty rules, which call for the European
Council, ‘taking into account the elections to the European Parliament and
after having held the appropriate consultations’, to ‘propose to the European
Parliament a candidate for President of the Commission [. . .] [who] shall
be elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its component
members’.1 Given that the EPP, to which Barroso belonged, won the largest

1
Treaty on European Union, Title III, Article 17.7.

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INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 109

number of seats, and that the Council Presidency was having discussions with
the EP on Barroso’s nomination, the European Council could fairly claim to
be acting in the spirit of the Lisbon Treaty.
That did not satisfy some MEPs, especially the socialists and greens, who
reviled Barroso for his neo-liberal economic philosophy and his alleged
cosiness with big business. Though the socialists were then in the process of
divvying up the Presidency of the EP with the EPP, they claimed that pushing
through Barroso’s candidacy without due consultation with the EP was a
violation of democratic principles. Barroso duly developed a set of guidelines
for the next mandate, which he presented at meetings with the political groups
in early September (Commission, 2009a). The socialists were split along
national lines. For instance, the Portuguese delegation generally supported
Barroso. In the event, Barroso convincingly won the vote on 16 September,
although by a smaller margin than in 2004 (of the 718 MEPs present, 382
voted in favour, 219 voted against and 117 abstained).
Wolfgang Münchau, the influential Financial Times columnist, described
Barroso as being ‘among the weakest Commission presidents ever, a vain
man who lacks political courage’ (Münchau, 2009). Other prominent critics
of Barroso have been kinder in their choice of words but no less fierce in their
disparagement of him. Barroso has been widely but unfairly blamed for not
having done enough to prevent voters from rejecting the Constitutional Treaty
in 2005 and the Lisbon Treaty in 2008, as if he could have changed the minds
of people who, often for irrational reasons, deeply dislike the EU and the
Commission. More reasonably, Barroso is blamed for having responded
slowly and inadequately to the financial crisis of 2007–09. Barroso may
indeed have failed to grasp the enormity of the crisis until late 2008, when
he finally rallied the Commission and helped put together the Economic
Recovery Plan. However, Barroso’s initial underestimation of the extent of
the crisis was no different from that of many national leaders, and his ability
to respond as Commission President was limited by the nature of the office
and the preponderance of national governments.
Barroso has been and should remain a competent Commission President;
a safe pair of hands at a difficult time for the institution and the EU. He has
tried to restore the institution’s prominence and sense of purpose. If not
resurgent, arguably the Commission under Barroso is as influential as it could
possibly be under extremely difficult circumstances. Barroso is adept at
presiding over a fractious Commission of 27 members, partly by introducing
procedural changes but largely by adopting a more presidential than collegial
style. Under his leadership, the Commission has become more accountable
and open and more responsive to the needs of citizens. The Barroso Com-
mission has been pragmatic in highlighting selective policy objectives. Aware
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110 DESMOND DINAN

of the constraints facing the Commission, Barroso is not inclined to tilt at

windmills and challenge the predominance of national capitals. Supranation-
alists are disappointed with what they see as Barroso’s subservience to
national leaders and unwillingness to reassert the Commission’s authority. A
more even-handed assessment is that Barroso is doing as much as he can at a
time of resurgent intergovernmentalism, compounded by economic uncer-
tainty and grandstanding by the EP.

Commissioners and Portfolios

Governments began to announce their nominees for the new Commis-
sion in mid-2009. Domestic political considerations, rather than ability or
merit, usually determine a government’s choice of nominee for a lucrative
and prestigious Commissionership. This was clearly the case in Germany,
where Merkel chose Günther Oettinger, the minister-president of Baden-
Württemberg, the third-largest state in Germany, as her country’s Commis-
sioner. Until his selection, Oettinger was mostly unknown outside Germany
and had little experience of the EU. Given his background, Oettinger would
likely be a staunch defender of German interests in Brussels. As France’s new
Commissioner, Sarkozy chose someone with a prominent international
profile and considerable EU experience: Michel Barnier, a former foreign
minister and a Commissioner for regional policy in the Prodi Commission
(1999–2004).
An unprecedented aspect of the selection process for the second Barroso
Commission was that, under the terms of the Lisbon Treaty, one of the Com-
mission Vice-Presidents would also be the High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security, a position that was allocated on the basis of intensive
intergovernmental bargaining.2 The selection of Catherine Ashton for the
position took care of Britain’s nomination of a Commissioner-designate.
Fourteen of the new Commissioners-designate were holdovers from the
first Barroso Commission. The Commission-designate included nine women
(one more than in the preceding Commission). Commissioners may be reap-
pointed any number of times. It is not unusual for them to serve two full terms
(now ten years); Viviane Reding had already served in two successive Com-
missions when the government of Luxembourg renominated her in 2009.
Reflecting the composition of most national governments at the time of the
Commissioners’ nomination, a majority of the new Commission-designate
came from the centre-right of the political spectrum, which also corresponded
with the make-up of the newly elected EP.

2
See Tony Barber’s contribution in this volume.

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INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 111

In principle the Commission President is solely responsible for allocat-

ing portfolios; in practice, national governments are constantly interfering.
Ever since the first enlargement there have been more Commissioners than
substantial portfolios, despite a formidable increase in the EU’s policy
scope. Responding to criticism that some of the portfolios in his first Com-
mission were too insubstantial, and to shifts in policy priorities over the
previous few years, Barroso reconfigured a number of portfolios for his
second Commission. For instance, Barroso carved a new portfolio, ‘Climate
Action’, out of the old environment portfolio. Barroso also broke up a
single portfolio, ‘Justice, Freedom and Security’, into two portfolios,
‘Home Affairs’ and ‘Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship’, in his
second Commission.
Similarly, Barroso divided ‘Development and Humanitarian Aid’ (from
his first Commission) into two portfolios, ‘Development’ and ‘International
Co-operation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response’. He also moved
‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ from ‘External Relations’ to ‘Enlarge-
ment’, external relations being subsumed into the High Representative/
Commission Vice-President’s responsibilities. Barroso kept a separate
portfolio for trade. In his announcement of portfolios for the Commissioners-
designate, Barroso noted that the Commissioners for enlargement and
European neighbourhood policy, development and international co-operation
would work ‘in close co-operation with the High Representative/Vice-
President in accordance with the treaties’ (Commission, 2009b).
It remained to be seen how Barroso, the High Representative and the
European Council President would manage EU external representation
among themselves. Barroso was the most eager to be in the limelight, in
Europe and beyond. For that reason Barroso must have been pleased that the
European Council chose such unassuming people as Ashton and van Rompuy
to be the first incumbents of the new positions. All three will, literally, be on
the stage together at international meetings. The fact that the EU has three
external relations representatives, despite the effort to streamline external
relations in the Lisbon Treaty, demonstrates the peculiar nature of the EU
itself.
Some national governments competed fiercely for particular portfolios.
Thus Sarkozy made no secret in 2009 of his determination that France’s next
Commissioner be allocated the internal market and services portfolio, thereby
ensuring that it did not go to an economic liberal and especially a Briton (for
Sarkozy the two are synonymous). Given the dearth of weighty portfolios,
Barroso could have split internal market and services into two jobs. Instead,
he went along with Sarkozy and handed the portfolio to the new French
Commissioner. Germany would appear to have lost out in the second Barroso
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112 DESMOND DINAN

Commission, as its Commissioner secured the energy portfolio, an important

responsibility but not a high-profile Commission job. Barroso juggled the
portfolios in his new Commission so that none of the returning Commis-
sioners kept his or her original portfolio (See Table 4).
The Commission comprises about 40 directorates-general and services,
corresponding roughly to its activities, responsibilities and organizational
needs. The number and names of the directorates-general and services change
constantly, especially with the arrival of a new Commission. For instance,
reflecting the growing political salience of energy policy, Barroso established
a new energy directorate-general in 2009 (previously energy was part of a
combined energy and transport directorate-general).

IV. Implications of the Financial Crisis and Economic Recession

The financial crisis and economic recession continued throughout 2009 and
put EU solidarity sorely to the test. Hard-hit countries in central and eastern
Europe, with little money to spend on stimulus plans and no prospect in the
near future of entering the euro area, felt increasingly resentful. More broadly,
the situation demonstrated the fragility of economic integration and monetary
union. The tendency on the part of national governments to protect their
own banks and industries threatened to pull the single market apart. Similarly,
the rapid deterioration of public finances in the euro area undermined
the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact, the fiscal foundation of
economic and monetary union (EMU).
Governments’ behaviour reflected the political realities in the EU. People
look to their national capitals, not to Brussels, for solutions to pressing
socio-economic problems. Politicians would have been foolhardy to dismiss
calls for national action by claiming that their hands were tied by EU com-
petition policy or the budget deficit threshold of the Stability and Growth
Pact. They had to meet urgent national needs within an EU structure that is
little liked or understood by citizens, despite the tangible benefits of the single
market and the obvious convenience of the single currency. Under the cir-
cumstances, most governments managed to strike a reasonable balance
between national and European interests, or at least did not blame Brussels
unduly for constraining their freedom of manoeuvre. The high and varied
number of summits during the crisis demonstrated national leaders’ appre-
ciation of the importance of EU co-operation while also giving them an
opportunity to let off steam (see Table 5).
The way in which the crisis played out politically underscores the point
that national governments are the decisive actors. The EU does not have

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INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 113

Table 4: The Second Barroso Commission-Designate

Commissioner Country of Origin Portfolio
José Manuel Barroso Portugal President
Catherine Ashton United Kingdom High Representative for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy (Vice-President)
Viviane Reding Luxembourg Justice, Fundamental Rights and
Citizenship (Vice-President)
Joaquín Almunia Spain Competition (Vice-President)
Siim Kallas Estonia Transport (Vice-President)
Neelie Kroes The Netherlands Digital Agenda (Vice-President)
Antonio Tajani Italy Industry and Entrepreneurship
(Vice-President)
Maroš Šefčovič Slovakia Inter-institutional Relations and
Administration (Vice-President)
Janez Potočnik Slovenia Environment
Olli Rehn Finland Economic and Monetary Affairs
Andris Piebalgs Latvia Development
Michel Barnier France Internal Market and Services
Androulla Vassiliou Cyprus Education, Culture, Multilingualism and
Youth
Algirdas Šemeta Lithuania Taxation and Customs Union, Audit and
Anti-Fraud
Karel De Gucht Belgium Trade
John Dalli Malta Health and Consumer Policy
Máire Geoghegan-Quinn Ireland Research, Innovation and Science
Janusz Lewandowski Poland Financial Programming and Budget
Maria Damanaki Greece Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
Rumiana Jeleva* Bulgaria International Co-operation, Humanitarian
Aid and Crisis Response
Günther Oettinger Germany Energy
Johannes Hahn Austria Regional Policy
Connie Hedegaard Denmark Climate Action
Štefan Füle Czech Republic Enlargement and European
Neighbourhood Policy
László Andor Hungary Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion
Cecilia Malmström Sweden Home Affairs
Dacian Cioloş Romania Agriculture and Rural Development
Source: The Members of the Barroso Commission, available at «http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/index_en.htm».
Note: * Rumiana Jeleva stepped down during her confirmation hearings in the European Parliament in
January 2010; the Bulgarian government nominated Kristalina Georgieva as her replacement.

responsibility for fiscal policy. Stimulus packages, whether in the form of

subsidies or automatic stabilizers, can come only from national budgets. Of
course national governments are obliged to co-ordinate such action within the
EU and especially in the euro area. But the institutions that manage fiscal
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114 DESMOND DINAN

Table 5: EU Summits in 2009

Informal meeting of Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 1 March 2009
Brussels European Council, 19–20 March
(Meeting of Heads of State or Government with the US President, Prague, 5 April)
Brussels European Council, 18–19 June
Informal Meeting of EU Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 17 September
Brussels European Council, 29–30 October
Informal Meeting of Heads of State or Government, Brussels, 19 November
Brussels European Council, 10–11 December
Source: European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 2009, available at «http://www.european-council.
europa.eu/council-meetings/presidency-conclusions.aspx?lang=en».

policy co-ordination – the Economic and Finance Council (of national finance
ministers), the Eurogroup (finance ministers of countries in the euro area) and
the European Council – influence the direction of national policy without
dictating it. When times are tough, governments will not put policy
co-ordination ahead of political survival and national recovery.
Apart from the European Central Bank, the EU institutions most directly
involved in the crisis were the European Council and the Commission. Once
again, the crisis showed that when the political stakes are high, only the
European Council is able to hold the EU together and move it forward. The
European Council was well served by the French Presidency in the second
half of 2008 because Sarkozy appreciated the importance of the EU dimen-
sion to the crisis and, as president of a big, resourceful Member State, was
able to get things done. The succeeding Czech Presidency was not only
hobbled by domestic politics but also lacked the clout necessary to lead the
European Council (Beneš and Karlas, this volume). The variable performance
of Council Presidencies during the crisis may have strengthened the appeal of
the full-time European Council President. But had the Lisbon Treaty been
in effect at the time, would Sarkozy – the headstrong leader of a powerful
Member State – have allowed himself to be upstaged by Herman van
Rompuy, the first elected President of the European Council?
The crisis also showed the difficulty of running the European Council
effectively in an EU of 27 Member States. On a number of occasions, a few
national leaders got together in smaller summits, notably of the G4 (France,
Germany, Italy and the UK), sometimes plus Spain and the Netherlands and
always with the Commission President. Having worked out a common posi-
tion, these leaders were able to foist their views onto the others at the next
meeting of the European Council. In theory all countries are equal in the EU;
in practice, when it comes to economics and finance, not to mention security
and defence, the big countries remain more equal than the others.
© 2010 The Author(s)
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INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 115

Among the big countries, France and Germany predominate. The crisis
was another test of their relationship and another opportunity for observers to
lament the demise of the Franco–German tandem. Yet once again, despite
personal differences (Merkel and Sarkozy could hardly have been less alike)
and policy preferences (Germany is deeply averse to deficit spending; France
is comfortable with public borrowing), the two countries pulled together
and nudged the EU in the direction of their choice. The effectiveness of
the Franco–German partnership may have diminished in the enlarged EU,
especially in the absence of a project as compelling as the single market
or monetary union, but it remains a formidable force.
What more could the Commission have done and what could it have
done better? Much of the criticism of the Commission focused on Barroso,
who seemed curiously inactive as the crisis unfolded. As noted earlier, he
was not the only EU leader to underestimate the severity of the crisis,
however. Merkel was similarly detached at the outset. Once roused to
action, Barroso led a vigorous response within the constraints that the Com-
mission faced with respect to fiscal and macroeconomic policy. The Com-
mission President’s most useful role was to push for concerted national
action, using the bully pulpit of the Presidency and participation in the
European Council. Barroso could hardly have taken centre stage from
Sarkozy or Merkel.

Conclusions
As far as EU institutions and governance are concerned, the year 2009 will be
remembered more than anything else for the eventual ratification and entry
into force of the Lisbon Treaty, most likely the final round in a bout of major
reform that began with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. In the
intervening quarter-century the European Union came into existence, more
than doubled in size and acquired a vastly greater policy scope than the earlier
European Community. During the same time, the EU grappled with major
institutional and governance issues such as accountability, comitology, sub-
sidiarity and transparency. The Lisbon Treaty may be the last round of major
treaty reform not because it has addressed these issues entirely satisfactorily
or because the post-Lisbon EU is ideally organized or structured, but because
national governments have lost their appetites and European publics have lost
their patience for further large-scale reform.
Nevertheless the Lisbon Treaty equips the EU with a robust set of
institutional arrangements and policy instruments to address a variety of
internal and external challenges. Those arrangements and instruments may be

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suboptimal in many respects, but they reflect the art of the possible at a
particular moment in EU history. Much depends on the ability and willing-
ness of EU actors – at the national and European levels – to make the most of
the Lisbon Treaty’s potential. That depends to some extent on the strength and
impact of Euroscepticism, which the process of treaty reform unintentionally
stoked. With the EU no longer engaged in seemingly perpetual treaty change,
the post-Lisbon period of consolidation and relative calm should help to
reduce Eurosceptical angst.
The EU’s obsession with the Lisbon Treaty coincided with the global
financial crisis. Joschka Fischer, who launched the debate on the future of
Europe at the beginning of the decade, lamented in March 2009 that the
crisis ‘is relentlessly laying bare the EU’s flaws and limitations. Indeed,
what Europe lost, first and foremost, with the rejection of the Constitutional
Treaty is now obvious: its faith in itself and its common future [. . .]
[Europe] threatens to revert to the national egoism and protectionism of the
past’ (Fischer, 2009). Fischer’s alarm may have reflected his frustration
with what eventually emerged from the treaty reform process. Undoubtedly
European integration has a long way to go – if the destination is a federal
Europe. A more realistic appraisal of the Lisbon Treaty and of the EU’s
response to the financial crisis is that European integration has already
come a long way, given the tenacity of national sovereignty in the global
system and the immense difficulty of forming and shaping supranational
organizations.

Key Reading
Arregui, J. and Thomson, R. (2009) ‘ “States” Bargaining Success in the
European Union’. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 16, No. 5,
pp. 655–76.
Blom-Hansen, J. and Brandsma, G.J. ‘The EU Comitology System: Intergov-
ernmental Bargaining and Deliberative Supranationalism?’ JCMS, Vol.
47, No. 4, pp. 719–40.
Fuglsang, N. and Olsen, K.B. (2009) ‘Staying in the Loop: The Commis-
sion’s Role in First Reading Agreements’. EPIN Working Paper, No. 25,
September.
König, T. and Junge, D. (2009) ‘Why Don’t Veto Players Use their Power?’
European Union Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 507–34.
Yordanova, N. (2009) ‘The Rationale behind Committee Assignment in the
European Parliament: Distributive, Informational and Partisan Perspec-
tives’. European Union Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 253–80.

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INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 117

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