Chapter 1 – Introduction Influence

In the dilemma game each player’s cooperation or defection is simultaneous just as it is mo more or
less in negotiation. But in influencing the players operation or defection is separated in time.

Prisoner’s dilemma – invented in 1950’s. - dilemma of choice. Same structure as Effusi’s game.
Both prisoners must contemplate what the other will choose. Neither one can unilaterally choose as
their choices are bound together.

(Ann confess – Bob gets 12 in jail, Bob confess- Ann gets 12 in jail, Bob & Ann confess – 5years each,
neither confess 1 year each)

RED Blue Game – extension of the prisoner’s dilemma. Played over several (10) rounds. Choice is to
play red or blue card. Three possible outcomes:

(both play blue = +4 points each, Both Red -4 points each, one plays blue – Blue (-8 ) and the other
red – red gets +8)

TIT for TAT – your interests are affected by the behaviors of others. Has three main behaviors – 1:
it’s nice but ruthless – A tit or tat player never initiates red play. 2. It is instantly forgiving. 3. it is an
easy to read strategy and so simple that anyone can identify TIT for TAT behavior after only a few
exchanges.

Cooperation and defection in the game of life: - Cooperation is a universal behavior practiced by
humans. Just because something is universal does not mean that it always applies. Although it may be
approved universally – people can cooperate for evil ends or use dubious methods to ensure
cooperation. Relationships consist of a sequence of actions and reactions that reinforce or undermine
their defining qualities. Positive actions reinforce strengths of relationships and negatives actions do
the opposite.

How might knowledge of Prisoners Dilemma and Tit-for-Tat help influencing?

Suggested Answer Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) is about the effect of the dilemmas of risk and trust on a
decision to cooperate for some common benefit or to defect for the benefit of oneself. The prisoners
have a choice of choosing what might be best for both of them (‘not confessing’) or choosing what
might be best for them alone (‘confessing), provided the other prisoner chooses ‘not to confess’. The
uncertain ‘might be’ parts of the statement corrupt the rational choice for both of them. As neither
prisoner knows for sure what his partner will choose, he does not wish to risk his partner's defection,
so he defects to protect himself and/or to exploit his partner. A brief description of PD and its choices
sufficient to show understanding of the dilemma is worth 3 marks. It is not sufficient on its own for a
pass mark.

Tit-for-Tat (TFT) is introduced by a brief reference to the red-blue game (but an overly detailed
exposition of the game and then of TFT is not necessary). A demonstration that the concepts are
understood is sufficient. TFT is about the appropriate strategy for a cooperative player in a risky
environment. An always play blue strategy is not appropriate as it rewards (invites) red play. An
always play red strategy is not appropriate as it provokes a deadlock when the victim withdraws.
If play is to be mixed between red and blue, which mix is appropriate?

TFT mixes the play according to three ‘rules’. These rules guarantee a cooperative player an
optimum score by protecting him or her from exploitation if he or she opens blue and then plays
whatever his or her partner played in the previous round. The three rules are:

 Never initiate red play, always open blue – ‘a nice strategy’.

 Instant forgiveness for previous red play once the other player switches to blue – also
instant punishment for switching to red. A ‘forgiving’ strategy.

 Easy to recognise- no ambiguity.

 Chapter 1 – Introduction Influence
Lessons for an influencer include: While the benefits of cooperation may be manifest, the
certainty that people will cooperate for the common good is not. It is not enough to assume that
a decision to cooperate for some beneficial outcome will be sufficient to induce the parties to do
so. Uncertainty derives from many sources, prominent among them that of mutual trust. If an
act of reciprocation for a beneficial act is separated too long from the initial act, distrust or
uncertainty may inhibit acting appropriately (examples such as ‘log rolling’, ‘you scratch my back
and I'll scratch yours’, would earn marks). Naïve trust could produce exploitation.

TFT provides some comfort. Reciprocal beneficial acts build up trust between parties and TFT
protects the cooperative influencer from exploitation continuing.

Case study 1 - Q1 – Yes. Explain prisoner’s dilemma.

EPILOGUE
Essentially, influencing is about creating opportunities for cooperation and limiting temptations for defection.
Formal procedures may exist to ensure cooperation among individuals in organizations – even supported by legal
statutes – but to make formal procedures work it is necessary to mobilize informal
Relationships between those charged with working the procedures. Influencers seek to enhance cooperation and
prevent or circumvent defection. People do not have to cooperate with alacrity, and they have many opportunities to
be less than enthusiastic about their commitment to and beyond the
Boundaries between cooperation and defection. Nor need they make conscious decisions to cooperate
or defect. They may not recognize they are in a game with you as a player. They may act – and often do – in this or
that manner by default.
If you do not deploy influencing skills in relationships with other players, you leave them to act in ignorance or
disregard of your interests. Their defection need not be born of their antagonism towards your preferences. It could
be a result of their being influenced that way by somebody else.

Deigning to influence them is not protection against their ‘defection’ in respect of your preferences. Influence or be
influenced by others – not all of these others being sympathetic to or aware of your interests – is an iron rule of the
games played in and between organizations. You are much better placed than the nascent cooperators in our mind
game. Influencing for cooperation is not something stumbled on in the minds of modern mankind. It is already
widely understood by people in modern organizations
Through our culturally derived universals of cooperative choices to achieve an organization’s goals. The very
existence of organizations presumes the cooperative imperative, for what else is an organization but the realization
of cooperation?
Moreover, relationships are barriers to defection, which is why influencing strategies aim to develop strong
relationships with the implicit goal of preventing defections. It is easier to defect when the ‘victim’ is a stranger; it is
much more difficult to defect when the ‘victim’ is a close ally.
True, as Slug and Gripper demonstrate, relationships do not preclude defection and personal interest can prove
overwhelming for the defector, but influencing through relationship building strategies, particularly those that serve
individual interests by building strong coalitions of interests, is a powerful barrier to
defection for trivial ends. By raising the ‘price’ of defection, the influencer goes a long way to ensuring the best
chances for cooperative outcomes.