2. PEOPLE VS.

QUE PO LAY
G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954
Justice Montemayor

FACTS: Defendant-appellant Que Po Lay was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.

dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required
by Circular No. 20. The appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the
Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular
had no force and effect.

Defendant-appellant contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular
to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor
General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the
publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have
force and effect.

ISSUE: whether the circular should be published first to have the force and effect of law.

HELD: Yes. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular
No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law
authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.

Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in
question which prescribes aenalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on
the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties.

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is
clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one
until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6791             March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.

Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty
of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S.
dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the
Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as
required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not
published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that
consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No.,
638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order
or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that
Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said
circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said
two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette,
presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the
Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress
shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the
completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of
the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
(See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule,
circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and
specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws,
(Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that
their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of
the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws"
include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:

El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de

Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.
Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que
muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia
de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de
aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p.
52).

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was
not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its
violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and
bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words,
appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to
have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one
may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court).
But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20
had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was
no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or
committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question
may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.

In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with
costs de oficio.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno,
JJ., concur.
3. Phil. International Trading Corp. vs. Judge Angeles
G.R. No. 108461, October 21, 1996
Justice Torres Jr.

FACTS: The Petitioner Philippine International Trading Corporation (PITC) issued

Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01, 1 under which, applications to the PITC for
importation from the People's Republic of China (PROC, for brevity) must be accompanied by a
viable and confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the
improper himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount equivalent to the
value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or, simply, at one is to one ratio.

Private respondents Remington and Firestone individually applied for authority to import from
PROC with the petitioner. They were granted such authority after satisfying the requirements for
importers, and after they executed respective undertakings. Subsequently, for failing to comply
with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations,
further import applications were withheld by petitioner PITC from private respondents, such that
the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC. As a result, the private
respondents filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against the PITC.

The court ruled that declared the Administrative Order to be null and void, since the same was
not published, contrary to Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether the Administrative Order issued by PITC is null and void on the ground
that it was not published in accordance with Article 2 of the New Civil Code.

HELD: Yes. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within
the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is
otherwise provided. . . .

The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed
their applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-
01 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register,
does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is
one of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to
enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, i.e., P.D. 1071, in relation
to LOI 444 and EO 133.
4. Delgado vs. Alonso, 44 Phil 739
G.R. No. L-19826, March 31, 1923
Justice Street

FACTS: In November of the year 1917 Alonso purchased twelve parcels of land in the
municipality of Goa from one Stickney. On February 1, 1918, Alonso conveyed the same
property to Luciano Delgado; and in order to secure the payment of the purchase money
Delgado contemporaneously executed a mortgage in favor of the defendant upon the same land
and also upon two other large parcels already owned by the plaintiff situated in the municipality
of Tinambac, of the Province of Camarines Sur.
A simple calculation shows that the interest agreed to be paid upon the purchase price of the
land which had thus been bought by Delgado was at a rate well above fifteen per centum per
annum. This mortgage therefore offends against the provisions of the Usury Law, which limits
the rate that can ordinarily be secured by mortgage upon real property to twelve per centum per
annum (Act No. 2655-2).
Delgado filed a complaint against Alonso to recover the sum of P2,625 paid upon February 1,
1919, by way of interest. To this complaint the defendant answered with a general denial; and
by way of special defense he alleged that the contract in question had been entered into by him
innocently and in total ignorance on his part of the existence of the Usury Law and, further, that
he had been maliciously inveigled into said contract by the plaintiff, with full knowledge on the
part of the latter of the illegality of the stipulation for usurious interest, and with the design of
taking advantages of the Usury Law to the prejudice of the defendant.

ISSUE: whether the defendant is justified in raising ignorance of the usury law as
defense to escape its legal consequences.

HELD: No. Both parties were, in our opinion, victims, at once of their own ignorance and of
economic practices inherited from the past; and ignorance of the provisions of the Usuary Law
does not relieve either from the legal consequences of the contract into which they voluntarily
entered.

We are quite prepared to believe the defendant when he says that the entered into the contract
in total ignorance of the law against usury and it is not improbable that the plaintiff, stimulated by
the desire to purchase the property, had suggested the terms upon which he was willing to take
it; but it is not proved that he had the Usury Law in mind at the time or maliciously intended to
entrap the defendant into the making of this contract and then to take advantage of the law.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-38230             November 21, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BITDU, defendant-appellant.

E.A. Fernandez for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from the following decision of Judge A. Horilleno in the Court of First Instance
of Zamboanga:

There is no dispute between the prosecution and the defense as to the fact Mora Bitdu
was married to Moro Halid before an Imam in Lamitan of this Province of Zamboanga in
accordance with Mohammedan rites more than twelve years ago, and that about seven
months ago she was also married to Moro Hajirol before a Hadji in accordance with
Mohammedan customs.

It is therefore a fact admitted by both the prosecution and the defense that the accused
contracted two marriages, one with Halid and another with Hajirol. She claims, however,
that the second marriage contracted by her with Hajirol took place after she had been
divorced from her first husband Halid in accordance with Mohammedan customs, said
divorce having taken place before Datu Gavino Cuevas, of Isabela de Basilan.

With this defense, two very important questions are raised before this court: first whether
or not the alleged divorce took place in accordance with Mohammedan customs, and
second, assuming that the divorce took place in accordance with such customs, is such
divorce legal?

With reference to the first question, two witnesses testified, one for the prosecution and
the other for the defense. The first witness testified that the divorce between
Mohammedans in Mindanao may be obtained before any person designated and agreed
upon by the parties. The second testified that divorce, like any other act relative to
marriage and separation of Mohammedan spouses, is obtained under certain conditions,
to wit, the interested parties or the spouses intending to secure a divorce select the
person before whom the divorce is to take place, and both parties are represented by
persons designated by them:
Chapter IV, section 35 of the Koran says:

"35. And if you fear a breach between the two, then appoint a judge from
his people and judge from her people; if they both desire agreement,
Allah will effect harmony between them; surely Allah is knowing; Aware."

The court is inclined to believe that the testimony of the witness for the defense on this
question is more in harmony with the doctrines of the Koran than that of the witness for
the prosecution.

Now, has the defense established that the divorce took place in accordance with the
commandments of the Koran? The defense presented no evidence to show that the
conditions prescribed by the Koran had been complied with by the parties when they
obtained their divorce before Datu Cuevas. Said divorce therefore between the
defendant and Halid does not satisfy the conditions prescribed by the Koran and
consequently said divorce seems to be of doubtful religious validity.

However, even admitting that this divorce was secured in accordance with the conditions
prescribed by Mohammedan doctrines, is such divorce legal? The laws governing
marriage and its incidents are moral in nature and as such they are laws relating to
public policy. In the Philippine Islands we have a law (Act No. 2710) enumerating the
causes and the conditions under which divorce may be secured and granted. Any
divorce obtained in the Philippine Islands of causes and under conditions other than
those enumerated in said law, would have no legal effect. The habits and customs of a
people, the dogmas and doctrines of a religion cannot be superior to or have
precedence over laws relating to public policy, because as stated above laws relating to
marriage and its incidents are normal in nature and as such they affect public policy.

The court therefore is of the opinion that even if the divorce alleged by the defense was
secured in conformity with Mohammedan doctrines, such divorce cannot prevail against
the Divorce Law of the Philippine Islands prescribing the causes and conditions under
which divorce may be obtained. In this case, as above demonstrated, the divorce in
question has not been obtained in accordance with the law.

Examined from whatever angle, the divorce alleged by the defense cannot be accepted
by this court for the reasons above set forth.

In view of the foregoing facts and considerations, we cannot escape the conclusion that
the defendant herein contracted a second marriage without her former marriage having
been first dissolved.

In the consideration of this case, however, the court cannot but take into account that the
defendant is a Mohammedan woman; and being a follower of Mohammedan doctrines
she no doubt contracted the second marriage honestly believing that in doing so she
was not committing any violation of the law, although of course her belief does not justify
her act.

In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the defendant is only seventeen years of
age and therefore in the opinion of the court it would be more convenient for her to be
sent to the Philippine Training School in Mandaluyong, Manila, (Rizal), it is ordered that
 the accused be sent to said institution, to be kept there until she reaches the age of
majority, all the proceedings in this case being hereby suspended.

The attorney for the defendant alleges that the lower court erred in finding that the accused
committed the crime of bigamy, and in ordering her to be sent to the Philippine Training School
in Mandaluyong, Rizal.

Appellant's attorney admits that the appellant was twice married as alleged in the information,
but contends that she was divorced from first husband in accordance with Mohammedan
religious practices, and that said divorce was valid; that if it be true that said divorce is not in
accordance with Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature, the appellant is nevertheless not
guilty of bigamy, because she believed that she had been validly divorced and had no criminal
intent when contracted the second marriage.

The Solicitor-General agrees with the attorney for the appellant, and is of the opinion that the
divorce was granted in accordance with the precepts of the Koran and Moro customs and
traditions; that fraudulent or criminal intent is an essential element of the crime of bigamy, and
that since the appellant believed that her first marriage had been legally dissolved because she
had been granted a divorce under the Mohammedan laws, she cannot be considered guilty of
the crime with which she is charged.

The Solicitor-General further argues that since it is the practice of the Government not to
interfere with the customs of the Moros, especially their religious customs, divorces among them
granted in accordance with the Koran ought to be recognized as a matter of public policy.

There is little to add to the well considered decision of the trial judge. It seems to us
unnecessary to determine whether or not the divorce in question was granted in accordance
with the Mohammedan religious practices, as to which there seems to exist considerable
uncertainty, because in our view of the case a valid divorce can be granted only by the courts
and for the reasons specified in Act No. 2710. It is not claimed that the appellant was divorced
from her first husband in accordance with said Act.lawphil.net

In the case of Francisco vs. Tayao (50 Phil., 42), it was held that in the Philippines the causes
for divorce are prescribed by statute or Act No. 2710 and that of the wife or concubinage on the
part of the husband.

In the recent decision of People vs. Bituanan (Moro), (56 Phil., 23), where the defendant and a
Moro woman were married by a datu according to Moro customs and usages and afterwards
divorced by the datu according to the same customs and usages, it was held that the marriage
performed according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion was valid, and assumed, for the
purpose of that case, that the defendant and his wife were not legally divorced.

Section 25 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) provides that marriages between Mohammedans
may be performed in accordance with the rites or practice of their religion, but there is no
provision of law which authorizes the granting of divorces in accordance with the rites or
practices of their religion.

A divorce cannot be had except in that court upon which the state has conferred jurisdiction,
and then only for those causes and with those formalities which the state has by statute
prescribed (19 C.J., 19).
It is conceded in all jurisdictions that public policy, good morals, and the interests of society
require that the marriage relation should be sounded with every safeguard and its severance
allowed only in the manner prescribed and for the causes specified by law. And the parties can
waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings (19 C.J., 20).

With respect to the contention that the appellant acted in good faith in contracting second
marriage, believing that she had been validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to
say that every one is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one does not know that is act
constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof. The case
of the United States vs. Enriquez (32 Phil., 202), cited by the Solicitor-General is not in point. In
that case the defendant left his wife in the municipality of Orion, Province of Bataan, in the year
1895, going to the Province of Laguna as a postal employee. When he returned in 1901, after
the revolution, he could not find his wife or obtain the slightest information as to her
whereabouts notwithstanding his persistent and diligent search. Believing her to be dead, he
contracted a second marriage in Orion on February 1st, 1905. In December, 1913, his first wife
made her appearance in Orion. She had been in Manila, Tarlac, and Victoria from 1895 to 1913.
The defendant was acquitted on appeal to this court because no fraudulent intent could be
charged to him. He believed that his first wife was dead, and that was a well-founded belief,
although it was subsequently to be erroneous. It was a mistake of fact and not of law.

The decisions of American courts, cited by the Solicitor- General, sustaining the validity of
divorces granted to members of Indian tribes according to the customs and usages thereof, are
likewise not in point. The various Indian tribes in the United States were dealt with by the
Government of the United States as independent nations and treaties were made with them.

As to the suggestion of the Solicitor-General that divorces among the Moros according to their
religious practices should be recognized as valid as a matter of public policy, because in the
contrary case, "there would be no end of criminal prosecutions, for polygamy still abounds
among them, and the remarriages of people divorced under the Koran are the order of the day,"
that is a matter for the consideration of the Legislature and the Governor-General.

The decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant.

Street, Malcolm, Abad Santos, and Butte, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22595             November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers
of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the
denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the
purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said
business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure
not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business
to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which,
among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as

well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question,
whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the
Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to
be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it
when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he
assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until
the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error.
It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted
ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being
contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed.  lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a
legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into
consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which
says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands
where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my
relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition
found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees
must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his
nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the
herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator,
as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil
Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should
the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when,
according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to
govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the
institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the
herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to
the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees,
and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

9. Minciano vs. Brimo Case Digest
Minciano vs. Brimo
50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924

Facts:

Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the
judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the
brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question
puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with the laws of his
Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition.

 Held:

Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen , though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern
the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore,
the testator’s national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code
9. Miciano vs. Brimo

G.R. No. L-22595, November 1, 1927 – Krist

Facts:

The judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased, Joseph Brimo, filed a scheme of
partition. However, one of the brothers of the deceased opposed the said partition.

According to the scheme and its provision, that the deceased requests that all his relatives
respect his wishes, otherwise those who opposed the same shall be cancelled in said
disposition in favor of the oppositor.

The apellant in the case, who opposed the same, based his opposition on the fact that the
deceased was a Turkish citizen, that his disposition should be in accordance with the laws of his
nationality.

Issue:

WON the disposition shall be made in accordance with Philippine Laws

WON there shall be cancellation of disposition/s in favor of the appellant-oppositor

Held:

No, although the disposition provides an express provision that it shall be governed by
Philippine Laws and those who opposed the condition of the provisions given shall be cancelled
from the disposition, the fact is that the condition itself is void for being contrary to law. Article
792 of the Civil Code provides:

“Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not
imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the
testator otherwise provide.”

It is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the decedent’s national law, according to
Article 10 of the Civil Code, such national law shall govern his testamentary dispositions.

Therefore, the institution of the legatees are unconditional and are valid, as well as those
favorable to herein appellant-oppositor.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20089      December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.

Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate
planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public
humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his
bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair
today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create
a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE

MAMA PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced
evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and
motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2,
1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at
this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that
should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed
submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his
counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The
counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence
— on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25,
1955.

Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on
September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the
parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel
informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has
appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged
excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that
defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,
must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3,
Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955
stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry
the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his
control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not
valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800,
December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere
surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on
evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October
30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner
to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to
defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in
default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).

In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is
contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an
action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-
14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere
breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be
perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract
marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4,
1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh.
C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were
purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn.,
6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,:
simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired
plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard
from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to
marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-
described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question
is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that
the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally
eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in
the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that
the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of
this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is
hereby affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
23. WASSMER VS. VELEZ 12 SCRA 648

Facts:

                Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love
decided to get married on September 4, 1954. On the day of the supposed marriage,
Velez left a note for his bride-to-be that day to postpone their wedding because his
mother opposes it. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from again.

                Beatriz sued Velez for damages and Velez failed to answer and was declared
in default. Judgement was rendered ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff  P2.000 as
actual damages P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages, P2,500 as attorney’s fees.

                Later, an attempt by the Court for amicable settlement was given chance but
failed, thereby rendered judgment hence this appeal.

Issue:

               Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:

                Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But

formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and
only to walk out of it when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This
is palpable and unjustifiable to good customs which holds liability in accordance with
Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.

                When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and
exemplary damages may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendanr
clearly  acted in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
 BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appeallant
No. L-20089. December 26, 1964

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided
to get married on September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the necessary preparations for
the wedding including making and sending wedding invitations, buying of wedding
dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities.

REPORT THIS AD

On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he will not
be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding.

And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her
that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. Therefore, Velez did not
appear and was not heard from again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in default.
On April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff
P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the costs.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because
of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for
breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an
action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral
damages against him.

Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:
This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary
to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an
award for moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further,
the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case
show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and
oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.