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International Relations: Is the Liberal Order in Retreat?
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Abstract
The process of modernization has resulted in the evolution of various policies starting from
industrialization to globalization, all for the sake of better world. There was a time when the
developed nations, rather the superpowers, were very excited to create a liberal world as the
process of establishing a globalized world, with formation of trade alliances and international
agreements. The world has witnessed the growth of the international relations with the
permeance of the UN, EU, NATO, ASEAN and NAFTA, setting the place for better
globalized trade. However, in recent times the world has witnessed the national and federal
agencies to concentrate on national sovereignty while neglecting or backing from the liberal
associations. The paper has elaborated about the future of liberal orders and their current
status, as to whether the nations are retreating, focusing on the global shocking incidents of
Brexit and European immigration predicament.
Keywords: Liberal World Order, Brexit, European Migration Backlash, Global Crisis,
Retreating liberationism
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Introduction
For more than seventy years, the world has been dominated by the western liberal order.
After the Second World War was over, the United States along with its partners, had built a
multifaceted as well as sprawling international order, which was organised around democratic
solidarity, security cooperation, multilateral institutions and economic openness. With the
expansion of the post-war order, there was also an expansion of the governance institutions.
Eventually, the WTO was launched, with further expansion of the NATO and then the G 20
took the centre stage (Ikenberry, 2018a). However, despite the development and expansion of
the liberal order, the order is approaching crisis.
The liberal order has always been dependent on the idea of progress. The Western
policymakers have always believed on the concepts of individual human rights, open markets
and democracy, which would act as the foundation that would eventually spread across
worldwide (Niblett, 2016). In the recent years, there have been rising debates associated with
the crisis of the global liberal order. Majority of the attention is devoted towards the growth
of the non-liberal players who have been challenging the foundations of the liberal
international order. The role of Europe in shaping the fundamental norms of the international
order has frequently been overshadowed by the predominant United States. However, Europe
has played crucial role in expanding the basic norms of the international liberal society
(Lucarelli, 2018).
Europe had been successful in the development of a system of regional integration that
comprises of all the fundamental principles of liberal order. These majorly include the liberal
democracy, continuity of the foreign and domestic policy, multilateralism, embedded
liberalism (that comprises of free trade and welfare systems), and a constitutionalisation of
the various international policies that based on the presumption of the presence of
fundamental sets of universal norms (Lucarelli, 2018). However, in the recent times, there
has been debate over the survival of liberal order that was followed within Europe and it is
anticipated that the liberal order is in crisis and would soon be retreating. The following
discussion would focus on elucidating the various aspects that are associated with the concept
of liberal order and the manner in which Europe has successfully integrated and influenced it.
Furthermore, the present state of liberal order in Europe and the impact of Brexit and the
European migration crisis on the existence of liberal order shall be explored.
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Analysis
Over the past few years, the European and US foreign policy makers have been increasingly
becoming anxious regarding the regarding the threats to the established liberal international
orders, particularly from the revisionist rising powers as well as authoritarian powers such as
Russia and China (Kundnani, 2017). Moreover, it has become quite ostensible that there has
been a decline in the support for the liberal order in the United States and Europe. This
particular aspect specifically obvious with the decision made by Britain to exit the European
union in June 2016 (Kundnani, 2017). This is majorly because the UK is considered to be
historically associated with the practice of liberalism and was perceived to be most
committed to the liberal international order.
It has been mentioned by Kundnani (2017) that the theorists of liberal order consider it to be
a “rule based and open international order” which is basically enshrined in the institutions
like the US and within the norms like multilateralism and the same was also opined by
Ikenberry (2011a). Kundnani (2017) has argued that liberalism implies the international
relations as well as political, and economic liberalism. On the other hand, Rodrik (2011)
argues that the concept of hyper-globalisation has been undermining the democracy, thereby
dejecting the political liberalism. However, as the liberal order is under crisis, due to the
various modern aspects, it is important that the Western policymakers as well as analysts
should focus towards reforming it in such manner, so that the same can be saved, as has also
been argued by Colgan and Keohane (2017).
Ikenberry (2011b) has demonstrated that the existing liberal international order is primarily a
fusion of the two distinct order building projects. These include the modern state system and
liberal order. The former is a project that is associated with the Peace of Westphalia during
1648, while the latter is led by the United States and the United Kingdom, which was aided
by the liberal ascendancy in the twentieth century. Moreover, Kundnani (2017) opines that
liberalism of the modern international system is fundamentally based on the older foundation
of order, which can be mentioned as ‘realist’ international order, instead of being called
‘liberal’ international order. As has been mentioned by Kundnani (2017), a straightforward
typology of the liberal order comprises of three major elements, namely, the human rights
order, the economic order and the security order. On the other hand, Kliman and Fontaine
(2012) mentions that the liberal international order comprises of five elements, namely, the
human rights order, the non-proliferation order, the maritime order, the financial order and
the trade order.
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As has been mentioned by Mearsheimer (2018) that an order is primarily a cluster of
international institutions that aid in governing the interactions amongst each of the member
states. These institutions are fundamentally, rules that states have devised themselves and
have agreed to follow on. This is because they have the belief that obeying the rules are in
their own favour. It has been opined by Mearsheimer (2018) that the rules prescribe
behaviours that are acceptable and proscribe the ones that are unacceptable. An order
comprises of varied kinds of institutions for inclusion of security institutions such as the
Warsaw Pact, SEATO, NATO, along with certain economic institutions such as NAFTA, the
World Bank, the IMF and the OECD. It also comprises of certain institutions that deal with
the issues associated with environment, such as the Paris Climate Agreement, as well as the
more multifaceted institutions such as the League of Nations, the United Nations and the
European Union as has been mentioned by Mearsheimer (2018).
Guzzini (2013) has argued that the definitional disorder associated with the concept of liberal
order is further complicated by the peculiarity that is associated with the scholarship in IR for
attaching varied meanings to certain key concepts of the political theories. It was also argued
by Guzzini (2013) that the International Relations are born out of practical knowledge and
practices of court societies on diplomacy and war. On the other hand, Szewczyk (2019)
argues that the liberal order is a complex quilt that comprises of several threads and layers
that have been incorporated over the time and comprises of varying protection and coverage,
with the primary objective of providing stability and minimisation of violence. ‘Order’
implies the set of norms and rules that govern the state as well as non-state behaviours via the
international law that are based on the multilateral treaties, the UN Charter and the political
standards that arise from the state practices.
There exists a difference in the perceptions of Westerns and non-Westerns, regarding the
liberal international order and the same illustrates the significance of thinking more
consistently and clearly regarding liberal order. Kundnani (2017) has mentioned that several
individuals appear to be comparatively relaxed regarding the aspects that are perceived to be
a crisis of the liberal order in the West. However, Kliman and Fontaine (2012) have
mentioned that the global swing states such as democracies like India and Brazil, are vital for
the future of the liberal international order. It was also highlighted by Kundnani (2017) that
some perceive the end of liberal international order as opportunity. As pointed out by
Kundnani (2017), Deo and Phatak (2016) had argued that the election of Donald Trump as
the president of the US has the potential of ‘dismantling the geopolitical Bretton Wood’ and
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thereby would result in the energisation of a multipolar world. This in turn implies that
Trump might be the unwitting catalyst that would cause a more equitable era.
It has been argued that the success of liberal orders to deliver the wider advantages to its
members with respect to political inclusion, prosperity and peace, have obfuscated the
diversity of the outcomes that are associated with the various segments of society that exists
within the order (Szewczyk, 2019). Although the process of globalisation has removed
poverty from millions, along with enriching the global elites, it has also been identified that
the same has occurred concurrently with the decline pf the middle class of the developed
world. Szewczyk, (2019) has mentioned that inequalities have developed in parts of Europe,
and particularly in the US, to the extent that some regard the foundational bargain as
primarily being unfair. Moreover, in Europe, the inequality in the income has risen as
opposed to the 1980s, although only to some extent with respect to the aggregate terms.
However, there exists less income inequality amongst the member states of the EU as
opposed to the US.
It has been mentioned by Ikenberry (2018b) that the power transition theories perceive a
strong association between the international order (beginning from its emergence, stability
and the decline), along with the rise and fall of the great powers. Kuhn, et al. (2016)
mentioned that the failure of the European Union in shouldering its responsibilities, with
respect to the governance of globalisation which would avoid the negative financial impacts
of globalisation that resulted in the rise of relative impoverishment and inequalities, has had
significant repercussions in the attitudes of Europeans towards the established elites and
Europe. Deudney, and Ikenberry (2018) have mentioned that the modern liberalism implies
that the world politics is in the need of new levels of political integrations due to the
inexorably rising interdependences.
It has been argued by Haass (2018) that the liberalism is in retreat and the democracies have
been feeling the impact of the rising populism. The different parties of political extremes
have been gaining grounds in Europe and the same can be witnessed with respect to the vote
in the UK that was in favour of exiting the EU, which attests for the loss of the elite
influence. It has also been argued by Haass (2018) that the attempts of building global
frameworks have been failing, while protectionism is rising and the global trade talks are not
in verge of reality, with very few rules in motion to govern the use of the cyberspace. It has
been argued that the rise of populism can be considered as one of the reasons for the
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stagnation of the income as well as job loss, which majorly owes to the novel technologies as
well as the immigrants and imports (Haass, 2018).
It has been opined by Porter (2018) the prospects of major changes within the international
system has been attracting a novel wave of literatures regarding the world order. There has
been a rise in the fear of end of the liberal international order primarily due to the rise of
economic protectionism, superpower unilateralism, political tribalism and authoritarian
nationalism. Szewczyk (2019) argues that the current debates that are associated with the
world order as well as its liberal subsets, majorly omit the role of Europe and treats it as an
origin of problems, a battleground or a bystander. However, with the fraying liberal order,
Europe has presented vital interests to defend it and aim towards mustering political
resources and will. It is said that the liberal order is under attack from both within as well as
outside the West (Szewczyk, 2019).
Empirical Section
To gain a better understanding regarding the concepts associated with liberal order and the
aspects relevant to it, the cases of Brexit and European Migration Crisis can be taken into
consideration. These two cases have highly affected the liberal order of Europe and has been
associated with the aspects of retreat of liberal order.
Case 1: Britain’s Exit from the EU – Brexit
Brexit is the existing crucial issue prevailing in Europe and beyond. The impact of Brexit to
the existing as well as the further European integration is not to be underestimated. Britain’s
vote to leave the European Union has had a major impact on the Western politics. The
alliance between the conservatives and socialists had rejected the status quo of
multiculturalism, mass immigration and remote bureaucracy so ass to favour a more
protected and self-governed settlement (Pabst, 2016). Pabst (2016) mentions that there is a
rise in a similar realignment in the European nations such as the Netherlands, France, Italy
and Austria, whereby the anti-EU parties have been forcing similar referenda or have been
aiming towards seizing the power altogether. The social democrats of Europe have been
experiencing an existential threat due to the decline in the base of traditional working class,
accompanied by the leave of former voters towards supporting Euro-sceptic alternatives
(Pabst, 2016).
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Bourgeot (2016) mentions that the Brexit campaign has illustrated the extent to which British
has resentment against the European Union. Furthermore, it has also been revealed from the
range of arguments that have been used in the United Kingdom as well as through the rest of
Europe that there exists a political complexity, along with the lack of economic debate that
would typify the relationship amongst the European nation, within the context of European
Union. Although the European institutions and majority of the national governments claim to
be following an economically ‘liberal’ approach, they appear not to be either agreeing on
what the notion implies or seek towards finding any common ground (Bourgeot, 2016).
Twining (2016) has mentioned that there exists unrest amongst several of the EU nations
regarding the suitability and efficacy of being associated with the EU. As has been mentioned
by Twining (2016) that in a research conducted by Pew Research Centre, over 60 per cent of
individuals in France comprise of negative views regarding the European Union and there
may appear French referendum which could potentially produce results that are similar to that
of British referendum of Brexit. Twining (2016) also mentions that Germans are evenly split
over the fact if the EU has been positive for their nation. It was also mentioned by Twining
(2016) that individuals in the Netherlands as well as elsewhere have been clamouring
regarding their own referendum on their EU memberships.
Twining (2016) mentions that the separation of the UK from the EU would imply that the US
is now required to pursue a multiprong transatlantic strategy, as it earlier considered Europe
to be a consolidated bloc. The US would be needed to engage its Atlantic alliance equally
across the EU headquarters in Brussels, NATO, Ankara, Warsaw, Paris, London and Berlin.
Moreover, unlike the ‘one stop shopping’ that was in operation when EU has the central role,
each of these elements would now be requiring separate handling due to the variance in the
perspectives within Europe on the different issues such as Russian revisionism, the crises in
the Middle East, and the future of the Transatlantic Investment and Trade Partnership
(Twining, 2016).
It has been mentioned in The Economist (2019) that the liberal democrats do not want the
Brexit to take place. The liberal democrats have opposing the Brexit and have been
demanding for a second referendum that does not include the exit of Britain from the EU.
However, the chances of Britain backing off from the Brexit offer appears to be likely to be
unconceivable. Lewis (2019) has also mentioned that the liberal democrats have been
opposing the decision of Brexit and being a strong supporter of the concept of liberal order as
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well as the amenities that are associated with it, they have been demanding second
referendum that would not be based on Brexit.
Despite the various views that have been presented with respect to the negative impact of
Brexit on the liberal order, Voeten (2016) has argued that Brexit does not necessarily imply
the end of the liberal international order. Voeten (2016) has highlighted that it is important to
focus on how Brexit would influence and reshape the liberal international order as there have
been evidences that the liberal international institutions have negatively affected the
economic interests of several large group of individuals. As per the economic theory, the
winners of the globalisation are required to compensate those who have not benefitted from
it, however, the same has not always happened (Voeten, 2016). Therefore, the case of Brexit
exemplifies that the liberal international order is in need of reformation so that the same can
be saved from being entirely retreated.
Case 2: European Immigration Crisis
The crisis of European migrant began in 2015 and is characterised by the high number of
individuals arriving in the European Union following the migrant crisis of Turkey, from
across the Mediterranean Sea and the overland through Southeast Europe. Diez (2019)
mentions that the issue of migration would remain central to the politics of Europe, while
raising the fundamental questions regarding the European societies, thereby challenging the
legitimacy of the system and raising the political strength of the nations in far right. It has
been argued by Diez (2019) that the arrival of the migrants to Europe highlighted the deep-
rooted differences that prevail through the continent, specifically regarding the tradition of
illiberal society against the practice of liberal democracy. Diez (2019) also highlights that
these were merely catalysts and not the cause.
To maintain the liberal order within the Europe, the Schengen Agreement of 1985 was
created that comprised of 26 European countries with the provision of free border controls.
As per the Agreement, if an individual is in one of the Schengen nation, they have the
provision of traveling freely to the other nations (although with exception to the Republic of
Ireland and the UK, however with the obligation to admit citizens of the EU nations) (Diez,
2019). This was primarily an effort of the EU leaders to get all the member nations to accept
a fair share of the refugees, however, the system failed. It has been mentioned by Diez (2019)
that the issue of migration is fundamentally associated with the multiculturism, sense of
belonging, identity and the fabric of the European society.
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Lucarelli (2018) has mentioned that the when the European migration crisis ascended in the
year 2015, arguments regarding multiculturalism were politically used for depicting migrants
as major threats to the ontological security of European Communities. The issues associated
with migration and cultural diversity were ultimately considered as the crucial arguments in
the debates that lead to the success of the Eurosceptic, nationalist, and largely the illiberal
forces that have won the referenda (or elections) in the UK, Austria, Poland and Hungary and
the ones that have had unprecedented electoral success in the Netherlands, Italy, France, and
Germany (Lucarelli, 2018).
Lucarelli (2018) has mentioned that the issue of migration is of specifically significant as the
same stands at the crossroads of the three challenges to the liberal orders of Europe, namely,
cultural, political and economic. For the European Union, coping with the issue of migration
comprises of triple strategic implications. Firstly, it infers envisaging the solutions towards
long term phenomenon which is to stay to for longer time. Secondly, it implies identification
of the ways for coping with the demographic downfall and economic inadequacies of Europe.
Thirdly, it involves figuring out the kind of actor that the European Union is and shall
become in the future (Lucarelli, 2018).
Due to sudden increase in the numbers of land and sea arrivals of the migrant as well as
asylum seekers in 2015, the EU had responded by implementing the packages of its Agenda
for migration that eventually shifted the balance from the dual aim of protecting its borders
and saving the lives of migrants, towards a stronger focus on the former (Ceccorulli, 2019).
Ceccorulli (2019) has argued that the reason for the trigger of this shift is associated with the
concern that the migration crisis had put one of the most significant achievements of the
European integrations at risk, that is the Schengen agreement. Moreover, due to the
temporary uncoordinated suspension of the Schengen agreement in many nations, along with
the construction of physical fences for stopping the flows of migration into Hungary and the
refusal by many states towards implementation of the relocation scheme that was envisaged
by the EU, the Commission was required to adopt a secondary implementation package that
raised the focus towards border protection.
Conclusion
As per the discussion that has been presented above, it is evident that the crisis associated
with the retreat or liberal order is majorly attributed to the various internal issues which have
emerged over the years. Although the liberal international order is not entirely ending,
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however, the same is gravely in on the edge of threat that it may get disintegrated soon.
Therefore, it can be stated that the key players associated with the management and uphold of
the liberal order be, should take appropriate measures to restore the balance that is associated
with it and reform or restructure the same so that it would be in alignment with the modern
global condition and favour the existing aspects.
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