The Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC and Election Officer of Bacolod City, Atty.

Majarucon

Facts:

1. On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size.
They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the
message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354.
The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case.

2. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team
Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were
classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay,"
while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay"

3. During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by
any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that
election.

4. Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice
to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The
election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from receipt for being oversized.
Petitioners replied requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by
COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of
legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.

5. COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise,
it will be constrained to file an election offense against petitioners. Concerned about the imminent threat
of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for
certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

6. They question respondents’ notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter issued on February 27, 2013.
They pray that: (1) the petition be given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from further proceeding in enforcing their
orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin; and (3) after notice and hearing, a decision be
rendered declaring the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently
restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar order.

7. After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013. On
March 13, 2013, respondents filed their comment arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before this court is not the proper remedy to question the notice
and letter of respondents
ISSUE: Whether the February 22, 2013 Notice/Order by Election Officer Majarucon and the February 27,
2013 Order by the Comelec Law Department are considered judgments/final orders/resolutions of the
COMELEC which would warrant a review of this Court via Rule 65 Petition
A. Whether petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts doctrine and jurisprudential rules
governing appeals from COMELEC Decisions
B. Assuming arguendo that the aforementioned orders are not considered judgments/final
orders/resolutions of the COMELEC, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would allow this
Court to take cognizance of the case

RATIO:

1. Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter are not final
orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its
adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise
objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil
action, there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law.

2. Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court, whose
power to review is "limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered
in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power." Instead, respondents claim that the assailed
notice and letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the
Constitution on COMELEC’s power to decide all questions affecting elections. Respondents invoke cases
to illustrate how judicial intervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the
COMELEC En Banc. These cases are not applicable.

In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC: We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution] to mean final
orders, rulings and decisionsof the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division,
certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to review via certiorari,
an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.

3. However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to
this general rule. This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a
motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves
the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and
speedy remedy available.

4. Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral contests —
despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC En Banc, if:

1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;

2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;
3) The issue involves the protection of labor;
 4) The decision or resolution sought tobe set aside is a nullity; or
5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy
available.

Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repol and decided that the status quo ante order issued by the
COMELEC Division was unconstitutional.

5. Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as precedents
to oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited involve election protests or
disqualification cases filed by the losing candidate against the winning candidate. In the present case,
petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to assert their fundamental
right to expression. Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the implementation
of its regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcing
election laws.

6. Nothing less than the electorate’s political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by
COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the desire to be heard and understood, to move people to
action. COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents’ acts are capable of repetition.
Under the conditions in which it was issued and in view of the novelty of this case,it could result in a
"chilling effect" that would affect other citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the
elections. Other citizens who wish to express their views regarding the election and other related issues
may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the COMELEC. Direct resort to this court is allowed
to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural platform for raising grave abuse of
discretion.

7. Respondents reliance of Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution is misplaced. We are not
confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused
it. We are confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its
acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful political speech. It is clear that
the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech. This
does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word "affecting" in this
provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to decide any and
allquestions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections should
not operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.

8. The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution.
This provision provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution. Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this court’s
power to review. During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of
discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional
mandate to protect the people against government’s infringement of their fundamental rights. This
constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC. It will, thus, be manifest
injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.
9. On Hierarchy of courts:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the
policy is not to be ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield
the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the lower courts,
and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the
Constitution has assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important reasons exist
to justify an exception to the policy.

The Supreme Court is a court of last ‘resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not
be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefore. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be presented.
This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised
in the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners.

10. We have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must
be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition toassail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive
branches of the government. In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only
petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases.
The case before this court involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political
landscape. This has become a rare occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political
discourse.

11. A second exception is when the issuesinvolved are of transcendental importance.74 In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for
prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts
from the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and
freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this
decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of
elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the
right to vocalize that choice to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said
that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The
protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this
court.

12. Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. This court finds that this is indeed
a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the right of suffrage includes the right
of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court has yet to provide substantial answers to,
through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.

13. Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In this case, it is this court,
with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed
issuances.

14. Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013
election period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that
necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct
resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In this
case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower
courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may
place in the same situation. Besides, thiscourt affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers
and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of
respondents, in order that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.

15. Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of
their right to freedom of expression.

In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally
compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the
course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.

16. Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to
be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past,
questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts included citizens’ right to bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters’
registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office. This case also poses a question of similar,
if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.

It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct
resort to this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the
recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.
 Aquino v Municipality of Malay (Francisco) question; that since the area is a forestland, it is
September 29, 2014 | Justice Velasco, Jr. | Rule 65 - the DENR — and not the municipality of Malay,
Certiorari or any other local government unit for that matter
— that has primary jurisdiction over the area, and
FACTS: that the Regional Executive Director of DENR-
1. Petitioner Crisostomo Aquino is the president Region 6 had officialy issued an opinion
and chief executive officer of Boracay Island regarding the legal issues involved in the present
West Cove Management Philippines, Inc case; that the Ordinance admits of exceptions; and
2. The company applied for a zoning compliance lastly, that it is the mayor who should be blamed
with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan. for not issuing the necessary clearances in the
While the company was already operating a resort company's favor.
in the area, the application sought the issuance of 6. CA dismissed the petition solely on the ground
a building permit covering the construction of a that the special writ of certiorari can only be
three-storey hotel over a parcel of land in Sitio directed against a tribunal, board, or officer
Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, exercising judicial or quasi-judical functions, and
Malay, Aklan covered by a covered by a Forest since the issuance of EO 10 was done in the
Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes exercise of executive functions, and not of judicial
(FLAgT) issued by the DENR. or quasi-judicial functions, certiorari will not lie.
3. The Municipal Zoning Administrator denied Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner,
Aquino’s application on the ground that the according to the CA, is to file a petition for
proposed construction site was within the “no declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court.
build zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance Aquino appeals to the SC.
2000-131 (Ordinance). The appeal of Aquino to
the Office of the City Mayor was denied.
4. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the ISSUE:
municipal government, enjoining the expansion 1. WoN the petition for certiorari is proper. – YES
of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of 2. WoN the Municipality of Aklan committed grave
the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO abuse of discretion in the issuance of EO 10. - NO.
10, ordering the closure and demolition of
Boracay West Cove's hotel. RULING: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
5. Alleging that the order was issued and executed petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision
with grave abuse of discretion, petitioner filed a and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Petition for Certiorari with prayer for No. 120042 dated August 13, 2013 and February 3, 2014,
injunctive relief with the CA. He argued that respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
judicial proceedings should first be conducted
before the respondent mayor could order the RATIO:
demolition of the company's establishment; that
Boracay West Cove was granted a FLAgT by the WoN Certiorari is the proper remedy. YES.
DENR, which bestowed the company the right to 1. For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must
construct permanent improvements on the area in establish the concurrence of the following
 requisites: judicial nature."
a. The writ is directed against a tribunal 4. In the case at bench, the assailed EO 10 was
board, or officer exercising judicial or issued upon the respondent mayor's finding that
quasi-judicial functions Boracay West Cove's construction, expansion,
b. Such tribunal, board, or officer has acted and operation of its hotel in Malay, Aklan is
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or illegal. Such a finding of illegality required the
with grave abuse of discretion respondent mayor's exercise of quasi-judicial
amounting to lack of excess of functions, against which the special writ of
jurisdiction; certiorari may lie. Hence, the CA erred in ruling
c. There is no appeal or any plain speedy, that the respondent mayor was merely exercising
and adequate remedy in the ordinary his executive functions, for clearly, the first
course of law. requisite for the special writ has been satisfied.
2. The CA fell into a trap when it ruled that a mayor, 5. We likewise hold that the third element, i.e., the
an officer from the executive department, unavailability of a plain, speedy, or adequate
exercises an executive function whenever he remedy, is also present herein. While it may be
issues an Executive Order. This is tad too argued that, under the LGC, Executive Orders
presumptive for it is the nature of the act to be issued by mayors are subject to review by
performed, rather than of the office, board, or provincial governors, this cannot be considered as
body which performs it, that determines whether an adequate remedy given the exigencies of
or not a particular act is a discharge of judicial or petitioner's predicament.
quasi-judicial functions. The first requirement for 6. In a litany of cases, We have held that it is
certiorari is satisifed if the officers act judicially inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal
in making their decision, whatever may be their remedies and the danger of failure of justice
public character. without the writ, that must usually determine the
3. It is not essential that the challenged proceedings propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy
should be strictly and technically judicial, in the and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
sense in which that word is used when applied to petitioner from the injurious effects of the
courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court
quasi-judicial. To contrast, a party is said to be or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant
exercising a judicial function where he has the need not mark time by resorting to the less speedy
power to determine what the law is and what legal remedy of appeal in order to have an order
rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to annulled and set aside for being patently void for
determine these questions and adjudicate upon the failure of the trial court to comply with the Rules
rights of the parties, whereas quasi-judicial of Court.
function is "a term which applies to the actions, 7. The CA should have proceeded to grab the bull by
discretion, etc., of public administrative officers its horns and determine the existence of the
or bodies . . . required to investigate facts or second element of certiorari — whether or not
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
draw conclusions from them as a basis for their respondents.
official action and to exercise discretion of a
WoN the Municipality of Malay committed grave abuse of to order the closure and removal of
discretion in the issuance of EO 10. NO. illegally constructed establishments for
failing to secure the necessary permits.
1. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a 3. In the case at bar, petitioner admittedly failed to
particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing secure the necessary permits, clearances, and
is a nuisance per se. exemptions before the construction, expansion,
2. Despite the hotel's classification as a nuisance per and operation of Boracay Wet Cove's hotel in
accidens, however, We still find in this case that Malay, Aklan. To recall, petitioner declared that
the LGU may nevertheless properly order the the application for zoning compliance was still
hotel's demolition. This is because, in the exercise pending with the office of the mayor even though
of police power and the general welfare clause, construction and operation were already ongoing
property rights of individuals may be subjected to at the same time. As such, it could no longer be
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the denied that petitioner openly violated Municipal
objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, Ordinance 2000-1311.
the government may enact legislation that may 4. Petitioner cannot justify his position by passing
interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful the blame onto the respondent mayor and the
businesses and occupations to promote the latter's failure to act on his appeal for this does not,
general welfare. in any way, imply that petitioner can proceed with
a. One such piece of legislation is the his infrastructure projects. On the contrary, this
LGC, which authorizes city and only means that the decision of the zoning
municipal governments, acting through administrator denying the application still stands
their local chief executives, to issue and that petitioner acquired no right to construct
demolition orders. Under existing laws, on the no build zone. The illegality of the
the office of the mayor is given powers construction cannot be cured by merely tendering
not only relative to its function as the payment for the necessary fees and permits since
executive official of the town; it has also the LGU's refusal rests on valid grounds.
been endowed with authority to hear 5. Instead of taking the law into his own hands,
issues involving property rights of petitioner could have filed, as an alternative, a
individuals and to come out with an petition for mandamus to compel the respondent
effective order or resolution thereon. 20 mayor to exercise discretion and resolve the
Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of controversy pending before his office. There is
the LGC, which empowered the mayor indeed an exception to the rule that matters

1
(a) No building or structure shall be allowed to start construction 2. The proposed construction has been duly endorsed by the
unless a Building Permit therefore has been duly issued by the Sangguniang Bayan through a Letter of Endorsement.
Office of the Municipal Engineer. Once issued, the building owner (b) Only buildings/structures which has complied with all the
or any person in charge of the construction shall display on the lot requirements for its construction as veri ed to by the Building
or on the building undergoing construction a placard containing the Inspector and the Sangguniang Bayan shall be issued a Certi cate
Building Permit Number and the date of its issue. The office of the of Occupancy by the O ce of the Municipal Engineer.
Municipal Engineer shall not issue any building permit unless: (c) No Business or Mayor's Permit shall be issued to businesses
1. The proposed construction has been duly issued a Zoning being undertaken on buildings or structures which were not issued
Clearance by the Office of the Municipal Zoning Officer; a certificate of Occupancy beginning January 2001 and thereafter.
 involving judgment and discretion are beyond the
reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may
be issued to compel action in those matters, when
refused. Whether or not the decision would be for
or against petitioner would be for the respondent
mayor to decide, for while mandamus may be
invoked to compel the exercise of discretion, it
cannot compel such discretion to be exercised in
a particular way. What would have been
important was for the respondent mayor to
immediately resolve the case for petitioner to be
able to go through the motions that the zoning
clearance application process entailed.
6. Thus, aside from complying with the provisions
in the FLAgT granted by the DENR, it was
incumbent on petitioner to likewise comply with
the no build zone restriction under Municipal
Ordinance 2000-131, which was already in force
even before the FLAgT was entered into. On this
point, it is well to stress that Sections 6 and 8 of
the Ordinance do not exempt petitioner from
complying with the restrictions since these
provisions adverted to grant exemptions from the
ban on constructions on slopes and swamps, not
on the no build zone.
Calim v. Guerrero, et. al. of Van on the Run is Felipe Castro, who was a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna, and one of the
TOPIC: Rule 65; on mandamus private respondents herein.
FACTS: • Finally, on 4 October 2001, Mayor Acero cancelled the mayor’s
permit to operate ELTTS based on the recommendation of the
• Petitioner Calim operates Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Sangguniang Bayan in Kapasiyahan Bilang 81 T-2001.
Services (ELTTS) in Laguna. Private respondent Roberto J. Acoba • On 1 February 2002, six of the eleven private respondents,
was the Vice-Mayor of Siniloan, Laguna. namely, Felipe A. Em, Noel Laberinto, Homer Serrano, Eligio de
• Private respondents Go, Serrano, Em, et. al. were councilors of the Leon, Hector A. Maneja, and Sedfrey Realeza filed a joint Counter-
Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan, Laguna. Affidavit.
• Petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the o They contended that there was nothing irregular in the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon against private respondents for issuance of Kapasiyahan Bilang 81 T-2001, as the same
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and was merely a request to the municipal mayor for cancellation
Corrupt) and Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 6713. of the mayor’s permit after a finding on their part that the
• Petitioner’s allegations: petitioner violated the terms and conditions set in the permit.
o He was given a mayor’s permit from the municipal o They similarly contested petitioner’s use of air-conditioned
government of Siniloan, Laguna, for his tours and tourist vans to transport passengers from Siniloan to Manila on the
services business. ground that such a purpose was outside the permit which
o He applied for the registration of his business name with the was granted to petitioner. Petitioner merely applied for a
Regional Office of DTI in San Pablo City, initially indicating booking office to be established in his residence.
therein as first priority the name, Mabuhay Tours and Tourist o Van on the Run, the alleged business competitor of ELTTS
Services for his business. was established as a civic organization and not for profit or
o However, he was advised by such office to change the name commerce.
to Eastern Laguna Tours and Tourist Services, and • After an exchange of pleadings between the parties, the Office of
thereafter, was issued a Certification of Registration the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, through Graft Investigation
o He informed Mayor Acero, through the Municipal Business Officer I Bagro:
License Office, of the fact of change of the name Mabuhay o issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal of
Tours and Tourist Services to Eastern Laguna Tours and petitioner’s Complaint for lack of probable cause.
Tourist Services. • The recommendation was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman
o A certain Amador Igos filed a letter-complaint with the for Luzon, Jesus F. Guerrero.
Sangguniang Bayan of Siniloan alleging the absence of a o The Deputy Ombudsman resolved that the recommendation
franchise of public conveyance on the part of ELTTS. to cancel petitioner’s permit was substantiated with enough
• Ultimately, on 22 August 2001, the Sangguniang Bayan of bases, and the action of private respondents Sangguniang
Siniloan, Laguna in Kapasiyahan Bilang 81 T-2001, Bayan members of Siniloan, Laguna, did not constitute a
unanimously recommended the cancellation of the municipal violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
license and permit issued to ELTTS. o The Deputy Ombudsman issued a Joint Order where it only
o Thus, the operations of his business ceased, thereby, admonished the respondents to be more circumspect in the
causing him injury, and giving unwarranted benefits and performance of their duties
advantage to his competitor, Van on the Run. The president
 • With this PETITIONER FILED THE INSTANT PETITION FOR • Mandamus, therefore, is employed to compel the performance,
MANDAMUS (seeking to compel the public respondents to file the when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use and not a
appropriate information against private respondents) discretionary duty.
• PETITIONER’S MAIN CONTENTION:
In relation to exercise of discretion of a public officer
o Petitioner submits that the public respondents should have
filed the proper information with the proper court for the • Mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of
criminal violation by private respondents of the aforesaid discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said
Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 6713. public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in
o Otherwise stated, petitioner theorizes that public reference to any matter in which he is required to act.
respondents can be compelled by a writ of mandamus o It is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
to file a criminal information against the private court.
respondents for their violation, instead of merely
admonishing them, as it did in the assailed Joint Order Application to the case
of 4 November 2002.
▪ According to him, the Complaint was for a criminal • What Petitioner attacks in the instant Petition is the order of the
offense, and not simply a case of administrative Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in admonishing the
misfeasance. private respondents. The case partakes of an administrative
disciplinary nature.
ISSUE: • In this case, petitioner was not able to establish his entitlement
to a writ of mandamus.
Whether a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be
• Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he has a clear legal right to
cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case?
compel the public respondents to file a criminal information against
– NO
the private respondents.
HELD: • The Supreme Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise
of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
Discussion on mandamus compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
o Said exercise of powers is based upon his constitutional
• Mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is
mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise.
founded clearly on law and not when it is doubtful. In varying
o Courts have upheld the wide latitude of investigatory and
language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights
prosecutorial powers that the Ombudsman enjoys; and such
may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-
powers are virtually free from executive, legislative or judicial
defined, clear and certain.
intervention.
• A writ of mandamus can be issued only when petitioner’s legal right
o The rationale of this rule is based not only upon respect for
to the performance of a particular act which is sought to be
the investigatory and prosecutory powers that the Office of
compelled is clear and complete.
the Ombudsman is granted under the present Constitution,
• What is a “clear legal right”? but upon practicality as well; otherwise, the functions of
o A right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as
the courts would be perilously bound by numerous
a matter of law.
petitions assailing the result of the investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office, in much the same
way that the courts would be saturated if compelled to review
 the prosecutors’ exercise of discretion each time they decide
to file an information or dismiss a complaint.
• The discretion to prosecute or dismiss a complaint filed before
it is lodged in the Office of the Ombudsman itself. To compel
the Ombudsman to further pursue a criminal case against the
private respondents, as petitioner would have it, is outside the
ambit of the courts.

In relation to Office of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure

• The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman clearly

provides the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude of
discretion in determining what and which acts to prosecute criminally
and/or administratively.
• In the instant case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman opted,
based on the evidence on hand, to only administratively
admonish the private respondents, a penalty which is in fine tune
with the mandate of Rule IV, Section 52 (C) (13) of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service

Petition for Mandamus DISMISSED.

Kalipunan v. Robredo • It also argued that the Constitution allows evictions and demolitions to be
G.R. No. 200903 conducted even without court order provided they are done in accordance
July 22, 2014 with law and in a just and humane society.

FACTS: Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners’ ISSUE: Whether the filing of petition for prohibition and mandamus before the
Association as well as the individual petitioners, Fernando Sevilla, Estrelieta Bagasbas, Supreme Court is proper? No.
Jocy Lopez, Elvira Vidol and Delia Frayres, were/are occupying parcels of land owned
by and located in the cities of San Juan, Navotas and Quezon (collectively, the LGUs). RULING:
These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to Section
28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 (Urban Development Housing Act) in order to give way to the
implementation and construction of infrastructure projects in the areas illegally The petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts when they directly
occupied by the petitioners. filed the petition before the Court.

Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279 authorize evictions and The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to
demolitions without any court order when: the Court with their petition for prohibition and mandamus. The petitioners appear to
have forgotten that the Supreme Court is a court of last resort, not a court of first
instance. The hierarchy of courts should serve as a general determinant of the
1. persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions.
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks,
roads, parks, and playgrounds; and The concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the
Regional Trial Courts to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
2. persons or entities occupy areas where government habeas corpus and injunction does not give the petitioners the unrestricted freedom of
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to choice of forum.
be implemented.
By directly filing Rule 65 petitions before us, the petitioners have unduly taxed the
On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to matters within our exclusive
before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et jurisdiction. Worse, the petitioners only contributed to the overcrowding of the Court’s
al. (the public respondents) to first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the docket. We also wish to emphasize that the trial court is better equipped to resolve
court prior to their implementation of Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA 7279. cases of this nature since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake an examination of the contending parties’ evidence.

The petitioners justify their direct recourse before this Court by generally averring that The petitioners wrongly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and
they have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
mandamus.

Respondents (Mayors of Navotas, San Juan Quezon City and DILG) prays for the The writ of prohibition only lies against the tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
outright dismissal of the petition for its serious procedural defects on the basis of the person's exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. The court
following grounds: issues a writ of prohibition to afford the aggrieved party a relief against the respondent's
usurpation or grave abuse of jurisdiction or power.
• Petitioners ignored hierarchy of courts when they directly filed Rule 65 petition
before the Supreme Court. In addition, the filing of petition for prohibition and • Both judicial and quasi-judicial functions involve the determination of what the
mandamus in assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 28 of RA 7279 is incorrect. law is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to
It added that the writ of prohibition is merely to prevent public respondent’s the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the
usurpation of power or improper assumption of jurisdiction. While the writ of adjudication of their respective rights.
mandamus only commands the public respondent to perform his ministerial
functions. On the other hand, a petition for mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person who unlawfully neglects the performance
• Petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of discretion that the of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station
Mayor of Navotas allegedly committed. Failed to present any justiciable or who unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
controversy because the petitioners have been successfully evicted by some office to which such other is entitled. Thus, a writ of mandamus will only issue to
LGUs compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty. It will not control a public officer's
exercise of discretion as where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his respondents. They merely imputed jurisdictional abuse through general averments,
judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act precisely because without any basis to support their claim.
it is his judgment that is to be exercised, not that of the court.
• Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action"; it is rooted in the
• Ministerial duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of principle of separation of powers and is thus merely an offshoot of the
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or equal branches of the government.
impropriety of the act done.
The Court emphasized that they are not trier of facts and this applies with greater force
In this case, the petitioners seek to prohibit the respondents from implementing Section to Rule 65 petitions which are
28 (a) and (b) of RA 72791 without a prior court order of eviction and/or demolition. The original and independent actions. To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally
provisions of said law shows that the acts complained of are beyond scope of the domain of the executive department, the petitioners must establish facts that are
prohibition and mandamus. The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the necessarily linked to the jurisdictional problem they presented in this case, i.e., whether
public respondents have discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or the public respondents exercised their power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
demolitions shall be performed. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free reason of passion or personal hostility in implementing Section 28 (a) and (b) of RA
7279.
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.
Since the petitioners failed to establish that the public respondents' alleged abuse of
The time when the public respondents shall carry out evictions and/or demolitions discretion was so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, this
under Section 28 (a), (b), and (c) of RA 7279 is merely discretionary, and not ministerial,
petition must necessarily fail.
judicial or quasi-judicial. The duty is discretionary if the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer and gives him the right to decide when the duty shall be performed.

Constitutionality of Sec. 28 RA 7279 is not the lis mota of the case. Even
assuming that the petition is one for certiorari, the petition still failed to show the
essential requisites that would warrant Court’s exercise of judicial review.

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the courts will not determine the
constitutionality of a law unless the following requisites are present:

(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal

rights susceptible of judicial determination;
(2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of the party
raising the constitutional question;
(3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision
of the case.

The case no longer presents justiciable controversy, save for the petition pertaining to
the City of Quezon’s threats. The mayors of Navotas and San Juan had already
successfully evicted the concerned petitioners in their respective cities.

The constitutionality of Sec.28 RA 7279 is not the lis mota of the case because they
failed to compellingly show the necessity of examining the constitutionality of the said
law. Moreover, they failed to substantiate grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

1
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. — Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations: (a) When playgrounds; (b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, implemented; or (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
 Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council 5. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015
ARGUMENTS
FACTS
Petitioner:
1. Petitioner directly came to this Court via a Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and 1. In his petition, he argued that:
Declaratory Relief with prayer for the issuance of a a) the Constitution already prescribed the
temporary restraining order and/or writ of qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC
preliminary injunction to assail the policy of the could add no more;
Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of b) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
service as judges of first-level courts before they can equal protection and due process clauses of the
qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the Constitution; and
ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with c) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
grave abuse of discretion. constitutional provision on Social Justice and
2. The petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of
the MTC in Compostela Valley Province. He applied for Employment.
the vacant position of 3 branches in the RTC. d) The petitioner also asserted that the requirement
3. In a letter, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and of the Prejudicature Program mandated by
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not Section 10 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8557 5
included in the list of candidates for the said stations. As should not be merely directory and should be
a response, petitioner sent a letter, through electronic fully implemented. He further alleged that he has
mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the all the qualifications for the position prescribed
list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion by the Constitution and by Congress, since he
of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature has already complied with the requirement of 10
examination. years of practice of law.
4. The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive
Officer, , that his protest and reconsideration was duly Respondents (JBC and OSG):
noted but its decision not to include his name in the list 1. The petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed
of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy does not violate the equal protection and due
policy of opening the chance for promotion to second- process clauses:
level courts to incumbent judges who have served in a. the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to
their current position for at least five years, and since the prevent the JBC from performing its principal
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, function under the Constitution to recommend
he was excluded from the list. appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not
 a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial • As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo,
function; etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al.,
b. the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will 10 this Court explained that:
not lie because the petitioner has no clear legal right
that needs to be protected; With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of
c. the equal protection clause is not violated because certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
the classification of lower court judges who have scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition
served at least five years and those who have may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed
served less than five years is valid as it is not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
performance and experience based; and exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions
d. there is no violation of due process as the policy is but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave
merely internal in nature. abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
ISSUE and DECISION
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
WON the remedy of Certiorari Prohibition and Mandamus and quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
action for Declaratory Relief was properly invoked? Yes to expressly authorized by the text of the second
Certiorari and Prohibition (No to the Mandamus and Declaratory paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Relief)
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
Certiorari and Prohibition to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative
and executive officials. (Citation omitted)
• "The present Rules of Court uses two special civil
actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of Applied to the case
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. • In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall
These are: within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
1. the special civil actions for certiorari and exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the
2. prohibition process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC
neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor
assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-
and both are governed by Rule 65." judicial prerogative.
• However, since the formulation of guidelines and
criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now
assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise
 of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was
determination must be made on whether the JBC violated when he was not included in the list of
has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and that his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these
enforcing the said policy. stations has caused him direct injury.
• Besides, the Court can appropriately take • It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus
cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's that the applicant should have a clear legal right to
power of supervision over the JBC. the thing demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of the respondent to perform the act required.
The power of supervision is the power of oversight, • The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is
or the authority to see that subordinate officers such a clear legal right to the performance of the act,
perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the
rules governing the conduct of a government entity respondent to perform the act.
are observed and complied with. Supervising officials • The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies
see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves
only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty,
do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the
not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of discretion
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, they may order the work done or and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually
redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may exclusive.
not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act.
They have no discretion on this matter except to see Applied to the case
to it that the rules are followed. • The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or
review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course
of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the
• Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the
petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The
Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees
with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the
for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not
policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the ministerial.
Court, through its supervisory authority over the
• Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be
JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies.
ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Possession of the constitutional and statutory
qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be
Mandamus
used to legally demand that one's name be included in
• The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the
the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's
petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner
Worldwide Web Corporation and Cherryll L. Yu vs. People of the through the PSTN of the called number to complete the
Philippines and Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company circuit.
(Pldt) | G.R. No. 161106 ii. In contrast, petitioners were able to provide international
long distance call services to any part of the world by
Planet Internet Corp vs. PLDT | G.R. No. 161266 using PLDT’s telephone lines, but bypassing its IGF. This
scheme constitutes toll bypass, a "method of routing and
January 13, 2014 | SERENO, CJ: completing international long distance calls using lines,
cables, antenna and/or wave or frequency which
Facts: connects directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the originating country or the country where
1. Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special the call is originated."
b. According to Gali:
Operations Office (RISOO) of the PNP filed applications for
i. A phone number serviced by PLDT and registered to
warrants before the RTC Quezon City to search the office premises
of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) located Eastwood WWC was used to provide a service called GlobalTalk,
City, Libis, Quezon City, and the office premises of petitioner Planet "an internet-based international call service, which can be
Internet Corporation (Planet Internet) located at Pasig City. availed of via prepaid or billed/post-paid
2. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll accounts." During a test call using GlobalTalk, Gali dialed
bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of P.D. the local PLDT telephone number 6891135, the given
1041 to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance access line. After a voice prompt required him to enter the
Telephone Company (PLDT). user code and PIN provided under a GlobalTalk pre-paid
3. RTC conducted a hearing on applications for search warrants. The account, he was then requested to enter the destination
applicant, Rivera and Gali of Alternative Calling Pattern Detection number, which included the country code, phone number
and a pound (#) sign. The call was completed to a phone
Division of PLDT testified as witnesses. They basically stated in
their testimonies that PLDT committed toll bypass, theft and number in Taiwan. However, when he checked the
committed unauthorized installation of telephone connections. records, it showed that the call was only directed to the
(NOTE: par. a – c contain the testimonies of the witnesses, just in local number 6891135.
case sir asks. But this is not related to the issue for remrev) ii. This indicated that the international test call using
a. According to Rivera: GlobalTalk bypassed PLDT’s IGF. Based on the records
of PLDT, telephone number 6891135 is registered to
i. A legitimate international long distance call should pass
through the local exchange or public switch telephone WWC. However, upon an ocular inspection conducted by
network (PSTN) on to the toll center of one of the Rivera at this address, it was found that the occupant of
international gateway facilities (IGFs) in the Philippines. the unit is Planet Internet, which also uses the telephone
The call is then transmitted to the other country through lines registered to WWC. These telephone lines are
voice circuits, either via fiber optic submarine cable or interconnected to a server and used as dial-up access
microwave radio using satellite facilities, and passes the lines/numbers of WWC. Since PLDT lines and equipment
toll center of one of the IGFs in the destination country. had been illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of
The toll center would then meter the call, which will pass equipment that routed the international calls and
bypassed PLDT’s IGF, they violated P.D. No. 401 as

1
Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other
Acts
 amended, on unauthorized installation of telephone b. Toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime;
connections. c. Search warrants were general warrants; and
iii. Petitioners also committed theft, because through their d. Objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous
misuse of PLDT phone lines/numbers and equipment and tree.
with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole business and 8. PLDT filed a Consolidated Opposition to the motions to quash.
revenues that rightly belong to PLDT. Moreover, they RTC granted motions to quash because they were in the nature
acted contrary to the letter and intent of R.A. No. 7925, of general warrants. Thus, properties seized under the said
because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they evaded the warrants were ordered released to petitioners.
payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while 9. PLDT filed an MR but it was denied because it failed to get the
"piggy-backing" on its multi-million dollar facilities and conformity of the City Prosecutor prior to filing the motion as
infrastructure, thus stealing its business revenues from required under Rule 110, Sec. 5 of ROC.
international long distance calls. 10. PLDT appealed to the CA. CA reversed and set aside RTC
iv. Petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum resolutions and declared the search warrants valid and
Circular No. 6-2-92 of the National Telecommunications effective.
Commission (NTC) prohibiting the use of customs 11. Petitioners separately filed an MR of CA ruling. It argued that PLDT
premises equipment (CPE) without first securing type should have filed a petition for certiorari rather than an appeal when
approval license from the latter. it questioned the RTC resolutions before the CA. MR denied.
c. Based on a five-day sampling of the phone line of petitioners, 12. Rule 45 Petitions were separately filed by petitioners WWC and
PLDT computed a monthly revenue loss of ₱764,718.09. Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet to assail the CA Decision and
PLDT likewise alleged that petitioners deprived it of foreign Resolution. SC consolidated the 2 Petitions.
exchange revenues, and evaded the payment of taxes,
license fees, and charges, to the prejudice of the government. Issue: Whether CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal
4. During the hearing, RTC required identification of the office (Petitioners argue that quashal orders should have been assailed
premises/units to be searched as well as their floor plans showing via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65)? NO.
the location of particular computers and servers that would be
taken. Ratio:
5. RTC granted the application for search warrants and issued the
search warrants authorizing the police officers to seize objects An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued
stated therein. The warrants were implemented on the same day by independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, partakes of a
RISOO operatives of the NCR Police Office. final order that can be the proper subject of an appeal.
6. Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 CPUs, 10 monitors,
numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer. Petitioners claim that since the RTC ruling on the motions to quash was
Even personal diskettes of Planet Internet’s employees were interlocutory, it cannot be appealed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of PLDT should have filed a Rule 65 petition instead. Petitioners cite, as
international calls, such as the President’s Office and the authority for their position, Marcelo v. de Guzman where the Court held
Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as that:
reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
7. Petitioners WWC and Cherryll Yu, and Planet Internet filed their
Where accused in criminal proceeding has petitioned for the
respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing
return of goods seized, the order of restoration by an inferior
basically the same grounds:
court is interlocutory and hence, not appealable; likewise, a
a. the search warrants were issued without probable cause,
denial, by the US District Court, of defendant's petition for the
since the acts complained of did not constitute theft;
 return of the articles seized under a warrant is such an An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity
interlocutory order. of the public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party
personality to question an order quashing search warrants.
A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole
subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, Rule 110, Sec. 5 of ROC states the general rule that the public
leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of "(a)ll criminal
been determined; on the other hand an order is interlocutory if actions commenced by a complaint or information." However, a search
it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information,
more to be done upon its merits. Tested against this criterion, but by the filing of an application therefor.
the search warrant issued in Criminal Case No. 558 is
indisputably of interlocutory character because it leaves Furthermore, an application for a search warrant is a "special criminal
something more to be done in the said criminal case, i.e., the process," rather than a criminal action.
determination of the guilt of the accused therein.
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
Petitioners’ reliance on this ruling is misplaced. An application for a application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution
search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus
a main criminal case already filed in court or in anticipation of one yet categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue
to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action,
an incident) has already been filed before the trial court is significant for jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated
the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
a motion to quash a search warrant. purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different
from those for the institution of a criminal action.
Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending
criminal case, as it was in Marcelo, the quashal of a search warrant A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely
is merely interlocutory. There is still "something more to be done constitutes process. A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as
in the said criminal case, i.e., the determination of the guilt of the an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
accused therein." In contrast, where a search warrant is applied signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to
for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the search for personal property and bring it before the court. A search
order quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery.
reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process. There is It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made
nothing more to be done thereafter. necessary because of a public necessity.

Thus, the CA correctly ruled that Marcelo does not apply to this case. Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.
Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal Meanwhile, we have consistently recognized the right of parties to
proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the question orders quashing those warrants.
search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there
was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the
search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may
be properly taken therefrom.

Other Notes:
G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010 4) RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. But petitioner filed
UY KIAO ENG v. NIXON LEE. an MR and the RTC granted it. Respondent’s MR denied, so petition
was dismissed.
FACTS 5) Respondent sought review from the appellate court. The CA initially
1) Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of
and left a holographic will, which is now in the custody of petitioner mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy
Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed a petition for would be available and sufficient to afford redress.
mandamus with damages before Manila RTC to compel petitioner a) Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of
to produce the will so that probate proceedings for the allowance his deceased father, respondent could ask for the presentation
thereof could be instituted. or production and for the approval or probate of the holographic
a) Respondent alleges he had already requested his mother to will.
settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate and to deliver to the b) The CA further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before
legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to the trial court, failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that
do so without any justifiable reason. his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will.
2) In her answer with counterclaim, argued that the petition should be 6) Respondent moved for reconsideration. CA granted the motion,
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of issued the writ, and ordered the production of the will and the
action, and for non-compliance with a condition precedent for the payment of attorney’s fees. It ruled this time that respondent was
filing thereof. able to show by testimonial evidence that his mother had in her
a) Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original possession the holographic will. MR of petitioner denied.
holographic will and that she knew of its whereabouts. She, 7) Brought before the SC by petitioner through ordinary appeal (45).
moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to
respondent and to his siblings. Respondent was able to ISSUE: Whether mandamus is the correct remedy to compel petitioner
introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in a civil case before to produce the holographic will? – NO. CA erred in granting the writ.
the Valenzuela RTC.
b) Petitioner further contended that respondent should have first RATIO
exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent
her before he filed the suit. jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign, directed to some
3) Trial ensued. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person
evidence, petitioner demurred, contending that her son failed to requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
prove that she had in her custody the original holographic will. duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
a) She asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence directed or from operation of law.
presented, aside from being hearsay, were all immaterial and
irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition—they did not This definition recognizes the public character of the remedy, and
prove or disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance clearly excludes the idea that it may be resorted to for the purpose of
of an act which the law specifically enjoined as a duty resulting enforcing the performance of duties in which the public has no interest.
from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of The writ is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public
mandamus. right and to compel the performance of a public duty, most
especially when the public right involved is mandated by the
Constitution. As the quoted provision instructs, mandamus will lie if the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee
performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an because there lies another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
office, trust or station. the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a
photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for
As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however, does not prevent
grounds: him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will
a. that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action whether the same is in his possession or not.1
is taken unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for
or station; or the production of the original holographic will.
b. that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully
excluded petitioner/relator from the use and enjoyment of a right There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
or office to which he is entitled. course of law for the production of the subject will, the remedy of
On the part of the relator, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee
mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to demurrer.
perform the act required.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on
Recognized further in this jurisdiction is the principle that mandamus certiorari is GRANTED. The August 23, 2006 Amended Decision and
cannot be used to enforce contractual obligations. Generally, the February 23, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
mandamus will not lie to enforce purely private contract rights, and will SP No. 91725 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
not lie against an individual unless some obligation in the nature of a 01100939 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED.
public or quasi-public duty is imposed. The writ of mandamus lies to
enforce the execution of an act, when, otherwise, justice would be SO ORDERED.
obstructed; and, regularly, issues only in cases relating to the public
and to the government; hence, it is called a prerogative writ.

Moreover, an important principle followed in the issuance of the writ is

that there should be no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law other than the remedy of mandamus being
invoked. In other words, mandamus can be issued only in cases where
the usual modes of procedure and forms of remedy are powerless to
afford relief. Also, its grant lies in the sound discretion of the court.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining

whether the obligation involved here—the production of the original
holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that

1
RULE 76, Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, at any time, after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.
GARCES V. COURT OF APPEALS not request for it. Garces, on the other hand, was directed
G.R. No. 114795 | July 17, 1996| Francisco, J. by the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to
Plaintiff: LUCITA Q. GARCES assume the Gutalac post. But she was not able to do so
Defendant: COURT OF APPEALS, SALVADOR because of a Memorandum issued by respondent
EMPEYNADO and CLAUDIO CONCEPCION Provincial Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado
that prohibited her from assuming office in Gutalac as
DOCTRINE: It is a basic precept in the law of public officers the same is not vacant.
that no person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a • GARCES WAS DIRECTED BY THE SAME OFFICE
certain position may be appointed to an office which is not OF ASSISTANT DIRECTOR TO DEFER HER
vacant. There can be no appointment to a non- vacant position. ASSUMPTION OF THE GUTALAC POST.
The incumbent must first be legally removed, or his MEANWHILE, SINCE RESPONDENT
appointment validly terminated before one could be validly CONCEPCION CONTINUED OCCUPYING THE
installed to succeed him. GUTALAC OFFICE, THE COMELEC EN BANC
CANCELLED HIS APPOINTMENT TO LILOY.
FACTS • GARCES A PETITION FOR MANDAMUS WITH
PRELIMINARY PROHIBITORY AND
• GARCES WAS APPOINTED ELECTION MANDATORY INJUNCTION AND DAMAGES
REGISTRAR OF GUTALAC TO REPLACE AGAINST RESPONDENTS. RTC DISMISSED
CONCEPCION WHO WAS TRANSFERRED TO SAYING THAT THAT QUO WARRANTO IS THE
LILOY BY THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION. PROPER REMEDY, AMONG OTHERS.
LILOY, TO ASSUME THE GUTALAC POST BUT
• Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus
SHE CAN’T BECAUSE THE PROVINCIAL with preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction
ELECTION SUPERVISOR EMPEYNADO
and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion,
PROHIBITED HER SAYING THAT THE POST IS
among others. Meantime, the COMELEC en banc
NOT VACANT. through a Resolution dated June 3, 1988, resolved to
• Petitioner Lucita Garces was appointed Election recognize respondent Concepcion as the Election
Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboanga del Norte on July 27, Registrar of Gutalac, and ordered that the appointments
1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar of Garces to Gutalac and of Concepcion to Liloy be
Claudio Concepcion, who, in turn, was transferred to cancelled. In view thereof, respondent Empeynado
Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Correspondingly approved moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that
by the Civil Service Commission, both appointments the same was rendered moot and academic by the said
were to take effect upon assumption of office. COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is cognizable
Concepcion, however, refused to transfer post as he did only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the
 1987 Constitution. or his appointment validly terminated before one could
• The RTC, thereafter, dismissed the petition for be validly installed to succeed him.
mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto is
the proper remedy, and that the cases or matters referred ON MANDAMUS:
under the constitution pertain only to those involving the
conduct of elections. • Garces claims that she has a clear legal right to the
Gutalac post which was deemed vacated at the time of
ON APPEAL, RESPONDENT CA AFFIRMED THE RTCS her appointment and qualification. Garces insists that the
DISMISSAL OF THE CASE. HENCE, THIS PETITION. vacancy was created by Section 2, Article III of the
Provisional Constitution.
ISSUES • The above organic provision did not require any cause
for removal of an appointive official under the 1973
ON MANDAMUS:
W/N petitioners action for mandamus is Constitution. Nevertheless, the government in an act of
proper? – NO, Garces has no well-defined, clear, certain legal auto-limitation and to prevent indiscriminate dismissal
right to the Gutalac post of government personnel issued on May 28, 1986,
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 17. This executive order,
ON QUO WARRANTO:
W/N Quo Warranto is the proper which applies in this case as it was passed prior to the
remedy – YES, considering that Concepcion continuously issuance of Concepcions transfer order, enumerates five
occupies the disputed position and exercises the corresponding grounds for separation or replacement of elective and
functions therefore, the proper remedy should have been quo appointive officials authorized under Article III, Section
warranto and not mandamus. 2 of the Provisional Constitution.
• Not one of the grounds was alleged to exist, much less
ON JURISDICTION:
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the proven by petitioner when respondent Concepcion was
case – YES, the controversy involves an appointive, not an transferred from Gutalac to Liloy. More, Concepcion
elective, official cognizable by the RTC. was transferred without his consent. A transfer requires
a prior appointment. If the transfer was made without the
RULINGS consent of the official concerned, it is tantamount to
removal without valid cause contrary to the fundamental
• It is a basic precept in the law of public officers that no guarantee on non-removal except for cause.
person, no matter how qualified and eligible he is for a
• Concepcions transfer thus becomes legally infirm and
certain position may be appointed to an office which is
without effect for he was not validly terminated. His
not vacant. There can be no appointment to a non- vacant
appointment to the Liloy post, in fact, was incomplete
position. The incumbent must first be legally removed,
because he did not accept it.
 • Acceptance, it must be emphasized, is indispensable to Provincial Agriculturist who never claimed title to the
complete an appointment. Corollarily, Concepcions contested office. In this case, there was no vacancy in the
postin Gutalac never became vacant. It is a basic precept Gutalac post and petitioners appointment to which she
in the law of public officers that no person, no matter could base her claim was revoked making her claim
how qualified and eligible he is for a certain position may uncertain.
be appointed to an office which is not vacant. There can
be no appointment to a non-vacant position. The ON JURISDICTION:
incumbent must first be legally removed, or his
appointment validly terminated before one could be • The settled rule is that decision, rulings, order of the
validly installed to succeed him. Further, Garces COMELEC that may be brought to the Supreme Court
appointment was ordered to be deferred by the on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate
COMELEC. The deferment order, we note, was not to the COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-
unequivocably lifted. Worse, her appointment to Gutalac judicial powers involving elective regional, provincial
was even cancelled by the COMELEC en banc. and city officials. In this case, what is being assailed is
the COMELECs choice of an appointee to occupy the
ON QUO WARRANTO: Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the
operational set-up of an agency. The controversy
• Considering that Concepcion continuously occupies the involves an appointive, not an elective, official. Hardly
disputed position and exercises the corresponding can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the
functions therefore, the proper remedy should have been Supreme Court. To rule otherwise would surely burden
quo warranto and not mandamus. Quo warranto tests the the Court with trivial administrative questions that are
title to ones office claimed by another and has as its best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law
object the ouster of the holder from its enjoyment, while vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over
mandamus avails to enforce clear legal duties and not to all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any
try disputed titles. court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
• Garces heavy reliance with the 1964 Tulawie case is quasi-judicial functions.
misplaced for material and different factual
considerations. Unlike in this case, the disputed office of DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Assistant Provincial Agriculturist in the case of Tulawie
is clearly vacant and petitioner Tulawies appointment WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is
was confirmed by the higher authorities making his hereby DENIED without prejudice to the filing of the proper
claim to the disputed position clear and certain. Tulawies action with the appropriate body.
petition for mandamus, moreover, was against the
SO ORDERED.
 Masikip v. City of Pasig
Rule 67 Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the complaint for expropriation on April 25,

1995. It was denied by the trial court on May 7, 1996. At that time, the rule on
Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with
expropriation was governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court
an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro
which provides:
Manila.

'SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. Within the time specified in the
In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, summons, each defendant, in lieu of an answer, shall present in a
respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter single motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief, all his
objections and defenses to the right of the plaintiff to take his
portion of her property to be used for the 'sports development and recreational
property for the use or purpose specified in the complaint. All
activities' of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. No agreement was concluded such objections and defenses not so presented are waived. A
after several exchanges of letters. copy of the motion shall be served on the plaintiff's attorney of
record and filed with the court with proof of service.
Respondent filed with the trial court a complaint for expropriation, praying that the
trial court, after due notice and hearing, issue an order for the condemnation of The motion to dismiss contemplated in the above Rule clearly constitutes the
the property; that commissioners be appointed for the purpose of determining the
responsive pleading which takes the place of an answer to the complaint for
just compensation; and that judgment be rendered based on the report of the
commissioners. expropriation. Such motion is the pleading that puts in issue the right of the
plaintiff to expropriate the defendant's property for the use specified in the
Petitioner filed a MTD on the ff. grounds, among others (marami, pero eto complaint. All that the law requires is that a copy of the said motion be served on
relevant):
plaintiff's attorney of record. It is the court that at its convenience will set the case

1. No cause of action, considering that: for trial after the filing of the said pleading.
a) No genuine necessity for the taking
b) Plaintiff has arbitrarily chosen the property sought to be expropriated The Court of Appeals therefore erred in holding that the motion to dismiss filed by
c) FMV of the property exceeds 78k assuming it can be appropriated. petitioner hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint,
2. Plaintiff’s complaint is defective in form and substance: specifically that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property for
a) Fails to allege purpose with certainty
public use. Pursuant to the above Rule, the motion is a responsive pleading joining
TC denied the MTD. There is a genuine necessity to expropriate the property for the issues. What the trial court should have done was to set the case for the
the sports and recreational activities of the residents of Pasig. As to the issue of reception of evidence to determine whether there is indeed a genuine necessity
just compensation, the trial court held that the same is to be determined in for the taking of the property, instead of summarily making a finding that the
accordance with the Revised Rules of Court. MR denied.
taking is for public use and appointing commissioners to fix just compensation. This

TC then appointed the City Assessor and City Treasurer of Pasig City as is especially so considering that the purpose of the expropriation was squarely
commissioners to ascertain the just compensation. This prompted petitioner to file challenged and put in issue by petitioner in her motion to dismiss. (no discussion of
with the Court of Appeals a special civil action for certiorari. the CA decision in the case, this is the first time court mentions it)


1. WN petitioner admitted the genuine necessity to expropriate by filing a MTD.
NO. Significantly, the above Rule allowing a defendant in an expropriation case to file a
motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took effect on July 1, 1997. Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the
Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization,
mandates that any objection or defense to the taking of the property of a
not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said
defendant must be set forth in an answer. Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational
facility. Petitioner's lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is,
The fact that the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 41860 on therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown,
October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect, is of no moment. It especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports
development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park,
is only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner filed her motion to dismiss should available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.
govern. The new provision cannot be applied retroactively to her prejudice.

2. WN there is a genuine necessity to expropriate. NO.

Judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain is limited to the following areas
of concern: (a) the adequacy of the compensation, (b) the necessity of the taking,
and (c) the public use character of the purpose of the taking.

In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a
genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she
does not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there
must be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. According to
petitioner, there is already an established sports development and recreational
activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized
by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not
dispute this. Evidently, there is no 'genuine necessity to justify the expropriation.

The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from
'the necessity and the taking must be limited to such necessity. In City of Manila v.
Chinese Community of Manila, we held that the very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a
public character. Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or
accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. In City of Manila v. Arellano Law
College, we ruled that 'necessity within the rule that the particular property to be
expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable
or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public
with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and the
property owner consistent with such benefit.

Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish
that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner's property. Our scrutiny
of the records shows that the Certification issued by the Caniogan Barangay
Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF e. Petitioner filed with the CA, a petition for certiorari.
GUIVELONDO, CA, PRESIDING JUDGE DICDICAN (RTC Meanwhile, RTC issued an Entry of Judgment over the
Cebu) and SHERIFF ABORDO | G.R. 154411 | June 19, 2003 Partial Judgment, as modified by the Omnibus order.
Subsequently, respondent Heirs filed a Motion for
FACTS: Execution, which was granted. CA dismissed the
a. On Feb. 23, 1999, NHA filed with the RTC Cebu an petition on the ground that the Partial Judgment and
Amended Complaint for eminent domain (Civil Case) Omnibus Order became final and executory when
against Associacion Benevola de De Cebu, Urot and petitioner failed to appeal the same.
Heirs of Guivelondo. NHA alleged that defendants are f. Petitioner’s MR and Urgent Ex Parte Motion for a
the claimants/owners of properties that are within the Clarificatory Ruling were denied in a Resolution.
blighted urban center which NHA intends to develop as Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review with the SC but
a socialized housing project. the same was denied in a Minute Resolution for failure
b. Heirs of Guivelondo filed a Manifestation stating that to show that the CA committed a reversible error.
they were waiving their objections to petitioner’s power Petitioner filed a MR, which was denied with finality.
to expropriate their properties. Hence, the RTC issued g. PRIOR TO THE DENIAL OF SAID MR, NHA filed with
an Order declaring the right of NHA to expropriate the the RTC a Motion to Dismiss the Civil Case for
properties. expropriation, alleging that the implementation of its
c. Thereafter, the RTC appointed 3 Commissioners to socialized housing project was rendered impossible by
ascertain the correct and just compensation of the the unconscionable value of the land sought to be
properties of respondents. The Commissioners expropriated, which the intended beneficiaries cannot
submitted their report recommending a just afford. MTD was denied by RTC on the ground that the
compensation of P 11200/sq.m. RTC rendered a Partial Partial Judgment had already became final and
Judgment adopting the recommendation of the executory and there was no just and equitable reason to
Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the warrant the dismissal of the case. Petitioner filed a MR,
land of Heirs of Guivelondo. but MR was denied.
d. NHA filed two MRs (August 30 and August 31), assailing h. Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA,
the inclusion of Lots 12, 13 and 19, as well as the praying for the annulment of the RTC Order denying its
amount of just compensation. Respondent Heirs also MTD and MR. The CA summarily dismissed the petition.
filed a MR of the Partial Judgment. RTC issued an Immediately thereafter, respondent Sheriff served on
Omnibus Order denying the MR of Respondent Heirs petitioner a Notice of Levy pursuant to the Writ of
and the August 31 MR of petitioner, on the ground that Execution issued by the RTC to enforce the Partial
the fixing of just compensation had adequate basis and Judgment and Omnibus Order. Subsequently, however
support. On the other hand, the RTC granted petitioner’s the CA set aside the dismissal of the petition and
August 30 MR on the ground that the Commissioner’s reinstated the same. Thereafter, a TRO was issued
Report did not include Lots 12, 13 and 19 within its enjoining respondent sheriff to preserve the status quo.
coverage.
 i. Respondent sheriff served on the Landbank a Notice of (1) condemnation of the property after it is determined that its
Third Garnishment against deposits, moneys and acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use – this ends
interests of petitioner therein. Subsequently, respondent with either an ORDER OF CONDEMNATION declaring that the
sheriff levied on funds and personal properties of plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
petitioner. The CA rendered the assailed decision condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
dismissing the petition. Hence, the present petition for complaint, upon payment of just compensation OR an ORDER
review. OF DISMISSAL; Both order of dismissal and condemnation are
final orders which finally disposes of the case
ISSUE: (2) determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking
May a petitioner (expropriator), in an expropriation of private property to be made by the court with the assistance
proceeding, after it has been placed in possession of the of not more than 3 commissioners – Order fixing the just
property and before the termination of the action, dismiss compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and findings
the petition? YES, if made during the pendency of the case. of, the commissioners would be final too.
But in this case, NO, since they judgment had already
become final and executory. Both orders for the 1st and 2nd stages are final and appealable.
Once the first order becomes final and NO APPEAL thereto is
HELD: taken, the authority to expropriate and its public use can no
In the decision of the court, it cited two expropriation cases longer be questioned. This rule is based on Rule 67, Sec. 4 of
where the court allowed the dismissal of the case at the instance the ROC. 1
of the plaintiff-expropriator. In ruling so, the Court held that given
that the purpose of expropriation was to acquire the land for a In the present case, NHA did not appeal the Order of the trial
public use, if its appears that the expropriation is not for public court, which declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the
use, then the action must necessarily fail. This is allowed properties of respondent Heirs of Guivelondo. Hence, the Order
provided that dismissal is made during the pendency of the became final and may no longer disturbed or reopened no
case. It must be noted, however, that in the present case, matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial
judgment had already become final and executory. determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages:

1
Order of expropriation – If the objections to and the defenses A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be
against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however,
overruled, or when no party appears to defend as required by this shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to
Rule, the court may issue an order for expropriation declaring that be paid.
the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted
expropriated, for the public use or purpose described in the to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined court deems just and equitable.
as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first. A
corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is
same claim. to be treated like any other corporation. Addditionally, the issue
of W/N the funds and properties of NHA are exempt from
Petitioner, however, anchors its claims that there are just and garnishment has already been resolved squarely against its
equitable grounds to allow dismissal or discontinuance of the predecessor (People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation) –
expropriation proceedings. NHA alleged that the intended public that petitioner NHA, having a juridical personality separate and
use was rendered nugatory by the unreasonable just distinct from the government, its funds, although considered
compensation fixed by the court, which is beyond the means of public in character, are not exempt from garnishment.
the intended beneficiaries of the socialized housing project. But
this argument is untenable.

Socialized housing has been recognized as public use for

purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain. The public
purpose of the socialized housing project is not in any wau
diminished by the amount of just compensation that the court
has fixed. The need to provide decent housing to the urban poor
dwellers in the locality was not lost by the mere fact that the land
cost more than petitioner had expected.It is also worth noting
that NHA pursued its petition with the CA assailing the amount
of just compensation and its petition with the SC, which
eloquently indicates that there still exists public use for the
housing project. It was only after its appeals and petition were
dismissed that NHA suddenly made a complete turn around and
decided that it did not want the property anymore. Respondent
landowners had already been prejudiced by the expropriation
case. NHA cannot be permitted to institute condemnation
proceedings against respondents ONLY to abandon it later
when it finds the amount unacceptable.

OTHER ISSUE:
W/N the funds of petitioner may be subjected to garnishment?
YES
If the funds belong to a public corporation or a GOCC which is
clothed with a personality of its own, separate and distinct from
that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from
garnishment. This is because when the government enters into
 • Republic of the Philippines then filed a notice of appeal. CA dismissed Republic of
Republic v. Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership | G.R. No. 171496 | March 3, 2014 the Philippines’ appeal on the ground that an order or judgment denying a motion
for reconsideration is not appealable.
FACTS: • Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of
• Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership, is the owner of a parcel of land (Lot). Appeals' resolution. Republic of the Philippines pointed out that its reference in the
Upon the request of the Department of Public Works and Highways, Ortigas notice of appeal to the order denying the motion for reconsideration of the trial
caused the segregation of its property into five lots and reserved one portion for court’s decision was merely due to inadvertence. CA denied the motion for
road widening for the C-5 flyover project. It designated one portion of its property reconsideration on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals noted
(1 of the 5 lots), hereinafter called as the “Lot”, for the road widening of Ortigas that even if the order denying the motion for reconsideration was appealable, the
Avenue. appeal was still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction because Republic of the
• The C-5-Ortigas Avenue flyover was completed utilizing only 396 of the 1,445- Philippines raised only a question of law.
square- meter allotment for the project. Consequently, Ortigas further subdivided • The Office of the Solicitor General argued that strict application of the rules of
the “Lot” into two lots: Lot 1, which was the portion actually used for road widening, procedure overrides substantial justice, in this case, to the detriment of petitioner
and Lot 2, which was the unutilized portion. Republic of the Philippines. In its comment, Ortigas argued that the Office of the
• Ortigas filed with the RTC a petition for authority to sell to the government Lot 1. Solicitor General committed a fatal mistake when it brought by way of appeal the
Ortigas alleged that the DPWH requested the conveyance of the property for road denial of its motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.
widening purposes.
• In an order, the RTC set the case for hearing. In the same order, Ortigas was
directed to cause the publication of both the Regional Trial Court’s order and ISSUE: WON Ortigas’ property should be conveyed to Republic of the Phils only by
respondent Ortigas' petition. donation, in accordance with Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529? No
• Despite due notice to the public, including the Office of the Solicitor General and HELD:
the DPWH, no one appeared to oppose Ortigas. Ortigas was allowed to present
evidence ex parte. Ortigas presented Mr. Rosete, its liaison officer, to support its No. Section 50 of PD 1529 does not apply in a case that is the proper subject of an
petition for authority to sell to the government. He testified that only 396 of the expropriation proceeding. Respondent Ortigas may sell its property to the government.
1,445-square-meter designated lot was actually utilized after the road had been It must be compensated because its property was taken and utilized for public road
finished. This caused Ortigas to further subdivide the designated property into two purposes.
lots. Rosete presented a certified true copy of the title of the utilized portion of the
lot to prove Ortigas' ownership. He alleged that Ortigas was not compensated for Petitioner Republic of the Philippines insists that the subject property may not be
the use of its property, and Ortigas was requested by the DPWH to convey the conveyed to the government through modes other than by donation. It relies on Section
utilized property to the government. Hence, to facilitate the processing of its 50 of the Property Registration Decree, which provides that delineated boundaries,
compensation, Ortigas filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court. streets, passageways, and waterways of a subdivided land may not be closed or
• Finding merit in respondent Ortigas' petition, the Regional Trial Court issued an disposed of by the owner except by donation to the government.
order on June 11, 2001, authorizing the sale of Lot 1 to petitioner Republic of the
Philippines. However, Petitioner’s argument is wrong. Section 50 contemplates roads and streets
• Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed an opposition, alleging in a subdivided property, not public thoroughfares built on a private property that was
that respondent Ortigas' property can only be conveyed by way of donation to the taken from an owner for public purpose. A public thoroughfare is not a subdivision road
government, citing Section 50 of PD 1529. Republic of the Philippines filed a or street.
motion for reconsideration reiterating its argument in its opposition. RTC denied
this MR.
More importantly, when there is taking of private property for some public purpose, the or she chooses to retain them, however, he or she also retains the burden of
owner of the property taken is entitled to be compensated. maintaining them and paying for real estate taxes.
There is taking when the following elements are present: Since the Constitution proscribes taking of private property without just compensation,
any taking must entail a corresponding appropriation for that purpose. Public funds,
1. The government must enter the private property;
however, may only be appropriated for public purpose. Employment of public funds to
2. The entrance into the private property must be indefinite or permanent;
benefit a private individual constitutes malversation. Therefore, private subdivision
3. There is color of legal authority in the entry into the property;
streets not taken for public use may only be donated to the government.
4. The property is devoted to public use or purpose;
5. The use of property for public use removed from the owner all beneficial enjoyment In contrast, when the road or street was delineated upon government request and taken
of the property. for public use, as in this case, the government has no choice but to compensate the
owner for his or her sacrifice, lest it violates the constitutional provision against taking
All of the above elements are present in this case. Republic of the Philippines’ without just compensation, thus:
construction of a road — a permanent structure — on Ortigas’ property for the use of
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
the general public is an obvious permanent entry on petitioner Republic of the
Philippines’ part. Given that the road was constructed for general public use stamps it As with all laws, Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree cannot be interpreted
with public character, and coursing the entry through the Department of Public Works to mean a license on the part of the government to disregard constitutionally
and Highways gives it a color of legal authority. guaranteed rights.
Because of this entry, Ortigas may not enjoy the property as it did before. It may not The right to compensation under Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution was put in
anymore use the property for whatever legal purpose it may desire. Neither may it place to protect the individual from and restrain the State’s sovereign power of eminent
occupy, sell, lease, and receive its proceeds. It cannot anymore prevent other persons domain, which is the government’s power to condemn private properties within its
from entering or using the property. territory for public use or purpose. This power is inherent and need not be granted by
law. Thus, while the government’s power to take for public purpose is inherent,
It is true that the lot reserved for road widening, together with five other lots, formed
immense, and broad in scope, it is delimited by the right of an individual to be
part of a bigger property before it was subdivided. However, this does not mean that
compensated. In a nutshell, the government may take, but it must pay.
all lots delineated as roads and streets form part of subdivision roads and streets that
are subject to Section 50 of the Property Registration Decree. Subdivision roads and Title to the subject lot remains under respondent Ortigas’ name. The government is
streets are constructed primarily for the benefit of the owners of the surrounding already in possession of the property but is yet to acquire title to it. To legitimize such
properties. They are, thus, constructed primarily for private use — as opposed to possession, Republic of the Philippines must acquire the property from Ortigas by
delineated road lots taken at the instance of the government for the use and benefit of instituting expropriation proceedings or through negotiated sale, which has already
the general public. been recognized in law as a mode of government acquisition of private property for
public purpose.
Delineated roads and streets, whether part of a subdivision or segregated for public
use, remain private and will remain as such until conveyed to the government by In a negotiated sale, the government offers to acquire for public purpose a private
donation or through expropriation proceedings. An owner may not be forced to donate property, and the owner may accept or reject it. A rejection of the offer, however, would
his or her property even if it has been delineated as road lots because that would most likely merely result in the commencement of an expropriation proceeding that
partake of an illegal taking. He or she may even choose to retain said properties. If he would eventually transfer title to the government. Hence, the government's offer to
acquire for public purpose a private property may be considered as an act preparatory
to an expropriation proceeding. Therefore, a private owner's initiative to segregate a
property to accommodate government needs saves the government from a long and
arduous expropriation proceeding. This is a commendable act on the part of the owner.
It must be encouraged, not dampened by threats of property deprivation without
compensation.
Respondent Ortigas, which merely accommodated petitioner Republic of the
Philippines' request, remains uncompensated for the taking of its property. Respondent
Ortigas could have brought action to recover possession of the property, but it instead
chose to sell its property to petitioner Republic of the Philippines. This is both fair and
convenient as the road construction had long been completed, and the road is already
being utilized by the public.
Taking of private property without just compensation is a violation of a person's property
right. In situations where the government does not take the trouble of initiating an
expropriation proceeding, the private owner has the option to compel payment of the
property taken, when justified. The trial court should continue to proceed with this case
to determine just compensation in accordance with law.
 BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. VDA. DE COSCOLLUELA • CA granted the petitioner, stating that the remedies sought are
G.R. No. 167724 / June 27, 2006 / Callejo, Sr., J. / Splitting / KJMSTA.ANA alternative and not cumulative. Thus, in denying the demurrer, RTC
NATURE Petition for Review under Rule 45 committed grave abuse of discretion.
PETITIONERS BPI Family Savings Bank • Petitioner filed MR but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
RESPONDENTS Margarita Vda. De Cosculluela
ISSUES & RATIO.
DOCTRINE: An action for foreclosure of REM must include all debts that are 1. WON petitioner waived its right to collect on the 34 other promissory
subsumed/secured by the mortgage. notes – YES

FACTS. Section 3, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party
• Respondent and her late husband Oscar obtained an agricultural sugar may not institute one suit for a single cause of action, and, if two or more
crop loan from Far East Bank & Trust Co. (later merged with BPI) for suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one
crop years 1997 and 1998. In the book of Far East, the loan account on a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the
was treated as a single account, and evidenced by 67 promissory dismissal of others. The law does not permit the owner of a single of entire
notes. cause of action or an entire or indivisible demand to divide and split the
• Sps. Coscolluela executed a real estate mortgage in favor of FEBTC cause to make it the subject of several actions.
over their parcel of land as security of loans on credit
accommodation obtained and those that may be obtained. The true rule which determined whether a party has only a single and entire
• Under the terms and conditions of the real estate mortgage, in the cause of action is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same
event of failure to pay the mortgage obligation or any portion thereof, act or contract or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts.
the entire principal, interest, penalties, and other charges shall be
immediately due; and Far East mat foreclose the same extra judicially. As gleaned from the plain terms of the REM, the real estate of respondent
• For failure to settle outstanding obligation on the maturity dates, Far served as a continuing security liable for obligations already obtained and
East sent a final demand letter to respondent demanding payment. obligations obtained thereafter. In this case, the action of petitioner is
• Since respondent failed to settle her obligation, Far East filed a petition anchored on one and the same cause: the nonpayment of respondent.
for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property, but only for Though the debt may be covered by several promissory notes and is covered
31 of the promissory notes. by a real estate mortgage, the latter is subsidiary to the former and both refer
• During pendency of said case, Far East filed a complaint for collection to one and the same obligation. A mortgage creditor may institute two
of money representing the amounts for the 36 other promissory notes. alternative remedies against the debtor, either to collect debt or to foreclose
• In respondent’s answer, she alleged that the complaint was barred by mortgage, but not both.
litis pendentia for the pending petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the REM. In the present case, petitioner opted to file a petition for extrajudicial
• Petitioner presented a loan officer as sole witness, who testified that foreclosure of the real estate mortgage but only for the principal amount
respondent were granted a loan, which was a “single loan account.” of P4,687,006.08 or in the total amount of P7,755,733.64 covering only 31 of
• Respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence contending that the loan the 67 promissory notes. By resorting to the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
officer’s admission, that there is only one loan account secured by the real estate mortgage, petitioner thereby waived its personal action to recover
REM thus barred the personal action for collection. She insisted that the amount covered not only by said promissory notes but also of the rest of
the filing of said complaint should be dismissed. the promissory notes. This is so because when petitioner filed its petition
before the Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff on June 10, 1999, the entirety of the
• Petitioner opposed the demurrer, stating that each promissory note
loan account of respondent under the 67 promissory notes was already due.
constituted a separate contract.
The obligation of respondent under Promissory Note Nos. 1 to 33 became
• The trial court denied the demurrer on the ground that each note
due on February 9, 1998 but was extended up to March 11, 1998, whereas,
covered a loan distinct from the others.
those covered by Promissory Note Nos. 34 to 67 matured on December 28,
• Respondent filed MR but denied, prompting her to file a certiorari 1998. Petitioner should have caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
petition under Rule 65 with CA. estate mortgage for the recovery of the entire obligation of respondent, on all
the promissory notes. By limiting the account for which the real estate
mortgage was being foreclosed to the principal amount of P4,687,006.68, An action to foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the amount mentioned
exclusive of interest and penalties, petitioner thereby waived recovery of the in the mortgage. The exact amount, however, for which the mortgage is
rest of respondent's agricultural loan account. given need not always be specifically named. The amount for which the
mortgage is given may be stated in definite or general terms, as is frequently
It must be stressed that the parties agreed in the Real Estate Mortgage that the case in mortgages to secure future advancements. The amount named in
in the event that respondent shall fail to pay the mortgage obligation "or any the mortgage does not limit the amount for which it may stand as security, if,
portion thereof when due, the entire principal, interest, penalties and other from the four corners of the document, the intent to secure future
charges then outstanding shall become immediately due, payable and indebtedness or future advancements is apparent. Where the plain terms, of
defaulted the mortgage, evidence such an intent, they will control as against a
contention of the mortgagor that it was the understanding of the parties that
Petitioner cannot split the loan account of respondent by filing a petition for the mortgage was security only for the specific amount named.
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage for the principal
amount of P4,687,006.68 covered by the first set of promissory notes, and a When a mortgage is given for future advancements and the money is paid to
personal action for the collection of the principal amount of P12,672,000.31 the mortgagor "little by little" and repayments are made from time to time, the
covered by the second set of promissory notes without violating the advancements and the repayments must be considered together for the
proscription against splitting a single cause of action against respondent. purpose of ascertaining the amount due upon the mortgage at maturity.
Moreover, the series of loan advancements herein cannot be likened to the
2. WON petitioner can still collect on the remaining 34 PNs because it credit line discussed in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
was not covered by the REM – NO Court,58 as petitioner posited in its reply59 filed before this Court. In Caltex,
unlike the instant case, the real estate mortgage executed did not contain a
Petitioner’s argument that respondent's loan account that was secured by the "dragnet" clause60 that would subsume all past and future debts. The
real estate mortgage was limited only to those covered by the Promissory mortgage therein specifically secured only the loans extended prior to the
Note Nos. 1 to 33 or for the total amount of P7,000,000.00 is belied by the mortgage. Thus, in the said case, the future debts were deemed as
real estate mortgage and by its own evidence. constituting a separate transaction from the past debts secured by the
mortgage.
Under the deed, the mortgage was to secure the payment of a credit
accommodation already obtained by respondent, the principal of all of which DECISION.
was fixed at P7,000,000.00, as well as any other obligation that may be WHEREFORE instant petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
extended to respondent (dragnet clause). As gleaned from the plain terms of
the real estate mortgage, the real estate of respondent served as continuing
security liable for future advancements or obligations beyond the amount
of P7,000,000.00. The mortgage partakes of the nature of contract for future
advancements.1

1 That for and in consideration of credit accommodation obtained from the MORTGAGEE, and to secure the payment of
the same and those that may hereafter be obtained, the principal of all of which is hereby fixed at SEVEN MILLION
PESOS ONLY (P7,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as well as those that the MORTGAGEE may extend to the
MORTGAGOR, including interest and expenses or any other obligation owing to the MORTGAGEE, whether direct or
indirect, principal or secondary, as appears in the accounts, books and records of the MORTGAGEE, the MORTGAGOR
does hereby transfer and convey by way of mortgage unto the MORTGAGEE, its successors or assigns, the parcels of
land which are described in the list inserted on the back of this document and/or appended herein, together with all the
buildings and improvements now existing or which may hereafter be erected or constructed thereon, of which the
MORTGAGOR declares that he/it is the absolute owner free from all liens and encumbrances. However, if the
MORTGAGOR shall pay to the MORTGAGEE, its successors or assigns, the obligation secured by this mortgage when
due, together with interest, and shall keep and perform all and singular the covenants and agreements herein contained
for the MORTGAGOR to keep and perform, then this mortgage shall be void, otherwise, it shall remain in full force and
effect.
Ulpiano Balo et al. v. CA, Judge Asis and Josefino Garrido | G.R. consent. Since Petitioners were her uncle and cousins, she
No. 129704 | Sept. 30, 2005 | Chico-Nazario, J. earnestly requested them to come to a fair and equal partition of the
properties, but they refused.
Grandparents/original owners of the property: Sps. Eugenio Balo Sr. 2. Instead of an Answer, Petitioners filed an MTD alleging that the
and Ma. Pasagui-Balo complaint failed to state a COA since Respondent failed to allege
Children: Ulpiano Balo Sr. (original defendant, died and substituted by whether or not she is a legitimate child. To allow Respondent to
Petitioners) and Maximino Balo (deceased) inherit from Sps. Balo in representation of her father would be to
Grandchildren: allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child. They also alleged
1. Petitioners – children of Ulpiano Balo Sr. that the estate of the Sps. Balo has not been settled and the
2. Respondent – Josefina Garrido, only child of Maximino and obligations have not been paid. In addition, the properties were
Salvacion Sabulao. proceeded against by way of execution to satisfy a judgment
against Sps. Balo, and it was Ulpiano Sr. who repurchased the
Gist: property. Hence, it was no longer co-owned with Respondent.
Respondent filed a Complaint for partition of properties owned by her 3. RTC denied the MTD. The allegation of illegitimacy and claim of
grandparents which Petitioners took and possessed to her prejudice. absolute ownership are issues that require an Answer and for the
She alleged that she asked them for a peaceful settlement to equally case to proceed for hearing on the merits.
apportion the properties but Petitioners refused. Petitioners filed an 4. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari alleging GAD on the part of
MTD on the ground that the complaint failed to state a COA as the CA. CA dismissed the petition on the technical ground that
Respondent did not establish her right to inherit from the original certiorari was not the proper remedy for the denial of an MTD.
owners, as it was uncertain whether she was a legitimate child of 5. SC said the CA should have proceeded to determine whether there
Maximino. RTC denied MTD as the complaint, on its face, sufficiently was GAD in the denial of the MTD, but decided to resolve the issue
stated a COA if the ultimate facts were hypothetically admitted. Any anyway.
issue as to Respondent’s legitimacy could be settled at trial. CA
affirmed. SC affirmed. Even before the SC has ruled that a natural child Whether the allegations in the complaint by Respondent were
with a right to compel acknowledgement but who has not been in fact sufficient to support a cause of action for partition? YES.
legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the Whether Respondent has to first prove her legitimacy before an
division of the inheritance against his co-heirs. It is not necessary for action for partition may be maintained? NO.
the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgement – in a 1. In an MTD for failure to state a COA, the inquiry is into the
partition suit, all persons who might take inheritance are already before sufficiency and not the veracity of the material allegations, which
the court and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such inquiry is confined to the 4 corners of the complaint. In her
proceedings. complaint, Respondent alleged that the parcels of land belonged
to the Sps. Balo and upon their death, were to be inherited in equal
1. Respondent filed a complaint for judicial partition of real properties shares by their 2 sons. And as the daughter of Maximino, the son
and accounting with damages against Petitioners. She alleged that of Sps. Balo, she was entitled to inherit her father’s share of the
she and Petitioners are co-owners of undivided parcels of land in inheritance. However, upon the death of Sps. Balo, Petitioners
Mayorga, Leyte, which were originally owned by her/their took possession of the properties and refused to settle with her.
grandparents, Sps. Eugeno and Maria Balo. Respondent alleged 2. These allegations show substantial compliance with the formal and
that immediately upon the death of her grandfather, Petitioners took substantial requirements of a Complaint for Partition as provided
possession of the said real properties without her knowledge and under S1 Rule 69.1

1
Rule 69, Section 1. Complaint in action for Partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining
the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his Complaint the nature and as defendants all other persons interested in the property.
3. On the insistence of Petitioners that Respondent first prove her
legitimacy before an action for partition may be entertained, the SC
has already ruled that proof of legal acknowledgement is not a
prerequisite before an action for partition may be filed.
4. A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but
who has not been in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain
partition and the same person may intervene in proceedings
for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural
father, or mother. In neither of these situations has it been
thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in
partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who
might take by inheritance are before the court; and the declaration
of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
5. In partition proceedings, dismissal prior to answer is premature.
An action for partition is at once an action for declaration of
co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determine portion of the properties involved. If the defendant
asserts exclusive title over the property, the action for partition
should not be dismissed. Rather, the court should resolve the case
and if the plaintiff is unable to sustain his claimed status as a co-
owner, the court should dismiss the action, not because the wrong
remedy was availed of, but because no basis exists for requiring
the defendant to submit to partition. If, on the other hand, the court
after trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the
parties, the court may and should order the partition of the
properties in the same action.
6. As to the claim of Petitioners that the action to claim partition has
already prescribed, an allegation of prescription can effectively be
used in an MTD only when the complaint on its face shows that the
action has prescribed, otherwise the issue of prescription involves
evidentiary matters to be resolved in a full-blown trial.
Quintos v. Nicolas Registry of Deeds of Tarlac in the names of the ten (10)
heirs of the Ibarra spouses.
G.R. No. 210252
• Respondent siblings then sold their 7/10 undivided
June 16, 2014 share over the property in favor of their co-respondents,
the spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario. By virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale 7 dated April 17, 2007
Velasco, JR., J: executed in favor of the spouses Candelario and an
Agreement of Subdivision purportedly executed by them
Facts: and petitioners, TCT No. 390484 was partially canceled
and TCT No. 434304 was issued in the name of the
• Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and
Candelarios, covering the 7/10 portion
Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas, Noli
• QUIETING OF TITLE CASE: Petitioners filed a
Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David Ibarra,
complaint for Quieting of Title and Damages against
Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra are siblings.
respondents wherein they alleged that during their
o Their parents, Bienvenido and Escolastica
parents' lifetime, the couple distributed their real and
Ibarra, were the owners of the subject property,
personal properties in favor of their ten (10) children.
a 281 sq.m. parcel of land situated along Quezon
They alleged that:
Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac, covered by
o Upon distribution, they received the subject
Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 318717.
property and the house constructed thereon as
• Bienvenido and Escolastica had already passed away,
their share.
leaving to their ten (10) children ownership over the
o They likewise averred that they have been in
subject property. Subsequently, sometime in 2002,
adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted
respondent siblings brought an action for partition
possession of the property for over four (4)
against petitioners.
decades and are, thus, entitled to equitable title
o TC: dismissed the case for failure of the parties
thereto.
to appear despite due notice. Case was
o They also deny any participation in the execution
dismissed. Ruling became final as evidence by
of the Deed of Adjudication dated September 21,
the Certificate of Finality.
2004 and the Agreement of Subdivision.
• Having failed to secure a favorable decision for partition,
• Petitioners' COA was already barred by estoppel when
respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a
sometime in 2006, one of petitioners offered to buy the
Deed of Adjudication on September 21, 2004 to transfer
7/10 undivided share of the respondent siblings.
the property in favor of the ten (10) siblings.
o They point out that this is an admission on the
• As a result, TCT No. 318717 was canceled and in lieu
part of petitioners that the property is not entirely
thereof, TCT No. 390484 was issued in its place by the
theirs. In addition, they claimed that Bienvenido
 and Escolastica Ibarra mortgaged the property 1. Main issue: Whether or not the respondents’
but because of financial constraints, respondent counterclaim for partition is already barred by laches or res
spouses Candelario had to redeem the property judicata – NO
in their behalf.
Other issues:
o Not having been repaid by Bienvenido and
Escolastica, the Candelarios accepted from their 2. Whether or not the petitioners were able to prove ownership
co-respondents their share in the subject over the property - NO
property as payment.
o Lastly, respondents sought, by way of 3. Whether or not the CA was correct in approving the
counterclaim, the partition of the property. subdivision agreement as basis for partition of the property - NO
• During pre-trial respondents admitted that they filed an Ratio:
action for partition, that pet did not participate in the deed
of adjudication that served as the basis for the issuance Main issue:
of the title and that the agreement of subdivision that led
• There is res judicata when the following requisites are
to the issuance of TCT in favor of respondent spouses
present: (1) the formal judgment or order must be 9nal;
Candelario was falsified.
(2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is,
• RTC: The court did not find merit in petitioners'
it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
asseverations that they have acquired title over the
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the
property through acquisitive prescription and noted that
case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having
there was no document evidencing that their parents
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
bequeathed to them the subject property. The case then
(4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
was dismissed.
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of
o The court decided that Spouses Candelario
action
are declared as absolute owners of the 7/10
• In the case at bar, respondent siblings admit that they
portion of the subject lot.
filed an action for partition docketed as Civil Case No.
o It also ordered the partition of the subject lots
02-52, which the RTC dismissed through an Order dated
between plaintiff and Candelarios.
March 22, 2004 for the failure of the parties to attend the
• CA: denied the appeal. It also did not agree with the
scheduled hearings. Respondents likewise admitted
argument of the petitioners that the partition should not
that since they no longer appealed the dismissal, the
be allowed because it is already barred by res judicata.
ruling attained finality. Moreover, it cannot be disputed
Issues/Held: that the subject property in Civil Case No. 02-52. and in
the present controversy are one and the same, and that
in both cases, respondents raise the same action for
 partition. And lastly, although respondent spouses the co-owners' specific shares so as to prevent
Candelario were not party-litigants in the earlier case for the allocation of portions to remain perpetually in
partition, there is identity of parties not only when the limbo. Thus, the law provides that each co-owner
parties in the case are the same, but also between those may demand at any time the partition of the thing
in privity with them, such as between their successors- owned in common.
in-interest • Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17,
• The next element is whether or not the dismissal of civil Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art.
case No. 02-52 operated as a dismissal on the merits 494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To
that would complete the requirements of res judicata. construe otherwise would diminish the substantive
• In accordance with Rule 17, Section 3 of Rules of Court right of a co-owner through the promulgation of
(Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff), the order here does procedural rules. Such a construction is not
not in any language say that the dismissal is without sanctioned by the principle, which is too well settled
prejudice. And thus, the requirement that dismissal be to require citation, that a substantive law cannot be
on the merits is present. amended by a procedural rule.
• The court had the occasion to rule that dismissal with o This further finds support in Art. 496 of the New
prejudice under the above-cited rule amply satisfies one Civil Code1
of the elements of res judicata. It is, thus, • Thus, for the Rules to be consistent with statutory
understandable why petitioners would allege res provisions, the Court holds that Art. 494, as cited, is an
judicata to bolster their claim. exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the
• However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. effect that even if then order of dismissal for failure to
3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right of a co- prosecute is silent on whether or not it is with prejudice,
owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that there it shall be deemed to be without prejudice.
is no actual adjudication of ownership of shares yet. o Important qualificatio: This is not to say,
Article 494 states that no co-owner shall be obliged however, that the action for partition will never be
in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at barred by res judicata. There can still be res
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, judicata in partition cases concerning the same
in so far as his share is concerned. parties and the same subject matter once the
o It can be gleaned that the law generally does not respective shares of the co-owners have been
o favor the retention of co-ownership as a property determined with finality by a competent court
relation, and is interested instead in ascertaining with jurisdiction or if the court determines that

1
Article 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by
judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules of Court
insofar as they are consistent with this Code
Acaylar v. Harayo therein that the subject property was already sold to respondent. For lack of
G.R. No. 176995 any legal right to remain on the subject property, the MTCC adjudged that
30 July 2008 petitioner’s possession of the same was illegal.

Facts: On appeal, the RTC affirming the award of possession in favor of respondent.
The subject property is a parcel of land designated as Lot 741-B-1 situated in The RTC declared that the sale of the subject property by the spouses Acaylar
Tolon, Potungan, Dapitan City, with an area of 30,000 square meters. to respondent vested ownership and possession of said property in the latter.
Thus, petitioner’s acts of entering the subject property, cutting the tall grasses
In his Complaint of Forcible Entry filed with the MTCC, respondent Danilo and gathering the agricultural products therein, constitute forcible entry, which
Harayo alleged that he acquired the subject property from the spouses Pablo gave rise to an action for ejectment.
Acaylar, Sr., and Zoila Dangcalan Acaylar (the spouses Acaylar) by virtue of a
Deed of Sale. On the same day, respondent took possession of the subject Banking on another Affidavit (Second Affidavit) executed by Zoila Acaylar, in
property. One of the spouses Acaylar’s sons, the petitioner Pablo Acaylar Jr., which she recanted the statements she made in her First Affidavit denying that
using strategy, intimidation, threats and stealth, entered the subject property, she designated petitioner as the administrator of her and her husband’s
cut the tall grasses in the coconut plantation therein, gathered the fallen property, petitioner moved for the reconsideration. The RTC, however, denied
coconuts and other fruits, and pastured his cows and other animals thereon. the MR.

In his Answer, petitioner countered that what was sold to the respondent was Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Court
only a portion of a 59,775 sqm property to which he was in possession of and of Appeals. Petitioner argued in his Petition that the RTC gravely erred in ruling
was the administrator of the whole property since 1979. He built his house that respondent was in prior possession of the subject property based solely
thereon and farmed the land. He also averred that the portion of the property on the Deed of Sale executed by the spouses Acaylar in respondent’s favor.
sold was not clearly delineated. In addition, petitioner, together with his sisters, Petitioner also asserted therein that the RTC gravely abused its discretion
Rosario Acaylar Herrera and Asteria Acaylar, already filed against respondent when it did not give credence to the Second Affidavit executed by Zoila
and his spouse Beatriz Harayo a case for annulment of the Deed of Sale, with Acaylar.
prayer for preliminary injunction and damages, presently pending before the
RTC. CA dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to avail himself of the correct
remedy under the law. MR was denied for lack of merit.
During the Pre-Trial Conference held before the MTCC, the parties stipulated
that the spouses Acaylar sold to respondent only a 30,000-square-meter Hence, this petition.
portion of their entire property; and that there is a pending civil case before the
RTC on the validity of the sale of the subject property. Issue: Whether the CA gravely erred in failing to evaluate the propriety forcible
entry case which is the original action involved in this case vis-à-vis unlawful
Among the pieces of evidence presented by respondent before the MTCC was detainer? YES
an Affidavit of Zoila Acaylar (First Affidavit) attesting that she sold the subject
property to respondent for consideration and she did not give petitioner Relevant in the case at bar is Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court
authority to either administer or remain on her and her husband’s property. which provides:

After trial, the MTCC rendered a Decision, awarding to respondent the SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject
possession of the subject property. The MTCC gave credence to respondent’s to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
claim that he took immediate possession of the subject property after the deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
execution of the Deed of Sale but was ousted therefrom by petitioner who intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
invoked the alleged authority granted to him by Zoila Acaylar as the vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land
administrator of the unsold portion of her and her husband’s property. The or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
MTCC referred to the First Affidavit executed by Zoila Acaylar wherein she termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
refuted that she gave petitioner authority or designated him as the contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
administrator of her and her husband’s property. Zoila Acaylar further admitted assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
 may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the In the case at bar, respondent filed an action for forcible entry before the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons MTCC. Respondent alleged that he immediately took possession of the
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person property after the execution of the Deed of Sale but was forcibly deprived by
or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such petitioner. A case for forcible entry, therefore, is proper since petitioner’s entry
possession, together with damages and costs. into the subject property is already illegal at its incipience.

Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes Petitioner, on the other hand, harps on the fact that he was in possession of
of action, to wit: the subject property since 1979, having built his house thereon and farmed the
land, and it was impossible for him to wrest possession of the subject property
(1) a case for FORCIBLE ENTRY, which is an action to recover from respondent, for he was already occupying the same way before its
possession of a property from the defendant whose occupation alleged sale to respondent. Petitioner, thus, maintains that his possession over
thereof is illegal from the beginning as he acquired possession by the subject property is lawful from the start, as he was authorized by Zoila
force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and Acaylar to administer the same, making respondent’s suit for forcible entry
before the MTCC the wrong remedy.
(2) a case for UNLAWFUL DETAINER, which is an action for recovery of
possession from defendant whose possession of the property was In a long line of cases, this Court reiterated that the fact of prior physical
inceptively lawful by virtue of a contract (express or implied) with the possession is an indispensable element in forcible entry cases. The plaintiff
plaintiff, but became illegal when he continued his possession despite must prove that he was in prior physical possession of the premises long
the termination of his right thereunder. before he was deprived thereof by the defendant. It must be stressed that
plaintiff cannot succeed where it appears that, as between himself and the
The distinctions between the two forms of ejectment suits, are: defendant, the latter had possession antedating his own.

FORCIBLE ENTRY UNLAWFUL DETAINER In the instant Petition, the MTCC cited Zoila Acaylar’s First Affidavit in which
The plaintiff must prove that he was The plaintiff need not have been in she attested that she did not appoint or designate petitioner as administrator
in prior physical possession of the prior physical possession of her and her husband’s property, and that she gathered the coconuts and
premises until he was deprived harvested other crops from the property by employing farm workers. Since
thereof by the defendant petitioner was never in possession of the subject property, then the MTCC
The possession of the land by the The possession of the defendant is concluded that respondent had taken possession of the same from the
defendant is unlawful from the inceptively lawful but it becomes spouses Acaylar right after its purchase. The RTC, on the other hand,
beginning as he acquires illegal by reason of the termination of expressly recognized that petitioner possessed the subject property, but his
possession thereof by force, his right to the possession of the possession was merely tolerated by his parents, and that respondent, as
intimidation, threat, strategy or property under his contract with the purchaser of the subject property from the parents, the spouses Acaylar, had
stealth plaintiff better right to the possession of the same. Thus, as to whether petitioner had
The law does not require a previous The plaintiff must first make such actual or physical possession of the subject property prior to respondent is a
demand for the defendant to vacate demand, which is jurisdictional in factual issue which we are called upon to resolve, considering that the courts
the premises nature. below had contradicting findings.

The above distinctions, more importantly the nature of defendant’s entry into After careful and thorough recalibration and re-examination of the evidence
the property, are material to the present case in order to ascertain the propriety available on record, we find that petitioner had physical possession of the
of respondent’s action for forcible entry filed before the MTCC. It bears to subject property prior to and at the time of its sale by the spouses Acaylar to
stress that it is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines respondent. It is actually irrelevant whether petitioner possessed the subject
the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry property as the administrator thereof. As the son of the spouses Acaylar, he
is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible could very well enter into possession of the subject property either with the
entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes express permission or at the tolerance of his parents who owned the property.
illegal, the case is unlawful detainer. Petitioner alleged, and respondent did not dispute, that petitioner had entered
into possession of his parents’ property as early as 1979, and he even built his subject property. It is thus incumbent upon respondent to establish by
house thereon. Although Zoila Acaylar may have attested in her First Affidavit evidence that he took physical possession of the subject property from the
that she did not appoint or designate petitioner as the administrator of her and spouses Acaylar on 14 September 2004 and he was in actual possession of
her husband’s property, she never claimed that petitioner unlawfully or the said property when petitioner forcibly entered the same five days later.
illegally entered her property when he built his house thereon.
The conflicting Affidavits of Zoila Acaylar, notwithstanding, we find that
We are not persuaded by respondent’s assertion that after he took possession petitioner was in peaceful possession of the subject property prior to its sale
of the subject property from the Zoila spouses, petitioner entered the subject to respondent. Even if petitioner was not authorized by Zoila Acaylar to
property on a whim, for not only does such postulation lack clear, positive, and possess the subject property as administrator, his possession was not
convincing evidentiary support, but also because it is illogical and contrary to opposed and was, thus, tolerated by his parents. As we ruled in Arcal v. Court
common human experience. A person would not, for a reason so shallow as a of Appeals:
whim, encroach upon another’s property and gather fruits and other
agricultural products therefrom, thereby risking criminal prosecution and civil The rule is that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such
liabilities. The more plausible and logical scenario would be that petitioner was possession becomes unlawful upon demand to vacate made
already occupying the subject property prior to the sale. Petitioner, in gathering by the owner and the possessor by torelance refuses to
the coconut fruits and other crops, cutting grasses, and domesticating animals comply with such demand. A person who occupies the land of
on the subject property, even after its sale to respondent, was only continuing another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any
to exercise acts of possession over the subject property as he had done in contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied
years before. promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
Moreover, we note that the subject property was sold to respondent and he The status of the possessor is analogous to that of a lessee or
supposedly took possession thereof on 14 September 2004; and that tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy
petitioner allegedly forced his way into the property on 19 September 2004. continued by tolerance of the owner. In such case, the unlawful
This would mean that respondent, after taking over possession of the subject deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the
property from petitioner’s parents, possessed the subject property for only five date of the demand to vacate.
days before being deprived thereof by the petitioner. The very short period
when respondent purportedly possessed the subject property renders said In the instant case, there is no showing that either Zoila Acaylar or respondent
possession suspect. It is not clear to us how petitioner took actual possession made an express demand upon petitioner to vacate the subject property. In
of the subject property on 14 September 2004. Neither are we enlightened on the absence of an oral or written demand, petitioner’s possession of the
the manner in which respondent exercised or demonstrated his physical or subject property has yet to become unlawful. The absence of demand to
material possession over the subject property for the five days before he was vacate precludes us from treating this case, originally instituted as one for
reputedly ousted therefrom by petitioner. forcible entry, as one of unlawful detainer, since demand to vacate is
jurisdictional in an action for unlawful detainer.
Both the MTCC and the RTC decided in favor of petitioner since they
considered him to have been vested with possession of the subject property In conclusion, since petitioner was in prior physical possession of the subject
by virtue of the execution of the Deed of Sale. However, such a ruling violates property, respondent has no cause of action against petitioner for forcible
one of the most basic doctrines in resolving ejectment cases. We had long entry. Neither can we treat respondent’s case against petitioner as one for
settled that the only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment unlawful detainer absent the jurisdictional requirement of demand to vacate
proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical or material possession of made upon petitioner. However, our dismissal of respondent’s Complaint
the property, that is, possession de facto; and they should not involve herein against petitioner is without prejudice to respondent’s filing of the
the question of ownership or of possession de jure, which is to be settled appropriate remedy under the law to acquire possession of the subject
in the proper court and in a proper action. property, as well as to the resolution of the civil case pending with the RTC,
Branch 6, for the annulment of the Deed of Sale dated 14 September 2004.
Hence, the Deed of Sale conferring ownership of the subject property upon
respondent is clearly irrelevant in the case presently before us. The Deed of
Sale did not automatically place respondent in physical possession of the
Sunflower Neighborhood Association vs. CA

FACTS:

1. Private respondent Elisa Maglaqui-Caparas, in her capacity as executrix of the testate estate of Macaria
Maglaqui, filed on March 16, 1993 a complaint for unlawful detainer gainst Alfredo Mogar and 46 other
persons who were occupying several parcels of land (Lots 1-A, B, C, E, F and G) in Yellow Ville, United
Parañaque Subdivision IV, Metro Manila. These lands are registered in the name of Macaria Maglaqui,
private respondent’s mother.

2. The MeTC of Parañaque City, Branch 78, eventually decided in favor of private respondent. On appeal,
the decision of the MeTC was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Before the CA,
their petition was then dismissed.

3. After the dismissal became final, a writ of demolition was issued by the MeTC of Parañaque City, Branch
78. The writ, however, was not immediately implemented because the case was transferred to Branch 77
of the same court.

4. On February 6, 1997, Mogar et al. filed a petition with the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 257, presided
over by Judge Rolando G. How, to enjoin the implementation of the writ of demolition. However, this
petition was denied and subsequently, an alias writ of demolition was issued by Judge Vivencio G. Lirio of
MeTC Branch 77, the court of origin.

4. The alias writ of demolition was, again, not executed, this time due to the ex parte issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction by Judge Amelita Tolentino, in connection with the expropriation case filed by the
Municipality of Parañaque against the Testate Estate of Macaria Maglaqui.

5. Another group of persons occupying portions of the parcels of land (Lots I-F and I-G) subject of the
unlawful detainer case, organized themselves into the Sunflower Neighborhood Association (Sunflower),
the petitioner herein.

6. Sunflower, represented by one Floro Aragan, filed a complaint for prohibition/injunction with
preliminary injunction against private respondent also with the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 257.
Sunflower argued that its members should be excluded from the demolition order as they were not
parties to the original unlawful detainer case. Judge How granted the injunction and ordered the
exclusion of the houses belonging to petitioner from demolition.

7. Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals
assailing both the injunction orders issued by Judge Tolentino in the expropriation case and by Judge How
in the prohibition case.

8. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent holding that, as the judgment in the unlawful
detainer case had already become final, the execution could not be enjoined. Consequently, the MeTC of
Parañaque City, Branch 77 issued another alias writ of demolition on September 14, 1998. In order to stay
the execution of the writ of demolition, Sunflower filed on January 7, 1999 an urgent motion in this Court
for the issuance of a status quo order. This was granted by the SC. Prior to the issuance of our resolution,
however, the writ of demolition was implemented on January 14, 1999. Petitioner thus filed a motion to
allow its members to return to the premises, which we granted in another resolution.
9. It should be pointed out that any issue relating to the expropriation case filed by the Municipality of
Parañaque has been rendered moot by the dismissal of that case. This Court, in a Resolution ordered the
presiding judge of the RTC of Parañaque City, Branch 274 to report on the status of the expropriation case
filed by the Municipality of Parañaque against herein private respondent. The presiding judge reported
that the case was already dismissed on June 1, 1999 in an order issued by then Presiding Judge Amelita
Tolentino who granted the motion to dismiss filed by herein private respondent. Said dismissal was not
challenged by the Municipality of Parañaque.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s members, who were not parties to the unlawful detainer case, may be
ejected from the land subject of this case – YES

RATIO:

1. It is well-settled that, although an ejectment suit is an action in personam wherein the judgment is
binding only upon the parties properly impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard, the judgment
becomes binding on anyone who has not been impleaded if he or she is:

(a) a trespasser, squatter or agent of the defendant fraudulently occupying the property to frustrate the
judgment;
(b) a guest or occupant of the premises with the permission of the defendant;
(c) a transferee pendente lite;
(d) a sublessee;
(e) a co-lessee or
(f) a member of the family, relative or privy of the defendant.

2. In the case at bar, the records show that petitioner’s members are trespassers or squatters who do not
have any right to occupy the property of respondent. Petitioner does not dispute the ownership of the
parcels of land in question. In fact, it even admitted that the subject property is owned by Macaria
Maglaqui, mother of private respondent.

3. Petitioner failed to establish any right which would entitle its members to occupy the land in any
capacity, whether as lessees, tenants and the like. Petitioner’s only defense against the eviction and
demolition orders is their supposed non-inclusion in the original detainer case. This defense, however,
has no legal support since its members are trespassers or squatters who are bound by the judgment.

4. Petitioner’s argument that the parcels of land occupied by its members (Lots I-F and I-G) were not
included in the original ejectment complaint has no basis. The complaint private respondent filed with the
MeTC of Parañaque City, Branch 78, clearly included Lots I-F and I-G as part of the subject matter under
litigation in the unlawful detainer case. Thus, petitioner’s members, together with all the parties in the
unlawful detainer case, must vacate the disputed land.

5. The Court commiserates with respondent, already in her twilight years, who has been unlawfully
deprived of her land for a good number of years. Thus, we exhort the court of origin to execute this
decision with reasonable dispatch, consistent with the requirements of Section 28 of RA 7279 and EO 152
on eviction and demolition.
ZACARIAS V. ACANAY G.R. No. 202354 reneged on their promise to vacate the property after the lapse of
the period agreed upon.
FACTS: • In reversing the MCTC, the RTC pointed out that in her
• An Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer case was filed complaint, petitioner did not state that respondents entered her
on December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in
son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the above- lawful possession and acceded to the request of respondents to
named respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her stay in the premises until May 2008 but respondents’ reneged on
household. Said respondents are the occupants of a parcel of land their promise to vacate the property by that time.
with an area of seven hundred sixty-nine (769) square meters, • It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the
situated at Barangay Lalaan 1st, Silang, Cavite and covered by respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner
Tax Declaration No. 18-026-01182 in the name of petitioner and after she allowed them to stay there for one year. This decision
issued by Municipal Assessor Reynaldo L. Bayot on August 31, became final and executory.
2007. • The CA rendered a decision. It held that the MCTC clearly had
• The parties were ordered to proceed to the Philippine Mediation no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint did not satisfy the
Center pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer.
Civil Procedure, as amended. Mediation was unsuccessful and Since the prescriptive period for filing an action for forcible
thus the case was returned to the court. entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one
• After due proceedings, the MCTC rendered a Decision for unlawful detainer, reckoning the one-year period to file her
dismissing the complaint. action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the
• The MCTC held that the allegations of the complaint failed to property.
state the essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as • Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is
the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated respondents’ the lawful possessor of the subject property,she availed of the
occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. wrong remedy to recover possession but nevertheless may still
• It noted that the averments in the demand letter sent by file an accion publicianaor accion reivindicatoria with the proper
petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the property regional trial court.
through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own
"Sinumpaang Salaysay", are more consistent withan action for ISSUE:
forcible entry which should have been filed within one year from Whether the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion
the discovery of the alleged entry. amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction in nullifying the
• Since petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her judgment of the RTC which has long become final and executory?
property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after
the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the MCTC HELD/RATIO:
ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case. No.
• On appeal to the RTC, petitioner argued that unlawful detainer
was the proper remedy considering that she merely tolerated The Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action
respondents’ stay in the premises after demand to vacate was for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
made upon them, and they had in fact entered into an agreement
and she was only forced to take legal action when respondents
1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint.
When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was
plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should
possession; either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the
proper regional trial court.
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and The complaint in this case is similarly defective as it failed to allege
how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of petitioner
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the that "sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. have entered the subject property and occupied the same", as
correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents
In this case, the complaint failed to allege a cause of action for entered the land and built their houses thereon clandestinely and
unlawful detainer as it does not describe possession by the without petitioner's consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible
respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner entry, not unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no
and which became illegal upon termination by the petitioner of jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing the
such lawful possession. Petitioner’s insistence that she actually lower court's ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of
their entry into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, Lastly, petitioner's argument that the CA gravely erred in nullifying
she discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007. Such a final and executory judgment of the RTC deserves scant
possession could not have been legal from the start as it was without consideration.
her knowledge or consent, much less was it based on any contract,
express or implied. We stress that the possession of the defendant in It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is
expiration or termination of the right to possess. conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court
to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action. Indeed,
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
the cause of action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation.
If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it
intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal, but the have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ
possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer. of execution based on it is void.

Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an

occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a
statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face the
court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
 Inonog v Judge Ibay pesos (P1,000.00). In his motions, complainant explained that he did
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2175. July 28, 2009 not know that the parking space was reserved for the respondent
Justice Leonardo-De Castro judge. He also begged for forgiveness and promised not to repeat the
incident. Acting on the said amended motion, respondent judge issued
FACTS: an Order dated March 30, 2005 finding complainant's explanation to
1. This is an Administative Case filed by Vicencio Inonog (Complainant) be unsatisfactory. However, respondent judge modified his previous
against Judge Francisco Ibay of RTC Makati Branch 135, charging order by deleting the sentence for imprisonment for five (5) days but
Judge Ibay of Gross Abuse of Authority. the fine of P1,000.00 was increased to P2,000.00, with a stern warning
2. Venancio Inonog is the security driver of the Chief of the Business that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more severely.
Permit Division of Makati City. At around 1:00 AM of March 18, 2005, In compliance, complainant paid the additional amount of P1,000.00
he parked the vehicle that he drives for his boss in a vacant parking as fine.
space at the basement of the Makati City Hall because the slot where 6. Aggrieved, Inonog filed the instant administrative complaint in the
he usually parked was already occupied. At that time, parking slots Office of the Court Administrator. OCA held that Judge Ibay should
were only indicated by numbers, and not by the names of the officials. be penalized by a fine of P5,000 with a stern warning that a repetition
Thereafter, Inonog informed his superior that he will not be reporting of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
for work the for the rest of the day because he was not feeling well. severely.
Thus, he left the vehicle in the said basement parking area and went
home to Tanay, Rizal. ISSUE: Whether the act of Inonog in parking the car in the slot of
3. Inonog was later informed that he should appear before the sala of Judge Ibay constitutes contempt. NO. JUDGE IBAY IS GUILTY OF
respondent judge at 10:30 AM to explain/show cause why he should GRAVE ABUSE OF AUTHORITY.
not be cited for contempt of court for parking his vehicle at the space
reserved for the respondent judge. He was informed that the FALLO: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge
respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking Francisco B. Ibay is found guilty of grave abuse of authority. He is
space for the delay in the promulgation of the decision in Criminal ordered to pay a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to be
Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-393 scheduled deducted from his retirement benefits.
at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the latter had a hard time
looking for another parking space. Complainant was also informed RATIONALE:
that if he failed to appear at the hearing, a warrant for his arrest will be 1. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the ROC prescribes the rules and
issued. Complainant immediately left his home in Tanay to go to procedure for indirect contempt.
Makati City Hall even though he was not feeling well. 2. The phrase "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
4. He found out that by then he had already been adjudged guilty of to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice"
contempt of court by Judge Francisco Ibay for delaying in the is so broad and general that it encompasses wide spectrum
administration of justice. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for of acts that could constitute indirect contempt.
five (5) days and to pay a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00). A 3. However, the act of complainant in parking his car in a
warrant for his arrest was also issued. slot allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall
5. On March 21, 2005, complainant through counsel filed an Urgent under this category.
Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift Order of Arrest, but said a. There was no showing that he acted with malice
motion was denied. Subsequently, complainant filed an Amended and/or bad faith or that he was improperly motivated
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or To Lift the Order of Arrest, to delay the proceedings of the court by making use
attaching proof of payment of the fine in the amount of one thousand of the parking slot supposedly reserved for
 respondent judge. We cannot also say that the said already saw fit to impose upon him a fine in the amount of
act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the P40,000.00, it is proper to impose on him the same penalty in
dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy this case.
and inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect
contempt proceeding.
4. An act, to be considered contemptuous, must be clearly
contrary or prohibited by the order of the Court. A person
cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the
act which is forbidden or required to be done is clearly and
exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or
required. Here, the act of complainant is not contrary or clearly
prohibited by an order of the court.
5. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so
as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to
uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise
the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal
because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges but for the functions they exercise.
a. Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to
exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly,
with utmost restraint and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of
the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or
vindication. Respondent judge's act of
unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a
clear evidence of his unjustified use of the authority
vested upon him by law.
b. Besides possessing the requisite learning in the law,
a magistrate must exhibit that hallmark of judicial
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint
which are indispensable qualities of every judge.
Respondent judge himself has characterized this
incident as a "petty disturbance" and he should not
have allowed himself to be annoyed to a point that he
would even waste valuable court time and resources
on a trivial matter.
6. Considering that this is not the first time that respondent
judge committed the same offense and in Nuñez, which had
similar factual antecedents as the case at bar, the Court
 Regalado vs. Go 3. After the receipt of a copy of the CA decision,
G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007 respondent Go, through counsel, filed, on a
FACTS Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the
1. The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of Release Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud,
illegal dismissal filed before the Labor Arbiter by herein mistake or undue influence. In the same motion,
respondent employee Antonio S. Go against Eurotech respondent Go, through counsel, moved that
Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI), and its President and petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to explain her
General Manager. unethical conduct for directly negotiating with
2. Case developments: respondent Go without the knowledge of his
a. LABOR ARBITER: Go was illegally dismissed from counsel.
employment. 4. EHSI, et al. submitted a Manifestation and Motion with
b. NLRC: Reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and Leave of Court praying that the CA case be considered
declaring that respondent Go’s separation from settled with finality in view of the amicable settlement
employment was legal. among the parties. In addition, EHSI, et al. also filed an
(Before the NLRC decision, EHSI, et al. employed MR with an ad cautelam that in case of unfavorable
the legal services of De Borja Medialdea Bello action on their foregoing Manifestation and Motion, the
Guevarra and Gerodias Law Offices where herein appellate court should reconsider its previous decision.
petitioner Atty. Regalado worked as an associate.) 5. CA issued a Resolution annulling the Order of the LA for
lack of jurisdiction. It also denied for lack of merit EHSI,
c. CA: Reinstated the decision of the LA. et al.‘s MR. In the same resolution, petitioner Atty.
d. VOLUNTARY SETTLEMENT BETWEEN PARTIES: Regalado was ordered to explain why she should
not be cited for contempt of court for violating
The parties decided to settle the case and signed a Canon 9 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
Release Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of 6. EHSI, et al. thus filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
the LA. In view of the amicable settlement, the before this Court, assailing the CA decision and its
Labor Arbiter, on the same day, issued an Order Resolution, denying their MR.
dismissing the illegal dismissal case with 7. For her part, petitioner Atty. Regalado submitted a
prejudice. The execution of the compromise Compliance and explained that:
agreement was attended by the counsel for a. she never took part in the negotiation for the
EHSI, et al., petitioner Atty. Regalado, and amicable settlement of the illegal dismissal case with
respondent Go, but in the absence and without respondent Go which led to the execution of a
the knowledge of respondent Go’s lawyer. compromise agreement by the parties.
b. EHSI, et al, through a former EHSI employee and a
close ally of respondent Go, were the ones who
(This happened after the promulgation of the CA negotiated the settlement.
decision but prior to the receipt of the parties of their c. She never met personally respondent Go, not until
respective copies) they appeared before the LA for the execution of the
Release Waiver and Quitclaim.
 d. Petitioner Atty. Regalado claimed that she was in authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to
fact apprehensive to release the money to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses
respondent Go because the latter cannot present during litigation.
any valid identification card to prove his identity. It
was only upon the assurance of Labor Arbiter Gan It is defined as disobedience to the Court by acting in
that Antonio S. Go and the person representing opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies not
himself as such were one and the same, that the only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders,
execution of the agreement was consummated. but such conduct as tends to bring the authority of the court
e. Considering the circumstances, petitioner Atty. and the administration of law into disrepute or in some
Regalado firmly stood that there was no way that she manner to impede the due administration of justice
had directly dealt with respondent Go, to the latter’s
damage and prejudice, and misled him to enter into • The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts
an amicable settlement with her client. and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments,
8. CA issued a Resolution finding Atty. Regalado guilty of orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to
indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of the due administration of justice.
Court. As declared by the appellate court, even granting • Thus, contempt proceedings has a dual function:
arguendo that petitioner Atty. Regalado did not 1. vindication of public interest by punishment of
participate in the negotiation process, she was contemptuous conduct; and
nonetheless under the obligation to restrain her clients 2. coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the
from doing acts that she herself was prohibited to law requires him to uphold the power of the
perform as mandated by Canon 16 of the Canons of Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties
Professional Ethics. However, instead of preventing her to a suit awarded by the Court.
clients from negotiating with respondent Go who was • In our jurisdiction, the Rules of Court penalizes two
unassisted by his counsel, Atty. Regalado actively types of contempt, namely
participated in the consummation of the compromise 1. direct contempt and
agreement by dealing directly with respondent Go and 2. indirect contempt.
allowing him to sign the Release Waiver and Quitclaim
without his lawyer. Direct contempt
9. MR filed but denied so Atty. Regalado filed this instant committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct
Petition for Review on Certiorari. or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes
disrespect toward the court, offensive personalities toward
ISSUE and DECISION others, or refusal to be sworn or answer as a witness, or to
WON the proceedings conducted in convicting petitioner subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to
done in accordance with law? No do so.
Contempt Indirect contempt
Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the particular acts which constitute indirect contempt, thus:
 a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance formal charge requiring the respondent to show
of his official duties or in his official transactions; cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, 2. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall
process, order, or judgment of a court, including the be commenced by a verified petition with supporting
act of a person who, after being dispossessed or particulars and certified true copies of documents or
ejected from any real property by the judgment or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for
or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt
such real property, for the purpose of executing acts charges arose out of or are related to a principal
of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs action pending in the court, the petition for contempt
the possession given to the person adjudged to be shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
entitled thereto; docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the
c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting contempt charge and the principal action for joint
direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule; hearing and decision.
d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of • As can be gleaned above, the provisions of the Rules
justice; are unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings may
e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, be initiated only in two ways:
and acting as such without authority; 1. motu proprio by the court; or
f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served 2. through a verified petition and upon compliance with
g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or the requirements for initiatory pleadings. Procedural
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an requirements as outlined must be complied with.
order or process of a court held by him.
• There is no doubt that the complained acts of Atty.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent Regalado would fall under paragraphs (a) and (d) of
the court from issuing process to bring the respondent into Section 3, Rule 71, as in fact, she was adjudged guilty
court, or from holding him in custody pending such of indirect contempt.
proceedings.
Application to the case
How to commence Indirect Contempt proceedings • In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings
• Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how was initiated by Go through a Manifestation with
proceedings for indirect contempt should be Omnibus Motion. It was based on the aforesaid Motion
commenced, thus: that the appellate court issued a Resolution requiring
petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she should
Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated: not be cited for contempt.
1. Motu proprio by the court against which the • Clearly, it was respondent Go who brought to the
contempt was committed by an order or any other attention of the appellate court the alleged misbehavior
committed by petitioner Atty. Regalado. Without such