NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM
vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA”
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner, Roberto Reyes more popularly known by the screen name “Amay
Bisaya,” alleged that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, Mrs. Filart,
his friend, approached and invited him to join her in a party at the hotel’s penthouse for
the birthday of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. After a couple of hours, when the
buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but he was stopped by
petitioner Ruby Lim, Executive Secretary of Hotel Nikko. In a loud voice and within the
presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table,
Ruby Lim told him to leave the party. Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by
Dr. Filart. Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him
thus adding to his shame and humiliation. Not long after, a Makati policeman
approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. Mr. Reyes asked for One Million
Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney’s fees. Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having
asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the embarrassing circumstance
painted by the latter. Dr. Filart said that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.
According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits
intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator. When they
reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was not properly
dressed and was not invited.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. “Amay
Bisaya,” to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant.
2) Whether or not the petitioners are liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
3) If Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarity
liable with her.
RULING:
No, in the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr.
Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is unlikely that she would shout at him
from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years
wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes
that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to
leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was
meant to be heard by him only and there is no intention on her part to cause humiliation
to him.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which
he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as
its liability springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of
the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does
not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There
is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order,
or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of
must be intentional.
Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two
people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr.
Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within
the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez -Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her
residence in the place was seven (7) months. On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo,
the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the
same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC
charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency
as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the
House of Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed
seven months to since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s
proclamation showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the
congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended
in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial
Board of Canvassers.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner has satisfied the 1- year residency requirement to
be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
.
Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives
as required by the 1987 Constitution.
An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained
residences in different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Montejo
lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It
cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as
a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible
to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was
obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.
Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run
for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s
questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside.
Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Republic v. Molina
268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997
FACTS:
Respondent Roridel Molina married Reynaldo Molina on April 14, 1985. After a
year of marriage, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as
husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered
his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with
his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a
result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child.
Since then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What
constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences
and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations
which would not meet the essential marital responsibilities and duties due to some
psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest
such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The
evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along
with each other and had shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence
nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological
incapacity.
VINCENT MERCADO, petitioner vs. MA.CONSUELO TAN, defendant
G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000
FACTS:
Dr. Vincent Mercado was previously married with Thelma Oliva in 1976 before he
contracted marriage with Consuelo Tan in 1991 which the latter claims she did not
know. Tan filed bigamy against Mercado and after a month the latter filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage against Oliva. The decision in 1993 declared marriage
between Mercado and Oliva null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mercado committed bigamy in spite of filing the declaration of
nullity of the former marriage.
HELD:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as “void.”
In the case at bar, Mercado only filed the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Oliva
right after Tan filed bigamy case. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. He contracted second marriage without the judicial declaration of the
nullity. The fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a
bigamy charge.
