CRIMPRO Right to speedy disposition of cases

Title GR No. 164763

Perez vs People Date: February 12, 2008
Ponente: REYES R.T., J.
Zenon Perez – Petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN –
Respondents
FACTS
Case timeline for better appreciation:
 On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin, Provincial Auditor’s Office,
Bohol, conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal
treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol.
 The audit team counted the cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his presence. In the course of the
audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. Based on the said audit, petitioner
incurred a shortage of P72,784.57.
 When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that
part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of
his family, and the rest for his medicine.
 From January 1989 to April 1989, the petitioner remits the shortage in instalments. An administrative case
was filed against petitioner on February 13, 1989.
 Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds, defined and
penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

Petitioner’s Contention:
 Petitioner plead not guilty, denied his first answers as to the whereabouts of the funds missing. Contends
that his first answers be inadmissible because it is done without the presence of his counsel furthermore he
claims that he was not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken with diabetes mellitus.
 Petitioner asserts that his right to due process of law and to speedy disposition of his case was violated
because the decision of the Sandiganbayan was handed down after the lapse of more than twelve years.
 In his last ditch effort to exculpate himself, petitioner argues that the penalty meted for the crime of
malversation of public funds "that have been replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the government is
cruel and therefore unconstitutional, "as government has not suffered any damage.

ISSUE/S
1. W/N the admission of facts of the petitioner in the administrative proceedings without the presence of his
counsel inadmissible. - NO
2. W/N the petitioner is denied of speedy disposition of his case. - NO
3. W/N The law relied upon in convicting the petitioner and the sentence imposed is cruel and therefore violates
Sec. 19 of Art III (Bill of Rights) of the constitution - NO
RATIO
1. RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
 The court ruled that, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because
such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity
of government service.
 Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the
rule that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given against him. This is
based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such
declarations were true.
2. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF THEIR CASES
 Measured by the following yardstick, We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his right to a speedy
 disposition of his case.
 As ruled in a number of jurisprudence ruled that it must be emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition
of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for
and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried.
 As ruled in different cases, the courts recognized that there is a balancing test necessarily compels courts
to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the
factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of
his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: (1) Length of
delay; (2)the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his right, and (4) prejudice to the
defendant.
o The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is some delay
which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go
into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the
length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar
circumstances of the case.
o Reason the government assigns to justify the delay.. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in
order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily.
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.
o We have already discussed the third factor, the defendant’s responsibility to assert his right.
The strength of his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, the defendant’s assertion
of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether
the defendant is being deprived of the right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will
make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.
o The fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be assessed in the
light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. This
Court has identified three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense
will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or
disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious.
 Indications that the petitioner is negligent in asserting his right to speed disposition of cases:
 Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de parte in all stages of the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed submitted for decision up to the time he was
found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, however, petitioner has not filed a single motion or manifestation
which could be construed even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case to be dispatched
without delay.

 Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all
those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or
at least made some overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not waiving
that right.
3. As to the Violation of Sec. 19 of the Bill of Rights
 The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not fastened to the obsolete but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by humane justice and must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.
 The court ruled that, payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it
may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of
malversation.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 24, 2003 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum term, with
perpetual special disqualification. He is likewise ORDERED to pay a fine of P72,784.57, the amount equal to the funds
malversed.

2S 2016-17 (JIMENEZ)
[Link]
CRIMPRO Rule 115
Title : G.R. No. 154155
OMBUDSMAN V JURADO Date: August 6, 2008
Ponente: REYES, R.T., J.
THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner BEN C. JURADO, respondent.
Nature of the case:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed and set aside the decision and
resolution of the Ombudsman finding respondent Bureau of Customs Division Chief administratively liable for neglect of duty,
penalizing him with suspension for six months without pay.

FACTS

Sometime in 1992, Maglei Enterprises Co., (Maglei), a partnership owned by Rose Cuyos and John Elvin C. Medina, filed an
application before the Bureau of Customs for the operation of a Customs Bonded Warehouse (CBW)-Manufacturing Warehouse.
As part of the evaluation of Maglei’s application, CBW Supervisor Juanito A. Baliwag conducted an inspection of Maglei’s
compliance with structural requirements. Baliwag submitted a report recommending approval of the application.
On March 16, 1992, respondent Jurado, who was then the Chief of the Warehouse Inspection Division, adopted the
recommendation of Baliwag. Then he indorsed the papers of Maglei to the Chief of the Miscellaneous Manufacturing Bonded
Warehouse Division (MMBWD).
Maglei’s application was submitted to Rolando A. Mendoza, Chief of the MMBWD for his comment and recommendation. In a
Memorandum (for the District Collector of Customs), Mendoza reported that Maglei has substantially complied with the physical
and documentary requirements relative to their application for the operation of a Customs Bonded Warehouse. Mendoza further
recommended that Maglei’s application be approved. Following the indorsements of the different divisions of the Bureau of
Customs – Emma M. Rosqueta (District Collector of Customs); Titus B. Villanueva (Deputy Commissioner for Assessment and
Operations); and Atty. Alex Gaticales (Executive Director of the Customs – SGS Import Valuation and Classification Committee) –
Maglei’s application was recommended for approval.
On June 25, 1992, Maglei was finally granted the authority to establish and operate CBW No. M-1467 located at 129 J.
Bautista, Caloocan City. By virtue of such authority, Maglei imported various textile materials which were then transferred to the
said warehouse. The textiles were to be manufactured into car covers for exportation.
Subsequently, on July 8 and 22, 1992, MMBWD Senior Storekeeper Account Officer George O. Dizon was tasked by
MMBWD Chief Mendoza to check and verify the status of Maglei’s CBW. Dizon reported that the subject CBW was existing and
operating. However, upon further verification by the Bureau of Customs, it was discovered that the purported CBW of Maglei did
not exist at the alleged site in Caloocan City. Rather, what was reported located at the site was a School of the Divine Mercy. Only
a small signboard bearing the name "Maglei Enterprises Company" was posted inconspicuously in the corner of the lot. Further
investigation revealed that Maglei’s shipment of textile materials disappeared, without proof of the materials being exported or the
corresponding taxes being paid.
OMB:
OMB dismissed the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019 and Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code filed against respondent. The complaint was dismissed on the ground of
lack of prima facie evidence to charge respondent of the [Link] the other hand, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of
the OMB rendered judgment finding respondent administratively liable, penalizing him with suspension for six (6) months without
pay. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of his suspension was likewise denied by the Ombudsman.
Respondent:
His right to a speedy disposition of his case had been violated; that the administrative case against him should have been
dismissed following the dismissal of the criminal charges against him; and that there is no substantial evidence on record to make
him administratively liable.
CA:
Reversed and set aside the questioned decision and resolution of the OMB.
ISSUE/S
[Link] OR NOT RESPONDENT’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED; - NO
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT WAS ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR NEGLECT OF DUTY.- YES
RATIO
1. NO. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy trial," "speedy disposition of cases" is a flexible concept. What the
Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays which render rights nugatory. In determining whether or
not the right to the speedy disposition of cases has been violated, this Court has laid down the following guidelines: (1) the length
of the delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice
caused by the delay.

First. Prior to the report and recommendation by the FFB that respondent be criminally and administratively charged, respondent
was neither investigated nor charged. That respondent was charged only in 1997 while the subject incident occurred in 1992, is
not necessarily a violation of his right to the speedy disposition of his case. The record is clear that prior to 1997, respondent had
no case to speak of – he was not made the subject of any complaint or made to undergo any investigation.

Second. In making a determination of what constitutes a violation of the right to the speedy disposition of cases, this Court has
time and again employed the balancing test. The balancing test first adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v.
Wingo was crucial in the Court’s resolution of the recent case of Perez v. People:

A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify
some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right.
Though some might express them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.

Records reveal that on September 29, 1997, the FFB of the OMB recommended that respondent be criminally and
administratively charged. Subsequently, the OMB approved the recommendation on October 17, 1997. Respondent submitted his
counter-affidavit on February 2, 1998 and motion to dismiss on October 8, 1998 before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of
the OMB. On August 16, 1999, the AAB rendered a decision finding petitioner administratively liable for neglect of duty. More or
less, a period of two (2) years lapsed from the fact-finding report and recommendation of the FFB until the time that the AAB
rendered its assailed decision.

To our mind, the time it took the Ombudsman to complete the investigation can hardly be considered an unreasonable and
arbitrary delay as to deprive respondent of his constitutional right to the speedy disposition of his case. Further, there is nothing in
the records to show that said period was characterized by delay which was vexatious, capricious or oppressive.

2. YES. It is elementary that the dismissal of criminal charges will not necessarily result in the dismissal of the administrative
complaint based on the same set of [Link] quantum of evidence in order to sustain a conviction for a criminal case is different
from the proof needed to find one administratively liable. On the other hand, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an
individual administratively liable is substantial evidence.
Verily, respondent can still be held administratively liable despite the dismissal of the criminal charges against him.

As a supervisor, respondent was clearly negligent in the performance of his duties. By merely acquiescing to the report and
recommendation of his subordinate without verifying its accuracy, respondent was negligent in overseeing that the duties and
responsibilities of the WID were performed with utmost responsibility. Respondent was likewise negligent when he failed, as
supervisor, to initiate, institute, or recommend investigation and disciplinary proceedings against his subordinate Baliwag after the
anomaly was discovered. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise the degree of care, skill, and diligence which the circumstances
warrant.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the appealed Decision REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the
Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-97-0656 finding respondent guilty of neglect of duty is REINSTATED.
2S-LAGUMBAY
CRIMINAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
PROCEDURE

Title GR No. 183994

WILLIAM CO v. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC Date: June 30 2004

Ponente:

William Co aka XU Quing He – Petitioner New Prosperity Plastic Products represented by

Elizabeth Uy – Respondent

Nature of the case: A special civic action for certiorari against Hon. Judge Ignacio Almodovar
FACTS

 Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy (Uy), is the private
complainant in Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for Violation of Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 22 filed against petitioner William Co (Co), which were raffled to the
MeTC Branch. 49 of Caloocan City.
 In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June
9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rules).
 On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases.9 Hon.
Belen B. Ortiz, then Presiding Judge of the MeTC Branch 49, granted the motion on October
14, 2004 and denied Co’s motion for reconsideration.
 On March 17, 2005, Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) before
the RTC of Caloocan City challenging the revival of the criminal cases.
 It was, however, dismissed for lack of merit on May 23, 2005. Co’s motion for reconsideration
was, subsequently, denied on December 16, 2005. Co then filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court, which was docketed as G.R. No.
171096. We dismissed the petition per Resolution dated February 13, 2006. There being no
motion for reconsideration filed, the dismissal became final and executory on March 20, 2006.

Before the MeTC Branch 50 where Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 were re-
raffled after the inhibition of Judge Ortiz, Co filed a “Motion for Permanent Dismissal” on July 13,
2006. Uy opposed the motion, contending that the motion raised the same issues already resolved
with finality by this Court in G.R. No. 171096. In spite of this, Judge Esteban V. Gonzaga issued an
Order dated September 4, 2006 granting Co’s motion. When the court subsequently denied Uy’s
motion for reconsideration on November 16, 2006, Uy filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC of
Caloocan City. On January 28, 2008, Hon. Judge Adoracion G. Angeles of the RTC Branch 121 acted
favorably on the petition, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and
November 16, 2006 and directing the MeTC Branch 50 to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases.
Co then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which, as aforesaid, dismissed the petition and
denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, this present petition with prayer for TRO/WPI.

 Petitioner’s contention: Co argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 should be considered as a final dismissal on the
ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. He reasons out that from his arraignment on
March 4, 2002 until the initial trial on June 9, 2003, there was already a “vexatious, capricious
and oppressive” delay, which is in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act 8493 (Speedy Trial Act
of 1998) and Section 2, Paragraph 2, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure mandating that the entire trial period should not exceed 180 days from the first day
of trial. As the dismissal is deemed final, Co contends that the MeTC lost its jurisdiction over the
cases and cannot reacquire jurisdiction over the same based on a mere motion because its
revival would already put him in double jeopardy.

ISSUE/S
According to Co, the following issue need to be resolved in this petition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PETITIONER ON THE
GROUND OF DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL CONSTITUTES FINAL DISMISSAL OF
THESE CASES;

RATIO

The petition is unmeritorious.

Co’s charge that his right to a speedy trial was violated is baseless. Obviously, he failed to show
any evidence that the alleged “vexatious, capricious and oppressive” delay in the trial was
attended with malice or that the same was made without good cause or justifiable motive on
the part of the prosecution. This Court has emphasized that “‘speedy trial’ is a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept.” In determining whether the accused's right to speedy trial was
violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors
to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the
right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be
regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular
regard must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. “While the Court
recognizes the accused's right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration
of justice, we cannot deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals.
Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.”
RULING

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 102975, which affirmed the
January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 121 of Caloocan City, annulling and
setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that permanently dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-
77 and 209634, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.
Notes

2-S 2016-17 (LUMIO)

CRIM PRO RULE 115 RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
Title GR No. 190798
IBANEZ VS. PEOPLE Date: JANUARY 27, 2016
Ponente: PEREZ, J.
RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ, AND DANIEL “BOBOT” PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES - RESPONDENT
IBANEZ - PETITIONERS
Nature of the case: Petitioners aver they were deprived of their right to counsel and right to cross-examine the witnesses.
FACTS
1. Petitioners were charged with frustrated homicide for allegedly hitting, stoning, and stabbing Rodolfo Lebria.
2. Atty. Manzano was appointed by the trial court as counsel de oficio for the petitioners. Trial was set and Atty. Manzano
was informed.
3. During the trial, the prosecution presented its 2 witnesses (Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit), however, Atty. Manzano was not
present at that time, and hence, witnesses were not cross-examined.
4. Trial court deemed that the petitioners waived their right to cross-examine.
5. Petitoner’s argue before the Supreme Court that they were deprived of their right to counsel because Atty. Manzano
failed to appear on the day of the trial court hearing when the 2 witnesses were presented. As a consequence they
were divested of the opportunity to cross-examine the 2 witnesses.
6. The OSG argues that the petitioners were not deprived of the right to counsel since from the beginning of the trial the
Court appointed a total of 3 counsel de oficio and that the petitioners did not object to their designation.
ISSUE/S
I. Whether or not petitioners were deprived of the right to counsel and right to cross-examine the witnesses. - NO
RATIO
ON THE ISSUE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL
1. The evidence shows that petitioners were assisted by counsel de oficio and pre-trial but more so, their counsel de
oficio actively participated in the proceedings. As found by the CA, the petitioners were duly represented by a counsel
de oficio all throughout the proceedings except for one hearing when their court appointed lawyer was absent and the
2 witnesses presented their testimony.
ON THE ISSUE OF RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES
1. Opportunity to cross-examine, and not actual cross-examination of witnesses is the essence of the right to cross
examine.
2. As explained in Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al. “The right of a party to confront and
cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the
right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right
of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.”
3. Such is the scenario in the present case where the reason why Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit were not subjected to cross-
examination was not because the petitioners were not given opportunity to do so.
4. Moreover, neither did the petitioners interpose any objection to the presentation of testimony of the prosecution
witnesses during the June 18, 2003 hearing nor did their counsel de oficio subsequently seek a reconsideration of the
June 18, 2003 Order.
5. Further, the trial court judge, when he issued the June 18, 2003 Order, was merely exercising a judicial prerogative. No
proof was presented by the defense showing that the exercise of such discretion was either despotic or arbitrary.
6. In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the absence of the counsel de oficio in one of the hearings of this case amounts
to a denial of right to counsel. Nor does such absence warrant the nullification of the entire trial court proceedings and
the eventual invalidation of its ruling. In People v. Manalo, the Court held that the fact that a particular counsel de
oficio did not or could not consistently appear in all the hearings of the case, is effectively a denial of the right to
counsel, especially so where, as in the instant case, there is no showing that the several appointed counsel de oficio in
any way neglected to perform their duties to the appellant and to the trial court and that the defense had suffered in
any substantial sense therefrom
RULING
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioners RONALD IBANEZ, EMILIO IBANEZ and DANIEL "BOBOT" IBANEZ are found guilty of frustrated
homicide and sentenced to a prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as They are also ordered to pay RODOLFO LEBRIA Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate
damages and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages. SO ORDERED.
Notes
1. Right invoked by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution which states that: “Section
14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law. (2)In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, x x x.”
2. Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to designate a counsel de oficio for the accused
in the absence of private representation.
3. The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in criminal prosecution.27 As such,
right to counsel is one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused.28 A deprivation of the right to counsel
strips the accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a level playing field.29 Simply put, an accused without
counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing which is tantamount to a grave denial of due process.
2S 2016-2017 (MAGDARAOG)
[Link]
CRIMPRO Rule 115 (Equipoise Rule)
Title GR No. 126480
Tin vs. People Date: August 10, 2001
Ponente: QUISUMBING, J.
MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY – Petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES – Respondent
This petition assails the decision of the Court of appeals, affirming the decision of the RTC - Manila, finding the
accused (now petitioner) guilty of estafa.
FACTS
Facts according to the accused:
1. Complainant Dr. Francisca Santiago and Mia Chan (daughter-in-law of the accused) entered into a contract
of loan, whereby Dr. Santiago obtained a loan amounting to Ph220,000; and Mia Chan received several
pieces of jewelry as collateral for the loan.
2. The term of the loan is for three-months only, with an interest rate of 14% per annum.

Facts according to the complainant:

1. The accused received in trust from said complainant several pieces of jewelry with an estimated value of
more than P220,000.00 as collateral to the loan in the amount of P220,000.00 which the latter obtained
from the accused, under the express obligation of returning the said pieces of jewelry to said complainant
immediately upon demand for redemption
2. The loan was under a "white-paper" system where there is no maturity/expiration date and where the
jewelry can be redeemed anytime provided the interests were paid.

The accused could not produce the jewelry upon demand of the complainant. Hence, the estafa case filed by the
complainant.
The Manila RTC found the accused guilty of the charge and sentenced her to suffer imprisonment of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the private
complainant, Dr. Francisca M. Santiago, the amount of P280,000.00 plus 12 percent interest per annum from the
filing of the information and P40,000.00 as attorney's fees
On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S
W/N the petitioner is guilty of the crime of estafa. – No.
RATIO
Petitioner raises issues of fact by assailing the credibility of witnesses. As a general rule, this Court in a petition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court will review only errors of law. It is not the function of this Court to weigh the
evidence on factual issues all over again. However, there are certain exceptions to this rule, one of which is when
the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts. In this case, the decisions of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are allegedly based on misapprehensions of vital facts, making their review necessary.
A conviction in this case for estafa depends on three facts: (1) that accused was the one who extended the loan;
(2) that accused was the one who received the pieces of jewelry as collateral for the loan she extended; and (3) that
the loan was for an indefinite term. These factual circumstances must relate directly to the elements of the crime of
estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
Mia Chan's admission, that she was the one who extended the loan and received the jewelries, deserves weighty
consideration and could not be ignored. That admission is one against self-interest, amounting to an incriminatory
statement, which the witness could not have volunteered if not the truth.
Petitioner claims that the loan was for a three-month period only. But private complainant averred that it was
extended under a so-called "white-paper" system, or a loan with an indefinite term. Petitioner presented her
daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the loan was only for a three-month period. Private complainant did not
present evidence to substantiate her claim, other than her self-serving testimony. Private complainant relied on the
acknowledgment receipt allegedly, signed by petitioner in the presence of two witnesses; However, the prosecution
did not present Aurora Jose, who allegedly witnessed the transaction. Nor did it present Mrs. Dava and Mrs. Zuñiga
who allegedly accompanied Dr. Santiago when the latter tried to redeem her jewelries. While non-presentation of
certain witnesses is not a valid defense nor does it work against the prosecution's cause,this holds true only if the
evidence of the prosecution is sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. If the
prosecution evidence is not strong, then it becomes mandatory for the prosecution to present evidence which can
help further its case, or explain why such evidence is not presented. When the sole testimony of the complainant is
met by an equally credible evidence of the defense, then the prosecution must present credible corroborative
witnesses to buttress its case. Its failure to present corroborative witnesses, without any explanation why they were
not produced, weakens the testimony of the witness who named those corroborating witnesses in her testimony. In
this case, the prosecution's failure to present the corroborative witnesses, without any explanation for their non-
appearance, makes private complainant's testimony weak.
Further, since it was private complainant who asserted that the loan was for an indefinite term under the so-called
"white-paper system" of the pawnshop, she had the burden of proving that fact as true. In this she failed, and her
failure undermines the case for the prosecution.
Faced with two conflicting versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule. Under this rule, where the evidence on
an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of
two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fullfil the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.
And in this case, the petitioner must be declared innocent and set free.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14818, affirming that of the Regional
Trial Court in Crim. Case No. 88-64598, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Tin isACQUITTED of the
charge against her under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, for lack of evidence sufficient to sustain a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2S 2016-17 (ALFARO)
[Link]
CRIMPRO RULE 115
Title G.R. No. 208404,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LUGNASIN Date: February 24, 2016
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, VICENTE LUGNASIN AND DEVINCIO GUERRERO, Accused-
Appellants.
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Vicente Lugnasin, Tito Lugnasin, Excelso
Lugnasin, Elmer Madrid, Rogelio Baldaba and Devincio Guerrero" wherein accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin
(Vicente) and Devincio Guerrero (Devincio) were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for
ransom.
FACTS

On October 15, 1999, the Department of Justice filed an Information against Vicente, Devincio and four other
individuals, namely, Tito E. Lugnasin (Tito), Excelso B. Lugnasin (Excelso), Elmer A. Madrid (Elmer), Rogelio D.
Baldaba (Rogelio), and five other unidentified individuals: John Doe, Peter Doe, Richard Doe, George Doe, and
James Doe, for the crime of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code.

When arraigned on November 5, 2001, accused-appellant Vicente pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
Accused-appellant Devincio likewise pleaded not guilty when he was arraigned on March 6, 2002. Both
accused-appellants made no stipulation during their respective pre-trial conferences except for their identities
and the jurisdiction of the court. The nine other accused remain at large.

The prosecution's lone witness, Nicassius Cordero narrated in court how he was abducted while opening the
garage door of his residence in Mindanao Avenue in the late evening of April 20, 1999 by three armed men.

Vicente Lugnasin, a resident of Luzviminda I, Dasmarifias Quezon City denied the accusation, saying he only
saw Cordero for the first time at the Department of Justice and Cordero could not even identify him. He
recounted that on May 14, 1999, while preparing for the town fiesta celebration, policemen came to his
residence and arrested him and his brother Tito and cousin Excelsio for alleged involvement in a robbery case.
They were tortured, then put on display for media men to feast on and for alleged victims to identify. After
posting bail, he was later arrested for illegal possession of firearms. He was also charged with two other cases,
a bank robbery and the Mercury Bank robbery, both pending before the sala of Judge Jose Mendoza. Devincio
Guerrero, a fish vendor at the Pasig Market, likewise denies any involvement in the kindnap[ping] of Cordero.
He swears he saw him for the first time only in the courtroom.

The Court of Appeals held that the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom were established by the
prosecution through its lone witness, Cordero, whose credible testimony should be accorded great weight. It
also ruled that Cordero's identification of his abductors conformed to the stringent guidelines of out-of court
identification, contrary to accused-appellant Devincio's assertion that it was marked with suggestiveness.

As regards accused-appellant Devincio's argument that his warrantless arrest was illegal since it did not fall
under Section 6, Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure, as amended, the Court of Appeals held that accused-
appellant Devincio's right to question his arrest and subsequent inquest/preliminary investigation is deemed
waived due to his failure to raise such argument before his arraignment.

Addressing accused-appellant Devincio's claim that his rights under Republic Act No. 7438, entitled "An Act
Defining Certain Rights of Person Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the Duties of
the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof were violated,
the Court of Appeals pointed out that he neither offered any evidence nor executed an extrajudicial confession
or admission for such allegation.

ISSUE/S
(1) WON COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE
PROSECUTION WITNESS.
(2) WON COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [DEVINCIO] GUILTY NOTWITHSTANDING THE PRESENCE OF
SUGGESTIVENESS IN [THE] IDENTIFICATION BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OF THE APPELLANT AS ONE OF HIS
ABDUCTORS.
RATIO

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone
is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to
the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of
persons lined up for the purpose.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the
charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15)
days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be
SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality
of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Cordero was able to see the faces of the men who abducted him from his house due to the light emanating from the
pedestrian gate. He was also able to describe how these men approached him, the kind of firearms they were carrying,
how the men acted where they passed, where he was taken, and even the sounds he heard. Cordero's testimonies
were replete with detailed descriptions of how he was abducted and who abducted him. To top it all, he was confident
that he could identify his abductors, as he did at the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG)

Cordero positively identified both accused-appellants Devincio and Vicente as two of his kidnappers. He saw both
accused-appellants' faces before he was blindfolded. Thus, it cannot be said that the length of time between the crime
and the identification of the accused-appellants, which was only 26 days, had any effect on Cordero's memory, to
render his positive identification flawed.

Accused-appellant Devincio's contention that Cordero's out-of-court identification was marked by suggestiveness must
similarly fail for his failure to support it by solid evidence. The only reason he gave for such argument was Cordero's
knowledge that the persons who were being investigated in connection with a robbery case were included in the police
or photographic line-up. However, that is not enough to strike down Cordero's identification for being tainted. The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was on point when it quoted this Court's ruling in People v. Villena;

Eyewitness identification is often decisive of the conviction or acquittal of an accused. Identification of an accused
through mug shots is one of the established procedures in pinning down criminals. However, to avoid charges of
impermissible suggestion, there should be nothing in the photograph that would focus attention on a single person.

[I]t is settled that an out-of-court identification does not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-
court identification and that, even assuming that an out-of-court identification was tainted with irregularity, the
subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have attended it.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 23, 2013 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02971 finding
accused-appellants Vicente Lugnasin and Devincio Guerrero GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659,
and sentencing them to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole is AFFIRMED
2S 2016-17 (MATABUENA)
[Link]
CRIMPRO RULE 115
Title GR No. 95026
TELAN V CA Date: OCTOBER 4, 1991
Ponente: SARMIENTO, J
SPOUSES PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN, petitioner, COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO TELAN, and SPOUSES
VICENTE and VIRGINA TELAN
Nature of the case: The Petition for Review on certiorari before this Court was filed on October 18, 1990 by the spouses PEDRO
and ANGELINA TELAN with an Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction
FACTS
 Petitioner PEDRO is a retired government employee and high school graduate who settled in 1973 on a property abutting
the national highway in Guibang, Gamu, Isabela
 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled to transfer his residence to the other side of the
national.
 PEDRO set up business enterprises such as a vulcanizing shop and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins, the herein
private respondents Roberto Telan and Spouses Vicente and Virginia Telan (hereinafter ROBERTO, VICENTE, and
VIRGINIA), followed suit by setting up their own eatery within the same lot.
 1984, PEDRO and his spouses ANGELINA received a Notice to Vacate from the [Link] was followed by a letter from
VIRGINIA herself, reiterating the said demand. Apparently VICENTE and VIRGINIA had executed a Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot shared by PEDRO and ANGELINA. DBP thereafter foreclosed the
mortgage.
 In the same year, 1984, the DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN filed a suit at the Regional Trial Court
of Ilagan, Isabela to evict PEDRO TELAN's family from the lot. The case was dismissed.
 1986, ROBERTO TELAN was able to secure a Certificate of Title in his name over the contested lot and then filed a
complaint for Accion Publiciana against the Sps PEDRO TELAN. Wherein the latter hired the services of Atty. Antonio
Paguiran to defend them in the suit.
 The lower court awarded the possession of the property to ROBERT TELAN, et. al.
 Spouses PEDRO TELAN wanted to appeal, however, Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so, PEDRO and ANGELINA
asked another person to sign for them
 petitioner ANGELINA TELAN became acquainted with Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be a "lawyer." Having
no counsel to assist them in their appeal, Angelina asked "Atty. Palma" to handle their case. he consented and the
petitioners paid his "lawyer's fees”
 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution which considered the appeal interposed by petitioners as abandoned and
dismissed "for failure ... to file an appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section 1 (f), Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court
 The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They only came to know about it on May 1990, when
somebody in the Isabela Provincial Capitol at Ilagan informed PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "Atty.
Palma" could no longer be found.
 PEDRO in verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of Attorneys with the Bar Confidant's Office. This was
followed by the filing of Criminal Case No. 389-90 for Estafa against "Atty. Palma." By now PEDRO had realized that
"Atty. Palma" was a fake.
 1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the Writ of Demolition for the enforcement of the decision.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer amounts to a deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a
lack of due process.
RATIO
We rule for the petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded due process of law* because they lost their to appeal when
deprived of the right to counsel. The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as
a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.

In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a
grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused
afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.

There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different from that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due
process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no fair hearing unless a party, who is
in danger of losing his house in which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest means of
livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and counsel.

Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. To demand as much form ordinary citizens whose
only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into a intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be
stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such
right. The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that
must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.
This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply refuse anyone the counsel that only the exercise of
his office can impart.
Ruling
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner is GRANTED; the proceedings in CA-G.R CV No. 20786 are hereby REINSTATED and the
respondent Court of Appeals is ordered to give DUE COURSE to the appeal and to decide the same on the merits
2S 2016-17 (MATIENZO)
CRIMPRO
Title GR No. 191752
People vs Cachuela Date: June 10, 2013
Ponente: Brion, J.
People of the Philippines-Apellee JOSE ARMANDO CERVANTES CACHUELA and BENJAMIN
JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused.
BENJAMIN JULIAN CRUZ IBANEZ, Accused-Appellant.
Nature of the case: We decide the appeal filed by appellants Jose Armando Cervantes Cachuela and Benjamin Julian Cruz
Ibanez assailing the August 7, 2009 decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474. The CA decision
affirmed with modification the July 14, 2008 decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 196, Parañaque City,
finding the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
FACTS
7. July 23,2004- Ibanez went to Weapon System Corporation(WSC) to buy a barrel and inquired about the rates and
schedule of it’s firing range.
8. July26 , 2004- an employee was discovered to be handcuffed(Zaldy Gabao) to a vault inside the store which was
unlocked. It was found out later that Rex Dorimon, the company gunsmith, was found dead inside the firing range
later on experts diagnosed that Rex suffered from several gunbshots.

3. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was
involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees; and that Cachuela had been looking for
prospective buyers of firearms. The NBI formed an entrapment team and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the
operation. Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he had been sent by Cachuela and
Ibañez to look for buyers of firearms. The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an
entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC. Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the
names of the other persons involved in the crime.6

Thereafter, the asset contacted Cachuela and informed him that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers, and that they
would like to see the firearms being sold. Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers at a gasoline station in Naic, Cavite.
NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising Agent Jerry Abiera and the asset went to the agreed place. Cachuela came
and talked to them, and brought them inside his house where Cachuela showed them several firearms. When the agents
inquired from Cachuela whether the firearms had legal documentation, the latter sensed that the meeting was a set-up.
The NBI agents arrested Cachuela before he could make any move. The agents recovered four (4) firearms from
Cachuela’s house, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with serial number T1102-03E000151 and soon after the NBI conducted a
follow up operation against Ibanez and was able to arrest him.

4. During the police line-up Zaldy was able to point out the appellants as the persons responsible for the robbery at WSC
and for the killing of Rex. Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the
crime.

5. Prosecution filed information for Robbery with Homicide against the appellants and they were arraigned to a plea of
not guilty. In the course of the trial Zaldy died.

6. In its decision dated July 14, 2008, the RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered them to
pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Rex P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. The trial court
likewise ordered the appellants to pay Hector C. Rodriguez, Jr. P1,563,300.00, representing the value of the firearms and
ammunitions stolen from WSC. Excepted from the conviction was Nabilgas whom the RTC acquitted on ground of
reasonable doubt.

7. The appellants filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-HC No. 03474. In its decision of August 7, 2009, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision with the following modifications: (a) the appellants were ordered to pay Arms Depot
Philippines, Inc. the amount of P1,093,947.50, representing the value of the stolen firearms and ammunitions from WSC,
with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the decision until fully paid; and (b) they are likewise ordered
to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of Rex P45,000.00 as actual damages with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
the date of the decision until fully paid.

ISSUE/S
II. W/n the out-of-court identification made by Zaldy is admissible?-NO
II. W/n the extrajudicial confession made by Nabilgas is admissible?-NO
RATIO
I. Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex
in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office on Taft Avenue, Manila. We note that Zaldy did not testify in court since he
was brought to the National Center for Mental Health, and subsequently died there during the trial. For this reason, we
examine with greater scrutiny Lino’s testimony regarding Zaldy’s alleged out-of-court identification.
To our mind, Lino’s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission that renders
unreliable Zaldy’s out-ofcourt identification. No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification; the length of time between the crime and the identification; and the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure. The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies our strict
treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony.

II. During trial, Nabilgas repudiated his extrajudicial confession as he said he was tortured by NBI agents and that he was
forced to copy a previously prepared statement.
After a close reading of the records, we rule that Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a competent
and independent counsel. The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were provided by the
very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to
the agency’s investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan. Atty. Paglinawan
confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the alleged
confession. Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she was called to assist him;
she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the confession. There was also nothing in the records to show
that Atty. Go ascertained whether Nabilgas’ confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the nature
and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.

In addition, the extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a witness who was present at the time the
written confession was made. We note in this regard that the prosecution did not present Atty. Go at the witness stand
despite hints made during the early stages of the trial that she would be presented.

At any rate, Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view of the res inter
alios acta rule. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible against his or
her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.
RULING
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 7, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR.-HC No.
03474 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the amount to be restituted by the appellants to Arms Depot
Philippines, Inc. be increased from P1,093,947.50 to P1,481,000.00.
Notes
A."A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on
the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following
elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its
generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but
the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery."

B. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone
is brought face-to-face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
lined up for the purpose x x x In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz.: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the
identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.

C. extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: "(1) the confession must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the
confessant's choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing."

D. Exception to the res inter alios acta rule

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court. This provision states that the act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy, and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it
is necessary that: (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself; (b) the admission relates
to the common object; and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.

ONG
[Link]
PACIS

People v Morial

G.R. No. 129295 August 15, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

EDWIN MORIAL, LEONARDO MORIAL alias "CARDING" NONELITO ABIÑON * alias "NOLY", defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

Two of the three appellants herein were sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Southern Leyte for
Robbery with Homicide. The other was sentenced to suffer only the penalty ofreclusion perpetua on account of
minority. The judgment of conviction is now before this Court on automatic review.

(Related facts)

SPO4 Fernandez testified that the investigation he conducted resulted in an admission by Leonardo Morial that he
was one of those who participated in the robbery with homicide. SPO4 Fernandez asked Leonardo whether he was
willing to reduce his statement into writing and to sign the same. The suspect answered positively. SPO4 Fernandez
then advised him of his right "to remain silent and [to] have a counsel[,] [and informed him that] whatever will be
his answer will be used as evidence in Court."40

Leonardo told the investigator that he had no money to pay for the services of counsel. SPO4 Fernandez thus
volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leonardo Morial consented. SPO4 Fernandez then
contacted Atty. Aguilar.41

Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived at about 8:00 that morning of January 9, 1996. After being introduced to Leonardo
Morial, Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions
that may be propounded by the police investigator. Atty. Aguilar warned him that the statements that he may give
might be used in evidence against him. Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions voluntarily. According
to Atty. Aguilar, Leonardo was bent on revealing what really happened. Thereafter, SPO4 Fernandez conducted the
investigation in Cebuano.

Midway into the investigation, after the police investigator had asked "all the material points," Atty. Aguilar asked
the investigator that he be given leave as he had a very important engagement. The investigator agreed to the
lawyer's request.42

Before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions in his absence. He also
instructed the police that, after the written confession had been prepared, the accused and the document
containing the confession should be brought to his office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police
station for less than thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation.
At about 1:30 or 2:00 in the afternoon, Leonardo and his policeman-escort arrived at Atty. Aguilar's office. Atty.
Aguilar asked the accused whether he was maltreated while he was away and examined the suspect's body for
contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him that he was not harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied
the document to determine whether its contents conformed to the answers given by the accused in his (counsel's)
presence. He propounded questions to Leonardo with reference to the document. Atty. Aguilar asked him whether
he understood its contents and whether he was willing to sign it. Leonardo replied in the positive and signed the
document in the presence of Atty. Aguilar and the policeman-escort.43

ISSUE

WON the extrajudicial confession is admissible against Morial

HELD

No. SPO4 Fernandez confirmed that Atty. Aguilar left during the investigation. On direct examination, SPO4
Fernandez said the lawyer left the station while the investigation was still going on, saying that he had so many
things to do in his office.44

During and despite Atty. Aguilar's absence, SPO4 Fernandez continued with the investigation and propounded
several more questions to Leonardo, which the latter answered.

The Court has stressed that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a counsel assisting him
from the very start thereof.49.

As appellant Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during custodial investigation, his
extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him.
CRIM PRO RULE 115
Title G.R. No. 85215
People vs Ayson July 7, 1989
NARVASA, J.:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON, Presiding over
Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, Baguio City, and FELIPE
RAMOS, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio
City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the
PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos
pertained.

the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a handwritten notes 3 reading as
follows:

2-8-86

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE IRREGULARITIES

ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000 (APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS
MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.

(s) Felipe Ramos

(Printed) F. Ramos

At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager and PALEA, Felipe Ramos
was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz,
were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made
disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by
him, that although he had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so,
"perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay
on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he desired the next
investigation to be at the same place.

About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa
allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987.

On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. The
prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.

At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21,
1988, 6which included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at
PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x
given on February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.

The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s Evidence." Particularly as regards the peoples'
Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused
being represented by a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A' and
'J.'

By Order dated August 9, 1988, the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part of the testimony of the
witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which
it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused
Felipe Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation conducted by the
Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance
actually of a counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by accused
Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it
does not appear that the accused was assisted by counsel when he made said admission.

The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration, It was denied.

ISSUE/S
Whether or not it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's
Exhibits A and K?
RATIO
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in the section, namely:

1) the right against self-incrimination — i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself — set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section
18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded by the Fifth Amendment of
the American Constitution, 12 and

2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."

Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and disparateness of these
rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The
lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now contained in Section 12
of the same Article III.

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a
person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come
into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered
questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the
proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he
sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the
alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the
ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
RULING
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of the respondent Judge in
Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in
evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the
trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become functus officio, is
now declared of no further force and effect.
2S 2016-2017 (REGENCIA)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES RULE 115: Rights of the Accused: Right Against Sef-incrimination
Title G.R. No. 16444
VILLAFLOR v SUMMERS Date: September 8, 1920
Ponente: MALCOLM, J.
EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, Petitioner RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the City of Manila,
Respondents
Doctrine of the Case: An order to the accused to submit oneself for physical examination does not violate the
constitutional provision relating to self-incrimination.

The petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus issue to restore her to her liberty.
FACTS

In a criminal case pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and
Florentino Souingco are charged with the crime of adultery. On this case coming on for trial before the Hon. Pedro
Concepcion, Judge of First Instance, upon the petitioner of the assistant fiscal for the city of Manila, the court ordered
the defendant Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the examination of one or
two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the order on the
ground that such examination of her person was a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until
she should permit the medical examination required by the court.

ISSUE
Whether the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to determine if she is
pregnant, violates that portion of the Philippine Bill of Rights and that portion of our Code of Criminal Procedure
providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. – NO

RATIO
The Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. PROVIDED that
torture or force shall be avoided during such submission to the physical examination. Whether facts fall within or
without the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be decided as cases arise.

It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and disinterested physicians due care will
be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no
objection to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by doctor of the same sex
can be seen.
RULING
Although the order of the trial judge, acceding to the request of the assistant fiscal for an examination of the person of
the defendant by physicians was phrased in absolute terms, it should, nevertheless, be understood as subject to the
limitations herein mentioned, and therefore legal. The writ of habeas corpus prayed for is hereby denied. The costs
shall be taxed against the petitioner. So ordered.
2-S 2016-17 (SALANGUIT)
[Link]
CRIMPRO RULE 115- Right Against Self-Incrimination

Title GR No. L-59378

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. NELIA NICANDRO Y Date: February 11, 1986
VELARMA Ponente: Plana, J.
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee Nelia Nicandro y Velarma, accused-appellant

This is an appeal from a judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, convicting the accused Nelia
Nicandro y Velarma of violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(e), (f), (1), (m), and (o) Article I, of Republic
Act 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act).
FACTS
1. Not long before Nov. 6, 1981, the Drug Enforcement Unit of Police Station NO. 5, Western Police District,
Metropolitan force Manila received complaints from concerned citizens regarding the illegal sale of prohibitd
drugs by one alias ‘Nel’ in the Commodore pension house in Ermita, Manila. It was also informed that the use of
prohibited drugs in the said place is rampant.
2. Acting on this complaint, the policemen of the Drug Enforcement unit placed the said pension house and its
surroundings under surveillance for about a week. After the complaints and reports were verfied to be true, an
entrapment with the confidential informant acting as the buyer of marijuana was organized.
3. The police team formed to carry out the entrapment plan was alerted of the presence of ‘Nel’ at a room 301 of
the Pension house selling marijuana to drug users. The Policemen proceeded to the pension house and met with
the female confidential informant. Pfc. Joves, one of the policemen, gave the informant two marked bills, 2 5-
peso bills, with his initial thereon.
4. Upon a given signal, the informant knocked on the dor and Nelia Nicandro alias ‘Nel’ opened the door. The latter
asked Nel to buy some marijuana cigarette and gave the two marked bills and Nel thereafter delivered the four
sticks of marijuana cigarette.
5. The police team closed in and nabbed Nel. Patrolman Gomez frisked her and got from the right front pocket of
her pants the two marked 5-peso bills.
6. DURING INVESTIGATION, and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, NEL ORALLY
ADMITTED HAVING SOLD THE FOUR STICKS OF MARIJUANA CIGARETTES AND THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
MARIJUANA FLOWERING TOPS AKEN FROM HER POCKET, BUT REFUSED TO REDUCE THE CONFESSIONS IN
WRITING.
7. The prosecution relied on the testimony of Pat. Joves, where he stated that they were hidden in the vicinity of
Room 301 when it happened, that the accused handed one small plastic bag containing the suspected marijuana
then retracted and said it was four sticks of marijuana cigarettes. He also admitted that he conducted the
investigation of the accused and the confiscation of the articles of the crime. When asked what he did first, he
said that he informed her of her constitutional rights then thereafter questioned her regarding the marijuana
cigarettes and leaes that were confiscated. When asked if he placed it in writing, he said that appellant refused to
do so.
8. The trial court conviceted the accused with reclusion perpetua and a fine of 20,000 pesos. The trial court relied
apartly on the alleged oral admission of Nel during custodial investigation, as testfieid by Pat. Joves.
ISSUE/S
III. Whether or not Nel Nicandro was duly informed of her constitutional rights – NO
IV. Whether or not Nel Nicandro’s constitutional right against self-incrimination has been violated – YES
V. Whether or not there has been a valid waiver of the right against self-incrimination by Nicandro – NO
RATIO
On being informed her Constitutional Rights
The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine held in Miranda v. Arizona which stated that prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may
waive such rights for as long as it is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. If he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the proess that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.

It is not sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation of the provisions of Sec. 20, Art. IV.
He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled: he must also explain their effects in
practical terms. The right to be informed of a person under interrogation implies a correlative obligation on the part of
the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is
conveyed.

On Self-Incrimination
The Supreme Court ruled that the reliance of the trial court on the alleged oral admission was violative of Sec. 20 of Art. IV
of the 1973 Constitution. To wit:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court invoked the ruling in Miranda v. Arizona which held that the prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
On Waiver
As stated above, the waiver of any constitutional right must be done voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. IT stands to
reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person
interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is idle to talk of
waiver of rights.

During the cross-examination, Pat. Joves only said that he informed the accused of her consitutional rights without
specifying which rights he infomed nor did he state the manner in which the appellant was advised of her constitutional
right as to make her understand them. In this case, Nel Nicandro is illiterate and cannot be expected to be able to grasp
the significance of her rihgt to silence and to counsel upon merely hearing an abstract statement. It is the duty of the
proseuction to affirmatively establish the compliance by the investigating officer with his said obligation.

A constitutional guarantee should be LIBERALLY CONSTRUED with a view to promoting its object. The Supreme Court will
not presume that a defendant has been effectivly apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has
been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or that any effective
alternative has been employed.

RULING
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside, and the appellant is hereby acquitted on the basis of
reasonable doubt.

Notes

2-S 2016-17 (SALVACION)

CRIMPRO RULE 115
Title GR No. 32035
BELTRAN v. SAMSON Date: September 23, 1929
Ponente: Romualdez, J.
FRANCISCO BELTRAN – Petitioner FELIX SAMSON, Judge of the Second Judicial District, and
FRANCISCO JOSE, Provincial Fiscal of Isabela–
Respondents
Nature of the case: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the petitioner complains that the respondent
judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The
order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining
whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
FACTS
Felix Samson, Judge of the Second Judicial District ordered Francisco Beltran to appear before the Provincial Fiscal of
Isabela, Francisco Jose, to take dictations in his own handwriting from the latter. The purpose for such was for the fiscal
to compare Beltran's handwriting and to determine if it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.
Beltran filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.
ISSUE/S
The question, then, is reduced to a determination of whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner
for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional
provision under examination.
RATIO
The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may
compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised
without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The privilege is found in the Jones Law, which
provides that "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." This text is not limited to
declaracion but says "to be a witness." As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to
all giving or furnishing of evidence.
Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers. Writing is not a purely
mechanical and attention. Herein, writing means that Beltran is to furnish a means to determine or not he is the
falsifier, as the petition of the provincial fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, the present case is similar to
that of producing documents of chattels in one's possession.
And as to such production of documents or chattels, which is not so serious as present, the same eminent
Professor Wigmore, in his work cited, says: "2264, Production or Inspection of Documents and Chattels. — 1. It follows
that the production of documents or chattels by a person (whether ordinary witness or party-witness) in response to a
subpoena, or to a motion to order production, or to other form of process treating him as a witness (i. e. as a person
appearing before the tribunal to furnish testimony on his moral responsibility for truth- telling), may be refused under
the protection of the privilege; and this is universally conceded." Thus, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege,
there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.
The present case is more serious than that of compelling the production of documents or chattels, because
here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and
which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended that if permission to obtain a specimen of Beltran's
handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a municipal
treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even
supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained of, that is not
reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals
may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the
privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.
RULING
Wherefore, we find the present action well taken, and it is ordered that the respondents and those under their orders
desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for
the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.
CRIM PRO RULE 115 – RIGHT TO SELF-INCRIMINATION
Title G.R. No. 148220
HERRERA VS. ALBA Date: June 15, 2005
Ponente: J. CARPIO
ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother
ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-
VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, respondents.
Nature of the case: Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case,
contrary to the belief of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination.
FACTS

This is a petition for review for the orders affirmed by the CA dated 3 February 2000 directing Rosendo Herrera
(petitioner) to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing and order dated 8 June 2000 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
 14 May 1998 – 13 y/o Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial
court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner.
 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the biological father of
respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the
motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D. When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate
Professor at DLSU where she taught Cell Biology, head of the UP-NSRI - a DNA analysis laboratory and a former
professor at the UP-D where she taught Molecular Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA
paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity.
Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued
that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
RTC: Granted respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and asserted that under the present circumstances, the DNA test [he] is
compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen,
unconstitutional. MR denied.
Filed before CA a petition for certiorari contending that orders are in excess of or without jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and that there is no appeal nor any [other] plain,
adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner maintained his previous objections to the taking of
DNA paternity testing.
CA: Denied and stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial courts evaluation of evidence. The appellate
court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right against self-incrimination because
the right applies only to testimonial compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a
possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether a DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. – YES.
2. Whether or not DNA paternity testing violates the right to self-incrimination. - NO
RATIO

The petition has no merit.

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with
paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of
paternity and filiation to incriminating acts alone. However, advances in science show that sources of evidence of paternity
and filiation need not be limited to incriminating acts. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive on non-paternity, although inconclusive on paternity.
Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence
 The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. Vallejo discussed the probative value, not
admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as
evidence. The Court moved from the issue of according official recognition to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of
observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis. Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is
not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court. Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Section 49 of Rule 130 does not pose any legal obstacle to the
admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is allowed when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue. DNA analysis that excludes the putative
father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the
DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there
is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him for DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence. Again, we quote
relevant portions of the trial courts 3 February 2000 Order with approval:
Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief
of respondent in this action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence
that is communicative in essence taken under duress. The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination
is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a
defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As such, a defendant can be required
to submit to a test to extract virus from his body; the substance emitting from the body of the accused was received as
evidence for acts of lasciviousness; morphine forced out of the mouth was received as proof; an order by the judge for the
witness to put on pair of pants for size was allowed; and the court can compel a woman accused of adultery to submit for
pregnancy test, since the gist of the privilege is the restriction on testimonial compulsion.
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of modern science and technology,
such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
RULING
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2000 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 59766. We also AFFIRM the Orders dated 3 February 2000 and 8 June 2000 issued by Branch 48 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. SP-98-88759.
Notes

In Frye v. U.S., the trial court convicted Frye of murder. Frye appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia. During trial, Fryes counsel offered an expert witness to testify on the result of a systolic blood
pressure deception test[42] made on defendant. The state Supreme Court affirmed Fryes conviction and ruled that the systolic
blood pressure deception test has not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced from the discovery,
development, and experiments thus far made. In 1993, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.[45] further modified
the Frye-Schwartz standard. Daubert was a product liability case where both the trial and appellate courts denied the
admissibility of an experts testimony because it failed to meet the Frye standard of general acceptance. The United States
Supreme Court ruled that in federal trials, the Federal Rules of Evidence have superseded the Frye standard. Rule 401
defines relevant evidence, while Rule 402 provides the foundation for admissibility of evidence. \
The cases of Frye-Schwartz standard and the Daubert-Kumho standard are not controlling in the Philippines. At
best, American jurisprudence merely has a persuasive effect on our decisions.
Admissibility would depend on factors such as (1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested; (2)
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error;
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the techniques operation; and (5) whether the theory or
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
2S 2016-2017 (SOBERANO)
[Link]
CRIM PRO RULE 115 – HABEAS CORPUS
Title G.R. No. 105597
Abadia vs CA September 23, 1994
KAPUNAN, J
LT. GENERAL LISANDRO ABADIA in his capacity HON. COURT OF APPEALS, TWELFTH
as Chief of Staff of the AFP, MAJ. GENERAL DIVISION and LT. COL. MARCELINO G.
ARTURO ENRILE, in his capacity as Commanding MALAJACAN, respondents.
General of the Philippine Army, and COL.
DIONISIO SANTIAGO, in his capacity as the
Commanding Officer of the ISG Detention Center,
Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila,

FACTS
1) Private respondent Lt. Col. Marcelino Malajacan was arrested on April 27, 1990 in connection with the
December 1989 coup attempt. He was brought to the ISG Detention Center in Fort Bonifacio, Makati where
he was detained for nine months without charges.
2) On January 30, 1991, a charge sheet was filed against private respondent by the office of the Judge Advocate
General alleging violations of the 67th, 94th and 97th Articles of War for Mutiny, Murder and Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman, respectively.
3) A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the private respondent with the CA (4th Division) on March 7, 1991
which was dismissed on the ground that PRE-TRIAL INVESTIGATION (PTI) for the charges against the
respondent was already ongoing before a (PTI) Panel of the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO).
4) Three months after these charges were filed, the PTI Panel came out with a Resolution finding no evidence of
direct participation by the private respondent in the coup. Said panel nonetheless recommended that
respondent be charged with violation of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code and the 96th Article of War in
relation to the 94th Article of War. All existing charges against respondent were dismissed and a new charge
for violation of Article of War No. 96 for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman for having
allegedly been involved in a series of conferences with other military officers for the purpose of overthrowing
the government.
5) JAGO endorsed the filing of charges for violation of Article 136 to the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office on
October 29, 1991. The City Prose dismissed the charges February 4, 1992.
6) Upon private respondent's arraignment (and before entering his plea) in General Court Martial No. 8 for
violation of the 96th Article of War, private respondent entered a special motion to dismiss the case on
grounds of prescription under AW 38. (Refer to Notes)
7) The private respondent contended that the offense was supposed to have been committed between August to
November, 1989, more than two years before his arraignment on April 22, 1992. Favorably resolving the
motion to dismiss, the General Court Martial dropped the last remaining charge against private respondent.
8) On May 27, 1992 respondent filed a second petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals where he
assailed his continued detention at the ISG Detention Center in spite of the dismissal of all the charges against
him. He contended that his continued confinement under the circumstances amounted to an "illegal restraint
of liberty" correctable only by the court's "issuance of the high prerogative writ of habeas corpus."
9) CA (12th Division) ordered petitioners Lt. General Lisandro Abadia, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and Maj. General Arturo Enrile, Commanding General of the Philippine Army "(t)o produce
the person of Lt. Col. Marcelino Q. Malajacan" and to show lawful cause for the latter's continued
detention. On June 3, 1992, respondent court promulgated the questioned decision issuing a writ of habeas
corpus and commanding herein petitioners to release the private respondent.
10) Consequently, on June 11, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court to annul and set aside respondent court’s decision alleging that:

1. The respondent court may not impose a time frame for the Chief of Staff to act on the respondent's
case where the law itself provides none; and,

2. The Resolution of June 3, 1992 contravenes a previous decision by a co-equal body, the Special
Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals which on September 27, 1991 dismissed respondent's
 petition for habeas corpus.

ISSUE/S
3. Whether or not the respondent court may impose a time frame for the Chief of Staff to act on the respondent's
case where the law itself provides none - YES
4. Whether or not the respondent’s court resolution contravenes a previous decision of a co-equal body (CA 4th
division vs. CA 12th Division) – NO
RATIO

1. In the context of the constitutional protection guaranteeing fair trial rights to accused individuals particularly
the Right to a Speedy Trial, we cannot accept petitioners' submission that the absence of any specific
provision limiting the time within which records of general courts martial should be forwarded to the
appropriate reviewing authority and for the reviewing authority to decide on the case would deny private
respondent — or any military personnel facing charges before the General Courts Martial, for that matter —
a judicial recourse to protect his constitutional right to a speedy trial. What petitioners suggest is untenable.
In the case at bench, the records of the case may indefinitely remain with the General Court Martial, and our
courts, because of a procedural gap in the rules, cannot be called upon to ascertain whether certain
substantive rights have been or are being denied in the meantime. That is not the spirit ordained by inclusion
of the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which mandates the "duty of the Courts
of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." 9 Moreover, the absence of rules
and regulations mandating a reasonable period within which the appropriate appellate military authority
should act in a case subject to mandatory review is no excuse for denial of a substantive right. The Bill of
Rights provisions of the 1987 Constitution were precisely crafted to expand substantive fair trial rights and to
protect citizens from procedural machinations which tend to nullify those rights. Moreover, Section 16,
Article III of the Constitution extends the right to a speedy disposition of cases to cases "before all judicial,
quasi-judicial and administrative bodies." This protection extends to all citizens, including those in the
military and covers the periods before, during and after the trial, affording broader protection than Section
14(2) which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial.
(Read full text for the history of Philippine military law)
2. The factual circumstances surrounding both decisions are different:
1. At the time of the first petition, the private respondent was being held in the detention center for eleven
months without charges being filed against him. The pre-trial investigative panel had not yet been
constituted.
2. By the time the subsequent petition for habeas corpus was before the court's Twelfth Division, the
JAGO's Pre-trial Investigative Panel had dismissed all cases against the petitioner and endorsed the filing
of charges (under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code) with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
3. In dismissing the cases against the private respondent, the General Court Martial had made a
determination that the charges against respondent had prescribed under Article 38 of the Articles of War
The mantle of protection accorded by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus "extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which a person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." 21 As we emphasized hereinbefore, and we repeat it once
more, petitioners cannot seek shelter in the absence of specific rules relating to review of cases dismissed by
military tribunals in violating the right of the accused to a speedy trial and in justifying his continued
confinement. Were we to uphold the proposition that our courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction
because the law itself provides no time frame for the proper military authorities to review the general court
martial's dismissal of the respondent's case would mean that we would be sanctioning the suggestion implicit
in petitioner's argument that the Constitution's guarantees are guarantees available not to all of the people but
only to most of them.
RULING
Petition is hereby DENIED.
Notes
Art. 38. As to time. — Except for desertion, murder or rape committed in time of war, or for mutiny or for war
offenses, no person subject to military law shall be liable to be tried or punished by a court martial for any crime of
offense committed more than two years before the arraignment of such person. . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code (Conspiracy and Proposal to Commit Rebellion or Insurrection)
2S 2016-2017 (TAN)
[Link]
CRIMPRO RULE 115
Title G.R. Nos. 121039-45.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SANCHEZ October 18, 2001]
MELO, J.:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZOILO
AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON, ROGELIO
CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants.
In his motion for reconsideration, Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity and that
the principal witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan presented by the prosecution are lacking in credibility. He
likewise contends that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter vis--vis his whereabouts on the night of the felony should
have been given full faith and credit as against the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan. Lastly, Mayor Sanchez seeks the
reconsideration of the amount of the gargantuan damages awarded on the ground that the same have no factual and legal
bases.
FACTS

SUPER SHORT FACTS: Mayor Sanchez, Mayor of Calauan Laguna was accused of the rape of Eileen Sarmenta and her
boyfriend Allan Gomez. Eileen was said to be with her boyfriend, both Agriculture students of UP Los Banos when she was
abducted to be gifted to the Mayor who has been her eyeing her beauty. The trial invited a lot of attention from press and
has been nationwide news, to which the accused invoked to have been violative of his constitutional rights to due process, it
being a trial by publicity.
(Resolution lang kasi ito nasa separate case yung facts pero ito yung digest nun in case you still want to read this.)
On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took the two
and loaded them at the back of the latter's van, which was parked in front of Café Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos, Laguna.
George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van while Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio
Malabanan, who were also with the group, stayed in the ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in
Barangay Curba, which was owned by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were then brought
inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayor’s room. Allan was badly beaten up by Luis, Boy, Ama and
Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m. of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out
of the resthouse by Luis and Medialdea – her hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped
of her shorts. Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for Calauan, followed
closely by the ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the van. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit
dragged Allan, whose head was already drenched in blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a single
gunshot from his armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away. Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio Paputok,
Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan, Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon, Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion and
Kawit. After Kawit’s turn, Luis Corcolon shot Eileen with his baby armalite. Moments later, all 8 men boarded the ambulance
and proceeded to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileen’s remains behind. Initially, the crime was attributed to one
Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio Corcolon were also implicated therein. However,
further investigation, and forensic findings, pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the
prosecution's theory. On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City, Branch 70) found
Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape with homicide, ordering them to pay Eileen Sarmenta the amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount of
P700,000.00 to the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999, the Supreme
Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez,
Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Office of the
Solicitor General filed its Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity,
besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility, that the testimony of his 13- year old daughter
should have been given full faith and credit, and that the gargantuan damages awarded have no factual and legal bases. Ama,
Brion and Kawit maintain that Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently impeached by their inconsistent statements pertain
to material and crucial points of the events at issue, besides that independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed
the prosecution’s version of events. On 2 February 1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance with AM 99-8-09. The
motions for reconsideration was assigned to Justice Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on 18
September 2001.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the accused Mayor Sanchez was deprived of his constitutional rights and was subjected to trial by publicity?
RATIO
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that
the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal
trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure,
responsible reporting enhances an accused right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been
regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field The press does not simply
publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and
judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was
given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge
and impaired his impartiality Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect
their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that
characterized the investigation and trial of the [Link] records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias
against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity
which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias
and he has not discharged the burden.
RULING

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the conviction of accused-appellants for seven counts of rape with
homicide and the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed upon them for each of said counts, with MODIFICATION that the
accused be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims.

2S 2016-17 (VARGAS)
[Link]