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ATLAS FERTILIZER CORP. V. NAVARRO

APRIL 30, 1987

 Curative Statute

FACTS:

Private respondent Emiliano C. Beneza was employed by Atlas Fertilizer

Corporation as a sales supervisor.

Atlas advised the Emiliano of his impending termination on the grounds of

inefficiency and loss of trust and confidence. He was given the option to resign or
wait for the termination order. Emiliano filed his resignation letter.

On January 8, 1979, Atlas sent to the Emiliano a memorandum giving the

latter seventy-two (72) hours to explain why he should not be terminated on the
grounds of acts inimical to the interest of the former.

On January 22, 1979, the Emiliano filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
a complaint against Atlas for injunction with damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. The complaint urged the court to
prevent his termination on the ground, among others, that any termination would
be unlawful because he had already tendered his resignation. Atlas filed his
answer.

At the time Emiliano filed his complaint, the applicable law was Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1367 wherein it is provided that no Labor Arbiters shall
entertain claims for moral or other forms of damages. It was therefore proper that
Emiliano filed his complaint with the Regional Trial court. P. D. 1367 provides as
follows:

Section 1.

The Labor Arbiter shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear

and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:

a) Unfair labor practice cases;

b) Unresolved cases in collective bargaining,
including those which involve wages, hours of
work and other terms and conditions of
employment; and
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c) All other cases arising from employer-employee

relations duly indorsed by the Regional Directors
in accordance with the provisions of this code;
Provided, that the Regional Directors shall not
indorse and Labor Arbiters shall not entertain
claims for moral or other forms of damages.

However, on May 1, 1980, during the pendency of his case, Presidential

Decree No, 1691 was promulgated. It amended the above-quoted provisions as
follows:

The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive

jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving
workers, whether a agricultural cultural or non-agricultural:

a) Unfair labor practice cases:

b) All money claims of workers, including those
based on non-payment or underpayment of wages,
overtime compensation, separation pay and other
benefits provided by law or appropriate
agreement, except claim s for employees
compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits;
c) All other claims arising from employer- employee-
relations, unless expressly excluded by this Code.

As can be observed, claims for damages, such as the claim of Emiliano

should not anymore be filed with the Regional Trial Courts, but with the Labor
Arbiters.

On November 29, 1982, the Atlas filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the complaint. The motion to dismiss cited the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1691.

An opposition was filed by Emiliano on the ground that at the time

Presidential Decree No. 1691 was approved, this case had already been filed
with the trial court. He maintained that jurisdiction, once acquired by a court
over a case, remains with it until the full termination of the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should be dismissed.

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HELD (Dry Run):

The case should be dismissed. As a rule, once jurisdiction is acquired by a

court over a case, it remains with it until the full termination of the case. One of
the exceptions to such a rule, however, is when a subsequent statute, as in the
case of P. D. No. 1691, is a curative one which will be given retroactive effect.
Considering that P. D. No. 1691 provides that money claims of workers are
within the jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and not within that of the regular courts,
the case should be dismissed.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The case should be dismissed. P. D. No. 1367, the law in force at the time of
the commencement of the action, shall not apply. Instead, P. D. No. 1691 which
only took effect during the pendency of the action and which provides that all
money claims by workers including damages shall be within the jurisdiction of
Labor Arbiters, shall apply. The reason is that P. D. No. 1691 is a curative
statute which must be given retroactive effect.

P.D. 1691 is a curative statute which corrected the lack of jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter at the start of the proceedings and, therefore, should be given a
retrospective application to the pending proceedings. P.D. 1691 merely restored a
jurisdiction earlier vested in Labor Arbiters before the enactment of P.D. 1367. It
was intended to correct a situation where two tribunals would have jurisdiction
over separate issues arising from the same labor conflict. The precise purpose of
the amendment was to hopefully settle once and for all the conflict of jurisdiction
between regular courts and labor agencies. To deprive the Labor Arbiters of the
jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases would mean duplicity of suits,
splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and conclusions by
two tribunals on one and the same claim.

CHAVEZ V. ROMULO
JUNE 9, 2004

 Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

FACTS:

In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech

before the members of the PNP stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all
public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She directed the then PNP Chief,
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respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms

Outside of Residence (PTCFOR).

Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, Ebdane issued guidelines on the same

month stating that persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license,
special permit, certificate of registration or MR) are prohibited from carrying their
firearms outside of residence.

Petitioner Francisco Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has

been issued, filed before the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition and
injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the said guidelines in the
implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence.

The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition should be dismissed.

HELD (Dry Run):

The petition should not be dismissed. While the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
is an established policy, it is not an iron-clad dictum. When the Supreme Court is
being confronted with cases of national interest and of serious implications such
as in the instant case where the petition involves the citizen’s right to bear arms,
the Supreme Court will entertain direct resort to it.

COMELEC V. QUIJANO-PADILLA
SEPTEMBER 18, 2002

 Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

 Mandamus

FACTS:

The Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as
the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and
computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of funds
therefor in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of
voters.
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Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections promulgated a resolution

approving in principle the Voter's Registration and Identification System Project
(VRIS). The VRIS Project envisions a computerized database system for the May
2004 Elections. The COMELEC then issued invitations to pre-qualify and bid for
the supply and installations of information technology equipment for the project.

After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of
P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared
the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued a
resolution approving the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA, which, in turn,
immediately accepted the same.

However, under Republic Act No. 8760, the budget appropriated by

Congress for the COMELEC’s modernization project was only One (1) Billion
Pesos.

Meanwhile, on February 2, 2001, Alfredo L. Benipayo was appointed as the

new chairman and Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as new
commissioners. Chairman Benipayo, through public statements, announced that
the VRIS Project has been scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside.

PHOTOKINA filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for mandamus,
prohibition and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order,
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction against
the COMELEC.

PHOTOKINA sought to enforce therein its rights under the accepted bid
proposal. Its petition alleged that notwithstanding the COMELEC’s issuance of
a Notice of Award and its subsequent acceptance thereof, the COMELEC still
refused to formalize the contract. As a relief, PHOTOKINA prayed that after trial,
the COMELEC be directed to review and finalize the formal contract and to
implement the VRIS Project.

The COMELEC on its part, specifically denied the existence of a perfected

contract and asserted that even if there was one, the same is null and void for
lack of proper appropriation. It labeled the contract as illegal and against public
policy.

When the Judge Quijano-Padilla rendered judgment against the COMELEC,

the latter filed a petition under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:
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a.) Whether or not there was a breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
considering that the COMELEC made a direct resort to the Supreme Court.

b.) Whether or not a petition for mandamus is the appropriate remedy for
PHOTOKINA.

HELD (Dry Run):

a.) There was no breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. The doctrine of
hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad dictum. The Supreme Court on several
instances when confronted with cases of national interest and of serious
implications never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial
determination of the case. The present case is of similar import. It is in the
interest of the State that questions relating to government contracts be settled
without delay. This is more so when the contract, as in this case, involves the
disbursement of public funds and the modernization of our country’s election
process, a project that has long been overdue.

b.) Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy for PHOTOKINA, for such
remedy does not lie to enforce contractual obligations. Moreover, mandamus
applies as a remedy only where petitioner’s right is founded clearly in law and
not when it is doubtful as in the present case where the contract relied upon by
PHOTOKINA is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected
but also because the same is illegal and against public policy.

FURTHER DISCUSSION:

No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce
the performance of contractual obligations. Mandamus is not the proper
recourse to enforce the COMELEC's alleged contractual obligations with
PHOTOKINA. Moreover, worth stressing is the judicial caution that mandamus
applies as a remedy only where petitioner's right is founded clearly in law and
not when it is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed
is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-
defined, clear and certain. Here, the alleged contract, relied upon by
PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is being
disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it is
illegal and against public policy.

DE BALLESTEROS V. RURAL BANK OF CANAMAN

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NOVEMBER 24, 2010

 Doctrine of Adherence of Jurisdiction/Exceptions

FACTS:

Lucia De Ballesteros (Lucia) filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of

Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Mortgage and Damages against her children and
the Rural Bank of Canaman, Inc., Baao Branch (RBCI) before the Regional Trial
Court of Iriga City.

The case was then set for pre-trial conference. During the pre-trial, RBCI’s
counsel filed a motion to withdraw after being informed that Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation (PDIC) would handle the case as RBCI had already been
closed and placed under the receivership of the PDIC. Consequently, the lawyers
of PDIC took over the case of RBCI.

RBCI, through PDIC, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC-
Iriga has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. RBCI stated that
pursuant to Section 30, Republic Act No. 7653, otherwise known as the "New
Central Bank Act," the RTC-Makati, already constituted itself, per its Order dated
August 10, 2001, as the liquidation court to assist PDIC in undertaking the
liquidation of RBCI. Thus, the subject matter of Civil Case No. IR-3128 fell within
the exclusive jurisdiction of such liquidation court. The RTC-Iriga issued an order
granting the Motion to Dismiss.

Lucia contended that the RTC erred in dismissing the case because it had
jurisdiction over the civil case under the rule on adherence of jurisdiction.
According to her, since the RTC-Iriga has already obtained jurisdiction over the
case it should continue exercising such jurisdiction until the final termination of
the case. She further argued that in the case of Aruego, Jr. v. CA, the jurisdiction
of a court once attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events,
although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching
in the first instance, and the Court retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of
the case.

ISSUE:

Is the doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction is applicable in the present case?

HELD (Dry Run):

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No. The doctrine of adherence of jurisdiction is not without exceptions. One of

the exceptions is when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character. Section
30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the liquidation court
shall have jurisdiction over all claims against the bank under liquidation. The
lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience, only one court, if possible,
should pass upon the claims against the insolvent bank.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The Court recognizes the doctrine on adherence of jurisdiction. It states that

when a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to final determination of the case is not
affected by a new legislation transferring jurisdiction over such proceedings to
another tribunal. (Alindao v. Joson, 264 SCRA 211). Once jurisdiction is vested,
the same is retained up to the end of the litigation (Bernate v. Court of Appeals,
263 SCRA 323).

Lucia, however, must be reminded that such principle is not without

exceptions. One of the exceptions is that when the change in jurisdiction is
curative in character (Garcia v. Martinez, 90 SCRA 331 [1979]; Calderon, Sr. v.
Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 459 [1980]; Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Navarro,
149 SCRA 432 [1987]; Abad v. RTC of Manila, Br. Lll, 154 SCRA 664 [1987]).
Section 30, R.A. 7653 is curative in character when it declared that the
liquidation court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to assist in the
adjudication of the disputed claims against the Bank. In Manalo v. Court of
Appeals (366 SCRA 752, [2001]), the Supreme Court says:

“The requirement that all claims against the bank be

pursued in the liquidation proceedings filed by the Central
Bank is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the
insolvent bank and designed to establish due process and
orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the
proliferation of litigations and to avoid injustice and
arbitrariness (citing Ong v. CA, 253 SCRA 105 [1996]). The
lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience, only one
court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against the
insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the
Superintendents of Banks and regulate his operations (citing
Central Bank of the Philippines, et al. v. CA, et al., 163 SCRA
482 [1988]).”
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Lucia contended that jurisdiction already attached when the civil case was
filed with, and jurisdiction obtained by, the RTC-Iriga prior to the filing of the
liquidation case before the RTC-Makati. This contention is untenable. The time of
the filing of the complaint is immaterial. It is the execution that will obviously
prejudice the other depositors and creditors.

In the Morfe case, it was held that after the Monetary Board has declared
that a bank is insolvent and has ordered it to cease operations, the Board
becomes the trustee of its assets for the equal benefit of all the creditors,
including depositors. The assets of the insolvent banking institution are held in
trust for the equal benefit of all creditors, and after its insolvency, one cannot
obtain an advantage or a preference over another by an attachment, execution or
otherwise.

Thus, to allow Lucia’s case to proceed independently of the liquidation case, a

possibility of favorable judgment and execution thereof against the assets of
RBCI would not only prejudice the other creditors and depositors but would
defeat the very purpose for which a liquidation court was constituted as well.

DELA CRUZ V. MOYA

APRIL 27, 1988

 Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter

FACTS:

General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977 provides that military tribunals
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official
duty.

In 1979, while in the performance of his official duty, Dela Cruz, a member of
the Armed Forces, shot Cabilto. On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with
homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao in an information filed by the
Provincial Fiscal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the criminal case.
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HELD (Dry Run):

The Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The law in force at that time of the filing of the information, on August
2, 1979, was General Order No. 59 which provides that military tribunals
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official
duty. Since Dela Cruz was a member of the Armed Forces and that he was in the
performance of his official duty when he shot Cabilto, the Court of First Instance
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the criminal case, but the military
tribunals.

FURTHER DISCUSSION:

One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court
hearing the case must have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. If the
court is acting without jurisdiction, then the entire proceedings are null and void.

FLORES V. MALLARE-PHILIPPS
SEPTEMBER 24, 1986

 Totality Rule

FACTS:

Remedio Flores filed a complaint against Ignacio Binongcal and Fernando

Calion before the Regional Trial Court.

The first cause of action was against Ignacio Binongcal for refusing to pay the
amount of P11,643.00 representing cost of truck tires which the latter purchased
on credit from Flores on various occasions from August to October, 1981.

The second cause of action was against Fernando Calion for allegedly
refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00 representing cost of truck tires which
he purchased on credit from Flores on several occasions from March, 1981 to
January, 1982.

Counsel for Binongcal filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction since the amount of the demand against his client was only
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P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of BP 129 the regional trial court shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is more than
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It was further averred in said motion that
although another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly indebted to petitioner
in the amount of P10,212.00, his obligation was separate and distinct from that
of the other defendant. Counsel for Calion joined in moving for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Should the complaint be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction?

HELD (Dry Run):

Yes, the complaint should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Regional Trial
Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is
more than twenty thousand pesos (the law then in force). In the present case,
the claim of Flores against either of the two defendants is less than that amount
cognizable by Regional Trial Courts. Totality rule does not apply because it
appears that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason that the claims
against Binongcal and Calion are separate and distinct from each other.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Under the present law, the totality rule is applied also to cases where two or
more plaintiffs having separate causes of action against a defendant join in a
single complaint, as well as to cases where a plaintiff has separate causes of
action against two or more defendants joined in a single complaint. However, the
causes of action in favor of the two or more plaintiffs or against the two or more
defendants should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions
and there should be a common question of law or fact, as provided in Section 6
of Rule 3.

The jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on joinder of parties pursuant to

Section 5 of Rule 2 and Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that, after a
careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears that there is a misjoinder of parties
for the reason that the claims against respondents Binongcal and Calion are
separate and distinct and neither of which falls within its jurisdiction.

The application of the totality rule is subject to the requirements for the
permissive joinder of parties under Section 6 of Rule 3 which provides as follows:
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“All persons in whom or against whom any right to relief in respect to or

arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist,
whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise
provided in these rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one
complaint, where any question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to
all such defendants may arise in the action; but the court may make such orders
as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or defendant from being embarrassed or
put to expense in connection with any proceedings in which he may have no
interest.”

HIYAS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK V. ACUŇA

AUGUST 31, 2006

 Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

FACTS:

Alberto Moreno filed with the RTC a complaint against Hiyas Savings and
Loan Bank, his (Alberto’s) wife Remedios, the spouses Felipe and Maria Owe
and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City for cancellation of mortgage
contending that he did not secure any loan from the bank nor did he sign or
execute any contract of mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy
with Hiyas and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the
loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that he could not
have executed the said contract because he was then working abroad.

The bank filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Alberto failed to comply
with Article 151 of the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. Petitioner contends that since the complaint
does not contain any averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be dismissed for
lack of cause of action.

The RTC issued an order denying the Motion to Dismiss as well as an order
denying the motion for reconsideration of the bank.
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Hence, the bank filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the aforestated two orders of the
RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition should be granted.

HELD (Dry Run):

The petition should not be granted, for the instant Petition for Certiorari
should have been filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. The Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it
because the bank failed to show that the redress it desired cannot be obtained in
the Court of Appeals, and exceptional and compelling circumstances justify its
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise
of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not

exclusive. It is shared by the Supreme Court with Regional Trial Courts and with
the Court of Appeals. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against
first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically
set out in the petition.

The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
precious time of the Supreme Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and
resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in
some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper
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forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues
because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

Thus, the Supreme Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and
compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases:

a) Chavez vs. Romulo on citizens’ right to bear arms;

b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan on
bail in extradition proceedings;
c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on government
contract involving modernization and computerization of voters’
registration list;
d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora on status and existence
of a public office; and
e) Fortich vs. Corona on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the
Office of the President which modified the approval of the
conversion to agro-industrial area.

In the present case, the bank failed to advance a satisfactory explanation as

to its failure to comply with the principle of judicial hierarchy. There is no reason
why the instant petition could not have been brought before the CA. On this
basis, the instant petition should be dismissed.

LANTING V. OMBUDSMAN
MAY 6, 2005

 Review Of Ombudsman’s Resolutions

FACTS:

Zenaida F. Lanting filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an affidavit-

complaint charging Vice-Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr., Emmanuel Sison, Secretary to
the City Council, and Charito Rumbo, Human Resource Management Officer III
with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
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Petitioner characterized respondents’ acts as unlawful, odious and

"despicable criminal activities" and prayed that the Office of the Ombudsman
proceed with the preliminary investigation with dispatch."

The Ombudsman issued a resolution dismissing the charges against the

respondents.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
and mandamus.

The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the

ground that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the assailed
Ombudsman’s Resolution. The CA said:

“Petition for certiorari and mandamus could not be given due course by this
court for lack of concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over the subject
matter of the petition for the issuance of the writ of certiorari and mandamus
against the Office of the Ombudsman for dismissing petitioner’s criminal
complaint for anti-graft and falsification of public documents. Except in
administrative cases, as ruled in Fabian vs. Desierto (295 SCRA 470), the
Congress, in Republic Act No. 6770, Section 14, 2 nd par., designated only the
Supreme Court as the appellate authority in Ombudsman decisions in criminal
cases. Under the said law, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is original and
exclusive.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari and
mandamus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

HELD (Dry Run):

The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition, for it is the
Supreme Court that has the sole authority to review Ombudsman’s resolutions in
criminal cases.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Petitioner’s complaint-affidavit before the Office of the Ombudsman is for

violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts. It is not an administrative
complaint. Nowhere in her complaint did she allege administrative offenses, such
as dishonesty or misconduct on the part of respondents.
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It bears stressing that the allegations in petitioner’s complaint describe

respondents’ actuations as "willful, felonious, unlawful, odious and despicable
criminal activities." Considering that petitioner’s complaint is criminal in nature,
this Court has the sole authority to review the Ombudsman’s Resolutions on
pure question of law as expressly mandated in Section 14, 2 nd paragraph of R.A.
6770.

In Fabian vs. Desierto, we held that only appeals from the decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 (of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure)."

Therefore, the Court of Appeals, did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
Clearly, it has no jurisdiction over petitioner’s criminal action. Jurisdiction lies
with this Court.

MIDGELY V. FERANDOS
MAY 13, 1975

 Action Quasi In Rem

FACTS:

Alvaro Pastor, Sr., a Spanish citizen, was allegedly the owner of properties
and rights in mining claims located in Cebu. When Alvaro Sr. died, he was
survived by his two legitimate children Sofia Pastor de Midgely and Alvaro
Pastor, Jr. He was also survived by one claiming to be his illegitimate child
Lewelyn Barlito Quemada. Quemada is a resident of the Philippines.

The properties and rights in mining claims located in Cebu were supposedly
held in trust by his son, Alvaro Pastor, Jr., and his daughter-in-law, Maria Elena
Achaval-Pastor (wife of Alvaro, Jr.).

Alvaro Pastor, Sr. in his supposed holographic will, devised to Lewelyn Barlito
Quemada thirty percent of his forty-two percent share in certain mining claims
and real properties. The alleged will was presented for probate and Quemada
was appointed special administrator of the decedent's estate.

As such administrator and as heir of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., Quemada filed in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint against the spouses Alvaro Pastor,
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Jr. and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (and others not mentioned here) to settle the
question of ownership over certain real properties and the rights in some mining
claims, to obtain an accounting and payment of the royalties and income thereof
and for the payment of damages amounting to P25,000. Quemada's theory is
that those properties and income belong to the estate of Alvaro Pastor, Sr.

Quemada caused extraterritorial service of summons through the Department

of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Embassy in Madrid, Spain, which effected
the service of the summons by registered mail upon Pastor, Jr. spouses and
Sofia Midgely at their respective address in Barcelona and Alicante, Spain.

Alvaro Pastor, Jr. and Sofia Midgely, in their respective letters to the
Philippine Embassy acknowledged the service of summons. The Minister-
Counselor of the Embassy forwarded those letters to the Clerk of Court and
apprised him of the manner the summons was served.

Sofia Midgely filed a motion to dismiss on ground that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over her person. The trial court denied the motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the denial of the trial court was correct.

HELD (Dry Run):

The denial by the trial court of Sofia’s motion to dismiss was correct. The
object of the action filed by Quemada against Sofia is to reach and dispose of
their properties or of some interest therein; hence, an action quasi in rem. In an
action quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is
not necessary and the service of summons is required only for purposes of due
process. The requirement of due process has been complied with when the third
mode of extraterritorial service of summons has been made on Sofia who is a
nonresident defendant. Hence, the motion was correctly denied.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Quemada's action against her may be regarded as a quasi in rem action

where jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident defendant is not necessary
and where service of summons is required only for the purpose of complying with
the requirement of due process (Perkins vs. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186; Banco Español-
Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Mabanag vs. Gallemore, 81 Phil. 254).
 18

An action quasi in rem is an action between parties where the direct object is
to reach and dispose of property owned by them, or of some interest therein.

With respect to the extraterritorial service of summons to a nonresident

defendant like Sofia, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does

not reside and is not found in the Philippines and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff or relates to, or the
subject of which is, property within the Philippines, in which
the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, wholly or
in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or
the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of
the Philippines by personal service as under section 7; or by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places
and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy
of the summons and order of the court shall be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or
in any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Under Rule 14, extraterritorial service of summons is proper –

1. when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;

2. when the action relates to, or the subject of which is, property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent;
3. when the relief demanded in such an action consists, wholly or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in the
Philippines, and
4. when defendant nonresident's property has been attached within the
Philippines (Sec. 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court).

In any of such four cases, the service of summons may, with leave of court, be
effected out of the Philippines in three ways:

(1) by personal service;

(2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for

such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and
order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of
the defendant, and
 19

(3) service of summons may be effected in any other manner which the court
may deem sufficient.

That third mode of extraterritorial service of summons was substantially

complied with in this case.

In the civil case filed by Quemada, the subject matter of the action for
reconveyance consists of properties of Alvaro Pastor, Sr. which are located in
Cebu. Mrs. Midgely claims an actual interest in those properties. She has been
receiving a share of the income therefrom. Therefore, the extraterritorial service of
summons upon her was proper. As already noted, the action against her is quasi
in rem.

PEOPLE V. LAGON
MAY 18, 1990

 Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter

FACTS:

Libertad Lagon, in April 1975, allegedly issued a check as payment for goods
she purchased knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same
check. The check subsequently bounced.

Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, the law in force at that time, judges of city
courts shall have jurisdiction to try parties charged with an offense in which the
penalty does not exceed prision correccional. The felony Libertad allegedly
committed, therefore, was clearly within the jurisdiction of the City Court of
Roxas City, for the penalty provided by law at that time was arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.

On October 22, 1975, P. D. No. 818 took effect which increased the penalty
for the offense allegedly committed by Libertad. The new law provides that the
penalty for such offense is prision mayor in its medium period.

On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas
City, charging Libertad with the crime of estafa under paragraph 2(d) of Article
315 of the Revised Penal Code.
 20

In an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information
upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was
beyond the court's authority to impose. According to the City Court, jurisdiction of
a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the
institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission
of the crime.

ISSUE:

Was the dismissal of the City Court proper?

HELD (Dry Run):

The dismissal was proper. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. By the time the
information was filed on July 7, 1976, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code had already been amended and the penalty thereunder
increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's jurisdiction to impose.

FURTHER DISCUSSION:

The dismissal was proper. Jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is

determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and not
by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the
alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was
vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information
was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already
been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder
increased, which penalty was beyond the City Court's authority to impose.

The real question raised by the People is: would application of the above-
settled doctrine to the instant case not result in also applying the new law to the
present case in disregard of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal.

No. The issue here is one of jurisdiction. In criminal prosecutions, the

jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the
offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented
at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the
violation charged in the complaint. Should the criminal information be refiled in
the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court, that court may not
 21

impose that more onerous penalty upon Lagon (assuming the evidence shows
that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the Regional Trial
Court would remain vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter to try and
decide the (refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the
date of the commission of the offense charged, should be the lower penalty
originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas
City.

The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, in the
following terms:

In criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not

determined by what may be meted out to the offender after
trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the result of the
evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co
Hick 62 Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the
law imposes, together with other legal obligations, on the basis
of the facts as recited in the complaint or information (People v.
Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense charged, for
once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the
information is filed, it is retained regardless whether the
evidence proves a lesser offense than that charged in the
information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330).

TIJAM V. SIBONGHANOY
APRIL 15, 1968

 Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter

 Laches

FACTS:

On June 17, 1948, the Judiciary Act of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court
of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, is not more than P2,000.00.

On July 19, 1948, barely one month after the effectivity of Judiciary Act of
1948, the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced a civil case in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy
 22

and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the sum of P1,908.00 (note that in view of
the effectivity of the Judiciary Act, the CFI here was without jurisdiction over the
subject matter).

As prayed for in the complaint, a writ of attachment was issued by the court
against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing
of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
(Surety).

After trial, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and upon
motion of the latter, the Court issued a writ of execution against the defendants.
The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance
of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond.

The Surety filed a written opposition upon two grounds, namely, (1) Failure to
prosecute and (2) Absence of a demand upon the Surety for the payment of the
amount due under the judgment. Upon these grounds the Surety prayed the
Court not only to deny the motion for execution against its counter-bond but also
the following affirmative relief : "to relieve the herein bonding company of its
liability, if any, under the bond in question”. The Court denied this motion on the
ground solely that no previous demand had been made on the Surety for the
satisfaction of the judgment.

Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety
to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against
the counterbond. On the date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion
of the Surety's counsel, granted the latter a period of five days within which to
answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court granted the
motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.

Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the
same was issued without the required summary hearing. As the Court denied
the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of
denial. Not one of the assignment of errors by the Surety raises the question of
lack of jurisdiction.

On December 11, 1962, the Court of Appeals decided the case affirming the
order of the Court of First Instance.

On January 8, 1963, five days after the Surety received notice of the decision,
it filed a motion asking for extension of time within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in its resolution of
 23

January 10 of the same year. Two days later, the Surety filed a pleading entitled
MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging that the Court of First Instance therefore had no
jurisdiction to try and decide the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the motion of the Surety should be granted on the ground that
the CFI has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

HELD (Dry Run):

The motion of the Surety should not be granted. Considering that it was
almost fifteen years before the Surety raised the question of lack of jurisdiction,
the Surety is barred by laches from invoking such plea. A party can not invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and
after failing to obtain such relief, question that same jurisdiction. It is not
because the judgment or order of the CFI was valid as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public policy.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The motion of the Surety should not be granted. True is the rule that
jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by
law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present
case, the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the Surety is barred by laches
from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything
done heretofore in the case with its active participation.

The action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on
January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals
that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. If the Supreme Court
were to sanction such conduct on its part, it would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on
July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once
more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
 24

A party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not
important because the party is barred from such conduct not because the
judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of
public policy.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and

unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public

policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims
and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim
to be enforced or asserted.

RUSSEL V. VESTIL
March 17, 1999

 Action Which is Incapable of Pecuniary Estimation

FACTS:

Spouses Casimero and Caesaria Tautho owned a parcel of land containing an

area of 56,977.40 square meters, more or less. Upon the death of said spouses,
the property was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private
respondents.  The lot had remained undivided.

Petitioners discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF

HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL AGREEMENT OF
PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private
respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late
spouses.  Petitioners claimed that the document was false and perjurious as
the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the
property whatsoever had been made between the heirs.
 25

Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated

"DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed value of the
subject land is P5,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court.
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss saying that the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which
is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and hence,

within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
The action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and hence, within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. The main purpose of petitioners in filing
the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private
respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided the property among themselves to the
exclusion of petitioners.  While the complaint also prays for the partition of the
property, this is just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of
nullity of the document above-described. 
FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to rule that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.  If it is
primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the claim.  However,
where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by the Regional Trial Courts.

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific

performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also
 26

actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, annulling a deed of sale or

conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME V. NLRC

SEPTEMBER 16, 1998

 Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

 Appeals from the NLRC

FACTS:

Aricayos worked as Operations Manager of St. Martin Funeral Home. He is

the uncle of Amelita, the owner of St. Martin. After almost one year in his
employment, he was dismissed by Amelita for allegedly misappropriating
P38,000.

Aricayos filed a complaint and based on the position papers of the parties,
the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of St. Martin declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his
(Labor Arbiter’s) office had no jurisdiction over the case.

Not satisfied with the said decision, Aricayos appealed to the NLRC
contending that the labor arbiter erred in ruling that there was no employer-
employee relationship between him and St. Martin.

The NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned decision and
remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate proceedings.
St. Martin then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC
in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present
petition for certiorari alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition challenging the resolutions of the NLRC was
properly filed with the Supreme Court.

HELD (Dry Run):

The petition was not properly filed. Appeals from the NLRC should be initially
filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy
of courts.
 27

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The Court feels that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the
functional validity and systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it
has long adopted and still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC.

There is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to the Supreme

Court which, not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand
the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings. The
Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions. There is undeniably an imperative
need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional
protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to

supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court
of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.

SOLICITOR GENERAL V. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY

DECEMBER 11, 1991

 Power of the Supreme Court to Suspend Procedural Rules

FACTS:

In the Gonong case promulgated by the Supreme Court, it held that the
confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not
among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission.
The judgment in that case became final and executory.

Subsequently, the following developments transpired:

In a letter, Rodolfo Malapira complained to the Supreme Court that when he

was stopped for an alleged traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated
by a traffic enforcer in Quezon City.
 28

Another letter was received by the Supreme Court from Stephen L. Monsanto,
complaining against the confiscation of his driver's license for an alleged traffic
violation in Mandaluyong.

This was followed by a letter-complaint from Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer, also

for confiscation of his driver's license by the Makati Police Force.

Still another complaint was received by the Supreme Court, this time from
Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer, who also protested the removal of his front
license plate by the Metropolitan Manila Authority-Traffic Operations Center and
the confiscation of his driver's license

On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No.
11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and
impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or
obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

On July 2, 1991, the Court issued the following resolution:

The attention of the Court has been called to the enactment

by the Metropolitan Manila Authority of Ordinance No. 11. The
ordinance appears to be in conflict with the decision of the
Court in Gonong case. To clarify these matters, the Court
resolved to require the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the
Solicitor General to submit, COMMENTS on such sanctions in
light of the said decision.

For his part, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was
null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated
legislative power. The Solicitor General also filed a petition for prohibition
against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 11.

The Authority stressed the validity of the ordinance and pointed out that the
ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action
challenging its validity. The Authority contended that the petition of the Solicitor
General should be dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy
before the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the validity of Ordinance No. 11 may be attacked collaterally.

 29

HELD (Dry Run):

The validity of Ordinance No. 11 may be attacked collaterally. While it is true

that it is a settled principle that the validity of a law or an act can be challenged
only in a direct action, such rule may be relaxed by the Supreme Court under
exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy where there
is a failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding and the
necessity of resolving, in the interest of the public, the important substantive
issues raised. Such settled principle may disregarded by the Supreme Court in
resolving the present case because it has the power to suspend procedural rules
in the interest of substantial justice.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the
validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not
collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not
inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances,
such as those in the present controversy.

The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have created a
great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the
questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are
illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be
stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated
a driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police
would not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top."

Given these considerations, the Court feels it must address the problem
squarely presented to it and decide it as categorically rather than dismiss the
complaints on the basis of the technical objection raised and thus, through its
inaction, allow them to fester.

It is stressed that this action is not intended to disparage procedural rules,

which the Court has recognized often enough as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice. If we are relaxing them in this particular case, it is
because of the failure of the proper parties to file the appropriate proceeding
against the acts complained of, and the necessity of resolving, in the interest of
the public, the important substantive issues raised.

The Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its
inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules
 30

concerning "pleading, practice and procedure in all courts." In proper cases,

procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial
justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic
adherence to such rules.

The Court has taken this step in a number of such cases, notably Araneta vs.
Dinglasan, where Justice Tuason justified the deviation on the ground that "the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure."

We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:

Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools

designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend
to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be avoided. (Aznar III vs. Bernad, G.R. No. 81190, May
9, 1988, 161 SCRA 276.) Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from
their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so
require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition
of the proper procedure that should have been taken by the
parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of the case.
(Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31).

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

JANUARY 24, 1992

 Art. 185 of the Family Code is Remedial in Nature

FACTS:

On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason, then six
(6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4)
months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. At the time of her
filing of the petition, the law in force was the Child and Youth Welfare Code
where it was not required that the spouses should jointly adopt. The trial court
rendered judgment in her favor.
 31

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, while the case was
pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive Order No. 209 or the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Under the said new law, specifically
under Art. 185 thereof, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.

The Republic contended that the petition for adoption should be dismissed
outright for it was filed solely by Zenaida without joining her husband, in
violation of Article 185 of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the
spouses.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 185 of the Family Code should be given retroactive effect.

HELD (Dry Run):

No. Article 185 of the Family Code is remedial in nature. While it is true that
procedural statutes are ordinarily accorded a retrospective construction in the
sense that they may be applied to pending actions and proceedings, as well as
to future actions, they will not be so applied as to defeat procedural steps
completed before their enactment.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

1. When Zenaida filed her petition in Special Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court
acquired jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing law.
Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the
jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action.
2. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law
which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for
adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in
governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains
it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it
attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a
character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
instance.

BARANGAY PIAPI V. TALIP

September 7, 2005
 32

 Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts

FACTS:

On August 28, 1998, petitioners filed with the said RTC a complaint for
reconveyance and damages.
 
The complaint alleges that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have
been in actual, peaceful, continuous and open possession for more than 30 years
of a parcel of land consisting of 3.2 hectares situated in Piapi, Padada, Davao
del Sur.  It has a market value of P15,000.00.

The following are the pertinent allegations in petitioners’ complaint:

 
2.   Plaintiffs by themselves and/or thru their predecessors-
in-interest have been in actual possession, in the concept of an
owner, in good faith and in a manner that is open, peaceful,
uninterrupted, public, adverse and continuous, for more than
30 years, the following described parcel of land, viz:
 
2a.       The market value of the above-described land is
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
 
5.         Defendant or his predecessor-in-interest has
never been in possession, of the land in suit and except for the
year 1998, has not paid taxes thereon nor declared the same
for taxation purposes – a clear index that defendant’s title over
the same is not genuine.
 
6.         Defendant, in procuring title to the land in suit
did so by fraud, mistake and/or misrepresentation, hence, he
holds the title for the benefit and in trust of the landowner –
that is, herein plaintiffs.
 
7.         Defendant is by law under obligation to reconvey
the land in suit in favor of herein plaintiffs, x xx.”

Instead of filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on

the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case considering that the
assessed value of the land is only P6,030.00.   Respondent, citing Section 33
(3) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, maintains that the case falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-
Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.
 
 33

In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioners alleged that

jurisdiction is vested in the RTC considering that the total assessed value of the
property is P41,890.00, as shown by a Real Property Field Appraisal and
Assessment Sheet dated August 20, 1996 issued by Atty. Marcos D. Risonar,
Jr., Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.   
 
On January 12, 1999, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
 
ISSUE:

Was the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction correct?

HELD (Dry Run):

The dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction was correct. The nature
of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff. In
the present case, the plaintiff alleged that the market value or the estimated
value of the property was P15,000. Under the Rules, in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of real property, where the assessed value thereof
does not exceed P20,000, jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Municipal
Trial Courts. The petitioner’s allegation as to the assessed value of the property
in its opposition to the motion to dismiss cannot be taken into account, as it was
not made in the complaint.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS: 

Petitioners contend that under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended, the
RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable of
pecuniary estimation.
 
The contention is bereft of merit.   This case is analogous to Huguete vs.
Embudo. There, petitioners argued that a complaint for annulment of a deed of
sale and partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.   However, we ruled that“the nature of an
action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by
the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for.  Where the ultimate
objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to real property,
it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value
of the property subject thereof.”
 
Indeed, basic as a hornbook principle is that the nature of an action, as well
as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or
not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
 34

 
It can easily be discerned that petitioners’ complaint involves title to, or
possession of, real property.   However, they failed to allege therein the
assessed value of the subject property.   Instead, what they stated is the
market value of the land at P15,000.00. 
 
Section 19 (2) of Batas PambansaBlg. 129, as amended provides:
 
“SEC. 19.   Jurisdiction in civil cases.– Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
 
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest thereon, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible
entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over
which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.”
  
The Rule requires that “the assessed valueof the property, or if there is none,
the estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant.”  It bears
reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint
and the reliefs prayed for.   Petitioners’ complaint is for reconveyance of a
parcel of land.   Considering that their action involves the title to or interest in
real property, they should have alleged therein its assessed value.   However,
they only specified the market value or estimated value, which is P15,000.00.  
Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has
jurisdiction over the case.

DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. V. VELEZ

November 29, 2001

 Independent Civil Action

FACTS:

On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 37, an information for estafa against Carmen
Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the
amount of P608,532.46.

Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint against Carmen
 35

Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages. In time,
petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the ground that there is a
pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts. Thereafter,
the trial court issued an order dismissing the civil case.

ISSUE:

Was the dismissal proper?

HELD (Dry Run):

The dismissal was not proper. The civil case, which was an independent civil
action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent
Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the
social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the
imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury
caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated
through indemnity which is civil in nature.

Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." This is
the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an
offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and
indemnification of consequential damages.

The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from the
commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either
deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted.

Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became
effective on December 1, 2000, provides that:

"(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action."
 36

Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that —

"After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action."

However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or
omission, the rule has been changed.

Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged
is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
"The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not
include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be
prosecuted separately even without a reservation."

Rule 111, Section 3 reads:

"Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. — In the cases

provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action."

The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to

independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are
applicable to this case.

Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and

undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules
of procedure.
 37

Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on
account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to
its filing.

DOMAGAS V. JENSEN
January 17, 2005

 Action Quasi-In Rem

 Action in Personam
 Summons

FACTS:

On February 19, 1999, petitioner Filomena Domagas filed a complaint for

forcible entry against respondent Vivian Jensen before the MTC of Calasiao,
Pangasinan. The petitioner alleged in her complaint that she was the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan.
She alleged that sometime in January, 1999, the respondent, by means of force,
strategy and stealth, gained entry into the petitioner’s property by excavating a
portion thereof and thereafter constructing a fence thereon. As such, the
petitioner was deprived of a 68-square meter portion of her property along the
boundary line.

The records show that respondent Vivian Jensen, before and after her
marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Her residence was located at No. 572 Barangay
Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. On February 17, 1999, prior to the filing by
Domagas of the complaint, Jensen left the Philippines and went to Norway. She
leased her house to Eduardo Gonzales.

Thus, the summons and the complaint were not served personally on the
respondent. The Sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons. He went to
Jensen’s house and served the summons to Oscar Layno, Jensen’s brother, who
happened to be there at the time of the service in order to collect rental payments
from Eduardo Gonzales.

Nonetheless, on May 17, 1999, the court rendered judgment ordering the
respondent and all persons occupying the property for and in the latter’s behalf
to vacate the disputed area.
 38

The respondent failed to appeal the decision. Consequently, a writ of

execution was issued on September 27, 1999.

On August 16, 2000, the respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner
before the RTC of Dagupan City for the annulment of the decision of the MTC in
Civil Case No. 879, on the ground that due to the Sheriff’s failure to serve the
complaint and summons on her because she was in Oslo, Norway, the MTC
never acquired jurisdiction over her person.

ISSUE:

Rule on the judgment rendered by the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan.

HELD (Dry Run):

The judgment rendered by the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan is null and void,
for the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
there being no valid service of summons.

When resorting to a substituted service of summons by leaving copies of the

summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion, the residence where the summons was served must be the actual
residence of the defendant at the time of the service and the person to whom the
same was served must be residing therein. In the present case, there can be no
valid service of summons as the place where the summons was served was not
anymore the dwelling house of Jensen and the person the summons was served,
Jensen’s brother, was not residing therein.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The ruling of the CA, that the petitioner’s complaint for forcible entry is an
action quasi in rem, is erroneous. The action of the petitioner for forcible entry is
a real action and one in personam.

The settled rule is that the aim and object of an action determine its
character. Whether a proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for
that matter, is determined by its nature and purpose, and by these only. A
proceeding in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and
obligations brought against the person and is based on the jurisdiction of the
person, although it may involve his right to, or the exercise of ownership of,
specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a proceeding in personam is to
 39

impose, through the judgment of a court, some responsibility or liability directly

upon the person of the defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or actions to fasten a pecuniary
liability on him. An action in personam is said to be one which has for its object a
judgment against the person, as distinguished from a judgment against the
propriety to determine its state. It has been held that an action in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights or obligations; such action is brought
against the person. As far as suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-
settled that it is an injunctive act in personam. In Combs v. Combs, the appellate
court held that proceedings to enforce personal rights and obligations and in
which personal judgments are rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in personam. Actions for recovery of real property
are in personam.

On the other hand, a proceeding quasi in rem is one brought against persons
seeking to subject the property of such persons to the discharge of the claims
assailed. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant and the
purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interests therein to the obligation or
loan burdening the property. Actions quasi in rem deal with the status,
ownership or liability of a particular property but which are intended to operate
on these questions only as between the particular parties to the proceedings and
not to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The
judgments therein are binding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. - Subject

to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building in force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any
land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or
assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person,
may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons
unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of
such possession, together with damages and costs.
 40

Under Section 15, Rule 70 of the said Rule, the plaintiff may be granted a writ
of preliminary injunction or mandatory injunction:

Sec. 15. Preliminary Injunction. – The court may grant

preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing
further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.

A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry

or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of
the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The
court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the
filing thereof.

If, after due proceedings, the trial court finds for the plaintiff, it shall then
render judgment in his or her favor, thus:

Sec. 17. Judgment. – If, after trial, the court finds that the
allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in
favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum
justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and
costs. If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall
render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a
counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for
the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as
justice requires.

From the aforementioned provisions of the Rules of Court and by its very
nature and purpose, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a real
action and in personam because the plaintiff seeks to enforce a personal
obligation or liability on the defendant under Article 539 of the New Civil Code,
for the latter to vacate the property subject of the action, restore physical
possession thereof to the plaintiff, and pay actual damages by way of
reasonable compensation for his use or occupation of the property.

As gleaned from the averments of the petitioner’s complaint in the MTC, she
sought a writ of a preliminary injunction from the MTC and prayed that the said
writ be made permanent. Under its decision, the MTC ordered the defendant
 41

therein (the respondent in this case), to vacate the property and pay a "monthly
rental" of P1,000.00 to the plaintiff therein (the petitioner in this case).

On the issue of whether the respondent was validly served with the
summons and complaint by the Sheriff on April 5, 1999, the petitioner asserts
that since her action of forcible entry against the respondent in Civil Case No.
879 was in personam, summons may be served on the respondent, by
substituted service, through her brother, Oscar Layno, in accordance with
Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner avers that Oscar Layno, a
person of suitable age and discretion, was residing in the house of the
respondent on April 5, 1999. She avers that the fact that the house was leased
to and occupied by Eduardo Gonzales was of no moment. Moreover, the Sheriff
is presumed to have performed his duty of properly serving the summons on the
respondent by substituted service.

The contention of the petitioner has no merit.

In Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals , the Court had the occasion to state:

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the

defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide
the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant
who does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by
personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule
14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with
summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be
made in accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is
temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of
service may be resorted to: (a) substituted service set forth in
Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of
court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4)
any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Thus, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant is null and void.

In the present case, the records show that the respondent, before and after
her marriage to Jarl Jensen on August 23, 1987, remained a resident of
Barangay Buenlag, Calasiao, Pangasinan. Considering that the respondent was
in Oslo, Norway, having left the Philippines on February 17, 1999, the summons
and complaint in Civil Case No. 879 may only be validly served on her through
substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
 42

SEC. [Link] service. — If, for justifiable causes, the

defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence
with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing
therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or
regular place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.

Strict compliance with the mode of service is required in order that the court
may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. The statutory
requirement of substituted service must be followed faithfully and strictly and
any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is rendered
ineffective. As the Court held in Hamilton v. Levy:

The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the

service of summons must be stated in the proof of service or
Officer’s Return; otherwise, any substituted service made in
lieu of personal service cannot be upheld. This is necessary
because substituted service is in derogation of the usual
method of service. It is a method extraordinary in character
and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute. Here, no such explanation
was made. Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with
the requirements of substituted service renders said service
ineffective.

In Keister v. Narcereo, the Court held that the term "dwelling house" or
"residence" are generally held to refer to the time of service; hence, it is not
sufficient to leave the summons at the former’s dwelling house, residence or
place of abode, as the case may be. Dwelling house or residence refers to the
place where the person named in the summons is living at the time when the
service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the
time. It is, thus, the service of the summons intended for the defendant that must
be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as
much important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.

The Return of Service filed by Sheriff Eduardo J. Abulencia on the service of

summons reads:
 43

Respectfully returned to the court of origin the herein summons

and enclosures in the above-entitled case, the undersigned
caused the service on April 5, 1999.

Defendant Vivian Layno Jensen is out of the country as per

information from her brother Oscar Layno, however, copy of
summons and enclosures was received by her brother Oscar
Layno on April 5, 1999 as evidenced by his signature
appearing in the original summons.

Calasiao, Pangasinan, April 6, 1999.

As gleaned from the said return, there is no showing that as of April 5, 1999,
the house where the Sheriff found Oscar Layno was the latter’s residence or that
of the respondent herein. Neither is there any showing that the Sheriff tried to
ascertain where the residence of the respondent was on the said date. It turned
out that the occupant of the house was a lessor, Eduardo Gonzales, and that
Oscar Layno was in the premises only to collect the rentals from him. The service
of the summons on a person at a place where he was a visitor is not considered
to have been left at the residence or place or abode, where he has another place
at which he ordinarily stays and to which he intends to return.

In sum, then, the respondent was not validly served with summons and the
complaint in Civil Case No. 879 on April 5, 1999, by substituted service. Hence,
the MTC failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the respondent; as such,
the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 879 is null and void.

DECENA V. PIQUERO
March 31, 2005

 Joinder of Causes of Action

 Action in Rem
 Venue

FACTS:

The petitioners, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners of a
parcel of land, with a house constructed thereon, located in Parañaque, Metro
Manila (now Parañaque City).
 44

On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses

Pedro and Valeria Piquero, executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) in
which the former sold the property to the latter for the price of P940,250.00
payable in six (6) installments via postdated checks. The vendees forthwith took
possession of the property.

On May 17, 1999, the petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a
Complaint against the respondents with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA, recovery of possession
and damages.  The petitioners alleged therein that the first two checks drawn
and issued by them in payment for the purchase price of the property were
dishonored by the drawee bank, and were not replaced with cash despite
demands therefor.

The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in

their favor, thus:

a. The sale/Memorandum of Agreement be declared null and void, rescinded

and with no further force and effect;
b. Defendants, and all persons claiming right under them, be ordered to
immediately vacate the subject property and turnover its possession to the
plaintiffs;
c. Defendants, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay the plaintiffs:
1. P10,000.00 – monthly, starting 01 October 1997 until complete
turnover of the subject property to the plaintiffs, as reasonable
compensation for its continued unlawful use and occupation by the
defendants;
2. P200,000.00 – moral damages;
3. P200,000.00 – exemplary damages;
4. P250,000.00 – attorney’s fees and litigation – related expenses; and
5. the costs of suit.

Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for.

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter
alia, of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction over the property subject matter
of the action.

On the first ground, the respondents averred that the principal action of the
petitioners for the rescission of the MOA, and the recovery of the possession of
the property is a real action and not a personal one; hence, it should have been
brought in the RTC of Parañaque City, where the property subject matter of the
action was located, and not in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, where the
petitioners resided. The respondents posited that the said court had no
 45

jurisdiction over the property subject matter of the action because it was located
in Parañaque City.

In opposition, the petitioners insisted that their action for damages and
attorney’s fees is a personal action and not a real action; hence, it may be filed
in the RTC of Bulacan where they reside.  They averred that while their second
cause of action for the recovery of the possession of the property is a real action,
the same may, nevertheless, be joined with the rest of their causes of action for
damages, conformably with Section 5(c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.

On October 16, 2001, the court issued an Order granting the motion and
ordered the dismissal of the complaint. 

ISSUE:

Was the dismissal by the trial court proper?

HELD (Dry Run):

The dismissal by the trial court was proper. The action of the petitioners for
the rescission of the MOA on account of the respondents’ breach thereof and the
latter’s failure to return the premises subject of the complaint to the petitioners,
and the respondents’ eviction therefrom is a real action.  As such, the action
should have been filed in the proper court where the property is located, namely,
in Parañaque City.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The sole issue is whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in
the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.  The resolution of this issue is, in turn, anchored
on whether Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court invoked by the petitioners is
applicable in this case.

SEC. 5. Joinder of causes of action.—A party may in one

pleading assert, in the alternative or otherwise, as many
causes of action as he may have against an opposing party,
subject to the following conditions:

(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the
rules on joinder of parties;

(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions
governed by special rules;
 46

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may
be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein; and

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally
for recovery of money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be
the test of jurisdiction. (5a)

Under the said Rule, a party may, in one pleading, assert, in the alternative
or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing
party subject to the conditions therein enumerated, one of which is Section 5(c)
which reads:

Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. -- …

(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties
but pertain to different venues or jurisdiction, the joinder may
be allowed in the Regional Trial Court provided one of the
causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and
the venue lies therein; …

Explaining the aforequoted condition, Justice Jose Y. Feria declared:

(c) Under the third condition, if one cause of action falls

within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and the other
falls within the jurisdiction of a Municipal Trial Court, the action
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court.  If the causes of
action have different venues, they may be joined in any of the
courts of proper venue.  Hence, a real action and a personal
action may be joined either in the Regional Trial Court of the
place where the real property is located or where the parties
reside.

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal

right of the other which causes the latter injury.  The essential elements of a
cause of action are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right of the plaintiff;
(2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect one’s right; and (3) an act
or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiff’s right. A cause of action
should not be confused with the remedies or reliefs prayed for.  A cause of
action is to be found in the facts alleged in the complaint and not in the prayer
 47

for relief.  It is the substance and not the form that is controlling. A party may
have two or more causes of action against another party.

A joinder of causes of action is the uniting of two or more demands or right of

action in a complaint.  The question of the joinder of causes of action involves in
particular cases a preliminary inquiry as to whether two or more causes of action
are alleged.  In declaring whether more than one cause of action is alleged, the
main thrust is whether more than one primary right or subject of controversy is
present.  Other tests are whether recovery on one ground would bar recovery on
the other, whether the same evidence would support the other different counts
and whether separate actions could be maintained for separate relief; or
whether more than one distinct primary right or subject of controversy is alleged
for enforcement or adjudication.

A cause of action may be single although the plaintiff seeks a variety of

remedies.  The mere fact that the plaintiff prays for multiple reliefs does not
indicate that he has stated more than one cause of action.  The prayer may be
an aid in interpreting the petition and in determining whether or not more than
one cause of action is pleaded. If the allegations of the complaint show one
primary right and one wrong, only one cause of action is alleged even though
other matters are incidentally involved, and although different acts, methods,
elements of injury, items of claims or theories of recovery are set forth. Where
two or more primary rights and wrongs appear, there is a joinder of causes of
action.

After due consideration of the foregoing, we find and so rule that Section 5(c),
Rule 2 of the Rules of Court does not apply.  This is so because the petitioners,
as plaintiffs in the court a quo, had only one cause of action against the
respondents, namely, the breach of the MOA upon the latter’s refusal to pay the
first two installments in payment of the property as agreed upon, and turn over
to the petitioners the possession of the real property, as well as the house
constructed thereon occupied by the respondents.  The claim for damages for
reasonable compensation for the respondents’ use and occupation of the
property, in the interim, as well as moral and exemplary damages suffered by
the petitioners on account of the aforestated breach of contract of the
respondents are merely incidental to the main cause of action, and are not
independent or separate causes of action.

The action of the petitioners for the rescission of the MOA on account of the
respondents’ breach thereof and the latter’s failure to return the premises subject
of the complaint to the petitioners, and the respondents’ eviction therefrom is a
 48

real action.  As such, the action should have been filed in the proper court where
the property is located, namely, in Parañaque City, conformably with Section 1,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or

possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.

Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their
complaint in the said RTC, venue was improperly laid; hence, the trial court
acted conformably with Section 1(c), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court when it
ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. V. LIM

October 5, 2007

 The Court May Not Motu Proprio Dismiss a Case on the Ground of
Improper Venue

FACTS:
 
The present controversy stemmed from a contract of sale between
Universal Robina Corporation, petitioner, and Albert Lim, respondent. Pursuant
to the contract, petitioner sold to respondent grocery products in the total amount
of P808,059.88. After tendering partial payments, respondent refused to settle
his obligation despite petitioner’s repeated demands.
 
Thus, on May 31, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, a complaint against respondent for a sum of money.
 
On June 22, 1999, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the complaint
motu proprio on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and improper venue, thus:
 
The case is misplaced with respect to jurisdiction and
venue. There is not even a remote connection by the parties to
Quezon City, where this Regional Trial Court sits, the plaintiff
corporation has principal office at Pasig City and the defendant
is, as provided in the complaint, from Laoag City.
 
 49

Wherefore, premises considered, this case is hereby

DISMISSED without prejudice for improper venue and for lack
of jurisdiction.
  
ISSUE:

Whether the trial court may dismiss motu proprio petitioner’s complaint on the
ground of improper venue.

HELD (Dry Run):

The trial court may not dismiss motu proprio petitioner’s complaint on the
ground of improper venue. The court may only dismiss an action motu proprio in
case of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res judicata
and prescription, but not in case of improper venue.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Sections 2 and 4, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 2. Venue of personal actions. – All other actions may be

commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.

Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable. – This Rule shall not apply –
(a) In those cases where a specific rule or law provides
otherwise; or
(b) Where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the
filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.

Clearly, in personal actions, the plaintiff may commence an action either in

the place of his or her residence or the place where the defendant resides.
However, the parties may agree to a specific venue which could be in a place
where neither of them resides.
 
Corollarily, Section 1, Rule 9 of the same Rules provides for the instances
when the trial court may motu proprio dismiss a claim, thus:

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses

and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears
from the pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
 50

or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of

limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
 
Implicit from the above provision is that improper venue not impleaded in the
motion to dismiss or in the answer is deemed waived. Thus, a court may not
dismiss an action motu proprio on the ground of improper venue as it is not one
of the grounds wherein the court may dismiss an action motu proprio on the
basis of the pleadings.

In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court, this Court held that a trial

court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the ground of improper venue,
thus:
 
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue
is certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of
the proceedings, particularly as venue, in inferior courts as well
as in the courts of first instance (now RTC), may be waived
expressly or impliedly. Where the defendant fails to challenge
timely the venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section
4 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held
and a decision to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a
special action be permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong
venue, which is deemed waived.
 
Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial court to have taken a
procedural short-cut by dismissing motu proprio the complaint on the ground of
improper venue without first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court
to take its proper course. Although we are for the speedy and expeditious
resolution of cases, justice and fairness take primary importance. The ends of
justice require that respondent trial court faithfully adhere to the rules of
procedure to afford not only the defendant, but the plaintiff as well, the right to
be heard on his cause.
 
  In Rudolf Lietz Holdings Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque, the Court
likewise held that a trial court may not motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the
ground of improper venue, thus:
 
Rule 9, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states
that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The court may
only dismiss an action motu proprio in case of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, res
judicata and prescription. Therefore, the trial court in
this case erred when it dismissed the petition motu
proprio. It should have waited for a motion to dismiss or
a responsive pleading from respondent, raising the
 51

objection or affirmative defense of improper venue,

before dismissing the petition.
 
  In the instant case, respondent, despite proper service of summons, failed
to file an answer and was thus declared in default by the trial court. Verily,
having been declared in default, he lost his standing in court and his right to
adduce evidence and present his defense, including his right to question the
propriety of the venue of the action.

FORTUNE MOTORS, INC. V. CA

October 16, 1989/ Paras

 Real Action

FACTS:

On March 29,1982 up to January 6,1984, private respondent Metropolitan

Bank extended various loans to petitioner Fortune Motors in the total sum of
P32,500,000.00 (according to the borrower; or P34,150,000.00 according to the
Bank) which loan was secured by a real estate mortgage on the Fortune building
and lot in Makati, Rizal.

Due to financial difficulties and the onslaught of economic recession, the

petitioner was not able to pay the loan which became due.

For failure of the petitioner to pay the loans, the respondent bank initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. After notices were served, posted, and
published, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for the price of
P47,899,264.91 to mortgagee Bank as the highest bidder.

The sheriff's certificate of sale was registered on October 24, 1984 with the
one-year redemption period to expire on October 24, 1985.

On October 21, 1985, three days before the expiration of the redemption
period, petitioner Fortune Motors filed a complaint for annulment of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale alleging that the foreclosure was premature
because its obligation to the Bank was not yet due, the publication of the notice
of sale was incomplete, there was no public auction, and the price for which the
property was sold was "shockingly low".

Before summons could be served private respondent Bank filed a motion to

dismiss the complaint on the ground that the venue of the action was improperly
laid in Manila for the realty covered by the real estate mortgage is situated in
Makati, therefore the action to annul the foreclosure sale should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati.
 52

The motion was opposed by petitioner Fortune Motors alleging that its action
"is a personal action" and that "the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings" so that it may have a new one year period to redeem.

ISSUE:
Was the petitioner's action for annulment of the real estate mortgage
extrajudicial foreclosure sale a real action?

HELD (Dry Run):

Yes. Since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property results in a

conveyance of the title of the property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an
action to annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily an action affecting the title of
the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and
tried in the place where the property or part thereof lies.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or as

indicated in Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real
property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation
of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. (Comments on the Rules of
Court by Moran, Vol. 1, p. 122)

Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or
for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property,
must be instituted in the Court of First Instance of the province where the
property or any part thereof lies. (Enriquez v. Macadaeg, 84 Phil. 674,1949;
Garchitorena v. Register of Deeds, 101 Phil. 1207, 1957)

Personal actions upon the other hand, may be instituted in the Court of First
Instance where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court).

A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the
true objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property. (Inton,
et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948)

An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real

action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v. Sanchez,
94 Phil. 760,1954)

An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from

an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Munoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil.
737,1950)
 53

While it is true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or
possession of the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his
claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the
building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of
which is petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action
for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to
efface the fundamental and prime objective and nature of the case, which is to
recover said real property. It is a real action. Respondent Court, therefore, did
not err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue (Sec. 2, Rule 4)
which was timely raised (Sec. 1, Rule 16). (Punzalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana,
121 SCRA 336, [1983]).

Thus, as aptly decided by the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by then

Court of Appeals Associate Justice now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, the pertinent portion reads: "Since an extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property results in a conveyance of the title of the property
sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action to annul the foreclosure sale is
necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real
action which should be commenced and tried in the province where the property
or part thereof lies."

ZOLETA V. ROMILLO
February 15, 1982

 Venue
 Personal Action

FACTS:

Efren Zoleta, the plaintiff and the petitioner in this case, is a resident of B.F.
Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila while the defendant is a domestic corporation
with principal office address at Paseo de Roxas, Makati.

Zoleta acquired a car financed by the defendant corporation. Zoleta executed

and delivered to the defendant a promissory note which was secured by a
chattel mortgage over the said motor vehicle.

It was expressly stipulated in the Deed of Chattel Mortgage and the

Promissory Note that the parties agreed that actions arising- from the, same
'shall be brought to the jurisdiction of the proper courts in the City of Manila.

In absolute good faith and honesty, plaintiff complied with the terms and
condition of the said promissory note and chattel mortgage. The last installment
 54

due was paid last October 15, 1980. On November 2, 1980, plaintiff was deeply
embarrassed to receive a notice of unpaid installment due from defendant.
Perplexed and upset, plaintiff readily relayed the same to a personnel of the
defendant who promised to rectify or correct everything. On November 11, 1980,
defendant sent a telegram demanding payment again of an alleged debt.

Thus, Zoleta filed a complaint against the private respondent, Filinvest Credit
Corporation (FILINVEST), in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City.

On December 12, 1980, FILINVEST filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on

the ground of improper venue. It invoked the terms of the promissory note and
the chattel mortgage.

ISSUE:

If you were the judge, will you grant the motion?

HELD (Dry Run):

If I were the judge, I will grant the motion.

It is true that by written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may
be changed from one province to another. But by his complaint, the plaintiff is
not suing on the promissory note nor on the chattel mortgage. He is suing for
damages because of the tortious act of the private-respondent who sent him a
dunning telegram for a debt which had already long been fully paid.

Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff. Zoleta resides in B. F. Homes in
Paranaque, while FILINVEST has its offices at Paseo de Roxas in Makati.
Accordingly, the venue was properly laid in the court presided by the respondent
judge.

HEIRS OF PAGOBO V. CA
October 16, 1997

Ruling:

It must be pointed out that the new Section 3 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
relaxes further the rule on amendment of pleadings. Refusal to allow
amendments other than those which may be made as a matter of right under
Section 2, may be based only on the ground that the motion was made with
intent to delay. The other ground, viz., the amendment substantially alters the
 55

original cause of action or defense, has been dropped from the Rule. This simply
means then that amendments may substantially alter the cause of action or
defense.

JOSEPH V. BAUTISTA
February 23, 1989/ Regalado, J.

 Cause of Action

FACTS:

Perez is the owner of a cargo truck conveying cargoes and passengers for a
consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. Villa was the driver thereof. Joseph,
with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City after paying
the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela.

While said cargo truck was negotiating the National Highway proceeding
towards Manila, Villa tried to overtake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same
direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truck supposedly owned by Sioson
and Pagarigan, then driven by Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck
which was then in the process of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the
cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango tree. As
a result, petitioner Joseph sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs.

Joseph filed a complaint for damages against respondent Perez, as owner of

the cargo truck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against
respondents Sioson and Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the
pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.

Sioson filed his answer alleging that he is not and never was an owner of the
pick-up truck and neither would he acquire ownership thereof in the future.

Joseph, with prior leave of court, filed his amended complaint impleading
Pagarigan and a certain Vargas as additional alternative defendants. Joseph
apparently could not ascertain who the real owner of said cargo truck was,
whether Patrocinio Perez or Vargas, and who was the real owner of said pick-up
truck, whether Sioson or Pagarigan.

Perez filed her amended answer with crossclaim against her co-defendants
for indemnity and subrogation in the event she is ordered to pay Joseph's claim,
and therein impleaded cross-defendant Cardeno as additional alternative
defendant.
 56

On September 27, 1974, defendants Villanueva, Cardeno, Sioson and

Pagarigan, thru their insurer, Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, paid
petitioner's claim for injuries sustained in the amount of P 1,300.00. By reason
thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim releasing from liability the
following parties, viz: Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Cardeno,
Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan.

On December 2, 1974, Villanueva, Cardeno and their insurer, the Insurance

Corporation of the Philippines, paid respondent Perez' claim for damages to her
cargo truck in the amount of P 7,420.61.

Consequently, Sioson, Pagarigan, Cardeno and Villanueva filed a motion to

exonerate them in the instant case, alleging that Cardeno and Villanueva
already paid P 7,420.61 by way of damages to respondent Perez, and alleging
further that respondents Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan paid P
1,300.00 to petitioner by way of amicable settlement.

Thereafter, respondent Perez filed her opposition to such motion. Aside from
such opposition, she filed a counter motion to dismiss. The so-called counter
motion to dismiss was premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by
petitioner in favor of Insurance Corporation of the Philippines, Cardeno,
Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan inured to her (Perez) benefit, considering that
all the respondents are solidarity liable to herein petitioner.

On July 8, 1975, respondent judge issued the questioned order dismissing

the case, and a motion for the reconsideration thereof was denied. Petitioner
contended that respondent judge erred in declaring that the release of claim
executed by petitioner in favor of Insurance Corporation of the Philippines,
Cardeno, Villanueva, Sioson and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of Perez; ergo, it
likewise erred in dismissing the case.

ISSUES:

How many are the causes of action embodied in Joseph’s complaint?

HELD (Dry Run):

There is only one cause of action embodied in Joseph’s complaint. The

singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong
violating the rights of one person. In the case at bar, there is no question that the
petitioner sustained a single injury on his person. That vested in him a single
cause of action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the different
respondents through the appropriate remedies allowed by law.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:
 57

The argument that there are two causes of action embodied in petitioner's
complaint, hence the judgment on the compromise agreement under the cause of
action based on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach of
contract of carriage, is untenable.

A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission

committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is
true that a single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the same
time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and
distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrong, there
is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have
been violated belonging to one person.

The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong
violating the rights of one person. Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from
several wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises.

In the case at bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single
injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of action, albeit with the
correlative rights of action against the different respondents through the
appropriate remedies allowed by law.

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one
cause of action involved although the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner
against the defendants therein were not necessarily identical since the
respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by the
petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, in
essence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery
for the same act or omission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule
against unjust enrichment.

It is undisputed that petitioner, in his amended complaint, prayed that the

trial court hold respondents jointly and severally liable. Furthermore, the
allegations in the amended complaint clearly impleaded respondents as solidary
debtors. On the evidence presented in the court below, the trial court found them
to be so liable. There is thus no question that the respondents herein are
solidarily liable to petitioner.

The respondents having been found to be solidarity liable to petitioner, the full
payment made by some of the solidary debtors and their subsequent release
from any and all liability to petitioner inevitably resulted in the extinguishment
and release from liability of the other solidary debtors, including herein
respondent Patrocinio Perez.

The claim that there was an agreement entered into between the parties
during the pre-trial conference that, after such payment made by the other
respondents, the case shall proceed as against respondent Perez is both
 58

incredible and unsubstantiated. There is nothing in the records to show, either

by way of a pre-trial order, minutes or a transcript of the notes of the alleged pre-
trial hearing, that there was indeed such as agreement.

MARISCAL V. CA
July 22, 1999

 Litis Pendentia
 A Counterclaim Partakes of the Nature of a Complaint and/or a Cause
of Action Against the Plaintiff

FACTS:

Private respondent Bella C. Catalan filed a complaint against petitioner

Rogelio Mariscal before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo for the annulment of
their marriage contracted on the ground that it was void ab initio for having been
solemnized without a valid marriage license and for being bigamous. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 20983.

Two (2) days later, or on 31 March 1993, Rogelio Mariscal filed his own
complaint against Bella C. Catalan before the Regional Trial Court of Digos
(Davao del Sur) seeking likewise the annulment of the same marriage on the
ground that he was forced to marry her at gunpoint and that they had no valid
license. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2996. Mariscal likewise
prayed for moral damages of P100,000.00, exemplary damages of P20,000.00,
attorney's fees of P50,000.00 including P2,000.00 monthly retainer starting 31
March 1993 and another P2,000.00 as court appearance fee, and litigation
expenses of P20,000.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2996.

In view of Civil Case No. 20983 which she earlier instituted in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Catalan moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2996
invoking litis pendencia, citing Civil Case No. 20983 pending before the RTC of
Iloilo which involved the same parties and the same cause of action. But the
RTC of Digos denied the motion to dismiss.

On appeal Catalan, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC of Digos and
dismissed the case on the ground of litis pendentia. Marical is now before the
Supreme Court questioning the decision of the CA.

ISSUE:
 59

Was the dismissal by the CA of the case before the RTC of Digos on ground of
litis pendentia correct?

HELD (Dry Run):

Yes. For litis pendencia to be invoked as ground for the abatement of an

action, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of
parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two (2) cases should be
such that the judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

The first two (2) requisites are present. The parties involved in RTC-Iloilo are
the very same protagonists in RTC-Digos. The actions in both fora are based on
the same facts that gave rise to the uniformity of the principal reliefs sought.

The last requisite is likewise present. In his answer to the complaint before
the RTC of Iloilo, he raised the issue of force, violence, intimidation, threats and
strategy. In his complaint before the RTC of Digos, he raised the same issues for
the dissolution of his marriage to Cataclan. Hence, any decision promulgated by
the RTC of Iloilo will necessarily constitute res judicata on the case before the
RTC of Digos.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The petition is devoid of merit. It is not infrequent that this Court is given the
opportunity to discuss litis pendencia as ground for the dismissal of an action
which has become unnecessary and vexatious. In Victronics Computers, Inc. v.
RTC-Br. 63, Makati, we said -

It is a rule that for litis pendencia to be invoked as ground

for the abatement or dismissal of an action, the concurrence of
the following requisites is necessary: (a) identity of parties, or
at least such as representing the same interest in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the
two (2) cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

It is quite evident that the first two (2) requisites are present. The parties
involved in Civil Case No. 20983 (RTC-Iloilo) are the very same protagonists in
 60

Civil Case No. 2996 (RTC-Digos). The actions in both fora are based on the same
set of facts that gave rise to the uniformity of the principal reliefs sought, more
particularly, the ultimate dissolution of their marriage.

The third requisite is the bone of contention. Mariscal contends that there can
be no res judicata between the two (2) simultaneous civil actions because of the
different grounds for the nullification of their marriage respectively invoked by
them. According to him, the judgment in one case will not abate the second
because the basis for annulment in the former would not have even been
traversed or passed upon in the latter. Thus Mariscal pleads -

Indeed, the RTC-Iloilo's refusal to declare the nullity of or

annul the marriage would mean only that herein private
respondent shall have failed to prove her claims in Civil Case
No. 20983 that there was no marriage license and that the
petitioner deceitfully failed to disclose a prior marriage.
However, the RTC-Iloilo's refusal would not constitute a ruling
on whether the petitioner himself had been forced into the
marriage through force, duress, intimidation, and threats, since
these grounds are pleaded in Civil Case No. 2996 before the
RTC-Davao del Sur.

Respondent CA's error, therefore, was essentially its failure

to consider the consequences of the various possible judgments
that could be rendered by the two trial courts in the two civil
cases below. The possible judgments in one of the civil cases
below will not necessarily bar the other.

Petitioner Mariscal does not convince. In litis pendencia what is essential is

the identity and similarity of the issues under consideration. In his effort to have
the case resolved in a different venue, petitioner has resorted to nit-picking and
in the process has lost track of the real issue besetting the two (2) actions which
is simply the nullification of a marriage contracted by the parties on 4 April
1988. Interestingly, in his answer submitted in Civil Case No. 20983 (RTC-Iloilo),
Mariscal prayed -

WHEREFORE it is prayed that the above-entitled case be

dismissed; and/or, in the alternative, that the alleged marriage
contracts (Annexes "A" and "B") be declared void from the
beginning for having been performed illegally and under
force, violence, intimidation, threats and strategy.
 61

By including such prayer in his answer, Mariscal has raised the issue of
"force, violence, intimidation, threats and strategy" before the RTC-Iloilo, the very
same set forth in the RTC-Digos. Hence, he cannot now deny that the issues as
well as arguments raised before the two (2) trial courts are identical. Any
decision or ruling promulgated in Civil Case No. 20983 by the RTC of Iloilo will
necessarily constitute res judicata on Civil Case No. 2996 pending before the
RTC of Digos and vice-versa.

More. In addition to specific denials, affirmative and special defenses wherein

Mariscal questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC of Iloilo over the nature of the
action and that there was pending between the same parties for the same cause
Civil Case No. 2996 in the RTC of Digos, he also presented a compulsory
counterclaim in his answer. Therein he alleged that by reason of the complaint
filed by Catalan in gross and evident bad faith, malice and harassment, he
suffered anxiety, wounded feelings, besmirched reputation, mental torture and
sleepless nights thus entitling him to moral damages of P1,000,000.00,
exemplary damages of P500,000.00 as well as attorney's fees of 35% of the
amount of damages and value of the property or money involved but in no case
less than P500,000.00, plus initial litigation costs of P30,000.00.

A counterclaim partakes of the nature of a complaint and/or a cause of action

against the plaintiff in a case. To interpose a cause of action in a counterclaim
and again invoke it in a complaint against the same person or party would be
splitting a cause of action not sanctioned by the Rules. Indeed the Court is
puzzled no end why Mariscal literally shied away from the RTC of Iloilo where
he could have just as well ventilated his affirmative and special defenses and
litigated his compulsory counterclaim in that court and thus avoided this
duplicity of suits which is the matrix upon which litis pendencia is laid.

A supervening development further dramatizes the puerile, if not needless,

efforts of Mariscal to derail the action pending before the RTC of Iloilo. In her
Rejoinder, Bella Catalan informed the Court that on 2 October 1996 the RTC of
Iloilo through Judge David A. Alfeche rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 20983
nullifying her marriage to Mariscal on the ground that it was bigamous. Catalan
was awarded P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages
and P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Her claim for reimbursement of
US$32,000.00 was however rejected as the evidence presented in support
thereof was considered hearsay. With this turn of events, any subsequent ruling
by the RTC of Digos (were it allowed to proceed) which deviates from the ruling
of the RTC of Iloilo, a co-equal and coordinate court, could only lead to absurd, if
not chaotic, consequences.
 62

Indeed, this case underscores the importance of res judicata or bar by prior
judgment as a stabilizing factor in our judicial system. It forecloses not only
matters squarely raised and litigated but all such matters which could have
been raised in the litigation but were not.

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORP. OF THE PHILS. V. SAMSON

November 28, 1975

 Real Action
 Preliminary Injunction

FACTS:

On July 16, 1965, petitioner Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines,

hereafter to be referred to as PICOP, filed with the respondent Court of First
Instance of Surigao del Sur a verified complaint for injunction and damages
against respondents Jose Samson and Benjamin Barrera, alleging therein,
among others that PICOP is the licensee of a pulpwood and timber concession;
that respondents herein were discovered and verified to have unlawfully
entered, trespassed and encroached deep into portions of plaintiff's pulpwood
and timber concession in two areas at Pamintigan, Mabtay, Malix within the
province of Surigao del Sur; and that without any title or notice whatsoever felled
trees standing thereon and took them away in gross violation of plaintiff's rights;
that defendants-respondents have unlawfully logged over a total area of 857
hectares and felled and took away logs with a total volume of 958.60 cubic
meters from plaintiff's concession; that because of the continuous unlawful
logging operations of defendants inside plaintiff's pulpwood and timber
concession, plaintiff as of May 31, 1965, suffered damages amounting to
P10,600.00, more or less; and that despite demands that they vacate plaintiff's
pulpwood and timber concession and stop their operations, defendants have
continued and are continuing their unlawful encroachment and trespass and
their spurious logging operations on , the plaintiff's concession. Plaintiff,
therefore, prayed inter alia that defendants be restrained from carrying on their
illegal logging operations by the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and
furthermore, that they pay for damages incurred by the plaintiff.

Samson and Barrera filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that venue is
improperly laid, defendants' contention being that the action was personal and,
 63

therefore, should have been filed either in the province of Agusan or Rizal, the
places of residence of the parties therein.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of improper
venue?

ISSUE:

Was the trial court right in dismissing plaintiff's complaint on the ground of
improper venue?

HELD (Dry Run):

No. PICOP is interested primarily in recovering its rights to the concession

over the land, to have defendants Samson and Barrera vacate the same, to
desist from further encroaching on their concession rights and to stop their illegal
logging operations in the concession areas. Clearly, therefore, the action is real
and in accordance with the Rules of Court, the same must be brought in the
locality where the land is situated.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The question whether or not venue has been properly laid depends to a great
extent on the kind of action (real or personal) presented by the Complaint. It is
defendants' contention, affirmed by the trial court, that the action at bar is
personal.

The contention has no merit. A personal action is one that is founded on

privity of contract (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1970 ed., p.
110). The facts of the case as borne out by the record reveal that no contract is
here involved. From a reading of the Complaint petitioner PICOP is interested
primarily in recovering its rights to the concession over the land, to have
defendants Samson and Barrera vacate the same, to desist from further
encroaching on their concession rights and to stop their illegal logging operations
in the concession areas. Clearly, therefore, the action is real and in accordance
with the Rules of Court, Section 2, Rule 4, the same must be brought in the
locality where the land is situated.

This ruling on venue was laid down in the early case of Cayetano de la Cruz
vs. El Seminario de la Archdioceses de Manila et al., 1 where it was held:
 64

If the action is founded on privity of contract between the

parties, then the action whether debt or covenant, is transitory.
But if there is no privity of contract and the action is founded
on privity of estate only, such a covenant that runs with the
land in the hands of the remote grantees, then the action is
local and must be brought in the country wherein the land lies.

From an analysis of the complaint and other pleadings filed by petitioner, We

find that the main complaint in this case is for recovery of possession. The claim
for damages is of no material consequence as it is only an incident to the
principal claim. As well slated by this Court: 2

In other words, the respondent Lim sought to establish an

interest in the Hacienda de Leon that ran with the land and
one that must be respected by the purchaser, even if the latter
was not party to the original lease contract. That being the
case, whether the standing crop is or is not immovable property
is not relevant, for venue is determined by the nature of the
principal claim. It is apparent that the plaintiff is primarily
interested in establishing his right to recover possession of the
crop. Hence, his action is real and must be brought in the
locality where the land is situated.

Petitioner was only cognizant of the lack of jurisdiction of Courts of First

Instance to issue injunction writs to control acts outside of their provinces or
districts; hence it acted right in filing its action in Surigao del Sur rather than in
the province of Agusan or Rizal. The courts of Rizal or Agusan could not have
issued the writ of injunction consistent with the rules, Sec. 2, Rule 58, , and the
Judiciary Act, Section 44 (h) , for such writs cannot effectively reach acts being
perpetrated outside of their districts or, in particular, in Surigao del Sur. It is now
settled that a Court of First Instance cannot restrain or enjoin acts being
perpetrated or will be perpetrated outside of its territorial boundaries.

In Hacbang, et al. vs. The Leyte Autobus Co., et al., this Court held — .

The jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance to control or

restrain acts by means of a writ of injunction is limited to act
being committed or about to be committed within the territorial
boundaries of their respective provinces and districts.

Cudiamat, et al vs. Torres (L-24225, February 22, 1968) reiterates this rule,
viz:
 65

The preliminary injunction that maybe granted by a CFI

under said Section 2 is, in its application, co-extensive with the
territorial boundaries of the province or district in which the
said court sits. Consequently, a Court of First Instance may not
issue a writ of preliminary injunction which will be enforced
outside the territorial boundaries of its province and district.

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION V. TENSUAN

December 10, 1993

 Venue

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Banking Corporation (hereafter "Bank") is a commercial

banking corporation with principal office at Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioner
Bank instituted a complaint for collection of a sum of money, with a prayer for
preliminary attachment, at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It appears from
the allegations of the Bank's complaint that respondent Circle Financial Co.
(hereafter "Circle"), sometime in 1983 and 1984, through its representatives,
obtained several loans aggregating P1,000,000.00 from petitioner. Respondent
Circle, for value received, delivered to petitioner Bank four (4) promissory notes,
each of which contained the stipulation that:

I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the

courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of
this promissory note.

On their due dates, Circle failed to pay its obligations under the promissory
notes.

A motion to dismiss was filed and averred that the venue of the action was
improperly laid since an agreement had fixed the venue of actions arising from
the promissory notes in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, only. Respondents called the
trial court's attention to the stipulation contained in the promissory note.

ISSUE:

If you were the judge, will you grant the motion?

HELD (Dry Run:

 66

If I were the judge, I will not grant the motion. A careful reading of the terms
of the stipulation — "I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may arise out of this promissory
note" — shows that the stipulation does not require the laying of venue in
Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or ordinary import of the
stipulation is the authorizing of, or permission to bring, suit in Valenzuela; there
is not the slightest indication of an intent to bar suit in other competent courts.
Thus, the petitioner, having its principal office at Makati, Metro Manila, properly
instituted the complaint at the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

It is settled in this jurisdiction that the parties, by written agreement, may

change or transfer the venue of an action from one province to another. We have
many times sustained the validity and enforceability of contractual stipulations
concerning venue, it is, of course, the tenor of their agreement which is of critical
relevance. The relevant task, in other words, is determining the intent of the
parties as manifested in the words employed by them and, where such words
are less than clear, in other recognized indicators of the will of the contracting
parties.

Petitioner Bank contends that the stipulation contained in the promissory

notes is merely an agreement to add the courts of Valenzuela to the tribunals to
which the parties may resort. Petitioner thus insists that the venue stipulation
set out in the notes did not restrict or limit the permissible venue of actions
arising out of those notes to the courts of Valenzuela, to the exclusion of all the
other courts recourse to any one of which is authorized or permitted under the
Rules of Court. Thus, venue was properly laid by petitioner Bank in the place
where its principal offices are located: i.e., Makati, Metropolitan Manila.

Private respondents, in opposition, aver that the words used in the stipulation
here involved are clear and unambiguous. A promise to submit to the jurisdiction
of a specific court, without an express reservation of the right to resort to one or
more of the tribunals otherwise accessible under the Rules of Court, is an
agreement definitely fixing the permissible venue in only one place, i.e.,
Valenzuela, to the exclusion of other competent courts.

A careful reading of the terms of the stipulation — "I/We hereby expressly

submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any legal action which may
arise out of this promissory note" — shows that the stipulation does not require
the laying of venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or
ordinary import of the stipulation is the authorizing of, or permission to bring,
suit in Valenzuela; there is not the slightest indication of an intent to bar suit in
other competent courts.

Permissive stipulations like the one here considered have invariably received
judicial approval and we have declared that either of the parties is authorized to
 67

lay venue of an action in the court named in the stipulation. The stipulation here
does not purport to deprive either party of it right to elect, or option to have resort
to, another competent court as expressly permitted by Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court, should such party choose to initiate a suit. The stipulation
here merely operated to confer or confirm a right upon a party to elect recourse to
the courts of Valenzuela or, alternatively, to go before any of the tribunals
envisaged by the rules on venue, i.e., the courts of Makati, Quezon City and
Bulacan.

In principle, the stipulation on venue here involved must be distinguished

from stipulations which purport to require or compel the parties to lay venue of
an action in a specified place, and in that particular place only. The latter
type of venue stipulation must clearly indicate, through qualifying and restrictive
words, that the parties deliberately intended to exclude causes or actions from
the operation of the ordinary permissive rules on venue, and that they intended
contractually to designate a specific venue to the exclusion of any other court
also competent and accessible to the parties under the ordinary rules on the
venue of actions. Stipulations of this exclusionary nature may, under certain
circumstances, be characterized as unreasonable or as contrary to public policy
and, accordingly, not judicially enforceable.

In practice, the task, as noted earlier, of this Court when confronted with
issues of this kind is always basically that of contract interpretation. In the case
at bar, neither qualifying nor restrictive words (e.g., "must," "only" or
"exclusively") were employed which could yield an intent on the part of the
parties mandatorily to restrict the venue of actions arising out of the promissory
notes to the courts of Valenzuela only. Private respondents suggest that the use
of words "any legal action" expressed a supposed agreement to bar actions
before any court other than a Valenzuela court. We do not agree, for we see no
necessary or customary connection between the words "any legal action" and an
intent strictly to limit permissible venue to the Valenzuela courts. Intent so to
establish an inflexible restriction of otherwise permissible venue to one single
place is not lightly to be presumed or inferred from stipulations which, like that
here before us, include no qualifying or exclusionary terms. Express reservation
of the right to elect venue under the ordinary rules was, accordingly,
unnecessary in the case at bar.

Such is the thrust of the great bulk of the case law of this Court where this
issue was directly raised and discussed.

In Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, the stipulation on venue there involved

read:

The parties agree to sue and be sued in the courts of Manila

 68

The Court, in upholding that stipulation and ruling that venue had been
properly laid in the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan (the place of
defendant's residence), speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, said:

. . . An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The

parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does
not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely
consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words
which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the
venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that
clause that plaintiff and defendant bound themselves to file
suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only
or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or
transfer venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely
agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they
may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in
the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2 (b) of Rule 4.
Renuntiatio non praesumitir.

In Nicolas v. Reparations Commission, the stipulation on venue provided that:

All legal actions arising out of this contract . . . may be

brought in and submitted to the jurisdiction of the proper courts
in the City of Manila.

This Court read the above stipulation as merely permissive, relying upon and
reinforcing Polytrade:

. . . the venue in personal actions is fixed for the

convenience of the plaintiff and his witnesses and to promote
the ends of justice. We cannot conceive how the interests of
justice may be served by confining the situs of the action to
Manila, considering that the residences or offices of all the
parties, including the situs of the acts sought to be restrained
or required to be done, are all within the territorial jurisdiction
of Rizal.

While the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to the

jurisdiction of the Manila courts, there is nothing in the
language used . . . which clearly shows that the intention of the
parties was to limit the venue of the action to the City of Manila
only. Such agreements should be construed reasonably and
should not be applied in such a manner that it would work
more to the inconvenience of the parties without promoting the
ends of justice.
 69

In Lamis Enterprises v. Lagamon, the promissory note sued on had the

following stipulation:

In case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the courts

of Davao City.

The collection suit was instituted in the then Court of First Instance of Tagum,
Davao. The Supreme Court rejected the defense of improper venue and held:

. . . it is alleged that the proper venue for Civil Case No.

1395 should be Davao City where the plaintiff resides and as
stipulated in the promissory note dated February 26, 1979 and
in the chattel mortgage dated February 27, 1979. However, the
respondent judge found that Maningo has not only legal
residence but also physical and actual residence in Busaon,
Tagum, Davao and we are not inclined to disturb this finding.
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the
venue, suffice it to say that a stipulation as to venue does not
preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant under Section 2(b), Rule 4, Rules of Court, in the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement
which would indicate that the place named is the only venue
agreed upon by the parties. The stipulation did not deprive
Maningo of his right to pursue remedy in the court specifically
mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Courts,
Renuntiatio non praesumitir.

In Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals, the clause on venue read:

21

The parties stipulate that the venue of the actions referred to

in Section 12.01 [Article XII of the Agreement] shall be in the
City of Manila.

The initial action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Benguet. This Court took the occasion to reiterate once more the Polytrade
doctrine:

. . . In any event, it is not entirely amiss to restate the doctrine

that stipulations in a contract, which specify a definite place for
the institution of an action arising in connection therewith, do
not, as a rule, supersede the general rules on the matter set out
in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, but should be construed merely
as an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue
to the specified place.

We note, finally, that no one of the private respondents has claimed to have
been put to undue hardship or inconvenience as a result of the institution of the
 70

action in Makati. Venue relates to the trial and touches more upon the
convenience of the parties rather than upon the substance or merits of the
case.

AGUSTIN V. DELA FUENTE

AUGUST 31, 1949

 Prohibition
POINT
Prohibition is a preventive remedy.

QUESTION: What was the need of the City of Manila?

ANSWER: It was in need of a central market so that the vendors and peddlers
causing nuisance in crowded places be transferred therein.

QUESTION: What happened next?

ANSWER: The mayor recommended to the municipal board the conversion of
certain buildings on Osmeña Parkinto such a market and setting aside of the
sum of P52,500 to cover the costs of remodeling the buildings. The board passed
the corresponding ordinance, funds were released, and the remodeling was
completed on July 1, 1948 using that sum of P52,500.

QUESTION: Notwithstanding the fact that the project was completed, did
somebody tried to oppose the conversion of the buildings for market purposes?
ANSWER: Yes, the majority of the same municipal board which passed the
ordinance filed an action to prohibit the mayor from converting the said buildings
for market purposes. They filed the action on July 9, 1948.

QUESTION: What was the ruling of the Supreme Court?

ANSWER: The following was the ruling of the Supreme Court:

“Prohibition is a preventive remedy. Its function is to restrain the doing of some

act about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for acts already
accomplished. If the thing be already done, the writ of prohibition cannot undo
it.”

Question: Will the petition for prohibition prosper?

No, the petition will not prosper. Prohibition is a preventive remedy and the
function thereof is to restrain the doing of some act about to be done. Considering
that the buildings were already been converted for market purposes and
therefore, has already been accomplished, the writ of prohibition cannot undo it.

BELTRAN V. PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION

 71

August 28, 1969

 Interpleader

Question: Who is Beltran?

ANSWER: Beltran was the purchaser of a housing unit from PHHC by way of
installments.

Question: What was the role of PHHC in the case?

ANSWER: Of course, PHHC was the seller. But this seller has standing
obligations with the GSIS that it failed to pay. When that obligations fell due, it
transferred the management, administration and ownership of its properties to
GSIS including the unit sold on installment to Beltran in order to pay the
aforesaid obligations. However, the newly appointed manager of PHHC has
opposed the agreements entered into by the PHHC to the GSIS.

Question: Upon such transfer, what did Beltran do?

ANSWER: He, together with other purchasers of housing units from PHHC, filed
an action for interpleader to compel PHHC and GSIS to interplead and to litigate
their conflicting claims among themselves, for they (Beltran and others) did not
know to whom the payment should be made.

Question: What did the GSIS do?

ANSWER: It filed a motion to dismiss.

Question: What happened during the hearing of the motion and during the
proceedings?
ANSWER: Both PHHC and GSIS manifested that they agreed that Beltran and
others will still pay to PHHC and that their conflict had nothing to do with the
purchasers Beltran and others.

Question: What was the decision of the Supreme Court in this case? ANSWER:
The special civil action of interpleader will not lie.

Question: Why did the special civil action for interpleader will not lie? ANSWER:
Plaintiffs entirely miss the vital element of an action of interpleader. The Rules of
Court requires as an indispensable element that "conflicting claims upon the
same subject matter are or may be made" against the plaintiff-in-interpleader
"who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in
whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants." While the two defendant
corporations may have conflicting claims between themselves with regard to the
management, administration and ownership of Project 4, such conflicting claims
are not against the plaintiffs nor do they involve or affect the plaintiffs.

The action of interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property in

his possession or has an obligation to render wholly or partially, without
 72

claiming any right in both, comes to court and asks that the defendants who
have made upon him conflicting claims upon the same property or who consider
themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation be required to
litigate among themselves in order to determine who is entitled to the property or
payment of the obligation. (BELTRAN V. PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING
CORPORATION)

The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a double liability but to
protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability. (BELTRAN V.
PEOPLE’S HOMESITE AND HOUSING CORPORATION)

ENRIQUEZ V. MACADAEG
SEPTEMBER 30, 1949

 Mandamus
POINT

PROHIBITION AND NOT MANDAMUS, IS THE REMEDY WHERE A MOTION TO

DISMISS IS WRONGFULLY DENIED

QUESTION: Was there a civil action for the recovery of real property located in
Negros Oriental?
ANSWER: Yes, there was and the defendant therein was Enriquez.

QUESTION: But where such civil action was filed?

ANSWER: It was filed in Cebu.

QUESTION: What was the action taken by Enriquez?

ANSWER: Before filing his answer, he filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
improper venue. That motion to dismiss was denied by Judge Macadaeg.

QUESTION: What was the subsequent action taken by Enriquez?

ANSWER: The motion having been denied, the defendants filed the present
petition for mandamus to compel the respondent judge to dismiss the action.

QUESTION: Is petition for mandamus the proper remedy?

ANSWER: While the respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the
motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is
not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or "unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right." It is rather a case
where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to
dismiss an action which would not be maintained in his court. The remedy in
such case is prohibition, and that remedy is available in the present case
 73

because the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not
appealable.

ESTRERA V. CA
AUGUST 16, 2006

 Special Civil Action for Certiorari Under Rule 65

POINT NO. 1:

A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI (RULE 65) IS NOT DESIGNED FOR
THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JUDGMENT

QUESTION: Was there a petition filed by Estrera before the CA?

ANSWER: Yes.

QUESTION: What was the ruling of the CA in the petition for certiorari filed by
Estrera?
ANSWER: It dismissed the petition.

QUESTION: Due to such dismissal by the CA, what did Estrera do?
ANSWER: He went to the Supreme Court. He filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Below were the contents of his petition:

The Honorable Court of Appeals:

 
A.)        FAILED SERIOUSLY TO APPRECIATE THE FACT
THAT THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING
INCORPORATED TO THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-
G.R. SP NO. 67944 WAS DEEMED IN SUBSTANTIAL
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION
3, PARAGRAPH 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE. HENCE, GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION.
 
B.)         SERIOUSLY FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT
THAT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION UNDER SECTION 3,
PARAGRAPH 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN RELATION TO SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF
THE SAME RULES SHALL BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
 
 74

C.)         SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 69407 WAS A
REVIVAL OF THE PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP
NO. 67944 WHICH IT EARLIER DISMISSED;
 
D.)        SERIOUSLY ERRED IN TREATING THE
PETITION DOCKETED AS CA-G.R. SP NO. 69407 AS A
NEW PETITION AND IN FINDING THAT THE SAME WAS
FILED OUT OF TIME;
 
E.)         SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN
PETITIONER AND UNDERSIGNED COUNSEL GUILTY OF
FORUM SHOPPING AND IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF
FINE IN THE AMOUNT OF FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00) EACH OR TO SUFFER IMPRISONMENT OF
THREE (3) MONTHS IN CASE OF FAILURE THEREOF,
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
 
F.)          SERIOUSLY FAILED TO APPRECIATE AND
CONSIDER THE PRESENCE OF EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT JUSTIFIED HEREIN
PETITIONER IN FILING THE PETITION WITHOUT FILING
A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; AND
 
G.)         FAILING TO DECIDE THE PETITION ON ITS
MERITS.

QUESTION: From the assigned errors in the petition, can the writ of certiorari be
availed of by Estrera?

ANSWER: As can be gleaned from the afore-quoted assignment of errors in the

petition, the issues alleged are only possible errors of judgment, questioning the
correctness of the CA’s rulings. Hence, since the issues involved do not affect
the jurisdiction of the CA, the writ of certiorari cannot be availed of by petitioner.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of
errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is
when a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does
not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it
did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a scenario, the
administration of justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or question
involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the
 75

jurisdiction of the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province
of a special civil action for certiorari.

POINT NO. 2
A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI SHOULD BE FILED WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM
NOTICE OF THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION

QUESTION: Was there a petition filed by Estrera before the CA?

ANSWER: Yes.

QUESTION: What was the ruling of the CA in the petition for certiorari filed by
Estrera?
ANSWER: It dismissed the petition. The notice of dismissal was received by
Estrera on January 22, 2002.

QUESTION: Due to such dismissal by the CA, what did Estrera do?
ANSWER: He went to the Supreme Court. He filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court July 31, 2002.

QUESTION: What was the ruling of the Supreme Court?

ANSWER: It is too late for Estrera to question the CA resolution through the
present petition for certiorari. A petition for certiorari should be filed within 60
days from notice of the questioned resolution. Since petitioner received said CA
Resolution on January 22, 2002, the last day for filing a petition for certiorari to
question the same was on March 23, 2002. The present petition was filed only
on July 31, 2002, thus, filed beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition
for certiorari.

POINT NO. 3
THE ISSUE OF THE PROPRIETY OF FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF
CONTEMPT FOR FORUM SHOPPING IS NOT WITHIN THE PROVINCE OF THE
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI

QUESTION: Did Estrera file a petition for certiorari before the CA?
ANSWER: Yes, he filed a petition, but the same was dismissed due to a
procedural defect.

QUESTION: Did he file a motion for reconsideration for such dismissal?

ANSWER: No. Instead, he filed another petition for certiorari, correcting the
aforesaid procedural defect, but this time failed to mention in his certification
against non-forum shopping that he already filed before the same court a similar
petition (the first petition which was earlier dismissed).

QUESTION: What was the ruling of the CA?

 76

ANSWER: The CA dismissed the petition and found Estrera guilty of forum
shopping and sentenced to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos. In case of his
failure to pay such a fine, he shall suffer imprisonment of three months.

QUESTION: What did Estrella do?

ANSWER: He assailed the said ruling. He filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 before the Supreme Court.

QUESTION: What was the ruling of the Supreme Court?

ANSWER: The issue of the propriety of finding petitioner guilty of contempt for
forum shopping is not within the province of a special action for certiorari. Issues
merely questioning the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision, not the
jurisdiction of the court rendering it, are not proper for a petition for certiorari.
Petitioner’s remedy to question the CA’s finding of contempt should have been to
appeal via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

LUMANLAW V. PERALTA
FEBRUARY 13, 2006

 Mandamus

QUESTION: What happened in this case?

ANSWER: Lumanlaw was apprehended by the police for illegal possession of
(0.011) grams of shabu.

QUESTION: Were there postponements of his arraignment?

ANSWER: Yes, it was postponed fourteen (14) times without justifiable reasons
for a period of one year and 9 months.

QUESTION: What action was taken by Lumanlaw?

ANSWER: He filed a petition for mandamus so that the information against him
be dismissed on the ground of the violation of his right to speedy trial.

QUESTION: Should the petition be granted?

ANSWER:

It is established that a writ of mandamus may be issued to control the

exercise of discretion when, in the performance of duty, there is undue delay that
can be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion resulting in manifest
injustice. In view of our finding of unwarranted delays in the conduct of the
arraignment of petitioner, he has indeed the right to demand -- through a writ of
mandamus -- expeditious action from all officials tasked with the administration
of justice. Thus, he may not only demand that his arraignment be held but,
ultimately, that the information against him be dismissed on the ground of the
violation of his right to speedy trial.
 77

Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who seek to enforce a public right
and to compel the performance of a public duty, most especially when the public
right involved is mandated by the Constitution. Besides, it has long been
established in this jurisdiction that the writ of mandamus is available to the
accused to compel a dismissal of the case.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

JULY 4, 1990

 Special Civil Action for Certiorari

QUESTION: Was there a pre-trial before the Regional Trial Court?

QUESTION: Yes, there was such a pre-trial.

QUESTION: When the counsel for the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), one
of the parties to the case, failed to appear, what did the court do?
ANSWER: The judge rendered a judgment in default against the company.

QUESTION: What was the action taken by the Manila Electric Company?
ANSWER: On June 1, 1988, or on the 14th day, after receipt of the Decision,
MERALCO filed a Motion for Reconsideration to Lift Order of Default and to
Vacate Judgment by Default.

QUESTION: What was the ruling of the RTC?

ANSWER: The RTC denied the MR.

QUESTION: Did the Manila Electric Company filed an appeal from the said
judgment in default and denial of the MR?
ANSWER: No. It allowed to lapse the period to file an appeal and when the
period had lapsed, it filed a petition for relief from judgment, which the RTC
subsequently dismissed.

QUESTION: What happened next?

ANSWER: The Manila Electric Company filed before the CA a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the order of dismissal of its petition for relief
from judgment and the judgment by default rendered by the RTC.

QUESTION: Was the remedy availed of by the Manila Electric Company correct?
ANSWER: No. This was how the Supreme Court disposed of the case:

While the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of in the alternative
situation where an appeal would not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy, this is on the theoretical assumption that the right to appeal is still
 78

available in the case. If, however, the remedy by appeal had already been lost
and the loss was occasioned by petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of
remedies, certiorari cannot lie as a substitute or a tool to shield the petitioner
from the adverse consequences of such neglect or error. The two remedies are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

Applying this fundamental principle to the case at bar, it is readily evident

that petitioner had ample opportunities to appeal the default judgment rendered
against it by the court a quo, to wit, after the default judgment itself was
rendered and, later, after its motion to lift the order of default and to vacate the
default judgment was denied by the trial court. It nevertheless deliberately
allowed the period for appeal to pass without interposing one. Worse, despite the
then availability of the remaining period for appeal from the denial of its motion
to lift the order of default and to vacate the default judgment, it opted to wait
and subsequently file a petition for relief from the judgment which by then was
final and executory, with the added misfortune that said petition could not claim
any procedural validity both technically and on the merits.

OLLADA VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

 Action for Declaratory Relief

FACTS:

Felipe B. Ollada is a certified public accountant, having passed the

examination given by the Board of Accountancy, and is duly qualified to practice
his profession. On July 22, 1952, his name was placed in the rolls of certified
public accountants authorized and accredited to practice accountancy in the
office of the Central Bank of the Philippines. In December, 1955, by reason of a
requirement of the Import-Export Department of said bank that CPAs submit to
an accreditation under oath before they could certify financial statements of their
clients applying for import dollar allocations with its office, Ollada's previous
accreditation was nullified.

Assailing said accreditation requirement on the ground that it was (a) an

unlawful invasion of the jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy, (b) in excess of
the powers of the Central Bank and (c) unconstitutional in that it unlawfully
restrained the legitimate pursuit of one's trade, Ollada, for himself and allegedly
 79

on behalf of numerous other CPAs, filed a petition for Declaratory Relief in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to nullify said accreditation requirement.

He has also alleged that by virtue of the violation of his right and that of
numerous CPAs, he has suffered serious injury in that the questioned
requirement which is collaterally attacked by this action (in the honest belief of
the petitioner that the same) is an unlawful restraint of the fee pursuit and
practice of petitioner's profession as a CPA; and also that the action of the
respondent Central Bank of the Philippines complained of, is also an unlawful
invasion into the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board of Accountancy as the sole
body vested by our laws to lay down rules and regulations for the practice of
public accountancy in the Philippines.

HELD:

On the question of when a special civil action of this nature would prosper,
we have already held that the complaint for declaratory relief will not prosper if
filed after a contract, statute or right has been breached or violated. In the
present case such is precisely the situation arising from the facts alleged in the
petition for declaratory relief. As vigorously claimed by petitioner himself,
respondent had already invaded or violated his right and caused him injury —
all these giving him a complete cause of action enforceable in an appropriate
ordinary civil action or proceeding. The dismissal of the action was, therefore,
proper in the light of our ruling in De Borja vs. Villadolid, 47 O.G. (5) p. 2315, and
Samson vs. Andal, G.R. No. L-3439, July 31, 1951, where we held that an action
for declaratory relief should be filed before there has been a breach of a contract,
statutes or right, and that it is sufficient to bar such action, that there had been a
breach — which would constitute actionable violation. The rule is that an action
for Declaratory Relief is proper only if adequate relief is not available through the
means of other existing forms of action or proceeding (1 C.J.S. 1027-1028).

REGALADO V. GO
FEBRUARY 6, 2007

 Contempt

FACTS:
 80

A complaint for illegal dismissal was filed before the Labor Arbiter by Antonio
S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. (EHSI). The Labor Arbiter ruled that
respondent Go was illegally dismissed from employment.

On appeal to the NLRC, EHSI, employed the legal services of Atty. Regalado
as its counsel.

The NLRC rendered a Decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision and

declaring that respondent Go’s separation from employment was legal.

Aggrieved, Antonio Go elevated the adverse decision to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals promulgated a Decision setting aside the ruling of the
NLRC and reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter adjudging EHSI guilty of
illegal dismissal.

On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but
prior to the receipt of the parties of their respective copies, the parties decided to
settle the case and signed a Release Waiver and Quitclaim with the approval of
the Labor Arbiter. In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor Arbiter, on the
same day, issued an Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice.

The execution of the compromise agreement was attended by the counsel for
EHSI, Atty. Regalado, and respondent Go, but in the absence and without the
knowledge of respondent Go’s lawyer.

After the receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, Go, through
counsel, filed a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release
Waiver and Quitclaim on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the
same motion, Go, through counsel, moved that petitioner Atty. Regalado be made
to explain her unethical conduct for directly negotiating with respondent Go
without the knowledge of his counsel

The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution adjudging Atty. Regalado guilty of

indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court. As declared by
the Court of Appeals, even granting arguendo that Atty. Regalado did not
participate in the negotiation process, she was nonetheless under the obligation
to restrain her clients from doing acts that she herself was prohibited to perform
as mandated by Canon 16 of the Canons of Professional Ethics. However,
instead of preventing her clients from negotiating with respondent Go who was
unassisted by his counsel, Atty. Regalado actively participated in the
consummation of the compromise agreement by dealing directly with respondent
Go and allowing him to sign the Release Waiver and Quitclaim without his
lawyer. Rule on the resolution of the Court of Appeals.

HELD:
 81

It is true that the complained acts of Atty. Regalado would fall under
paragraphs (a) and (d) of Section 3, Rule 71.

“(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official

duties or in his official transactions;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,

obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;”

However, the proceedings were conducted not in accordance with law.

Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides how proceedings for indirect
contempt should be commenced, thus:

SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt

may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. (Examinee’s
clarification: motu proprio by the court by an order OR motu proprio by the court
by any other formal charge.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a

verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal
action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court
in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal
action for joint hearing and decision.

As can be gleaned above, the provisions of the Rules are unequivocal. Indirect
contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways:

(1) motu proprio by the court; or

(2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for
initiatory pleadings. Procedural requirements as outlined must be complied with.

In the instant case, the indirect contempt proceedings was initiated by

respondent Go through a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion. It was based on
the aforesaid Motion that the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dated 19
November 2003, requiring petitioner Atty. Regalado to show cause why she
should not be cited for contempt.
 82

Clearly, respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion was the

catalyst which set everything in motion and led to the eventual conviction of Atty.
Regalado. It was Go who brought to the attention of the appellate court the
alleged misbehavior committed by Atty. Regalado. Without such positive act on
the part of respondent Go, no indirect contempt charge could have been initiated
at all.

FURTHER DISCUSSION:

It is true in Leonidas v. Judge Supnet, this Court ruled that the contempt
proceedings was considered commenced by the court motu proprio even if the
show cause order came after the filing of the motions to cite for contempt filed by
the adverse party. The Decision thus reads:

Thus, independently of the motions filed by the Tamondong Spouses, it was

the Pasay MTC which commenced the contempt proceedings motu proprio. No
verified petition is required if proceedings for indirect contempt are initiated in
this manner, and the absence of a verified petition does not affect the procedure
adopted.

It is true that the Tamondong Spouses did file a Motion To Cite Plaintiff For
Contempt Of Court, dated May 17, 2000. In this pleading they prayed that Union
Bank be declared in indirect contempt of court for its disobedience to the Pasay
MTC’s Order dated May 9, 2000. This Order dated May 9, 2000 specifically
directed Union Bank to "return immediately to the defendants the replevied
motor vehicle." However, the Tamondong Spouses’ unverified motion dated May
17, 2000 cannot invalidate the contempt proceedings because these proceedings
were initiated by respondent judge motu proprio in accordance with Section 4,
Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

This above-cited case, however, has no application in the case at bar for the
factual milieu of the cases are different from each other. In Leonidas, there was
an order of the court that was utterly violated by Union Bank. Thus, even in the
absence of the motion of spouses Tamondong to cite Union Bank in contempt, the
court a quo on its own can verily initiate the action. In the present case, the
appellate court could not have acquired knowledge of petitioner Atty. Regalado’s
misbehavior without respondent Go’s Manifestation with Omnibus Motion
reiterating the alleged deceitful conduct committed by the former.

REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO

October 5, 2005

 Petition for Declaratory Relief

 83

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of

Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for
the United States. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his
son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley.

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to
his case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce
decree which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation
of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

HELD:

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the
trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute
(the right of Cipriano is affected by par. 2 of Art. 26, Family Code), executive
order or regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
 84

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are:

1. there must be a justiciable controversy;

2. the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
3. that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and
4. that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage

between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained
a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A.

The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the
State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a
private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.

Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy.

The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when
respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his
second marriage.

SAWMILL VS. TAMBUNTING

OCT. 16, 1950

 Action for Interpleader

Question: Was there a vacant lot in Quiapo, Manila?

ANSWER: Yes, there was such a vacant lot.

Question: Who owns the lot?

ANSWER: It was formerly owned by Manuel Tambunting, but he allegedly sold it
to Angel de Leon.

Question: Now that de Leon became the owner, what happened next? ANSWER:
de Leon leased the same property to Manuel including the apartments
constructed thereon.

Question: What did Manuel do?

ANSWER: He subleased the property against the will of de Leon. One of the
subleases was Oriental Sawmill.

Question: What did de Leon do?

ANSWER: He filed an action to eject Manuel but the latter interposed ownership.
 85

Question: What was the problem of Oriental Sawmill?

ANSWER: Since both Manuel and Angel de Leon claimed rental payments,
Oriental Sawmill did not know to whom payment shall be made.

Question: What should Oriental Sawmill do?

ANSWER: File an action for interpleader.

Question: Is an action for interpleader proper in this case?

ANSWER: Yes. See below how the facts precisely apply to the requisites for
interpleader.

Question: Analyze with the requisites for interpleader whether the action in the
present case will prosper.
ANSWER: The action will prosper. See the analysis below:

Requisite No. 1. Plaintiff claims no interest in the subject matter or his claim is
not disputed
Here, the subject matter was the lot and the plaintiff Oriental
Sawmill has no interest thereon.

Requisite No. 2. Two or more claimants asserting conflicting claims against the
plaintiff
There were two claimants asserting conflicting claims against
the plaintiff. They are Manuel and Angel. They have
conflicting claims and the claims were against the plaintiff.

Requisite No. 3. The subject matter must be one and the same

There was only one subject matter and that is the rent.

Requisite No. 4. Person in possession or obliged files a complaint.

Here, Oriental Sawmill was the one obliged to pay the rent
and it filed the complaint.

Requisite No. 5. The parties to be interpleaded must make effective claims.

Manuel and Angel both have effective claims.

Requisite No. 6. Payment of docket and other lawful fees.

TOLENTINO V. THE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY

September 28, 1951
 86

 Action for Declaratory Relief

Question: Who was Ferguson and Hausamann?

ANSWER: They were certified public accountants under the trade name "Fleming
and Williamson”. They were some of the defendants.

Question: Was there any law which authorized accountants to use a trade name
to the exclusion of others?
ANSWER: Yes. Section 16-A of Act No. 3105 as amended by Commonwealth Act
No. 342, authorized accountants to practice their profession under a trade name.

Question: Since there was such a law, what was the concern of the plaintiff
Tolentino?
ANSWER: According to Toletino, the law is unconstitutional on the ground that it
excludes persons engaged in other callings and professions from adopting or
acquiring or using a trade name.

Question: What then the plaintiff did?

ANSWER: The plaintiff filed an action for declaratory relief for the purpose of
testing the constitutionality of section 16-A of Commonwealth Act No. 3105,
otherwise known as the Philippine Accountancy Law, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 342.

Question: What can we find from the action filed by the plaintiff?
ANSWER: It is obvious that he seeks the declaratory relief not for his own
personal benefit, or because his rights or prerogatives as an accountant, or as an
individual, are adversely affected, but rather for the benefit of persons belonging
to other professions or callings, who are not parties to this case. He does not
claim having suffered any prejudice or damage to him or to his rights or
prerogatives as an accountant by the use of the disputed name by the
defendants. His complaint is rather addressed against the propriety of the use of
said trade name by the defendants because it is misleading and is liable to
defraud the public.

Question: State the requisites of an action for declaratory relief so that we can
determine whether from the foregoing facts, the action of the plaintiff will
prosper.
ANSWER:
In order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be
predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions:

(1) there must be a justiciable controversy;

(2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
 87

(3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the
controversy; and

(4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

Question: What are the requisites for justiciability as stated in the first requisite
above?
ANSWER: There must be –

(1) real parties in interest

(2) asserting adverse claims and
(3) presenting a ripe issue.

Question: Based on the above requisites, will the action of the plaintiff prosper?
ANSWER: No.
Firstly, requisite No. 1 is not present, that is, there is no justiciable controversy.
There is no real party in interest because the plaintiff Tolentino brought the
plaintiff not for himself, but for others. He did not also claim having suffered from
the implementation of the law.

Secondly, requisite No. 2 is lacking, that is, the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse. In the present case, it cannot be said that
the plaintiff has an adverse interest for the reason that he brought the action not
for himself. For the same reason, the application of requisite No. 3 is also
lacking.

OŇATE V. ABROGAR
FEB. 23, 1995

 Writ of Preliminary Attachment

FACTS:

Before the summons and the complaint were served on the petitioners Oñate
and Econ Holdings Corporation on January 9, 1992, the deputy sheriff had
already served on January 3, 1992 notices of garnishment on the PNB Head
office and on all its Metro Manila branches. In addition he made other levies
before the service of summons on petitioners, to wit:

On January 6, 1992, he levied on attachment Oñate's condominium unit.

 88

On January 8, 1992, he attached Oñate's lot, consisting of 1,256 square

meters, at the Ayala-Alabang Subdivision, Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT
No. 112673.

He made several levies, which indicates a predisposition to serve the writ of

attachment in anticipation of the eventual acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over petitioners.

Petitioners maintain that the attachment of their properties was void because
the trial court had not at that time acquired jurisdiction over them and that the
subsequent service of summons on them did not cure the invalidity of the levy.
Rule on the contention.

HELD:

The contention of the petitioners is correct. While the petition for a writ of
preliminary attachment may be granted and the writ itself issued before the
defendant is summoned, the writ of attachment cannot be implemented until
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

1. It must be emphasized that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment

practically involves three stages; first, the court issues the order granting the
application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two
stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
should first be obtained. However, once the implementation commences, it is
required that the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for
without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in any
manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind
the defendant.

2. The attachment of properties before the service of summons on the defendant

is invalid, even though the court later acquires jurisdiction over the defendant.
At the very least, then, the writ of attachment must be served simultaneously
with the service of summons before the writ may be enforced. As the
properties of the petitioners were attached by the sheriff before he had served
the summons on them, the levies made must be considered void.

3. Nor can the attachment of petitioners' properties before the service of

summons on them was made be justified and the ground that unless the writ
was then enforced, petitioners would be alerted and might dispose of their
properties before summons could be served on them.
 89

4. It is indeed true that proceedings for the issuance of a writ of attachment are
generally ex parte. In Mindanao Savings and Loans Ass'n v. Court of Appeals
it was held that no hearing is required for the issuance of a writ of
attachment because this "would defeat the objective of the remedy [because]
the time which such hearing would take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property before a writ of attachment
issues." It is not, however, notice to defendant that is sought to be avoided
but the "time which such hearing would take" because of the possibility that
defendant may delay the hearing to be able to dispose of his properties. On
the contrary there may in fact be a need for a hearing before the writ is
issued as where the issue of fraudulent disposal of property is raised. It is
not true that there should be no hearing lest a defendant learns of the
application for attachment and he remove's his properties before the writ can
be enforced. On the other hand, to authorize the attachment of property even
before jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is acquired through the
service of summons or his voluntary appearance could lead to abuse. It is
entirely possible that the defendant may not know of the filing of a case
against him and consequently may not be able to take steps to protect his
interests.

RODULFA V. ALFONSO
February 28, 1946

 Writ of Preliminary Injunction

FACTS:

On Sept. 19, 1945, Alejandro Rodulfa filed a complaint against Pablo del
Moral before the CFI of Pangasinan for reconveyance to him of 15 parcels of
land. In his complaint, he claimed that in 1924, by means of fictitious
documents, he conveyed to the defendant that 15 parcels of land. He claimed
that he also authorized Pablo to register the said lands in the latter’s name. Such
conveyance was subject to the condition that Pablo would return and reconvey
said properties to him after 20 years. Alejandro also admitted that Pablo had
been in the possession of the land for that entire 20 years.

On the other hand, Pablo claimed to have acquired since 1924 by purchase
some of the lands in question from Alejandro and the rest from other parties in
good faith and for valuable consideration.
 90

About two months from the filing of the complaint and without waiting for the
final determination of the civil case he filed, Alejandro entered the properties in
question by means of threat and intimidation.

Due to the actuations of the Alejandro, Pablo filed a motion praying for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the former to desist and
refrain from molesting, retarding, or otherwise disturbing his possession of the
said parcels of land. After he filed the required bond of P5,000, the judge
forthwith issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Alejandro’s offer to file a
counter-bond was denied by the trial court.

ISSUE:

Rule on issuance of the writ and the denial of the offer to file a counter-bond.

ANSWER:

The writ of preliminary injunction was properly issued. Alejandro himself

admitted that Pablo had been in the possession of the properties in question for
the period of 20 years and that the same were registered under the latter’s
name. Pablo should be respected in his possession until Alejandro established
his ownership over the said properties. Injunction, as a rule, will not be granted
to take property out of the possession or control of one party and place it into
that of another whose title has not clearly been established by law.

The offer of Alejandro to file a counter-bond was properly denied by the trial
court in its sound judicial discretion, for his right and interest, if any, in the
property in question were amply protected by the bond executed by Pablo for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Since Alejandro was himself a
wrongdoer, the denial was necessary for the preservation of the status quo.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

1. The rule that a court should not, by any means of a preliminary injunction,
transfer property in litigation from the possession of one party to another, is
more particularly applicable where the legal title is in dispute and the party
having possession asserts ownership in himself. (Gordillo and Martinez vs.
Del Rosario, 39 Phil., 829.)

2. Where a person other than the owner from time to time unlawfully enters
upon land and commits depredations thereon, as by cutting wood or bamboo,
the true owner, having possession, can maintain an action to quiet title and
enjoin the intruder from the repetition of such trespass in the future. The
 91

circumstance that the trespasser in such case also pretends to ownership of

the same lands is immaterial. (Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil., 280.)

3. The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the merits can be heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. (Examinee: In
this case the last actual peaceable uncontested status was the time when
Alejandro had not yet entered the properties) (Fredericks vs. Huber, 180 Pa.,
572; 37 Atl., 90.)

4. In cases involving the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the exercise

of sound judicial discretion by the lower court will not generally be interfered
with; and the refusal of the trial court to permit the plaintiff in this case to file
a counter-bond cannot be considered as an abuse of sound judicial discretion,
bearing in mind particularly the admission made by the plaintiff himself that
sometime in 1945, or thereabouts, he occupied and took possession of all or
some of the lands in question, without waiting for the final decision of the
competent courts in said civil case No. 8930. It is a general principle in equity
jurisprudence that "he who comes to equity must come with clean hands."
(North Negros Sugar Co. vs. Hidalgo, 63 Phil., 664.)

URIARTE V. CFI
MAY 29, 1970

 Wrong Venue is a Waivable Procedural Defect

POINT

WRONG VENUE IS A WAIVABLE PROCEDURAL DEFECT

QUESTION: Who was Don Juan?

ANSWER: He was the deceased in this case. He was a non-resident.

QUESTION: But did the deceased Don Juan left properties in the Philippines?
ANSWER: Yes, he left considerable properties in the Philippines.

QUESTION: Under the law, therefore, which court has jurisdiction over the
settlement of his estate?
ANSWER: Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that since he was an
inhabitant of a foreign country at the time of his death, the Regional Trial Court
of any province in which he had estate, shall have jurisdiction over the
settlement of his estate.

QUESTION: Did Don Juan has properties in the province of Negros and in the
City of Manila?
 92

ANSWER: Yes. That is why the estate of Don Juan may be settled in the
Regional Trial Court of either Negros or the City of Manila.

QUESTION: What happened next?

ANSWER: Vicente Uriarte filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement
of the estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein,
inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir. This was an
intestate proceeding.

QUESTION: Aside from Vicente, was there anybody who commenced special
proceedings?
ANSWER: Yes. It was Juan Zamacona. On August 28, 1962.

He commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Don Juan.

On the same date he filed before the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the
same on the ground that the deceased Don Juan had left a last will, there was
no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings.
QUESTION: What happened next?

ANSWER: Vicente Uriarte, on April 15, 1963, filed with the Manila Court in
Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene
and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to
that date.

QUESTION: Rule on the special proceeding in the Manila Court.

ANSWER:

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely

a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining
in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that Vicente has waived
the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. He knew
of the existence of the alleged will in the Philippines when Juan Zamacona filed
a motion to dismiss in Negros Court. Notwithstanding said knowledge, it was
only on April 15, 1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal
and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date; thus enabling
the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but
also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier. To allow him
now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the
Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding
No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence.

SANDOVAL V. SANTIAGO
MAY 30, 1949
 93

 Jurisdiction of the Probate Court

POINT
THE PROBATE COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION FROM THE MOMENT THE
PETITION FOR SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE IS FILED WITH
SAID COURT. IT CANNOT BE DIVESTED OF SUCH
JURISDICTION BY THE HEIRS BY SIMPLY
ENTERING INTO AN EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION OF THE ESTATE

QUESTION: Was Luz Sandoval designated as executrix in will and codicil of the
deceased Daniel Marquez?
ANSWER: Yes, she was.

QUESTION: What did Sandoval do?

ANSWER: She instituted a special proceeding in the Court of First Instance for
the probate of such will and codicil.

QUESTION: Were the will and codicil allowed?

ANSWER: Yes. The will and codicil were allowed and Sandoval was appointed
on August 16, 1946, executrix in accordance with the will. (Take note that even
though she was appointed as executrix, it does not mean that she was already
qualified as such.)

QUESTION: What was happened on October 5, 1946? (almost 2 months after

Sandoval was appointed as executrix)
ANSWER: Before Sandoval was qualified as executrix, the three heirs instituted
in the will all age made an extrajudicial partition of all the properties of the
deceased on October 5, 1946 and entered into the possession of their respective
share without the authority and approval of the court.

QUESTION: In 1947, the CFI judge required Sandoval to qualify as executrix and
to file a bond. What was the response of Sandoval?
ANSWER: Sandoval informed the respondent judge that it was not necessary for
her to qualify because the heirs had already made an extrajudicial partition in
accordance with the will as shown by the copy the copy of said partition which
she submitted to the court.

QUESTION: What was the response of the judge?

ANSWER: In view of the answer of Sandoval, the respondent judge ordered her
to qualify as executrix within forty-eight hours and declared the extrajudicial
agreement of partition entered into by the heirs null and void, on the ground that
the probate proceedings having been commenced judicially it must also be
terminated judicially.
 94

QUESTION: Was the judge correct?

ANSWER: Yes, the judge was correct. The heirs of the deceased Marquez could
not divest the Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the
mere fact of dividing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among
themselves.

QUESTION: But would it make a difference if the extrajudicial settlement was

made with the approval of the court?
ANSWER: The following answer was quoted in the present case from the case of
McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng. 21 Phil., 211:

If the extrajudicial partition made by the heirs of the deceased was submitted
to the court and approved by the respondent judge after verifying that it does not
prejudicially affect the rights of third parties, the testate proceedings pending in
the court would have been legally thereby terminated. An extrajudicial partition
of the estate of a deceased by the heirs becomes a judicial partition after its
approval by the court which had previously acquired jurisdiction of the estate by
the filing of an application for the probate of the decedent's will; but as the
testate proceeding is terminated in such case without the necessary publication
of notices to creditors and other persons interested in the estate required in a
regular judicial administration, the effect of such judicial partition would be the
same as if it had been effected extrajudicially without the intervention of the
court.

JAO V. CA
MAY 29, 2002

POINT

IF THE DECEDENT IS AN INHABITANT OF THE PHILIPPINES AT

THE TIME OF HIS DEATH, WHETHER A CITIZEN OR AN ALIEN,
HIS WILL SHALL BE PROVED, OR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
GRANTED, AND HIS ESTATE SETTLED, IN THE CFI IN THE
PROVINCE IN WHICH HE RESIDES
AT THE TIME OF HIS DEATH

QUESTION: Who were the deceased in this case?

ANSWER: The spouses Ignacio and Andrea Jao. They have two sons, namely,
Rodolfo and Perico.

QUESTION: What happened after the spouses died?

ANSWER: Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
 95

QUESTION: Did Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition?

ANSWER: Yes. He moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
improper venue. He argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon
City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths.  The decedent’s
actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to
run and operate a bakery.  As the health of his parents deteriorated due to old
age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City,
solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization.

QUESTION: Did Perico filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss filed by
Rodolfo?
ANSWER: Yes. Perico countered in his opposition that their deceased parents
actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their
deaths.  As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death
certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia
Street, Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the
death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the
said document.

QUESTION: State the ruling of the Supreme Court.

ANSWER: The Philippine Supreme Court ruled in this way:

The estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of

administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death and in the present case, in RTC of
Quezon City.
The decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both
residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise.  Significantly, it was
Rodolfo himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate.  To our mind,
this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, Rodolfo recognized his
deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City.  
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were
thus properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo.  We
agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates
were accomplished even before Rodolfo and Perico quarreled over their
inheritance, they may be relied upon to reflect the true situation at the time of
their parents’ death.
Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at
 96

the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of

First Instance of any province in which he had estate.  The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts.  The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far
as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from
that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record.
QUESTION: In the present case, Rodolfo invokes the ruling of the Supreme Court
in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, where it was held that the situs of settlement
proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence
or domicile at the time of death.  How did the Supreme Court reason out on
that?

ANSWER: The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at

bar.  The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process
of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City.  He was
then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to
purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor.  While he
was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could
move therein.  In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and
hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga.  It cannot be said that
Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence
in Quezon City was just temporary.

ALIMPOOS V. CA
JULY 30, 1981

 Habeas Corpus

FACTS:
Reynaldo Mosquito was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan,
by virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal
Case, which was a prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The place allegedly robbed belonged to Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos.
Contending that the Warrant was issued without the observance of the legal
requirements for the issuance thereof, the accused, then detained, and his wife
instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the Trial Court. Named as defendants
were the Spouses Alimpoos, the two arresting policemen, the Municipal Judge,
and the Chief of Police.
 97

The complaint prayed for the following:

1. That the accused be released from detention

2. Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin Spouses Alimpoos

and the Municipal Judge and/or their representatives, from proceeding
with the Criminal Case

3. Damages.

QUESTIONS:
Was the complaint defective? Reason.
ANSWER:

Yes, the complaint was defective. Mosquito should have limited his complaint
against the Chief of Police, the person having him in alleged custody, for Sec. 3,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that the application for the writ shall set
forth the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or
restrained. There is no mention in the Rule that the municipal judge issuing
arrest be joined as defendants. He should not have named also as defendants
the Spouses Alimpoos since the proceedings by habeas corpus is in no sense a
suit between private parties.

Moreover, the accused’s allegation as to damages was out of place. An

application for the writ cannot contain a prayer for damages. The sole function of
the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment and ordinarily, it cannot
properly be used for any other purpose.

BERNARTE V. CA
October 18, 1996

 Habeas Corpus

RULING:

The writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court extends "to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of
his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto." The function of the special proceeding of habeas
corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's detention. In all petitions
for habeas corpus, the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention — from the moment petitioner was taken into custody up to
the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition and only after such a
 98

scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our
Constitution has been satisfied.

However, once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
His remedy then is the quashal of the information and/or the warrant of arrest
duly issued. The reason for the issuance of the writ were becomes more
unavailing when the person detained files a bond for his temporary release.
Thus, in Velasco v. Court of Appeals,  the Court said:

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may

bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired
into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of
the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention
is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening
events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be
no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among
such supervening events is the issuance of judicial process
preventing the discharge of the detained person . . . . . Another is the
filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which the
accused is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of
liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and,
therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available. Section
4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in this
rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with . . .
an offense in the Philippines."

It may also be said that filing his motion for bail, Larkins
admitted that he was under the custody of the court and voluntarily
submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero (41
SCRA 235, 240 [1971]), this Court stated:

De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to

the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest in
question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail
with the lower court, thereby accepting the court's
jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on
arraignment, to the information filed against him.

The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is

recommended has the same legal import and effect as the posting of
bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving
or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his
person to the jurisdiction of the court.
 99

FERIA V. CA
FEBRUARY 15, 2000

 Habeas Corpus

FACTS:

Norberto Feria has been under detention by reason of his conviction of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide.

After some years of detention, it was discovered that the entire records of the
case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing. Upon further inquiries,
the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which
occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall.

Norberto Feria filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus

with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City
Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground
that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of
his constitutional right to due process.

ISSUES:

1. Was the remedy resorted to by Norberto proper?

2. If not, what is the proper remedy?

HELD (Dry Run):

a) The remedy resorted to by Norberto was not proper. The mere loss or
destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to conviction of the
accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor will it warrant the
release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus.

b) The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records (which is as

much a duty of the prosecution as of the defense).

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

1. Norberto’s release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule

102 of the Rules of Court which provides that –

"Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. - If it appears

that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
 100

officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or

order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment."

2. In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused

was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to
the New Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records
of the case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost.
Accused then filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus with the Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:

The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is holding
the prisoner under process issued by a competent court in pursuance of a
lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself admits the legality of his
detention. The mere loss or destruction of the record of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or the commitment, or authorize the prisoner’s
release."

3. Norberto’s invocation of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152

(1994), is misplaced since the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein
was premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of Informations
against the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he government has failed to show that
their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the
pendency of charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In
this case, the records were lost after Norberto, by his own admission, was
already convicted by the trial court of the offense charged.

MARQUEZ V. CA
DEC. 29, 1998

 Reconveyance

QUESTION: Who were the spouses here in the present case? Did they own a
property?
ANSWER: They were Rafael Marquez, Sr. and Felicidad Marquez. Yes, they
owned a property described in TCT No. 47572
 101

QUESTION: But Felicidad died, wasn’t it?

ANSWER: Yes.

QUESTION: After Felicidad died, what happened next?

ANSWER:

In 1982, Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication" vesting unto

himself sole ownership to the property described in TCT No. 47572.

In June 16, 1982, TCT No. 47572 was cancelled and on the same date, TCT No.
33350 was issued in his name on June 16, 1982.

QUESTION: Did he donate the property afterwards?

ANSWER: On December 29, 1983 Rafael Marquez, Sr. executed a "Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos"  covering the land described in TCT No. 33350, as well as
the house constructed thereon to three of his children, namely: (1) petitioner
Rafael, Jr.; (2) Alfredo; and (3) Belen to the exclusion of his other children.

QUESTION: His children, other than the donees, filed a complaint on May 31,
1991 for "Reconveyance and Partition with Damages" before the trial
court alleging that both the "Affidavit of Adjudication" and "Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos" were fraudulent since the private respondents took advantage of the
advanced age of their father in making him execute the said documents. Did
their action already prescribed?
ANSWER:

No. It is settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or

constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property. For the purpose of this case, the prescriptive period shall start
to run when TCT No. 33350 was issued, which was on June 16, 1982. Thus,
considering that the action for reconveyance was filed on May 31, 1991, or
approximately nine years later, it is evident that prescription had not yet barred
the action.

NUGUID V. NUGUID
JUNE 23, 1966

 Jurisdiction of the Probate Court

POINT

GENERAL RULE: JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT IS LIMITED TO THE

EXAMINATION AND RESOLUTION OF THE EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF A WILL
 102

ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS (THIS CASE): IF THE CASE WHERE TO BE

REMANDED FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL, IT WILL RESULT TO WASTE OF TIME,
EFFORT, EXPENSE, PLUS ADDED ANXIETY.

QUESTION: Who is Rosario Nuguid?

ANSWER: She was the testator in the present case. She was single until her
death and left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. During her lifetime, she
made a will and instituted therein her sister Remedios Nuguid as her sole
universal heir.

QUESTION: Please continue the story.

ANSWER: Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid some 11 years before her
demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of
administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

QUESTION: Was there an opposition?

ANSWER: Yes. Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate
father and mother of the deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to
the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the institution of
petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who
are compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were
illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

QUESTION: What was the ruling of the CFI of Rizal?

ANSWER: Since there was preterition, the CFI held that the will in question is a
complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased
Rosario Nuguid.

QUESTION: On appeal, what procedural aspect engaged the attention of the

Supreme Court?
ANSWER:

The case is for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited — to
an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The due
execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with
the requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be
presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the
proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.

QUESTION: What was the ruling of the Supreme Court?

ANSWER:

If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that
appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will,
 103

probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce
us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all, there exists a justiciable controversy
crying for solution.

PAREDES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
JANUARY 28, 1991

 Habeas Corpus

FACTS:

On January 21, 1976, Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., then the Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur, applied for a free patent for a parcel of land, His application
was favorably acted upon by the Land Inspector, Armando Luison.

On October 28, 1986, a former vice-mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur,
filed with the Tanodbayan, a criminal complaint charging Attorney Paredes with
having violated Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019)
because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Attorney to influence,
persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office
in Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application.

On February 23, 1987, the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) referred the case
to a fiscal for preliminary investigation.

Fiscal Brocoy issued summons to Attorney Paredes, Jr. to appear at the

preliminary investigation of the case. However, the summons did not reach
Attorney Paredes. Nevertheless, without waiting for proof of service of the
summons on the accused, Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary
examination of the complainant and his witnesses. The fiscal issued a resolution
finding a prima facie case of violation of Section 3(a) of R.A. 3019 committed by
the accused.

On August 28,1988, an information was filed against Governor Paredes in the

Sandiganbayan and a warrant for his arrest was issued. Consequently, he was
detained in the municipal jail of San Francisco.

A petition for habeas corpus was filed by his wife. She alleged that the
warrant for her husband's arrest was void because the preliminary investigation
was void, and, that the crime charged in the information against him had
already prescribed.
 104

ISSUES:

a) Should the writ of habeas corpus be allowed?

b) How would you rule on the claim of the wife of Attorney Paredes that the
crime had already prescribed?

ANSWERS (Dry Run):

a) No, the writ should not be allowed because an information has already
been filed against Atty. Paredes. The writ of habeas corpus will not issue
where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. The absence
of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case
nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.

b) The defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information should

be pleaded in the criminal action otherwise it would be deemed waived. It is a
proper ground for a motion to quash which should be filed before the
arraignment of the accused (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 117, 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure; People vs. Castro, L-6407, July 29, 1954) for whether the crime may
still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the criminal case not
in a special proceeding of habeas corpus.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

1. The petitioner alleges that the information against Governor Paredes is invalid
because the preliminary investigation was invalid and the offense charged
has already prescribed. Those circumstances do not constitute valid grounds
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case nor impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective (People vs.
Casiano, L-15309, February 16, 1961; People vs. Figueroa, L-24273, April 30,
1969). The remedy of the accused in such a case is to call the attention of the
court to the lack of a preliminary investigation and demand, as a matter of
right, that one be conducted. The court, instead of dismissing the information,
should merely suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a preliminary
investigation.

2. Thus did we rule in Ilagan [Link], 139 SCRA 349. If the detained
attorneys question their detention because of improper arrest, or that no
preliminary investigation has been conducted, the remedy is not a petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus but a Motion before the trial court to quash the
Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules,
or to ask for an investigation / reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus
would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the
basis of the Information filed against the accused.
 105

TUNG CHIN HUI V. RODRIGUEZ

APRIL 2, 2001

 Habeas Corpus

FACTS:

Tung Chin Hui, a "Taiwanese national," 6 arrived in this country. A few days
later, he was arrested by several policemen, who turned him over to the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation (BID).

Petitioner was duly charged. In due course, the BID Board of Commissioners
issued a Summary Deportation Order dated November 25, 1998, finding him
guilty of possessing a tampered passport earlier cancelled by Taiwanese
authorities.

On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila a Petition for Habeas Corpus on the ground that his detention was
illegal.

ISSUE:

Can the writ be issued?

ANSWER:

No. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued in cases in which the Bureau
of Immigration has duly ordered the deportation of undocumented aliens,
specifically those found guilty of illegally entering the Philippines with the use of
tampered and previously cancelled passports, as in the instant case.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Habeas corpus is a writ directed to a person detaining another, commanding

the former to produce the body of the latter at a designated time and place.
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "the writ of habeas corpus
shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." The objective of the writ is to
 106

determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ
cannot be issued.

VELASCO V. CA
JULY 7, 1995

 Habeas Corpus

FACTS:

On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of
the crime of rape allegedly committed against her.

Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, NBI Special Investigators

Resurreccion and Erum, proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati on 21
November 1994 and arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified
by Alinea as her rapist. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the
NBI.

The complaint was filed with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994. On the
same date, Larkins, through his counsel, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail wherein
he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong.
The trial court denied the aforesaid motion.

On 6 December 1994, Larkins, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the

Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release, principally based on the
alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion was also denied by the
trial court.

Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag,

filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus.

After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision, holding that:

From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to order the

immediate release of Larkins from his present confinement on the ground
that the complaint presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on
the basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for
 107

rape did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court (warrantless arrest).

The NBI and the People insist that the respondent court erred in granting the
petition for habeas corpus because Larkins had already been charged with the
crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application for bail. They further
claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

Rule on the contentions of the parties.

ANSWER:

The NBI and the People were correct. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal,
supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be
inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the
application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the filing of a
complaint or information, as in the instant case, be no longer illegal at the time of
the filing of the application. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of
the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no
longer available.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS

1. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his
release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of
his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of
habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in
Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial
process preventing the discharge of the detained person. Another is the filing
of a complaint or information for the offense for which the accused is
detained, as in the instant case.
2. Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons, where petitioners Macario Herce and
Celso Almadovar claimed to have been illegally detained for more than one
year without any complaint or information filed against them, this Court
denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time they filed the
petition they had already been charged with the crime of treason and
confined by reason thereof.
3. In Cruz vs. Montoya, this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for
having become academic because the information for estafa against the party
whose liberty was allegedly illegally restrained had already been filed and a
 108

warrant for his arrest had been issued, and whatever illegality might have
originally infected his detention had been cured.
4. In Umil vs. Ramos this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule
102, held that the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released had been charged before any court.
 109

FEBRUARY 2011 AND BEYOND

PEOPLE V. PANGILINAN
November 14, 2011/ Peralta, J.

 Right to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation

against an Accused

FACTS:

AAA testified that she was born on January 20, 1988. She had lived with her
Aunt BBB, first cousin of her father, and her husband, herein appellant, since
she was two years old until July 27, 2001. At around 10 p.m. of July 27, 2001,
while her aunt was working in Angeles, Pampanga, appellant arrived and
ordered her to cook chicken adobo which she did. Suddenly, appellant
approached her and pointed a samurai at her. Appellant then kissed her neck
and mashed her breast. It was not the first time that appellant did that to her.

AAA further testified that she remembered three incidents wherein appellant
abused her. The first time was when appellant kissed her and touched her
private parts. The second time was when appellant pointed a samurai at her,
took her to a room and removed her clothes and kissed her on her lips and
touched her private organ. He then laid on top of her and tried to insert his penis
to her private organ. His organ touched her vagina; that she felt pain in her
vagina but there was no blood. And the third time was when appellant kissed
 110

her and mashed her breast. She did not tell her aunt of appellant's sexual
molestations, because he threatened to kill her and her aunt.

The prosecution filed two (2) Informations charging appellant of the crimes of
Rape and Child Sexual Abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610. The
Information charging him of sexual abuse reads:

Criminal Case No. 11769

That on or about 1995 up to about June 2001, at Barangay

Apsayan, Municipality of Gerona, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and criminally commit acts of
lasciviousness upon the person of AAA, a minor subjected to
sexual abuse.

That accused is the stepfather of AAA, who was born on

January 29, 1988.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

ISSUE:

May the appellant be convicted of sexual abuse under such Information?

HELD (Dry Run):

No. The Information in Criminal Case No. 11769 for sexual abuse is void for
being violative of appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. A reading of the allegations in the above-
quoted Information would show the insufficiency of the averments of the acts
alleged to have been committed by appellant. It does not contain the essential
facts constituting the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of law. Thus,
appellant cannot be convicted of sexual abuse under such Information.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

In this case, appellant was charged under two separate Informations for rape
under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and sexual abuse under Section 5
(b) of RA No. 7610, respectively. However, we find the Information in Criminal
Case No. 11769 for sexual abuse to be void for being violative of appellant's
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, it provides:

 111

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense.  The complaint or

information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made
to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

A reading of the allegations in the above-quoted Information would show the

insufficiency of the averments of the acts alleged to have been committed by
appellant. It does not contain the essential facts constituting the offense, but a
statement of a conclusion of law. Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of sexual
abuse under such Information.

In People v. Dela Cruz, wherein the Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R
read:

That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of

Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on
his daughter either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter,
JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

We dismissed the case after finding the Information to be void and made the
following ratiocinations:

The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be

convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under the
information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which charges
accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act), "either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness.

It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information

do not constitute an offense. The information does not cite
which among the numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No.
7610 has been violated by accused-appellant. Moreover, it
does not state the acts and omissions constituting the offense,
or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the
same, as required under the rules of criminal procedure.
Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
 112

The allegation in the information that accused-

appellant "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by
raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her"
is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the
offense as required under Section 8, for these are
conclusions of law, not facts. The information in
Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being
violative of the accused-appellant’s constitutionally-
guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.

The right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against an
accused cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative
that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet
its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific
offense alleged to have been committed.

NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LTD. V. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED

MINING COMPANY
November 28, 2011/ Leonardo-De Castro, J.

 Action in Personam
 Extraterritorial Service of Summons
 Voluntary Appearance

FACTS:

On August 30, 2005, respondent Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company filed

with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Complaint against petitioner NM
Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring the loan
and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018
of the Civil Code of the Philippines and for damages. Upon plaintiff’s motion, the
trial court authorized plaintiff’s counsel to personally bring the summons and
Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latter
office to effect service of summons on the defendant.

Petitioner filed a Special Appearance With Motion to Dismiss praying for the
dismissal of the Complaint on the following grounds: (a) the court has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner due to the defective and
improper service of summons; (b) the Complaint failed to state a cause of action
and respondent does not have any against petitioner; (c) the action is barred by
estoppel; and (d) respondent did not come to court with clean hands.
 113

On November 29, 2005, petitioner filed two Motions: (1) a Motion for Leave to
take the deposition of Mr. Paul Murray (Director, Risk Management of petitioner)
before the Philippine Consul General; and (2) a Motion for Leave to Serve
Interrogatories on respondent.

On December 9, 2005, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss.

ISSUE:

1. Was there a valid service of summons?

2. Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant?

HELD (Dry Run):

1. There was no valid service of summons. The action filed by Lepanto

Consolidated Mining Company is an action in personam because it is lodged
against a person based on personal liability. Since it is an action in personam
and the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, the
Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over its person.

The extraterritorial service of summons resorted to by the plaintiff applies

only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not in the present case where
the action is in personam.

2. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant,
because although there was no valid service of summons, it voluntarily appeared
in court. By seeking affirmative reliefs when it filed the Motion for Leave to take
a deposition and the Motion for Leave to Serve Interrogatories, the defendant
deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Whether petitioner is a real party in interest

Respondent argues that the present Petition should be dismissed on the

ground that petitioner no longer existed as a corporation at the time said Petition
was filed on February 1, 2007. Respondent points out that as of the date of the
filing of the Petition, there is no such corporation that goes by the name NM
Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited. Thus, according to respondent, the
present Petition was not filed by a real party in interest, citing our ruling in
Philips Export B.V. v. Court of Appeals, wherein we held:

A name is peculiarly important as necessary to the very

existence of a corporation (American Steel Foundries vs.
 114

Robertson, 269 US 372, 70 L ed 317, 46 S Ct 160; Lauman vs.

Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa 42; First National Bank vs.
Huntington Distilling Co., 40 W Va 530, 23 SE 792). Its name is
one of its attributes, an element of its existence, and essential
to its identity (6 Fletcher [Perm Ed], pp. 3-4). The general rule
as to corporations is that each corporation must have a name
by which it is to sue and be sued and do all legal acts. The
name of a corporation in this respect designates the corporation
in the same manner as the name of an individual designates
the person (Cincinnati Cooperage Co. vs. Bate, 96 Ky 356, 26
SW 538; Newport Mechanics Mfg. Co. vs. Starbird, 10 NH 123);
and the right to use its corporate name is as much a part of the
corporate franchise as any other privilege granted (Federal
Secur. Co. vs. Federal [Link]., 129 Or 375, 276 P 1100, 66
ALR 934; Paulino vs. Portuguese Beneficial Association, 18 RI
165, 26 A 36).

In its Memorandum before this Court, petitioner started to refer to itself as

Investec Australia Limited (formerly "NM Rothschild & Sons [Australia] Limited")
and captioned said Memorandum accordingly. Petitioner claims that NM
Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited still exists as a corporation under the
laws of Australia under said new name. It presented before us documents
evidencing the process in the Australian Securities & Investment Commission on
the change of petitioner’s company name from NM Rothschild and Sons
(Australia) Limited to Investec Australia Limited.

We find the submissions of petitioner on the change of its corporate name

satisfactory and resolve not to dismiss the present Petition for Review on the
ground of not being prosecuted under the name of the real party in interest.
While we stand by our pronouncement in Philips Export on the importance of the
corporate name to the very existence of corporations and the significance thereof
in the corporation’s right to sue, we shall not go so far as to dismiss a case filed
by the proper party using its former name when adequate identification is
presented. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
There is no doubt in our minds that the party who filed the present Petition,
having presented sufficient evidence of its identity and being represented by the
same counsel as that of the defendant in the case sought to be dismissed, is the
entity that will be benefited if this Court grants the dismissal prayed for.

Jurisdiction over the person of petitioner

Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over its person on
account of the improper service of summons. Summons was served on petitioner
through the DFA, with respondent’s counsel personally bringing the summons
and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia.
 115

In the pleadings filed by the parties before this Court, the parties entered into
a lengthy debate as to whether or not petitioner is doing business in the
Philippines. However, such discussion is completely irrelevant in the case at bar,
for two reasons. Firstly, since the Complaint was filed on August 30, 2005, the
provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure govern the service of summons.

Section 12, Rule 14 of said rules provides:

Sec. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. – When the
defendant is a foreign private juridical entity which has transacted
business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no
such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect,
or on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Secondly, the service of summons to petitioner through the DFA by the

conveyance of the summons to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney,
Australia was clearly made not through the above-quoted Section 12, but
pursuant to Section 15 of the same rule which provides:

Sec. 15. Extraterritorial service. – When the defendant does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the personal status of the
plaintiff or relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent, or in
which the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest therein, or the property of the defendant has been attached
within the Philippines, service may, by leave of court, be effected out of the
Philippines by personal service as under section 6; or by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court
may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant, or in any
other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order granting such leave shall
specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less than sixty (60) days after
notice, within which the defendant must answer.

Respondent argues that extraterritorial service of summons upon foreign

private juridical entities is not proscribed under the Rules of Court, and is in fact
within the authority of the trial court to adopt, in accordance with Section 6, Rule
135:

Sec. 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. – When by law

jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry
it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if
the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction
is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
 116

suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which

appears comformable to the spirit of said law or rules.

Section 15, Rule 14, however, is the specific provision dealing precisely with
the service of summons on a defendant which does not reside and is not found
in the Philippines, while Rule 135 (which is in Part V of the Rules of Court
entitled Legal Ethics) concerns the general powers and duties of courts and
judicial officers.

Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that there are only four
instances wherein a defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when
the action affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the action relates
to, or the subject of which is property, within the Philippines, in which the
defendant claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief
demanded in such action consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the
defendant non-resident's property has been attached within the Philippines. In
these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out
of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c)
any other manner the court may deem sufficient.

Proceeding from this enumeration, we held in Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte

Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation that:

Undoubtedly, extraterritorial service of summons applies

only where the action is in rem or quasi in rem, but not if an
action is in personam.

When the case instituted is an action in rem or quasi in rem,

Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case because, in actions in rem and quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, in such instance,
extraterritorial service of summons can be made upon the
defendant. The said extraterritorial service of summons is not
for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for
complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so
that the defendant will be informed of the pendency of the
action against him and the possibility that property in the
Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may
be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and he can
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded. On
the other hand, when the defendant or respondent does not
reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action
involved is in personam, Philippine courts cannot try any case
 117

against him because of the impossibility of acquiring

jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily appears in
court.

In Domagas v. Jensen, we held that:

The aim and object of an action determine its character. Whether a proceeding
is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in rem for that matter, is determined by its
nature and purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in personam is a
proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the person
and is based on the jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right
to, or the exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to
control or dispose of it in accordance with the mandate of the court. The purpose
of a proceeding in personam is to impose, through the judgment of a court, some
responsibility or liability directly upon the person of the defendant. Of this
character are suits to compel a defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him.

It is likewise settled that "an action in personam is lodged against a person

based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself
instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as
defendant, but its object is to subject that person’s interest in a property to a
corresponding lien or obligation."

The Complaint in the case at bar is an action to declare the loan and Hedging
Contracts between the parties void with a prayer for damages. It is a suit in
which the plaintiff seeks to be freed from its obligations to the defendant under a
contract and to hold said defendant pecuniarily liable to the plaintiff for entering
into such contract. It is therefore an action in personam, unless and until the
plaintiff attaches a property within the Philippines belonging to the defendant, in
which case the action will be converted to one quasi in rem.

Since the action involved in the case at bar is in personam and since the
defendant, petitioner Rothschild/Investec, does not reside and is not found in
the Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any case against it because of
the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over its person unless it voluntarily
appears in court.

In this regard, respondent vigorously argues that petitioner should be held to

have voluntarily appeared before the trial court when it prayed for, and was
actually afforded, specific reliefs from the trial court. Respondent points out that
while petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss was still pending, petitioner prayed for and
was able to avail of modes of discovery against respondent, such as written
interrogatories, requests for admission, deposition, and motions for production of
documents.
 118

Petitioner counters that under this Court’s ruling in the leading case of La
Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, a party may file a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, and at the same time raise
affirmative defenses and pray for affirmative relief, without waiving its objection
to the acquisition of jurisdiction over its person.

It appears, however, that petitioner misunderstood our ruling in La Naval. A

close reading of La Naval reveals that the Court intended a distinction between
the raising of affirmative defenses in an Answer (which would not amount to
acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court) and the prayer for affirmative reliefs
(which would be considered acquiescence to the jurisdiction of the court):

In the same manner that a plaintiff may assert two or more causes of action
in a court suit, a defendant is likewise expressly allowed, under Section 2, Rule
8, of the Rules of Court, to put up his own defenses alternatively or even
hypothetically. Indeed, under Section 2, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court, defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer, except
for the failure to state a cause of action, are deemed waived. We take this to
mean that a defendant may, in fact, feel enjoined to set up, along with his
objection to the court's jurisdiction over his person, all other possible defenses. It
thus appears that it is not the invocation of any of such defenses, but the failure
to so raise them, that can result in waiver or estoppel. By defenses, of course, we
refer to the grounds provided for in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court that must be
asserted in a motion to dismiss or by way of affirmative defenses in an answer.

In order to conform to the ruling in La Naval, which was decided by this Court
in 1994, the former Section 23, Rule 14 concerning voluntary appearance was
amended to include a second sentence in its equivalent provision in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure:

SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant's

voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of
other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.

The new second sentence, it can be observed, merely mentions other grounds
in a Motion to Dismiss aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. This clearly refers to affirmative defenses, rather than affirmative
reliefs.

Thus, while mindful of our ruling in La Naval and the new Section 20, Rule
20, this Court, in several cases, ruled that seeking affirmative relief in a court is
tantamount to voluntary appearance therein. Thus, in Philippine Commercial
International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, wherein defendants filed a "Motion for
Inhibition without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Honorable
 119

Court" subsequent to their filing of a "Motion to Dismiss (for Lack of Jurisdiction),"

we held:

Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary

appearance dissipate when the respondents' motion for
inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief:
inhibition of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further hearing the
case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other than
dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the
active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount
to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case, and will bar said party
from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction.

In view of the above, we therefore rule that petitioner, by seeking affirmative

reliefs from the trial court, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of said court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. Consequently,
the trial court cannot be considered to have committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to Dismiss
on account of failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

LUCAS V. LUCAS
June 6, 2011

 Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation is An Action In Rem

 Motion for DNA Testing

FACTS:

On July 26, 2007, petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas, filed a Petition to Establish

Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing) before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. Petitioner narrated
that, sometime in 1967, his mother, Elsie Uy, migrated to Manila from Davao and
stayed with a certain "Ate Belen" who worked in a prominent nightspot in
Manila. Elsie would oftentimes accompany Belen to work. On one occasion, Elsie
got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas, at Belen’s workplace, and an
intimate relationship developed between the two. Elsie eventually got pregnant
and, on March 11, 1969, she gave birth to petitioner, Jesse U. Lucas. The name
of petitioner’s father was not stated in petitioner’s certificate of live birth.

However, Elsie later on told petitioner that his father is respondent.

 120

Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless,

respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore
went to the trial court on August 29, 2007 and obtained a copy of the petition.

The RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issued
the Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection
to the petition to file his opposition. The court also directed that the Order be
published once a week for three consecutive weeks in any newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, and that the Solicitor General be furnished with
copies of the Order and the petition in order that he may appear and represent
the State in the case.

The respondent filed a Special Appearance and Comment. He manifested

inter alia that: (1) he did not receive the summons and a copy of the petition; (2)
the petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served
on him as respondent.

ISSUE:

In a petition to establish illegitimate filiation, is it necessary to serve

summons on respondent for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the case?

HELD (Dry Run):

No. A petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the

simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

We find that the primordial issue here is actually whether it was necessary,
in the first place, to serve summons on respondent for the court to acquire
jurisdiction over the case. In other words, was the service of summons
jurisdictional? The answer to this question depends on the nature of petitioner’s
action, that is, whether it is an action in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.

An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal

liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the person;
while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to
subject that person's interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation.
A petition directed against the "thing" itself or the res, which concerns the status
of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of
entries in the birth certificate, is an action in rem.

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is

necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in
 121

rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a

prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has
jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the
seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual
custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in
which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.

The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the

simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which
undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter
thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the
proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through
publication, all interested parties are deemed notified of the petition.

If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the defendant, it is not for

the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the
due process requirements. This is but proper in order to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure
to serve summons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide
the case. In such a case, the lack of summons may be excused where it is
determined that the adverse party had, in fact, the opportunity to file his
opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirement with
respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in
the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to
the petition to establish filiation.

To address respondent’s contention that the petition should have been

adversarial in form, we further hold that the herein petition to establish filiation
was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial in nature despite its caption
which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to implead respondent as
defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is
adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other
party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this petition—
classified as an action in rem—the notice requirement for an adversarial
proceeding was likewise satisfied by the publication of the petition and the
giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.

The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section

1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain,
concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases
his claim. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of
action when it contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2)
the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right.
 122

The petition sufficiently states the ultimate facts relied upon by petitioner to
establish his filiation to respondent. Respondent, however, contends that the
allegations in the petition were hearsay as they were not of petitioner’s personal
knowledge. Such matter is clearly a matter of evidence that cannot be
determined at this point but only during the trial when petitioner presents his
evidence.

In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the

question submitted to the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not whether
those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.

The inquiry is confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no

other. The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether
or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon
the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint.

If the allegations of the complaint are sufficient in form and substance but
their veracity and correctness are assailed, it is incumbent upon the court to
deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendant to answer and go to trial
to prove his defense. The veracity of the assertions of the parties can be
ascertained at the trial of the case on the merits.

The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural

aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by
these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented
their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be
determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to
establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to
establish a prima facie case—the first procedural aspect in a paternity case—is
therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima
facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet,
been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss
whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering
that no such order has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has
just set the said case for hearing.

At any rate, the CA’s view that it would be dangerous to allow a DNA testing
without corroborative proof is well taken and deserves the Court’s attention. In
light of this observation, we find that there is a need to supplement the Rule on
DNA Evidence to aid the courts in resolving motions for DNA testing order,
particularly in paternity and other filiation cases. We, thus, address the question
 123

of whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA
testing order.

The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar for
the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides the
"prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity (i.e.,
the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the possible
sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test results as
evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence." It seeks "to ensure
that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis, is utilized
effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused and, more
importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves justice and
protects, rather than prejudice the public."

Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for
conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the DNA
testing. Section 4 states:

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court

may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to

the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;

(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce

new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of
the case; and

(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may
consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of
the DNA testing.

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court
order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a
suit or proceeding is commenced.

This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
 124

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must
be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity
or "good cause" for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood
testing is considered a "search," which, under their Constitutions (as in ours),
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana eloquently explained —

Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the

constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient
justification under the particular factual circumstances of the
case must be made before a court may order a compulsory
blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed
regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those
jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary
showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find
that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an
order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must
show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested
and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood
test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order
for blood testing.

The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect

the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or
establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA

testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example,
consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is
already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result
would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA
testing.

RODRIGUEZ V. ARROYO
November 15, 2011/ Sereno, J.
 125

EN BANC

 Writ of Amparo
 Writ of Habeas Data

FACTS:

Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.

On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay

Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle, when four men forcibly took him and forced
him into a car. Inside the vehicle were several men in civilian clothes, one of
whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more persons
arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car,
while the others rode on the tricycle.

The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat
on his back and started punching him. The car travelled towards the direction of
Sta. Teresita. During the drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a
member of the New People’s Army (NPA), but he remained silent. The car then
entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. Rodriguez later on learned
that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army.

Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit
him on the head to wake him up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded
him, but did not allow him to sleep.

In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez,
blindfolded him and made him board a vehicle. While they were in transit, the
soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the car
stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his
blindfold, and forced him to confess to being a member of the NPA. During the
interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head. Thereafter, he was
detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach to a
papag, and gave him rice and viand. Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he
refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the waist.

On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought
them to Bugey and Mission. While passing houses along the way, the men asked
him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer, a soldier
pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he
remained silent, the soldiers beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to
the military camp at past 1:00 p.m., where he was again subjected to tactical
interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged NPA comrades.
He suffered incessant mauling every time he failed to answer.
 126

Examinee’s Note: The mauling and maltreatment of continued. The

facts are long. We go to the point where he was able to reach his
house.

Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18

September 2010.

On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the

International Committee on Torture and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and
issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of torture.

Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen
Hazel Robles, noticed that several suspicious-looking men followed them at the
Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a jeepney.

On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ
of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data.

Thereafter, the writ of amparo and habeas data were issued in favor of
Rodriguez. After the writs have been granted, interim reliefs were also prayed
for.

The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt.
Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt. Matutina, Calog, George
Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

ISSUE:

Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the
writs of amparo and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.

HELD (Dry Run):

The interim reliefs may not be granted because the writ of amparo and
habeas data have already been issued in favor of Rodriguez. Those provisional
reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious
determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be
granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. Since the petitioner was
granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary
protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents
from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

At the outset, it must be emphasized that the writs of amparo and habeas
data were promulgated to ensure the protection of the people’s rights to life,
 127

liberty and security. The rules on these writs were issued in light of the alarming
prevalence of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The Rule on the
Writ of Amparo took effect on 24 October 2007, and the Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data on 2 February 2008.

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that

provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and
permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages
requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it
serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it
breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses, and it is
curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by
inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.

Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a

person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends. As an independent and summary remedy to protect the
right to privacy – especially the right to informational privacy – the proceedings
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does not entail any finding of
criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are
proven through substantial evidence, then the Court may (a) grant access to the
database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the
database or information contains erroneous data or information, order its
deletion, destruction or rectification.

Grant of interim reliefs

In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a
temporary protection order. It must be underscored that this interim relief is only
available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
clearly provides:

Interim Reliefs. – Upon filing of the petition or at anytime

before final judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any
of the following reliefs:

Temporary Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge,

upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the petitioner or
the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family
be protected in a government agency or by an accredited
person or private institution capable of keeping and securing
their safety. If the petitioner is an organization, association or
 128

institution referred to in Section 3(c) of this Rule, the protection

may be extended to the officers involved.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private

institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it shall
issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply

with the rules and conditions that may be imposed by the
court, justice or judge.

(a) Inspection Order. – The court, justice or judge, upon

verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession or control of a designated land or other property, to
permit entry for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any relevant object
or operation thereon.

The motion shall state in detail the place or places to be

inspected. It shall be supported by affidavits or testimonies of
witnesses having personal knowledge of the enforced
disappearance or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

If the motion is opposed on the ground of national security

or of the privileged nature of the information, the court, justice
or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to determine the
merit of the opposition.

The movant must show that the inspection order is

necessary to establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged
to be threatened or violated.

The inspection order shall specify the person or persons

authorized to make the inspection and the date, time, place
and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe other
conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties. The
order shall expire five (5) days after the date of its issuance,
unless extended for justifiable reasons.

(b) Production Order. – The court, justice, or judge, upon

verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person in
possession, custody or control of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which
constitute or contain evidence relevant to the petition or the
 129

return, to produce and permit their inspection, copying or

photographing by or on behalf of the movant.

The motion may be opposed on the ground of national

security or of the privileged nature of the information, in which
case the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in
chambers to determine the merit of the opposition.

The court, justice or judge shall prescribe other conditions to

protect the constitutional rights of all the parties.

(c) Witness Protection Order. – The court, justice or judge,

upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness Protection,
Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to Republic Act No.
6981.

The court, justice or judge may also refer the witnesses to

other government agencies, or to accredited persons or private
institutions capable of keeping and securing their safety.

We held in Yano v. Sanchez that "these provisional reliefs are intended to

assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo
petition." Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final
adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the
privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of
the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of
amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of
the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is
subsumed under the privilege of the writ.

Presidential immunity from suit

It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil

or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go
as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

In Estrada v. Desierto, we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President

does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s
tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor
upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the
search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right, to wit:

We reject Estrada’s] argument that he cannot be prosecuted

for the reason that he must first be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner
 130

Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by

the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on
February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83
"Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio."
Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be
impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.
The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his
prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself
for it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting
President who has not been subjected to impeachment
proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution.
To be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make
it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot
due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and
civil cases may already be filed against him.

Further, in our Resolution in Estrada v. Desierto, we reiterated that the

presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s
incumbency:

Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former
President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself
from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo
proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

Command responsibility in amparo proceedings

To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo,

Rodriguez contends that the doctrine of command responsibility may be applied.
As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the
"responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of
the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity,
the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for
human rights abuses. This doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases
not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may
likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of
amparo. As we held in Rubrico:

Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be

used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to
address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise
remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court
from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to
ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
 131

Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility

in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as
commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the

following elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the

accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be
or had been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to

prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily

possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the
purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international

tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may
nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a
more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive
knowledge.

Responsibility or accountability of former President Arroyo

The next question that must be tackled is whether Rodriguez has proven
through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or
accountable for his abduction. We rule in the negative.

We do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for

each and every count of forcible disappearance. Aside from Rodriguez’s general
averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or
accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show
that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or
security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

Responsibility or accountability of respondents

The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in
this Court’s ruling in Razon, to wit:
 132

The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the
pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to
be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic
test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue
at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it
satisfies this basic minimum test.

In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, the same being supported by substantial evidence. A careful
examination of the records of this case reveals that the totality of the evidence
adduced by Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of
some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right to life, liberty and
security.

LORENZO SHIPPING CORPORATION V. DISTRIBUTION MANAGEMENT

ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
August 31, 2011/ Bersamin, J.

 Indirect Contempt

FACTS:

The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued a Letter-Resolution, advising

respondent Distribution Management Association of the Philippines (DMAP) that
a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA was no longer
required for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in
accordance with MARINA Memorandum Circular No. 153 (MC 153).

For clarity, MARINA issued MC 153 pursuant to Executive Order No. 213 (EO
213) entitled Deregulating Domestic Shipping Rates promulgated by President
Fidel V. Ramos on November 24, 1994.

In order to challenge the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-

Resolution dated June 4, 2001, DMAP commenced in the Court of Appeals a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction or temporary restraining order. On November 29, 2001,
however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition and upheld
the constitutionality of EO 213, MC 153, and the Letter-Resolution dated June 4,
2001.

DMAP appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 152914), but the Court denied
DMAP’s petition for review on certiorari "for petitioners’ failure to:
 133

(a) take the appeal within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days; and

(b) pay the deposit for sheriff's fee and clerk's commission in the total amount of
P202.00.

In October 2002, DMAP held a general membership meeting (GMM) on the

occasion of which DMAP publicly circulated the Sea Transport Update, which is
reproduced as follows:

SEA TRANSPORT UPDATE

Oct. 2002 GMM
20% GRI RATE INCREASE ISSUE

1. The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme Court

was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue
DMAP presented.

Small technical matter which should not be a cause for denial

(like the amount of filing fee lacking & failure to indicate date of
receipt of court resolution)

> Some technical matters that could cause denial

- Failure to file on time and to file necessary pleadings

- Failure to provide copies to respondents.

> Legal issue DMAP presented

- Public Service Act

- Regulated or Deregulated
- MC 153
- Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal
leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months.

WHAT TO EXPECT?

1. Liners will pressure members to pay the 20% GRI

WHAT TO DO?
1. As advised by DMAP counsel, use the following arguments:

- DMAP case was denied based on technicalities and not on

merits of the case
- Court of Appeals has ruled that computation of
reasonableness of freight is not under their jurisdiction but with
MARINA
 134

- DSA's argument that DMAP's case prematurely (sic) file (sic)

as there is a pending case filed before MARINA.
- Therefore, DSA & DMAP will be going back to MARINA for
resolution

2. Meantime, DMAP members enjoined not to pay until resolved

by MARINA

3. However, continue collaboration with liners so shipping

service may not suffer

Thereupon, the petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt
against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea Transport
Update constituted indirect contempt of court for patently, unjustly and
baselessly insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and,
worse, that the publication unfairly debased the Supreme Court by making
"scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless innuendo" to the effect that the
Supreme Court had allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners as to lead
the respondents to conclude that the "Supreme Court ruling issued in one month
only, normal lead time is at least 3 to 6 months." They averred that the
respondents’ purpose, taken in the context of the entire publication, was to "defy
the decision, for it was based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was
influenced!"

ISSUE:

Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or

amount to indirect contempt of court?

HELD:

Contempt of Court: Concept and Classes

Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of

a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience
to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its
proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so
near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a
body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising
of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is
generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be
specifically granted by statute. It lies at the core of the administration of a
judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question that courts have the power
by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum in their
presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and
 135

their officers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for
contempt essentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings
and for the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and,
consequently, for the due administration of justice. The reason behind the power
to punish for contempt is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of
their institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the courts would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.

Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, which is

committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the
administration of justice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of
willful disobedience of the lawful process or order of the court.

The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no
process or evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae.
The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed in the
presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is
not open to question, considering that this power is essential to preserve their
authority and to prevent the administration of justice from falling into disrepute;
such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law. There
is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt
punishable by summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate
presence of the court, if it tends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions
of the court in the courtroom itself. Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the
presence of the court, if admitted by the contemnor in open court, may be
punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it is advisable to proceed by
requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why he should not be
punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior and
is informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under
oath of other persons.

In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the
first. The proceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed
outside the personal knowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all
the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges, and an
opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and
sentence imposed.

Plainly, therefore, the word summary with respect to the punishment for
contempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to
the procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that
result from the issuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding
hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of
findings, and all that goes with a conventional court trial.

A distinction between in-court contempts, which disrupt court proceedings

and for which a hearing and formal presentation of evidence are dispensed with,
 136

and out-of-court contempts, which require normal adversary procedures, is

drawn for the purpose of prescribing what procedures must attend the exercise
of a court’s authority to deal with contempt. The distinction does not limit the
ability of courts to initiate contempt prosecutions to the summary punishment of
in-court contempts that interfere with the judicial process.

The court may proceed upon its own knowledge of the facts without further
proof and without issue or trial in any form to punish a contempt committed
directly under its eye or within its view. But there must be adequate facts to
support a summary order for contempt in the presence of the court. The exercise
of the summary power to imprison for contempt is a delicate one and care is
needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. The reason for the
extraordinary power to punish criminal contempt in summary proceedings is that
the necessities of the administration of justice require such summary dealing
with obstructions to it, being a mode of vindicating the majesty of the law, in its
active manifestation, against obstruction and outrage.

Proceedings for contempt are sui generis, in nature criminal, but may be
resorted to in civil as well as criminal actions, and independently of any action.
They are of two classes, the criminal or punitive, and the civil or remedial. A
criminal contempt consists in conduct that is directed against the authority and
dignity of a court or of a judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or
discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly
forbidden act. A civil contempt consists in the failure to do something ordered to
be done by a court or judge in a civil case for the benefit of the opposing party
therein. It is at times difficult to determine whether the proceedings are civil or
criminal. In general, the character of the contempt of whether it is criminal or civil
is determined by the nature of the contempt involved, regardless of the cause in
which the contempt arose, and by the relief sought or dominant purpose. The
proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily
punishment, and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
Where the dominant purpose is to enforce compliance with an order of a court for
the benefit of a party in whose favor the order runs, the contempt is civil; where
the dominant purpose is to vindicate the dignity and authority of the court, and
to protect the interests of the general public, the contempt is criminal. Indeed, the
criminal proceedings vindicate the dignity of the courts, but the civil proceedings
protect, preserve, and enforce the rights of private parties and compel obedience
to orders, judgments and decrees made to enforce such rights.

Indirect contempt is defined by and punished under Section 3, Rule 71 of the

Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and

hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by
 137

himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts

may be punished for indirect contempt:

a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his

official duties or in his official transactions;

b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,

order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;

c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the

processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;

d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to

impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and

acting as such without authority;

f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in

the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a
court held by him.

But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to

prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent
into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings.

Misbehavior means something more than adverse comment or disrespect.

There is no question that in contempt the intent goes to the gravamen of the
offense. Thus, the good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be
considered. Where the act complained of is ambiguous or does not clearly show
on its face that it is contempt, and is one which, if the party is acting in good
faith, is within his rights, the presence or absence of a contumacious intent is, in
some instances, held to be determinative of its character. A person should not be
condemned for contempt where he contends for what he believes to be right and
in good faith institutes proceedings for the purpose, however erroneous may be
 138

his conclusion as to his rights. To constitute contempt, the act must be done
willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose.

Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the

court or to bring it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment
serves no useful purpose. On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of
court or contempt in facie curiae and, when committed by a lawyer, a violation of
the lawyer’s oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Utterances in Sea Transport Update, Not Contemptuous

The petitioners did not sufficiently show how the respondents’ publication of
the Sea Transport Update constituted any of the acts punishable as indirect
contempt of court under Section 3 of Rule 71, supra.

The petitioners’ mere allegation, that "said publication unfairly debases the
Supreme Court because of the scurrilous, malicious, tasteless, and baseless
innuendo therein that the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners
as concocted in the evil minds of the respondents thus leading said respondents
to unjustly conclude: Supreme Court ruling issued in one month only, normal
lead time is at least 3 to 6 months," was insufficient, without more, to sustain the
charge of indirect contempt.

Nor do we consider contemptuous either the phrase contained in the Sea

Transport Update stating: "The Motion for Reconsideration filed with the Supreme
Court was denied based on technicalities and not on the legal issue DMAP
presented", or the phrase in the Sea Transport Update reading "Supreme Court
ruling issued in one month only, normal leadtime is at least 3 to 6 months."
Contrary to the petitioners’ urging that such phrases be considered as
"scurrilous, malicious, tasteless and baseless innuendo" and as indicative that
"the Court allowed itself to be influenced by the petitioners" or that "the point that
respondents wanted to convey was crystal clear: ‘defy the decision, for it was
based on technicalities, and the Supreme Court was influenced!’", we find the
phrases as not critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in G.R. No.
152914 were issued, or as inciting DMAP’s members to defy the resolutions. The
unmistakable intent behind the phrases was to inform DMAP’s members of the
developments in the case, and on the taking of the next viable move of going
back to MARINA on the issues, as the ruling of the Court of Appeals instructed.

We have long recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or of any other
person, for that matter, to be critical of the courts and their judges as long as the
criticism is made in respectful terms and through legitimate channels. We have
no cause or reason to depart from such recognition and respect, for the Court has
long adhered to the sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In
re: Almacen:
 139

Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the
actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by the
fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that it
is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because
then the court’s actuation are thrown open to public
consumption.

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and

expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the
executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in
the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve. Well-
recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer
of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges.

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is

expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right.
Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to
legal animadversion as a citizen."

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it

shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency
and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on
the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct
that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

The test for criticizing a judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the Sea Transport
Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of
indirect contempt of court. In this regard, then, we need to remind that the power
to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent
power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice
must falter or fail. As judges we ought to exercise our power to punish contempt
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of
utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity of the Court,
not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
 140

BULAWAN V. AQUENDE
June 22, 2011/ Carpio, J.

 Petition for Annulment of Judgment

 Indispensable Parties

FACTS:

Bulawan filed a complaint for annulment of title, reconveyance and damages

against Lourdes Yap and the Register of Deeds before the trial court. Bulawan
claimed that she is the owner of Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 having bought
the property from its owners, brothers Santos and Francisco Yaptengco, who
claimed to have inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. Bulawan alleged
that Yap claimed ownership of the same property and caused the issuance of
TCT No. 40292 in Yap’s name.

In her Answer, Yap clarified that she asserts ownership of Lot No. 1634-A of
Psd-187165, which she claimed is the controlling subdivision survey for Lot No.
1634. Yap also mentioned that, in Civil Case No. 5064, the trial court already
declared that Psd-153847 was simulated by the Yaptengco brothers and that
their claim on Lot No. 1634-B was void. The trial court likewise adjudged Yap
Chin Cun as the rightful owner of Lot No. 1634-B. Yap also stated that Lot No.
1634-B was sold by Yap Chin Cun to the Aquende family.

On 26 November 1996, the trial court ruled in favor of Bulawan. The trial
court’s 26 November 1996 Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby

rendered in favor of the plaintiff (Bulawan) and against the
defendant (Yap) declaring the plaintiff as the lawful owner and
possessor of the property in question, particularly designated
as Lot 1634-B of Plan Psd-153847.

Subdivision Plan Psd-187165 for Lot 1634 Albay Cadastre

as well as TCT No. 40292 in the name of Yap over Lot 1634-A
of Plan Psd-187165 are hereby declared null and void and the
Register of Deeds of Legazpi City is hereby ordered to cancel as
well as any other certificate of title issued pursuant to said
Plan Psd-187165.

Yap appealed. On 20 July 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed Yap’s

appeal.

On 7 February 2002, the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision became

final and executory. The trial court issued a writ of execution.
 141

In a letter dated 24 July 2002, the Register of Deeds informed Aquende of

the trial court’s writ of execution and required Aquende to produce TCT No.
40067 so that a memorandum of the lien may be annotated on the title.

Aquende alleged that he was unaware of any litigation involving his property
having received no summons or notice thereof, nor was he aware of any adverse
claim as no notice of lis pendens was inscribed on the title.

Thereafter, Aquende filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the

Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Aquende alleged that he was deprived of his property without due
process of law. Aquende argued that there was extrinsic fraud when Bulawan
conveniently failed to implead him despite her knowledge of the existing title in
his name and, thus, prevented him from participating in the proceedings and
protecting his title. Aquende also alleged that Bulawan was in collusion with
Judge Vladimir B. Brusola who, despite knowledge of the earlier decision in Civil
Case No. 5064 on the ownership of Lot No. 1634-B and Aquende’s interest over
the property, ruled in favor of Bulawan. Aquende added that he is an
indispensable party and the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person because he was not impleaded as a party in the case.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Aquende. The 26 November 2007

Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

dated November 26, 1996 is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Transfer Certificate of Title No.
40067 registered in the name of petitioner Emerson B. Aquende
is hereby ordered REINSTATED.

ISSUE:

Is the petition for annulment of judgment the proper remedy for Aquende?

HELD (Dry Run):

Yes. In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled

on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Fraud is extrinsic
where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to
the court. In present case, there was extrinsic fraud because Aquende was
prevented from protecting his title when Bulawan and the trial court failed to
implead him as a party. The petition for annulment of judgment, therefore, is the
proper remedy.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Petition for Annulment of Judgment is the Proper Remedy

 142

Bulawan argues that the Court of Appeals erred in granting Aquende’s

petition for annulment of judgment in the absence of extrinsic fraud and the
existence of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court. Bulawan adds that the
Court of Appeals erred because it annulled a decision which had already been
considered and affirmed by another division of the Court of Appeals. According
to Bulawan, the trial court’s 26 November 1996 Decision is already final and
had been fully executed.

In a petition for annulment of judgment, the judgment may be annulled on the

grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Fraud is extrinsic where it
prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the
court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but
to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court. On the other hand, lack of
jurisdiction refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party or over the subject matter of the claim, and in either case the judgment or
final order and resolution are void. Where the questioned judgment is annulled,
either on the ground of extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be
set aside and considered void.

In his petition for annulment of judgment, Aquende alleged that there was
extrinsic fraud because he was prevented from protecting his title when
Bulawan and the trial court failed to implead him as a party. Aquende also
maintained that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person and,
therefore, its 26 November 1996 Decision is not binding on him. In its 26
November 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals found merit in Aquende’s petition
and declared that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Aquende, who
was adversely affected by its 26 November 1996 Decision. We find no error in
the findings of the Court of Appeals.

Moreover, annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case

where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. Consequently, an
action for annulment of judgment may be availed of even if the judgment to be
annulled had already been fully executed or implemented.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err when it took cognizance of
Aquende’s petition for annulment of judgment and overturned the trial court’s 26
November 1996 Decision even if another division of the Court of Appeals had
already affirmed it and it had already been executed.

The Court also notes that when the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
26 November 1996 Decision, it had not been given the occasion to rule on the
issue of Aquende being an indispensable party and, if in the affirmative,
whether the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over his person. This
question had not been raised before the trial court and earlier proceedings before
the Court of Appeals.
 143

Aquende is a Proper Party to Sue for the Annulment of the Judgment

Bulawan argues that Aquende was not an indispensable party in Civil Case
No. 9040 because the lot Aquende claims ownership of is different from the
subject matter of the case. Bulawan clarifies that she claims ownership of Lot
No. 1634-B of Psd-153847, while Aquende claims ownership of Lot No. 1634-B
of Psd-187165. Bulawan argues that even if Aquende will be affected by the trial
court’s 26 November 1996 Decision, this will not make him an indispensable
party.

Contrary to Bulawan’s argument, it appears that Aquende’s Lot No. 1634-B of

Psd-187165 and Bulawan’s Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-153847 actually refer to the
same Lot No. 1634-B originally owned by Yap Chin Cun. Both Aquende and
Bulawan trace their ownership of the property to Yap Chin Cun. Aquende
maintains that he purchased the property from Yap Chin Cun, while Bulawan
claims to have purchased the property from the Yaptengco brothers, who alleged
that they inherited the property from Yap Chin Cun. However, as the Court of
Appeals declared, the title of the Yaptengco brothers over Lot No. 1634-B of Psd-
153847 had already been cancelled and they were forever enjoined not to
disturb the right of ownership and possession of Yap Chin Cun.

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as

parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s
action in the litigation. As such, they must be joined either as plaintiffs or as
defendants. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, we said:

The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the
joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence
being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be dismissed."
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present.

During the proceedings before the trial court, the answers of Yap and the
Register of Deeds should have prompted the trial court to inquire further
whether there were other indispensable parties who were not impleaded. The
trial court should have taken the initiative to implead Aquende as defendant or
to order Bulawan to do so as mandated under Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. The burden to implead or to order the impleading of indispensable parties
is placed on Bulawan and on the trial court, respectively.

However, even if Aquende were not an indispensable party, he could still file
a petition for annulment of judgment. We have consistently held that a person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled. What is essential is
 144

that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of
fraud and collusion and that he would be adversely affected thereby.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that Bulawan obtained a favorable

judgment from the trial court by the use of fraud. Bulawan prevented Aquende
from presenting his case before the trial court and from protecting his title over
his property. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the 26 November
1996 Decision adversely affected Aquende as he was deprived of his property
without due process.

Moreover, a person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound
by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in
which he is a stranger. In National Housing Authority v. Evangelista, we said:

In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was never

made a party to Civil Case No. Q-91-10071. It is basic that no
man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by judgment
rendered by the court. Yet, the assailed paragraph 3 of the trial
court’s decision decreed that "(A)ny transfers, assignment, sale
or mortgage of whatever nature of the parcel of land subject of
this case made by defendant Luisito Sarte or his/her agents or
assigns before or during the pendency of the instant case are
hereby declared null and void, together with any transfer
certificates of title issued in connection with the aforesaid
transactions by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City who is
likewise ordered to cancel or cause the cancellation of such
TCTs." Respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as
he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property from
Sarte, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the
height of inequity to allow respondent’s title to be
nullified without being given the opportunity to present
any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of
the property. Much more, it is tantamount to a violation
of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be
deprived of property without due process of law. Clearly,
the trial court’s judgment is void insofar as paragraph 3 of its
dispositive portion is concerned.

Likewise, Aquende was never made a party in Civil Case No. 9040. Yet, the
trial court ordered the cancellation of Psd-187165 and any other certificate of
title issued pursuant to Psd-187165, including Aquende’s TCT No. 40067.
Aquende was adversely affected by such judgment as his title was cancelled
without giving him the opportunity to present his evidence to prove his ownership
of the property.
 145

CALUBAQUIB V. REPUBLIC
June 22, 2011/ Del Castillo, J.

 Summary Judgment

FACTS:

On August 17, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No.

80, which declared a 39.3996-hectare landholding located at Barangay
Caggay, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a military reservation site. The proclamation
expressly stated that it was being issued "subject to private rights, if any there
be."

Accordingly, the respondent Republic obtained an Original Certificate of Title

No. 13562 over the property.

On January 16, 1995, respondent filed before the RTC of Tuguegarao a

complaint for recovery of possession against petitioners alleging that sometime in
1992, petitioners unlawfully entered the military reservation through strategy
and stealth and took possession of a five-hectare portion (subject property)
thereof. Petitioners allegedly refused to vacate the subject property despite
repeated demands to do so. Thus, respondent prayed that the petitioners be
ordered to vacate the subject property and to pay rentals computed from the time
that they unlawfully withheld the same from the respondent until the latter is
restored to possession.

Petitioners filed an answer denying the allegation that they entered the
subject property through stealth and strategy sometime in 1992. They
maintained that they and their predecessor-in-interest, Antonio Calubaquib, have
been in open and continuous possession of the subject property since the early
1900s. Their occupation of the subject property led the latter to be known in the
area as the Calubaquib Ranch. When Antonio died in 1918, his six children
acknowledged inheriting the subject property from him in a private document
entitled Convenio. In 1926, Antonio’s children applied for a homestead patent
but the same was not acted upon by the Bureau of Lands. Nevertheless, these
children continued cultivating the subject property.
Petitioners acknowledged the issuance of Proclamation No. 80 on August 17,
1936, but maintained that the subject property (the 5-hectare portion allegedly
occupied by them since 1900s) was excluded from its operation. Petitioners cite
as their basis a proviso in Proclamation No. 80, which exempts from the military
reservation site "private rights, if any there be." Petitioners prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint against them.

Given the trial court’s opinion that the basic facts of the case were
undisputed, it advised the parties to file a motion for summary
judgment. Neither party filed the motion. In fact, respondent expressed on two
 146

occasions its objection to a summary judgment. It explained that summary

judgment is improper given the existence of a genuine and vital factual issue,
which is the petitioners’ claim of ownership over the subject property. It argued
that the said issue can only be resolved by trying the case on the merits.

On January 31, 2001, the RTC issued an Order thus:

The Court noticed that the defendants in this case failed to

raise any issue. For this reason, a summary judgment is in
order. Let this case be submitted for summary judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, without any trial, the trial court rendered its April 26, 2004
Decision dismissing petitioners’ claim of possession of the subject property in
the concept of owner. The trial court held that while Proclamation No. 80
recognized and respected the existence of private rights on the military
reservation, petitioners’ position could "not be sustained, as there was no right of
[petitioners] to speak of that was recognized by the government."

ISSUE:

Rule on the propriety of rendering a summary judgment.

HELD (Dry Run):

It was improper for the trial court to render summary judgment.

Neither of the parties filed a motion for summary judgment and the trial court
did not conduct a hearing. The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on
such motion are important because these enable the court to determine if the
parties’ pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion
are sufficient to overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding
that, as a matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to
the action.

Moreover, the conclusion reached by the trial court, that the petitioners’
defense of acquisitive prescription and the ultimate facts they pleaded in their
Answer to the effect that they are in open and continuous possession of the
property since 1900s cannot be proven, is baseless and premature. No reason
was given why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during
trial.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the
defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not
 147

tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. A deeper understanding of summary judgments is
found in Viajar v. Estenzo:

Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or

promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed
and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be
an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of
them can pray for a summary judgment. Where the facts
pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings
for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.

An examination of the Rules will readily show that a

summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a
scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a
motion for summary judgment by one party supported by
affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with
notice upon the adverse party who may file an opposition to the
motion supported also by affidavits, depositions, or other
documents. In spite of its expediting character, relief by
summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with
the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a
summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation
of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a
party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact,
or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently
unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and
any doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved
against the movant.

A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence
of a genuine issue of fact, "as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or
false claim." "[A] factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by
its nature it is evident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party
tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to
prove it. This usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the
sake of having an issue and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact
that their answers are not under oath anyway."

In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of

rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and
appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under
oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they submitted
 148

with the motion and the corresponding opposition. Thus, it is held that, even if
the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is
proper so long as "the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the
moving party show that such issues are not genuine."

The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are therefore
important because these enable the court to determine if the parties’ pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to
overcome the opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a
matter of law, the claim is clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the
action. The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and
conducting a hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the
summary judgment.

In the case at bar, the trial court proceeded to render summary judgment with
neither of the parties filing a motion therefor. In fact, the respondent itself filed
an opposition when the trial court directed it to file the motion for summary
judgment. Respondent insisted that the case involved a genuine issue of fact.
Under these circumstances, it was improper for the trial court to have persisted
in rendering summary judgment. Considering that the remedy of summary
judgment is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case, the trial
court cannot railroad the parties’ rights over their objections.

Due process rights are violated by a motu proprio rendition of a summary

judgment.

More importantly, by proceeding to rule against petitioners without any trial,

the trial and appellate courts made a conclusion which was based merely on an
assumption that petitioners’ defense of acquisitive prescription was a sham, and
that the ultimate facts pleaded in their Answer (e.g., open and continuous
possession of the property since the early 1900s) cannot be proven at all. This
assumption is as baseless as it is premature and unfair. No reason was given
why the said defense and ultimate facts cannot be proven during trial. The lower
courts merely assumed that petitioners would not be able to prove their defense
and factual allegations, without first giving them an opportunity to do so.

It is clear that the guidelines and safeguards for the rendition of a summary
judgment were all ignored by the trial court. The sad result was a judgment
based on nothing else but an unwarranted assumption and a violation of
petitioners’ due process right to a trial where they can present their evidence and
prove their defense.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES V. COMELEC

June 28, 2011/ Bersamin, J.

EN BANC
 149

 Second Motion for Reconsideration

FACTS:

We hereby consider and resolve:– (a) the petitioners’ Motion for Leave to File
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April 2011, attached to which
is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 12 April 2011 dated April
29, 2011 (Motion For Reconsideration), praying that the resolution of April 12,
2011 be reconsidered and set aside; and (b) the respondents’ Motion for Entry
of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.

(Examinee’s Note for Quick Understanding of the Facts: Attached to the

Motion for Leave to file a Motion for Reconsideration is the Motion for
Reconsideration itself. That Motion for Reconsideration is dated April 29, 2011.
What it sought to reconsider is the resolution of the Court dated April 12.)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration dated April 29, 2011 will
prosper.

HELD (Dry Run):

The Motion for Reconsideration dated April 29, 2011 will not prosper. As its
prayer for relief shows, it seeks the reconsideration of the resolution of April 12,
2011. In turn, the resolution of April 12, 2011 denied the petitioners’ Ad
Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 15 February
2011. Clearly, it is really a second motion for reconsideration in relation to the
resolution dated February 15, 2011. Another indicium of its being a second
motion for reconsideration is the fact that it raises the same issues.

A second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and only for

extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave has been
first obtained may a second motion for reconsideration be entertained. Having no
such persuasive reasons being presented by the petitioners, the Motion for
Reconsideration will not prosper.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

After thorough consideration of the incidents, we deny the Motion for

Reconsideration and grant the Motion for Entry of Judgment.

As its prayer for relief shows, the Motion for Reconsideration seeks the

reconsideration, reversal, or setting aside of the resolution of April 12, 2011. In
turn, the resolution of April 12, 2011 denied the petitioners’ Ad Cautelam Motion
 150

for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011). Clearly,

the Motion for Reconsideration is really a second motion for reconsideration in
relation to the resolution dated February 15, 2011.

Another indicium of its being a second motion for reconsideration is the fact
that the Motion for Reconsideration raises issues entirely identical to those the
petitioners already raised in their Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of
the Decision dated 15 February 2011).

The Motion for Reconsideration, being a second motion for reconsideration,

cannot be entertained. As to that, Section 2 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court is
unqualified. The Court has firmly held that a second motion for reconsideration is
a prohibited pleading, and only for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only
after an express leave has been first obtained may a second motion for
reconsideration be entertained. The restrictive policy against a second motion
for reconsideration has been re-emphasized in the recently promulgated Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15 states:

Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. – The Court

shall not entertain a second motion for reconsideration, and
any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher
interest of justice by the Court en banc upon a vote of at least
two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration
"in the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is
not only legally erroneous, but is likewise patently unjust and
potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable
injury or damage to the parties. A second motion for
reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling
sought to be reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or
by the Court’s declaration.

In the Division, a vote of three Members shall be required to elevate a second

motion for reconsideration to the Court En Banc.

We observe, too, that the prescription that a second motion for reconsideration
"can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes
final by operation of law or by the Court’s declaration" even renders the denial of
the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration more compelling. As the resolution of
April 12, 2011 bears out, the ruling sought to be reconsidered became final by
the Court’s express declaration. Consequently, the denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration is immediately warranted.

Finally, considering that the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration merely

rehashes the issues previously put forward, particularly in the Ad Cautelam
Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011), the Court,
having already passed upon such issues with finality, finds no need to discuss
the issues again to avoid repetition and redundancy.
 151

Accordingly, the finality of the resolutions upholding the constitutionality of

the 16 Cityhood Laws now absolutely warrants the granting of
respondents’ Motion for Entry of Judgment.

ANDERSON V. HO
January 7, 2013/ Del Castillo, J.

 Certification Against Forum Shopping

FACTS:

Anderson filed a Complaint for Ejectment against respondent Enrique Ho

before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The MeTC rendered a
Decision dismissing the case for lack of cause of action. On appeal the RTC also
favored the dismissal of the case.

Intending to file with the CA a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court, Anderson’s counsel, Atty. Rommel V. Oliva, filed a Motion for Extension
of Time of 15 days from May 20, 2005 or until June 4, 2005 within which to file
a petition allegedly due to the revisions required in the initial draft and on
account of heavy pressure of work. This was granted by the CA in a Minute
Resolution dated May 31, 2005.

Subsequently, said counsel sought another extension of 15 days or until June

19, 2005, this time claiming that the petition had already been finalized and
sent to Anderson in Hawaii, U.S.A. for her to read as well as sign the
certification and verification portion thereof. However, as of the last day of the
extended period on June 4, 2005, the petition has not yet been sent back, hence,
the additional extension being sought. In the interest of justice, the CA once
again granted the said motion for extension.

On June 20, 2005, Atty. Oliva was finally able to file the Petition for Review
but the certification against forum shopping attached thereto was signed by him
on Anderson’s behalf without any accompanying authority to do so. Hence, the
CA issued a Resolution on July 14, 2005, viz:

The Court resolves to DISMISS herein Petition for Review as the

certification against forum shopping was executed not by the
 152

petitioner herself but by her counsel without attaching

therewith any special authority to sign on her behalf.

Anderson filed a Motion for Reconsideration. During its pendency, she also
filed a Manifestation to which was attached an Affidavit and a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) authorizing her counsel to cause the preparation and filing of the
Petition for Review and to sign and execute the verification and certification
against forum shopping on her behalf.

She explained in the Affidavit that at the time the petition was filed, her
health condition hindered her from going to the proper authority to execute the
necessary SPA so she just verbally instructed her lawyer to draft the petition
and cause the filing of the same. Nevertheless, upon learning of the dismissal of
her case, she returned to the Philippines even against her doctor’s advice and
executed an SPA in favor of her counsel. She thus prayed that the subsequently
submitted documents be considered in resolving her pending Motion for
Reconsideration.

The CA, however, remained unswayed and denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Decide on the denial by the Court of Appeals.

HELD (Dry Run):

The denial by the Court of Appeals of the petition is correct. The certification
against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf. In this case, Atty. Oliva filed the petition
without a written authorization from his client. The dismissal, therefore, is
proper.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

No justifiable reason exists in this case as to relax the rule on

certification against forum shopping.

The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it
imposes has been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these procedural
 153

requirements is the certificate of non-forum shopping which, time and again, has
been declared as basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural orderliness.

In Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, the Court reiterated the

guidelines respecting non-compliance with or submission of a defective certificate
of non-forum shopping, the relevant portions of which are as follows:

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance

therewith or a defect therein, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance’
or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling reasons’.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be

executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however,
for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping is due to the fact that a "certification is a
peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases
involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action." "Obviously, it
is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional services have
been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether
she actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in that case." Per the above
guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable
or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of record
to sign on her behalf. "A certification which had been signed by counsel without
the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the
dismissal of the petition."

In this light, the Court finds that the CA correctly dismissed Anderson’s
Petition for Review on the ground that the certificate of non-forum shopping
attached thereto was signed by Atty. Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to
do so. While the Court notes that Anderson tried to correct this error by later
submitting an SPA and by explaining her failure to execute one prior to the filing
of the petition, this does not automatically denote substantial compliance. It must
be remembered that a defective certification is generally not curable by its
subsequent correction. And while it is true that in some cases the Court
considered such a belated submission as substantial compliance, it "did so only
 154

on sufficient and justifiable grounds that compelled a liberal approach while

avoiding the effective negation of the intent of the rule on non-forum shopping."

Unlike in Donato and the other cases cited by Anderson, no sufficient and
justifiable grounds exist in this case as to relax the rules on certification against
forum shopping.

In Donato, the CA dismissed therein petitioner’s Petition for Review on the

ground, among others, that the certification against forum shopping was signed
by his counsel. In filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner submitted a
certification duly signed by himself. However, the CA ruled that his subsequent
compliance did not cure the defect of the instant petition and denied his Motion
for Reconsideration. When the case reached this Court, it was held, viz:

The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification against
forum shopping but said certification was signed by petitioner’s counsel. In
submitting the certification of non-forum shopping duly signed by himself in his
motion for reconsideration, petitioner has aptly drawn the Court’s attention to the
physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal considering that he is a resident of 1125 South
Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. where he needs to personally
accomplish and sign the verification.

We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the petition to
have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to
travel from Virginia, U.S.A. to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington,
D.C., U.S.A. in order to sign the certification before the Philippine Consul, and for
him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary
period. Thus, we find that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to
personally sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the rule.

We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely
designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should
not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate
and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of
forum-shopping. The subsequent filing of the certification duly signed by the
petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac vice.

While at first blush Donato appears to be similar with the case at bench, a
deeper and meticulous comparison of the two cases reveals essential
differences. In Donato, the Court held that it was impossible for the petition to
have been prepared and sent to the therein petitioner in the USA; for him to
 155

travel from Virginia to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington D.C.; and
for the petition to be sent back to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary
period. The same could not, however, be said in this case. It must be
remembered that on top of the 15-day reglementary period to file the petition,
Atty. Oliva sought and was granted a total extension of 30 days to file the same.
Hence, Anderson had a total of 45 days to comply with the requirements of a
Petition for Review as against the 15 days afforded to the petitioner in Donato.
To this Court, the said period is more than enough time for Anderson to execute
an SPA before the nearest Philippine Consulate, which again unlike in Donato,
was located in the same state where Anderson was (Hawaii), and thereafter to
send it to the Philippines. Anent her allegation that her health condition at that
time hindered her from going to the proper authorities to execute an SPA, the
same deserves scant consideration as no medical certificate was submitted to
support this. "Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges must
prove his allegations."

Moreover, simultaneous with the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the

proper certificate of non-forum shopping was submitted by the petitioner in
Donato. Notably in this case, the SPA was submitted two months after the filing
of Anderson’s Motion for Reconsideration. It took that long because instead of
executing an SPA before the proper authorities in Hawaii and sending the same
to the Philippines, Anderson still waited until she came back to the country and
only then did she execute one.

SPOUSES DACUDAO V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

January 8, 2013/ Bersamin, J.

EN BANC

 Hierarchy of Courts
 Special Civil Action for Certiorari
 Preliminary Investigation
 Petition for Prohibition
 Petition for Mandamus
 Equal Protection Clause
 Right to the Speedy Disposition of Cases

FACTS:

Petitioners - residents of Davao City - were among the investors whom Celso
G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies
 156

(Legacy Group) allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were dishonored. After their
written demands for the return of their investments went unheeded, they
initiated a number of charges for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et
al. in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City.

On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department of Justice

(DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all Regional State Prosecutors,
Provincial Prosecutors, and City Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed
against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in
Manila for appropriate action.

DO No. 182 reads:

All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under

Legacy Group of Companies, may be filed with the docket
section of the National Prosecution Service, Department of
Justice, Padre Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the
Secretariat of the Special Panel for assignment and distribution
to panel members, per Department Order No. 84 dated
February 13, 2009.

However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles,

Jr. et al. of Legacy group of Companies in your respective
offices with the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro
City which is covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009,
should be forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel at
Room 149, Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for
proper disposition.

Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were forwarded by the

Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel
of the DOJ.

Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come to the

Supreme Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, ascribing to
respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182.
They claim that DO No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the
equal protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition of cases.
They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of justice and a violation of the
rule against enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
 157

Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of DOJ

Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the coverage of DO No. No.
182 all the cases for syndicated estafa already filed and pending in the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum
dated March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the
Constitution.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent Secretary of

Justice, maintains the validity of DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009, and prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of
merit.

ISSUE:

Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus directly to the Supreme Court?

HELD (Dry Run):

No, the petitioners did not properly bring their petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus directly to the Supreme Court for the reason that
such a direct resort disregards the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although, as
regards these remedies, the Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, such rule does not give
petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum without tendering
any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct filing of the
petition. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being bereft of

substance and merit, is dismissed.

Hierarchy of Courts

Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming

directly to the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
without tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify
the direct filing of the petition.
 158

We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court,

Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give
petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard
of this policy against direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the
recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion, we explained why, to wit:

The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the

hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the policy is
designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that
are also well within the competence of the lower courts, and thus
leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more
essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court
may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or
when serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to
the policy. This was why the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v.
Suelto:

The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must

so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions
assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be
burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the
first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only
where absolutely necessary or where serious and
important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to
actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or
before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the
issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the
competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial
Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific
action for the writ’s procurement must be presented.
This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly
observe.
 159

In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for strict
adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting "a growing tendency
on the part of litigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called
extraordinary writs, and sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and
adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the
Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a direct resort to the
highest tribunal, viz:

This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari

(as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the
writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is
also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with
the Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions
for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra—
resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to
relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with
 160

applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the

expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction,
would have had to be filed with it.

The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration

for the information and evidence of all concerned, that it will
not only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more
strict observance thereof.

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only
judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances.
As a rule, the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance.
Hence, every litigant who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly defined and enjoined in
Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall

be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion
is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of the said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it

relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the
Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals
whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or
these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by
the Court of Appeals.

In election cases involving an act or an omission of a

municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed
exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
 161

Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort to the Court
was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.

Special Civil Action for Certiorari

The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. "The sole office of the writ of certiorari,"
according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes

the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive
duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act
in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.

For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the following
requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or
officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c) there is no appeal
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
burden of proof lies on petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites. To start
with, they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice had acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the petition did not show that the Secretary of
Justice was an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the
Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any judicial or quasi-
judicial functions because his questioned issuances were ostensibly intended to
 162

ensure his subordinates’ efficiency and economy in the conduct of the

preliminary investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The
function involved was purely executive or administrative.

Preliminary Investigation

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does
not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of
cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-
judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the
finding of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-
judicial proceeding, stating:

x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not

determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only
means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably
charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting
as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass
judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized the public
prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in
nature. Still, this characterization is true only to the extent that the public
prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of law.

But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a quasi-judicial
body quickly ends there. For sure, a quasi-judicial body is an organ of
government other than a court of law or a legislative office that affects the rights
of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making; it performs
adjudicatory functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights of
the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect as the judgments
of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the effect whenever a public prosecutor
conducts a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause in order to file
 163

a criminal information against a person properly charged with the offense, or

whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public prosecutor’s orders or
resolutions.

Petition for Prohibition

Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for prohibition. However,

we do not see how that can be. They have not shown in their petition in what
manner and at what point the Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed
issuances, acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the other hand, we
already indicated why the issuances were not infirmed by any defect of
jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings

of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified

true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

Petition for Mandamus

Similarly, the petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy
available only when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
 164

entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court." The main objective of mandamus is to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty on the part of the respondent. Plainly enough,
the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was
what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their favor.
Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and where the Secretary of
Justice’s assailed issuances excluded them from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which they were unquestionably entitled.

Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong presumption of

its validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v. Purisima, the Court has extended the
presumption of validity to legislative issuances as well as to rules and
regulations issued by administrative agencies, saying:

Administrative regulations enacted by administrative

agencies to implement and interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to
respect. Such rules and regulations partake of the nature of a
statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in
the statute itself. As such, they have the force and effect of law
and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until
they are set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a
competent court.

DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84 that the
Secretary of Justice had promulgated to govern the performance of the mandate
of the DOJ to "administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof" as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071 (Prosecution
Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title III and Section 1, Chapter I,
Title III of Book IV of Executive Order 292 (Administrative Code of 1987).

To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned issuances, it

became incumbent upon petitioners to prove their unconstitutionality and
invalidity, either by showing that the Administrative Code of 1987 did not
authorize the Secretary of Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating that
DO No. 182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other
pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further show that the performance
of the DOJ’s functions under the Administrative Code of 1987 and other
pertinent laws did not call for the impositions laid down by the assailed
 165

issuances. That was not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in
any degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done against them
by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were designed to assist petitioners
and others like them expedite the prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all
those responsible for the wrong through the creation of the special panel of state
prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to conduct a nationwide and
comprehensive preliminary investigation and prosecution of the cases. Thereby,
the Secretary of Justice did not act arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.

Equal Protection Clause

Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation decreed in

DO No. 182 of the cases filed or pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that the exemption traversed the constitutional
guaranty in their favor of the equal protection of law.

The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2,

2009, to wit:

It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases

for syndicated estafa were filed with your office against
officers of the Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the
distance of the place of complainants therein to Manila, your
Office is hereby exempted from the directive previously issued
by the undersigned requiring prosecution offices to forward the
records of all cases involving Legacy Group of Companies to the
Task Force.

Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct

preliminary investigation of all cases involving the Legacy
Group of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to
file the corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to
prosecute the same in court.

Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal protection clause of

the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has
affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect
class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational relationship to some
legitimate government end.
 166

That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took into account the relative distance
between Cagayan de Oro, where many complainants against the Legacy Group
resided, and Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be conducted
by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had already been
filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de Oro at the time he issued DO
No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants residing in Cagayan de
Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases
commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182. The classification
taken into consideration by the Secretary of Justice was really valid.
Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire into the wisdom behind the exemption
upon the ground that the non-application of the exemption to them would cause
them some inconvenience.

Right to the Speedy Disposition of Cases

Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right to the speedy
disposition of cases guaranteed by the Constitution. They posit that there would
be considerable delay in the resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a
flagrant transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights to speedy disposition of
their cases."

We cannot favor their contention.

In The Ombudsman v. Jurado, the Court has clarified that although the
Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy disposition of cases, such speedy
disposition is a flexible concept. To properly define that concept, the facts and
circumstances surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken into account.
There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy disposition of a case only when
the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when,
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. It is cogent to mention that a mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not determinant of the concept.

The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered
obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and
vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related
questions to be dealt with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of
Justice rightly found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means
of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of having a comprehensive
investigation of the cases.
 167

On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there would be more
cases reaching the DOJ in addition to those already brought by petitioners and
other parties. Yet, any delays in petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and
subsequent cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The
Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory. In fine, we see neither undue
delays, nor any violation of the right of petitioners to the speedy disposition of
their cases.

Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should cover only
future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not those already being
investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the
prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions

exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The
reason is that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of
procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing
rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed
as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. All
procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive
application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural laws.

Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO No. 182
constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the petition, being
unsubstantiated, was unfounded.

Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the Secretary of

Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters involving the investigation of crimes
and the prosecution of offenders is fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end,
the Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over all the regional,
provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad discretion in the
discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and administers the DOJ and its adjunct
offices and agencies by promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their
objectives, policies and functions.
 168

Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts beyond the
bounds of his authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically, or oppressively, any
person or entity who may feel to be thereby aggrieved or adversely affected
should have no right to call for the invalidation or nullification of the rules and
regulations issued by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.

DIONA V. BALANGUE
January 7, 2013/ Del Castillo, J.

 Petition for Annulment of Judgments

FACTS:

Respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six

months and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter
property located in Valenzuela. When the debt became due, respondents failed to
pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, petitioner filed with the RTC a Complaint
praying, among others, that respondents be ordered:

(a) To pay petitioner the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with

interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, from 02 March
1991 until the full obligation is paid.

Respondents failed to file an answer and for such reason, they were declared
in default. In a decision dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioner’s
complaint. It ordered the respondents to pay petitioners the sum of FORTY FIVE
THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan
obligation plus interest at 5% per month reckoned from March 2, 1991, until the
same is fully paid.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, alleging that

respondents did not interpose a timely appeal despite receipt by their former
counsel of the RTC’s Decision on November 13, 2000. On March 16, 2001, the
RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its October 17,
2000 Decision. However, since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved
for the public auction of the mortgaged property, which the RTC granted. In an
auction sale conducted on November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder in
the amount of P420,000.00. Thus, a Certificate of Sale was issued in her favor
and accordingly annotated at the back of TCT No. V-12296.
 169

Respondents filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale

with Damages. They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting
petitioner 5% monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court and of their right to due process.

ISSUE:

Will the petition of the respondents prosper?

HELD (Dry Run):

The petition of the respondents will prosper. While under Section 2, Rule 47
of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes
lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment. The grant of 5%
monthly interest in favor of the petitioners is way beyond the 12% per annum
interest they sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due process. It
is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in
excess of what is being sought by the party.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated

their right to due process and, hence, the same may be set aside in a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final

judgment rule; grounds therefor

A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a

remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances where a party, without
fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that
it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’s
own neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is
traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goes against the grain of
finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once
a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid
to rest."
 170

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment
of Judgment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to
annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared that a
final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection
thereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without
jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest
sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due process.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or
in excess of what is being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief
without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process
considerations require that judgments must conform to and be supported by the
pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Teston, this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is

improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief
sought by the pleadings, absent notice which affords the
opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the
proposed relief. The fundamental purpose of the requirement
that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of
recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process
of a defendant who was declared in default than of a defendant who
participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence
presented during trial is allowed the parties under the Rules. But the same is not
feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9
of the Rules of Court comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by
the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered

against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be
different in kind from that prayed for nor award unliquidated
damages.

The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it
cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow
himself to be declared in default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded
 171

a relief greater than or different in kind from that sought in the Complaint. No
doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to
safeguard defendant’s right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily
issued judgment. This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the very essence of
due process. It embodies "the sporting idea of fair play" and forbids the grant of
relief on matters where the defendant was not given the opportunity to be heard
thereon.

In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported
both by the allegations in the pleadings and the evidence on record. The Real
Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not include any provision on
interest. When petitioner filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that
respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" and sought
payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest.
Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award
of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due
process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents were not
informed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They
were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute and present controverting
evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was
seeking for what she merely stated in her Complaint.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by

petitioner’s general prayer for other reliefs and remedies just and equitable
under the premises. To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what
has been prayed for in the Complaint or related thereto, supported by evidence,
and covered by the party’s cause of action. Besides, even assuming that the
awarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and
proven during trial, the same remains unconscionably excessive and ought to be
equitably reduced in accordance with applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v.
Yasuma, this Court held:

In the case of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of

Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v. Court of Appeals, Spouses
Bautista v. Pilar Development Corporation and the recent case
of Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, this Court considered the 3%
interest per month or 36% interest per annum as excessive and
unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the said case, equitably
reduced the rate of interest to 1% interest per month or 12%
interest per annum.
 172

It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for,
as alleged in their Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn or run away from
their just and valid obligation." Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence
should never be construed as waiver to contest patently erroneous award which
already transgresses their right to due process, as well as applicable
jurisprudence.

Respondents’ former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case of

his clients; respondents did not lose ordinary remedies of new trial, petition for
relief, etc. through their own fault.

Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the

client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the
scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. A
recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in
their duty to maintain their client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivation of
their client’s property without due process of law. In which case, the courts must
step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.

The manifest indifference of respondents’ former counsel in handling the

cause of his client was already present even from the beginning. It should be
recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a Motion to Extend Period to
Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without filing an
Answer, which resulted to respondents being declared in default. His negligence
was aggravated by the fact that he did not question the awarded 5% monthly
interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision on November 13, 2000. A simple
reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision readily reveals that it
awarded exorbitant and unconscionable rate of interest. Its difference from what
is being prayed for by the petitioner in her Complaint is so blatant and very
patent. It also defies elementary jurisprudence on legal rate of interests. Had the
counsel carefully read the judgment it would have caught his attention and
compelled him to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client. But
he did not. Instead, he filed in behalf of his clients a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment dated January 26, 2001 based on the sole ground of lack of
jurisdiction, oblivious to the fact that the erroneous award of 5% monthly interest
would result to his clients’ deprivation of property without due process of law.
Worse, he even allowed the RTC Decision to become final by not perfecting an
appeal. Neither did he file a petition for relief therefrom. It was only a year later
that the patently erroneous award of 5% monthly interest was brought to the
attention of the RTC when respondents, thru their new counsel, filed a Motion to
Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale. Even the RTC
 173

candidly admitted that it "made a glaring mistake in directing the defendants to

pay interest on the principal loan at 5% per month which is very different from
what was prayed for by the plaintiff."

"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his
client except in accordance with the law." Judging from how respondents’ former
counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly
negligent in protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their
property without due process of law.

In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief and other remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed to the
gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing
such remedies. We cannot also blame respondents for relying too much on their
former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their lawyer would
amply protect their interest during the trial of the case. Here, "respondents are
plain and ordinary people who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and
technicalities of law and legal procedures. Being so, they completely relied upon
and trusted their former counsel to appropriately act as their interest may
lawfully warrant and require."

As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents’ principal obligation was

only P45,000.00. Due to their former counsel’s gross negligence in handling their
cause, coupled with the RTC’s erroneous, baseless, and illegal award of 5%
monthly interest, they now stand to lose their property and still owe petitioner a
large amount of money. As aptly observed by the CA:

If the impugned judgment is not, therefore, rightfully nullified, petitioners will

not only end up losing their property but will additionally owe private respondent
the sum of P232,000.00 plus the legal interest said balance had, in the
meantime, earned. As a court of justice and equity, we cannot, in good
conscience, allow this unconscionable situation to prevail.

Indeed, this Court is appalled by petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of

immutability of judgment. Petitioner does not contest as she even admits that the
RTC made a glaring mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest. Amazingly, she
wants to benefit from such erroneous award. This Court cannot allow this
injustice to happen.
 174

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. FORERUNNER MULTI RESOURCES, INC.

January 7, 2013

 Preliminary Injunctive Writ

FACTS:

Executive Order No. 156, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 12

December 2002, imposes a partial ban on the importation of used motor vehicles.
The ban is part of several measures EO 156 adopts to "accelerate the sound
development of the motor vehicle industry in the Philippines." In Executive
Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc. and two related petitions
(collectively, Southwing), we found EO 156 a valid executive issuance
enforceable throughout the Philippine customs territory, except in the Subic
Special Economic and Freeport Zone in Zambales (Subic Freeport) by virtue of its
status as a "separate customs territory" under Republic Act No. 7227.

Respondent Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. (respondent), a corporation

engaged in the importation of used motor vehicles via the ports of Aparri,
Cagayan and San Fernando, La Union, sued the government in the Regional
Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan (trial court) to declare invalid EO 156, impleading
petitioner public officials as respondents. Respondent attacked EO 156 for (1)
having been issued by President Arroyo ultra vires; (2) trenching the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution; and (3) having been
superseded by Executive Order No. 418, issued by President Arroyo on 4 April
2005, modifying the tariff rates of imported used motor vehicles. Respondent
sought a preliminary injunctive writ to enjoin, litis pendentia, the enforcement of
EO 156.

ISSUE:

Should a preliminary injunctive relief be granted to the respondent?

HELD (Dry Run):

No. A preliminary injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing
of the applicant’s "clear legal right" being violated or under threat of violation by
the defendant. Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes
the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. In the present case, it cannot be said
that the respondent has clear legal right against the operation of EO 156, as
such order was upheld by the Supreme Court in the previous case of Executive
Secretary v. Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.
 175

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

We hold that it was error for the Court of Appeals to grant preliminary
injunctive relief to respondent.

Respondent Without Clear Legal Right to Import Used Motor Vehicles

It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary

injunctive writ under Rule 58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant’s
"clear legal right" being violated or under threat of violation by the defendant.
"Clear legal right," within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right "clearly
founded in or granted by law." Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal
right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the
validity of laws or issuances with the force and effect of law, as here, the
applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of overcoming
the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances. These procedural
barriers to the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the
equitable nature of such relief, preserving the status quo while, at the same time,
restricting the course of action of the defendants even before adverse judgment is
rendered against them.

Respondent sought preliminary injunctive relief as ancillary to its principal

cause of action to invalidate EO 156. Respondent’s attack on EO 156, however,
comes on the heels of Southwing where we passed upon and found EO 156
legally sound, albeit overextended in application. We found EO 156 a valid police
power measure addressing an "urgent national concern":

There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the

domestic industry is a reasonable exercise of police power. The
deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms due to the
influx of imported used motor vehicles is an urgent national
concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In
the exercise of delegated police power, the executive can
therefore validly proscribe the importation of these vehicles.

The narrow ambit of this review precludes us from passing upon the merits of
the constitutional and administrative issues respondent raised to attack EO 156.
Nevertheless, we have no hesitation in holding that whatever legal right
respondent may possess vis à vis the operation of EO 156, we find such legal
right to be doubtful by force of the Southwing precedent. Until reversed or
modified by this Court, Southwing makes conclusive the presumption of EO
 176

156’s validity. Our holding is bolstered by respondent’s failure to remove its case
from the confines of such ruling.

In arriving at a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals dwelt on the "grave

and irremediable" financial losses respondent was poised to sustain as a result
of EO 156’s enforcement, finding such prejudice "inequitable." 21 No doubt, by
importing used motor vehicles in contravention of the ban under EO 156,
respondent risked sustaining losses. Such risk, however, was self-imposed.
Having miscalculated its chances, respondent cannot look to courts for injunctive
relief against self-inflicted losses which are in the nature of damnum absque
injuria. Injunction will not issue on the mere possibility that a litigant will sustain
damage, without proof of a clear legal right entitling the litigant to protection.

Nor does our ruling in Filipino Metals furnish doctrinal support for respondent.
We sustained the trial court’s issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ in that
case to enjoin the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8800 (RA 8800) delegating to
a cabinet member the power to adopt measures to address prejudicial
importations in contravention of relevant international agreements. We grounded
our ruling on the fact that the petitioners, which principally argued that RA 8800
violates Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution (limiting Congress’ delegation
of the power to fix trade quotas to the President), "have established a strong case
for the unconstitutionality of RA 8800." In short, the petitioners in Filipino Metals
discharged the burden of overcoming the presumption of validity accorded to RA
8800, warranting the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ in their favor.
Southwing forecloses a similar finding for respondent.

Lastly, we find no merit in respondent’s submission that EO 418 repealed EO

156, removing the legal bar to its importation of used motor vehicles. The
question of whether EO 418 repealed EO 156 was already settled in our
Resolution dated 22 August 2006 denying reconsideration of our ruling in
Southwing. The respondents in those cases, importers of used motor vehicles via
the Subic Freeport, had espoused the theory presently advanced by respondent.
We rejected the proffered construction of the two issuances:

The subsequent issuance of E.O. No. 418 increasing the

import duties on used motor vehicles did not alter the policy of
the executive department to prohibit the importation of said
vehicle. x x x There is nothing in the text of E.O. No. 418 which
expressly repeals E.O. No. 156. The Congress, or the Office of
the President in this case, is presumed to know the existing
laws, such that whenever it intends to repeal a particular or
 177

specific provision of law, it does so expressly. The failure to

add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was
not to repeal previous administrative issuances.

E.O. No. 156 is very explicit in its prohibition on the

importation of used motor vehicles. On the other hand, E.O. No.
418 merely modifies the tariff and nomenclature rates of import
duty on used motor vehicles. Nothing therein expressly revokes
the importation ban.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY V. ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT

CORPORATION
January 9, 2013/ Brion, J.

 Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under

Rule 86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court

FACTS:

Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of

money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC). The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42105 and was assigned to the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 80.

SHCI alleged in its complaint that it made advance payments to AMC for the
purchase of 27,000 pieces of plywood and 16,500 plyboards in the sum of
P12,277,500.00, covered by Metrobank checks. These checks were all crossed,
and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC’s General
Manager, in 1998.

Chua died in 1999, and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate
was commenced before the RTC of Pasay City.

In its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint (against

Metrobank), AMC averred that it had no knowledge of Chua’s transactions with
SHCI and it did not receive any money from the latter. AMC claimed that in case
it is true that Chua received those checks from SHCI, the latter never credited the
same to the account of the AMC.
 178

In its answer to the third-party complaint, Metrobank admitted that it

deposited the checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware,
a sole proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The deposit was allegedly
done with the knowledge and consent of AMC. According to Metrobank, Chua
then gave the assurance that the arrangement for the handling of the checks
carried AMC’s consent. Chua also submitted documents showing his position
and interest in AMC. These documents, as well as AMC’s admission in its
answer that it allowed Chua to manage AMC with a relative free hand, show
that it knew of Chua’s arrangement with Metrobank. Further, Chua’s records
show that the proceeds of the checks were remitted to AMC which cannot
therefore now claim that it did not receive these proceeds.

Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth-party

complaint against Chua’s estate. It alleged that Chua’s estate should reimburse
Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed
against it by AMC.

ISSUE:

Rule on the motion for leave to admit fourth-party complaint filed by

Metrobank.

HELD (Dry Run):

The motion should be denied.

Metrobank’s claim against Chua’s estate is one that is based on quasi-

contract which embodies the concept of solutio indebiti. Solutio indebiti has two
indispensable requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered
through mistake; and second, that something was received when there was no
right to demand it. In the instant case, Metrobank, in effect, delivered through
mistake the amount to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware and the latter
has no right to demand it. A claim based on quasi-contract against a deceased
person should be filed as a claim in the settlement of his estate.

Metrobank, therefore, should not be allowed to file such claim in an ordinary

civil action in the RTC of Quezon City.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

In F.A.T. Kee Computer Systems, Inc. v. Online Networks International, Inc.,

Online Networks International, Inc. similarly assailed F.A.T. Kee Computer
 179

Systems, Inc.’s failure to attach the transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the
RTC proceedings, and claimed this omission to be a violation of Section 4, Rule
45 of the Rules of Court that warranted the petition’s dismissal. The Court held
that the defect was not fatal, as the TSN of the proceedings before the RTC forms
part of the records of the case. Thus, there was no incurable omission that
warranted the outright dismissal of the petition.

The Court significantly pointed out in F.A.T. Kee that the requirement in
Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not meant to be an absolute rule
whose violation would automatically lead to the petition’s dismissal. The Rules
of Court has not been intended to be totally rigid. In fact, the Rules of Court
provides that the Supreme Court "may require or allow the filing of such
pleadings, briefs, memoranda or documents as it may deem necessary within
such periods and under such conditions as it may consider appropriate"; and "[i]f
the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation of
the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days
from notice." These provisions are in keeping with the overriding standard that
procedural rules should be liberally construed to promote their objective and to
assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding.

Under this guiding principle, we do not see Metrobank’s omission to be a fatal

one that should warrant the petition’s outright dismissal. To be sure, the
omission to submit the adverse party’s pleadings in a petition before the Court is
not a commendable practice as it may lead to an unduly biased narration of
facts and arguments that masks the real issues before the Court. Such skewed
presentation could lead to the waste of the Court’s time in sifting through the
maze of the parties’ narrations of facts and arguments and is a danger the Rules
of Court seeks to avoid.

Our examination of Metrobank’s petition shows that it contains AMC’s

opposition to its motion to admit fourth-party complaint among its annexes. The
rest of the pleadings have been subsequently submitted as attachments in
Metrobank’s Reply. A reading of these pleadings shows that their arguments are
the same as those stated in the orders of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Thus, even if Metrobank’s petition did not contain some of AMC’s pleadings, the
Court still had the benefit of a clear narration of facts and arguments according
to both parties’ perspectives. In this broader view, the mischief that the Rules of
Court seeks to avoid has not really been present. If at all, the omission is not a
grievous one that the spirit of liberality cannot address.
 180

The main issue poses to us two essential points that must be addressed.
First, are quasi-contracts included in claims that should be filed pursuant to Rule
86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court? Second, if so, is Metrobank’s claim against
the Estate of Jose Chua based on a quasi-contract?

Quasi-contracts are included in claims that should be filed under Rule

86, Section 5 of the Rules of Court

In Maclan v. Garcia, Gabriel Maclan filed a civil case to recover from Ruben
Garcia the necessary expenses he spent as possessor of a piece of land. Garcia
acquired the land as an heir of its previous owner. He set up the defense that
this claim should have been filed in the special proceedings to settle the estate of
his predecessor. Maclan, on the other hand, contended that his claim arises from
law and not from contract, express or implied. Thus, it need not be filed in the
settlement of the estate of Garcia’s predecessor, as mandated by Section 5, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court (now Section 5, Rule 86).

The Court held under these facts that a claim for necessary expenses spent
as previous possessor of the land is a kind of quasi-contract. Citing Leung Ben v.
O’Brien, it explained that the term "implied contracts," as used in our remedial
law, originated from the common law where obligations derived from quasi-
contracts and from law are both considered as implied contracts. Thus, the term
quasi-contract is included in the concept "implied contracts" as used in the Rules
of Court. Accordingly, liabilities of the deceased arising from quasi-contracts
should be filed as claims in the settlement of his estate, as provided in Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is based on quasi-contract

Both the RTC and the CA described Metrobank’s claim against Chua’s estate
as one based on quasi-contract. A quasi-contract involves a juridical relation that
the law creates on the basis of certain voluntary, unilateral and lawful acts of a
person, to avoid unjust enrichment. The Civil Code provides an enumeration of
quasi-contracts, but the list is not exhaustive and merely provides examples.

According to the CA, Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint falls under the

quasi-contracts enunciated in Article 2154 of the Civil Code. Article 2154
embodies the concept "solutio indebiti" which arises when something is delivered
through mistake to a person who has no right to demand it. It obligates the latter
to return what has been received through mistake.
 181

Solutio indebiti, as defined in Article 2154 of the Civil Code, has two
indispensable requisites: first, that something has been unduly delivered
through mistake; and second, that something was received when there was no
right to demand it.

In its fourth-party complaint, Metrobank claims that Chua’s estate should

reimburse it if it becomes liable on the checks that it deposited to Ayala Lumber
and Hardware’s account upon Chua’s instructions.

This fulfills the requisites of solutio indebiti. First, Metrobank acted in a

manner akin to a mistake when it deposited the AMC checks to Ayala Lumber
and Hardware’s account; because of Chua’s control over AMC’s operations,
Metrobank assumed that the checks payable to AMC could be deposited to Ayala
Lumber and Hardware’s account. Second, Ayala Lumber and Hardware had no
right to demand and receive the checks that were deposited to its account;
despite Chua’s control over AMC and Ayala Lumber and Hardware, the two
entities are distinct, and checks exclusively and expressly payable to one cannot
be deposited in the account of the other. This disjunct created an obligation on
the part of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, through its sole proprietor, Chua, to
return the amount of these checks to Metrobank.

The Court notes, however, that its description of Metrobank’s fourth-party

complaint as a claim closely analogous to solutio indebiti is only to determine the
validity of the lower courts’ orders denying it. It is not an adjudication
determining the liability of Chua’s estate against Metrobank. The appropriate
trial court should still determine whether Metrobank has a lawful claim against
Chua’s estate based on quasi-contract.

Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within

the claims that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court

A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent

nature – the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged
liable to AMC, a future event that may or may not happen. This characteristic
unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in
the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not

filed, barred; exceptions. – All claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral
 182

expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,

and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice.

Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court prevail over

general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court

Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply
because it impleaded Chua’s estate for reimbursement in the same transaction
upon which it has been sued by AMC. On this point, the Court supports the
conclusion of the CA, to wit:

Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section

11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily
shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to ordinary civil actions
while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims
against the estate. The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
must therefore prevail over the general provisions of Section 11,
Rule 6.

We read with approval the CA’s use of the statutory construction principle of
lex specialis derogat generali, leading to the conclusion that the specific
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the
general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of
the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be
filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules
provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court,
merely apply suppletorily.

In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the
resolution points to the affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution.
Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on
quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that depends on another event. Both
belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that should be filed
under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and, as such, should have been so
filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023.

NPC V. ZABALA
January 30, 2013/ Del Castillo, J.
 183

 Eminent Domain

FACTS:

On October 27, 1994, plaintiff National Power Corporation filed a complaint

for Eminent Domain against defendants Spouses Zabala before the Regional
Trial Court, Balanga City, Bataan alleging that: defendants Spouses Zabala own
parcels of land located in Balanga City, Bataan; and it urgently needed an
easement of right of way over the affected areas for its transmission lines.

On June 28, 2004, the RTC rendered its Partial Decision, ruling that Napocor
has the lawful authority to take for public purpose and upon payment of just
compensation a portion of spouses Zabala’s property. The RTC likewise ruled
that since the spouses Zabala were deprived of the beneficial use of their
property, they are entitled to the actual or basic value of their property. Thus, it
fixed the just compensation at P150.00 per square meter. The dispositive portion
of the RTC’s Partial Decision reads:

Accordingly, Napocor is hereby ordered to pay defendant

Spouses Rodolfo Zabala and Lilia Baylon the amount of Php
150.00 per square meter for the 6,820 square meters taken
from the latter’s property, as the just compensation fixed and
recommended by the commissioners determined as of the date
of the taking of the property.

Napocor appealed to the CA. It argued that the Commissioners’ reports upon
which the RTC based the just compensation are not supported by documentary
evidence. Necessarily, therefore, the just compensation pegged by the RTC at
P150.00 per square meter also lacked basis. Napocor likewise imputed error on
the part of the RTC in not applying Section 3A of Republic Act (RA) No. 6395
which limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market
value of the property traversed by its transmission lines.

Napocor contends that under Section 3A of RA No. 6395, it is not required to

pay the full market value of the property when the principal purpose for which it
is actually devoted will not be impaired by its transmission lines. It is enough for
Napocor to pay easement fee which, under the aforementioned law, should not
exceed 10% of the market value of the affected property. Sec. 3A of RA No. 6395
provides:

Sec. 3A. In acquiring private property or private property

rights through expropriation proceedings where the land or
portion thereof will be traversed by the transmission lines, only
a right-of-way easement thereon shall be acquired when the
principal purpose for which such land is actually devoted will
not be impaired, and where the land itself or portion thereof
 184

will be needed for the projects or works, such land or portion

thereof as necessary shall be acquired.

ISSUE:

Napocor argued that in computing just compensation, the RTC should apply
Sec. 3A of RA 6395. Is the argument meritorious?

HELD (Dry Run):

No, the argument is not meritorious. Determination of just compensation in

eminent domain cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes, such as RA 6395, may serve only as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation. It may
not substitute the court’s own judgment as to what amount should be awarded
and how to arrive at such amount.

FURTHER DISCUSSIONS:

Legislative enactments, as well as executive issuances, fixing or providing fix

the method of computing just compensation are tantamount to impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives. Thus they are not binding on courts and,
at best, are treated as mere guidelines in ascertaining the amount of just
compensation.

Section 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the

courts to determine just compensation.

In insisting that the just compensation cannot exceed 10% of the market value
of the affected property, Napocor relies heavily on Section 3A of RA No. 6395.

Just compensation has been defined as "the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's
gain, but the owner’s loss. The word ‘just’ is used to qualify the meaning of the
word ‘compensation’ and to convey thereby the idea that the amount to be
tendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample."
The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is
guaranteed no less by our Constitution and is included in the Bill of Rights. As
such, no legislative enactments or executive issuances can prevent the courts
from determining whether the right of the property owners to just compensation
has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot "be usurped by any other
branch or official of the government." Thus, we have consistently ruled that
statutes and executive issuances fixing or providing for the method of computing
just compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere
guidelines in ascertaining the amount thereof. In National Power Corporation v.
Bagui, where the same petitioner also invoked the provisions of Section 3A of RA
No. 6395, we held that:
 185

Moreover, Section 3A-(b) of R.A. No. 6395, as amended, is

not binding on the Court. It has been repeatedly emphasized
that the determination of just compensation in eminent domain
cases is a judicial function and that any valuation for just
compensation laid down in the statutes may serve only as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just
compensation but it may not substitute the court’s own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount.

This ruling was reiterated in Republic v. Lubinao, National Power Corporation

v. Tuazon and National Power Corporation v. Saludares and continues to be the
controlling doctrine. Notably, in all these cases, Napocor likewise argued that it
is liable to pay the property owners for the easement of right-of-way only and not
the full market value of the land traversed by its transmission lines. But we
uniformly held in those cases that since the high-tension electric current passing
through the transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of
the normal use of their land, it is only just and proper to require Napocor to
recompense them for the full market value of their property.

The just compensation of P150.00 per square meter as fixed by the RTC is not
supported by evidence.

It has likewise been our consistent ruling that just compensation cannot be
arrived at arbitrarily. Several factors must be considered, such as, but not
limited to, acquisition cost, current market value of like properties, tax value of
the condemned property, its size, shape, and location. But before these factors
can be considered and given weight, the same must be supported by
documentary evidence.

In the case before us, it appears that the Commissioners’ November 28, 1997
Report/Recommendation is not supported by any documentary evidence. There
is nothing therein which would show that before arriving at the recommended
just compensation of P150.00, the Commissioners considered documents
relevant and pertinent thereto. Their Report/Recommendation simply states that
on November 17, 1997, the Commissioners conducted an ocular inspection; that
they interviewed persons in the locality; that the adjacent properties have
market value of P150.00 per square meter; and, that the property of Nobel
Philippine which is farther from the Roman Expressway is being sold for
P200.00 per square meter. No documentary evidence whatsoever was presented
to support their report that indeed the market value of the adjacent properties
are P150.00 and that of Nobel Philippine is P200.00.

In Republic v. Santos, we ruled that a commissioners’ land valuation which is

not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should be
disregarded by the court.
 186

The same ruling was arrived at in National Power Corporation v. Diato-

Bernal, where we overturned the ruling of the trial court and the CA adopting the
findings of the commissioners sans supporting documentary evidence therefor.
Thus:

It is evident that the above conclusions are highly

speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis. First,
the market values of the subject property’s neighboring lots
were mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative
documents, such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area
concerned, tax declarations or zonal valuation from the Bureau
of Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings
and commercial establishments. The report also failed to
elaborate on how and by how much the community centers and
convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondent’s
property. Finally, the market sales data and price listings
alluded to in the report were not even appended thereto.

Under Section 8, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the trial court may accept or
reject, whether in whole or in part, the commissioners’ report which is merely
advisory and recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the report or
set aside the same and appoint new commissioners. In the case before us,
however, in spite of the insufficient and flawed reports of the Commissioners
and Napocor’s objections thereto, the RTC eventually adopted the same. It
shrugged off Napocor’s protestations and limited itself to the reports submitted
by the Commissioners. It neither considered nor required the submission of
additional evidence to support the recommended P150.00 per square meter just
compensation.

Lastly, it should be borne in mind that just compensation should be computed

based on the fair value of the subject property at the time of its taking or the
filing of the complaint, whichever came first. Since in this case the filing of the
eminent domain case came ahead of the taking, just compensation should be
based on the fair market value of spouses Zabala’s property at the time of the
filing of Napocor’s Complaint on October 27, 1994 or thereabouts.

ORPIANO V. SPOUSES TOMAS

January 14, 2013/ Del Castillo, J.

 Forum Shopping

FACTS:

Petitioner Estrella Orpiano is the widow of Alejandro Orpiano. Part of their

conjugal estate is an 809.5-square meter lot in Quezon City.
 187

In 1979, a Decision was rendered by the defunct Juvenile and Domestic

Relations Court (JDRC) of Quezon City declaring Estrella an absent/absentee
spouse and granting Alejandro the authority to sell the lot.

In 1996, Alejandro sold the lot on installment basis to respondent spouses

Antonio and Myrna Tomas (the Tomas spouses) for P12,170,283.00. That very
same day, a new title – TCT No. N-152326 – was issued in the name of the
Tomas spouses despite the fact that the purchase price has not been paid in full.

On October 28, 1996, Alejandro filed Civil Case No. Q-96-29261 (the collection
case) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 226 (the collection
court), seeking collection of the balance of the price in the amount of
P4,314,100.00 supposedly left unpaid by the Tomas spouses, with damages.

During the pendency of the collection case, Alejandro passed away. His heirs,
Estrella included, were substituted in his stead in the collection case. Estrella
moved to amend the Complaint to one for rescission/annulment of sale and
cancellation of title, but the court denied her motion. She next moved to be
dropped as party plaintiff but was again rebuffed.

On June 11, 2005, Estrella filed Civil Case No. Q-05-56216 (the annulment
case) for annulment of the March 1996 sale and cancellation of TCT No. N-
152326, with damages, against the Tomas spouses and the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City which was impleaded as a nominal party. The case was raffled to
Branch 97 of the Quezon City RTC (the annulment court). In her Complaint,
Estrella claimed that the 1979 declaration of her absence and accompanying
authority to sell the lot were obtained by Alejandro through misrepresentation,
fraud and deceit, adding that the May 1979 JDRC Decision was not published
as required by law and by the domestic relations court. Thus, the declaration of
absence and Alejandro’s authority to sell the lot are null and void.
Correspondingly, the ensuing sale to the Tomas spouses should be voided, and
TCT No. N-152326 cancelled.

In their Answer to the annulment Complaint, the Tomas spouses prayed for
the dismissal thereof on the ground of forum shopping, arguing that the filing of
the annulment case was prompted by the denial of Estrella’s motion initiated in
the collection case to amend the Complaint to one for annulment of sale. The
annulment case is Estrella’s attempt at securing a remedy which she could not
obtain in the collection case. The Tomas spouses added that the dismissal of the
annulment