Practice of Law

Section 1. Who may practice law. -  Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law.
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Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. -  Every applicant for admission as a member of
the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines

In its most general sense, the practice of law involves giving legal advice to clients, drafting
legal documents for clients, and representing clients in legal negotiations and court
proceedings such as lawsuits, and is applied to the professional services of a lawyer or
attorney at law, barrister, solicitor, or civil law notary. However, there is a substantial amount
of overlap between the practice of law and various other professions where clients are
represented by agents. These professions include real estate, banking, accounting, and
insurance. Moreover, a growing number of legal document assistants (LDAs) are offering
services which have traditionally been offered only by lawyers and their employee paralegals.
Many documents may now be created by computer-assisted drafting libraries, where the
clients are asked a series of questions that are posed by the software in order to construct the
legal documents. In addition, regulatory consulting firms also provide advisory services on
regulatory compliance that were traditionally provided exclusively by law firms.

Sec. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -  In the court of a justice of the peace a
party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and
his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.

Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. -  No judge or other official or employee
of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

Admission to Practice Law

An admission to practice law is acquired when a lawyer receives a license to practice law. In
jurisdictions with two types of lawyer, as with barristers and solicitors, barristers must gain
admission to the bar whereas for solicitors there are distinct practicing certificates.

Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. -  Every applicant for admission as
a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. -  All applicants for admission other than
those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination,
satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed
all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the
Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the
university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be
required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law,
commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law,
labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

Sec. 6. Pre-Law. -  No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any
of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history and economics.

Sec. 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. -  An applicant who has
passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to
admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the
corresponding oath of office.

Sec. 18. Certificate. -  The Supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as
a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to
be entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be
given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Sec. 19. Attorneys' roll. - The clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a roll of all
attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted
when he receives his certificate.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7662

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN THE LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE
PURPOSE, A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Legal Education Reform Act of 1993."

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the
standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-
solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them
the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of
the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system,
require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

Section 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. - (a) Legal education in the
Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of
the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;

(3) to train persons for leadership;

(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the
improvement of its administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light
of the historical and contemporary development of law in the Philippines and in other
countries.

(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:

(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and
of legal institutions;

(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and
apply the law effectively, as well as to allowthem to have a holistic approach to legal
problems and issues;
 (3) to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving and decision-
making, and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the
present and the future;

(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment
or sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree,
and to develop in them the desire and capacity for continuing study and self-
improvement;

(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and

(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession
and to fully adhere to its ethical norms.

Section 4. Legal Education Board; Creation and Composition. - To carry out the purpose of this Act,
there is hereby created the Legal Education Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, attached
solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support to the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports.

The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall preferably be a former justice of the
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, and the following as regular members: a representative of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); a representative of the Philippine Association of Law Schools
(PALS); a representative from the ranks of active law practitioners; and, a representative from the
law students' sector. The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, or his
representative, shall be an ex officio member of the Board.

With the exception of the representative of the law students' sector, the Chairman and regular
members of the Board must be natural-born citizen of the Philippines and members of the Philippine
Bar, who have been engaged for at least ten (10) years in the practice of law, as well as in the
teaching of law in a duly authorized or recognized law school.

Section 5. Term of Office; Compensation. - The Chairman and regular members of the Board shall
be appointed by the President for a term of five (5) years without reappointment from a list of at least
three (3) nominees prepared, with prior authorization from the Supreme Court, by the Judicial and
Bar Council, for every position or vacancy, and no such appointment shall need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Of those first appointed, the Chairman and the representative of the
IBP shall hold office for five (5) years, the representatives of the PALS and the PALP, for three (3)
years; and the representative from the ranks of active law practitioners and the representative of the
law students' sector, for one (1) year, without reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpire portion of the term of the predecessor.

The Chairman and regular members of the Board shall have the same salary and rank as the
Chairman and members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions: Provided, That their
salaries shall not be diminished during their term of office.

Section 6. Office and Staff Support. - The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall
provide the necessary office and staff support to the Board, with a principal office to be located in
Metropolitan Manila.

The Board may appoint such other officers and employees it may deem necessary in the
performanceof its powers and functions.
Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the
Board shall havethe following powers and functions:

(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the
provisions of this Act;

(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as
herein enumerated;

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others,
the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other
facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;

(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members;

(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for
admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of
study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels of
accreditation status;

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law
student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal
assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may
decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall
prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such
internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide
for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as
the Board may deem necessary; and

(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for
the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.

Section 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a law school
unless accredited by the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only to educational
institutions recognized by the Government.

Section 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The Board may withdraw or downgrade

the accreditation status of a law school if it fails to maintain the standards set for its accreditation
status.

Section 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The withdrawal or

downgrading of accreditation status shall be effetive after the lapse ofthe semester or trimester
following the receipt by the school of the notice of withdrawal or downgrading unless, in the
meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or corrects the deficiencies upon which
the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation status is based.
Section 11. Legal Education Fund. - There is hereby created a special endowment fund, to be
known as the Legal Education Fund, which shall be under the control of the Board, and administered
as a separate fund by the Social Security System (SSS) which shall invest the same with due and
prudent regard to its solvency, safety and liquidity.

The Legal Education Fund shall be established out of, and maintained from, the amounts
appropriated pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 13 hereof, and from sixty percent (60%) of the
privilege tax paid by every lawyer effective Fiscal Year 1994; and from such donations, legacies,
grant-in-aid and other forms of contributions received by the Board for the purposes of this Act.

Being a special endowment fund, only the interests earned on the Legal Education Fund shall be
used exclusively for the purposes of this Act, including support for faculty development grants,
professorial chairs, library improvements and similar programs for the advancement of law teaching
and education in accredited law schools.

The Fund shall also be used for the operation of the Board. For this purpose, an amount not
exceeding ten percent (10%) of the interest on the Fund shall be utilized.

The Board, in consultation with the SSS, shall issue the necessary rules and regulations for the
collection, administration and utilization of the Fund.

Section 12. Coverage. - The provisions of this Act shall apply to all schools and colleges of law
which are presently under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
Hereafter, said supervision shall be transferred to the Board. Law schools and colleges which shall
be established following the approval of this Act shall likewise be covered.

Section 13. Appropriation. - The amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) is hereby authorized
to be charged against the current year's appropriation of the Contingent Fund for the initial expenses
of the Board.

To form part of the Legal Education Fund, there shall be appropriated annually, under the budget of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
for a period of ten (10) years effective Fiscal Year 1994.

Section 14. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or the
application thereof to any person, circumstance or transaction is held invalid, the validity of the
remaining provisions of this Act and the applicability of such provisions to other persons,
circumstances and transactions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 15. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executie orders, rules and regulations, issuances
or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act is hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Section 16. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: 23 December 1993.

Case No. 1

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18727             August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in
contention is that of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on
27 April 1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio
Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna
Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine
Legislature passed 27 November 1925) and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses
through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2 January 1926.

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their
incapacity or death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to
them." Section 2 of the deed of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro
legitime sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare
residiendo en la caudad de Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro
dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu,
designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio Cui. Ambos sobrinos
 administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o
incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE
DE BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimainente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui,
Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o
contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare
persona de estas cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia
Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta Provincia de
Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in
1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died
on 8 May 1931 and the second on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of
Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter, beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and
court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as they are
pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui,
one of the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the
then incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a
"convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28
February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of
either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the
defendant demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand
not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on
intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the
nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances
would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age
may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the legitimate descendants of the
nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o
a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the
degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of
the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other
hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative
case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks
before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado," taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation
and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict
interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws.
This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the intervenor.
We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not
mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as
"testimonies o instrumento dado para ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la
Lengua Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows:
"Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los
derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos
legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon
completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal
profession. The English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed
and general signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of
the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his
license to practice the profession. The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do
with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant
to the examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however, possession
of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in
some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure,
where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take
the Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the
necessary qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such
persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor
of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test
advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a
doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No.
3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said
institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and
destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall
administer properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the
office of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is
nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the
administrator may be removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his
office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant was
disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact,
however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than
that required for his admission to the Bar in the first place.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äwphï1.ñët

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the court. The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it
decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be
conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney and
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law.
The court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and
the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement,

notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the
requirements for reinstatement have been held to be the same as for original admission to
the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original
admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good
moral character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law
and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney,
and whether his mental qualifications are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his
duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from
his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the
office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as
a requisite for the office which is disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll
of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the
prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section
216 of Act 190), this kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold
the office arose.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On
January 26 of that year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed
the administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma.
Cui came in as intervenors. The case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer
by the defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme
Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60
Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the decision of this
Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator, Mariano
Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant
administrator.

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he
informed the Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous
1 January he had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio."
He followed that up with another letter dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the
administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a notary
public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the
Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as stated in
his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the
Commissioner to the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S.
1950), correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer,
was not entitled to the administration of the Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950, the
Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank
then filed a third-party complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated
above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the
opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that
he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of the Hospicio. The motion was
denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of
office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a second motion to
dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was
pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned
the court may disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and
the other parties in the case filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then
filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the
motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in
the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956, to the effect that Jesus
Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached this Court was
dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of the
Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent
by whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The
resolution of dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr.
Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as
indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the
Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor,
pursuant to the "convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui
took his oath of office.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of Cui
v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance
instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as
administrator and his failure to file an action in quo warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956,
when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of the
parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such an action —
all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action
in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
The excuse that the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956
because of the latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that
this action was filed within one year of the defendant's assumption of office in September 1960 does
not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the office and
it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not from the date the
incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs.
Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of
Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of
donation. He is further, in the line of succession, then defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of
Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o
incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona
que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos
legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En
igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia
ultimamente la administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma.
Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The
intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by line and
successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named.
Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui
line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs.
This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and
set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs
equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
 Case No. 2

Alawi v. Alauya, AM SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997 digest

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court,
Marawi City, respondent.

DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners
Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of
one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement
entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of
your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made
said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as
I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to
any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled
by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
 On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:

(T) through this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to
be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the
swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of
Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May
3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon
M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to
stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he
was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on
Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a
bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible,
"all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that
notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this
case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice,
and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's
office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the
Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family
**."[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,
[5]
 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. [6] He
stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi
as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract
entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there was
no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate
whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the
envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); [8] and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.[9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney"
because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. [11] He was induced
to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the
property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; [12]He says Alawi
somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so
until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his
signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of
the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19,
1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as
"Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU
ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation.
[14]
 The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges
(against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to
(her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights,
and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates
the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. [16] Section 4 of
the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee
of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for
the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right
of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct
more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he
accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps
be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
 Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there
are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and
he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 3

Cayetano v Monsod G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

Facts:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC on April
25, 1991. Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod’s
n o m i n a ti o n , p e ti ti o n e r fi l e d a p e ti ti o n f o r C e r ti o r a r i a n d P r o h i b i ti o n p r a y i n g t h a t
s a i d confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void because Monsod did not meet the requirement of having
practiced law for the last ten years.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent possess the required qualifications of having engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.

HELD:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized
to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the
business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or
acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.” Atty.
Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since
its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than
ten years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor, verily more than sati sfy the consti tuti onal requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Case No. 4

EN BANC
B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than
possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar
candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with
unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-
taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled
that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him.
Thus, respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys
up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant
alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office
of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is
not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting
as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging
respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the
same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before
the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as
a lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his
resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of
the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor
Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the
Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in
this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in
the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even
before he took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts
a serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The
OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.

On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly
violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent
resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by
Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for
the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In
the first paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel
for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the
MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him
before the MBEC and similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel.
On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been
authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party.
Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19
May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC
praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon,
Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the
practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in
addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and
drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage
in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal
knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the
MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice
law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. 3 cräläwvirtualibräry

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise
of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and
even public trust4 since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right
to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be
withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had
practiced law without a license.5 cräläwvirtualibräry

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 a candidate
passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held
in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for
indirect contempt of court.7
cräläwvirtualibräry

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is
the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that
respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law.8 Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9 cräläwvirtualibräry

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act
as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed
to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated
that he was resigning effective upon your acceptance. 10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents
resignation effective 11 May 2001. 11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent
acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While
there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.
Case No. 5

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1678             December 17, 2007

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the
practice of law.

Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to
Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for
Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved
and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.

On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he
returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question,
however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when
he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.

In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138
(Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:

SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one
years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no
charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines.

Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the
disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice
of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties
and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications.

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare.3

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality,
faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for
enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued
exercise of his professional privilege. 4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the
statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law.

Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant
for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good
moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 6

Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of
educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar examinations; 8 taking the lawyer’s oath9
and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the
license to practice.10

The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing
requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual
membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the annual professional tax; 12 compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the
legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the
Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to
Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for
admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another
country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens
who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of [RA 9225]." 17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the
Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he
reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority
for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who
reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure
from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;

(b) the payment of professional tax;

(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and

(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to

compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar
Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 6

EN BANC

July 12, 2016

A.C. No. 11316

PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant

vs.
RICHARD A. CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN," Respondent

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit filed by complainant Patrick A. Caronan
1

(complainant), before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," whose real name is allegedly
Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity and falsely
representing that the former has the required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations
and be admitted to the practice of law.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio R. Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan.
2

Respondent is the older of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was
born on August 5, 1976. Both of them completed their secondary education at the Makati High
3
School where complainant graduated in 1993 and respondent in 1991. Upon his graduation,
4 5

complainant enrolled at the University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business

Administration in 1997. He started working thereafter as a Sales Associate for Philippine Seven
6

Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores. In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis
7

with whom he has two (2) daughters. Through the years, complainant rose from the ranks until, in
8

2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa. 9

Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod
ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in 1992. In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their
10

father in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana,
and their three (3) children. Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a college
11

degree.12

In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told complainant that the former had
enrolled in a law school in Nueva Vizcaya. 13

Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar
Examinations and that he used complainant's name and college records from the University of
Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya and take the
Bar Examinations. Complainant brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse
14

consequences to him. 15

In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of his name and identity when he saw
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter's
office in Taguig City. Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent about it since he was
16

pre-occupied with his job and had a family to support. 17

Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager, complainant was ordered to
report to the head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue,
Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent who, at that point, was using the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared before the Anti-
18

Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to identify
documents including: (1) his and respondent's high school records; (2) his transcript of records from
the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's records showing his and respondent's
driver's licenses; (4) records from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's transcript of
records from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's
University's College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University showing respondent's
photograph under the name "Patrick A. Caronan." Complainant later learned that the reason why he
19

was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's involvement in a case for qualified theft and
estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at
respondent's wedding. 20

Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful
activities, complainant took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" and that respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan. However, problems relating to
21

respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC
received a letter from Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they be
furnished with complainant's contact details or, in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to
discuss certain matters concerning respondent. On the other hand, a fellow church-member had
22

also told him that respondent who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost victimized his
(church-member's) relatives. Complainant also received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L.
23

Reyes (Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was authorized to
sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was not. Further, he learned that respondent
24

was arrested for gun-running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22. 25

Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant
developed a fear for his own safety and security. He also became the subject of conversations
26

among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC. Hence, 27

complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's
name and identity, and illegal practice of law. 28

In his Answer, respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a
29

defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been
resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the administrative
30

case filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared closed and
31

terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074. Moreover, according to him, complainant is being used
32

by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign,
discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and criminal complaints against
them before the Ombudsman. 33

On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory conference where both parties
failed to appear. Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015. On such date,
34 35

however, both paiiies again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an Order 36

directing them to file their respective position papers. However, neither of the parties submitted any. 37

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating
Commissioner) issued his Report and Recommendation, finding respondent guilty of illegally and
38

falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records. He observed that respondent
39

failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity. 40

On the other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan." 41

Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he disclosed
upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma
Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan. However, based on the Marriage Certificate
42

issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G.
Tagpis," not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. 43

The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the photograph taken of
respondent when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same
person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." These, 44

according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed assumed complainant's
identity to study law and take the Bar Examinations. Since respondent falsely assumed the name,
45

identity, and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the
bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll
of Attorneys. He also recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
46

from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial
institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent. 47
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-607, adopting the
48

Investigating Commissioner's recommendation.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted to the Bar.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings
and recommendations of the IBP.

As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear and overwhelming evidence
that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is Richard A.
Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and academic records to enroll at the St.
Mary's University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the Bar Examinations.

As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and complainant are siblings when he
disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and
Norma Atillo. Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan. This
49 50

diverges from the official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is married to Myrna G.
Tagpis, not to Rosana Halili-Caronan. Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when he was
51

arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan." Meanwhile, complainant submitted
52

numerous documents showing that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his photograph; (b) a copy of his high
53

school yearbook with his photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it; and (c) NBI
54

clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013. 55

To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's
name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick
A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be
barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for
admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed a pre-law course, VIZ.:

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with
any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM
in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating. Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.
56

The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college
education and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his
1âwphi1

brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The
practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good moral character. In In the
57 58

Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for
Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez, the Court
59

explained the essence of good moral character:

Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place
where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it
merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at
least common honesty. (Emphasis supplied)
60

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar
when he assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter
into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where
he had been working for years. Good moral character is essential in those who would be lawyers. 61

This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists between him
and his client, as well as between him and the court. 62

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary
qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous
activities, which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and
his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one of the primary duties of its members is
to uphold its integrity and dignity.
63

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is

found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick
A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly,
without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves
that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPED and
STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations
as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the
name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued
in such name are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin
boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A.
Caronan," with a warning that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false
assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 7
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5582, January 24, 2017
ARTHUR O. MONARES, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 5604, January 24, 2017

ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.

A.C. No. 5652, January 24, 2017

BENJILIEH M. CONSTANTE,1, Complainant, v. ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for Absolution and/or Clemency 2 (Joint Petition)
dated May 14, 2009 filed by respondent Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz) , in connection with the complaints for
disbarment filed by Arthur O. Monares (Monares), Atty. Oliver 0. Olaybal (Olaybal) purportedly representing
Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), and Benjilieh M. Constante (Constante), dated January 17, 2002,
February 4, 2002 and March 21, 2002, respectively.

Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo Muñoz (Ludolfo) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Legazpi City. In his complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz represented his brother Ludolfo in
the said case during regular government hours while employed as Provincial Legal Officer of Albay City. 3
Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of directors (BOD) engaged Muñoz as retained counsel
sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred that Muñoz did not inform ALECO's old BOD that he was employed
as Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that after its administrator, the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), deactivated the old BOD on the ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained
counsel of the NEA-appointed team which took over the management of ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged
that Muñoz illegally collected payments in the form of notarial and professional fees in excess of what was
agreed upon in their retainer agreement.

Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest Construction and Development Corporation
(Sunwest). Constante claimed that Muñoz filed ten (10) cases against Sunwest on Ludolfo's behalf before the
Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was serving as Provincial Legal Officer. 5
All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for unlawfully engaging in private practice. In
addition, Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment for acts of disloyalty, particularly, for violating the rule against
conflict of interest.

To support their position, the complainants raised that Muñoz had been previously disciplined by the
Ombudsman for two (2) counts of unauthorized practice of profession in OMB-ADM-101-0462, and was
meted the penalty of removal and dismissal from service. The complainants further manifested that Muñoz
had been convicted by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Legazpi City in Criminal Case Nos. 25568
and 25569 for violation of Section 7(b)(2) in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713. 7 Muñoz's
conviction has since become final pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated June 14, 2004 in G.R. No. 160668.

In his respective comments to the complaints, 9 Muñoz claimed that he had requested Governor Al Francis C.
Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to continue his private practice shortly after his appointment. This
request was granted on July 18, 199510 Thereafter, Muñoz submitted the same request to Rafael C. Alunan III,
then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). 11 On September 8, 1995,
Acting Secretary Alexander P. Aguirre granted Muñoz's request, under the following conditions:
1. That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in connection (sic) and that
no conflict of interest with your present position as Provincial Legal Officer shall arise thereby; chanrobleslaw

2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours, the place(s) and under what circumstances you can
engage in private employment shall be fixed by the Governor of Albay to the end that it will not
impair in any way your efficiency; and

3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be a ground for the cancellation and/or revocation of
this authority.12 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara imposed the following conditions upon Muñoz:
a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of Albay; chanrobleslaw

b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic) working hours provided that the efficiency of the
Provincial Legal Office shall not be prejudiced; chanrobleslaw
 c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your Daily Time Record considering the limitation already
mentioned above; [and]

d. In addition to the above enumeration [,] you are to perform functions subject to limitations in Sec.
481 of RA 7160.

Muñoz emphasized that his authority to engage in private practice was renewed by Governor Bichara on July
3, 1998 for his second term ending in July 2001, and again on July 5, 2001 for his third term ending in July
2004.

The complaints were separately referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.15 The complaints were then consolidated through the Order
dated January 16, 2003 issued by Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. 16 Subsequently, the complaints
underwent a series of re-assignments, until finally assigned to Commissioner Dorotea B. Aguila

In his Report dated March 11, 2005 18 (IBP Report), Commissioner Aguila recommended that Muñoz be found
guilty of gross misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). The penalty of suspension from the practice of law for an aggregate period of four (4)
years19 was recommended. On automatic review, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and
adopted Commissioner Aguila's recommendation in a Resolution dated October 22, 2005. 20
On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency and Compassion before the IBP-
BOG, praying that the recommended penalty be reduced to one (1) year. 21 This appeal was denied on January
28, 2006.22

Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency, Forgiveness and Compassion 23
(Appeal) dated April 8, 2006 praying for the reduction of the recommended penalty of suspension for four (4)
years to one (1) year or less, and the dismissal of the complaints for disbarment filed against him. As an
alternative prayer, Muñoz requested that he be granted special limited authority to practice law until all his
pending cases are terminated.

In his Appeal, Muñoz, insisted that when he served as Provincial Legal Officer from June 1995 to May 2002,
he engaged in private practice pursuant to the three (3) written authorities issued by Governor Bichara, and
the written authority of the DILG issued during his first term, which he claims had never been revoked.
Muñoz also argued that no conflict of interest existed between ALECO's old BOD and the NEA management
team, since he was engaged as retained counsel of ALECO as an institution, not its management teams. 25

On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand Muñoz's Appeal to the IBP for disposition. 26

Acting on Muñoz's Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a Resolution reducing the recommended period of suspension
from four (4) to three (3) years.27 Unsatisfied, Muñoz filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the IBP-BOG
denied on December 11, 2008.28
Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this Court through this Joint Petition. In fine, Muñoz reiterates
the allegations in his Appeal, with the additional assertion that the fees he collected from ALECO were
contemplated under their retainer agreement.29

The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG's findings and recommendations.

Muñoz violated the conditions of his

DILG authorization.

Munoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing government time for his private practice. As
correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires government
officers and employees of all departments and agencies, except those covered by special laws, to render not
less than eight (8) hours of work a day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours a week. 30 The
number of required weekly working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where the department or
agency adopts a flexible work schedule.31

Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least eighty-six (86) court appearances in
connection with at least thirty (30) cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001. 32 He merely alleged that his
private practice did not prejudice the functions of his office.

Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government working hours, from
8:00 in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. 33 Additional time is
likewise required to study each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer volume
of cases handled by Muñoz clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in
pursuit of his private practice, in clear violation of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.02 34 of
the CPR.
Muñoz should have requested for
authority to engage in private practice
from the Secretary of DILG for his
second and third terms.

Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be unreasonably construed to have

been perpetual. Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim that he believed in good faith that the
authority granted by Governor Bichara for his second and third terms sufficed.
Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 (Memorandum 17) , which Muñoz himself
cites in his Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. The power to grant
authority to engage in the practice of one's profession to officers and employees in the
public service lies with the head of the department, in accordance with Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules which provides, in part:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial
undertaking without a written permission from the head of Department: Provided,
That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose
duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government: Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in
outside activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the chief of
the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or
employee x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years prior to Muñoz's appointment as
Provincial Legal Officer, hence, he cannot feign ignorance thereof. As a local public official, it
was incumbent upon Muñoz to secure the proper authority from the Secretary of the DILG
not only for his first term, but also his second and third. His failure to do so rendered him
liable for unauthorized practice of his profession and violation of Rule 1.01 35 of the CPR.

Muñoz represented conflicting interests.

Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. In Mabini Colleges, Inc. v. Pajarillo,36
the Court explained the tests to determine the existence of conflict of interest, thus:

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to
fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he
argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other
client." This rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also,
there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to
perform an act which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his
first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)

As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as counsel for ALECO under the
management of the old BOD in the following cases:

A. Civil Case No. 10007 — ALECO (Petitioner) vs. Eleuterio Adonay, NEA Project
Supervisor and his team John Catral et. al., a case filed by Oliver O. Olaybal
and his group. For: Injunction, Accounting with Prayer for Writs of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to stop the election
of the new set of member (sic) of the Board of Directors x x x.
B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. as
Petitioner, also filed by Oliver O. Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus
and Receivership, with Preliminary Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining and Mandatory Orders. Among others, this
Petition was filed to stop the second scheduled election of the ALECO Board of
Directors scheduled for February 23, and 24, 2002. 37 (Underscoring omitted;
additional emphasis supplied)

Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction of the NEA
management team. Muñoz could have easily anticipated that his advice would be sought
with respect to the prosecution of the members of the old BOD, considering that the latter
was deactivated due to alleged mismanagement. The conflict of interest between Olaybal's
board on one hand, and NEA and its management team on the other, is apparent. By
representing conflicting interests without the permission of all parties involved, Muñoz
violated Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR.

In Catu v. Rellosa,39 the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6) months upon a
punong barangay who acted as counsel for respondents in an ejectment case without
securing the authority of the Secretary of DILG. In Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40 the Court
imposed the penalty of one (1) year suspension upon a lawyer who accepted a new
engagement that required him to oppose the interests of a party whom he previously
represented. In view of Muñoz's multiple infractions, the Court finds the recommended
penalty of suspension for an aggregate period of three (3) years proper.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of
Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective upon receipt
of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of any violation hereunder shall
be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 8

IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534, MARCH 18, 1954

FACTS

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. Under the
Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court).

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R. A.
No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No.
12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946.

The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and
shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it
approved Senate Bill No. 371 which is an Act to fix the passing marks for bar examinations from
nineteen hundred and forty-six up to and including nineteen Hundred and fifty-five, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large,
the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate
preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination
papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission.
To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to
the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied
equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not.
ISSUE

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

HELD

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system
from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional

responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the
court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the
Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules
on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those
rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A.
972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

Case No. 9

Title: In re Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 - August 15, 1961

Topic: INCORPORATION CLAUSE (SEC 2)

“ The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations”
IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar without
taking the examination. ARTURO EFREN GARCIA, petitioner.

Parties:
PETITIONER: ARTURO EFREN GARCIA

Facts:

Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without
submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers, among others,
that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City, Province of Negros Occidental, of Filipino
parentage; that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior";
that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for admission
to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course graduating
there as "Licenciado En Derecho"; that thereafter he was allowed to practice the law
profession in Spain; and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the
Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is
entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the required
bar examinations.

After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition on the following grounds:

(1) the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State cannot be invoked by
applicant. Under Article 11 thereof;

The Nationals of each of the two countries who shall have obtained recognition of the
validity of their academic degrees by virtue of the stipulations of this Treaty, can
practice their professions within the territory of the Other, . . .. (Emphasis supplied).

from which it could clearly be discerned that said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino
citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to
practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice
the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country
and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the
Philippines.

(2) Article I of the Treaty, in its pertinent part, provides.

The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degree or diplomas to
practice the liberal professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by
competent national authorities, shall be deemed competent to exercise said
professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and regulations of the
latter. . . ..

It is clear, therefore, that the privileges provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are
made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting State in whose
territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in
connection with Sections 2,9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that
before anyone can practice the legal profession in the Philippine he must first successfully
pass the required bar examinations; and
(3) The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish State could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for the reason that the Executive
Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, the lower to repeal,
alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines. (See
Sec. 13, Art VIII, Phil. Constitution).

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS. AGRAVA

FACTS:

A   petition   was   filed   by   the   petitioner   for   prohibition   

and   injunction   against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of
the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a
circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination
for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that
one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme
Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly
qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office   and   that   
the   respondent   Director’s   holding   an   examination   for   the
purpose   is   in   excess   of   his   jurisdiction   and   is   in   
violation   of   the   law. The respondent, in   reply,   maintains   the   
prosecution of   patent   cases  “   does   not involve entirely  or purely 
the  practice of  law  but includes  the   application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to
include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can
practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the
longtime he is holding tests, this is the first time that his right has been
questioned formally.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation
and the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in
the practice of law.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and
other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
opposition thereto,   or   the   enforcement   of   their   rights   in   
patent   cases.   Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves
the interpretation and application of other   laws   and   legal   
principles, as   well   as   the   existence   of   facts   to   be
established   in   accordance   with   the   law   of   evidence   and   
procedure.  The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the
law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the legal
effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party
may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the
director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office involved
exclusively or mostly technical   and   scientific   knowledge   and   
training, then   logically,  the   appeal should   be   taken   not   to   
a   court   or   judicial   body,   but   rather   to   a   board   of
scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.