State, Class, and Expansion of Education in South Korea: A General Model
Author(s): Insook Jeong and J. Michael Armer
Source: Comparative Education Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 531-545
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Comparative and
International Education Society
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State, Class, and Expansion of Education in South
Korea: A General Model
INSOOK JEONG AND J. MICHAEL ARMER
Few economists, sociologists, or educational researchers have fa
make the point that educational development was critical for the a
ment of rapid economic growth in resource-poor South Korea. Gen
researchers approach the contribution made by education in terms
production of skilled workers and its propagation of the values inst
tal in modernizing economic and social structures.' Based on the hu
capital perspective, these studies take the educational system as giv
are primarily concerned with its consequences for the economy
often overlook the political and economic contexts that affect the
sion of education within a society. Our premise is that educational
sion is driven not only by the economy's need for increasingly spec
labor but also by the interaction between the state and class. This in
tion may shape the expansion of education in ways that do not fit
capital considerations. Our objective is thus to examine the effect of
ular combinations of state and class forces on the expansion of
Korean education at three levels from 1945 to 1988. Our results can be
compared with those from studies elsewhere involving combinations of
state and class forces, with the ultimate goal of specifying a general mod
of educational expansion that incorporates the relative strength of both
state and class.
Previous Evidence
Recent case studies have stressed the importance of the state and s
classes in shaping educational development. Richard Rubinson foc
on the interplay between political structure and class forces to ex
why educational outcomes differed in the United States and Europe,
when they shared similar economic and democratic development.2 In
'Kwang Suk Kim, Rates of Return in Education in Korea (Seoul: U.S. Agency for Internat
Development, 1968); Young Chul Kim, "Educational Contributions to the Economic Develop
Korean Social Science Journal 12 (1985): 120-50.
2 Richard Rubinson, "Class Formation, Politics, and Institutions: Schooling in the United S
American Journal of Sociology 92 (November 1986): 519-48.
Comparative Education Review, vol. 38, no. 4.
? 1994 by the Comparative and International Education Society. All rights reserved.
0010-4086/94/3804-0004$01.00
Comparative Education Review 531
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JEONG AND ARMER
United States, where both the state and social classes were historically
weak, neither exercised control over schooling. The conflict-prone and
decentralized political structure did not enable the state to formulate
unified educational programs, nor did it allow class interests to be reflected
in schooling. Under these institutional circumstances, educational expan-
sion was driven primarily by market and popular demand forces, resulting
in mass schooling at all levels.3 In Europe, however, strong states could
structure powerful class interests in schooling so that an educational sys-
tem developed in which the middle class and working class followed sepa-
rate educational tracks. Accordingly, Rubinson argued that the state's
influence on educational outcomes depended on its ability to constrain
class interests from being translated into politically viable outcomes in
the school system.4
Maurice Garnier, Jerald Hage, and Bruce Fuller further demonstrated
the importance of state strength and explicit state policies in shaping the
educational demands of different social classes in France.5 They found
that the strong French state built a differentiated educational system with
separate mass and elite school systems. The French state promoted the
growth of mass-track schooling while controlling expansion of elite school-
ing. Whereas elite-track growth was determined by economic opportuni-
ties for the predominantly middle-class students, enrollments in the work-
ing-class schools followed the state's expansionary actions, such as
compulsory attendance laws.
In a more recent study, Hage and Garnier compared Italy's weak
state to the strong French state in terms of consequences for class-based
educational structures.6 They argued "that a strong state plays a key role in
creating and maintaining a class-based system of education by restrictin
access to the most prestigious tracks, especially to higher education."'
That is, demand forces are less determinant of educational expansion
under strong states. "Weak states, by contrast, are not in a position to
dictate closure of educational opportunities, since such a closure would
mitigate against some class interests. Therefore, demand models are more
likely to explain educational expansion under such a condition.,"8
SRandall Collins, The Credential Society: A Historical Sociology of Education and Strattfication (New
York: Academic Press, 1979).
4 See Rubinson.
5 Maurice Garnier, Jerald Hage, and Bruce Fuller, "The Strong State, Social Class, and Con-
trolled School Expansion in France, 1981-1975," American Journal of Sociology 95 (September
1989): 279-306.
6 J. Hage and M. Garnier, "Strong States and Educational Expansion: France versus Italy," in
The Political Construction of Education: The State, School Expansion, and Economic Change, ed. Bruce
Fuller and Richard Rubinson (New York: Praeger, 1992).
7 Ibid., p. 156.
8 Ibid.
532 November 1994
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EXPANSION OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA
Although a strong state may be necessary for limiting schoo
sion and reproducing the class structure, it is not in itself s
Whether states can actually impede and channel expansionary f
largely depends on the strength of class forces. Where classes a
a strong state may structure education less to reproduce the cl
ture than to maximize economic growth, political loyalty, or o
purposes.
To understand more fully the determinants and processes of educa-
tional expansion, we need to examine a case in which the state is strong
but classes are weak. South Korea represents such a case, especially duri
the 1950s through the 1970s. As such, it provides an important exampl
for comparison with states having other combinations of state and clas
strengths. Such an analysis can advance the theory of educational expan
sion by specifying the configuration of political and class forces that co
tribute to particular educational outcomes.
South Korea State Regimes
After its liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945, South Kore
built the first modern state system under the occupying U.S. forces. T
colonial bureaucratic structure and coercive political organizations r
mained intact at the core of the Syngman Rhee regime (1948-60).9 A
thority was concentrated in the top state manager, who governed hier
chically ordered bureaucratic apparatuses. Under the centralized comma
structure, various state units strictly conformed to regime policies and
directives.
Under Rhee, South Korea's economy did not significantly change from
its predominantly agrarian basis. During the 1950s, agricultural products
accounted for more than half of the gross domestic product, while manu-
facturing and mining output constituted less than 10 percent.1' Import
substitution industries were developed to produce basic consumer goods
such as foods and textiles, and these industries were financed by large
inflows of foreign aid over which the state had monopolistic control."
Capitalists and workers remained relatively weak vis-a-vis the state.
Import substitution industrialization (ISI) under the Rhee regime led to
the establishment of a few big firms financed mainly by government-
controlled foreign aid and assistance money. The ISI entrepreneurs de-
pended on personal ties with top-ranking government officials for favor
9 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes,
1945-1947 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981).
10 South Korea, Economic Planning Board, Statistical Yearbook of Korea (Seoul, 1955).
"1 Kyung Dong Kim, "Political Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South
Korea," Korean Survey 16 (1976): 465-77.
Comparative Education Review 533
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JEONG AND ARMER
in the capital allocation process.'2 In short, the state's singular control
over aid proved crucial in consolidating its strength and autonomy from
the capitalists.
General Chung Hee Park came into power through a military coup.
His regime (1961-79) inherited the previous government's centralized
authoritarian government structure but turned into a powerful and effec-
tive bureaucracy responsible for central economic planning and control
under presidential dominance. Throughout his rule, Park promoted an
export-oriented industrialization (EOI) policy and maintained monopolis-
tic control over investment, production, and capital allocation.13
The weak position of capitalists did not change under Park. After the
1961 coup, revelations of political and business corruption among ISI
firms left capitalists more vulnerable to government pressure. Further-
more, the government controlled capitalists through diverse economic
and political mechanisms (banking, financing, and taxing) and other in-
centives for voluntary political compliance.'" According to Frederic Deyo,
this mode of capital control "created a domestic bourgeoisie that is depen-
dent upon government access to investment funds and, furthermore, un-
der informal obligation to reciprocate with financial and political support
for the governing party."'5 In short, to gain the state's favor, capitalists
were placed in a competitive relationship with each other that in turn
further curtailed class formation.
Simultaneously, the state adopted a repressive policy toward labor, as
controls from the Japanese occupation and the Rhee regime were further
strengthened under the Park government.16 Under the EOI strategy,
which exploited low-cost labor to produce light manufactured goods for
world markets, the state repressed labor movements, banning the rights
of organization, collective bargaining, and collective action. Labor protests
were mounted in some industries but resulted in few enduring gains
for workers.17
The South Korean workers' lack of power is consonant with the disor-
ganization of their capitalist counterparts. Literature suggests that work-
ing-class formation occurs only to the extent that workers become con-
scious of their class interests as antagonistic to those of capitalists.18 When
"2 Ibid.
13 Clive Hamilton, Capitalist Industrialization in Korea (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1986).
"4 Gary Hamilton and Nicole Biggart, "Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative Analysis
of Management and Organization in the Far East," American Journal of Sociology 94, suppl. (1988):
S52-S94.
15 Frederic Deyo, Beneath the Miracle: Labor Subordination in the New Asian Industria
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), p. 46.
'6 Jang Jip Choi, Labor and the Authoritarian State: Labor Unions in South Korean M
Industries, 1961-1980 (Seoul: Korea University Press, 1989).
17 See Deyo.
18 See Rubinson (n. 2 above).
534 November 1994
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EXPANSION OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA
capitalists are formed as a class, workers are more likely to reco
antagonistic interests and form as a class to oppose them, a
in Europe.
In 1973, the state called for heavy and chemical industrialization (HCI)
to shift the economy's sectoral base from light manufacturing to heavy,
chemical, and high-tech industries. Although this policy spurred a trans-
formation of the South Korean economy, it largely ignored the nation's
comparative advantage in skilled labor. Economic surplus was overinv-
ested in capital-intensive industries, producing inefficiency and working
against market economy principles.? As a result, by the end of the 1970s,
both entrepreneurs and the government felt the ineffectiveness of heavy-
handed government economic control.
The relationship between the state and capitalists began to change
under the regime of Doo Wha Chun (1980-88), a government that was
also created through a military coup. This coup aborted democratic move-
ments that had spread throughout the nation after Park's assassination in
1979. Although the Chun regime maneuvered to sustain central economic
planning and management, it lacked political legitimacy and popular sup-
port. The result was a progressive erosion of state strength relative to the
previous regimes, and the government could no longer ignore external
pressures from capitalists and workers for change and inclusion. Even
though the state still exercised considerable power over capital through
its allocative control, its authority to impose new growth plans lacked
both the strength and support of the past. Most notably, big business
groups that had created a niche for themselves during the HCI period
successfully pressured the government into allowing their participation
in the planning and implementation of economic policy.20 The big capital-
ists who possessed their own management systems and research and devel-
opment structures by 1980 took a leading role in demanding reduced
state intervention and increased reliance on the market.21
The relationship between the state and the working class underwent
less change during the 1980s. Workers did begin to strengthen their own
position, however, given that HCI development required a long-range
investment in a skilled, trained, and efficient labor force.22 The workers'
improved position was felt in large-scale labor strikes against the automo-
bile and shipbuilding sectors and was reflected in more successful
bargaining.
"19 Michael Shafer, "Sectors, States, and Social Forces: Korea and Zambia Confront Economic
Restructuring," Comparative Politics 22 (January 1990): 127-50.
20 Federation of Korean Industries, 1981 Annual Report (Seoul, 1981), pp. 79-80.
2' Eun Mee Kim, "Contradictions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations from
the South Korean Case" (paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological
Association, Pittsburgh, August 1992).
22 Shafer, pp. 135-37.
Comparative Education Review 535
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JEONG AND ARMER
In examining these three regimes, we have found that state strength
was not historically invariant. While the state's internal institutional ar-
rangements remained mostly intact during those 40 years, its strength
changed under the influences of external economic and class forces. From
1950 to 1979, South Korean class forces remained relatively weak, and a
strong centralized state pursued national political and/or economic goals.
In the 1980s, however, state strength diminished as the strength of class
forces increased, thus enabling class interests to exert a greater influence
on political and economic policies. We next examine how the structural
arrangements and changes of the state-economy linkage and state-class
relations affected the state's educational policy and the outcomes of educa-
tional expansion.
South Korea Education Development
In 1948, the Rhee regime established an education ministry to con-
struct a national system because it regarded education essential to nation
building-for example, by mobilizing the populace for the newly con-
structed political community, producing a loyal patriotic citizenry, and
fostering sentiments of anticommunism and national reunification.23 Ac-
cordingly, the central government exerted tight control over education.
This ministry controlled every major aspect of education, including
enrollments, teacher supply, curricula, examinations, and certification.24
At the provincial level, high-rank civil bureaucrats such as governors,
mayors, and county chiefs-appointed by the president-were charged
with approving all public and private schools, teacher appointments, and
supervision of superintendents in school districts.25 Under this arrange-
ment, the educational bureaucracy had no autonomy vis-a-vis the regime.
Instead, it served as a subordinate agent, devising and implementing
specific educational policies consonant with general regime policies.
Backed by extensive American military and civilian aid, the Rhee
regime contiriued to rely on personal autocratic power and centered on
building a militarily strong state to deter communist expansion in East
Asia.26 In this context, it concentrated on promoting political goals without
launching plans for economic development.27 The state used education
"23 J. E. Jayasuriya, Education in Korea: A Third World Success Story (Colombo: Unesco Regional
Office for Education in Asia, 1980).
24 Noel McGinn, Donald Snodgrass, Yung Bong Kim, Shin Bok Kim, and Quee Young Kim,
Education and Economic Development in the Republic of Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1980).
25 Herbert W. Dodge, "A History of U.S. Assistance to Korean Education, 1953-1966" (Ph.D.
diss., George Washington University, 1971).
26 Hyun Chin Lim and Woon Seon Paek, "State Autonomy in Modern Korea: Instrumental
Possibilities and Structural Limits," KoreaJournal 27 (January 1987): 19-32.
27 Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, Growth and Structural Transformation: Studies of Modern-
ization of the Republic of Korea, 1945-1975 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).
536 November 1994
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EXPANSION OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA
TABLE 1
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION (MOE) BUDGET AS A % OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET,
1955-85
Obligations as a % of MOE Bud
MOE Budget
Year (%) Primary Education Postprimary
1955 9.3 74.4 35.6
1960 15.2 80.9 19.1
1970 17.5 76.5 23.5
1980 18.9 62.2 37.8
1985 19.9 62.5 37.5
SOURCEs.- South Korea,
(Seoul, 1988), p. 703.
primarily to promo
best be achieved at
worker socialization
mary education, wh
It was under Park
planning occurred.
ministry designed
with the Economic
planning apparatus.2
policy during the 1
utilizing low-to-mod
and technical education. It abolished middle-school entrance examina-
tions, eased high school admission qualifications, built a less stratifie
high school system, and emphasized technical and vocational educatio
to produce a sufficient stock of moderately educated, disciplined laborer
for the growing manufacturing sector. In short, the state's expansionar
policy toward secondary enrollments was designed to effectively incorpo-
rate the population into the shifting economic system to maximize growth
One indicator of the government's expansionary educational policy
under Park is the rising percentage of the total budget allocated to the
education ministry. As table 1 shows, this percentage doubled betwee
1955 and 1970, accounting for 18 percent of the budget in 1970. The
percentage of the total education ministry budget assigned for postpri-
mary education also doubled, from 19 percent to 38 percent between
1960 and 1980.
The traditionally weak class forces in South Korea did not im
serious limitations on state actions, as both big and small entrepren
28Jayasuriya, p. 49.
29 David C. Cole and Princeton N. Lyman, Korean Development: The Interplay of Politics and E
ics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
Comparative Education Review 537
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JEONG AND ARMER
TABLE 2
NUMBER OF UNION MEMBERS, 1955-88
Number of Union Members
Year (in Thousands)
1955 189
1960 300
1970 473
1980 948
1988 1,707
SOURCE.- South Korea Economic Plan-
ning Board, Statistical Yearbook ofKorea (Seoul,
various years).
had to rely on the state's protection and nurturing to prosper and c
quently did not organize as a class. The absence of a strong capitalist
enabled the state to prevent capitalists from intervening in schoolin
thereby directly reflecting their own interests. As a result, the stat
not limit secondary education to privileged classes or stratify schoo
into different status streams.
At the tertiary level, the Park regime attempted to hold down the rate
of increase and to redirect the modest expansion into engineering, science
and technology, which were directly related to the economy's emerging
industrial needs.30 This restrictive policy was not geared to imposing
system that reproduced the class structure but instead sought to suppress
the production of an overeducated workforce that could not be absorbed
by the economy.
Under Chun, state-class relations began to change. Lacking legitimacy,
the regime became more vulnerable than previous governments to the need
for popular support. It subsequently yielded to pressure from both capitalists
and workers for greater openness and reduced control over the economy
Workers, for example, demanded that the government relax its repressive
policy against labor organizations.31 As a result, the absolute number of
unionized workers doubled between 1980 and 1988, as shown in table 2.
The Chun government's diminishing strength led to an increasing
amount of reformist educational policies. These expanded opportunitie
in higher education and promoted more egalitarian practices by eradicat-
ing the private tutoring system that had favored the middle class in the
entrance examination competition. By extending the narrow charter of
tertiary education to previously excluded citizens, the new government
sought to portray itself as serving the interests of the general population
30 Sah-Myung Hong, "The Republic of Korea," in Schooling in East Asia: Forces of Change, ed.
R. Murray Thomas and T. Neville Postlethwaite (New York: Pergamon, 1983).
31 See Shafer (n. 19 above).
538 November 1994
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EXPANSION OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA
TABLE 3
ENROLLMENT PERCENTAGES OF CORRESPONDING AGE-GROUPS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL,
Educational Level 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Elementary school (ages 6-11) 77 86 92 103 108 105 102 100
Middle school (ages 12-14) 31 33 39 53 74 95 99 99
High school (ages 15-17) 18 20 27 29 41 69 84 84
College (ages 18-21) 5 6 7 9 9 15 28 28
SOURCES.--Noel McGinn, Donald Snodgrass, Yung
Kim, Education and Economic Development in the Repu
sity Press, 1980), p. 47, for the period 1955-75; Sou
Yearbook of Korea (Seoul, 1980, 1985, 1988).
NOTE.-The elementary enrollment ratio for 1970
of compulsory education, students who did not fall
were enrolled for belated education. As these student
the enrollment rate tapered off to the saturation le
As a result, tertiary schooling expanded
cal and class forces rather than economic needs.
Thus, educational expansion in South Korea has been a direct re-
sponse to both political and economic forces. We now examine how this
combination of a relatively strong state and weak class forces affect
enrollment expansion.
South Korean Education Enrollments
From 1950 to 1960, South Korea developed a mass system of
tion at the primary level, a largely undifferentiated and expanding
at the secondary level, and a highly selective system at the tertiar
(See table 3.) Primary school attendance was made compulsory i
and was financed-though not fully-by the state. Students cont
at the secondary and tertiary levels were selected through nati
academic achievement examinations. The rise in secondary school e
ment, which increased exponentially and became virtually unive
the mid-1980s, was especially aided by the abolition of the middle-
entrance exams in 1968. The absence of a class-divided system a
levels and the tight linkage between education and work spurred t
dous popular demand for education, which built on the traditional
cian bent for learning.32 Students entered these lower levels of ed
regardless of social class, gender, or region. At the tertiary level, h
opportunities were sharply restricted by state policies that imposed
ocratic selection and formidable school fees, resulting in a highly co
tive and selective system continuing into the 1980s.
32 For the Confucian cultural tradition of emphasizing education, see Won-Shik Chon
for Education," Korea Journal 26 (October 1986): 45-51.
Comparative Education Review 539
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JEONG AND ARMER
TABLE 4
MEANS OF ENROLLMENT, ENROLLMENT RATIOS, AND CONTINUATION RATIOS AT THE P
SECONDARY, AND TERTIARY LEVEL, 1945-88
Educational Level 1945-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-88
Primary:
Enrollment (in thousands) 2,583.0 4,735.3 5,650.5 5,139.3
(551.8) (720.8) (104.2) (359.0)
Enrollment rate 78.9 92.7 105.9* 105.1*
(7.9) (6.1) (3.7) (4.0)
Secondary:
Enrollment (in thousands) 458.47 1,173.0 2,986.6 4,697.9
(241.2) (275.9) (696.7) (281.7)
Net continuation rate 26.0 33.2 51.2 82.2
(4.9) (2.0) (9.1) (6.7)
Tertiary:
Enrollment (in thousands) 97.6 147.0 290.6 1,034.5
(18.3) (19.7) (94.1) (251.2)
Net continuation rate 24.1 16.8 13.9 23.4
(8.1) (2.4) (1.4) (4.6)
SOURCES.-South Korea, Ministry of Ed
Ministry of Education data from 1945 t
Yung Bong Kim, Shin Bok Kim, and Qu
Republic of Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Ha
NOTE.-Standard deviations are in pa
primary enrollment rate = primary e
net continuation rate = secondary enroll
tion rate = tertiary enrollment/seconda
was computed by dividing the number o
the net continuation rate at the secondar
enrollments at the preceding level. The
* See the note to table 3.
Table 4 presents the mean absolute enrollments and continuati
rates at each level from 1945 to 1988. Enrollments expanded enormousl
at all three levels in the last half-century, as primary students doubled
mean absolute number from approximately 2.6 to 5.1 million, while m
than ten times as many secondary and tertiary students were enrolled
1988 as in the 1950s.
As table 4 shows, compulsory primary schooling started at 80 per
in the 1950s and swiftly increased to 100 percent by the early 1970s
accomplishment of universal primary schooling is largely credited t
high degree of educational mobilization under Japanese rule (1910
as the assimilation policy of Japan's colonial authorities emphasize
education of Koreans exclusively at this level. Accordingly, as ea
1939, elementary enrollments accounted for 35 percent of the age c
and 58 percent by 1943.33
33 Andrew J. Grajandzev, Modern Korea (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, Interna
Secretariat, 1944), p. 262; Man-Kyu Yi, History of Korean Education (Seoul, 1947), pp. 382-
540 November 1994
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EXPANSION OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA
In contrast, the enrollment rate at the secondary level was
at the time of liberation. Among Korean youths, the secondary
ratio was less than 9 percent in 1943-compared to 84 percen
Japanese counterparts living in Korea-and increased to 26
the 1950s.34 Bolstered by the Park government's policy of
secondary and vocational education in connection with the gro
omy, the percentage of primary students continuing secondar
exceeded 50 percent in the 1970s and increased to over 80
the 1980s.
Higher education shows a different pattern. In the 1950s, the continu
ation rate started at 24 percent but fell below 20 percent from the 196
throughout the 1970s. This decline clearly reflects the Park governmen
policy of controlled expansion. In 1961, the government took charge of
all college entrance examinations, which previously had been given b
each university, and fixed admission and graduate quotas for each insti
tute. Starting in 1968, the government adopted a nationally administer
qualifying examination as a mechanism to prescreen the number of app
cants actually sitting for the entrance examinations of each college. Th
ratio of qualified applicants to the nationwide first-year student quota w
maintained at around 1.5 during the 1970s.35
The sharp increase in tertiary enrollment in the 1980s is largely
result of major reforms adopted by the Chun government, especially t
relaxation of college admission quotas. The government allowed 4-ye
colleges and universities to enroll 30 percent over the fixed number th
graduate and 2-year junior colleges to enroll an additional 15 percent.36
Colleges were required to eliminate the surplus of admitted student
before graduation via exit exams and attrition. However, the high absen
teeism among male college students enlisted for compulsory military se
vice reduced the competition within graduate cohorts considerably. Thu
Chun's expansionary policy during the 1980s opened the doors of highe
education and led to sharp enrollment increases without realizing the ai
of postadmission screening. In 1980, the college enrollment rate of t
corresponding age cohorts was 15 percent; by 1985, this figure had almos
doubled to 28 percent of the age groups, with more than a million stu-
dents enrolled.
State, Class, and Education: An Analytic Model
We thus far have examined the relationships among schooling, the
state, social class, and the economy in South Korea. The evidence shows
34 Grajandzev, p. 262.
35 South Korea, Ministry of Education, Statistical Yearbook of Education (Seoul, various years).
36 Shin-Bok Kim, "Recent Development of Higher Education in Korea: Quantity, Quality and
Equality," Korea Journal 23 (October 1983): 20-30.
Comparative Education Review 541
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JEONG AND ARMER
that schooling has been involved in complex relations with political and
economic processes and that each level of schooling has developed distinc-
tively within that web.
Primary schooling expansion in South Korea can be considered an
example of educational expansion driven by the state mainly for political
rather than economic purposes. Primary education was used to mobilize
the populace; that is, they were involved in a direct state-citizen relation-
ship and subjected to the state's authority and dominance. Toward these
ends, primary schooling became a mass system including everyone in the
political community.
The opportunities for secondary schooling were initially limited but
developed into a mass system during the period of rapid economic growth.
Under the economic growth strategy adopted by the state, secondary
education was the appropriate sector to expand for creating a labor force
adequately trained and disciplined for factory work and industrial produc-
tion. Secondary education, thus, developed work-related skills, passed on
ideologies, and integrated broader segments of the population into the
changing economic and social system.
The development of secondary schooling in South Korea demonstrates
an important dynamic of school expansion geared to a growing economy.
Had the economy not created a demand for more highly skilled labor, or
had educated workers been dislocated in the labor market, the strong
South Korean state would not have fostered such rapid growth at the
secondary level. What happened instead was that the state actively sought
to expand opportunities by lifting barriers to school attendance (e.g.,
examinations), supplying additional schools and teachers, and helping a
large private sector to develop. Because the state was strong and classes
were weak, the result was a mass secondary school system, incorporating
members of all economic class backgrounds, both genders, and remote
rural areas as well as urban areas. Therefore, this expansion can be under-
stood in terms of the political and economic contexts that enabled the
state to maintain direct control over the economy and to link educational
development with its economic policy.
Tertiary schooling in South Korea has expanded only slightly, per-
sisting in its enrollment selectivity. To organize education effectively for
the purposes of the economic and political order, the state sup-
pressed-through meritocracy, examinations, and predetermined admis-
sion and graduate quotas-class pressures or status competition that
could have led to a rapid expansion of tertiary education, which was not
required by the economy. An increase in the number of college graduates
could have hampered economic growth by creating a serious imbalance
between the kinds of skills required by the economy and those actually
supplied. Overeducation and unemployment could also have increased
542 November 1994
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EXPANSION OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA
TABLE 5
AN ANALYTIC MODEL FOR EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION
State Strength
High Low
The state effectively implements The state is ineffective; education is
High educational policies reflecting shaped by class struggles and interests
dominant class interests (e.g., France). at local level (e.g., Italy).
Class Strength
The state effectively implements The state is ineffective; education is
Low educational policies designed to meet shaped by popular movements, local
national goals (e.g., South Korea prior struggles, or market forces (e.g.,
to the Chun government). United States).
social conflicts and political strife. To use education effectively as a syst
of social allocation, the South Korean state actively attempted to li
the expansion of tertiary schooling by requiring a highly competi
meritocratic selection system and restricting enrollments and school su
ply. The stronger the state, the more successfully it limited enrollme
and held class-based pressures for expansion in check. As the state we
ened in the 1980s, the tertiary level began to increase but still remain
highly selective and meritocratic.
On the basis of these findings with respect to South Korea and tho
of studies discussed previously, we may lay the foundation for a mod
of educational expansion. Clearly the pattern of educational expan
in South Korea differs from that found in the United States, France,
Italy.37 In particular, it is more restrictive at the postprimary levels-
pecially at the tertiary level-than is true for the United States or Ital
and it is less stratified-especially at the secondary level-than the Fren
system. In contrast, South Korea is similar to France in having a stro
state, similar to the United States in having weak social classes, and unl
Italy in both respects. These distinctions lead to the conception of edu
tional expansion associated with various combinations of state and c
forces shown in table 5.
More specific consequences for educational expansion are associated
with the four combinations of state and class strength. Where both the
state and class forces are weak, unstratified education and general expan-
sion at all levels is probable, as happened in the United States. The
weak state is likely to have difficulty restraining educational expansion in
response to popular demand or pressures from various status groups,
especially when education is instrumental for status attainment.38 A com-
37 See Rubinson (n. 2 above); Garnier et al. (n. 5 above); and Hage and Garnier (n. 6 above).
38 R. Rubinson and B. Fuller, "Specifying the Effects of Education on National Economic
Growth," in Fuller and Rubinson, ed. (n. 6 above).
Comparative Education Review 543
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JEONG AND ARMER
bination of a weak state but strong class forces, as in Italy, leads to a
situation in which the dominant class cannot use the state to effectively
develop and implement educational expansion policies that will preserve
class interests. Although a stratified system of restrictive elite education
may be favored by members of the capitalist class, a weak state will gener-
ally lack the ability to produce politically successful, class-based educa-
tional outcomes on a national level. Instead, local interests and class poli-
tics will generally determine educational outcomes, and these may vary
from region to region. For example, in southern Italy the interests of
local landed gentry were often favored by educational policies restricting
the expansion, diminishing the quality, and limiting the economic returns
of schooling.39
The remaining two combinations involve strong states. In France, the
capitalist class-working through a strong state-obtained a two-tiered,
nationwide system of mass and elite schooling that effectively restricted
entry into prestigious positions to elites while expanding working-class
education for the masses. This led Hage and Garnier to suggest that
strong states usually limit school expansion and stratify education into
different status streams.40 Whether this occurs depends, as Rubinson
noted, on the ability of class forces to translate their interests into politi-
cally successful outcomes-that is, on the strength of social classes within
the society. If classes (and other social factions) are weak, as in South
Korea, the strong state is less likely to tailor educational expansion to
class interests and will instead pursue the state's own political or economic
interests. These state policies may involve either expansion or contraction
of schooling. Such policies are illustrated by the expansion of primary
education to bolster political legitimacy to promote nation-building under
Rhee and by the simultaneous restriction of tertiary education and expan-
sion of secondary education for economic development purposes under
Park. At no level did the strong South Korean state implement separate
elite and mass educational streams, as happened in France. In general,
strong states are also unlikely to allow popular pressures seeking increased
opportunities for social mobility through educational achievement to dic-
tate expansion. Status competition and educational inflation are more
likely under weak state conditions, especially where class forces are also
weak.
Combinations of state and class strength also have implications for
the effects of other factors such as economic growth and modernization on
education. Economic growth is likely to influence educational expansion
where there is a strong state to effectively restrict status competition that
"39 Hage and Garnier, p. 159.
40 Ibid., p. 157.
544 November 1994
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EXPANSION OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH KOREA
leads to educational inflation without regard to economic
state strength does not guarantee that economic growth will h
effects because strong states may also promote educational ex
political or other purposes, as in the case of South Korean
schooling.
Similarly, modernization processes increasing the value of education
have a positive effect on expansion only under conditions in which educa-
tion is perceived as "open" rather than "closed" to subordinate classes.
Stratified educational systems typical of societies with strong class struc-
tures and strong state systems are less likely to show modernization effects,
as in France.
Thus, educational expansion is patterned and understandable in ter
of a society's state and class structural characteristics. This case stud
South Korea helps to clarify the influence of such structures by analy
the state's role in shaping policies to limit or expand education prim
to meet political and economic objectives rather than class interests.
analytical model generated by comparing South Korea with previous
ies of other countries possessing different combinations of state and c
strength provides a foundation for understanding and predicting patt
of educational expansion in society.
Comparative Education Review 545
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