TITLE : THE RIGHTS OF MAJOR UNMARRIIED DAUGHTERS IN HINDU CO-

PARCENARY

SUB-TITLE- In the light of Judgment of Supreme Court in B Chandrashekhar

Reddy v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2003 SC 2322

AUTHOR: Rahul Shrivastava, 2nd Yr. (B.A. L.L.B.), Hidayatullah National Law
University

RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: A-66, Surya Residency, Bhilai, Chhattisgarh, India

Electronic copy available at: [Link]

Abstract

Since the passing of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (‘the Act’), one issue which was constantly
agitated by the liberals was regarding the right of a daughter or a married daughter in
coparcenary property of a Hindu Undivided Family. Some of the States which took the lead in
liberalisation, passed State amendments to the Act, whereby an unmarried daughter married after
the specified date was given a right in coparcenary property. Kerala, Karnataka and Maharashtra
were some such States.

However, the agitation of the liberals still continued. As a result, the Act was amended by the
Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (‘the Amending Act’) which came into force from
9th September 2005. The Amending Act substituted S. 6 of the Act. The provision of S. 6 of the
Act, so far as it relates to this article, is quoted below :

"6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. — (1) On and from the commencement of the
Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara
law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, —

(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;

(b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a
son;

(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son,

and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a
daughter of a coparcener :

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or
alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place
before the 20th day of December, 2004.

Electronic copy available at: [Link]

 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

• N.R. Raghavachariar, Hindu Law- Principles and Precedents, 12th Edition (Madras)
• Satyajeet A. Desai, Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law. 17th ed. 2 Vol. (New Delhi:
Butterworths, 1998)
• Paras Diwan and Peeyushi Diwan, Modern Hindu Law. 10th ed. (Allahabad: Allahabad
Law Agency, 1995)
• Ranganath Misra, Mayne's Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage. 15th ed. (New Delhi:
Bharat Law House, 2003).

• Commentary on the Constitution of India (Vols. 1 & 2 of a Set of 8 Vols.) 8th edition,
2007 By Durga Das Basu, revised by Justice [Link], Justice [Link] &
Justice [Link]

• Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Delhi: Oxford UP:
2003).

TABLE OF STATUTES

1. Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956

2. Hindu Succession Act, 1956

3. Hindu Succession (Andhra Pradesh) Amendment Act , 1985

4. Hindu Succession (Karnataka) Amendment Act , 1994

5. Hindu Succession (Maharashtra) Amendment Act , 1994

6. Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu) Amendment Act , 1989

7. Hindu Women’s Right To Property Act, 1937.

8. Kerala Joint Family System (Abolition) Act, 1976

Contents
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................................................ 3
TABLE OF STATUTES ...................................................................................................................................... 3
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 5
The Approach of the Southern Amendments ............................................................................................... 6
Effect on the Traditional Joint Family and on its Fundamentals .................................................................. 9
A female Hindu’s right to property is governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 ................................. 13
The Response of the Judiciary .................................................................................................................... 14
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................... 16
 INTRODUCTION
The United Nation's Report in 1980 presented that:

"Women constitute half the world's population, perform nearly two-thirds of its hours, receive
one-tenth of the world's income and less than one hundredth of the property." 1

India is a multi-linguistic, multi-cultural and multi-religious state of more than a billion people,
of which almost half comprise females. The principles of fairness and equity are enshrined in the
Constitution of India, that unequivocally mandates gender equality. Discrimination and violence
against women do not just victimize the individual women, but do indeed hold back whole
sections of society. Guaranteeing rights to women is an investment in making the whole nation
stronger and self-reliant. 2

In India, it is particularly the Personal law that principally governs the lives of women, though to
many, the exact dimension and how it controls the lives of each one of us may not be very clear.
Simply stated, Personal law is the set of rules which govern the behavior of individuals vis a vis
their family i.e. spouse, parents, children etc. As often seen, law by itself is no deterrent against
crime. In fact it is the attitude of society in general and the individual in particular that
determines the effectiveness of any legal system. Thus, laws are nothing but codified social
behaviour, so in order to make the law effective there is equally a back-up requirement for social
education and social transformation.

It has been widely observed that the rights that women have under personal law are often
usurped. Though the law provides for a judicial procedure to enforce the law by way of courts as
well as the penalty for violating the law, women being socially and economically subservient are
either unaware or unable to enforce these legal rights through courts. Most common people are
apprehensive and reluctant to approach the court because the language of the law is difficult and
the procedure often extremely complicated, for example, if two people are faced with the same

1
UNDP ‘Convention on equal right to women’,1998
2
Werner Menski, Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Delhi: Oxford UP: 2003).
legal problem, depending on where they reside, their religion etc., the court of jurisdiction and
remedy available to them may be different. 3

The Approach of the Southern Amendments

It will be noticed that reform in the area of property rights for women and daughters in particular
follow two broad approaches. The first being a reformation of the personal law as it stands i.e.
reform the hitherto discriminatory law that devolve property upon males by virtue of birth and
give women similar rights. This approach is liable to the general criticism that it purports to
retain customary-personal laws but tamper with their fundamental principles, which is primarily
directed towards giving only males property rights. The second approach is more direct,
removing all customary-personal laws, which are inherently discriminatory against women on
the ground that they cannot fruitfully be reformed. Both approaches have been attempted in India
with varied results and consequences for the rights of women.

The second more direct approach was attempted in Kerala in 1976 with the Kerala Joint
Family System (Abolition) Act, 1976 which followed the broad recommendations of the Hindu
Law Committee (Rau Committee) and abolished the right of birth under both Mitakshara and
Marumakattayam Law. The Act itself creates consequences that have proved to have both
positive and negative consequences for the rights of women. 4

Firstly, the Act has operation only in Kerala where the existence of matrilineal succession
systems such the Marumakattayam Law also got abolished. While in general ‘right by birth’ as a
principle has been discriminatory against women, in Kerala for instance this may not have been
the case and the legislation adversely affected women who were benefiting by a ‘right by birth’
principle in favor of women. Secondly, the Act is prospective in nature, abolishing devolution of
property by birth, after its enactment, thereby not benefiting women who were previously denied
property on account of this principle. Thirdly, the Act lays down that members of the Mitakshara
coparcenary will hold the ancestral property as tenants-in-common the Act comes into operation
as if a partition had taken place and each of them holding it separately. The property rights of
women may be defeated if the male coparceners dispose the property by testament or by

3
Ibid
4
Ranganath Misra, Mayne's Treatise on Hindu Law and Usage. 15th ed. (New Delhi: Bharat Law House, 2003).
alienation and the act makes no effort to prevent such a manner of defeating the property rights
of the woman. Fourthly, the Act does not confer any rights to daughters in existing coparcenary
properties. 5

The second approach of reform was attempted by the Andhra Pradesh legislature in 1985 where
it attempted to reform the customary Hindu Law by making the Daughter a coparcener and
giving her the same rights as other (previously only male) coparceners. The Andhra Model has
been replicated in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka & Maharashtra. This model will be examined in
greater detail below.

The Pith and Substance of the Andhra Model

Under S.29-A 6 of the Andhra Act 7 the Daughter becomes a ‘coparcener by birth’ and has all the
rights and liabilities as male coparceners i.e. the devolution of coparcenary property to the
daughter would be in the same manner as to the sons. S.29-B provides that coparcenary property
would devolve by survivorship on the daughters. 8 The effect of S.29-C is an example of the

5
Supra at note4
6
(i) In a joint Hindu Family governed by Mitakshara Law, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth
become a
coparcener in her own right in the same manner as a son had have the same rights in the coparcenery
property
as she would have had if she had been a son, inclusive of the right to claim by survivorship; and shall be
subject to the same liabilities and disabilities in respect thereto as the son
(ii) At a partition in such a Joint Hindu Family the coparcenery property shall be so divided as to allot to a
daughter the same share as is allotable to a son;
Provided that the share which a pre-deceased son or a (SIC) deceased daughter would have got at the
partition if he or she had been alive at the time of the partition shall be allotted to the surviving child of
such pre-deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter;
Provided further that the share allotable to the pre-deceased child or a pre-deceased son or of a pre-
deceased daughter, if such child had been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of
such pre-deceased child of such pre-deceased daughter as the case may be.
(iii) any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of the provisions of Clause (i) shall
be held by her with the incidents of coparcenery ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being
disposed of by her by will or other testamentary disposition;
(iv) nothing in this Chapter shall apply to a daughter married before the date of the commencement of the
Hindu Succession (A.P. Amendment) Act, 1989;
(v) nothing in Clause (ii) shall apply to a partition which had been effected before the date of the
commencement of the Hindu Succession (A.P. Amendment) Act, 1989."
7
AP Act 13 0f 1986 w.e.f. 5.9.1985
8
S. Narayan Reddy v Sai Reddy AIR 1990 AP 263
‘special rights’ that would now accrue on the daughter, as she would now be entitled to the right
of preemption in case of certain coparcenary property. Under the Act the ‘new rights and
liabilities’ arise only if (a) a prior partition had not taken place (b) the daughter had not
previously married 9 (c) daughter is a major 10

Prima Facie it appears all seems well in terms of the technical and substantive aspects of the
Andhra model, whether this early assumption is correct remains to be examined. The technical
aspect will now be examined in this sub-section.

The State Acts that create the Andhra model are titled ‘Amendment’ to the ‘Hindu Succession
Act, 1956’ i.e. it wishes to modify the law which is dealt with in the latter Act. Under S.4 (1)(a)-
(b) of the HSA it is clear that the Act does not codify the entire the Hindu Law related to
devolution of property but is the Code only to those areas where specific provisions have been
made. The HSA does not deal with the intricacies devolution of coparcenary property at all (even
S.6 HSA creates only an exception for devolution by survivorship in respect of interest in
coparcenary of the intestate) and therefore devolution (by birth) of coparcenary property is
covered by (uncodified) customary Hindu Law. Thus the Amendments give ‘survivorship rights’
to the daughter (with ‘succession rights’ already given by S.6 of the HSA) i.e. the Amendment
purports to amend a part of the law that is not even dealt with in the Act itself. 11

This fundamental error is carried further (either to tide over colorable nature of the amendment
or because of pure error) in titling the material section of the Andhra, Tamil Nadu &
Maharashtra as “Succession by Survivorship” which it is submitted is an oxymoron! In the
scheme of the HSA ‘devolution of interest of the intestate in coparcenary’ is titled ‘succession’
(obstructed heritage) while ‘devolution of coparcenary property’ (as explained earlier, is in the
domain of customary Hindu Law) is termed ‘survivorship’ (unobstructed heritage). This error
while appearing hyper technical illustrates a conceptual confusion, which may not be overcome
by simply changing the marginal heading of the section because of the fundamental conceptual
flaws pointed out in the previous paragraphs. 12

9
B Chandrashekhar Reddy v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2003 SC 2322
10
G Valli v State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 2004 AP 174
11
N.R. Raghavachariar, Hindu Law- Principles and Precedents, 12th Edition (Madras)
12
Paras Diwan and Peeyushi Diwan, Modern Hindu Law. 10th ed. (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency, 1995)
 Effect on the Traditional Joint Family and on its Fundamentals
As explained earlier the Acts make the daughter a full coparcener and this makes her a member
of her natal family and marriage to another family does not alter this position. In other words she
is a member of two families, her natal family and her husband’s family-- a position of law
hitherto unknown. The Supreme Court in the past has struck down definitions of ‘family’ that are
artificial because they don’t exist in actual practice or because they violate fundamental rules of
legal construction. In Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala a definition of family that included
‘husband, wife, unmarried children or such of them as they exist’ was struck down as
unconstitutional and artificial as they did not exist in actual practice nor in any established
system of law. It remains to be seen if such a modification to the meaning of the ‘family’ that the
amendments have in fact been effected will be sustained, if challenged.

The woman as a karta within traditional Hindu law has not been accepted in practice nor in
theories of Hindu Law. Such an exclusion is based on the logic that ‘only a coparcener can be a
karta’ since women cannot be a coparcener they also cannot be a karta and such logic is
supported by the opinion of the Supreme Court. The amendments however attempt to create
exactly the contrary position making a daughter a karta and thereby technically allowing her to
become a karta of the joint family. 13 As Prof. Sivaramayya has argued this fiction of law could
lead to practical difficulties if a coparcener leaves a daughter from a first marriage and a wife
and children from a second marriage. Potentially the first daughter could claim kartaship over the
second wife’s family (as well as well as manage the affairs of their family) despite being a
14
member of another family (after marriage)-practically a very difficult situation.

The doctrine of pious obligation has posed difficulties in the context of codified law and more so
in the context of women. It has been held that the ‘moral obligation’ to pay of the debts of

13
Commr of Income Tax V Govindram Sugar Mills AIR 1966 SC 24. Also see Kanji v Parmanand AIR 1992 MP
208 and Mangal v Jayabai AIR 1994 Kant. 276
14
[Link], "Coparcenary Rights to Daughters; Constitutional and interpretational Issues," (1997) 3 SCC (J),
P.25.
deceased relatives that arises in the case of male coparceners does not apply to the widow. 15 In
Keshav Nandan Sahay v. Bank of Bihar the court held that the sons were liable for pre-partition
debts incurred by their deceased father with respect to some bank loans while the widow was
not. The court felt that on partition between the coparcener and his sons the widow is allotted a
share in her own right and not as a mere representative of her husband. This position of her
differentiates her from her sons as regards their pious obligations.

In the High Court of Karnataka (where the new amendments operate) took the same view, albeit
before the enactment of the amendments. In Padminibai v. Arvind Purandhar Murabatte the
court felt that because a wife not being a person entitled to a share in the Mitakshara coparcenary
by birth is not bound by the doctrine of pious obligation.

Now applying this reasoning of the Karnataka High Court to a post-amendment scenario-- will
the daughter be liable for pious obligation? Following from the reasoning of the Karnataka High
Court, the wife was excluded from pious obligation simply because she did not have a right by
birth in the coparcenary. Therefore if a daughter acquires a share in the Mitakshara coparcenary
by birth it must follow that she will now be [Link] will have to be adjudicated upon by the
courts to achieve certainty in the matter. 16

Other aspects of Mitakshara Law such as reunion also pose problems because firstly they are
regulated by uncodified Hindu Law and secondly a reunion is only possible between father-sons,
brothers, nephews-paternal uncles totally excluding women. Again as argued above, if the
daughter (or sister or niece) becomes eligible to participate in reunion as coparceners then it will
amount to tampering with uncodified law something, which the amendment to a partial code
cannot effect.

Questionable Distinctions in the Amendments 17

In S.29-A of the Andhra Act the daughter becomes a coparcener “by birth” therefore does this
section apply to only natural born daughters or also to daughters by adoption? Should “birth” be
strictly interpreted so as to exclude the latter? The second questionable distinction is found in

15
Supra at note11
16
Satyajeet A. Desai, Mulla's Principles of Hindu Law. 17th ed. 2 Vol. (New Delhi: Butterworths, 1998)
17
Ibid
S.29-A (iv) where the coparcenary rights are said to accrue only to daughters who remained
unmarried at the time of enactment of the amendment. Should marital status be taken as a
legitimate basis of classification that could exclude some daughters from the rights that the
amendments create for other ‘classes’ of daughters? 18

In Indian constitutional law, exceptions to the “Equality and Equal protection Clause (Art.14)”
are analyzed with the Doctrine of Reasonable Classification. The doctrine which is a juristic tool
allows for certain exceptions to a strict rule of equality if two conditions are satisfied namely (a)
the classes created have been based on some intelligible differentia (b) the classification bears a
rational nexus to the object of the classification. 19

The distinction relating to “birth” will be considered first. It seems that there is an intelligible
differentia between a ‘natural born’ and ‘adopted’ daughter with the reading of the section
providing that “birth” might have to be strictly construed. However it is on the second condition
of rational nexus that the distinction seems untenable. From the reading of the preamble to the
Andhra Act it is clear that it was enacted because “…exclusion of the daughter from
participation in coparcenary ownership by reason of her sex…” is contrary to Art.14 (equality
clause) of the constitution. The emphasis seems to be directed at removing discrimination ‘by
reason of sex’. Does differentiation by “birth” have a rational nexus with the object of the Act,
which is removing discrimination on the basis of sex? It is humbly submitted that the answer is
no. 20

Further support for this argument can be drawn from S.12 of the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956 which severs for the adoptive child (from the date of adoption) all legal
links with his natal family and associates him with only his adopted family. However Prof.
Sivaramayya 21 disagrees arguing that the section does not intend to give coparcenary rights to an
adoptive daughter because of the emphasis on “by birth”. Without going into the substance of his
argument, it may be questioned on the count that one must not assume that the opinion of the
legislature must in all cases be given effect if it results in some absurdity or clear injustice.

18
The position of women in Hindu law: Volume 2 - Page 386 by Dwarka Mittal
19
Commentary on the Constitution of India (Vols. 1 & 2 of a Set of 8 Vols.) 8th edition, 2007 by Durga Das Basu,
revised by Justice [Link], Justice [Link] & Justice [Link]
20
Supra at note8
21
Supra at note14
Judicial review of a number legislative acts have proceeded on the ground of ensuring some
higher values, either intended by the legislature (but not reflected in wording of the enactment
itself) or contrary to the opinion of the legislature itself. 22

The second questionable distinction arises with the use of marital status to exclude daughters
married before the commencement of the Act from its operation. It has been argued the reason
for this distinction might have been the sociological fact that dowry is given to the daughter at
the time of marriage and this would constitute her share. This justification for the differentiation,
it is submitted, would be against public policy especially when there are a number of legal
prohibitions against the custom of dowry. 23

While this distinction in the context of the amendment has not been adjudicated, in other fact
situations, marital status as a ground for differentiation has been held unconstitutional. Thus the
trend of the Apex court seems to go against accepting a differentiation where the ground is
marital status. The opinion of the Supreme Court will reinforce the submission that ‘marital
status’ as a ground of differentiation cannot have a rational nexus to the object of granting
coparcenary rights to daughters in general.

22
Mulla on ‘Principles of Hindu Law’ Twentieth edn. Vol. 1 By S.A. Desai
23
ibid
A female Hindu’s 24 right to property is governed by the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956
Prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 a female Hindu only had a right to
maintenance from ancestral property and a widow had a limited estate which she was disentitled
to part with. The amendment in the act has gone a long way to make the law far more egalitarian.

Now, as an heir a daughter is identically placed to a son as far as inheritance of ancestral

25
property is concerned. The only disability put on a female heir under Section 23 of the Hindu
Succession Act is that a female heir cannot seek partition of the dwelling house till the male
members choose to have such a partition even though if the female heir is single or widowed she
has a right of residence and maintenance. 26

However, there is a substantial difference in the right to succession of the property of a woman.
While a man’s property devolves upon his children, wife and mother at the first instance and
upon his extended family at the second, the property of a woman devolves upon her children at
the first instance, her husband at the second and his relatives at the third. Only in the event that
her husband does not have any family does any right accrue to the family of the women. The
only exception to this rule is that her family inherits property, which devolves upon a woman
from her family.

The Hindu Succession (Amendment ) Bill 2004 proposes to remove the discrimination as
contained in section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by giving equal rights to daughters in
the Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property as the sons have. It is based on the recommendations
of the Law Commission of India as contained in its 174th Report on “Property Rights of Women:
Proposed Reform under the Hindu Law”.

The amendment which will have far reaching implications is the proposal to omit Section 23 so
as to remove the disability on female heirs contained in that section. Section 23 of the Act
disentitles a female heir to ask for partition in respect of a dwelling house wholly occupied by a
joint family until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares therein

24
Vidya Nand Ram (2001) 10 SCC 747; Dhanishta Kalita v Ramakanta AIR 2003 Gau 932
25
Rambai Patil v Rukminibai Vekhande AIR 2003 SC 3109
26
Mulla on ‘Principles of Hindu Law’ Twentieth edn. Vol. II By S.A. Desai
 The Response of the Judiciary

It is clear from the foregoing that though the property rights of Indian women have grown better
with advance of time, they are far from totally equal and fair. There is much that remains in
Indian women’s property rights, that can be struck down as unconstitutional.
The response of the judiciary has been ambivalent. On one hand, the Supreme Court of India has
in a number of cases held that personal laws of parties are not susceptible to fundamental rights
under the Constitution and therefore they cannot be challenged on the ground that they are in
violation of fundamental rights especially those guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 21 27 of the
Constitution of India 28. On the other hand, in a number of other cases the Supreme Court has
tested personal laws on the touchstone of fundamental rights and read down the laws or
interpreted them so as to make them consistent with fundamental rights. Though in these
decisions the personal laws under challenge may not have been struck down, but the fact that the
decisions were on merits go to show that though enactment of a uniform civil code may require
legislative intervention but the discriminatory aspects of personal laws can definitely be
challenged as being violative of the fundamental rights of women under Articles 14 and 15 and
can be struck down. 29 In some earlier decision of the Patna High Court 30, subsequent;y reversed
by a full bench of the same high court 31 and a decision of the Allahabad high court 32,the rule was
made that any property acquired by a female hindu anytime before the commencement of this act
is to be her absolute [Link] fact in one case the Supreme Court has held that that personal
laws, to the extent that they are in violation of the fundamental rights, are void 33. In some

27
Pratap Singh v UOI AIR 1985 SC 1694
28
Krishna Singh Vs. Mathura Ahir (AIR 1980 SC 707), Maharshi Avdhesh Vs. Union of India (1994 Supp (1) SCC
713),Ahmedabad Women Action Group & Ors. Vs. Union of India (1997 3 SCC 573), Pannalal Pitti Vs. State of
A.P. (1996 2 SCC 498)
29
Anil Kumar Mhasi Vs. Union of India (1994 5 SCC 704), Madhu Kishwar Vs. State of Bihar (1996 5 SCC 125),
Githa Hariharan Vs. Reserve Bank of India (1999 2 SCC 228), Daniel Latifi Vs. Union of India (2001 7 SCC 740),
N. Adithyan Vs. Travancore Devaswom Board & Ors. (2002 8 SCC 106), John Vallamattom Vs. Union of India
(2003 6 SCC 611).
30
RA Missir v Raghunath AIR 1957 Pat 480; Janki Kuer v Chharthu Prasad AIR 1957 Pat 674
31
Harak Singh v Kailash Singh AIR 1958 Punj 581 (FB)
32
Hanuman Prasad v Indrawati AIR 1958 All. 304
33
Masilamani Mudaliar Vs. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Thirukoil (1996 8 SCC 525)
judgments the Supreme Court has expressly recommended to the State to carry out its obligation
under Article 44 of the Constitution and formulate a uniform civil code 34.
Another heartening trend is that the Indian courts are increasingly relying on international
standards, derived from various international declarations and conventions 35. Specifically
CEDAW has been referred to and relied upon by the Supreme Court of India in some
judgments 36. These line of judgments give a firm basis for the women of India to demand gender
justice and equal rights on par with international standards.

Apart from the ongoing struggle for a uniform civil code in accordance with the Constitutional
framework, today the India women are fighting for rights in marital property, denied uniformly
to them across all religious boundaries. There is also a significant movement in some of the hill
states, towards community ownership of land by women by creating group titles and promoting
group production and management of land and natural resources by landless women for joint
cultivation or related farm activity. Land rights would be linked directly to residence and
working on land under this approach being lobbied for under the Beijing Platform for Action.
However, the challenges are many: social acceptance of women’s rights in property leads them.
In a country where women continue to be property themselves the road ahead promises to be
long and bumpy.

34
National Textile Mazdur Union Vs. [Link] (1983 1 SCC 224), Mohd. Ahmed Khan Vs. Shah Bano
Begum (1985 2 SCC 556), Jordam Diengdeh Vs. S.S. Chopra (1985 3 SCC 62), Sarla Mudgal Vs. Union of India
(1995 3 SCC 635), Lily Thomas Vs. Union of India (2000 6 SCC 224), John Vellamatham Vs. Union of India (2003
6 SCC 611)
35
For instance: Jolly George Verghese & Anr. v. State Bank of India: AIR 1980 SC 470, Gramophone company of
India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey & Ors.: AIR 1984 SC 667, People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of
India & Anr.: (1997) 3 SCC 433,
36
Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.: AIR 1997 SC 3011, Gita Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India: AIR
1999 SC 1149, C. Masilamani Mudaliar & Ors. v. The Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami: 1996 8 SCC 52
 Conclusion

Empowerment of women, leading to an equal social status in society hinges, among other things,
on their right to hold and inherit property. Several legal reforms have taken place since
independence in India, including on equal share of daughters to property. Yet equal status
remains illusive. Establishment of laws and bringing practices in conformity thereto is
necessarily a long drawn out process. The government, the legislature, the judiciary, the media
and civil society has to perform their roles, each in their own areas of competence and in a
concerted manner for the process to be speedy and effective.

These amendments can empower women both economically and socially. and have far-reaching
benefits for the family and society. Independent access to agricultural land can reduce a woman
and her family's risk of poverty, improve her livelihood options, and enhance prospects of child
survival, education and health. Women owning land or a house also face less risk of spousal
violence. And land in women's names can increase productivity by improving credit and input
access for numerous de facto female household heads.

Making all daughters coparceners like wise has far-reaching implications. It gives women
birthrights in joint family property that cannot be willed away. Rights in coparcenary property
and the dwelling house will also provide social protection to women facing spousal violence or
marital breakdown, by giving them a potential shelter. Millions of women - as widows and
daughters - and their families thus stand to gain by these amendments.