1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

R – 24

1ST NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2019

Before

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF REPUBLIC OF INDUSTAN

(SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION UNDER)

(ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF INDUSTAN)

IN THE MATTER OF

SURESH ..................................................................................................................PETITIONER

SIDDHART................................................................................................................PETITIONER

HUMAN WELFARE ORGANISATION..................................................................PETITIONER

V.

REPUBLIC OF INDUSTAN................................................................................RESPONDENT

BEFORE SUBMISSION

TO THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION OF JUSTICES OF

THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDUSTAN

MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

DRAWN AND FILED BY THE COUNCILS FOR THE RESPONDENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS__________________________________________________IV

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES________________________________________________V - IX

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION_____________________________________________X

STATEMENT OF FACTS________________________________________________XI - XII

STATEMENT OF ISSUES__________________________________________________XIII

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS_________________________________________XIV - XV

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED_______________________________________________1 - 18

[Link] SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY SURESH AND SIDDHART ARE

NOT MAINATAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF

INDUSTAN.__________________________________________________________________1

I.1. NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTS AND

SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE IN THE PRESENT CASE._______1

I.2. THE PETITIONER HAVE LOST THEIR CREDIBILITY._________________2

I.3. THERE WAS NO INJUSTICE DONE BY THE LOWER COURTS._________3

II: THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE & PROTECTION
OF CHILDREN) ACT, 2015 ARE WITHIN THE AMBIT OF CONSTITUTION AND
SHOULD BE UPHELD._______________________________________________________3

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II.1. THE PROVISIONS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT, 2015 ARE WITHIN THE

AMBIT OF THE CONSTITUTION.______________________________________4

II.2 THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT, 2015 ARE VALID

AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.__________________________________________6

III:THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THE

OFFENCE OF WHICH SIDDHART HAS BEEN CONVICTED._____________________9

III.1 THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES ARE CONCLUSIVE IN

NATURE._________________________________________9

III.2 S.K. KUMAR’S STATEMENT CAN BE RELIED UPON.____________12

IV: THAT THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SURESH ARE VALID AND

SHOULD BE UPHELD._______________________________________________________14

IV.1. SURESH IS GUILTY OF HEINOUS OFFENCE FOR WHICH HE IS

CONVICTED AND SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE AN ADULT._____________15

IV.2. THE PROCEEDINGS OF SESSION COURT AND HIGH COURT WERE

VALID AND BE UPHELD.____________________________________________18

PRAYER._________________________________________________________________XVI

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

1. SLP SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION

2. SC SUPREME COURT
3. ART ARTICLE
4. ROI REPUBLIC OF INDUSTAN
5. ¶ PARA
6. AIR ALL INDIA REPORTER
7. ICCPR INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON CIVIL AND

POLITICAL RIGHTS, 1966

8. UNCRC UNITED NATION CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE

CHILDREN
9. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
10. SEC SECTION
11. U.P. UTTAR PRADESH
12. IO INVESTIGATING OFFICER
13. UK UNITED KINGDOM
14. JJ JUVENILE JUSTICE
15. CRPC CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
16. IPC INDIAN PENAL CODE
17. HC HIGH COURT
18. UDHR UNIVERSAL DECLERATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
19. ECHR EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Serial Referred

No. CASES to in:

1. Aiyar, P Ramanatha, The Law Lexicon 49 (2nd Edition 2006). 33
2. Ameerunnissa Begum vs. Mahaboob Begum, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 91 ¶11;  19
3. Arunachalam v. Sethuratnam, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1284. 16
4. Ashish Batham v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 3206. 25
5. Ashok Kumar v. State of M.P, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1890. 25
6. Babulal Amthalal Mehta v. Collector of 19

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Customs, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 877 ¶16.
7. Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical works ltd. v. Employees, A.I.R. 1969 17
S.C.R. (2) 113.
8. Bishnudas Behra v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1997 Cril LJ 2207. 31
9. Central Bank of India v. Workmen, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 12. 16
10. Chenga Reddy and Ors. V. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1996 Cri LJ 3461 25
11. Chhotka v. State of W.B., A.I.R. 1958 Cal 482. 30
12. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India And others, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 18
41.
13. Com v. Webster, 5 Cuch 295, 316. 30
14. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Patranu Dass Raja Ram Beri, A.I.R. 1982 33
PH 1, 4.
15. Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt, A.I.R. 1972; 15
16. CSIR v. K.G.S Bhatt, A.I.R. 1989 S.C.1972. 17
17. D.C Bhatia [Link] Of India, A.I.R. 1955 S.C.C. 104. 18
18. Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 2 S.C.R. 570. 29
19. Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT West Bengal, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 65. 15
20. DPP v Kilbourne, 1973 2 WLR 254 (HL) ¶276-77. 26
21. Empress v. Rama Birapa, 1878 3 Bom 12, 17. 30
22. Gade Lakshmi v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2677 ¶2681. 30
23. Gopi Nath v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 237. 32
24. Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 609. 19
25. Gurbakhsh Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 320. 16
26. Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1984 S.C.R. 1 88. 27
27. Karnataka v. Mangalore University Non Teaching Employees Association, 19
A.I.R. 2002 3 S.C.C. 302 ¶10;
28. KeshavLal v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 1221. 30
29. Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 2000 254 I.T.R. 360 S.C. 16
30. Lakshmi Kirsani v. State, A.I.R. 2001 Cri LJ 3648. 25
31. Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2503. 26
32. McCauley v. Vine, 1 WLR 1977 (CA). 30
33. Miller v Minister of Pensions, 1947 2 All ER 372,373. 28
34. Miller v. Alabama, 2012 567 U.S. 21
35. Mulakh Raj v. Satish Kumar, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1175. 29
36. Nawrot v. Chief Constable of Hampshire, 1992 CLY 3346. 30
37. Nirmala v. Ashu Ram, A.I.R. 2000 Cri Lj 2001. 30
38. Ombalika  Das v. Hulisa Shaw, A.I.R. 2002 4 S.C.C. 539 ¶11. 19
39. Pritam Singh v. The state, A.I.R. 1950 169; 16
40. R v Exall, 1866 4 F & F 922 Pollock CB ¶929. 24
41. R v. Sharp 1988 1 All ER 65, HL. 28
42. Ramesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 327. 18
43. Reg. v. Hodge, 18380 2 Lew 227. 25
44. S.B Minerals v. M/s. M.S.P.L Ltd, AIR 2010 S.C. 1137. 15

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45. Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 715. 17

46. Sara J. Kruzan Case. 22
47. SDS Shipping (P) ltd. v. Jay Container Services Co.(P) ltd., A.I.R. 2003 9 16
S.C.C. 439.
48. Son Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1142 30
49. Southern Steel ltd. v. Jindal Vijaynagar Steel Ltd., A.I.R. 2008 5 S.C.C. 16
762.
50. Sri Batcha Khamari v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1997 77 CLT &11. 31
51. State of A.P v. I.B.S.P Rao, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 520. 27
52. State of H. P. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1277. 15
53. State of Illinos v. Davis, 2014 IJ 115595. 22
54. State of Maharashtra v. Vilas Pandurang, A.I.R. 1999 Cr LJ 1062 ¶1066. 30
55. State of Maharashtra v. Meyer Hans George, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 722. 33

56. State of Orissa v. Balram Sahu, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 33: 2002 SCW 4421. 18
57. State of Rajasthan v. N.K, A.I.R. 2000 S.C.W. 1407. 28
58. State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Shrivastava, A.I.R. 1992 1 S.C.R. 37 25
59. State of U.P. v. Babu Ram, A.I.R. 2000 Cri Lj 2457. 30
60. State of U.P. v. Ram Manorath, A.I.R. 1972 3 S.C.C. 215 (S.C.). 17
61. State of Bombay v. Balsara, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318. 19
62. Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust, A.I.R. 2011 2 19
S.C.C. 575.
63. TVL Sundaram Granites v. Imperial Granites Ltd., A.I.R. 1999 8 S.C.C. 17
150.
64. Union of India v. Rajeshwari & Co., A.I.R. 1986 161 ITR 60 (S.C.). 16
65. UOI v. Rajeswari & Co., A.I.R. 1986 1748 S.C. 17
66. Vishnu Undrya v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 2005. 31
67. Vithal Eknath Adlinge v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 2009 11 S.C.C. 637. 25

INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS

1. The Australian Evidence Act, 1995 §55. 26
2. The New Zealand Evidence Act, 2006 §7, cl.3. 26
3. The United States Federal Rules of Evidence §401. 26
4. Youth Criminal Justice Act, 2002 Section 38(2)(a). 22
BOOKS
1. 11.3 Halsbury‟s, Laws of England 1374 (5th edition LexisNexis 28
Butterworths 2010).
2. B M Prasad & Manish Mohan, The Law of Evidence 75 (25 th Edition 30
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal 2013).
3. Buzzard, John, May, Richard, Howard, M.N., Phipson on Evidence 63 25
(12th Edition Sweet & Maxwell London).

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4. David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan‟s, Criminal Law (13th Edition Oxford 28
University Press 2011).
5. DD Basu’s, Shorter  Constitution  of  India 81(14th Edition 2009). 19
st
6. Justice Y V Chandrachud, The law of Evidence 12 (21 Edition Ratan lal 25
dihirajlal).
7. K.D. Gaur, Indian Penal Code 475 (5th Edition Universal Law Publication 32
Co. 2014).
8. Basu D.D, Constitution of India ,14th edition 2009, LexisNexis,
Butterworths Wadhwa Publication Nagpur.
9. BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY (West Group, 7th ed.)
10. Jain M.P., Indian Constitutional Law, 6th Edition 2011, LexisNexis
Butterworth Wadhwa Nagpur.

ARTICLES
1. Buzzard, John, May, Richard, Howard, M.N., Phipson on Evidence 164 27
(12th Edition Sweet & Maxwell London).
2. Hari Om Tripathi and Shourya Raj, Stages of School Education in India, 31
[Link]/a/stages-of-school-education-in-india.
3. J. F. B., The American Law Register, Vol. 16, No. 12, New Series Volume 25
7 1852-1891 pp. 705-713.
4. Jo Shaw, Jo Hunt & Chloe Wallace, Evidence Raymond Emson 15 (4th 23
Edition Palgrave Macmillan 2006).
5. Jo Shaw, Jo Hunt & Chloe Wallace, Evidence Raymond Emson 15 (4th 26
Edition Palgrave Macmillan 2006).
6. National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) 2013, Juvenile in conflict with 18
Law. 
7. Roberson Cliff,Juvenile Justice:  Theory and Practice.  CRC Press,  ISBN 22
9781439813775 (20100820).
8. Wigmore John H., The Principles of Judicial Proof: As given by Logic, 25
Psychology and General Experience and Illustrated in Judicial Trials,
(Little, Brown and Company 632 1913).
9. Wigmore, John H., The Principles of Judicial Proof: As given by Logic 23
Psychology and General Experience and Illustrated in Judicial Trials 632,
Little, Brown and Company 1913.

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Respondents have approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 136 of the

Constitution of Republic of Industan, 1950. Article 136 of the Constitution of Domalia reads as

hereunder:

“136. SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL BY THE SUPREME COURT.

(1) NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING IN THIS CHAPTER, THE SUPREME COURT MAY,

IN ITS DISCRETION, GRANT SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM ANY JUDGMENT,

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DECREE, DETERMINATION, SENTENCE OR ORDER IN ANY CAUSE OR MATTER

PASSED OR MADE BY ANY COURT OR TRIBUNAL IN THE TERRITORY OF INDIA.

(2) NOTHING IN CLAUSE (1) SHALL APPLY TO ANY JUDGMENT, DETERMINATION,

SENTENCE OR ORDER PASSED OR MADE BY ANY COURT OR TRIBUNAL

CONSTITUTED BY OR UNDER ANY LAW RELATING TO THE ARMED FORCES.”

STATEMENT OF FACTS

BACKGROUND: Suresh was a domestic worker since past six years under employment of Mr.

Chopra after he dropped out from government school from sixth standard. He was ill treated by

Shubhangi and Shubham children of Mr. Chopra. One day while performing their routine, Shubham

had an intense fight with Siddhart in the park. Siddhart and Shubham had animosity since childhood.

On 7th March, 2018, Suresh took permission from Mr. Chopra to go to his village on leave for 3

[Link] 8th March, 2018, [Link] had planned to go to a painting exhibition with her children.

At 7:30 p.m. Shubham sensed Shubhangi was missing. Shubham reached basement in search of

Shubhangi where he saw four guys trying to outrage her modesty. When Shubham tried to save his

sister, he was hit by rod on head and abdomen which later caused his death and Shubhangi was killed

by strangulation.

INVESTIGATION: On 10th March IO arrested Siddhart on the basis of statement by S.K. Kumar

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who saw Siddhart sneaking out of the basement on the night of 8 th March, 2018. On 12th March Suresh

along with Dharmesh and Suraj(aged 17 years) were arrested who were Siddhart’s friend.

PROCEEDINGS IN JUVENILE BOARD, SESSION COURT & HIGH COURT: On 15th March,

2018 case of Suresh & Siddhart was referred to Session court by Juvenile Board as they were found

capable of committing offences for which they were charged. Siddhart’s case was later remanded back

to Juvenile board where he was sentenced for three years of remand in special homes. Suresh

requested for a bone test for age determination as his age was not proved, which was denied by the

court & was sentenced three years of imprisonment. Later a cross appeal was filled by Mr. Chopra in

which High Court found Suresh & Siddhart guilty u/s 302 of penal code & were sentenced life

imprisonment and imprisonment for a period of 10 years respectively.

And now this SLP filled by Suresh and Siddhart lie before the Hon’ble Apex Court of Industan.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The following issues are to be adjudicated upon in the instant case:

ISSUE NO.I: Whether The Special Leave Petition filed By Suresh And Siddhart Are

Maintainable Before The Hon’ble Supreme Court Of Industan.

ISSUE [Link]: Whether the Provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection Of Children)

Act, 2015 classifying among Juveniles are within the ambit of Constitutional and International

Provisions.

ISSUE [Link]: Whether the evidences on record are sufficient to prove the offences of which

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Siddhart has been convicted.

ISSUE [Link]: Whether the Criminal proceeding initiated against Suresh were valid and be

upheld.

SUMMARYARY OF ARGUMENTS

CONTENTION I: THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY SURESH AND

SIDDHART ARE NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF

INDUSTAN.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Industan that the Special Leave Petition

filed by Suresh and Siddhart are not maintainable as Special Leave cannot be granted when substantial

justice has been done and no exceptional or special circumstances exist for case to be maintainable.

The petitioners have lost their total credibility because of their own conduct they are not entitled to

any indulgence under the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 136. Special leave should be

granted only when there is failure of justice or when substantial injustice is done. In the present case

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both the accused where tried in accordance to the provisions of law and when found guilty were

sentenced as per the provisions Juvenile Justice and Code of Criminal Procedure. The matter of the

petition is ineligible to be tried by the apex court as there has been no injustice being served by the

lower courts.

CONTENTION II: THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE &

PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT, 2015 ARE WITHIN THE AMBIT OF

CONSTITUTION AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the objective of Juvenile Justice System is

rehabilitation of Juveniles. The differential treatment of juveniles in conflict with law for Heinous

offence aged 16-18 years are hardened and need a stricter treatment for their rehabilitation. There is a

steep rise in heinous crime rates by these category of juveniles and several nations like U.K, U.S.A

have adopted this stricter policy to check these crimes. The provisions of Juveniles Justice Act are

within the ambit of the constitution provisions under articles 14, 15(3), 21 and provisions of Directive

principles, Part IV and international conventions and hence are valid.

CONTENTION III:THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE

THE OFFENCE OF WHICH SIDDHART HAS BEEN CONVICTED.

It is humbly submitted that the evidence presented at the trial stage are sufficient and conclusive

evidence to show that Siddhart is indeed guilty of the aforementioned offences. The circumstantial

chain is complete and leaves no reasonable doubt or any hypothesis pointing towards the innocence of

Siddhart. The chain is sufficient and carries with it the Probative force to sustain a conviction. The

Statement of S.K. Kumar is a circumstantial evidence of identity therefore can be corroborated with

other circumstances to draw inference of Siddhart’s guilt. It is further submitted that Siddhart was

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convicted after case was proved beyond reasonable doubt and not merely on the basis of his presence

in exhibition.

CONTENTION IV:THAT THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SURESH ARE

VALID AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

It is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble court that Suresh is in conflict with law for committing

heinous offence and was found to have sufficient capability for understanding the nature of his act.

Therefore he must be tried like an adult as stated by Section 15 and 18(3) of the JJ act, [Link]

evidence presented proves his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and no inference of innocence can be

drawn. There was no need for courts to conduct bone ossification test as per provisions of Sec. 94 of

the JJ Act, 2015. The punishments sentenced to Suresh are in accordance to the juvenile justice system

and therefore, it is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble court that the decision of lower courts should

be allowed to stand as the proceedings were proper.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

CONTENTION I: THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION FILED BY SURESH AND

SIDDHART ARE NOT MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF

INDUSTAN.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Industan that the Special Leave Petition

filed by Suresh and Siddhart are not maintainable as Special Leave cannot be granted when substantial

justice has been done and no exceptional or special circumstances exist for case to be

maintainable.1Since the laws are certain about the case and there is no substantial question of law, the

case cannot be held to be an exceptional one.

I.1. NO EXCEPTIONAL AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTS AND SUBSTANTIAL

JUSTICE HAS BEEN DONE IN THE PRESENT CASE.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the instant petition does not contains any

substantial question of law as the issues in conflict are within the ambit of law. It being an exceptional

and overriding power, naturally, it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special

and extraordinary situations.2Siddhart and Suresh were found guilty under charges for committing

murder and outraging the modesty of women and were tried by the court in accordance with law.

Special leave will not be granted when there is no failure of justice or when substantial justice is done,

though the decision suffers from some legal errors.3

It is contended by the Respondent that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law

1
S.B Minerals v. M/s. M.S.P.L Ltd, AIR 2010 S.C. 1137.
2
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT West Bengal, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 65.
3
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt, A.I.R. 1972; State of H. P. v. Kailash
ChandMahajan, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1277.

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rather it involves pure question of fact and hence, is not maintainable. Questions of fact cannot be

permitted to be raised unless there is material evidence which has been ignored by the high court or

the finding reached by the court is perverse. 4 In the case of Gurbakhsh Singh v State of Punjab

(1955) AIR 320 (SC), it was held that the SC cannot consistently with its practice convert itself into a

third court of facts.5

In the case at hand, no exceptional and special circumstances have been shown by the petitioners.

Laws related to minors are clearly mentioned in the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)

Act. The powers conferred to apex court under Article 136 should be exercised only in some

exceptional cases6 and the present case is made out, therefore should be dismissed 7 without wasting

the precious time of the apex court.

I.2. THE PETITIONER HAVE LOST THEIR CREDIBILITY.

It is submitted by the Respondents that the Special Leave shall not be granted to decide hypothetical

question since Article 136 is an appellate jurisdiction and not an advisory. 8Where the petitioner has

lost their total credibility because of their own conduct they are not entitled to any indulgence under

the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 136.9 As the petitioner has lost all their cases in the court

of law, both the accused have been found guilty in all the lower courts and have lost their credibility.

The remedies under Article 136 need not to be exercised in a careeven when the impugned judgement

is found to be erroneous, if by reason substantial justice is done.10

In plethora of cases, it has been held that except that where there has been an illegality or an
4
Union of India v. Rajeshwari & Co., A.I.R. 1986 161 ITR 60 (S.C.).
5
Gurbakhsh Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 320.
6
Pritam Singh v. The state, A.I.R. 1950 169; Arunachalam v. Sethuratnam, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1284.
7
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 2000 254 I.T.R. 360 S.C.
8
Central Bank of India v. Workmen, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 12.
9
Southern Steel ltd. v. Jindal Vijaynagar Steel Ltd., A.I.R. 2008 5 S.C.C. 762.
10
SDS Shipping (P) ltd. v. Jay Container Services Co.(P) ltd., A.I.R. 2003 9 S.C.C. 439.

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irregularity of procedure or a violation of principle of natural justice resulting in the absence of a fair

trial or gross miscarriage of justice, the SC does not permit a third review of evidence with regard to

question of fact in cases in which two courts of fact have appreciated and assessed the evidence with

regard to such questions.11

I.3. THERE WAS NO INJUSTICE DONE BY THE LOWER COURTS.

The Respondents submits that Special Leave shall not be granted when there is no serious prejudice is

caused to the Petitioner by the impugned direction of the lower courts 12 or some violations of the

principals of natural justice or substantial or grave injustice have been done. 13 Special leave should be

granted only when there is failure of justice or when substantial injustice is done. 14 In the present case

both the accused where tried in accordance to the provisions of law and when found guilty were

sentenced as per the provisions Juvenile Justice and Code of Criminal Procedure. The matter of the

petition is ineligible to be tried by the apex court 15 as there has been no injustice being served by the

lower courts.

Therefore, after examining the case on the touch-stone of the afore-noted legal principles, it is humbly

submitted before this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Republic of Industan that the special leave petition

filed by the Petitioners are not maintainable.

CONTENTION II: THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE &

PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT, 2015 ARE WITHIN THE AMBIT OF

CONSTITUTION AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

11
State of U.P. v. Ram Manorath, A.I.R. 1972 3 S.C.C. 215 (S.C.); UOI v. Rajeswari & Co., A.I.R. 1986 1748 S.C.
12
TVL Sundaram Granites v. Imperial Granites Ltd., A.I.R. 1999 8 S.C.C. 150.
13
Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 715.
14
CSIR v. K.G.S Bhatt, A.I.R. 1989 S.C.1972.
15
Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical works ltd. v. Employees, A.I.R. 1969 S.C.R. (2) 113.

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The Respondent humbly submits that the objective of the JJ Act, 2015 was to consolidate and amend

the law relating to children alleged and found to be in conflict with law and children in need of care

and protection by catering to their basic need. The Juvenile Justice act seeks to rehabilitate children

from their juvenile criminal behaviour. The Statistics show that there is an increase in number of

heinous offence by the children of age 16 – 18 years.16 The act provides a stricter and more effective

trail, since they are more dangerous delinquents to the society and increases the chance of their

reformation. These provisions are not violative of constitutional provisions and do not hamper the

rights of the children.

II.1. THE PROVISIONS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT, 2015 ARE WITHIN THE AMBIT OF

THE CONSTITUTION.

It is humbly submitted that the separate treatment of Juveniles charged for heinous offences is within

the principles of Article 14 of the act. As, the article provides for equal protection of law in equal

circumstances.17 The section 15 of the act lays down that if a child of age 16 – 18 years is found in

conflict with law for committing a heinous offence and has sufficient mental and physical capacity to

commit such crime he will be prosecuted under the provisions of section 18(3) of the act that is the

trail of the child will be conducted similar to the trail of the adult by the children court. The children

with mental and physical capability to commit the heinous crime are the serious deterrents unlike the

other children and therefore there arises a need for a stricter trail so as to rehabilitate them in an

effective way. It is a reasonable classification 18 of juveniles who are capable enough to commit

heinous crimes and doesn’t violates article 14 as these provisions are aimed to attain the common

16
National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) 2013, Juvenile in conflict with Law. 
17
State of Orissa v. Balram Sahu, A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 33: 2002 SCW 4421; D.C Bhatia [Link] Of India, A.I.R. 1955
S.C.C. 104.
18
Ramesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 327.

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objective of the juvenile justice system that is rehabilitation of children in conflict with law .19

The juvenile justice system provides protection to the children because they don’t have sufficient

mental ability to understand the nature or consequence of their act. But the JJ Act provides

application of Section 18(3) only on juveniles who have been in conflict with law for heinous offence,

are aged 16 – 18 years and have sufficient physical and mental capability to commit the crime and to

understand the nature and consequence of their act, which means that they are equal to an adult in

capability to commit crime and hence should be treated in more effective way for their rehabilitation.

The discrimination is unfound when the reasonable classification is conductive for functioning

of modern society20 and mere deferential treatment is not violation of Article 14 of the constitution 21

unless there are no valid reason for such treatment.22

The respondent also submits that Article 14 doesn’t prohibit reasonable classification for the purpose

of legislation provided that the classes are reasonably classified and well defined for implementation

of any policy.23 However for a legislation to be reasonable it must be found on

intelligible differentia and the differentia must havearational relation

totheobjectoughttobe achieved by the statute.24 The Juveniles of age 16 – 18 years of age are treated as

adults only if they are found competent enough under the provisions of Section 18(3) of the act as

there can be no set formulae or age bar to define the capability of the child nor it is prudent for a

classification to be scientifically accurate for being valid as the circumstances are never same in every

case,25 the court examines the accused and it is only after that the accused if found competent is tried
19
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India And others, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41.
20
Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust, A.I.R. 2011 2 S.C.C. 575.
21
State of Bombay v. Balsara, A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318.
22
 Ameerunnissa Begum vs. Mahaboob Begum, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 91 ¶11; Babulal Amthalal Mehta v. Collector of
Customs, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 877 ¶16. 
23
DD Basu’s, Shorter  Constitution  of  India 81(14th Edition 2009). 
24
Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 609.
25
Karnataka [Link] University NonTeaching Employees Association, A.I.R. 2002 3 S.C.C. 302 ¶10;
Ombalika Das v. Hulisa Shaw, A.I.R. 2002 4 S.C.C. 539 ¶11.

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as an adult.

It is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble court that the act reasonably classifies among the juveniles

based on the gShubhamty of the offences they are capable of committing and lays down effective

measures for achieving the objective of the juvenile justice system that is proper rehabilitation and

reformation of the juveniles.

Constitution confer powers and impose duties, under clause (3) of article 15, clauses (e) and (f) of

article 39, article 45 and article 47, on the State to ensure that all the needs of children are met and to

make provisions for their welfare. The Act seeks to rehabilitate the juveniles in an effective way. The

provisions of section 15 of the act apply a stricter approach on offenders aged 16 – 18 years, charged

for heinous crimes as they are capable of committing heinous crimes and are hardened offenders and

can be effectively rehabilitated by stricter provisions. Under the provisions of the Article 15(3) the

state is empowered to make special provisions for the children. The respondent submits that which

means even if the legislature makes any special provisions for children it won’t be unconstitutional

and is not discriminatory in nature. The act objects for welfare of children in need of help or in found

to be in conflict with law. The special treatment of children charged for heinous offence is in

pursuance of the objective of the Juvenile justice system that is reformation of juveniles and making

them able to live a dignified life as protected under Article 21.

II.2 THE PROVISIONS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE ACT, 2015 ARE VALID AND

SHOULD BE UPHELD.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that juvenile justice system protects the juveniles

for the regressivecriminal law as they lack sufficient capability to understand the nature and

consequences of the act. But the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 provides for treatment of

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juveniles of age 16 – 18 years as an adult by the children court who are charged for heinous offences

if they have sufficient physical and mental capacity to understand the nature and consequences of their

act. It is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble court that such juveniles should be treated by stricter

procedure as they have similar capability to that of an adult to commit a crime. Their reformation can

only be achieved if they are given a stricter treatment because of their extreme violent nature and

capability equal to an adult to commit crime.

NCRB data shows that the percentage of juvenile crimes, whenseen in proportion to total crimeshas in

creased from 1% in 2003 to 1.2% in 2013.  During the same period, 1618 year olds accused

of crimes as a percentage of all juveniles accused of crimes increased from 54% to 66%.  The juvenile

justice act, 2000 provided protection to children below the age of 18 years which gave immunity to

offenders to take shield behind the laws and commit crime. If serious steps are not being taken this

trend will take dangerous proportions. Crime syndicates are taking advantage of the juvenile age and

increasingly involving in heinous crimes, knowing fully well that they cannot be punished.

The section 15 of the JJ act, 2015 deals with such offenders who have capacity to understand the

nature and consequence of their act and have sufficient capacity to commit the crime. Providing

protection to them would be abuse of law and against the society. To control the increasing rate of

crimes in the society by such juveniles of age 16 – 18 years it is necessary that these provisions should

be upheld. It is also important for the reformation of these juveniles who are hardened and should be

treated strictly. Therefore based on this rationale, there is nothing wrong in treating juveniles of age 16

– 18 years who have sufficient maturity to commit such heinous crime and it is scientifically sensible

and harmless. These provisions also protect the society from such deterrent juveniles.

Psychologist studies have stated that maximum juveniles of age 16 years attain sufficient maturity to

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understand the nature and consequence of their act. The U.S Supreme court states that Juveniles who

have sufficient maturity should not be given protection as juveniles. 26 In the case of State of Illinois v.

Davis27the minor who was found in conflict with law was awarded life imprisonment without the

possibility of Parole because he was capable of committing the crime and has sufficient maturity,

similar conclusion was drawn in the case of Sara Kruzan.28

The act doesn’t subject the juveniles to the regressive provisions of the adult trail as the trail is to be

conducted by the Children court and the Child is not awarded death punishment nor the life

imprisonment without the possibility of release as stated under section 21 of the act. The section19

protects the child from being sent to Jail before the age of 21 years. After the case is received by the

Children Court the court makes assessments that weather the child is capable to stand the trail it is

only after that the child is tried under the provisions of CRPC, 1973.

In New York  and North Carolina the minimum age at which  all accused personsare chargedasadul

ts is 13. In Canada, the juveniles aged between 12 – 18 years who commit serious offence can be

treated as an adult.29Section 34 of Youth criminal justice act, 2002 lays provisions for psychological

assessment. In United Kingdom children between 10–18 years can be tried by Crown Courts.

In Michigan &  Texas minimum age is [Link] Washington, the minimum age depends on the severity

of the crime.30

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015

are not violative of any constitutional provisions and are in pursuance of the objective of the juvenile

justice system that is reformation of juveniles in conflict with law. The JJ act, 2015 in no way hampers

26
Miller v. Alabama, 2012 567 U.S.
27
State of Illinos v. Davis, 2014 IJ 115595.
28
Sara J. Kruzan Case.
29
Youth Criminal Justice Act, 2002 Section 38(2)(a).
30
 Roberson Cliff, Juvenile Justice: Theory and Practice. CRC Press, ISBN 9781439813775 (20100820).

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the rights of the juveniles and is valid and should be upheld.

CONTENTION III. THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD ARE SUFFICIENT TO PROVE

THE OFFENCE OF WHICH SIDDHART HAS BEEN CONVICTED.

It is humbly submitted by the respondents that the instant matter, the lower courts have convicted

Siddhart of the offences of under § 302, 304, 354, 376 and § 34 of the Industan Penal Code. With the

evidence presented at the trial stage, there is sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that Siddhart

(hereinafter the ‘accused’) is indeed guilty of the aforementioned offences. An appeal has been filed

for the review of evidence de novo as accused contends that the lower courts have passed judgment

solely on the basis of his presence, accused’s contention stands immaterial, however it may be noted

at the outset that, it is a very well settled principle that in a criminal appeal the court has to consider

the evidence on record and the conclusion of the trial court. It is not for the court to go into facts or

alter the facts. The court can revaluate the evidence but the findings of the trial court with respect to

the facts are not to be set aside.

III.1 THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES ARE CONCLUSIVE IN NATURE.

The Respondent humbly submits that an item of circumstantial evidence is an evidentiary fact from

which an inference may be drawn rendering the existence of a fact in issue more probable. 31 In court

as elsewhere, the data cannot 'speak for itself'. It has to be interpreted in the light of the competing

hypotheses put forward and against a background of knowledge and experience about the world. 32 In

the present case, the plausibility of the hypothesis is conclusive in nature and leaves no reasonable

31
Jo Shaw, Jo Hunt & Chloe Wallace, Evidence Raymond Emson 15 (4th Edition Palgrave Macmillan 2006).
32
Wigmore, John H., The Principles of Judicial Proof: As given by Logic Psychology and General Experience and
Illustrated in Judicial Trials 632, Little, Brown and Company 1913.

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doubt about the existence of any other hypothesis. The proposition to be proved in the instant matter is

that the accused conspired with his two friends Suraj and Dharmesh and with Suresh to commit the

offence of murder of Shubhangi and Shubham and outraging modesty of Shubhangi. The statement of

S.K. Kumar is essentially corroborated by the circumstances encompassing situation at hand

successfully prove the factum probandum.

It is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble Court that there exists a material proposition implicating the

accused. In the present case, as evident from the facts, the accused was instrumental in the

commission of the offences for which he was indicted. There was motive, there was generation of an

opportunity and it was within the capacity of the accused to commit the acts in question. All the

circumstances taken together corroborate the same. In R v Exall 33 it was notably held that “One strand

of the cord might be insufficient to sustain the weight, but three stranded together may be quite of

sufficient strength. Thus, it may be in circumstantial evidence-there may be a combination of

circumstances, when taken as a whole may create a strong conclusion of guilt, that is, with as much

certainty as human affairs can require or admit of.”

Accused and Shubham had animosity since childhood.34 This was recently instigated by a heated

quarrel between accused and Shubham. Accused was present in the exhibition at the night of

omission. He shared his hatred with Suresh his co- accused. Most importantly the proved guilt of

Suraj and Dharmesh who were his friends who had no prior connection with Shubham and Shubhangi.

The frame work of these circumstances clearly point that the accused is guilty of the charged offences.

On 8th march, 2018 the accused and Suresh had a prior knowledge that the Mrs. Chopra had a plan to

attend the exhibition in the desolate part of the city along with her children. This gave them the

opportunity to commit the crime as it was within their capacity and they performed subsequent
33
R v Exall, 1866 4 F & F 922 Pollock CB ¶929.
34
¶2 Moot Problem.

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[Link] facts are in clear inference with the provisions of sec. 7, 8 & 114 of Industan evidence

act. As these circumstances are connected with facts in issue, and show the motive of the accused,

specifically Mens rea and Actus Reus on their part. In reference to cases where the decision has rest on

circumstantial evidence, the SC in a line of decisions has consistently held that such evidence must

satisfy the following test.35 (1)It must state inference of guilt. (2)It should define tendency unerringly

pointing towards guilt of accused. (3) The inference draw must have complete chain. 36 (4) The

hypothesis enacted must not sufficient to point the guilt of the accused.37

It is humbly pleaded before this Hon’ble court that the circumstantial chain is complete and leaves no

reasonable doubt. The rules as laid down by Wills on Circumstantial Evidence, other writers on the

subject have repeated, and are as follows:-(1.) The circumstances alleged as the basis of any legal

inference must be strictly and indubitably connected with the factum probandum. (2.) The onus

probandi is on the party who asserts the existence of any fact which infers legal accountability. 38 The

same has been reiterated in a plethora of Cases 39 and by Wigmore40 and Phispon41. In the present case,

the hypothesis put forth by the Prosecution gives the evidence of a design or a plan, evidence of intent,

the commissioning of the actual act, the disposition of the accused. The cumulative effect of the

circumstances leads to the conclusion that the facts probans point towards the factum probandum, in

other words the only reasonable conclusion is that the crimes can be accredited to the accused.

It is therefore most respectfully submitted before the Hon’ble court that the Evidence presented is

35
Justice Y V Chandrachud, The law of Evidence 12 (21st Edition Ratan lal dihirajlal).
36
Lakshmi Kirsani v. State, A.I.R. 2001 Cri LJ 3648.
37
Ashok Kumar v. State of M.P, A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1890.
38
J. F. B., The American Law Register, Vol. 16, No. 12, New Series Volume 7 1852-1891 pp. 705-713.
39
Reg. v. Hodge, 18380 2 Lew 227; Vithal Eknath Adlinge v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 2009 11 S.C.C. 637;
Chenga Reddy and Ors. V. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1996 Cri LJ 3461; State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Shrivastava,
A.I.R. 1992 1 S.C.R. 37; Ashish Batham v. State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 3206.
40
Wigmore John H., The Principles of Judicial Proof: As given by Logic, Psychology and General Experience and
Illustrated in Judicial Trials, (Little, Brown and Company 632 1913).
41
Buzzard, John, May, Richard, Howard, M.N., Phipson on Evidence 63 (12th Edition Sweet & Maxwell London).

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sufficient and carries with it the Probative force to sustain a conviction.

III.2 S.K. KUMAR’S STATEMENT CAN BE RELIED UPON.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that during the course of trail S.K. Kumar’s statement

was corroborated with the circumstantial evidence. The Respondent humbly submits that the statement

of S.K. Kumar is admissible as well as reliable enough to convict the accused.

The statement is a relevant piece of evidence under the provisions of Sec. 13 of Industan evidence

Act. To be admissible, any item of evidence must be relevant to a fact in issue or contribute towards

an explanation of the background to the case. 42 As held in the English case of DPP v

Kilbourne43evidence is relevant if it makes the matter which requires proof more or less probable.

Similar requirements are envisaged in the Australian44, New Zealand45 and American46jurisdictions. In

42
Jo Shaw, Jo Hunt & Chloe Wallace, Evidence Raymond Emson 15 (4th Edition Palgrave Macmillan 2006).
43
DPP v Kilbourne, 1973 2 WLR 254 (HL) ¶276-77.
44
The Australian Evidence Act, 1995 §55.
45
The New Zealand Evidence Act, 2006 §7, cl.3.
46
The United States Federal Rules of Evidence §401.

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the instant matter, the statement of S.K. Kumar suffices this test of relevancy. The statement taken

within the context of the existing circumstances implicates the accused of the offences. It makes the

fact in issue, that is the involvement of the accused in the offences committed, more probable. Hence,

it is submitted that the statement is admissible and is relevant to the case at hand.

Provisions of section 157 of evidence act state two essential conditions for admissibility of such

statement that are that such statement must point at inference of the omission of crime and should be

taken within a reasonable period of time so that the memories of witness are intact at time of making

statement.47 Though section 157 of the evidence act doesn’t recognize such statements as substantial

evidence though doesn’t negate such statements completely. The statement was recorded under

section 161 of CrPC and was used as a circumstantial evidence of identity which is admissible under

section 9 of evidence act.48 The statement was corroborated as a circumstantial evidence to prove the

presence of the accused at the crime scene which has been accepted by the accused. The statement is

an oral evidence under section 60 of the evidence act and is not treated as a testimony. Therefore the

corroboration of this statement is not under the section 157 of the evidence but it is corroborated as a

circumstantial evidence with other circumstantial evidence to complete the chain of inference that the

accused is guilty of charged offences. Hence, the corroboration of statement of S.K. Kumar by the

lower courts is justified under section 114 of the evidence act. Therefore the plea of accused that he

was convicted merely on the basis of presence fails as his presence was merely a circumstantial

evidence corroborated with other circumstantial evidence and the nexus of these evidence leaves

possibility of only one hypothesis that is guilt of the accused in the offences for which he is charges as

this case rests upon circumstantial evidence and meets every possible hypothesis pointing towards the

47
Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2503.
48
Buzzard, John, May, Richard, Howard, M.N., Phipson on Evidence 164 (12th Edition Sweet & Maxwell London).

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guilt of the accused.49

It is humbly presented before the Hon’ble court the case of Hanumant v. The State of Madhya

Pradesh50 where Mahajan, J. clearly expounded that if the circumstantial evidence prove the case

beyond reasonable doubt such evidence are conclusive enough.

It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that a person may not be convicted of a crime unless the

prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt both (a) that responsibility is attributed to the accused

for a certain behaviour or the existence of a certain state of affairs, in circumstances forbidden by

criminal law and that the accused has caused the prescribed event and (b) that the accused had a

defined state of mind in relation to the behaviour, existence of a state of affairs or causing of the event.

It is submitted that as per the Law of Industan, the burden of proof lies on the prosecution to establish

the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Halsbury‟s Laws of England maintains that

prosecution should prove to full criminal standards any fact essential to admissibility of evidence. 51

This principle is best explained in the words of Lord Denning who in Miller v Minister of

Pensions52maintained that, “It need not reach certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability.

49
State of A.P v. I.B.S.P Rao, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 520.
50
Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1984 S.C.R. 1 88.
51
11.3 Halsbury‟s, Laws of England 1374 (5th edition LexisNexis Butterworths 2010).
52
Miller v Minister of Pensions, 1947 2 All ER 372,373.

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Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond shadow of a doubt. The law would fail to

protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to deflect the course of justice.”

Therefore it is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble court that the abovementioned arguments do prove

that there lies no reasonable doubt in all the charges framed against the accused. Thus, the conviction

should be upheld.

CONTENTION IV: THAT THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST SURESH ARE

VALID AND SHOULD BE UPHELD.

The Respondent submits that in the instant matter, the lower courts have convicted Suresh of the

offences u/s 302, 304, 326 and 354 read with sec. 34 of the Industan penal Code. With the evidence

presented at the trial stage, there is sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that Suresh (hereinafter

for contention 4 the “accused‟) is indeed guilty of the aforementioned heinous offence and therefore

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he must be treated like a major. It is not for the court to go into facts or alter the facts. The court can

revaluate the evidence but the findings of the trial court with respect to the facts are not to be set

aside.53

IV.1 SURESH IS GUILTY OF HEINOUS OFFENCE FOR WHICH HE IS CONVICTED AND

SHOULD BE TREATED LIKE AN ADULT.

It is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble court that Suresh is in conflict with law for committing

heinous offence andwas found to have sufficient capability for understanding the nature of his act. 54

Therefore he must be tried under the provisions of CrPC 1973 like an adult as stated by Section 15 and

18(3) of the JJ act, 2015.

The circumstantial evidence prove guilt of Suresh, which prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. 55

There is no difference between circumstantial evidence and direct evidences when the chain of

evidence furnished leaves no reasonable ground for conclusion of innocence of the

accused.56Therefore the facts that Suresh had hatred for Shubham and Shubhangi which he shared

from Siddhart,57Suresh took leave from his work before the day of commission, his prior knowledge

about the plan of Mrs. Chopra to attend exhibition, presence of Siddhart at exhibition who had prior

quarrel with Shubhangi and Shubham58 and most importantly proven guilt of Suraj and Dharmesh

who were friends of Siddhart and had no prior connection to the victims are all in a nexus as they

clearly direct towards the hypothesis that Siddhart and Suresh conspired to commit the crime with

53
State of Rajasthan v. N.K, A.I.R. 2000 S.C.W. 1407;R v. Sharp 1988 1 All ER 65, HL.
54
¶8 Moot Problem.
55
Mulakh Raj v. Satish Kumar, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1175.
56
Deonandan Mishra v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1955 2 S.C.R. 570; Sharad v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1984 S.C.
1622 : 1984 Cr LJ 1738.
57
¶3 Moot Problem.
58
¶2 Moot Problem.

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assistance of Dharmesh and Suraj.

It is humbly pleaded that Sec 8 of Evidence Act stipulates that any fact is relevant which shows or

constitutes motive or preparation for any fact in issue or relevant fact. Thus, previous incidents which

show the hatred in Suresh for Shubham and Shubhangi are admitted to show motive. 59 The motive

which induces a person to commit an act or preparation which he makes in its commission become

relevant evidence when the case is based on circumstantial evidence.60 These facts are admissible as

they have special significance as a ground for inference with respect to the issues in the case. 61The

analysis of conduct of the accused makes it clear that they are the culprits and it should be taken into

admission.62The feeling of hatred in Suresh for Shubham and Shubhangi is an essential fact that must

be taken into consideration.63It is further pertinent to note that if there is motive in doing an act, then

it’s gShubhamty is not in all cases necessary. Heinous offences have been committed for very slight

motive.64 The total cumulative effect of each proved facts reinforce the conclusion of guilt and are

sufficient to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.65

The section 45 of the evidence act states that the finger prints are relevant facts and should be taken

into consideration66and court can satisfy itself from these evidences. 67 Recovery of accused’s finger

prints on body of Shubhangi derives conclusive inference of his [Link] the circumstantial

evidences and the medical evidence are looked upon after corroboration the case becomes pretty clear

59
Son Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1142; Chhotka v. State of W.B., A.I.R. 1958 Cal 482.
60
B M Prasad & Manish Mohan, The Law of Evidence 75 (25th Edition Ratanlal & Dhirajlal 2013).
61
Empress v. Rama Birapa, 1878 3 Bom 12, 17.
62
Nirmala v. Ashu Ram, A.I.R. 2000 Cri Lj 2001.
63
Com v. Webster, 5 Cuch 295, 316; State of U.P. v. Babu Ram, A.I.R. 2000 Cri Lj 2457.
64
State v. Dinakar Bandu, A.I.R. 1969 72 Bom LR 905.
65
Gade Lakshmi v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 2001 S.C. 2677 ¶2681; State of Maharashtra v. Vilas Pandurang, A.I.R.
1999 Cr LJ 1062 ¶1066.
66
Nawrot v. Chief Constable of Hampshire, 1992 CLY 3346; McCauley v. Vine, 1 WLR 1977 (CA).
67
KeshavLal v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 2002 S.C. 1221.

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that Suresh is guilty of the offences for which he is charged.

It is further submitted that Suresh was working as a domestic employee since past 6 years under Mr.

Chopra immediately after he dropped out from School. Which makes it evident that his age was more

than 16 years.68Since he was charged for heinous crime he should be tried as an adult under the

Provisions of Section 15 and 18(3) of the JJ act, 2015. In the current case the Juvenile Board on

preliminary inquiry found Suresh physically and mentally capable of committing crime. Section 94(1)

of the JJ Act states that where it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of

the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of

giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such

observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under section

14 or section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the [Link] the present

case it was pretty evident that Suresh was above 16 years of age. He was charged for a heinous

offence and was liable to be charged as an adult under the provisions of the CrPC, 1973.

It is pleaded before the Hon’ble court that there was no requirement of bone ossification test as it

determines the age of subject as the test doesn’t determine the exact age of the person and the age

varies and Bone ossification test cannot be conclusive proof to determine the age of the person. 69In the

Case of Bishnudas Behra v State of Orissa it was stated by Hon’ble court that ossification test is one

of the test to find out the age, it is well known in the determination of age by ossification test is not

obsolete.70The variation in the age determination of ossification test can be upto three years in either

way.71Bone ossification test is not necessary if the board or committee doesn’t have any reasonable

68
Hari Om Tripathi and Shourya Raj, Stages of School Education in India, [Link]/a/stages-of-school-
education-in-india.
69
Vishnu Undrya v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 2005.
70
Bishnudas Behra v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1997 Cril LJ 2207.
71
Sri Batcha Khamari v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1997 77 CLT &11.

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doubt whether the person brought before them is major or minor. 72 The committee nor the court

believed Suresh to an adult, but they treated his as adult u/s 15 and 18(3) of the Juvenile Justice Act as

he was tried for a heinous crime.

It is humbly contended before the Hon’ble Court that Suresh is guilty of unlawful offence u/s 302, 326

and 354 of Industan Penal Code. Furthermore, the Prosecution humbly contends that the

circumstantial evidences corroborated with medical evidences prove the case beyond reasonable

doubt. The age determination of Suresh by Bone ossification was immaterial as the courts were

satisfied by the preliminary examination of Suresh that he should be treated like a major. 73 The

provisions of Juvenile Justice Act support this approach under its provisions. Therefore, it is submitted

before this Hon’ble Court that the circumstantial evidence makes it clear that the accused had hatched

the plan and conspired with other three accused for the commission of the Crime.

IV.2 THE PROCEEDINGS OF SESSION COURT AND HIGH COURT WERE VALID AND

BE UPHELD.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the Children Court established in Session court

and High Court are empowered to deal with the cases of Juveniles between the age of 16 – 18 years

for heinous offences, if on the assessment the court is satisfied that the juvenile has sufficient physical

and mental capacity to commit such crime. 74 And are vested with all the powers of the Juvenile Board

and committee u/s 8(2) of the JJ act, 2015. The accused was charged under Section 302 which is a

heinous crime75 as per Juvenile Justice Act since the minimum punishment under Section 302 is life

imprisonment.76Therefore the petitioner’s plea that Session court didn’t had any jurisdiction to try his

72
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 Section 94(2).
73
Gopi Nath v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 237.
74
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 Section 18 (3).
75
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 Section 2(33).
76
K.D. Gaur, Indian Penal Code 475 (5th Edition Universal Law Publication Co. 2014).

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case is immaterial.

The respondent humbly contends that sufficient measures were taken to recover the Birth Certificate. 77

As, it was only a conclusive proof but the attempts were in vain. The Section 94 of JJ Act lays

provisions for determination of age by recovery of birth certificate from school, or matriculate or

equivalent certificate from examination board in the absence of birth certificate in Municipal

Corporation. Since Suresh drop out from Sixth standard hence birth certificate was only a conclusive

proof which was not found.

Suresh was found guilty u/s 304 of IPC hence he was awarded a punishment of 3 years under the

provisions of Section 18(1) (g). Hence there was no abuse of law as the punishment awarded to Suresh

was in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. Therefore it is humbly

contended before the Hon’ble court that there was no error in the proceeding of Suresh in Session

court and should be upheld.

The Prosecution humbly contends that both, the Actus Reus and the Mens Rea of the crime are

established in the instant matter, negating any claims of petitioner. Actusreus is any wrongful

act.78Thus, in a case of murder, actusreus would be the physical Conduct of the accused that causes

death of the victim. In the instant case, the actusreus is established by way of medical evidences

which report recovery of finger prints from the body of Shubhangi and wounds on the body of

Shubhangi and Shubham which were deadly enough to take their [Link] rea is considered as

guilty intention79, which is proved or inferred from the acts of the accused. 80 It is submitted that the

intention to kill is established in light of clear-cut motive of the accused. As, the injuries inflicted upon

77
Clarification Question 2.
78
Aiyar, P Ramanatha, The Law Lexicon 49 (2nd Edition 2006).
79
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Patranu Dass Raja Ram Beri, A.I.R. 1982 PH 1, 4.
80
State of Maharashtra v. Meyer Hans George, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 722.

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Shubham and strangulation of Shubhangi were clearly with the intention of killing [Link] sentence

of life imprisonment sentenced to Suresh is appropriate under the provisions of section 21 of Juvenile

Justice Act, 2015 as it prohibits death penalty and life imprisonment without possibility of release and

both punishments are not awarded. The High court has awarded Suresh life imprisonment, which is

not without the possibility of release and hence is a valid sentence and therefore is not violative of any

principle of law. Therefore, the respondent humbly submits that the High Court would be justified in

convicting the accused as the evidence on records show that he is guilty u/s 302 and should be treated

like an adult as he was having sufficient capacity to commit crime.

It is humbly pleaded before the Hon’ble court that the decision of lower courts should be allowed to

stand.

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PRAYER

Wherefore In The Light Of The Issues Raised, Argument Advanced, Reasons Given And

Authorities Cited, This Hon’ble Court May Be Pleased To::

TO HOLD

THE ORDER OF CONVICTION OF SURESH AND SIDDHART BY SESSION COURT

AND HIGH COURT.

TO DIRECT

THAT BOTH THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED.

MISCELLANEOUS

AND ANY OTHER RELIEF THAT THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY BE PLEASED TO

GRANT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

Sd/-
……………………….
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT

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