Syllabus in

COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW

I. Corporation Law (B. P. Blg. 11232)

This segment of the course will include a review of the pertinent provisions of the
Corporation Code particularly those governing the organization, establishment, operation and
dissolution of private corporations. Upon conclusion of this segment of the course, the student is
expected to have a solid understanding of the basic concepts, terms, principles, theories and
relevant jurisprudence relating to private corporations. (min. of 16 lecture hours required)

II. Securities and Regulation Code (R.A. 8799)

This segment of the course will call for a review of relevant provisions of SRC
concerning the registration, issuance, marketing, sale and/or transfer of securities. Discussion
will also include pertinent legal provision concerning to the creation and organization of the
SEC, as well as a review of all prohibited acts that were defined and penalized under the Code.
Upon conclusion of the course, the student is expected to possess the knowledge and
understanding of the basic concepts, terms and jurisprudence relating to the registration and sale
of securities. (min. of 8 lecture hours required)

III. Insurance Law (R.A.10607)

This segment of the course will require a review of the important provisions of the new
Philippine Insurance Law. Focus of the study will be on the various classes if insurance polies as
well as remedies available to the insurer against possible fraudulent insurance claims. Upon
conclusion of this segment of the course, the student is expected to possess a solid understanding
of the basic concepts, terms, principles and latest jurisprudence on Philippine Insurance Law.
(min. of 12 lecture hours required)

IV. Negotiable Instrument Law (Act No. 2031)

This segment of the course will require a review of the important provisions of the
Negotiable Instruments Law and related laws concerning promissory notes, bills of exchange
and checks. The review will involve a discussion of relevant jurisprudence which applied the
various rules concerning the negotiation and transfer of instruments. Upon conclusion of this
segment of the course, students are expected to have a thorough understanding of the basic
concepts, terms, principles and jurisprudence relating to negotiable instruments. (min. of 12
lecture hours required)

V. Banking Laws

a) General Banking Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8791)

b) New Central Bank (R.A. No. 7653)
c) Truth in Lending Act (R.A. No. 3765)
d) Secrecy in Bank Deposit Act (R.A. No. 1405, as amended)
e) Foreign Currency Deposits Act (R.A. 6426, as amended)
 This segment of the course will require a A review of the various laws, rules and
regulations that affects the establishment, business operation and conduct of banks and
other financial institutions, including their directors, officers, stockholders and related
interests. At the end of this segment of the course, students are expected to possess a
basic knowledge and understanding of the concepts, terms, principles and jurisprudence
relating to banking. (min. of 12 lecture hours required)

VI. Law on Transportation (Arts. 1732- 1766, New Civil Code)

This segment of the course will include a review of the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code relating to common carriers, as well as relevant laws pertaining to land, air
and naval transportation affecting passengers and cargo. At the end of the segment of
this course, students are expected to possess a wide understanding of the concepts,
terms, principles and jurisprudence relating to common carriers and relevant laws on
transportation. (min. of 12 lecture hours required)

VII. Intellectual Property Law (R.A. No. 8293)

This segment of the course will require a A review of the pertinent provisions of the
Philippine Intellectual Property Law particularly the available remedies to owners of intellectual
creations or discoveries. The course is expected to give the students the basic knowledge and
understanding of the concepts, terms, principles and jurisprudence relating to intellectual
properties. (min. of 12 lecture hours required)

VIII. Special Commercial Laws

This segment of the course will require a review of existing and new laws relating to
business and commerce not covered by the major laws mentioned above, particularly the Trust
Receipt Law, Letters of Credit, Anti Money Laundering Law, FRIA, the Philippine Competition
Act, etc. (min. of 12 lecture hours)
 Case List in Insurance Law
Interpretation
1. Gaisano Cagayan, Inc. vs. Insurance Co. of North America, G.R. No. 147839, June 8, 2006

Facts

1. Intercapitol Marketing Corporation (IMC) is the maker of Wrangler Blue Jeans. Levi Strauss
(Phils.) Inc. (LSPI) is the local distributor of products bearing trademarks owned by Levi Strauss &
Co.. IMC and LSPI separately obtained from respondent fire insurance policies with book debt
endorsements. The insurance policies provide for coverage on "book debts in connection with ready-
made clothing materials which have been sold or delivered to various customers and dealers of the
Insured anywhere in the Philippines."2 The policies defined book debts as the "unpaid account still
appearing in the Book of Account of the Insured 45 days after the time of the loss covered under this
Policy."3 The policies also provide for the following conditions:

1. Warranted that the Company shall not be liable for any unpaid account in respect of the
merchandise sold and delivered by the Insured which are outstanding at the date of loss for a
period in excess of six (6) months from the date of the covering invoice or actual delivery of the
merchandise whichever shall first occur.

2. Warranted that the Insured shall submit to the Company within twelve (12) days after the
close of every calendar month all amount shown in their books of accounts as unpaid and thus
become receivable item from their customers and dealers.

2. Petitioner is a customer and dealer of the products of IMC and LSPI. On February 25, 1991, the
Gaisano Superstore Complex in Cagayan de Oro City, owned by petitioner, was consumed by fire.
Included in the items lost or destroyed in the fire were stocks of ready-made clothing materials sold and
delivered by IMC and LSPI.

3. On February 4, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages against petitioner.

4. In its Answer with Counter Claim dated July 4, 1995, petitioner contends that it could not be held
liable because the property covered by the insurance policies were destroyed due to fortuities event or
force majeure; that respondent's right of subrogation has no basis inasmuch as there was no breach of
contract committed by it since the loss was due to fire which it could not prevent or foresee; that IMC
and LSPI never communicated to it that they insured their properties; that it never consented to paying
the claim of the insured.6

5. On August 31, 1998, the RTC rendered its decision dismissing respondent's [Link] rendered
its decision setting aside the decision of the RTC.

Issue: At issue is the proper interpretation of the questioned insurance policy. Petitioner claims that the
CA erred in construing a fire insurance policy on book debts as one covering the unpaid accounts of
IMC and LSPI since such insurance applies to loss of the ready-made clothing materials sold and
delivered to petitioner.

Ruling

The Court disagrees with petitioner's stand.

It is well-settled that when the words of a contract are plain and readily understood, there is no room
for construction.22 In this case, the questioned insurance policies provide coverage for "book debts in
connection with ready-made clothing materials which have been sold or delivered to various customers
and dealers of the Insured anywhere in the Philippines."23 ; and defined book debts as the "unpaid
account still appearing in the Book of Account of the Insured 45 days after the time of the loss covered
under this Policy."24 Nowhere is it provided in the questioned insurance policies that the subject of the
insurance is the goods sold and delivered to the customers and dealers of the insured.

Indeed, when the terms of the agreement are clear and explicit that they do not justify an attempt to
read into it any alleged intention of the parties, the terms are to be understood literally just as they
appear on the face of the contract.25 Thus, what were insured against were the accounts of IMC and
LSPI with petitioner which remained unpaid 45 days after the loss through fire, and not the loss or
destruction of the goods delivered.

Petitioner argues that IMC bears the risk of loss because it expressly reserved ownership of the goods
by stipulating in the sales invoices that "[i]t is further agreed that merely for purpose of securing the
payment of the purchase price the above described merchandise remains the property of the vendor
until the purchase price thereof is fully paid."26

The Court is not persuaded.

The present case clearly falls under paragraph (1), Article 1504 of the Civil Code:

ART. 1504. Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until the ownership therein is
transferred to the buyer, but when the ownership therein is transferred to the buyer the goods are at the
buyer's risk whether actual delivery has been made or not, except that:

(1) Where delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer or to a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of
the contract and the ownership in the goods has been retained by the seller merely to secure
performance by the buyer of his obligations under the contract, the goods are at the buyer's risk from
the time of such delivery; (Emphasis supplied)

xxxx

Thus, when the seller retains ownership only to insure that the buyer will pay its debt, the risk of loss is
borne by the buyer.27 Accordingly, petitioner bears the risk of loss of the goods delivered.

IMC and LSPI did not lose complete interest over the goods. They have an insurable interest
until full payment of the value of the delivered goods. Unlike the civil law concept of res perit
domino, where ownership is the basis for consideration of who bears the risk of loss, in property
insurance, one's interest is not determined by concept of title, but whether insured has
substantial economic interest in the property.28

Section 13 of our Insurance Code defines insurable interest as "every interest in property,
whether real or personal, or any relation thereto, or liability in respect thereof, of such nature
that a contemplated peril might directly damnify the insured." Parenthetically, under Section 14
of the same Code, an insurable interest in property may consist in: (a) an existing interest; (b) an
inchoate interest founded on existing interest; or (c) an expectancy, coupled with an existing
interest in that out of which the expectancy arises.
Therefore, an insurable interest in property does not necessarily imply a property interest in, or a lien
upon, or possession of, the subject matter of the insurance, and neither the title nor a beneficial interest
is requisite to the existence of such an interest, it is sufficient that the insured is so situated with
reference to the property that he would be liable to loss should it be injured or destroyed by the peril
against which it is insured.29 Anyone has an insurable interest in property who derives a benefit from its
existence or would suffer loss from its destruction.30 Indeed, a vendor or seller retains an insurable
interest in the property sold so long as he has any interest therein, in other words, so long as he would
suffer by its destruction, as where he has a vendor's lien.31 In this case, the insurable interest of IMC
and LSPI pertain to the unpaid accounts appearing in their Books of Account 45 days after the time of
the loss covered by the policies.

Moreover, there is no proof of full settlement of the insurance claim of LSPI; no subrogation receipt
was offered in evidence. Thus, there is no evidence that respondent has been subrogated to any right
which LSPI may have against petitioner. Failure to substantiate the claim of subrogation is fatal to
petitioner's case for recovery of the amount of P535,613.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED.

2. Malayan Insurance Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 119599, March 20, 1997, 270 SCRA 242, 254

Private respondent TKC Marketing Corp. was the owner/consignee of some 3,189.171 metric tons of
soya bean meal which was loaded on board the ship MV Al Kaziemah on or about September 8, 1989
for carriage from the port of Rio del Grande, Brazil, to the port of Manila. Said cargo was insured
against the risk of loss by petitioner Malayan Insurance Corporation for which it issued two (2) Marine
Cargo policy Nos. M/LP 97800305

While the vessel was docked in Durban, South Africa on September 11, 1989 enroute to Manila, the
civil authorities arrested and detained it because of a lawsuit on a question of ownership and
possession. As a result, private respondent notified petitioner on October 4, 1989 of the arrest of the
vessel and made a formal claim for the amount of US$916,886.66, representing the dollar equivalent on
the policies, for non-delivery of the cargo. Private respondent likewise sought the assistance of
petitioner on what to do with the cargo.

Petitioner replied that the arrest of the vessel by civil authority was not a peril covered by the policies.
Private respondent, accordingly, advised petitioner that it might tranship the cargo and requested an
extension of the insurance coverage until actual transhipment, which extension was approved upon
payment of additional premium..

However, on December 11, 1989, the cargo was sold in Durban, South Africa, for US$154.40 per
metric ton or a total of P10,304,231.75 due to its perishable nature which could no longer stand a
voyage of twenty days to Manila and another twenty days for the discharge thereof. On January 5,
1990, private respondent forthwith reduced its claim to US$448,806.09 (or its peso equivalent of
P9,879,928.89 at the exchange rate of P22.0138 per $1.00) representing private respondent's loss after
the proceeds of the sale were deducted from the original claim of $916,886.66 or P20,184,159.55.
Petitioner maintained its position that the arrest of the vessel by civil authorities on a question of
ownership was an excepted risk under the marine insurance policies. This prompted private respondent
to file a complaint for damages praying that aside from its claim, it be reimbursed.

The lower court decided in favor of private respondent

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court stating that with the deletion
of Clause 12 of the policies issued to private respondent, the same became automatically covered under
subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses. The arrests, restraints or detainments
contemplated in the former clause were those effected by political or executive acts. Losses occasioned
by riot or ordinary judicial processes were not covered therein. In other words, arrest, restraint or
detainment within the meaning of Clause 12 (or F.C. & S. Clause) rules out detention by ordinary legal
processes. Hence, arrests by civil authorities, such as what happened in the instant case, is an excepted
risk under Clause 12 of the Institute Cargo Clause or the F.C. & S. Clause.

Issue

This Court cannot agree with petitioner's assertions, particularly when it alleges that in the "Perils"
Clause, it assumed the risk of arrest caused solely by executive or political acts of the government of
the seizing state and thereby excludes "arrests" caused by ordinary legal processes, such as in the
instant case.

With the incorporation of subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses, however, this Court
agrees with the Court of Appeals and the private respondent that "arrest" caused by ordinary judicial
process is deemed included among the covered risks. This interpretation becomes inevitable when
subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses provided that "this insurance covers the risks
excluded from the Standard Form of English Marine Policy by the clause "Warranted free of capture,
seizure, arrest, etc. . . ." or the F.C. & S. Clause. Jurisprudentially, "arrests" caused by ordinary judicial
process is also a risk excluded from the Standard Form of English Marine Policy by the F.C. & S.
Clause.

This Court cannot help the impression that petitioner is overly straining its interpretation of the
provisions of the policy in order to avoid being liable for private respondent's claim.

This Court finds it pointless for petitioner to maintain its position that it only insures risks of "arrest"
occasioned by executive or political acts of government which is interpreted as not referring to those
caused by ordinary legal processes as contained in the "Perils" Clause; deletes the F.C. & S. Clause
which excludes risks of arrest occasioned by executive or political acts of the government and
naturally, also those caused by ordinary legal processes; and, thereafter incorporates subsection 1.1 of
Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses which now includes in the coverage risks of arrest due to
executive or political acts of a government but then still excludes "arrests" occasioned by ordinary legal
processes when subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of said Clauses should also have included "arrests"
previously excluded from the coverage of the F.C. & S. Clause.

It has been held that a strained interpretation which is unnatural and forced, as to lead to an absurd
conclusion or to render the policy nonsensical, should, by all means, be avoided. 9 Likewise, it must be
borne in mind that such contracts are invariably prepared by the companies and must be accepted by
the insured in the form in which they are written. 10 Any construction of a marine policy rendering it
void should be avoided. 11 Such policies will, therefore, be construed strictly against the company in
order to avoid a forfeiture, unless no other result is possible from the language used. 12

If a marine insurance company desires to limit or restrict the operation of the general provisions of its
contract by special proviso, exception, or exemption, it should express such limitation in clear and
unmistakable language. 13 Obviously, the deletion of the F.C. & S. Clause and the consequent
incorporation of subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses (Cargo) gave rise to
ambiguity. If the risk of arrest occasioned by ordinary judicial process was expressly indicated as an
exception in the subject policies, there would have been no controversy with respect to the
interpretation of the subject clauses.

Be that as it may, exceptions to the general coverage are construed most strongly against the
company. 14 Even an express exception in a policy is to be construed against the underwriters by whom
the policy is framed, and for whose benefit the exception is introduced. 15

In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to discuss the other issues presented.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED.

3. Diosdado C. Ty vs. Filipinas Compania De Seguros, et al., G.R. No. L-21821-22, May 31,
1966

Facts

1. Plaintiff-appellant was an employee of Broadway Cotton Factory at Grace Park,

Caloocan City, working as mechanic operator, with monthly salary of P185.00.

2. In the latter part of 1953, he took Personal Accident Policies from several insurance
companies, among which are herein defendants-appellees, on different dates,1 effective for
12 months.

3. During the effectivity of these policies, or on December 24, 1953, a fire broke out in
the factory where plaintiff was working. As he was trying to put out said fire with the help of
a fire extinguisher, a heavy object fell upon his left hand. Plaintiff received treatment at the
National Orthopedic Hospital from December 26, 1953 to February 8, 1954, for the injuries
to the left hand.

4. The attending surgeon certified, would cause temporary total disability of appellant's
left hand.

5. As the insurance companies refused to pay his claim for compensation under the
policies by reason of the said disability of his left hand, Ty filed motions in the Municipal
Court of Manila, which rendered favorable decision. CA dismissed it.

Issue: WON the disability of the hand of the insured is compensable injury.
Ruling

"INDEMNITY FOR TOTAL OR PARTIAL DISABILITY

The loss of a hand shall mean the loss, by amputation through the bones of the wrist.

Appellant contends that to be entitled to indemnification under the foregoing provision, it is enough
that the insured is disabled to such an extent that he cannot substantially perform all acts or duties of
the kind necessary in the prosecution of his business. It is argued that what is compensable is the
disability and not the amputation of the hand. The definition of what constitutes loss of hand, placed in
the contract, according to appellant, consequently, makes the provision ambiguous and calls for the
interpretation thereof by this Court.

This is not the first time that the proper construction of this provision, which is uniformly carried in
personal accident policies, has been questioned. Herein appellant himself has already brought this
matter to the attention of this Court in connection with the other accident policies which he took and
under which he had tried to collect indemnity, for the identical injury that is the basis of the claims in
these cases. And, we had already ruled:

While we sympathize with the plaintiff or his employer, for whose benefit the policies were
issued, we can not go beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance policies, all of
which definite partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the
wrist. There was no such amputation in the case at bar. All that was found by the trial court,
which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical injuries "caused temporary total disability
of plaintiff's left hand." Note that the disability of plaintiff's hand was merely temporary, having
been caused by fractures of the index, the middle and the fourth fingers of the left hand.

We might add that the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As
the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be
considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary
disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted.2

We find no reason to depart from the foregoing ruling on the matter.

Plaintiff-appellant cannot come to the courts and claim that he was misled by the terms of the contract.
The provision is clear enough to inform the party entering into that contract that the loss to be
considered a disability entitled to indemnity, must be severance or amputation of that affected member
from the body of the insured.

Wherefore, finding no error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed,

4. Gulf Resorts, Inc. vs. Phil. Charter Ins. 485 SCRA 551

Facts

[P]laintiff is the owner of the Plaza Resort situated at Agoo, La Union and had its properties in said
resort insured originally with the American Home Assurance Company (AHAC-AIU). In the first four
insurance policies issued by AHAC-AIU from 1984-85; 1985-86; 1986-1987; and 1987-88 (Exhs. "C",
"D", "E" and "F"; also Exhs. "1", "2", "3" and "4" respectively), the risk of loss from earthquake shock
was extended only to plaintiff's two swimming pools

In consideration of the payment by the insured to the company of the sum included additional premium
the Company agrees, notwithstanding what is stated in the printed conditions of this policy due to the
contrary, that this insurance covers loss or damage to shock to any of the property insured by this
Policy occasioned by or through or in consequence of earthquake (Exhs. "1-D", "2-D", "3-A", "4-B",
"5-A", "6-D" and "7-C");

that in Exhibit "7-C" the word "included" above the underlined portion was deleted; that on July 16,
1990 an earthquake struck Central Luzon and Northern Luzon and plaintiff's properties covered by
Policy No. 31944 issued by defendant, including the two swimming pools in its Agoo Playa Resort
were damaged.2

After the earthquake, petitioner advised respondent that it would be making a claim under its Insurance
Policy No. 31944 for damages on its properties. On August 23, 1990, respondent denied petitioner's
claim on the ground that its insurance policy only afforded earthquake shock coverage to the two
swimming pools of the resort.8 Petitioner and respondent failed to arrive at a settlement.

On February 21, 1994, the lower court after trial ruled in favor of the respondent, viz:

Appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and ruled, thus:

Issue:

We hold that the petition is devoid of merit.

In Insurance Policy No. 31944, four key items are important in the resolution of the case at bar.

First, in the designation of location of risk, only the two swimming pools were specified as included

Second, under the breakdown for premium payments,21 it was stated that:

PREMIUM RECAPITULATION
ITEM NOS. AMOUNT RATES PREMIUM
xxx
3 393,000.00 0.100%-E/S 393.0022]

Third, Policy Condition No. 6 stated:

6. This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence,
directly or indirectly of any of the following occurrences, namely: - -

(a) Earthquake, volcanic eruption or other convulsion of nature.23

Fourth, the rider attached to the policy, titled "Extended Coverage Endorsement (To Include the Perils
of Explosion, Aircraft, Vehicle and Smoke)," stated, viz:
 ANNUAL PAYMENT AGREEMENT ON
LONG TERM POLICIES

THE INSURED UNDER THIS POLICY HAVING ESTABLISHED AGGREGATE SUMS

INSURED IN EXCESS OF FIVE MILLION PESOS, IN CONSIDERATION OF A DISCOUNT OF
5% OR 7 - % OF THE NET PREMIUM x x x POLICY HEREBY UNDERTAKES TO CONTINUE
THE INSURANCE UNDER THE ABOVE NAMED x x x AND TO PAY THE PREMIUM.

Earthquake Endorsement

In consideration of the payment by the Insured to the Company of the sum of P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
additional premium the Company agrees, notwithstanding what is stated in the printed conditions of
this Policy to the contrary, that this insurance covers loss or damage (including loss or damage by fire)
to any of the property insured by this Policy occasioned by or through or in consequence of
Earthquake.

Provided always that all the conditions of this Policy shall apply (except in so far as they may be
hereby expressly varied) and that any reference therein to loss or damage by fire should be deemed to
apply also to loss or damage occasioned by or through or in consequence of Earthquake.24

Petitioner contends that pursuant to this rider, no qualifications were placed on the scope of the
earthquake shock coverage. Thus, the policy extended earthquake shock coverage to all of the insured
properties.

It is basic that all the provisions of the insurance policy should be examined and interpreted in
consonance with each other.25 All its parts are reflective of the true intent of the parties. The policy
cannot be construed piecemeal. Certain stipulations cannot be segregated and then made to control;
neither do particular words or phrases necessarily determine its character. Petitioner cannot focus on
the earthquake shock endorsement to the exclusion of the other provisions. All the provisions and
riders, taken and interpreted together, indubitably show the intention of the parties to extend earthquake
shock coverage to the two swimming pools only.

A careful examination of the premium recapitulation will show that it is the clear intent of the parties to
extend earthquake shock coverage only to the two swimming pools.

Section 2(1) of the Insurance Code defines a contract of insurance as an agreement whereby one
undertakes for a consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an
unknown or contingent event. Thus, an insurance contract exists where the following elements concur:

1. The insured has an insurable interest;

2. The insured is subject to a risk of loss by the happening of the designated peril;

3. The insurer assumes the risk;

4. Such assumption of risk is part of a general scheme to distribute actual losses among a large group of
persons bearing a similar risk; andcralawlibrary
5. In consideration of the insurer's promise, the insured pays a premium.26 (Emphasis ours)

An insurance premium is the consideration paid an insurer for undertaking to indemnify the insured
against a specified peril.27 In fire, casualty, and marine insurance, the premium payable becomes a debt
as soon as the risk attaches.28 In the subject policy, no premium payments were made with regard to
earthquake shock coverage, except on the two swimming pools. There is no mention of any premium
payable for the other resort properties with regard to earthquake shock.

There is no ambiguity in the terms of the contract and its riders. Petitioner cannot rely on the general
rule that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion which should be liberally construed in favor of
the insured and strictly against the insurer company which usually prepares it.31 A contract of adhesion
is one wherein a party, usually a corporation, prepares the stipulations in the contract, while the other
party merely affixes his signature or his "adhesion" thereto. Through the years, the courts have held
that in these type of contracts, the parties do not bargain on equal footing, the weaker party's
participation being reduced to the alternative to take it or leave it. Thus, these contracts are viewed as
traps for the weaker party whom the courts of justice must protect.32 Consequently, any ambiguity
therein is resolved against the insurer, or construed liberally in favor of the insured.33

The case law will show that this Court will only rule out blind adherence to terms where facts and
circumstances will show that they are basically one-sided.34 Thus, we have called on lower courts to
remain careful in scrutinizing the factual circumstances behind each case to determine the efficacy of
the claims of contending parties. In Development Bank of the Philippines v. National
Merchandising Corporation, et al.,35 the parties, who were acute businessmen of experience, were
presumed to have assented to the assailed documents with full knowledge.

We cannot apply the general rule on contracts of adhesion to the case at bar. Petitioner cannot claim it
did not know the provisions of the policy. From the inception of the policy, petitioner had required the
respondent to copy verbatim the provisions and terms of its latest insurance policy from AHAC-AIU.

Respondent, in compliance with the condition set by the petitioner, copied AIU Policy No. 206-
4568061-9 in drafting its Insurance Policy No. 31944. It is true that there was variance in some terms,
specifically in the replacement cost endorsement, but the principal provisions of the policy remained
essentially similar to AHAC-AIU's policy. Consequently, we cannot apply the "fine print" or "contract
of adhesion" rule in this case as the parties' intent to limit the coverage of the policy to the two
swimming pools only is not ambiguous.37

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The Petition
for Certiorari is dismissed.

5. Simon De La Cruz vs. The Capital Ins. and Surety Inc., G.R. No. L-21574, June 30, 1966

Facts

1. Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a mucker in the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. in

Baguio, was the holder of an accident insurance policy (No. ITO-BFE-170) underwritten by the
Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc.
 2. On January 1, 1957, he had a boxing match wherein he slipped and was hit by
his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting
the rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left.

3. Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and who was named beneficiary
under the policy, filed a claim with the insurance company for payment which was denied with a
claim that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not
accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance.

4. After due hearing the court rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff which
is the subject of the present appeal.

5. Appellant insurer now contends that while the death of the insured was due to
head injury, said injury was sustained because of his voluntary participation in the contest. It is
claimed that the participation in the boxing contest was the "means" that produced the injury which,
in turn, caused the death of the insured. And, since his inclusion in the boxing card was voluntary on
the part of the insured, he cannot be considered to have met his death by "accidental
means".1äwphï1.ñët

Issue: WON the death is accidental which is compensable.

Ruling

The terms "accident" and "accidental", as used in insurance contracts, have been taken to mean
that which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is
unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an event that takes place without one's
foresight or expectation — an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual
effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected.1

Appellant however, would like to make a distinction between "accident or accidental" and "accidental
means", which is the term used in the insurance policy involved here. It is argued that to be considered
within the protection of the policy, what is required to be accidental is the means that caused or brought
the death and not the death itself. It may be mentioned in this connection, that the tendency of court
decisions in the United States in recent years is to eliminate the fine distinction between the terms
"accidental" and "accidental means" and to consider them as legally synonymous.2 But, even if we take
appellant's theory, the death of the insured in the case at bar would still be entitled to indemnification
under the policy. The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not result from accident or
accidental means within the terms of an accident-policy if it is the natural result of the insured's
voluntary act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or injury.3 There is no accident
when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen
happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death.4 In other words, where
the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the insured's voluntary act, or if something
unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury, the resulting death is within the
protection of policies insuring against death or injury from accident.

In the present case, while the participation of the insured in the boxing contest is voluntary, the injury
was sustained when he slid, giving occasion to the infliction by his opponent of the blow that threw
him to the ropes of the ring. Without this unfortunate incident, that is, the unintentional slipping of the
deceased, perhaps he could not have received that blow in the head and would not have died. The fact
that boxing is attended with some risks of external injuries does not make any injuries received in the
course of the game not accidental. In boxing as in other equally physically rigorous sports, such as
basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily anticipated to result. If, therefore, it ever does, the injury
or death can only be accidental or produced by some unforeseen happening or event as what occurred
in this case.

Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically excluded from its coverage —

(e) Death or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging in football, hunting,
pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling.

Death or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was not declared outside of the
protection of the insurance contract. Failure of the defendant insurance company to include death
resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the
conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability for such death.5

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with costs against appellant. so ordered.

Beneficiaries

6. Heirs of Loreto C. Maramag vs. Eva Verna De Guzman, [Link]., G.R. No. 181132, June 5, 2009

Facts

The petition alleged that: (1) petitioners were the legitimate wife and children of Loreto Maramag
(Loreto), while respondents were Loreto's illegitimate family; (2) Eva de Guzman Maramag (Eva) was
a concubine of Loreto and a suspect in the killing of the latter, thus, she is disqualified to receive any
proceeds from his insurance policies from Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. (Insular)4 and Great
Pacific Life Assurance Corporation (Grepalife);5 (3) the illegitimate children of Loreto Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie were entitled only to one-half of the legitime of the legitimate children, thus,
the proceeds released to Odessa and those to be released to Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie were
inofficious and should be reduced; and (4) petitioners could not be deprived of their legitimes, which
should be satisfied first.

In answer,6 Insular admitted that Loreto misrepresented Eva as his legitimate wife and Odessa, Karl
Brian, and Trisha Angelie as his legitimate children, and that they filed their claims for the insurance
proceeds of the insurance policies; that when it ascertained that Eva was not the legal wife of Loreto, it
disqualified her as a beneficiary and divided the proceeds among Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha
Angelie, as the remaining designated beneficiaries; and that it released Odessa's share as she was of
age, but withheld the release of the shares of minors Karl Brian and Trisha Angelie pending submission
of letters of guardianship. Insular alleged that the complaint or petition failed to state a cause of action
insofar as it sought to declare as void the designation of Eva as beneficiary, because Loreto revoked her
designation as such in Policy No. A001544070 and it disqualified her in Policy No. A001693029; and
insofar as it sought to declare as inofficious the shares of Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie,
considering that no settlement of Loreto's estate had been filed nor had the respective shares of the
heirs been determined. Insular further claimed that it was bound to honor the insurance policies
designating the children of Loreto with Eva as beneficiaries pursuant to Section 53 of the Insurance
Code.
In its own answer7 with compulsory counterclaim, Grepalife alleged that Eva was not designated as an
insurance policy beneficiary; that the claims filed by Odessa, Karl Brian, and Trisha Angelie were
denied because Loreto was ineligible for insurance due to a misrepresentation in his application form
that he was born on December 10, 1936 and, thus, not more than 65 years old when he signed it in
September 2001; that the case was premature, there being no claim filed by the legitimate family of
Loreto; and that the law on succession does not apply where the designation of insurance beneficiaries
is clear.

During the pre-trial on July 28, 2004, both Insular and Grepalife moved that the issues raised in their
respective answers be resolved first. The trial court ordered petitioners to comment within 15 days.

On September 21, 2004, the trial court issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads'

WHEREFORE, the motion to dismiss incorporated in the answer of defendants Insular Life and
Grepalife is granted with respect to defendants Odessa, Karl Brian and Trisha Maramag. The action
shall proceed with respect to the other defendants Eva Verna de Guzman, Insular Life and Grepalife.

The Insurance Code, as amended, contains a provision regarding to whom the insurance proceeds shall
be paid. It is very clear under Sec. 53 thereof that the insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to
the proper interest of the person in whose name or for whose benefit it is made, unless otherwise
specified in the policy. Since the defendants are the ones named as the primary beneficiary (sic) in the
insurances (sic) taken by the deceased Loreto C. Maramag and there is no showing that herein plaintiffs
were also included as beneficiary (sic) therein the insurance proceeds shall exclusively be paid to them.
This is because the beneficiary has a vested right to the indemnity, unless the insured reserves the right
to change the beneficiary. (Grecio v. Sunlife Assurance Co. of Canada, 48 Phil. [sic] 63).

Neither could the plaintiffs invoked (sic) the law on donations or the rules on testamentary succession
in order to defeat the right of herein defendants to collect the insurance indemnity. The beneficiary in a
contract of insurance is not the donee spoken in the law of donation. The rules on testamentary
succession cannot apply here, for the insurance indemnity does not partake of a donation. As such, the
insurance indemnity cannot be considered as an advance of the inheritance which can be subject to
collation (Del Val v. Del Val, 29 Phil. 534). In the case of Southern Luzon Employees' Association v.
Juanita Golpeo, et al., the Honorable Supreme Court made the following pronouncements[:]

"With the finding of the trial court that the proceeds to the Life Insurance Policy belongs exclusively to
the defendant as his individual and separate property, we agree that the proceeds of an insurance policy
belong exclusively to the beneficiary and not to the estate of the person whose life was insured, and
that such proceeds are the separate and individual property of the beneficiary and not of the heirs of the
person whose life was insured, is the doctrine in America. We believe that the same doctrine obtains in
these Islands by virtue of Section 428 of the Code of Commerce x x x."

Issue: Are the members of the legitimate family entitled to the proceeds of the insurance for the
concubine?15

.Ruling

The petition should be denied.

In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the
legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by
Insular and Grepalife. The basis of petitioners' claim is that Eva, being a concubine of Loreto and a
suspect in his murder, is disqualified from being designated as beneficiary of the insurance policies,
and that Eva's children with Loreto, being illegitimate children, are entitled to a lesser share of the
proceeds of the policies. They also argued that pursuant to Section 12 of the Insurance Code,19 Eva's
share in the proceeds should be forfeited in their favor, the former having brought about the death of
Loreto. Thus, they prayed that the share of Eva and portions of the shares of Loreto's illegitimate
children should be awarded to them, being the legitimate heirs of Loreto entitled to their respective
legitimes.

It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment in
light of Article 2011 of the Civil Code which expressly provides that insurance contracts shall be
governed by special laws, i.e., the Insurance Code. Section 53 of the Insurance Code states'

SECTION 53. The insurance proceeds shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person
in whose name or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy.

Pursuant thereto, it is obvious that the only persons entitled to claim the insurance proceeds are either
the insured, if still alive; or the beneficiary, if the insured is already deceased, upon the maturation of
the policy.20 The exception to this rule is a situation where the insurance contract was intended to
benefit third persons who are not parties to the same in the form of favorable stipulations or indemnity.
In such a case, third parties may directly sue and claim from the insurer.21

Petitioners are third parties to the insurance contracts with Insular and Grepalife and, thus, are not
entitled to the proceeds thereof. Accordingly, respondents Insular and Grepalife have no legal
obligation to turn over the insurance proceeds to petitioners. The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in
one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no moment considering that the
designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto's insurance policies remains valid.
Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the children of illicit relationships by
the insured,22 the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether forfeited by the court in view of the
prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by the insurers themselves for reasons
based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said illegitimate children, the designated
beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases where the insured has not designated
any beneficiary,23 or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified by law to receive the
proceeds,24 that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the estate of the insured.

In this regard, the assailed June 16, 2005 Resolution of the trial court should be upheld. In the same
light, the Decision of the CA dated January 8, 2008 should be sustained. 25

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

7. Southern Luzon Employees’ Ass. v. Golpeo, et al., 96 Phil. 83

8. Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, No. L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315
9. The Insular Life Ass. Co., Ltd. v. Ebrado, No. L-44059, Oct. 28, 1977, 80 SCRA 181

Insurable Interest
 10. Sps. Nilo Cha and Stella Uy Cha, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals , et. al., G.R. No. 124520. Aug. 18, 1997
11. Gaisano Cagayan, Inc. vs. Ins. Co. of North America, G.R. No. 147839, June 8, 2006
12. Vicente Ong Lim Sing, Jr. vs. FEB Leasing & Finance Corp., G.R. No. 168115, June 8, 2007

Concealment

13. Great Pacific Life Ass. Corp. vs. CA and Medarda V. Leuterio ,G.R. No. 113899. Oct. 13, 1999
14. New Life Enterprises v. CA G.R. No. 94071, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 669
15. Ma. Lourdes S. Florendo vs. Philam Plans, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 186983, Feb. 22, 2012
16. Great Pacific Life Ass. Co. vs. CA and Ngo Hing, G.R. No. L-31845, April 30, 1979
17. Saturnino vs. Phil. American Life 7, SCRA 316, 319

Warranties

18. Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance Co., Ltd., 98 Phil. 85 (1955)

Double Insurance

19. Geagonia v. Court of Appeals 241 SCRA 152, 160 (1995)

20. Malayan Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Phils. First Ins. Co., Inc. and Reputable Forwarder Services, Inc., G.R. No.
184300, July 11, 2012

Notice of Loss

21. Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194, August 5, 1992

Premiums

22. Jaime T. Gaisano vs. Development Insurance and Surety Corp., G.R. No. 190702, Feb. 27, 2017
23. Arce v. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., 117 SCRA 63 (1982)
24. Sps. Antonio A. Tibay , [Link]. vs. Court of Appeals ,[Link]., G.R. No. 119655.  May 24, 1996
25. UCPB Gen. Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Masagana Telamart, Inc. G.R. No. 137172. April 4, 2001
26. American Home Ass. Co. vs. Antonio Chua, G.R. No. 130421. June 28, 1999
27. Makati Tuscany Condo. Corp. v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 95546, 6 Nov. 1992

Reinstatement

28. Violeta R. Lalican vs. The Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd, G.R. No. 183526 August 25, 2009

Marine Insurance

29. Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Court Of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 121833, Oct. 17, 2008
30. FGU Insurance Corp. vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 137775, March 31, 2005
31. Phil. American General Ins. Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 116940, June 11, 1997, 273 SCRA 262

On Presentation of Policies

32. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Regis Brokerage Corp., G.R. No. 172156, Nov. 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 681
33. ITCSI vs. FGU Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 161539, June 27, 2008
Subrogation

34. Keppel Cebu Shipyard, Inc. v. Pioneer Ins.., G.R. Nos. 180880-81, Sept. 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 96
35. Malayan Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Rodelio Alberto and Enrico Alberto Reyes, G.R. No. 194320, Feb.1, 2012

Fire Insurance

36. Uy Hu & Co. v. The Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd. 51, Phil. 231 (1927)
37. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., vs. PAP Ltd. Co. (Phil. Br.) G.R. No. 200784, Aug. 07, 2013
38. United Merchants Corp. vs. Country Bankers Ins. Corp., G.R. No. 198588 July 11, 2012

Surety

39. Clarita Quiamco vs. Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., G.R. No. 170852 Sept. 12, 2008
40. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Tokyu Construction Co., Ltd., G.R. Nos. 158820-21, June 5, 2009
41. First Lepanto-Taisho Ins. Corp. vs. Chevron Phils., Inc., G.R. No. 177839, Jan. 18, 2012

On Motor Vehicle Insurance

42. Perla Compania De Seguros, Inc. petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals G.R. No. 96452 May 7, 1992

Theft Clause

43. Paramount Ins. Corp. vs. Sps. Yves and Maria Teresa Remondeulaz, G.R. No. 173773, Nov. 28, 2012
44. Alpha Insurance and Surety Co. vs. Arsenia Sonia Castor, G.R. No. 198174, Sept. 2, 2013

Other Insurance Clause

45. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Phils. First Insurance Co., Inc. G.R. No. 184300, July 11, 2012

On Mortgage Redemption Insurance

46. Great Pacific Life Ass. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 113899, Oct. 13, 1999

On the Liability of Insurer for Loss Due to Negligence

47. FGU Insurance Corp. vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 137775, March 31, 2005
 Case List in Negotiable Instruments Law

Elements of Negotiable Instrument

1) Rodrigo Rivera vs. Sps. Salvador and Violeta Chua, G.R. No. 184458, Jan.14, 2015
2) Sps. Pedro Violago v. BA Finance Corp. and Avelino Violago, G.R. No. 158262, July 21, 2008

Incomplete and Undelivered Instruments

3) Alvin Patrimonio vs. Napoleon Gutierrez , et. al. G.R. No. 187769, June 04, 2014

Complete but Undelivered Instruments

4) RCBC vs. Hi-Tri Dev. Corp. , et. al, G.R. No. 192413, June 13, 2012

Forgery

5) MWSS vs. CA and PNB, G.R. No. L-62943, July 14, 1986
6) Samsung Construction Co. Phils, Inc. vs. Far East Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. 129015. Aug. 13, 2004
 7) Associated Bank vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107382. Jan. 31, 1996

Consideration

8) Quirino Gonzales Logging Concessionaire, et. al. vs. CA, G. R. No. 126568. April 30, 2003
9) Carmela Brobio Mangahas vs. Eufrocina A. Brobio, G.R. No. 183852, October 20, 2010
10) Engr. Jose E. Cayanan North Star Int’l Travel, Inc., G.R. No. 172954 Oct. 5, 2011

Accommodation Party

11) Fideliza J. Aglibot vs. Ingersol R. Santia, G.R. No. 185945, Dec. 5, 2012
12) Eusebio Gonzales vs. PCIB, et. al. G.R. No. 180257, February 23, 2011
13) Ang v. Associated Bank, G.R. No. 146511, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 244
14) Claude P. Bautista vs. Auto Plus Traders, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 166405, Aug. 6, 2008
15) Tomas Ang vs. Associated Bank , et. al. G.R. No. 146511 Sept. 5, 2007
16) Genevieve Lim vs. Florencio Saban, G.R. No. 163720, December 16, 2004

Negotiation

17) Caltex (Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al. , G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992
18) People of the Phils. vs. Gilbert Reyes Wagas, G.R. No. 157943, Sept. 04, 2013
19) BPI vs. CA, Annabelle A. Salazar and Julio Templonuevo, G.R. No. 136202, Jan. 25, 2007
20) Raul Sesbreño vs. CA, Delta Motors Corp. and Pilipinas Bank G.R. No. 89252, May 24, 1993

Indorsement

21) PNB vs. Erlando T. Rodriguez, et. al., G.R. No. 170325, Sept. 26, 2008
22) PCIB vs. CA, G.R. No. 121413. January 29, 2001
23) Metrobank vs. BA Finance , et. al., G.R. No. 179952, December 4, 2009
24) Metrobank vs. PB Com, et. al. G.R. No. 141408, Oct. 18, 2007
25) Allied Banking Corp. vs. Lim Sio Wan, et. al., G.R. No. 133179 March 27, 2008
26) Melva Theresa Alviar Gonzales vs. RCBC G.R. No. 156294 Nov. 29, 2006

Holders in Due Course

27) Cesar V. Areza , et. al. vs. .Express Savings Bank, Inc. , et. al., G.R. No. 176697, Sept. 10, 2014
28) BPI vs. Gregorio C. Roxas, G.R. NO. 157833 : October 15, 2007
29) Robert Dino vs. Maria Luisa Judal-Loot, et. al., G.R. No. 170912, April 19, 2010
30) Equitable PCI Bank vs. Rowena Ong G.R. No. 156207, Sept. 15, 2006
31) Atrium Management Corp. vs. CA, E.T. Henry and Co., et. al., G.R. No. 109491, Feb. 28, 2001
32) Equitable PCI Bank vs. Rowena Ong, G.R. No. 156207, September 15, 2006
33) Cely Yang vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, PCIB, et. al. G.R. No. 138074. August 15, 2003

Liability of Indorsers

34) Allied Banking Corp. vs. Lim Sio Wan, Metrobank, et. al., G.R. No. 133179, March 27, 2008
35) Metrobank vs. BA Finance Corp. and Malayan Ins. Co., Inc., G.R. No. 179952, Dec. 4, 2009
36) BPI vs. CA, CBC. and Philippine Clearing House Corp., G.R. No. 102383, Nov. 26, 1992
37) Far East Bank & Trust Co. vs. Gold Palace Jewellery Co., et. al., G.R. NO. 168274, Aug. 20, 2008

Presentment for Payment; Notice of Dishonor

 38) Far East Realty Investment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. L-36549 Oct. 5, 1988
39) Stelco Marketing Corporation vs. Court Of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 96160, June 17, 1992

Discharge of Negotiable Instrument

40) Anamer Salazar vs. J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 171998, October 20, 2010
41) State Investment House, Inc. vs. CA and Nora B. Moulic, G.R. No. 101163, Jan. 11, 1993

Material Alteration

42) The International Corporate Bank, Inc. vs. CA and PNB, G.R. No. 129910, Sept. 5, 2006
43) PNB vs. Court of Appeals, et.. al., G.R. No. 107508, April 25, 1996
44) Metrobank Vs. Renato D. Cabilzo, G.R. No. 154469, December 6, 2006

Protest

45) Allied Banking Corp. vs. CA, G.G. Sportswear Mfg. Corp., et. al., G.R. No. 125851, July 11, 2006

Crossed Checks

46) Vicente Go vs. Metrobank., G.R. No. 168842, August 11, 2010
47) Traders Royal Bank vs. Radio Phils. Network, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 138510. October 10, 2002

Cases for Bouncing Checks Law

48) Eumelia R. Mitra vs. PP and Felicisimo S. Tarcelo, G.R. NO. 191404, July 5, 2010
49) Amada Resterio vs. People of the Phils., G.R. No. 177438, Sept. 24, 2012
50) Ma. Rosario Campos vs. People of the Phils. Et. al., G.R. No. 187401, Sept. 17, 2014

Case List in Banking Law

1) Go vs. BSP G.R. No. 178429, Oct. 23, 2009 (604 SCRA 322)
2) Soriano vs. People, G.R. No. 162336, Feb. 1, 2010, (611 SCRA 191) -
3) Bibiano O. Reynoso, IV vs. C.A. and Gen. Credit Corp. G.R. Nos. 116124-25.  Nov. 22, 2000
4) Central Bank of the Phils. vs. C.A, G.R. No. 7618, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 536
5) BF Savings Bank vs. MB, G.R. Nos. 70054 and 68878, Dec 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 767
6) Central Bank of the Phils. v. CA, G.R. No. 88353, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 652, 684-685
7) Phil. Veterans Bank Employees Union v. Phil. Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 67125, Aug. 24, 1990
8) RB of San Miguel, Inc. v. MB, BSP, G.R. No. 150886, Feb. 16, 2007, 516 SCRA 154, 160
9) Ana Maria A. Koruga vs. Teodoro O. Arcenas, Jr., et. al. G.R. No. 168332/ Teodoro O. Arcenas et. al.
vs. Hon. Sixto Marella, Jr. , G.R. No. 169053, June 19, 2009
10) Central Bank vs. DeLa Cruz, 191 SCRA 346 (1990)
11) Banco Filipino Savings Bank vs. Monetary Board, G.R. Nos. 70054, Dec. 11, 1991, 204 SCRA 767
12) Leticia G. Miranda vs. PDIC, G.R. No. 169334 Sept. 8, 2006
13) CB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76118, March 30, 1993, 220 SCRA 536, 543.
14) BSP and Chuchi Fonacier vs. Hon. Nina G. Valenzuela, et. al., G.R. No. 184778, Oct. 2, 2009
 15) Lucia Barrameda Vda. De Ballesteros vs. RB of Canaman Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 176260 Nov. 24, 2010
16) Leticia G. Miranda vs. PDIC et. al., G.R. No. 169334 Sept. 8, 2006
17) PDIC vs. BIR, G.R. No. 172892, Jun 13, 2013
18) GSIS vs. Court of Appeals, et. al, G.R. No. 189206,  June 8, 2011
19) China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140687, 18 Dec. 2006, 511 SCRA 110, 117
20) Intengan v. Court of Appeals, 377 SCRA 63 (2002)
21) China Banking Corp. v. Ortega 49 SCRA 355 (1973)
22) Marquez vs. Desierto 359 SCRA 772 (2001)
23) Karen E. Salvacion, et. al vs. Central Bank, et. al, G.R. No. 94723.  Aug. 21, 1997
24) BSB Group, Inc., et. al. vs. Sally Go a.k.a. Sally Go-Bangayan, G.R. No. 168644, Feb. 16, 2010
25) Joseph Victor G. Ejercito vs. Sandiganbayan , G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006
26) Republic vs. Hon. Antonio Eugenio, G.R. No. 174629, February 14, 2008
27) Republic vs. Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc., G.R. No. 170281,   Jan. 18, 2008
28) Republic  vs. Cabrini Green & Ross, Inc., G.R. No. 154522 June 19, 2009
29) Ret. Lt. Gen. Jacinto C. Ligot, et. al. vs. Republic, G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013
30) Republic of the Phils., et. al. vs. First Pacific Network Inc. G.R. No. 156646 Nov. 19, 2014

Case List in Intellectual Property Law

Patent

1. Smith Kline Beckham Corp. vs. CA, GR No. 126627, Aug. 14, 2003
2. Creser Precision System Inc. vs. CA (GR No. 118708, Feb. 2, 1998)
3. Angelita Manzano vs. CA, et al. (GR No. 113388, Sept. 5, 1997)
4. E.I. Dupont De Nemours, et. al. vs. Dir. Emma Francisco et. al., G.R. No. 174379, Aug. 31, 2016

Trademark

5. E.Y. Industrial Sales, Inc., et. al   Shen Dar Electricity Co., Ltd., G.R. No. 184850 October 20, 2010
6. Mc Donald's Corp. vs. Macjoy Fastfood Corp., G.R. NO. 166115, Feb. 2, 2007

7. Fredco Mfg. Corp. vs. Pres and Fellows of Harvard College, GR No. 185917, June 1, 2011
8. In-N-Out Burger, Inc. vs. Sehwani, Inc. and/or Benita's Frites, Inc., G.R. NO. 179127, Dec. 24, 2008
9. La Chemise Lacoste S.A. vs. Hon. Fernandez, et al. 214 Phil. 332, (1984)
10. Birkenstock Orthopaedie GMBH vs. Phil. Shoe Expo Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 194307, Nov. 20, 2013
11. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 120900, July 20, 2000, 336 SCRA 266
12. GSIS Family Bank - Thrift Bank vs. BPI Family Bank, G.R. No. 175278, Sept. 23, 2015
13. UFC Phils., Inc., et. al. vs. Fiesta Barrio Mfg. Corp., G.R. No. 198889, Jan. 20, 2016
 14. Taiwan Kolin Corp. Ltd. vs. Kolin Electronics, Inc., G.R. No. 209843, Mar. 25, 2015

Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition

15. Mighty Corp. vs. E&S Gallo, 434 SCRA 473 (2004)
16. Societe Des Produit Nestle S.A. vs. CA, G.R. No. 172276, August 08, 2010, 356 SCRA 207
17. Sterling Products International, Inc. v. Farbenfabriken Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 137 Phil. 838. (1969)
18. Prosource Int’l, Inc. v. Horphag Research Mgnt. SA, G.R. No. 180073, 25 Nov. 2009, 605 SCRA 523
19. Esso Standard vs. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 336 [1982], 116 SCRA 336
20. Asia Brewery, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103543, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA 437 (1993)
21. Victorio Diaz vs. People of the Phils. and Levi Strauss [Phils.], Inc., G.R. No. 180677, Feb. 18, 2013

Dominant Word in Corporate Name

22. Lyceum of the Phils. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101897, March 5, 1993
23. De La Salle Montessori Int’l vs. De La Salle Brothers, Inc., et. al. G.R. No. 205548, Feb. 07, 2018

Copyright

24. Habana vs. Robles (GR No. 131522, July 19, 1999)
25. Filipino Society of Composers vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-36402. March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 461 (1987)
26. ABS-CBN Corp. vs. Felipe Gozon, et. al., G.R. No. 195956, March 11, 2015

Copyright Infringement

27. Pearl & Dean vs. Shoemart, Inc. et al. (GR No. 148222) (Aug. 15, 2003)
28. Columbia Pictures vs. Court of Appeals 261 SCRA 144 (1996)
29. NBI- Microsoft Corp. vs. Hwang, G.R. NO. 147043 : June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 428 (2005)
30. Microsoft Corporation vs. Rolando D. Manansala, G.R. No. 166391, October 21, 2015
 Case List in Transportation Law
Common Carrier

1) Malayan Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Phils. First Insurance Co., Inc., [Link]., G.R. No. 184300, July 11, 2012
2) National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 45
3) Sps. Teodoro Perena vs. and Sps. Teresita Zarate, et. al. , G.R. No. 157917, Aug. 19, 2012
4) Schmitz Transport vs. Transport Venture, Inc., G.R. No. 150255. April 22, 2005, 426 SCRA 557
5) Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 409 SCRA 340, August 19, 2003
6) Torres-Madrid Brokerage, Inc. vs. FEB Mitsui Marine Insurance Co., Inc., et. al.,G.R. No. 194121,
July 11, 2016
7) Sps. Dante and Leonora Cruz vs. Sun Holidays, Inc., G.R. No. 186312, June 29, 2010
8) First Phil. Industrial Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125948, Dec. 29, 1998, 300 SCRA 661

Presumption of Fault

9) Light Rail Transit Authority v. Navidad, G.R. No. 145804, February 6, 2003, 397 SCRA 75
10) G.V. Florida Transport, Inc. vs. Heirs of Romeo Battung, Jr., G.R. No. 208802, Oct.14, 2015

When contract of carriage begin?

11) Dangwa Trans. Co., Inc., et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 95582, Oct. 7, 1991

When contract of carriage ends?

12) Aboitiz Shipping vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 95 (1989)

13) La Mallorca vs. Court of Appeals, 17 SCRA 793

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

14) Greenstar Express, Inc., et. al. vs. Universal Robina Corp., et. al., G.R. No. 205090, Oct. 17, 2016
15) PNR v. Brunty G.R. No. 169891, Nov. 2, 2006, 506 SCRA 685

Contributory Negligence

16) Sealoader Shipping Corp. vs. Grand Cement Mfg. Corp., et. al., G.R. No. 167363 Dec. 15, 2010
17) Larry Estacion vs. Noe Bernardo, G.R. No. 144723, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 222
18) Travel & Tours Advisers, Inc. V. Alberto Cruz, Sr., et. al., G.R. No. 199282, March 14, 2016

Kabit System

19) Abelardo Lim And Esmadito Gunnaban vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 125817,  Jan. 16, 2002
20) Baliwag Transit Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57493, 7 January 1987, 147 SCRA 82;
21) Teja Marketing v. IAC, G.R. No. 65510, 9 March 1987, 148 SCRA 347;
22) Lita Enterprises, Inc. v. Sec. Civil Cases Div., IAC, G.R. No. 64693, 27 April 1984, 129 SCRA 79)
Boundary Hulog

23) Oscar Villamaria, Jr. vs. Court Of Appeals, G.R. No. 165881, April 19, 2006 
24) Hernandez vs. Dolor, 435 SCRA 668 (2004) 
25) Primo E. Caong, Jr., et. al. vs. Avelino Regualos, G.R. No. 179428, January 26, 2011

Liability for the Death of the Passenger

26) Herminio Mariano, Jr. vs. Ildefonso C. Callejas and Edgar De Borja, G.R. No. 166640 July 31, 2009
citing Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 52159, Dec. 22, 1989, 180 SCRA 546)

Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor

27) Eddie Cortel and Yellow Bus Line, Inc. vs. Cecile Gepaya-Lim, G.R. No. 218014, Dec. 07, 2016

Registered Owner Rule

28) Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. vs. Ermilinda R. Abejar, G.R. No. 170631, Feb 10,
2016

Vicarious Liability

29) Mariano Mendoza and Elvira Lim vs. Sps. Gabriel Gomez G.R. No. 160110, June 18, 2014

Bill of Lading

30) Ace Navigation Co., Inc. vs. FGU Insurance Corp., et. al. G.R. No. 171591, June 25, 2012
31) MOF Company, Inc. vs. Shin Yang Brokerage Corp. G.R. No. 172822 Dec. 18, 2009
32) Designer Baskets, Inc. vs. Air Sea Transport, Inc., et. al., G.R. No. 184513, March 09, 2016

Doctrine of Limited Liability of Shipowners

33) Phil-Nippon Kyoei, Corp. vs. Rosalia T. Gudelosao, et. al., G.R. No. 181375, July 13, 2016

COGSA

34) Philam Insurance Co., Inc., et. al. vs. Heung-A Shipping Corp., et. al., G.R. No. 187701, July 23,
2014
35) Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Philam Insurance Co., Inc. G.R. No. 181319, July 24, 2013, 702 SCRA 88

Air Transportation (Warsaw Convention)

36) Edna Diago Lhuillier vs. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010
37) Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Hon. Adriano Savillo, Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 30, Iloilo City, and
Simplicio Griño, G.R. No. 14954, July 4, 2008
38) Sps. Jesus and Elizabeth Fernando vs. Northwest Airlines, Inc., G.R. No. 212038, Feb. 08, 2017
39) Cathay Pacific Airways v. Spouses Vazquez 399 SCRA 207 [2003])
 Case List in Special Commercial Law

Letters of Credit

1) Transfield Phils., Inc. vs. Luzon Hydro Corp., et. al., G.R. No. 146717, Nov. 22, 2004
2) Bank of the Phil. Islands v. De Reny Fabric Industries, Inc, 146 Phil. 269 (1970).
3) Bank of America, NT & SA v. C.A., G.R. No. 105395, 10 Dec. 1993, 228 SCRA 357.
4) Feati Bank & Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 576 (1991)
5) Prudential Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 216 SCRA 257 (1992).
6) MWSS vs. Hon. Reynaldo Daway, [Link]., G.R. No. 160732.  June 21, 2004
7) Insular Bank of Asia & America v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 450 (1988).
8) Bank of America, NT & SA v. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 357 (1993).

Cases in Trust Receipts

1) Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Lamberto C. Perez, et. al., G.R. No. 166884 June 13, 2012
2) PNB vs. Lilian S. Soriano, G.R. No. 164051, Oct. 3, 2012
3) Ildefonso S. Crisologo vs. People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. No. 199481, Dec. 3, 2012
4) Metrobank vs. Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzales, et. al., G.R. No. 180165, April 7, 2009
5) Alfredo Ching vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et. al., G.R. No. 110844, April 27, 2000
6) Colinares vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90828, Sept. 5, 2000, 339 SCRA 609, 623-624
7) Ng v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 173905, April 23, 2010, 619 SCRA 291
8) Allied Banking vs. Ordoñez, G.R. 82495, December 10, 1990
9) Rosario Textile Corp. v. Home Bankers Savings and Trust Co., G.R. No. 137232, June 29, 2005
10) Sps. Vintola vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America, G.R. No. 73271, May 29, 1987

SMC.01.03.19