People vs.

Pomar
G.R. No. L-22008, November 3, 1924
Johnson, J.

Facts: Julio Pomar has an employee named Macaria Fajardo whom he granted vacation leave due to he
pregnancy. Pomar was found guilty of violating Sec. 13 of Act No. 3071, an Act of Police Power of the
State when he refused to pay Fajardo her entitled wage during her leave.

Issue: Whether or not Sec. 13 of Act 3071 is a constitutionally valid exercise of Police Power?

Held: The provisions of Sec.13 of Act 3071 were held unconstitutional and void for it violates the
constitutional right to liberty of the employer and employee in accordance to their own terms. It ignores
the necessities of the employer by compelling him to pay not less than a certain amount, irrespective of
the ability of his business. It has deprived every person, firm or corp. owning or managing factory, of his
right to enter into contracts of employment wherein employer and employee may agree. Such persons
are therefore deprived of their liberty to contract. Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is revoked,
the complaint is dismissed, and the defendant is discharged from the custody of the law.

People vs. Mendoza

Facts: Octavio Mendoza was charged with parricide and illegal possession of firearm and ammunition by
the death of his wife Cecilia Mendoza. The accused claimed that on the night of Nov. 11, 1988, he was
suddenly awakened by an unusual sound or shot outside their room. When he went out, he saw his wife
wounded and bleeding. Accused-appellant denied the charges against him and claimed that his wife was
killed by somebody else.

Issue: Whether or not Mendoza should be charged with parricide and illegal possession of firearm?

Held: Yes, the testimony of Charmaine Mendoza, daughter of the spouses, that she saw her father hide
a gun under his bed, made the court to believe that the accused indeed killed his wife. The unbelievable
story of accused-appellant that the killing was perpetrated by the "smuggling syndicate's man" is all too
plainly a mere concoction of accused-appellant designed to exculpate himself from criminal liability.
Although the prosecution duly established that the crime of illegal possession of firearm under
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was committed, fortunately for accussed-appellant, R.A No 8294 amended
the said decree and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a separate offense. Withal, accused-apppellant is held
liable for parricide with the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm.
People v. Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76
February 3, 2000

FACTS: The accused, Romeo G. Jalosjos a member of Congress is confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. He filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted
in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Issue: Whether or not Jalosjos should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives and to leave his cell.

Held: NO. While the Constitution guarantees: no person shall be denied the equal protection of laws,
this simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and
responsibilities imposed. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman
is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and
restricted in liberty of movement. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

US v. Fowler
G.R. No. L-496, December 31, 1902
TORRES, J.

Facts: In August 12, 1901, the defendants were accused of the theft of 16 champagne bottles worth 20
dollars while on board the vessel. The counsel for defendants alleged to the Court of First Instance of
Manila that they were without jurisdiction over the crime. Since it happened in the high seas and not in
the city of Manila or in the territory in which the jurisdiction of the court extends, they asked that the
case be dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction over the criminal case theft
committed on board while navigating on high seas on a vessel not registered in the Philippines.

Facts: No. The Philippine court has jurisdiction over the crime of theft committed on high seas on board
a vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. The English Rule states that such crimes are triable
in our country when crimes are committed on board a foreign vessel sailing from a foreign port and
which enters the Philippine waters. In the case at bar, the vessel Lawton was navigating the high seas at
the commission of the crime. Given the location of the vessel at the time, such act is not triable within
our jurisdiction.

WHO vs. AQUINO

Facts: Dr. Leonce Verstuyft was assigned by WHO to its regional office in Manila as Acting Assistant
Director of Health Services. His personal effects, contained in twelve (12) crates, were allowed free entry
from duties and taxes. Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) suspected that the crates “contain
large quantities of highly dutiable goods” beyond the official needs of Verstuyft. Upon application of the
COSAC officers, Judge Aquino issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the personal effects
of Verstuyft.

Issue: Whether or not personal effect of Verstuyft can be exempted from search and seizure under the
diplomatic immunity.

Facts: Yes. The executive branch of the Phils has expressly recognized that Verstuyft is entitled to
diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The Solicitor General, as
principal law officer of the government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's right to diplomatic
immunity and asked for the quashal of the search warrant. It is a recognized principle of international
law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a political
question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive
branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of
immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government.