G.R. No.

158090, October 04, 2010

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO

FACTS:

Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a mortgage secured by their residential lot from petitioner Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) in the amount of P20,000.00. However, Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with the GSIS. GSIS wrote a letter to
Fernando, informing him of the consolidation of title in its favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in view of Fernando's continued
occupancy of the subject property. Negotiation as to repurchase also takes place.

GSIS scheduled the subject property for a 2nd public bidding after a failed negotiation with Fernando to buy back his property. In this bidding,
Jocelyn Caballero, Fernando’s daughter submitted a bid but unfortunately defeated by CMTC. With this, Fernando, filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint against CMTC, the GSIS and its responsible officers Fernando prayed, among others, that
judgment be rendered: declaring GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No. 199, dated May 16, 1989, null and void for the irregularities in the
conduct of the bidding.

GSIS and its officers filed their Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. GSIS alleged that Fernando owed of P130,365.81,
representing back rentals, including additional interests from January 1973 to February 1987, and the additional amount of P249,800.00.
Caballero, on the other hand, alleged that GSIS's counterclaim is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed docket fees results into the
dismissal of its claim.

After trial, the RTC, in its Decision, 1994, ruled in favor of GSIS and dismissed the complaint. In the same decision, the trial court granted
GSIS's counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of P249,800.00.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in holding that GSIS’s counterclaim of rentals collected by the Caballero’s against CMTC is in
the nature of a permissive counterclaim which required the payment of GSIS of docket fees before the Trial Court can acquire jurisdiction over
the said counterclaim.

HELD

YES. The test was also established by the Supreme Court in this case to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not. The Court has
devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support
or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A
positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.

Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, the SC agreed with the CA's view that GSIS's counterclaim for the recovery of the amount
representing rentals collected by Fernando from the CMTC is permissive. The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid
award, deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that required to establish GSIS's claim for the recovery of rentals.

The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different
from the issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether GSIS is entitled to receive the CMTC's rent payments over the subject property when it (GSIS)
became the owner of the subject property by virtue of the consolidation of ownership of the property in its favor.

The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket
fees. This, GSIS did not do, because it asserted that its claim for the collection of rental payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since
petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the
RTC, insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay GSIS the rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered null and void. Any decision rendered
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
Case Name: CALIBRE TRADERS, INC., MARIO SISON
SEBASTIAN, and MINDA BLANCO SEBASTIAN v BAYER
PHILIPPINES, INC.,
GR No. 161431
Date: October 13, 2010
Facts
 Calibre Traders, Inc. (Calibre) was one of Bayerphils distributors/dealers of its agricultural
chemicals within the provinces of Pangasinan and Tarlac. Their last distributorship agreement was
effective from June 1989 to June 1991. However, Bayerphil stopped delivering stocks to Calibre on
July 31, 1989 after the latter failed to settle its unpaid accounts in the total amount of P1,751,064.56.
 As Bayerphils authorized dealer, Calibre then enjoyed discounts and rebates. Subsequently,
however, the parties had a disagreement as to the entitlement and computations of these discounts.
Calibre, although aware of the deadline to pay its debts with Bayerphil, nevertheless withheld
payment to compel Bayerphil to reconcile its accounts.
 In a letter dated August 16, 1989, Calibre requested Bayerphil for a reconciliation of accounts. It
enumerated claims that amounted to P968,265.82.
 Calibre sent follow-up letters dated September 17, October 13, and November 16, 1989.
 On September 29, 1989, Bayerphils credit and collection officer, Leon Abesamis, conferred with
Calibres General Manager Mario Sebastian (Sebastian). The attempt to settle failed. Again,
Bayerphils Sales Manager of the Agro Division, Vidal Lingan, met with Sebastian. The results of
their discussion were put in writing in Bayerphils letter dated November 10, 1989 and granted some
of their claims.
 In his letter, Sebastian expressed discontent in Bayerphils refusal to credit his claims in full and
underscored the alleged inaction of Bayerphil in reconciling Calibres accounts.
 This was followed by a demand letter requiring Bayerphil to pay the sum of P10,000,000.00 for the
damages it had allegedly caused to Calibre. Bayerphil replied, reminding that Calibre owed it
P1,272,103.07 as of December 31, 1989.
 Accusing Bayerphil of maliciously breaching the distributorship agreement by manipulating
Calibres accounts, withholding discounts and rebates due it, charging unwarranted penalties,
refusing to supply goods, and favoring the new distributors/dealers to drive it out of business,
Calibre, on March 14, 1990, filed a suit for damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
 In its Answer with Counterclaim, Bayerphil denied its alleged wanton appointment of other
distributors, reasoning that it could not be faulted for a difference in treatment between a paying
dealer and a non-paying one. It maintained that Calibre filed the damage suit to avoid paying its
overdue accounts. Considering that those purchased on credit remained unpaid, Bayerphil had to
refuse to further supply Calibre with its products. Bayerphil also averred that the dealership
agreement provides that rebates and discounts would only be granted if the previous purchases had
been first fully paid. It denied that it failed to reconcile Calibres accounts since it conferred with
Calibre, and even acceded to a number of deductions demanded by Calibre subject to the latters
settlement of accounts. Bayerphil thus prayed for collection with interest
 Bayerphil also moved that Mario Sebastian and his wife Minda (Sebastians) be impleaded as co-
defendants, considering that the Sebastians bound themselves as solidary debtors under the
distributorship/dealership agreement.
 Calibre opposed Bayerphils motion to implead the Sebastians and moved to strike out the
counterclaim, reasoning that the spouses are not parties in its suit against Bayerphil and thus are not
the proper parties to the counterclaim. It stressed that the issues between the damages suit it filed
and Bayerphils counterclaim for collection of money are totally unrelated.
 On the other hand, Bayerphil contended that both causes of action arose from the same contract of
distributorship, and that the Sebastians inclusion is necessary for a full adjudication of Bayerphils
counterclaim to avoid duplication of suits.
 The trial court rejected Calibres arguments and granted the motion to implead the Sebastians as co-
defendants in the counterclaim. The spouses then filed their answer to Bayerphils counterclaim,
adopting all the allegations and defenses of Calibre. They raised the issue that the counterclaim
against them is permissive, and since Bayerphil failed to pay the required docket fees, the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the counterclaim.
 The trial court rendered judgment favoring Calibre. It held that Calibre was justified in withholding
payment because there was deliberate inaction/employment of dilatory tactics on the part of
Bayerphil to reconcile accounts making it liable for damages for abuse of rights and unfair
competition under Articles 19, 20, and 28 of the Civil Code. As for Bayerphils counterclaim, the
court a quo adjudged that aside from being unmeritorious for lack of valid demand, the counterclaim
was permissive in character. Therefore, it must be dismissed for Bayerphils failure to pay the
required docket fees.
 The CA reversed the trial courts factual findings. It found no reason to award Calibre anything as it
has no cause of action against Bayerphil. the CA favored Bayerphils counterclaim. It ruled that
Bayerphils counterclaim was compulsory hence it need not pay the docket and filing fees. It noted
 that it arose out of the same dealership agreement from which the claims of Calibre in its complaint
were likewise based. Finding that Calibre never denied that it owes Bayerphil, and that the evidence
of Bayerphil regarding the amount owed by Calibre was unrebutted, the CA deemed justified the
award of actual damages.
Issue/s
a) Whether or not Calibre is entitled to an award of damages
b) the propriety of granting relief to Bayerphils counterclaim.
Ruling
a) To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, the amount of loss must be proved with a reasonable
degree of certainty, based upon competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. The
projected sum of P10 million sales cannot thus be the proper base in computing actual damages. Calibre
computed its lost income based only on its capability to sell around P10 Million, not on the actual income
earned in the past years to properly compute the average income/profit. At any rate, since Calibre had no
cause of action at all against Bayerphil, there can be no basis to award it with damages.

b) It is a settled doctrine that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, its non-payment should not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees
are paid within the applicable prescriptive period. The prescriptive period therein mentioned refers to the
period within which a specific action must be filed. It means that in every case, the docket fee must be paid
before the lapse of the prescriptive period. Chapter 3, Title V, Book III of the Civil Code is the principal law
governing prescription of actions.
 
In accordance with the aforementioned rules on payment of docket fees, the trial court upon a determination
that Bayerphils counterclaim was permissive, should have instead ordered Bayerphil to pay the required
docket fees for the permissive counterclaim, giving it reasonable time but in no case beyond the reglementary
period. At the time Bayerphil filed its counter-claim against Calibre and the spouses Sebastian without having
paid the docket fees up to the time the trial court rendered its Decision on December 6, 1993, Bayerphil could
still be ordered to pay the docket fees since no prescription has yet set in. Besides, Bayerphil should not
suffer from the dismissal of its case due to the mistake of the trial court.

SPOUSES RAMON MENDIOLA and ARACELI N. MENDIOLA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM CORPORATION, and TABANGAO REALTY, INC.

G.R. No. 159746 July 18, 2012

BERSAMIN, J.:

Facts of the Case:

On July 31, 1985, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) entered into an agreement for the distribution of Shell petroleum products by
Pacific Management & Development (Pacific), a single proprietorship belonging to petitioner Ramon G. Mendiola (Ramon). To secure Pacific’s
performance of its obligations under the agreement, petitioners executed on August 1, 1985 a real estate mortgage in favor of Shell covering their
real estate and its improvements, located in the then Municipality of Parañaque.

Pacific ultimately defaulted on its obligations, impelling Shell to commence extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. After application of the
proceeds of the sale to the obligation of Pacific, a deficiency of P170,228.00 remained. The deficiency was not paid by Ramon. Thus, on
September 2, 1987, Shell sued in the RTC in Manila to recover the deficiency. In his answer with counterclaim filed on October 28, 1987,
Ramon asserted that the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage had been devoid of basis in fact and in law; and that the foreclosure and the
filing of the action were made in bad faith, with malice, fraudulently and in gross and wanton violation of his rights.

On March 22, 1988, petitioners commenced in the RTC in Makati an action to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure. The defendants moved for the
dismissal of the case. After the Makati RTC denied both motions, Shell filed its answer ad cautelam. Pending the trial of the Makati case, the
Manila RTC rendered judgment in favor of Shell. As sole defendant in the Manila case, Ramon appealed (C.A.-G.R. No. CV-28056), but his
appeal was decided adversely to him on July 22, 1994, with the CA affirming the Manila RTC’s decision and finding that he was guilty of forum
shopping for instituting the Makati case. Undaunted, he next appealed to the Court (G.R. No. 122795), which denied his petition for review on
February 26, 1996,16 and upheld the foreclosure of the mortgage. The decision of the Court became final and executory, as borne out by the
entry of judgment issued on June 10, 1996. Shell sought the reconsideration of the decision but it was denied. Aggrieved by the decision of the
Makati RTC, Shell and Tabangao filed a joint notice of appeal. On November 22, 2002, the CA denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss appeal. On
July 31, 2002, the CA denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration through the second assailed resolution. Hence, petitioners brought these
special civil actions for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
Issue of the Case:

Whether or not a counterclaim is compulsory.

Ruling of the Court:

Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines a compulsory counterclaim as follows:

Section 7. Compulsory counterclaim. — A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of
or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of
the court both as to the amount and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount. Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected
with the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim both as to its
amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be considered compulsory regardless of the amount.

The four tests to determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not are the following, to wit: (a) Are the issues of fact or law raised by the
claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claims, absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as the defendant’s counterclaim? and (d) Is
there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court?

The four tests are affirmatively met as far as the Makati case was concerned. The Makati case had the logical relation to the Manila case because
both arose out of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage constituted to secure the payment of petitioners’ credit purchases under
the distributorship agreement with Shell. Specifically, the right of Shell to demand the deficiency was predicated on the validity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure, such that there would not have been a deficiency to be claimed in the Manila case had Shell not validly foreclosed the
mortgage. As earlier shown, Ramon’s cause of action for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure was a true compulsory counterclaim in the
Manila case. Thus, the Makati RTC could not have missed the logical relation between the two actions.

Soriente v. Estate of Arsenio Concepcion (2009)

Facts:

Respondent Nenita S. Concepcion established that she was the registered owner of the lot occupied by petitioner Angelina Soriente at No. 637
Cavo F. Sanchez Street, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila.

During the lifetime of Arsenio E. Concepcion, who acquired the lot in 1978, he allowed and tolerated the occupancy of the lot by petitioner, who
was already staying on the property. Petitioner was allowed to stay on the lot for free, but on a temporary basis until such time that Concepcion
and/or his family needed to develop the lot.

After Arsenio E. Concepcion died on December 27, 1989, his family initiated steps to develop the lot, but petitioner’s occupancy of the lot
prevented them from pursuing their plan.

Elizabeth Concepcion-Dela Cruz, daughter of respondent, sent petitioner a demand letter dated September 22, 2000 by registered mail,
demanding that she peacefully surrender the property and extending financial assistance for her relocation. Despite receipt of the demand letter,
petitioner did not vacate the premises.
 

On April 27, 2001, respondent filed against petitioner a Complaint for unlawful detainer with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 59 (trial court).
Petitioner Soriente, as a defendant in the lower court, did not file a separate Answer, but affixed her signature to the Answer filed by defendant
Alfredo Caballero in another ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, which was filed by respondent against Caballero. Hence,
respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Render Judgment under Section 7, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for
Soriente’s failure to file an Answer to the Complaint. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Render Judgment.

The trial court denied the Motion to Render Judgment. It stated that the allegations of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 17973 and 17974 are
similar, the only substantial difference being the time when defendants occupied the subject property allegedly through the tolerance of Arsenio
Concepcion. The trial court believed that in signing the Answer filed in Civil Case No. 17974, Soriente intended to adopt the same as her own,
as both defendants Caballero and Soriente had a common defense against plaintiff’s (respondent’s) separate claim against them. The trial court
denied the Motion to Render Judgment in the interest of justice and considered that the two cases, including Civil Case No. 17932 against
Severina Sadol, had been consolidated.

Pursuant to Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, the trial court set a preliminary conference on October 9, 2001 at 8:30
a.m. The preliminary conference was reset to November 15, 2001, and then to December 18, 2001 because the Motion to Render Judgment was
still pending resolution. The preliminary conference was reset several times due to absences of the parties and their counsels.

In the scheduled preliminary conference held on February 18, 2003, only plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel and defendants Severina Sadol and
Alfredo Caballero were present. In view of the absence of defendant Angelina Soriente or her authorized representative, plaintiff’s (respondent’s)
counsel moved that the case be submitted for decision, and that he be given 15 days within which to submit his position paper.

The trial court granted the motion of plaintiff’s (respondent’s) counsel and considered the case against defendant (petitioner) Angelina Soriente
submitted for decision in accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. The trial court eventually rendered a decision against
Angelina Soriente.

Here, petitioner contends that the lower court erred in deciding this case in accordance with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
asserting that considering that the cases against her, defendants Caballero and Sadol were consolidated, and she and defendant Caballero signed
and filed one common Answer to the Complaint, thus, pleading a common defense, the trial court should not have rendered judgment on her case
based on Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.

Held:

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above
provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, That the court may in its discretion reduce the
amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to
the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants.

SEC. 7. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. – Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a
preliminary conference shall be held. The rules on pre-trial in ordinary cases shall be applicable to the preliminary conference
unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
 
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be a cause for the dismissal of his complaint.
The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with
Section 6 hereof. All cross-claims shall be dismissed.
 
If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
This Rule shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a common cause of action who had pleaded a
common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference

The Court holds that Soriente and Caballero were not co-defendants in the same case. The ejectment case filed against petitioner was distinct
from that of Caballero, even if the trial court consolidated the cases and, in the interest of justice, considered the Answer filed by Caballero in
Civil Case No. 17974 as the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her signature thereto.

Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case for ejectment from that of Caballero and Sadol, petitioner’s failure to appear in the
preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial court on the ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed
as Civil Case No. 17973, in accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO RETUYA ET AL V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. 163039

FACTS:
 Severo Retuya (Severo) and Maxima Mayol Retuya (Maxima) were husband and wife without any children.
 Severo left several parcels of land registered under his name which are located in Mandaue City.
 Severo died intestate, survived by his wife Maxima and by Severo's full blood brothers and sisters, namely, Nicolas, Francisco, Quintin,
Eulogio, Ruperto, Epifania, Georgia and the Heirs of Juan Retuya (Severo’s brother who had died earlier), as well as Severo's half-blood
siblings, namely, Romeo, Leona, Rafaela, Fidela, Severina  and Martina.
 Sometime in 1971, Maxima also died intestate, survived by her siblings, namely, Fructuoso, Daniel, Benjamin, Lorenzo, Concepcion and
Teofila.
 In 1996, Severo and Maxima's siblings and their nephews and nieces, herein petitioners, filed with the RTC of Mandaue City, an action for
judicial partition of the real properties registered under the names of Severo and Maxima, and the accounting of the rentals derived there
from against Severo's two other brothers, respondents Nicolas and his son Procopio Villanueva, and Eulogio, who was represented by the
latter's heirs.
 RTC declared the heirs of EULOGIO Retuya as owners of 1/16 share of Severo to the ½ of the subject properties representing the shares of
Severo, which he inherited from his father and later on sold to Eulogio.
 Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for annulment of Judgment of the RTC, claiming that the question order was a patent nullity for want
of jurisdiction and lack of due process.
 CA dismissed the petition.
o Three of the petitioners did not sign the certificate of non-forum shopping.
o Payment of docket fee was short of P480.00.
 Parties filed for a motion for reconsideration but was dismissed by the CA on the ground that the petitioners failed to comply with the
certification of non-forum shopping due to their alleged dishonesty by claiming that on of the principal parties signed the said certification
when if fact he passed away before the petition was filed.

ISSUE:
WON CA erred in dismissing the petition(s).

HELD/RATIO:
NO. The decisions of the CA are AFFIRMED.
 Petitioners’ actuation showed their lack of forthrightness to the CA which the latter correctly found to be a dishonest act committed against
it.
o There was a signature above the typewritten name of Quintin.
o Written below the signature of Quintin was CTC No. 06570132, issued on January 8, 2003 in Mandaue City.
o It would appear that Quintin, who was already dead at the time the petition was filed, had signed the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping and he was even in possession of a CTC.
 CA correctly denied the motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the Atty. Dela Cerna, representative of the party had no right to
represent the petitioners.
o Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court on the requirements of a valid substitution of counsel:
 The filing of a written application for substitution;
 The client’s written consent;
 The consent of the substituted lawyer if such consent can be obtained;
 and, in case such written consent cannot be procured, a proof of service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be substituted in
the manner required by the Rules.
 o In this case, petitioners failed to comply with the above requirements.

31 SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA SAMMA– LAKAS SA INDUSTRIYA NG KAPATIRANG HALIGI NG ALYANSA

(SAMMA–LIKHA) V. SAMMA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 167141 March 13, 2009

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE: Requirement of certificate of non forum shopping is not required in a petition for certification election. The
erroneous inclusion of one supervisory employee in the union of rank-and-file employees was not a ground to impugn its legitimacy as a
legitimate labor organization which had the right to file a petition for certification election.

EMERGENCY RECIT: SAMMA-LIKHA filed for PCE, denied by Med-Arbiter due to (1) lack of legal personality for failure to attach the
certificate of registration purporting to show its legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rank-andfile and supervisory employees and (3)
failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping. SC: Unless petitioners union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall
continue to have all the rights of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to petition for certification election.

FACTS:
 Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Samma Lakas sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa (SAMMA-LIKHA) filed a petition for
certification election on July 24, 2001. It claimed that: (1) it was a local chapter of the LIKHA Federation, a legitimate labor
organization registered with the DOLE; (2) it sought to represent all the rank-and-file employees of respondent Samma Corporation; (3)
there was no other legitimate labor organization representing these rank-and-file employees; (4) respondent was not a party to any
collective bargaining agreement and (5) no certification or consent election had been conducted within the employer unit for the last 12
months prior to the filing of the petition.
 Samma Corp. moved for the dismissal of the petition arguing that (1) LIKHA Federation failed to establish its legal personality; (2)
petitioner failed to prove its existence as a local chapter; (3) it failed to attach the certificate of non-forum shopping and (4) it had a
prohibited mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.
 Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition on the following grounds: (1) lack of legal personality for failure to attach the certificate of
registration purporting to show its legal personality; (2) prohibited mixture of rank-andfile and supervisory employees and (3) failure to
submit a certificate of non-forum shopping. Petitioner moved for MR. The Regional Director of DOLE forwarded the case to the
Secretary of Labor. During pendency of the petition, Samma Corp. filed a petition for cancellation of petitioner’s union registration in
the DOLE Regional Office IV.
 Sec. of Labor reversed the order of the med-arbiter, the legal personality of a union cannot be collaterally attacked but may only be
questioned in an independent petition for cancellation of registration. Thus, he directed the holding of a certification election among the
rank-and-file employees. Meanwhile, Director of DOLE revoked the charter certificate of SAMMA-LIKHA as local chapter of LIKHA
Federation on the ground of prohibited mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees and noncompliance with the attestation
clause under paragraph 2 of Article 235 of the Labor Code.
 CA reversed SOL’s decision, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 which required the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping applied
to petitions for certification election. It also ruled that the Secretary of Labor erred in granting the appeal despite the lack of proof of
service on respondent. Lastly, it found that petitioner had no legal standing to file the petition for certification election because its
members were a mixture of supervisory and rank-and-file employees.

ISSUES:
1. Whether certificate for non-forum shopping is required in a petition for certification election? NO
2. Whether petitioners MR which was treated as an appeal by the Secretary of Labor should not have been given due course for failure to attach
proof of service on respondent? NO
3. Whether SAMMA LIKHA had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election? Remanded to the DOLE office of origin for
determination of the status of petitioners legal personality. 

HELD:
1. REQUIREMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF NONFORUM SHOPPING IS NOT REQUIRED IN A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION
ELECTION. The requirement for a certificate of non-forum shopping refers to complaints, counter-claims, crossclaims, petitions or applications
where contending parties litigate their respective positions regarding the claim for relief of the complainant, claimant, petitioner or applicant. A
certification proceeding, even though initiated by a petition, is not a litigation but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding character.
Such proceedings are not predicated upon an allegation of misconduct requiring relief, but, rather, are merely of an inquisitorial nature. The
Board's functions are not judicial in nature, but are merely of an investigative character. The object of the proceedings is not the decision of any
alleged commission of wrongs nor asserted deprivation of rights but is merely the determination of proper bargaining units and the ascertainment
of the will and choice of the employees in respect of the selection of a bargaining representative. Under the omnibus rules implementing the
Labor Code as amended by D.O. No. 9, the PCE is supposed to be filed in the Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of
the employer or where the bargaining unit is principally situated. The rules further provide that where two or more petitions involving the same
bargaining unit are filed in one Regional Office, the same shall be automatically consolidated. Hence, the filing of multiple suits and the
possibility of conflicting decisions will rarely happen in this 22 proceeding and, if it does, will be easy to discover.

2. The MR was properly treated as an appeal because it substantially complied with the formal requisites of the latter. The lack of proof of
service was not fatal as respondent had actually received a copy of the motion. Consequently, it had the opportunity to oppose the same. Under
these circumstances, we find that the demands of substantial justice and due process were satisfied. Specifically, technical rules and objections
should not hamper the holding of a certification election wherein employees are to select their bargaining representative.

3. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF PETITIONER: The erroneous inclusion of one supervisory employee in the union of rank-and-file employees
was not a ground to impugn its legitimacy as a legitimate labor organization which had the right to file a petition for certification election.
LIKHA was granted legal personality as a federation. With certificates of registration issued in their favor, they are clothed with legal personality
as legitimate labor organizations. Such legal personality cannot thereafter be subject to collateral attack, but may be questioned only in an
independent petition for cancellation of certificate of registration.

Unless petitioners union registration is cancelled in independent proceedings, it shall continue to have all the rights of a legitimate labor
organization, including the right to petition for certification election. Samma Corp. filed a petition for cancellation of the registration of petitioner
on December 14, 2002. In a resolution dated April 14, 2003, petitioners charter certificate was revoked by the DOLE. But on May 6, 2003,
petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this resolution. Neither of the parties alleged that this resolution revoking petitioners charter
certificate had attained finality. However, in this petition, petitioner prayed that its charter certificate be reinstated in the roster of active
legitimate labor [organizations]. The proceedings on a petition for cancellation of registration are independent of those of a petition for
certification election. This case originated from the latter. If it is shown that petitioners legal personality had already been revoked or cancelled
with finality in accordance with the rules, then it is no longer a legitimate labor organization with the right to petition for a certification election.

A FINAL NOTE Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a certification election among its rankand- file employees.
This should not be the case. We have already declared that, in certification elections, the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material
interest to assail the certification election. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the
office of origin, the Regional Office IV of the Department of Labor and Employment, for determination of the status of petitioners legal
personality. If petitioner is still a legitimate labor organization, then said office shall conduct a certification election subject to the usual pre-
election conference.
Michelle Lana Brown-Araneta v Juan Ignacio Araneta
9 Oct 2013
Velasco, Jr., J.
TOPIC: Motion to Dismiss

SV: After 7 years of marriage, Juan and Michelle separated and Michelle had custody of their 2 children. Juan filed a PETITION FOR
CUSTODY of their children with the Makati RTC. After initially failing to file an answer Michelle filed a Motion to Admit Answer and with a
Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Protection Order. The Makati judge was disinclined to grant Michelle’s motion for a TPO and
declared her in default. Subsequently, she interposed a Motion to Withdraw her Motion for TPO. Subsequently, Michelle initiated a PETITION
FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER with the Muntinlupa RTC, which granted the same. Juan filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia and arguing that this constitutes forum shopping, which the RTC only partially granted. He then filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. CA ruled that although the Petition for Certiorari is a prohibited pleading under RA 9262, the case can’t be
dismissed because it would in effect “reward” the forum shopping done by Michelle.

Court said that Michelle committed forum shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would come out with a favorable
disposition. Litis pendentia refers to the situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such
that the second cause of action becomes vexatious and unnecessary. Applying the rules, Michelle committed forum shopping because, as a result
or in anticipation of the adverse ruling of Makati RTC, she sought the favorable opinion of Muntinlupa RTC. PETITION FOR TEMPORARY
AND PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER in Muntinlupa RTC is dismissed.

FACTS:

- Juan Ignacio and Michelle were married and had 2 children, Ara and Ava. After 7 years, they separated and their 2 children remained in
Michelle’s custody.

- Juan filed a PETITION FOR CUSTODY of his children1 with prayer for visitation rights with the Makati RTC against Michelle and her
mother, Glenda Santos, claiming that they have completely barred him from seeing or getting in touch with his daughters despite repeated
requests.

- The process server attempted to serve summons upon both of them, but only Santos was served. In Santos’ answer, she disclaimed knowledge
of Michelle’s whereabouts and she raised the court’s jurisdiction over Michelle and rattled off negative habits and traits of Juan.

- After a visiting grant was granted to Juan later on, Michelle filed a Motion to Admit Answer and an Answer (With Affirmative Defenses and
With Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Issuance of Protection Order), acknowledging that she heard about the delivery of summons, but she
disregarded it because she claimed she thought that it was improperly served upon her person.

1
Pursuant to A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC or The Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus In relation to Custody of Minors
- [RTC Makati] In a hearing for the issuance of a TPO, the judge expressed her bent to maintain jurisdiction over the PETITION FOR
CUSTODY and her disinclination to issue the TPO. Juan was granted visitation rights for one Saturday and Sunday because he was previously
unable to see his children.
 Subsequently, the RTC resolved to deny admission of Michelle’s answer to the PETITION FOR CUSTODY and declared her in default.
 Michelle interposed a Motion to Withdraw Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Protective Order

- Michelle initiated a PETITION FOR TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT PRTECTION ORDER before RTC Muntinlupa. In the verification
portion of her petition for protection order, Michelle stated that there was a pending petition for custody of their children in Makati.

- [RTC Muntinlupa] granted Michelle’s prayer for a TPO which ordered Juan to stay away at a specified distance from Michelle and the children
and to desist from communicating with Michelle.
 Juan filed a MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION WITH PRAYER TO LIFT TPO anchored on, among others, litis pendentia, since
Makati RTC is competent to grant the very same reliefs Michelle sought from Muntinlupa RTC. Thus, Michelle’s act of filing her
PETITION FOR PROTECTION ORDER constitutes forum shopping.
 RTC conceded the exclusionary effect of RTC Makati assuming the jurisdiction on the issue of custody first, so it PARTIALLY
GRANTED the Motion to Dismiss and modified the protection order to exclude from its coverage the orders issued by Makati RTC in
the exercise of its jurisdiction on the pending custody case.

- Meanwhile in relation to the custody case in Makati RTC, Michelle went to the CA on certiorari

- [CA] ruled partly in favor of Michelle, and decided that Makati RTC erred in not admitting her answer and in holding that she is in default.

- From the adverse orders of Muntinlupa RTC, Juan also went to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari, praying to enjoin the Muntinlupa RTC from
further taking cognizance of Michelle’s protection order petition since it will intrude upon Makati RTC’s disposition of the custody case.
 Michelle opposed and sought the dismissal of the PETITION FOR CERTIORARI on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading under
RA 9262.

- [CA] found Michelle guilty of forum shopping, but also said that Juan’s PETITION FOR CERTIORARI is a prohibited pleading which renders
it dismissible. Nonetheless, it ruled in favor of Juan, declaring void the issuances made by Muntinlupa RTC.
 It said that the rule that a petition for certiorari against any interlocutory order issued by a family court is a prohibited pleading is not
absolute.
 On the other hand, Michelle initially recognized the jurisdiction of Makati RTC to issue a TPO, but it was only after it denied her
prayer for a TPO when she filed a petition before Muntinlupa RTC.
 Dismissing this petition on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading would in effect, “reward” Michelle for this negative act.

- Michelle sought to set aside the Decision of the CA.

ISSUE: Did Michelle commit forum shopping? (YES)

- Michelle argues that:

 She withdrew her petition for protective order in the custody case. Besides, the CA decided that Makati RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over her so all its issuances were void
 There was no forum shopping because there is no identity of parties and the rights asserted and the reliefs prayed for aren’t the same
 It wasn’t possible for her to apply for a protection order under RA 9262 in the custody case because she wasn’t a petitioner in the
Makati case and the venue for the application for a protection order under the law is the place where the offended party resides, which is
Muntinlupa.

- Court pointed out that Michelle only withdrew her petition for protective order in the Makati Court after it was denied. Also, there is nothing in
the CA decision declaring that all issuances of the Makati RTC were void for lack of jurisdiction over Michelle—the Court said that this posture
was meant to deceive and mislead the court.

- Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would come out with a favorable disposition.
 The test for determining whether there is forum shopping is where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other case.
 Litis pendentia refers to the situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that
the second cause of action becomes vexatious and unnecessary. For this to apply, the ff. requisites must be present:
o 1. Identity of the parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions
o 2. Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts
o 3. Identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful would amount to res judicata in the other
 Thus it has been held that there is forum shopping:
 o 1. Whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or
certiorari) in another;
o 2. If, after he has filed a petition before the SC, a party files another before the CA since in such case said party deliberately
splits appeals “in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case offering a
similar remedy would still be open; or
o 3. Where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing to obtain it from the original court.

- Applying the rules, Michelle committed forum shopping because, as a result or in anticipation of the adverse ruling of Makati RTC, she sought
the favorable opinion of Muntinlupa RTC.
 The cases have identical parties. In a long line of cases, the SC has held that absolute identity of parties isn’t required, it being enough
that there is substantial identity of the parties or at least such parties represent the same interests in both actions. The fact that the
identities of parties are reversed doesn’t negate the identity of parties for the purpose of determining whether the case is dismissible on
the ground of litis pendentia.
 The rights asserted and reliefs prayed for are based on the same facts. Both courts will have to make a finding on Michelle’s
allegations of abuse and whether granting visitation rights will be in the children’s best interest.
 Elements of litis pendentia are present and any any judgment rendered in the pending cases, regardless of which party is
successful, will amount to res judicata. In the custody case, Juan asserted his right to visit his children and enjoy custody over them. In
the Petition for Protection Order filed by Michelle, on the other hand, she asserts that the grant of visitation rights in Juan’s favor will
not be in the best interest of the children. A favorable decision in one case would amount to res judicata in the other.

- The evil sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by 2 competent tribunals of 2 separate and contradictory
decisions, thereby causing confusion, is present in this case.

Petition for TPO filed by Michelle in Muntinlupa RTC should be dismissed with prejudice since this is a clear case of forum shopping.

CA Decision AFFIRMED.

METROBANK v. SANTOS
December 15, 2009 | PONENTE | TOPIC

PETITIONERS: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY

RESPONDENTS: HON. SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS, Presiding Judge, RTC, Br. 65, Makati City and MANFRED JACOB DE
KONING

SUMMARY: Metrobank foreclosed and purchased a condominium unit owned by De Koning after the latter failed to pay for a loan to the
former. After De Koning’s refusal to turn over possession of the condo unit, Metrobank filed an ex parte petition for a writ of possession over the
property. De Koning filed an MTD on the ground that Metrobank did not attach a certification against non forum shopping to its petition.
Metrobank argued that its petition is not an initiatory pleading asserting a claim, and therefore does not require such certification. Court agreed
with Metrobank and held that although the ex parte “petition” of Metrobank was a petition in form, it was, in substance actually a motion (neither
a complaint nor an initiatory pleading), making a ceritification against forum shopping unnecessary.

DOCTRINE:
A certification against non-forum shopping is required only in a complaint or in any other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief. An ex
parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is neither of the two - it is merely a motion. Therefore, it does not require such a
certification.

FACTS:
 1. De Koning obtained a P2M loan from Metrobank evidenced by a promissory note and secured by a real estate mortgage over a
condominium unit.
2. After De Koning’s failure to pay, Metrobank foreclosed the mortgage and bought the condo unit, being the highest bidder in the auction
sale.
3. The redemption period lapsed, so Metrobank demanded that De Koning turn over possession of the condo unit.
4. De Koning refused, prompting Metrobank to file an ex parte petition for a writ of possession over the foreclosed property with the RTC
of Makati.
5. Counsel of De Koning filed an MTD on the ground that the petition of Metrobank violated S5 R7 ROC, which requires attachment of a
certification against forum shopping to a complaint or other initiatory pleading. Thus, the petition of Metrobank was dismissed.
6. CA affirmed, adding that S5, R7 is not limited to actions, but covers any initiatory pleading that asserts a claim for relief. Also,
Metrobank failed to disclose in the verification and certification that there are already 2 cases filed by De Koning (one with the RTC,
the other a petition for certiorari with the CA), both of which involve the same issues and subject matter as that of Metrobank’s petition:
its right to foreclose, and consequently, its right to a writ of possession.
7. Metrobank argues that its petition is not covered by S5, R7 ROC
1. ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is not an initiatory pleading asserting a claim
2. it is a mere incident in the transfer of title over the real property acquired
3. therefore, a certification against forum shopping is not required

ISSUES/HELD
1. WON an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession is an initatory pleading asserting a claim, which is covered by the rule
on certification against non-forum shopping (Sec. 5, Rule 7 ROC). NO

RATIO:
The certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or other initiatory pleading.  An ex parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession is neither of the two.

One of the ways a writ of possession may be issued is in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a REM.
In accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118, in order to obtain a writ of possession, the purchaser in a foreclosure
sale must file a petition, in the form of an ex parte MOTION, in the registration or cadastral proceedings of the registered property.
This pleading, although denominated as a petition is actually considered as a MOTION.
Reason (Sps. Arquiza v. CA):
A motion is not an independent right or remedy; its purpose is not to initiate new litigation. It is confined to material but incidental matters in the
progress of a case. It refers to a collateral issue and is dependent upon the principal remedy.
An application for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding.
Therefore, although it may a petition in form, it is in substance merely a motion.
In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property, the basis of the purchaser’s right to possession is his/its right of ownership. There is no
need to file a separate and independent suit for possession – the mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of the writ of
possession is enough.

Since the ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is neither a complaint nor an initiatory
pleading, a certificate against non-forum shopping is NOT required.

Case remanded to RTC.

Monasterio-Pe v. Tong,

Facts

In the Complaint, it was alleged that Tong is the registered owner of two parcels of land known as Lot Nos. 40 and 41 and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-9699 and T-9161, together with the improvements thereon, located at Barangay Kauswagan, City Proper, Iloilo
City; herein petitioners are occupying the house standing on the said parcels of land without any contract of lease nor are they paying any kind of
rental and that their occupation thereof is simply by mere tolerance of Tong; that in a letter dated December 1, 1999, Tong demanded that
respondents vacate the house they are occupying, but despite their receipt of the said letter they failed and refused to vacate the same; Tong
referred his complaint to the Lupon of Barangay Kauswagan, to no avail.[3]
In their Answer with Defenses and Counterclaim, herein petitioners alleged that Tong is not the real owner of the disputed property, but is only a
dummy of a certain alien named Ong Se Fu, who is not qualified to own the said lot and, as such, Tong's ownership is null and void; petitioners
are the true and lawful owners of the property in question and by reason thereof they need not lease nor pay rentals to anybody; a case docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 52676 (RTC Civil Case No. 20181) involving herein petitioner Pe and respondent is pending before the Court of Appeals
(CA) where the ownership of the subject property is being litigated; respondent should wait for the resolution of the said action instead of filing
the ejectment case; petitioners also claimed that there was, in fact, no proper barangayconciliation as Tong was bent on filing the ejectment case
before conciliation proceedings could be validly made.[4]

Ruling

On the foregoing bases alone, the instant petition should be denied.

In any case, the instant petition would still be denied for lack of merit, as discussed below.

In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the RTC erred in holding that the law authorizes an attorney-in-fact to execute the required
certificate against forum shopping in behalf of his or her principal. Petitioners argue that Tong himself, as the principal, and not Ong, should have
executed the certificate against forum shopping.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that the first paragraph of Section 5,[10] Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, requires that the certification should be signed by the "petitioner or
principal party" himself. The rationale behind this is because only the petitioner himself has actual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated
similar actions or proceedings in different courts or agencies. [11] However, the rationale does not apply where, as in this case, it is the attorney-in-
fact who instituted the action.[12] Such circumstance constitutes reasonable cause to allow the attorney-in-fact to personally sign the Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping. Indeed, the settled rule is that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact is not a
violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same. [13] The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually
filed the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit. [14] In fact, Section 1,[15] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of the parties authorized to institute the proceedings. In the present case, there
is no dispute that Ong is respondent's attorney-in-fact. Hence, the Court finds that there has been substantial compliance with the rules
proscribing forum shopping.

Petitioners also aver that the certificate against forum shopping attached to the complaint in Civil Case No. 2000(92) falsely stated that there is
no other case pending before any other tribunal involving the same issues as those raised therein, because at the time the said complaint was
filed, Civil Case No. 20181 was, in fact, still pending with the CA (CA-G.R. CV No. 52676), where the very same issues of ejectment and
physical possession were already included.

Corollarily, petitioners claim that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2000(92) on the ground that the issue of physical possession
raised therein was already included by agreement of the parties in Civil Case No. 20181. As such, petitioners assert that respondent is barred
from filing the ejectment case, because in doing so he splits his cause of action and indirectly engages in forum shopping.

Cosco Philippines Shipping, Inc v. Kemper Insurance Company

G.R. No. ###### Date promulgated Ponente Author’s surname

petitioners Names and titles of parties

respondents Names and titles of parties

summary Kemper (a insurance corporation based in the US) sued Cosco (shipper) because of the spoilage of Genosi Inc’s
beef (consignee). Problem: Kemper’s Filipino lawyer did not attach any proof that he was authorised by Kemper
to sign the Certificate Against Forum Shopping.

SC: A certification against forum shopping must be signed by

(1) the principal parties or
(2) authorized individuals, with proof of such authority
(3) If the plaintiff is a corporation, the authority must be through a valid board resolution
facts of the case
• An insurance case. Genosi Inc (consignee) tried to ship imported beef thru Cosco (shipper) but a portion was spoiled so Genosi
claimed the insurance proceeds from Kemper (insurer) which paid it.
• Kemper is an insurance corporation based in the US
• It instituted an action in the Philippines thru Atty Rodolfo Lat
• THE PROBLEM: Atty Lat signed the Certificate Against Forum Shopping (CAFS) without showing his authority to bring
suit
• There was a SPA made by Brent Healy for Atty. Lat, but it also does not show that Healy was authorised by Kemper
• Cosco filed a MTD, arguing that the CAFS is fatally defective
• RTC: dismissed without prejudice
• CA: reversed. Liberal application of the rule on CAFS.
issue
Whether the Certificate Against Forum Shopping (CAFS) is fatally defective. YES.

ratio
(1) Atty Lat was not properly authorised by Kemper to sign the CAFS
• Who may sign a CAFS (Rule):
• (a) A certification against forum shopping must be signed by the principal parties. If, for any reason, the principal party
cannot sign the petition, the one signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized.
• (b) With respect to a corporation, the certification against forum shopping may be signed for and on its behalf, by a
specifically authorized lawyer who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document.
• only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping on behalf of a corporation…
• Req’d: proof of such authority (must) be presented
• Effect if there is no proof of authority: petition is subject to dismissal
• EXCEPTION (Republic v Coalbrine): “special circumstance or compelling reason” + “subsequent compliance by the
submission of the proof of authority “
• Applied: There is no proof that (Kemper), a private corporation, authorized Atty. Lat, through a board resolution, to sign the
verification and certification against forum shopping on its behalf. Accordingly, the certification against forum shopping appended to the
complaint is fatally defective, and warrants the dismissal of respondent's complaint for Insurance Loss and Damages.
• Relaxation of the rule is unjustified:
• there is no proof of authority submitted, even belatedly
• there is no copy of the board resolution or the secretary’s certificated attesting to Atty Lat’s authority
• the SPA by Healy is fatally defective (it does not show Healy’s authority to act in behalf of Kemper)
(2) Cosco is not estopped by laches from raising the issue with the CAFS
• Rule: if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff who is not authorized to do so, the complaint is not deemed filed. The
court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the complaint and the plaintiff.
• Applied: since no valid complaint was ever filed with the RTC… the same did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
respondent… (therefore) Cosco is not estopped from challenging the RTC’s jurisdiction.
• Note: the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or
by estoppel;
• Exception: estoppel by laches (Tijam v Sibonghanoy)
• But Sibonghanoy does not apply here because “the trial court's jurisdiction was questioned by the petitioner during the
pre-trial stage of the proceedings, and it cannot be said that considerable length of time had elapsed for laches to attach"

HEIRS OF AUSTINO and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN MESINA, Petitioners,

vs.

HEIRS OF DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, ET AL., Respondents.

Definition of Terms:

Non-joinder - failure to bring a person who is a necessary party or in this case an indispensable party into a lawsuit.
Indispensable party - is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of the action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiff or defendant.

Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.

Facts of the Case:

The late spouses Mesina, during their lifetime, bought from the spouses Fian two parcels of land on installment. The properties described:

Parcel 1 – A parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 6791-Rem. Albuera, Leyte; Containing an area of ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
THIRTY TWO (1,632) SQUARE METERS.

Parcel 2 – A parcel of land, Cadastral Lot No. 6737-Rem, Albuera, Leyte; Containing an area of THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
THIRTY (3,730).

Upon the death of the spouses Fian, their heirs––whose names do not appear on the records, claiming ownership of the parcels of land and
taking possession of them––refused to acknowledge the payments for the lots and denied that their late parents sold the property to the
spouses Mesina.

Notwithstanding repeated demands, the Heirs of Fian refused to vacate the lots and to turn possession over to the heirs of the spouses
Mesina, namely: Norman, Victor, Maria and Lorna. Thus, on August 8, 2005, Norman, as attorney-in-fact of his siblings, filed an action for
quieting of title and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte against the Heirs of Fian, naming only
Theresa Fian Yray (Theresa) as the representative of the Heirs of Fian. The case, was docketed as Civil Case No. B-05-08-20.

On September 5, 2005, respondent Theresa filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint, arguing that the complaint states no cause of action and
that the case should be dismissed for gross violation of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which state in part:

“Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. – Only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in
a civil action.”

She claims that the "Heirs of Mesina" could not be considered as a juridical person or entity authorized by law to file a civil action. Neither
could the "Heirs of Fian" be made as defendant, not being a juridical person as well. She added that since the names of all the heirs of the late
spouses Mesina and spouses Fian were not individually named, the complaint is infirmed, warranting its dismissal.

On November 24, 2005, petitioners filed their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.

RTC Ruling:

The Rules of Court is explicit that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action (Section 1,
Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court). Certainly, the Heirs of Faurstino s. Mesina and Genoveva S. Mesina, represented by Norman Mesina as
plaintiffs as well as Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. represented by Theresa Fian Yray as defendants, do not fall within the category as natural or
juridical persons as contemplated by law to institute or defend civil actions. Said heirs not having been individually named could not be the
real parties in interest. Hence, the complaint states no cause of action.

Accordingly, the case is hereby dismissed.

Ruling of the CA

In affirming the RTC, the CA, on April 29, 2011, rendered its Decision, ruling that all the heirs of the spouses Fian are indispensable parties
and should have been impleaded in the complaint. The appellate court explained that this failure to implead the other heirs of the late spouses
Fian is a legal obstacle to the trial court’s exercise of judicial power over the case and any order or judgment that would be rendered is a
nullity in view of the absence of indispensable parties. The CA further held that the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for being
improperly verified.
Issue:

1. W/N the court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action.

2. W/N the court correctly dismissed the complaint for being improperly verified.

Ruling of the SC

1. Failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the
existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and
(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said right.9

By a simple reading of the elements of a failure to state a cause of action, it can be readily seen that the inclusion of Theresa’s co-
heirs does not fall under any of the above elements. The infirmity is, in fact, not a failure to state a cause of action but a non-joinder
of an indispensable party.

As such, this is properly a non-joinder of indispensable party, the indispensable parties who were not included in the complaint
being the other heirs of Fian, and not a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action.

Thus, the dismissal of the case for failure to state a cause of action is improper. What the trial court should have done is to direct
petitioner Norman Mesina to implead all the heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants within a reasonable time from notice with a
warning that his failure to do so shall mean dismissal of the complaint.

2. Verification, like in most cases required by the rules of procedure, is a formal requirement, not jurisdictional. It is mainly intended
to secure an assurance that matters which are alleged are done in good faith or are true and correct and not of mere speculation.
Thus, when circumstances so warrant, as in the case at hand, "the court may simply order the correction of unverified pleadings or
act on it and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed April 29, 2011 Decision and April 12, 2012 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 01366, and the November 22, 2005 Order and February 29,2006 Resolution of the RTC, Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte, dismissing the
complaint in Civil Case No. 8-05-08-20, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Norman Mesina is ORDERED to implead all
the Heirs of Domingo Fian, Sr. as defendants in said civil case within thirty (30) days from notice of finality of this Decision. Failure on the
part of petitioner Mesina to comply with this directive shall result in the dismissal of Civil Case No. B-05-08-20. Upon compliance by
petitioner Mesina with this directive, the RTC, Branch 14 in Baybay, Leyte is ORDERED to undertake appropriate steps and proceedings to
expedite adjudication of the case.

3. Mid-Pasig Land Development Corp. v. Mario Tablante

Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation v. Mario Tablante, doing business under the name and style ECRM Enterprises,
Rockland Construction Company, Laurie Litam, and MC Home Depot, Inc.

G.R. No. 162924

Feb. 4, 2010

Rule 7
FACTS:

Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation (Mid-Pasig) is the registered owner of a piece of land in Pasig City, bounded by Meralco
Avenue, Ortigas Avenue, Julia Vargas Avenue, and Valle Verde Subdivision.

On Dec. 6, 1999, Mid-Pasig, represented by its Chairman and President Ronaldo Salonga, and ECRM Enterprises (ECRM),
represented by its proprietor Mario Tablante (Tablante), executed an agreement whereby Mid-Pasig would lease to ECRM 1 hectare of the
subject land for 3 months, to be used as the staging area for the Home and Garden Exhibition Fair. On the date of the expiration of the Lease
Agreement (March 6, 2000), Tablante assigned all his rights and interests under the said agreement to respondents Laurie M. Litam and/or
Rockland Construction Company, Inc. (Rockland) under a Deed of Assignment of the same date. Mid-Pasig eventually learn that Tablante
had executed a Deed of Lease with respondent MC Home Depot (MC) over the same parcel of land. MC constructed improvements on the
land and subdivided the area into 59 commercial stalls which it leased to various entities. Upon the expiration of the lease, Mid-Pasig
demanded that respondents vacate the land. Final demand was made in a letter dated Dec. 20, 2000.

Rockland filed a case for Specific Performance with the Pasig RTC to forestall the ejectment.

Mid-Pasig then simultaneously filed for: (1) unlawful detainer against the respondents, which was raffled to the Pasig MTC, Branch
70 and (2) a supplemental motion to dismiss Rockland’s case on the ground of litis pendentia. The motion to dismiss was denied. The denial
was questioned and eventually elevated to the SC.

On the other hand, the MTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case because it held that the real issue of
the case was whether or not ECRM had the right to exercise an option to renew its lease contract. Such issue is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, thus the RTC has jurisdiction. MTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

Pasig RTC Branch 160 affirmed the decision in toto.

The CA dismissed Mid-Pasig’s petition for certiorari on the following grounds:

1) The verification and certification against non-forum shopping was signed by a certain Antonio A. Merelos as General Manager of the
petitioner-corporation without attaching therewith a Corporate Secretary’s certificate or board resolution that he is authorized to sign
for and on behalf of the petitioner; and

2) Lack of pertinent and necessary documents which are material portions of the record as required by Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure

Thus, this case.

ISSUE:

1. W/N failure to attach the Secretary’s Certificate is a valid ground for the dismissal of Mid-Pasig’s case

HELD/RATIO:

1. NO, dismissal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon by the Court. (frowned upon )
The court has recently recognized the authority of corporate officers or representatives to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping. Thus, it is clear that the failure to attach the Secretary’s Certificate, attesting to General Antonio Merelos’s authority
to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping should not be considered fatal to the filing of petition. Moreover, the
requisite board resolution was subsequently submitted to the CA together with the pertinent documents. Considering that Mid-Pasig
substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal was unwarranted. The dismissal of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned
upon especially if it will result in unfairness. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have
been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice.

After a finding that the CA erred in dismissing the petition before it, a remand of the case is in order. 

The petition is GRANTED.  The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.   However, in view of the
expiration of the lease in question which has rendered the issue of the right of possession over the subject property moot and academic,
the main case is hereby considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.

ANITA A. LEDDA vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

G.R. No. 200868 // November 21, 2012

Topic: Pleading an actionable document

Facts:

This case arose from a collection suit filed by respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) against Ledda for the latter’s unpaid credit
card obligation.

BPI, through its credit card system, extends credit accommodations to its clientele for the purchase of goods and availment of various
services from accredited merchants, as well as to secure cash advances from authorized bank branches or through automated teller machines.

As one of BPI’s valued clients, Ledda was issued a pre-approved BPI credit card under Customer Account Number 020100-9-00-3041167.
The BPI Credit Card Package, which included the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the credit card, was delivered at Ledda’s
residence on 1 July 2005. Thereafter, Ledda used the credit card for various purchases of goods and services and cash advances.

Ledda defaulted in the payment of her credit card obligation, which BPI claimed in their complaint amounted to P548,143.73 per Statement
of Account dated 9 September 2007. Consequently, BPI sent letters to Ledda demanding the payment of such amount, representing the
principal obligation with 3.25% finance charge and 6% late payment charge per month.

Despite BPI’s repeated demands, Ledda failed to pay her credit card obligation constraining BPI to file an action for collection of sum of
money with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 61. The trial court declared Ledda in default for failing to file Answer within the prescribed
period, despite receipt of the complaint and summons. Upon Ledda’s motion for reconsideration, the trial court lifted the default order and
admitted Ledda’s Answer Ad Cautelam.

While she filed a Pre-Trial Brief, Ledda and her counsel failed to appear during the continuation of the Pre-Trial. Hence, the trial court
allowed BPI to present its evidence ex-parte.

In its Decision of 4 June 2009, the trial court ruled in favor of BPI.

The CA rejected Ledda’s argument that the document containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is an
actionable document contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA held that BPI’s cause of action is
based on "Ledda’s availment of the bank’s credit facilities through the use of her credit/plastic cards, coupled with her refusal to pay BPI’s
outstanding credit for the cost of the goods, services and cash advances despite lawful demands."

Issue: Whether or not the document containing the Terms and Conditions is an actionable document.
Held: NO.

Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Action or defense based on document. — Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document,
the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached
to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the
pleading.

Clearly, the above provision applies when the action is based on a written instrument or document.

In this case, the complaint is an action for collection of sum of money arising from Ledda’s default in her credit card obligation with BPI.
BPI’s cause of action is primarily based on Ledda’s (1) acceptance of the BPI credit card, (2) usage of the BPI credit card to purchase goods,
avail services and secure cash advances, and (3) non-payment of the amount due for such credit card transactions, despite demands. In other
words, BPI’s cause of action is not based only on the document containing the Terms and Conditions accompanying the issuance of the BPI
credit card in favor of Ledda. Therefore, the document containing the Terms and Conditions governing the use of the BPI credit card is not
an actionable document contemplated in Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As such, it is not required by the Rules to be
set forth in and attached to the complaint.

At any rate, BPI has sufficiently established a cause of action against Ledda, who admits having received the BPI credit card, subsequently
used the credit card, and failed to pay her obligation arising from the use of such credit card.

CIVIL LAW

TITAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. SPS. MANUEL DAVID, SR. and MARTHA DAVID

G.R. No. 169548, March 15, 2010

SUBJECT/ TOPIC: Conjugal Partnership Property

THESIS STATEMENT:

Titan Construction Corporation filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court which invalidate both the Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title, ordered to
reconvey the property, directed the Quezon City Register of Deeds to issue a new title, and ordered to pay damages, all in favor of Sps.
Manuel and Martha David and its Resolution denying Motion for Reconsideration.

FACTS:

Manuel and Martha David were married on March 25, 1957 and sometime in 1970, the spouses acquired a parcel of land (602 sq. m.) at
White Plains, Quezon City and the same was registered in the name of the wife, Martha David and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 156043 which was registered by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. The spouses separated de facto and no longer
communicated with each other in 1976. Later in 1995, the husband, Manuel David discovered that Martha had sold a property to Titan
Construction Corp. through a Deed of Sale for Php 1,500,000.00 which transferred the title in the name of Titan, cancelling and replacing the
TCT No. 156043 to TCT No. 130129.

Aggrieved, Manuel filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance against Titan before the RTC of Quezon City alleging
that said Deed of Sale was void for the contract was executed without his knowledge and consent. Hence, he prayed that both the Deed of
Sale and TCT No. 130129 be invalidated, property be reconveyed to the spouses, and a new title be issued in the spouses’ names. Through
the Answer with Counterclaim, Titan prayed for the dismissal of the complaint insisting that it bought the property in good faith and that the
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) which was allegedly signed by Manuel authorized Martha to dispose the property on behalf of the spouses.
However, in Manuel’s unverified Reply, he claimed that the SPA was spurious and the signature purporting to be his was a forgery. Hence,
Martha had no authority to dispose the property on behalf of the spouses as claimed by Titan. The RTC ruled in favor of Manuel stating that
since the spouses purchased the property with conjugal funds during their marriage, the property is conjugal by nature and even if the title
was registered in the name of Martha, it didn’t negate that the property is conjugal. Titan also failed to rebut the expert’s testimony stating
that the signature was not genuine and that even though SPA was notarized it was doubtful for it didn’t contain Manuel’s residence
certificate and not presented for registration with the QC Register of Deeds in violation of Sec 64 of P.D. No. 1529. Lastly, the RTC noted
that Titan should have put on notice the SPA’s doubtful veracity with its transaction with Martha. With these in mind, the RTC granted the
invalidation of both the Deed of Sale and the TCT No. 130129, the reconveyance of the property to the spouses, the issuance of a new title in
the name of the spouses directing the QC Register of Deeds, and compelling Titan to pay Php 200,000.00 plus Php 1,000.00 per appearance
as attorney’s fees, and Php 50,000.00 as cost of suit. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification deleting the award of
attorney’s fees and cost of suit. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the property was Martha’s exclusive property.

2. WON the Deed of Sale in valid even without Manuel’s consent.
3. WON the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) allegedly signed by Manuel is spurious and void.
4. WON the failure of Manuel to specifically deny the genuineness and due execution of the notarized SPA as his implied agreement
to the veracity of the document.
5. WON Titan can claim belatedly that the RTC should have ordered Martha to reimburse.

HELD:

1. NO. The property is NOT the exclusive property of Martha alone but part of the conjugal partnership property of the spouses.
Since the marriage of the spouses is in 1957, the marriage is governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides in Art.
160 that “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife” and in Art. 153 which defines a conjugal property to be those that are “acquired by
onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one
of the spouses.” Hence, even if Manuel failed to present any proof of his income in 1970, assuming that Manuel could not have the
financial capacity to contribute to the purchase as claimed by Titan, the court ruled that Manuel was not required to prove that the
said property was acquired with conjugal funds (Sps. Castro v. Miat). Since the spouses bought the property during their marriage,
the presumption can be applied to the case that if said property, when purchased during the marriage, was part of a conjugal
partnership as provided by Art. 160 and 153. Therefore, the property was owned not only by Martha but the property was also
owned by her husband, Manuel.

2. NO. The Deed of Sale is NOT valid without Manuel’s consent.

Since the property is part of the spouses’ conjugal property, the Deed of Sale required both the consent of the spouses. The Civil
Code provides in Art. 165, husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership and also in Art. 172 provides that the wife
cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law. Therefore, the Deed of Sale
required also the consent of Manuel not only Martha’s.

3. YES. The Special Power of Attorney allegedly signed by Manuel was spurious and void.
Titan claimed that the RTC gave an undue weight to the testimony of Manuel’s witness, Atty. Desiderio Paqui, which states that the
signature found on the SPA was not genuine. The Court, however, ruled that the ruling of the RTC was not only based on the
testimony of the expert witness of Manuel but also Manuel’s categorical denial of signing the SPA. The Court concur to the findings
of the RTC that said SPA was dubious for the SPA does not contain the Residence Certificate of Manuel and not presented for
registration with the QC Register of Deeds violating the Sec. 64 of P.D. No. 1592. It is also noted by the Court that Titan withdraws
its Motion for Re-examination of Another Document/ Handwriting Expert because the PNP and NBI might come out with two
conflicting opinions and conclusions and may cause a waste of time and resources. However, the Court ruled that factual findings of
the trial court when affirmed by CA are binding and conclusive and will not be reviewed on appeal and that only errors of law are
reviewable by the SC and not errors of fact. Hence, the Court will not depart on the rulings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA.

4. NO. The failure of Manuel to specifically deny the genuineness and due execution of the notarized SPA is NOT an implied
agreement to the veracity of the document.
Although, Manuel failed to specifically deny the genuineness and due execution of the notarized SPA in his Reply and not made
under oath, his Complaint, under oath, that a contract of a Deed of Sale between Martha and Titan executed without his consent,
and approval , express or implied, amounts great weight. The Court concurred with the ruling of the CA that as Titan did not object
to the presentation of Manuel’s witness, Atty. Paqui, nor object to the introduction and admission of evidence questioning the
genuineness and due execution of the document, Titan had been deemed to waived its protection provided by Rule 8, Sec. 7 and 8 of
the Rules of Court. In addition, although, a notarized document has a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due execution
unless with clear and convincing evidence that will proved otherwise, in this case, where Manuel’s Community Tax Certificate was
absent while Martha’s are complete, supports Manuel’s claim that the signature purportedly his is a forgery, therefore, the Court
concludes that this notarization has defects.

5. NO. Titan CANNOT claim belatedly that the RTC should have ordered Martha to reimburse.
The Court ruled that it cannot order the return of the amounts paid by Titan to Martha for ordering such would deny due process to
Martha. The party must be duly apprised of a claim against her before judgment maybe rendered. If the Court ruled to hold Martha
 liable to Titan for the reimbursement of money paid for the property, without any claim being filed against her by Titan, would
violate her right to due process. However, The Court is not prohibiting Titan to file an appropriate case against Martha before the
proper court.

Petition DENIED. The Decision of the RTC as affirmed by the CA with modification and its Resolution to deny Motion for
Reconsideration are AFFIRMED.

REBECCA PACAÑA-CONTRERAS and ROSALIE PACAÑA, Petitioners,

v.

ROVILA WATER SUPPLY, INC., EARL U KOKSENG, LILIA TORRES, DALLA P. ROMANILLOS and MARISSA GABUYA,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 168979 December 2, 2013

FACTS:

Petitioners Rebecca Pacaña-Contreras and Rosalie Pacaña, children of Lourdes Teves Pacaña and Luciano Pacaña, filed the present case
against Rovila Inc., Earl, Lilia, Dalla and Marisa for accounting and damages. The petitioners filed the complaint in their own names
although Rosalie was authorized by Lourdes through a sworn declaration and special power of attorney (SPA).

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds, among others, that the petitioners are not the real parties in interest to institute and
prosecute the case and that they have no valid cause of action against the respondents.

The RTC denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss as well as respondents’ motion for reconsideration.

The respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, invoking grave abuse of
discretion in the denial of their motion to dismiss. The CA granted the petition and ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion as
the petitioners filed the complaint and the amended complaint as attorneys-in-fact of their parents. As such, they are not the real parties in
interest and cannot bring an action in their own names.

The petitioners filed the present petition and argued, among others, that in annulling the interlocutory orders, the CA unjustly allowed the
motion to dismiss which did not conform to the rules. Specifically, the motion was not filed within the time for, but before the filing of, the
answer to the amended complaint, nor were the grounds raised in the answer. Citing Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the respondents
are deemed to have waived these grounds, as correctly held by the RTC.

The respondents argued that the grounds invoked in their motion to dismiss were timely raised, pursuant to Section 2, paragraphs g and i,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. Specifically, the nature and purposes of the pre-trial include, among others, the dismissal of the action, should
a valid ground therefor be found to exist; and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. Finally, the special civil
action of certiorari was the proper remedy in assailing the order of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a proper remedy for a denial of a motion to dismiss attended by grave abuse of
discretion.

RULING: YES.

We find the petition meritorious.

In Barrazona v. RTC, Branch 61, Baguio City, the Court held that while an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and non-
appealable, certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to address an order of denial made without or in excess of jurisdiction. The writ of
certiorari is granted to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The motion to dismiss in the present case based on failure to state a cause of action was not timely filed and was thus waived.

Rule 9 of the Rules of Court which states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived, except for the following grounds: 1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; 2) litis pendencia; 3) res judicata; and 4)
prescription. Therefore, the grounds not falling under these four exceptions may be considered as waived in the event that they are not timely
invoked. As the respondents’ motion to dismiss was based on the grounds which should be timely invoked, material to the resolution of this
case is the period within which they were raised. Both the RTC and the CA found that the motion to dismiss was only filed after the filing of
the answer and after the pre-trial had been concluded.
The Court cannot uphold the dismissal of the present case based on the grounds invoked by the respondents which they have waived for
failure to invoke them within the period prescribed by the Rules.

Therefore, the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders denying the respondents’ motion to dismiss and
motion for reconsideration.

Diona vs. Balangue (2013)

G.R. No. 173559 | 2013-01-07

Subject: A petition for annulment of judgment is granted only under exceptional circumstances; Court
cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the complaint; The award of 5% monthly interest violated the
respondent’s right to due process; The respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
for relief and other remedies as it was due to the gross negligence of the counsel

Facts:

Respondents Balangue obtained a P45,000.00 loan from Diona payable in six months and secured by a
Real Estate Mortgage over their 202-square meter property located in Valenzuela. When the debt became
due, they failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, Diona filed a complaint praying that respondents
be ordered to pay the principal obligation plus actual damages. She also prayed that a decree of
foreclosure for the sale at public auction be issued and for the disposition of the proceeds upon failure of
the respondents to fully settle the obligation.

The respondents were served summons. On October 15, 1999, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to
Answer. Despite the requested extension, however, the respondents failed to file any responsive
pleadings. Upon Diona’s motion, the RTC declared them in default. The RTC granted Diona’s complaint.
The latter eventually moved for the public auction of the mortgaged property with Diona as the highest
bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in her favor. The respondents filed a motion to correct/ amend the
judgment and to set aside the execution sale stating that they did not agree to a 12% interest per annum.
Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5%, or 60% per annum until full payment causing their indebtedness to
increase exorbitantly.

The RTC granted the respondent’s motion and accordingly modified the interest rate. They filed a motion
for leave to deposit/ consign judgment. The petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The CA held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
when it granted 5% monthly interest instead of 12% per annum, but the proper remedy is not to amend
the judgment but to declare the portion of the judgment as null and void.
Held:

A petition for Annulment of judgment is granted only under exceptional circumstances 

1. A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only
under exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly
provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party's own neglect
in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final
judgments goes against the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become
final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest."

Court cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the complaint

2.  It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be
supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court.

3.  It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by the pleadings, absent
notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief.
The fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of
recovery is to prevent surprise to the defendant.

The award of 5% monthly interest violated the respondent’s right to due process

4.  The award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and
the evidence on record. The Real Estate Mortgage executed by the parties does not include any provision
on interest. When Diona filed her Complaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from
her P45,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum" and sought payment thereof. She
did not allege or pray for the disputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified
thereon. Clearly, the RTC's award of 5% monthly interest or 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards
due process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents were not informed of the
possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest.
5.  The Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5% monthly interest instead of the 12% per
annum prayed for in the complaint. However, the proper remedy is not to amend the judgment but to  to
have the Court declare the portion of the judgment providing for a higher interest than that prayed for as
null and void for want of or in excess of jurisdiction. A void judgment never acquire[s] finality and any
action to declare its nullity does not prescribe.

6.  It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is
being sought by the party. They cannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence
presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that judgments must conform to and be
supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court.

The respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
remedies as it was due to the gross negligence of the counsel

7. It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged in their
Comment, "it is not their intention to impugn or run away from their just and valid obligation."
Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed as waiver to contest patently
erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as well as applicable
jurisprudence.

8. The mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that
any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act
of his client. A recognized exception to the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to
maintain their client's cause and such amounted to a deprivation of their client's property without due
process of law. In which case, the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who suffered thereby.

9. The indifference of the respondent’s former counsel in handling the cause of the client was already
present even from the beginning. It should be recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a Motion to
Extend Period to Answer, said counsel allowed the requested extension to pass without filing an Answer,
which resulted to respondents being declared in default. His negligence was aggravated by the fact that he
did not question the awarded 5% monthly interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision.

10. There is no doubt that the counsel was negligent in protecting its rights, to the extent that they were
deprived of their property without due process of law. In fine, the respondents did not lose the remedies
of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies through their own fault. It can only be attributed
to the gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies.

11. The court noted that the respondent’s principal obligation was only P45,000.00. Due to the counsel’s
gross negligence in handling their cause, coupled with RTC’s erroneous, baseless, and illegal award of 5%
monthly interest, they now stand to lose their property. This being so, the court denied the assailed
decision and affirmed the CA in saying that the RTC acted beyond its jurisdiction in granting such
exorbitant interest.  

OTERO V TAN
15 August 2012
Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to annul and set aside CA Decision affirming RTC Judgment

FACTS:
- Complaint- Tan filed for collection of sum of money and damages with MTCC Cagayan de Oro against Otero alleging that Otero purchased on credit
petroleum products from his Petron outlet for P270k; despite demands, Otero defaulted
- Despite receipt of summons through wife Otero, he failed to file answer with MTCC
- Tan then filed a Motion to declare Otero in default; Otero denied receiving summons
- Hearings were conducted until MTCC issued an order declaring Otero in default, to which a copy was sent to Otero, and thereby allowing Tan to present
his evidence ex parte: his employees, showing various statements of account

MTCC
- In favor of Tan, noting that Otero’s failure to file an answer despite notice is a tacit admission of Tan’s claim
- Otero appealed to RTC asserting that MTCC’s decision is factually baseless and that he was deprived of due process

RTC
- Affirmed MTCC, noting that the statements of account presented were overwhelming enough to prove Otero’s indebtedness, and that he was served due
notice contrary to Otero’s claim of deprivation of due process
- Otero filed for MR but was denied; then filed for review with CA
- Explaining that evidence presented were presented by Betache who was not a witness by Tan
- That the genuineness and due execution of said statements of account, being private, must first be established lest the said documents be
rendered inadmissible in evidence

CA
- Assailed RTC and MTCC decision, noting that any defense which Otero may have against Tan is already deemed waived due to Otero’s failure to file his
answer

ISSUE:
- WON Otero, declared in default by MTCC, in the appellate proceedings, may still raise the failure of Tan to authenticate the statements of account which
he adduced in evidence

HELD:
- YES
- A defendant who fails to file an answer may, upon motion, be declared by the court in default
- A party in default loses his right to present his defense, control the proceedings, and examine or cross-examine witnesses
- However, the fact that a defendant has lost his standing in court for having been declared in default does not mean that he is left without recourse
- Remedies available to party in default (Lina v CA, et al):
- May, at any time after discovery thereof and after judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground
that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses
- If judgment has been rendered when defendant discovered default, but before the same has become final and executor, he may file a
motion for new trial
- If defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executor, he may file a petition for relief
- He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside
the order of default has been presented by him
- Grounds that may be raised in such an appeal:
- Failure of plaintiff to prove material allegations of the complaint
- Decision is contrary to law
- Amount of judgment is excessive or different in kind from that prayed for
- In this case, Otero asserts that Tan failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint since the statements of account which he presented are
inadmissible in evidence
- Contrary then to CA, it is not accurate to state that having been declared in default by the MTCC, Otero is already deemed to have waived any and all
defenses which he may have against Tan’s claim

16. SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF SHEKER

GR No. 157912, December 13, 2007, 534 SCRA 62

FACTS: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order
for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner Alan Joseph
Sheker filed a contingent claim for agent’s commission due him amounting to approximately P206, 250.00 in the
event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275, 000.00, as reimbursement
for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.
The executrix of the Estate of Alice Sheker, Medina, moved for the dismissal of Alan Sheker’s claim alleging
among others that the money claim filed by Alan Sheker is void because the latter did not attach a certification of
non-forum shopping thereto.

ISSUES:
I. WON the money claim filed is void for failure to provide certification of Non-Forum Shopping?
II. WON a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding should be dismissed for failing
to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?
III. WON the contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain
a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?
HELD:

I. No, the Supreme Court emphasized that the certification of non-forum shopping is required only for
complaints and other initiatory pleadings. In the case at bar, the probate proceeding was initiated not by Alan
Sheker’s money claim but rather upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the Alice Sheker’s will.
Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court
and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to
certain exceptions.

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent’s estate; more
so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim.
Hence, herein petitioner’s contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification
against non-forum shopping.

II. No, the court ruled in Pascual v. CA that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim against an
estate for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate
even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment
pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 141 of the ROC, or the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a
reasonable time. After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the
estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the
grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.
III. No, with regard to the requirement of a written explanation, the Court held that under Sec. 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of
 service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of
the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.

Spouses dela Cruz vs. Concepcion Digest

G.R. No. 172825 : October 11, 2012

SPOUSES MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ and LETA L. DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, v. ANA
MARIE CONCEPCION, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Miniano and Leta Dela Cruz (spouses Dela Cruz) entered into a contract to sell with
respondent Ana Marie Concepcion (Concepcion) involving a house and lot for a consideration of
PhP 2,000,000.00 payable in installments. As instructed by spousesDela Cruz, Concepcion paid her
last installment to a certain Adoracion or "Dori" Losloso. Thus, Concepcion was able to pay the total
purchase price and the title to the property was transferred in her favor.

Notwithstanding Concepcions full payment, the spouses Dela Cruz demanded the amount of
P209,000.00 purportedly as remaining balance of the purchase price. Concepcion refused to pay the
said amount. The spouses averred that Concepcions payment to "Dori" was not valid. Hence,
spouses Dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Sum of Money with Damages before the RTC.

In her answer, Concepcion failed to allege the defense of payment of the amount claimed by the
spouses. However, during the presentation of her evidence, she submitted a receipt to prove that she
had already paid the remaining balance.

The RTC dismissed the spouses complaint. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision with
modification. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the spouses complaint notwithstanding that
Concepcion failed to allege in her answer the defense of payment?

II. Whether or not payment to Losloso amounts to a valid tender of payment?

HELD: The petition is without merit.

FIRST ISSUE: The RTC cannot be faulted for admitting respondents testimonial and documentary
evidence to prove payment.

REMEDIAL LAW: amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence

Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court states that "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived." Hence, respondent should have been barred
from raising the defense of payment of the unpaid P200,000.00. However, Section 5, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court allows the amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.

The foregoing provision envisions two scenarios, namely, when evidence is introduced in an issue
not alleged in the pleadings and no objection was interjected; and when evidence is offered on an
issue not alleged in the pleadings but this time an objection was raised. When the issue is tried
without the objection of the parties, it should be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the
pleadings. On the other hand, when there is an objection, the evidence may be admitted where its
admission will not prejudice him.

When the receipt was formally offered as evidence, petitioners did not manifest their objection to the
admissibility of said document on the ground that payment was not an issue. Since there was an
implied consent on the part of petitioners to try the issue of payment, even if no motion was filed
and no amendment of the pleading has been ordered, the RTC cannot be faulted for admitting
respondents testimonial and documentary evidence to prove payment.

SECOND ISSUE: Payment made to Losloso is deemed payment to the spouses Dela Cruz.

CIVIL LAW: payment

In order to extinguish said obligation, payment should be made to the proper person as set forth in
Article 1240 of the Civil Code. The Court explained in Cambroon v. City of Butuan, cited in
Republic v. De Guzman, to whom payment should be made in order to extinguish an obligation: "In
general, a payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper
person. Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express
or implied, to receive the particular payment. Payment made to one having apparent authority to
receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual authority had been given for its receipt.
Likewise, if payment is made to one who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work a
discharge."

Taking into consideration the busy schedule of respondent, petitioners advised the latter to leave the
payment to a certain "Dori" who admittedly is Losloso, or to her trusted helper. This is an express
authority given to Losloso to receive payment. Thus, as shown in the receipt signed by petitioners
agent and pursuant to the authority granted by petitioners to Losloso, payment made to the latter is
deemed payment to petitioners.

Petition is DENIED.
Dela Cruz v Concepcion (Civil Procedure)

Digest # 1

Dela Cruz v Concepcion

GR No. 172825, October 11, 2012

FACTS:

On March 25, 1996, petitioners entered into a Contract to Sell with respondent involving a house
and lot in Antipolo City for a 2 million consideration.

Respondent made the following payments, to wit:

(1) 500,000 by way of downpayment;
(2) 500,000 on May 30, 1996;
(3) 500,000 paid on January 22, 1997; and
(4) 500,000 bounced check dated June 30, 1997 which was replaced.
Thus, Respondent was able to pay the 2 million total obligation.

Before respondent issued the 500,000 replacement check, she told petitioners that based on the
computation of her accountant as of July 6, 1997, her unpaid obligation which includes interests and
penalties was only 200,000. Petitioners agreed with respondent. Despite repeated demands,
petitioners failed to collect the amounts they claimed. Hence, the complaint for sum of money with
damages filed with the RTC of Antipolo Rizal. In her answer with Compulsory counterclaim and
during the presentation of evidence, respondent presented a receipt purportedly indicating payment
of the remaining balance of 200,000 to Losloso who allegedly received the same on behalf of
petitioners.

On March 8, 2014, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision with modification by deleting the award of moral damages and attorney's fees in favor
of respondent. Aggrieved, petitioners come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether it was proper to dismiss the complaint based on the ground that the defendant fully paid the
claims of plaintiff

HELD:
Yes.

When the issue is tried without the objection of the parties, it should be treated with all respects as if
it had been raised in the pleadings. On the other hand, when there is an objection, the evidence may
be admitted where its admission will not prejudice him.

Thus, while respondent judicially admitted in her answer that she only paid 2 million and that she
still owed petitioners 200,000, respondent claimed later and in fact, submitted an evidence to show
that she already paid the whole amount of her unpaid obligation. It is noteworthy what when
respondent presented evidence of payment, petitioners did not object thereto.

To be sure, petitioners were given ample opportunity to refute the fact of and present evidence to
prove payment.