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QUISABA v. STA. INES-MELALE VENEER & PLYWOOD, INC., et al.
G.R. No. L-38088
August 30, 1974
Jurisdiction of regular courts and labor arbiters.
FACTS:
Petitioner Jovito N. Quisaba filed with the CFI of Davao a complaint for moral damages,
exemplary damages, termination pay and attorney's fees against the respondent corporation
and its vice-president Robert Hyde. The complaint avers that Quisaba, for eighteen years prior to
his dismissal, was in the employ of the corporation. On January 11, 1973, respondent Hyde
instructed him to purchase logs for the company's plant and he refused on the ground that the
work of purchasing logs is inconsistent with his position as internal auditor. On the following day,
Hyde informed him of his temporary relief as internal auditor so that he could carry out immediately
the instructions given, and he was warned that his failure to comply would be considered a ground
for his dismissal. Quisaba responded with a plea for fairness and mercy as he would be without
a job during an economic crisis but he averred that he was demoted from a position of dignity to
a servile and menial job and the respondents did not reconsider their "clever and subterfugial
dismissal" of him which constituted a "constructive discharge;" and because of the said acts, he
suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock
and social humiliate on. The complaint does not pray for reinstatement or payment of
backwages.
The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
asserting that the proper forum is the NLRC. Quisaba opposed the motion and informed the court
that in response to a "consults" presented by his counsel, the NLRC's authorized representative
opined that NLRC has no jurisdiction. Notwithstanding, the court a quo granted the motion to
dismiss on the ground that the complaint basically involves an employee-employer
relation.
ISSUE:
Whether a complaint for moral damages, exemplary damages, termination pay and
attorney's fees, arising from an employer's constructive dismissal of an employee, is exclusively
cognizable by the regular courts of justice or by the NLRC.
RULING:
Regular courts of justice.
The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission is defined by section 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 21 which reads:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following.
(1) All matters involving employee employer relations including all disputes and
grievances which may otherwise lead to strikes and lockouts under Republic Act
No. 875;
(2) All strikes overtaken by Proclamation No. 1081; and
(3) All pending cases in the Bureau of Labor Relations.
Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-
employer relations" as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing employee-
employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se as in fact he does
not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the
consequent effects of such dismissal. Civil law consists of that "mass of precepts that
determine or regulate the relations ... that exist between members of a society for the protection
of private interests.
The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner
in which the right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was
done anti-socially or oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated
article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor
against the other, and article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the
sanction for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10.
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cages:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, ....
The case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil (not a labor) dispute, it has to do with
an alleged violation of Quisaba's rights as a member of society, and does not involve an
existing employee-employer relation within the meaning of section 2(1) of PD No. 21. The
complaint is thus properly and exclusively cognizable by the regular courts of justice, not
by the National Labor Relations Commission.
