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VOL. 148, FEBRUARY 27, 1987 91

Bayang vs. Court of Appeals

No. L-53564. February 27,1987.*

JUAN BAYANG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF

APPEALS and BENIGNO BIONG, respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summary Judgment; Nature

and functions of summary judgment.—In its decision, the Court of
Appeals quoted the following excerpt from Singleton v. Philippine
Trust Co. on the nature and functions of the summary judgment:
"Summary judgment is one of the methods sanctioned in the
present Rules of Court for a prompt disposition of civil actions
wherein there exists no serious controversy. The procedure may
be availed of not only by claimants, but also by defending parties
who may be the object of unfounded claims. A motion for
summary judgment assumes that scrutinizing of the facts will
disclose that the issues presented by the pleadings need not be
tried because they are so patently unsubstantial as not to be
genuine issues, or that there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts or where the facts appear undisputed and certain
from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits."
Same; Same; Res Judicata; Requisites for res judicata to
apply.—A long line of decisions has consistently held that for res
judicata to apply: a) the former judgment must be final; b) it must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; c) it must be a judgment on the merits;
and d) there must be between the first case and the second case
identity of parties, identity of subject matter and identity of cause
of action.
Same; Same; Same; Splitting of causes of action; Land in
dispute in one civil case and the income from that land being
claimed in another civil case, not different; Filing of the second
case is splitting a cause of action.—The petitioner would draw a
distinction between the land in dispute in Civil Case No. 1892 and
the income from that and being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589.
But that is in our view splitting hairs to split a cause of action.
The subject-matter is essentially the same in both cases as the
income is only a consequence or accessory of the disputed

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property. We cannot agree that there are involved here two causes
of action calling for two separate cases. The claim for the income
from the land was incidental to, and should have been raised by
Bayang in his earlier claim for ownership of the land.

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bayang vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure of petitioner to amend his

complaint in the first civil case, fatal to his cause.—Civil Case No.
1892 was commenced in November 1969 and was finally decided
only on February 2, 1978. The private respondent entered the
disputed property in 1970 and left it only in 1978. For about seven
years, therefore, the petitioner made no move at all to amend his
complaint to include a claim for the income supposedly received
by the private respondent during that period.
Same; Same; Same; Judgment; Second civil case barred by the
previous judgment in the first civil case; Summary judgment, a
case of.—Clearly, then, Civil Case No. 2589 is barred by the
previous judgment in Civil Case No. 1892. This being so, it should
follow that the trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion
in deciding the latter case by summary judgment.
Same; Same; Same; Unjust Enrichment; For failure of
petitioner to make a proper claim at the proper time and in the
proper proceedings, he was deemed to have waived his right
because of neglect.—We are not unmindful of the argument that
affirmance of the challenged decision of the respondent court will
result in the unjust enrichment of Biong at the expense of
Bayang. This assumes, of course, that the petitioner could have
proved his right to the income he now claims belatedly. The point
is that he did not make the proper claim at the proper time and in
the proper proceedings, and he cannot do it now. Whatever right
he might have had is now deemed waived because of his neglect.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason for rule on waiver.—
Nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa. This has to be so if
litigants are to be spared the annoyance, anxiety and expense
that could otherwise be inflicted upon them endlessly by
capricious, malicious or vindictive suitors.

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PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court

of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Rodrigo Matutina for petitioner.
     Luceniano E. Lancin for private respondent.

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VOL. 148, FEBRUARY 27, 1987 93

Bayang vs. Court of Appeals

CRUZ, J.:

Sometime in November 1969, Juan Bayang filed a

complaint for quieting of title with damages against
Benigno Biong in the Court of First Instance of Surigao
1
del
Norte, Branch I, docketed as Civil Case No. 1892. In 1970,
while the case was pending, Biong succeeded in
dispossessing the plaintiff of the land2 in question and
remained there until January 25,1978. On February 21,
1972, the case was decided in favor of Biong, but the Court
of Appeals on December 8, 1977, reversed the trial court,
declaring in the dispositive portion of its decision:

"WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and

appellants are hereby declared owner of the property in litigation,
and defendant appellee are (sic) hereby ordered to pay appellant
the sum of P56.40 as the latter's share in the proceeds from the
sale of the copra derived from the third harvest of coconuts from
the same 3land, and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, and costs of
litigation."

This decision became final on February 2,1978.

On February 6, 1978, Bayang filed a second case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2589, with the CFI of Surigao
del Norte, Branch II, seeking to recover from Biong the
incomes earned from the same land from 1970 up to the
quarterly incomes from 4 1978 until the said land was
delivered to the plaintiff. At the pre-trial conference held
on July 10, 1978, the counsel for Bayang admitted that as
of January 25, 1978, Biong had already 5surrendered
possession of the land in question to Bayang. On August
16, 1978, Biong filed a motion for summary judgment,
reiterating the affirmative defense of res judicata raised in
his answer dated April 12,1978, insofar as it related to the6
incidents concerning the case prior to January 25, 1978.
An opposition to this motion was duly filed by

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_______________

1 Rollo, p. 33.
2 Ibid, pp. 9,33.
3 Id., pp. 24, 33.
4 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p. 33.
5 Rollo, pp. 33,83.
6 Ibid; Annex E, Petition.

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94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bayang vs. Court of Appeals

7
Bayang.
The trial court, after considering the arguments of the
parties, granted the motion and 8
rendered a summary
judgment on October 30, 1978. The said decision was
sustained by the Court of Appeals, and Bayang is now
before us in this petition for review by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court
His assignment of errors raises two basic submissions,
to wit:

1. Civil Case No. 2589 should not have been decided

by summary judgment.
2. The judgment in CA-G.R. No. 54720-R (appeal from
judgment in Civil Case No. 1892) did not constitute
res judicata as to bar Civil Case No. 2589.

Both contentions are incorrect. We rule for the

respondents. In its decision, the Court of Appeals quoted
the9 following excerpt from Singleton v. Philippine Trust
Co. on the nature and functions of the summary judgment:

"Summary judgment is one of the methods sanctioned in the

present Rules of Court for a prompt disposition of civil actions
wherein there exists no serious controversy. The procedure may
be availed of not only by claimants, but also by defending parties
who may be the object of unfounded claims. A motion for
summary judgment assumes that scrutinizing of the facts will
disclose that the issues presented by the pleadings need not be
tried because they are so patently unsubstantial as not to be
genuine issues, or that there is no genuine issue as to any
material facts or where the facts appear undisputed and certain
from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits."

We hold that there was no genuine or triable issue of fact

raised by the parties, in view particularly of the affirmative
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defense of res judicata invoked by the private respondent.

That defense is sustained,
A long line of decisions has consistently held that for res
judicata to apply: a) the former judgment must be final; b)
it

_______________

7 Rollo, pp. 7, 33; Annex F, petition.

8 Rollo, pp. 34,83.
9 52 O.G. 3948.

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Bayang vs. Court of Appeals

must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction

over the subject matter and the parties; c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and d) there must be between the
first case and the second case identity of parties,
10
identity of
subject matter and identity of cause of action.
The decision in Civil Case No. 1892 became final and
executory on February 2, 1978. There is no dispute that the
trial court which rendered that decision had jurisdiction
over the subject-matter and the parties to the proceeding.
The case was tried on the merits. The parties to Civil Case
No. 1892 and the subsequent Civil Case No. 2589 are the
same petitioner and private respondent now before us.
The petitioner would draw a distinction between the
land in dispute in Civil Case No. 1892 and the income from
that land being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589. But that is
in our view splitting hairs to split a cause of action. The
subject-matter is essentially the same in both cases as the
income is only a consequence or accessory of the disputed
property. We cannot agree that there are involved here two
causes of action calling for two separate cases. The claim
for the income from the land was incidental to, and should
have been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for,
ownership of the land.
We note that while the first case was pending, the
private respondent, by the petitioner's own account, 11
"succeeded in dispossessing" him of the disputed land and
that at the pretrial conference on Civil Case No. 2589,
Bayang's counsel admitted that Biong
12
had vacated the said
property as of January 25, 1978. This means that from
1970 to the date the respondent surrendered the property

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in 1978, Biong was presumably collecting and enjoying the

income therefrom to the exclusion of the petitioner.

_______________

10 San Diego v. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281; Valdez v. Pineda, 89 Phil. 547;

Lapid v. Lawan, 101 Phil. 1243; Nater v. CIR, 4 SCRA 727; Malvar v.
Pallingayan, 18 SCRA 121; Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, 42 SCRA 589;
Santos v. Gabriel, 45 SCRA 488; Aroc v. PHHC, 81 SCRA 350.
11 Annex A, Petition.
12 Rollo, pp. 33,83.

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Bayang vs. Court of Appeals

Civil Case No. 1892 was commenced in November 1969 and

was finally decided only on February 2, 1978. The private
respondent entered the disputed property in 1970 and left
it only in 1978. For about seven years, therefore, the
petitioner made no move at all to amend his complaint to
include a claim for the income supposedly received by the
private respondent during that period.
Under Rule 10, Section 6, of the Rules of Court.

"Sec. 6. Matters subject of supplemental pleadings.—Upon motion

of a party the court may, upon reasonable notice and upon such
terms as are just, permit him to serve a supplemental pleading
setting forth transactions, occurrence or events which have
happened since the date of the pleading sought to be
supplemented. If the court deems it advisable that the adverse
party should plead thereto, it shall so order, specifying the time
therefor."
13
In the case of Jalandoni v. Martin-Guanzon, this Court
declared through Justice J.B.L. Reyes:

"As to the value of the plaintiff s share in the products of the land
during the time that the former action was pending (which are
the damages claimed under the second cause of action), their
recovery is now barred by the previous judgment. These damages
are but the result of the original cause of action, viz., the
continuing refusal by defendants in 1941 to recognize the plaintiff
s right to an interest in the property. In the same way that
plaintiffs claimed for their share of the produce from 1941 to
1947, these later damages could have been claimed in the first
action, either in the original complaint (for their existence could
be anticipated when the first complaint was filed) or else by
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supplemental pleading. To allow them to be recovered by

subsequent suit would be a violation of the rule against
multiplicity of suits, and specifically of sections 3 and 4 of Rules 2
of the Rules of Court, against the splitting of causes of action,
since these damages spring from the same cause of action that
was pleading (sic) in the former case No. 573 between the same
parties (Blossom & Co., Inc. v. Manila Gas Corporation, 55 Phil.
226; Santos v. Moir, 36 Phil. 350; Pascua v. Sideco; 24 Phil. 26;
Bachrach Motor Co. v. Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287)."

_______________

13 102 Phil. 859.

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Bayang vs. Court of Appeals

14
And in another case, the same jurist declared:

"Urtula, as defendant in the expropriation case, could have raised

the matter of interest before the trial court even if there had been
no actual taking yet by the Republic and the said court could have
included the payment of interest in its judgment but conditioned
upon the actual taking, because the rate of interest upon the
amount of just compensation (6%) is a known factor, and it can
reasonably be expected that at some future time, the expropriator
would take possession of the property, though the date be not
fixed. In this way, multiple suits would be avoided. Moreover,
nothing prevented appellee from calling the attention of the
appellate courts (even by motion to reconsider before judgment
became final) to the subsequent taking of possession by the
condemnor, and asking for allowance of interest on the indemnity
since that f ollowed the taking as a matter of course, and raised
no issue requiring remand of the records to the Court of origin.
"As the issue of interest could have been raised in the former
case but was not raised, res judicata blocks the recovery of
interest in the present case. (Tejedor vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494; Phil.
Engineering Corp., et al. vs. Ceniza, etc., et al., L-17834, 29 Sept.
1962). It is settled that a former judgment constitutes a bar, as
between the parties, not only as to matters expressly adjudged,
but all matters that could have been adjudged at the time (Rule
39, sec. 49; Corda vs. Maglinti, L-17476, Nov. 30, 1961; Rodriguez
vs. Tan, 48 Off. Gaz. 3330)."

Clearly, then, Civil Case No. 2589 is barred by the previous

judgment in Civil Case No. 1892. This being so, it should

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follow that the trial judge committed no grave abuse of

discretion in deciding the latter case by summary
judgment.
We are not unmindful of the argument that affirmance
of the challenged decision of the respondent court will
result in the unjust enrichment of Biong at the expense of
Bayang. This assumes, of course, that the petitioner could
have proved his right to the income he now claims
belatedly. The point is that he did not make the proper
claim at the proper time and in the proper proceedings, and
he cannot do it now. Whatever right he might have had is
now deemed waived because of his neglect,

_______________

14 Urtula vs. Republic, 22 SCRA 481.

98

98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Manalo

Nemo debet bis vexare pro una et eadem causa. This has to
be so if litigants are to be spared the annoyance, anxiety
and expense that could otherwise be inflicted upon them
endlessly by capricious, malicious or vindictive suitors.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, and the
appealed decision is af firmed. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

          Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,

Feliciano, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed Decision affirmed.

Notes.—Parties should not be permitted to litigate the

same issue more than once and when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined. It should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
in law or estate. (Sy Kao vs. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA
302.)
Change in the form of action or remedy does not bar
operation of rule of res judicata. (Madija vs. Patcho, 132
SCRA 540.)

——o0o——

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