CAMILO SIBAL v. PEDRO BUQUEL et. al.

G.R. No. 197825

JANUARY 11, 2016
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Respondents Buquel et. al. inherited a parcel of land from their parents, Santiago Buquel,
Sr. and Faustina Buquel. Sometime in January 1999, petitioner Sibal (petitioner) and Mangoba
took possession of a portion of the property which belonged to Santiago, Sr. Thereafter, the
Buquels made several demands against the former for the to vacate and turn over the property but
the same refused to do so. Thus, they filed a complaint before the RTC for recovery of possession
and damages. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioner filed a Petition for Annulment
of the RTC Decision before the CA, where he raised lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud as
grounds. The CA dismissed the said petition. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the same was denied. Thus, he filed the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the Buquels were guilty
of extrinsic fraud.

RULING: NO. Sibal contends that the RTC Decision should be annulled on the ground that the
RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the case as the complaint filed merely alleged that the value
of the subject property is P51,190.00, without, however, categorically mentioning its assessed
value, and only the real property tax order of payment was attached to the complaint and not the
tax declaration that would determine the assessed value of the property. But, upon review of the
records, the Court notes that the Real Property Tax Order of Payment shows that the amount of
P51,190.00 is truly the assessed value of the property.

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be
availed of only if the judgment, final order, or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered
by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud, and only when other remedies are
wanting. In the present case, Sibal was able to avail of other remedies when he filed before the
RTC: a motion to quash, the writ of execution, and a motion to annul judgment.

Moreover, parties aggrieved by final judgments, orders or resolutions cannot be allowed to easily
and readily abuse a petition for annulment of judgment. Thus, the Court has instituted safeguards
by limiting the grounds for annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic, fraud, and by
prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available without fault on the part of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores
or disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

Fraud is extrinsic when the unsuccessful party has been prevented from fully exhibiting his case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real contest
in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside
and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and lair hearing.

Petitioner asserts that the negligence of his former counsel in handling his defense during the
proceedings resulted in violation of his right to due process. He claims that his counsel's
inexcusable negligence denied him of his day in court. However, he admitted that he attended only
one stage of the proceedings below, which was the preliminary conference. He was not aware of
the subsequent proceedings as he was totally dependent on his former counsel and would merely
wait for the latter to notify him if his attendance would be required.

As a ground for annulment of judgment, extrinsic fraud must arise from an act of the adverse party,
and the fraud must be of such nature as to have deprived the petitioner of its day in court. The
fraud is not extrinsic if the act was committed by the petitioner's own counsel.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RAYMUNDO VIAJE, ET. AL.
G.R. NO. 180993
JANUARY 27, 2016
REYES, J.

FACTS: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic and as represented
by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with the RTC. The action mainly sought to nullify the transfer certificate of title
(TCT) individually issued in the name of the defendants therein, for having been issued in violation
of law and for having dubious origins. The Republic alleged that the documents of transfer in this
case do not exist in the records of the Register of Deeds. After several re-settings of the pre-trial
were made due to the absence of either the counsel for the Republic or the counsel of one of the
defendants, the RTC dismissed the complaint due to the non-appearance of the counsel for the
Republic. The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration and this was granted. The pre-trial was again
set and re-set, and then the RTC finally dismissed the case with prejudice. The OSG filed a
Manifestation and Motion informing the RTC that the former’s deputized counsel, being the lead
counsel, was not notified of the pre-trial schedule. The OSG argued that its deputized counsel
should have been notified of the settings made by the trial court as it is not merely a collaborating
counsel who appears with an OSG lawyer during hearing; rather, its deputized counsel appears in
behalf of the OSG and should be separately notified. Aside from this, the OSG pointed out that it
particularly requested for a separate notice for the deputy counsel. The RTC denied this, and so
the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the RTC. Subsequently, on
motion of the defendants, the RTC issued an Order recalling that which gave due course to the
appeal. The ground for the recall was the OSG’s failure to indicate in its notice of appeal the court
to which the appeal was being directed. The OSG moved for the reconsideration of the Order but
this was denied. The OSG filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA, and this was
dismissed. It ruled that failure to indicate in its notice of appeal the court to which the appeal is
being taken violated Sec. 5, Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in holding that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the Notice of Appeal.

RULING: NO. The Court cannot attribute error to the CA when it affirmed the RTC's recall of its
order granting the OSG's notice of appeal. The RTC simply applied the clear provisions of Section
5, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Nevertheless, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the
Court resolves to relax the stringent application of the rules, both on the matter of service of notices
to the OSG and its deputized counsel, and on the notice of appeal. Such relaxation of the rules is
not unprecedented. In Cariaga v. People of the Philippines, the Court ruled that rules of procedure
must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice such that its rigid and strict application
which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice must always be avoided. In
Ulep v. People of the Philippines, meanwhile, the Court ordered the remand of the case to the
proper appellate court, stating that the "petitioner's failure to designate the proper forum for her
appeal was inadvertent," and that "the omission did not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part."

Similarly in this case, the OSG's omission should not work against the Republic. For one, the OSG
availed of the proper remedy in seeking a review of the RTC's order of dismissal by pursuing an
ordinary appeal and filing a notice of appeal, albeit without stating where the appeal will be taken.
For another, it is quite elementary that an ordinary appeal from a final decision/order of the RTC
rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction can only be elevated to the CA under Rule 41
of the Rules of Court. Moreover, as in Ulep, the OSG's failure to designate where the appeal will
be taken was a case of inadvertence and does not appear to be a dilatory tactic on its part. More
importantly, the OSG's omission should not redound to the Republic's disadvantage for it is a well-
settled principle that the Republic is never estopped by the mistakes or error committed by its
officials or agents.
 MILA GRACE PATACSIL PIOTROWSKI v. CA and GINA Q. DAPLIYAN
G.R. NO. 193140
JANUARY 11, 2016
BRION, J.

FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint for annulment of documents with recovery of
possession and damages filed by respondent Gina Dapliyan (Dapliyan) against her father Simeon
Dapliyan (Simeon) and petitioner Piotrowski before the RTC. The dispute involved a parcel of
land located at Barangay Saytan, Pugo, La Union. The land was allegedly registered under the
names of Simeon and his late wife Petra Ternate-Dapliyan. The RTC found that Dapliyan failed
to exert earnest efforts to compromise with her father as required by the Family Code and the Rules
on Katarungang Pambarangay. Thus, the RTC dismissed the original complaint against Simeon.
Dapliyan then filed an amended complaint alleging that she failed to compromise with her father
despite earnest efforts. She later filed a re-amended complaint with the same allegations except for
the corrected United States address of Piotrowski. Dapliyan alleged that Simeon sold portions of
the undivided land to Piotrowski in 2002. She averred that Simeon and Piotrowski made it appear
that her mother who died in 1992 signed the Deeds of Absolute Sale. She further claimed that
Piotrowski registered the falsified Deeds of Absolute Sale with the Office of the Register of Deeds
and consequently took possession of the lots. She prayed for the nullification of the said deeds.
The RTC dismissed the re-amended complaint against Simeon because there was no proof that the
case passed through the barangay conciliation proceedings, which is a condition precedent before
judicial action. However, it declared Piotrowski in default and found the re-amended complaint
meritorious as against her. A writ of execution was issued.

Four years after the promulgation of the above decision, Piotrowski filed an omnibus motion for
new trial and to set aside the decision, the order of default, and the writ of execution. Piotrowski
argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case because no summons was ever issued. She
further alleged that she was not notified that a motion, if any, had been filed to declare her in
default. She also argued that the dismissal of the complaint against Simeon rendered all subsequent
actions of the RTC null and void. The RTC issued an order partly granting Piotrowski's omnibus
motion, and she claimed in her answer that she is the absolute and registered owner of the parcel
of land, acquired by her by virtue of a Deed of Absolute sale executed in her favor by Simeon.
Afterwards, the RTC declared that the first decision had become final and executory and could not
be assailed by a mere motion. The RTC ruled that Piotrowski's omnibus motion was an improper
remedy and that the final and executory decision should have been assailed in a new case under a
Rule that is appropriate to the situation. Piotrowski then filed a Notice of Appeal, which was given
due course at first but was later denied and granted Dapliyan’s motion for reconsideration, holding
that the first decision could no longer be appealed because it is already final and executory.
Piotrowski’s counsel then filed with the CA the motion for additional time to file a petitioner for
certiorari but this was denied because the ground invoked by the petitioner, which is Section 4 (3)
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides that "no extension of time to file the petition shall
be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days", has been deleted on
December 27, 2007 by A.M. No. 07-7-12- SC (Amendments to Rules 41, 45, 58 and 65 of the
Rules of Court). She then moved for reconsideration but the same was denied, hence the petition.
ISSUE: WON the CA gravely abused its discretion when it denied Piotrowski's motion for
additional time to file a petition for certiorari.

RULING: NO. The Court did not agree with Piotrowski when she argued that there was an overly
strict application of Rule 65. She claims that the CA ignored issues of paramount importance and
disregarded her substantive rights over her property. The strict application by the CA of the Rules
of Court does not by itself constitute grave abuse of discretion. The CA had basis to deny the
motion for additional time because the provision previously allowing extension of time to file a
petition for certiorari (for compelling reason) had been deleted by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.

In Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the general rule is that a
petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty days from notice of the judgment or order
denying the motion for reconsideration. However, the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65
pertaining to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. The
Court observed that if this had been the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been
reworded to state that no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted. In the absence of
such prohibition, motions for extension are allowed, subject to the court's sound discretion. In
another case, the Court held that there are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of the
rules, such as:

(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons;

(2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with
the prescribed procedure;
(3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from
the time of the default;
(4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case;
(6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the
suspension of the rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
(9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellant's fault;
(10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
(11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12) importance of the issues involved; and
(13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances

In addition, there should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a
reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules. Heavy workload,
standing alone, is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the sixty- day rule. More importantly, a
motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period sought to be
extended; otherwise, the motion would have no effect since there would no longer be any period
to extend and the assailed judgment or order would have become final and executory. The above
principles make it obvious that the sixty-day period is generally not extendible. The courts,
however, may grant extension only if any of the recognized exceptions exists. It follows that an
unjustified and unfettered grant of extension may be assailed via a petition for certiorari. The grave
abuse of discretion in such case would be the baseless extension of the sixty-day period, needlessly
delaying the resolution of the case.

In the present case, Piotrowski's counsel manifested that he needed additional time to prepare the
petition for certiorari because: (1) he had "some difficulty in consulting with Piotrowski who is
residing abroad and is now in old age and in ailment"; (2) he was "burdened with duties as an
officer of the court, in the preparation of some other petitions...which heavily toll on his time to
finalize the petition"; and (3) "there is an urgent need for additional time to secure the certified
true copies of the voluminous documents required by the rules to support the petition." The Court
does not find these general and bare allegations sufficient to relax the application of the Rules.
Thus, the CA did not abuse, much less gravely abuse, its discretion when it denied Piotrowski's
motion for additional time.
 MARASIGAN y DE GUZMAN v. FUENTES
G.R. NO. 201210
JANUARY 11, 2016
LEONON, J.

FACTS: While he was walking on his way home along Hebrew Street in Laguna and after he had
passed by Fuentes' house where some merrymaking had been ongoing, Marasigan felt someone
throw an object at him from behind. Turning around, he saw Fuentes, who, upon noticing that he
had been seen, disappeared. A witness, Jefferson Pablo (Pablo), spoke with Marasigan and
confirmed that it was Fuentes who threw an object at him. While he and Pablo were speaking,
Fuentes reappeared with Calilan and Lindo, as well as with another unidentified individual.
Fuentes suddenly punched Marasigan on the face, making his nose bleed. Calilan and Lindo also
hit him while their unidentified companion sought to stop them. Fuentes picked up a stone (i.e.,
piece of a hollow block) and attempted to hit Marasigan's head with it. Marasigan parried the stone
with his hand, causing his hand to fracture. Fuentes again picked up the stone. Lindo and Calilan
took hold of each of Marasigan's arms. Several more men who were in Fuentes' home joined in
the assault. Sensing that Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo were determined to crush him with hollow
blocks from a nearby construction site, Marasigan shouted for help. Gregoria Pablo, Jefferson
Pablo's mother, came rushing out of their house and tried to pacify Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo.
They, however, continued to assault Marasigan. It was only upon the arrival of neighbors Marcelo
Maaba and Lauro Agulto that Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo ceased their assault and fled.

A complaint for frustrated murder was filed against Fuentes, Calilan, and one John Doe. The
prosecutor found probable cause for charging Fuentes and Calilan with less serious physical
injuries and clearing Lindo of any liability. Aggrieved, Marasigan filed a Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice, arguing that the medical findings made on him as well as the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength justified prosecution for frustrated murder.
He added that Lindo's acts were unambiguous and indicated his participation in a design to kill
him. Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla partially granted Marasigan's Petition for Review and
ordered the provincial prosecutor of Laguna to file informations for attempted murder against
Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo. Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo filed their Motion for Reconsideration to
Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla's Resolution. Secretary Devanadera issued a Resolution on
Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo's Motion for Reconsideration. This Resolution absolved Fuentes and
Lindo of liability and deemed that Calilan could only be charged with less serious physical injuries.
Aggrieved, Marasigan filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the Court of Appeals. It dismissed such petition as well as the Motion for Reconsideration later
filed by Marasigan.

ISSUE: WON the case warrants a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

RULING: YES. The present Rule 45 Petition calls upon us to examine whether the Court of
Appeals committed an error of judgment in resolving the question of whether Secretary
Devanadera committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
concluding the respondents ought to stand trial only for the charge of less serious physical injuries.
In her capacity as Secretary of Justice, Secretary Devanadera was well within her jurisdiction to
rule on the Petition for Review filed with the Department of Justice. She is, however, not at liberty
to flagrantly disregard the evidence and the records and to insist on conclusions that stray dismally
far from what the evidence warrants. Neither is she at liberty to disregard evidentiary principles
established in jurisprudence.

It is basic that petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may only raise pure questions of
law and that findings of fact are generally binding and conclusive on this court. Nevertheless, there
are recognized exceptions that will allow this court to overturn the factual findings confronting it.
These exceptions are the following:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record

Moreover, in Rule 45 petitions, which are appeals from petitions for certiorari under Rule
65, the appealed ruling may be reversed and its factual moorings rejected if it can be shown that,
in rendering the act originally subject of the Rule 65 petition, the tribunal acted capriciously and
whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy. A careful review of this
case and of the evidence that were available for the prosecutors' and the Department of Justice's
appreciation will reveal that there was a gross misapprehension of facts on the part of Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Serrano and Secretary Devanadera. It was, therefore, grave abuse of
discretion for Secretary Devanadera to conclude that respondent Calilan may only be prosecuted
for the crime of less serious physical injuries while his co-respondents, Fuentes and Lindo, may
not be prosecuted at all.
 APOSTOLIC VICAR OF TABUK, INC. v. SPOUSES ERNESTO AND ELIZABTH
SISON AND VENANCIO WADAS
G.R. NO. 191132
JANUARY 27, 2016
BRION, J.

FACTS: The respondent spouses Ernesto and Elizabeth Sison and respondent Venancio Wadas
filed a forcible entry complaint against the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province represented by
Fr. Gerry Gudmalin. They alleged that Fr. Gerry Gudmalin, a priest of the St. Anthony Church of
the Vicar Apostolic of Mountain Province, ordered the forcible demolition of their respective
perimeter fences in order to expand the area of the Church. The priest dispossessed them of their
lands and began constructing a building that encroached on portions of their respective lots. The
MCTC Junior Process Server Raul T. Abad executed an officer's return. The return stated that the
person/defendant cited therein went to Manila for an official business as per verbal information
related by his secretary Mariphee B. Polio, who received and signed said summons, she promised
the undersigned that said summons will be handed to the defendant upon his arrival from Manila.
The case was submitted for decision because the defendant failed to file its answer despite service
of summons, and the MCTC rendered a decision in favor of the respondents. Petitioner Apostolic
Vicar of Tabuk, Inc. (the Vicariate of Tabuk) filed an urgent manifestation and motion before the
MCTC. It manifested that the land is owned and possessed by the Vicariate of Tabuk represented
by Reverend Monsignor Prudencio P. Andaya, Jr., not by the Vicariate Apostolic of Mt. Province
represented by Fr. Gerry Gudmalin as alleged in the complaint; and (2) that it had been denied due
process because it was neither impleaded nor served summons. It moved for the court to set aside
its decision and to summon and implead the Vicariate of Tabuk. The MCTC denied the petitioner's
urgent motion and manifestation. It treated the motion as a motion for reconsideration - a
prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.

The petitioner then filed a notice of appeal which was denied due to petitioner’s failure to file its
appellant’s memorandum within the reglementary period. The Vicariate of Tabuk filed a Rule 47
petitioner for annulment of the MCTC judgment arguing that it rendered a decision without
acquiring jurisdiction over its person. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss because: (1) the
petition had no cause of action and (2) the Vicariate of Tabuk had no juridical personality or legal
capacity to sue. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss because the petition stated a cause of action.
It held that if the allegations in the petition were hypothetically admitted, then a judgment can be
rendered in accordance with the prayer. It brushed aside the contention that the Vicariate of Tabuk
had no legal personality because its articles of incorporation were attached to the opposition. The
respondents moved for reconsideration, and the RTC dismissed the petition for failure to state a
cause of action. The RTC reasoned that the petitioner's filing of a notice of appeal and subsequent
failure to file its appeal memorandum precluded its resort to annulment of judgment; the remedy
is not available to a party who lost his right to appeal due to his own fault. The RTC concluded
that since the petitioner claimed ownership over the property, then it should file an appropriate
case of ownership with the proper court instead. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
subsequently filed. Thus, the present petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON there was a failure to state a cause of action.

RULING: NO. Upon reviewing the order in contention, examining the petition for annulment,
the Court concludes that the dismissal was actually due to lack of a cause of action.

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of a cause of action are not the same. Failure to state a
cause of action refers to an insufficiency of the allegations in the petition/complaint. It is a ground
for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court before the defendant or respondent files a
responsive pleading. Notably, the dismissal is without prejudice to the refiling of an amended
complaint.

On the other hand, the lack of a cause of action refers to an insufficiency of factual or legal basis
to grant the complaint. It applies to a situation where the evidence failed to prove the cause of
action alleged in the pleading. It is a ground for dismissal using a demurrer to evidence under Rule
33 after the plaintiff has completed presenting his evidence. The dismissal constitutes res judicata
on the issue and will bar future suits based on the same cause of action.

In the present case, the petition for annulment of judgment actually stated a cause of action: that
the MCTC rendered a judgment against the petitioner without acquiring jurisdiction over its
person. If the RTC hypothetically admitted this allegation, the petitioner becomes entitled to the
relief prayed for: the annulment of the MCTC judgment. Thus, the RTC erred when it stated that
the dismissal was for "failure to state a cause of action."
 FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT CORPORATION v. PO
G.R. NO. 217694
JANUARY 27, 2016
MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Fairland alleged that it was the owner of a condominium unit in Cedar Mansion
II in Pasig City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal agreement, with a rental fee
of PHP20,000 per month. Po, unfortunately, continuously failed to pay the rent. Thus, Fairland
opted not to renew the lease agreement anymore. Fairland sent a formal letter to Po demanding he
pay PHP220,000, representing the rental arrears, and that he vacate the leased premises within 15
days from receipt of the latter. Despite the receipt and the lapse of the said 15-day period, Po
neither tended payment nor vacated the premises. Thus, Fairland filed a motion to render judgment
and the MeTC considered the case submitted for decision. The MeTC dismissed the complaint for
lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure to prove its claim by preponderance of evidence. Fairland
appealed, claiming that an unlawful detainer case was a special civil action governed by summary
procedure. Thus, in cases where a defendant failed to file his answer, judgment should be based
on the facts alleged in the complaint, and there was no requirement that judgment must be based
on facts proved by preponderance of evidence. The RTC and CA affirmed, hence the petition.

ISSUE:
(1) WON Fairland’s complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
(2) WON the MeTC correctly rendered judgment, upon Po’s failure to file an answer on time,
based solely on the complaint without the need to consider the weight of evidence.

RULING:
(1) YES. A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites
the following: (1) initially, possession of the property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property, and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.

In this particular case there is no doubt that the complaint filed by Fairland adequately
alleged a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The pertinent portion of the said complaint
reads that Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been leasing to the defendant, the premises
mentioned above as the residence of the latter; that there is no current written lease contract
between plaintiff and the defendant, but the latter agreed to pay the former the amount of
PHP20,000 as rent at the beginning of each month. Thus, the term of the lease agreement
is renewable on a month- to-month basis; that since March 2011, defendant has not been
paying the aforesaid rent despite plaintiffs repeated demands; that due to defendant's
continuous failure to pay rent, plaintiff reached a decision not to renew the lease agreement.
It sent a formal letter, demanding defendant to pay the amount of Php220,000.00,
representing defendant's twelve month rental arrears beginning January 2011, and to vacate
the leased premises, both within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said letter; that despite
receipt of the aforesaid demand letter and lapse of the fifteen day period given to comply
 with plaintiffs demand, defendant neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated
the leased premises. Worse, defendant has not been paying rent up to now.

The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently alleged that Fairland was the owner
of the subject property being leased to Po by virtue of an oral agreement. There was a
demand by Fairland for Po to pay rent and vacate before the complaint for unlawful
detainer was instituted. The complaint was seasonably filed within the one-year period
prescribed by law. With all the elements present, there was clearly a cause of action in the
complaint for unlawful detainer.

(2) YES. According to Sec. 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, should the defendant fail
to answer the complaint within the period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion
reduce the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise
unconscionable, without prejudice to the applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules
of Court, if there are two or more defendants.

Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the court shall render
judgment, either motu proprio or upon plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts alleged
in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the defendant to timely
file his answer and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to every
allegation stated in the complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in this situation
except to render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint

Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which governs the rules for
forcible entry and unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the complaint within
the period provided, the court has no authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead,
the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.

In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint despite proper service of summons.
He also failed to provide a sufficient justification to excuse his lapses. Thus, as no answer
was filed, judgment must be rendered by the court as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the complaint.

To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time, judgment shall be rendered based
only on the complaint of Fairland without the need to consider the weight of evidence. As
discussed above, the complaint of Fairland had a valid cause of action for unlawful
detainer. Consequently, there is no more need to present evidence to establish the allegation
of Fairland of its ownership and superior right of possession over the subject property. Po's
failure to file an answer constitutes an admission of his illegal occupation due to his non-
payment of rentals, and of Fairland's rightful claim of material possession. Thus, judgment
must be rendered finding that Fairland has the right to eject Po from the subject property.
 FERNANDO MEDICAL ENTERPRISES, INC. v. WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY
PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. NO. 207970
JANUARY 20, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of
money against Wesleyan University Philippines. The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint
upon the following grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; (b)
improper venue; (c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis
pendentia, it stated that it had earlier filed a complaint for the rescission, the resolution of which
would be determinative of the petitioner’s action for collection. After the RTC denied the motion
to dismiss, respondent filed its answer (ad cautelam), averring that “the allegations in Paragraphs
Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint are DENIED for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to
form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as the alleged transactions were undertaken
during the term of office of the past officers of defendant Wesleyan University-Philippines. At any
rate, these allegations are subject to the special and affirmative defenses hereafter pleaded;”

Petitioner filed a Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the respondent had
admitted the material allegations of its complaint and thus did not tender any issue as to such
allegations. The RTC issued the order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings
of the petitioner. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals ruled that a judgment on the pleadings would
be improper because the outstanding balance due to the petitioner remained to be an issue in the
face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for rescission (another case). Hence, this
Petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA should have confined itself to the respondent’s Answer in the action in
order to resolve the petitioner’s motion for judgment based on the pleadings.

RULING: YES. The rule on judgment based on the pleadings is Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules
of Court. The essential query in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings is whether or
not there are issues of fact generated by the pleadings. Whether issues of fact exist in a case or not
depends on how the defending party’s answer has dealt with the ultimate facts alleged in the
complaint. The defending party’s answer either admits or denies the allegations of ultimate facts
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading. The allegations of ultimate facts the answer admit,
being undisputed, will not require evidence to establish the truth of such facts, but the allegations
of ultimate facts the answer properly denies, being disputed, will require evidence. The answer
admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse party’s pleadings not only when it
expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but also when it omits to deal with them at all.
The controversion of the ultimate facts must only be by specific denial.

In Civil Case No. 09-122116, respondent expressly admitted paragraphs no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 9 and 10 of
the complaint. The respondent denied paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the complaint "for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity thereof, inasmuch as
the alleged transactions were undertaken during the term of office of the past officers of
respondent.
To be sure, paragraphs no. 6, 7 and 8 of the Complaint averred matters that the respondent ought
to know or could have easily known. However, the answer did not specifically deny such material
averments. It is settled that denials based on lack of knowledge or information of matters clearly
known to the pleader, or ought to be known to it, or could have easily been known by it are
insufficient, and constitute ineffective or sham denials. That the respondent qualified its
admissions and denials by subjecting them to its special and affirmative defenses of lack of
jurisdiction over its person, improper venue, litis pendentia and forum shopping was of no
consequence because the affirmative defenses, by their nature, involved matters extrinsic to the
merits of the petitioner’s claim, and thus did not negate the material averments of the complaint.

In order to resolve petitioner’s Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could
rely only on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1,
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the sole basis for ascertaining whether the
complaint’s material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent’s
averment of payment to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the
resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a
factual issue on the total liability of the respondent remained to be settled through trial on the
merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case No. 09-122116
did not allege the supposed payment, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial
of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere.
 SPS. ERORITA v. SPS. DUMLAO
GR. NO. 195477
JANUARY 25, 2016
BRION, J.

FACTS: Spouses Dumlao filed a complaint for recovery of possession before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) against Hernan, Susan, and the Spouses Erorita. The RTC decided in the Spouses
Dumlao’s favor. Spouses Erorita appealed to the CA arguing that the complaint patently shows a
case for unlawful detainer. Thus, the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
On appeal, Spouses Erorita essentially argue that the RTC had no jurisdiction because the
allegations in the complaint show a case for unlawful detainer. In their comment, the respondents
argue that: (a) the RTC had jurisdiction because this case involves issues other than physical
possession; (b) even assuming the RTC initially had no jurisdiction, the petitioners’ active
participation during the proceedings bar them from attacking jurisdiction; and (c) this last issue
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case

(2) WON the issue of jurisdiction can be raised for the first time on appeal

RULING:

(1) NO. The allegations in the complaint determine the nature of an action and jurisdiction
over the case. Jurisdiction does not depend on the complaint’s caption. Nor is jurisdiction
changed by the defenses in the answer; otherwise, the defendant may easily delay a case
by raising other issues, then, claim lack of jurisdiction. To make a case for unlawful
detainer, the complaint must allege that: (a) initially, the defendant lawfully possessed the
property, either by contract or by plaintiff’s tolerance; (b) the plaintiff notified the
defendant that his right of possession is terminated; (c) the defendant remained in
possession and deprived plaintiff of its enjoyment; and (d) the plaintiff filed a complaint
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property. A complaint for
accion publiciana or recovery of possession of real property will not be considered as an
action for unlawful detainer if any of these special jurisdictional facts is omitted.

A review of the complaint shows that: (a) the owners, Spouses Dumlao, agreed to allow
the petitioners to continue operating the school on the disputed property; (b) in a demand
letter dated February 12, 2004, the Spouses Dumlao told the petitioners to pay and/or
vacate the property; (c) the respondents refused to vacate the property; and (d) the Spouses
Dumlao filed the complaint (March 4, 2004) within a year from the last demand to vacate
(February 12, 2004).

Thus, although the complaint bears the caption "recovery of possession," its allegations
contain the jurisdictional facts for an unlawful detainer case. Under RA 7691, an action for
unlawful detainer is within the MTC’s exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the property’s
 assessed value. Considering that the complaint clearly contained the elements of an
unlawful detainer case, the case should have been filed with the MTC. The RTC had no
jurisdiction over this case. Since a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is void,
the RTC’s decision is void.

(2) NO. As a general rule, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any
time, or even for the first time on appeal. An exception to this rule is the principle of
estoppel by laches. Estoppel by laches may only be invoked to bar the defense of lack of
jurisdiction if the factual milieu is analogous to Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In that case, lack of
jurisdiction was raised for the first time after almost fifteen (15) years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered and after the movant actively participated in several stages of the
proceedings. It was only invoked, too, after the CA rendered a decision adverse to the
movant. However, the Court also previously ruled in the case of Figueroa V. People that
the failure to assail jurisdiction during trial is not sufficient for estoppel by laches to apply.
When lack of jurisdiction is raised before the appellate court, no considerable length of
time had elapsed for laches to apply. Laches refers to the "negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it."

The factual setting of this present case is not similar to Tijam so as to trigger the application
of the estoppel by laches doctrine. The present petitioners assailed the RTC’s jurisdiction
in their appeal before the CA. Asserting lack of jurisdiction on appeal before the CA does
not constitute laches. Furthermore, the filing of an answer and the failure to attend the pre-
trial do not constitute the active participation in judicial proceedings contemplated in
Tijam. Thus, the general rule should apply, as in the case of Figueroa.
 MAE FLOR GALIDO v. NELSON P. MAGRARE, et. Al.
G.R. NO. 206584
JANUARY 11, 2016
CARPIO, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Mae Flor Galido filed before the RTC of San Jose, Antique a petition to cancel
all entries appearing on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-22374, T-22375 and T-22376,
and to annul TCT No. T-24815 and all other titles issued pursuant to RTC Civil Case No. 2001-2-
3230. Finding that the case was contentious in nature, the trial court ordered petitioner to amend
her petition to implead the following: (1) Magrare, in whose name TCT No. T-24815 was
registered and who had earlier registered an adverse claim on TCT No. T-22374; (2) Palcat, who
had registered an adverse claim on TCT No. T-22375; and (3) Bayombong, who had registered an
adverse claim on TCT No. T-22376. After petitioner amended her petition, the trial court issued
summons to Magrare, Palcat and Bayombong. However, the sheriff reported that Bayombong was
not served because he was already dead.

Petitioner moved to substitute the heirs of Bayombong, but the trial court ruled that the substitution
was without legal basis because Bayombong was not properly impleaded. Hence, the trial court
dismissed the case against Bayombong. Petitioner moved to amend her petition for the second time
to include the heirs of Bayombong. The trial court ruled that the names and addresses of all the
heirs of Bayombong were not identified, and that there was no showing that the widow of
Bayombong represented all the heirs. Hence, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion to further
amend the petition.

ISSUE: WON the trial court erred in denying petitioner’s motion to implead the heirs of
Bayombong.

RULING: YES. The heirs of Bayombong are indispensable parties, and thus, the trial court erred
in not impleading the heirs of Bayombong. Indispensable parties are parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action. Petitioner’s action was for the cancellation
of titles, including TCT No. T- 22376. In its Order, the trial court itself recognized that the
controversy was contentious in nature, and required the participation of Bayombong, among
others. Bayombong stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the outcome of the case. Since he was
already dead at the time the case was filed by petitioner, the heirs of Bayombong stand in his stead
not only as parties in interest, but indispensable parties. Without the heirs of Bayombong to
represent the interest of Bayombong, there can be no complete determination of all the issues
presented by petitioner. By denying petitioner’s motion to implead the heirs of Bayombong due to
technicalities, the trial court in effect deprived petitioner a full adjudication of the action, and the
heirs of Bayombong any beneficial effects of the decision.
Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy
in that situation is to implead the party claimed to be indispensable, because the rules provide that
parties may be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action. Given the Court’s authority to order the inclusion of an indispensable party at
any stage of the proceedings, the heirs of Bayombong are hereby ordered impleaded as parties-
defendants.
 MARCELINO M. FLORETE, JR. v. ROGELIO M. FLORETE ET. AL.
G.R. 174909
JANUARY 20, 2016
LEONEN, J.

FACTS: Marcelino, Jr., Ma. Elena, and Raul Muyco (Marcelino, Jr. Group) filed before the RTC
a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Issuances, Transfers and Sale of Shares in People’s
Broadcasting Service, Inc. and all Posterior Subscriptions and Increases thereto with Damages
against Diamel Corporation, Rogelio, Sr., Imelda Florete, Margaret Florete, and Rogelio Florete,
Jr. (Rogelio, Sr. Group). The Complaint was predicated on violations of and liabilities arising from
the Corporation Code and ultimately prayed that People’s Broadcasting’s entire capital structure
be reconfigured. The RTC dismissed the Complaint stating that indispensable parties were not
joined in the Complaint. Rogelio, Sr. Group’s counterclaim for damages was granted by the RTC.
Rogelio, Sr. then filed a Motion for the immediate execution of the award of moral and exemplary
damages, which motion was granted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s
dismissal and ratiocinated that the Marcelino, Jr. Group did not have a cause of action against
those whom they have impleaded as defendants. Furthermore, it ruled that the principal obligors
in or perpetrators of the assailed transactions were persons other than those in the Rogelio, Sr.
Group who have not been impleaded as parties.

ISSUE: WON the failure to implead indispensable parties renders the trial court’s Decision null
and void for want of jurisdiction.

RULING: YES. What the Marcelino, Jr. Group asks is the complete reversal of a number of
corporate acts undertaken by People’ Broadcasting’s different boards of directors. These boards
supposedly engaged in outright fraud or, at the very least, acted in such a manner that amounts to
wanton mismanagement of People’s Broadcasting’s affairs. Hence, Marcelino Group should have
filed a derivative suit, where the corporation concerned ought to have been impleaded as a party.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a
failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. Thus, the general
rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all indispensable
parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial
power.

All subsequent actions of lower courts are void as to both the absent and present parties. The
inclusion of an indispensable party is a jurisdictional requirement: While the failure to implead an
indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an action, considering that said party
may still be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and/or such times as are just, it remains essential — as it is jurisdictional — that any
indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings before the court renders judgment. This is
because the absence of such indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Courts must first acquire jurisdiction over the person of an indispensable party.

Any decision rendered by a court without first obtaining the required jurisdiction over
indispensable parties is null and void for want of jurisdiction: "the presence of indispensable
parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is ‘the authority to hear and determine
a cause, the right to act in a case.’" Thus, the Supreme Court has annulled judgments rendered by
lower courts in the absence of indispensable parties.

In the case at bar, considering that People Broadcasting is an indispensable party which was not
impleaded, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction and its Decision awarding damages is void. From
the conclusion that the Decision awarding damages is void and unwarranted, it necessarily follows
that the Order of the Regional Trial Court to immediately execute its Decision is likewise null and
void.
 ARTURO C. ALBA, JR. v. RAYMIND D. MALAPAJO, et. Al.
G.R. NO. 198752
JANUARY 13, 2016
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Arturo C. Alba, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City a
Complaint against respondents for recovery of ownership and/or declaration of nullity or
cancellation of title and damages alleging, among others, that his title over a parcel of land was
cancelled by virtue of a deed of sale he allegedly executed in favor of respondents. He claimed
that the deed of sale was a forged document which respondents Malapajo were the co-authors of
the same. Respondents Malapajo filed their Answer with Counterclaim contending that petitioner
had, on separate occasions, obtained loans from them and their mother which were secured by
separate real estate mortgages covering the subject property; that the two real estate mortgages had
never been discharged. Respondents counterclaimed for damages and for reimbursement of
petitioner's loan from them plus the agreed monthly interest in the event that the deed of sale is
declared null and void on the ground of forgery.

Petitioner filed a Reply to Answer and Answer to (Permissive) Counterclaim stating, among
others, that the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the nature of respondents' permissive
counterclaim. Petitioner filed a Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Hearing as if a Motion to
Dismiss had been filed alleging that respondents’ counterclaims are in the nature of a permissive
counterclaim, thus, there must be payment of docket fees and filing of a certification against forum
shopping. The RTC denied the Motion finding that respondents’ counterclaims are compulsory.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari
saying that there was no proper proof of service of the petition to the respondents, and that only
the last page of the attached copy of the RTC Order was signed and certified as a true copy of the
original while the rest of the pages were mere machine copies.

ISSUE:

(1) WON CA erred in denying petitioner's petition for certiorari after the latter had clearly
shown compliance with the proof of service of the petition as required under Section 13 of
Rule 13
(2) WON respondents’ counterclaim is permissive in nature which requires the payment of
docket fees and a certification against forum shopping for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the same.

RULING:

(1) YES. Under Section 13, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, service made
through registered mail is proved by the registry receipt issued by the mailing office and
an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing compliance with the rule. In this case,
Nerissa Apuyo, the secretary of petitioner’s counsel, had executed an affidavit of personal
service and service by registered mail which she attached to the petition marked as original
filed with the CA. She stated under oath that she personally served a copy of the petition
 to the RTC of Roxas, as evidenced by a stamp mark of the RTC on the corresponding page
of the petition; that she also served copies of the petition by registered mail to respondents'
counsels as evidenced by registry receipts numbers "PST 188" and "PST 189", both issued
by the Roxas City Post Office. The registry receipts issued by the post office were attached
to the petition filed with the CA. Petitioner had thus complied with the rule on proof of
service.

(2) NO. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected
with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent claim
that may be filed separately in another case. To determine whether a counterclaim is
compulsory or permissive, the Court has devised the following tests:

(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely
the same
b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants’ claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well
as the defendants’ counterclaim?
d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

A positive answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.

Petitioner seeks to recover the subject property by assailing the validity of the deed of sale
on the subject property which he allegedly executed in favor of respondents Malapajo on
the ground of forgery. Respondents counterclaimed that, in case the deed of sale is declared
null and void, they be paid the loan petitioner obtained from them plus the agreed monthly
interest which was covered by a real estate mortgage on the subject property executed by
petitioner in favor of respondents. There is a logical relationship between the claim and the
counterclaim, as the counterclaim is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. Notably, the same evidence
to sustain respondents' counterclaim would disprove petitioner's case. In the event that
respondents could convincingly establish that petitioner actually executed the promissory
note and the real estate mortgage over the subject property in their favor then petitioner's
complaint might fail. Petitioner's claim is so related logically to respondents' counterclaim,
such that conducting separate trials for the claim and the counterclaim would result in the
substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties.

Since respondents' counterclaim is compulsory, it must be set up in the same action;

otherwise, it would be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently with the main action but in
a different proceeding, it would be abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if filed
subsequently, it would meet the same fate on the ground of res judicata. There is, therefore,
no need for respondents to pay docket fees and to file a certification against forum shopping
for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the said counterclaim.
 SHERYL M. MENDEZ v. SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT
G.R. NO. 201614
JANUARY 12, 2016
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: Mendez and Maliga were married under Muslim laws and rituals. They already had a
daughter before even getting married. Their marriage, however, did not turn out for the best shortly
after their wedding. Maliga filed with the 1st Shari'a Circuit Court a petition for the judicial
confirmation of talaq, with a prayer for the grant of probational custody of their minor child
pending the resolution of the case. Before Mendez could file her answer, Maliga filed his urgent
motion reiterating his plea to be awarded temporary custody of Princess Fatima. The said court
issued an Order granting Maliga's urgent motion. Thereafter, Mendez filed her opposition to
Maliga's urgent motion for issuance of temporary custody. She argued that the motion did not
contain the requisite notice of hearing and was, therefore, a mere scrap of paper. She pointed out
that the motion was filed prior to the filing of the main case. In its Order, the court partially
reconsidered its initial order awarding temporary custody to Maliga by granting the right of
visitation to Mendez.

ISSUE: WON the Shari’a Circuit Court erred in acting on Maliga’s urgent motion for issuance of
temporary custody.

RULING: YES. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that every written motion shall be set for hearing
by the applicant. Every written motion is required to be heard and the notice of hearing shall be
served in such manner as to insure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the
date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice. The notice of
hearing is intended to prevent surprise and to afford the adverse party a chance to be heard before
the motion is resolved by the court. A seasonable service of a copy of the motion on the adverse
party with a notice of hearing indicating the time and place of hearing is a mandatory requirement
that cannot be dispensed with as this is the minimum requirement of procedural due process. A
motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper and presents no question
which merits the attention and consideration of the court. It is not even a motion for it does not
comply with the rules, and, hence, even the clerk has no right to receive it. In this case, the urgent
motion lacked the requisite notice of hearing. It is immediately evident from the face of the motion
that it did not contain the notice of hearing required by the Rules of Court which has suppletory
application to the present case. Thus, the award of custody to Maliga by the Shari’a Court was
void as it was rendered in violation of the constitutional right of Mendez to due process.
 MICHAEL C. GUY v. ATTY. GLENN C. GACOTT
G.R. NO. 206147
JANUARY 13, 2016
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: Gacott filed a complaint for damages against Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC) and
the latter’s employee, Rey Medestomas (Medestomas). Summons was served upon QSC and
Medestomas, after which they filed their Answer. QSC and Medestomas did not present any
evidence during the trial. RTC decided in favor of Gacott. The decision became final as QSC and
Medestomas did not interpose an appeal. Gacott then secured a Writ of Execution. During the
execution stage, Gacott learned that QSC was not a corporation, but was in fact a general
partnership registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In the articles of
partnership, petitioner Guy was appointed as General Manager of QSC. The Sheriff attached Guy’s
vehicle prompting Guy to file a Motion to Lift Attachment, arguing that he was not a judgment
debtor and, therefore, his vehicle could not be attached. The RTC issued an order denying Guy’s
motion. Not satisfied, Guy moved for reconsideration. He argued that he was neither impleaded as
a defendant nor validly served with summons and, thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over his person. The motion was denied by the RTC. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE: WON jurisdiction over the person of the partnership was not acquired.

RULING: NO. While the service of summons was flawed, voluntary appearance remedied or
cured the flaw of the summons.

Under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, when the defendant is a
corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical
personality, the service of summons may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. Jurisprudence is replete with
pronouncements that such provision provides an exclusive enumeration of the persons authorized
to receive summons for juridical entities. In this case, QSC was never shown to have been served
with the summons through any of the enumerated authorized persons to receive such, namely:
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel.
Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid.
Even substantial compliance is not sufficient service of summons. The CA was obviously mistaken
when it opined that it was immaterial whether the summons to QSC was served on the theory that
it was a corporation.

Nevertheless, while proper service of summons is necessary to vest the court jurisdiction over the
defendant, the same is merely procedural in nature and the lack of or defect in the service of
summons may be cured by the defendant’s subsequent voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction through his filing a responsive pleading such as an answer. In this case, it is not
disputed that QSC filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its
person was acquired through voluntary appearance.
 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY v. FADCOR, INC., et.al.
G.R. NO. 197970
JANUARY 25, 2016
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Metrobank filed a Complaint against respondents for recovery of sum of money.
Respondents failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial. The RTC, therefore, issued an Order
directing Metrobank to present its evidence ex parte. Metrobank presented as lone witness its
Senior Assistant Manager, Ms. Irene Sih-Tan and, thereafter, filed its Formal Offer of Evidence.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Metrobank. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the RTC Decision and ruled that during the ex parte hearing held by the RTC, the petitioner's lone
witness identified and marked Exhibits "A" to "DD-4" only as shown in the stenographic notes,
however, the RTC admitted Exhibits "A" to "MM," contrary to the Supreme Court's resolution in
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 03-1-09-SC which provides that no evidence shall be allowed
to be presented and offered during the trial in support of the party's evidence-in-chief other than
those that have been identified below and pre-marked during the trial.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling that the RTC did not follow the provisions of A.M. No. 03-
1-09-SC.

RULING: YES. This case involves an ex parte presentation of evidence allowed by the RTC after
the respondents herein failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference and submit a pre-trial
brief despite receipt of the Order of the same court, which is in accordance with Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the RTC did not commit an error in allowing the petitioner
herein to present its evidence ex parte and rendering a judgment on the basis thereof. The CA,
however, found an error in the RTC's admission of the evidence presented or offered by the
petitioner. According to the same, there is no showing in the transcript of stenographic notes
whatsoever that Exhibits "EE" to "MM" were presented and identified by the petitioner's witness
during the proceeding. By admitting those evidence that were not identified or testified to by the
petitioner's witness, the CA ruled that the RTC did not follow the provisions of A.M. No. 03-1-
09-SC, which is erroneous.

The records show however that the documentary evidence being questioned by respondents
(Exhibits "EE" to "MM") were marked during the ex parte presentation of evidence and were
formally offered and admitted by the RTC before the latter rendered its decision. Thus, the CA's
ruling that Exhibits "EE" to "MM" should not have been considered simply because the
stenographic notes does not reflect that those evidence were presented and identified is mind-
boggling because they could not have been marked had they not been presented during the ex parte
hearing where the lone witness for the petitioner was able to testify. The fact that the questioned
pieces of evidence were formally offered and admitted by the RTC should be the foremost
consideration. Unfortunately, when respondents failed to appear during the pre-trial despite due
notice, they have already acquired the risk of not being able to dispute the evidence presented ex
parte by petitioner.
 ENRIQUE DE LEON v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPO3 LEONARDO
G.R. NO. 212623
JANUARY 11, 2016
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with Grave Oral Defamation. In its Decision, the MeTC found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Grave Oral Defamation. On appeal to the RTC,
among the petitioner’s arguments is that the MeTC decision lacked the necessary constitutional
and procedural requirements of a valid decision. The RTC and the CA affirmed the MeTC
Decision.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the MeTC failed to include the facts and the law upon which the
decision is based.

RULING: NO. Under Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, no decision shall be rendered
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that a judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge,
stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed
with the clerk of the court.

Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is
indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. A decision that does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to
how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the
possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. Moreover, the requirement serves as
an assurance to the parties that, in arriving at a judgment, the judge did so through the processes
of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him
from deciding by virtue of an arbitrary and unsupported assertion.

From the factual milieu of this case, there was no breach of the constitutional mandate that
decisions must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based. The
CA correctly stated that the MeTC clearly emphasized in its decision, the factual findings, as well
as the credibility and the probative weight of the evidence for the defense vis-à-vis the evidence
of the prosecution. The MeTC presented both the version of the prosecution and that of the defense.
He was fully aware of the alleged errors of the MeTC was not left in the dark. The RTC, as an
appellate court, found no reason to reverse the decision of the MeTC.
 CAGAYAN ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY v. MERIDIEN VISTA GAMING
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 194962
JANUARY 27, 2016
MENDOZA, J.

FACTS: Respondent Meridien Vista Gaming Corporation (MVGC) filed a petition for mandamus
and damages against petitioner CEZA praying that it be allowed to continue with its gaming
operations. The case was referred by CEZA to the OGCC, which assigned Atty. Edgardo Baniaga
(Atty. Baniaga) to handle the case. After the parties had filed their Joint Manifestation with Motion
to Render Judgment based on the Pleadings, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of MVGC. On
the same date, a copy of the decision was obtained by Atty. Baniaga, who was coincidentally then
in the premises of the court building. The OGCC then filed a Manifestation informing the court
that they received information that a decision had been rendered but they have not received a copy
thereof. Thus, it requested from the RTC that an official copy of the decision be given to its
representative, Monico Manuel (Manuel). The request was granted and a copy of the said decision
was given to Manuel.

CEZA filed its Notice of Appeal stating that it officially received a copy of the decision only on
December 3, 2009. On the same date, December 9, 2009, the RTC issued an Order denying the
notice of appeal on the ground that the 15-day reglementary period within which to appeal had
already lapsed. On January 25, 2010, CEZA, with the assistance of a new government corporate
counsel appointed by the OGCC, filed a Petition for Relief (Petition for Relief from Judgment
under Rule 38) before the RTC alleging honest mistake or excusable neglect on the part of Atty.
Baniaga. The RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit. CA affirmed the
denial.

ISSUE: WON the RTC and the CA erred in denying CEZA’s petition for relief.

RULING: YES. Relief from judgment is a remedy provided by law to any person against whom
a decision or order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. This
remedy is equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases where there is no other
available or adequate remedy provided by law or the rules. Generally, relief will not be granted to
a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to the negligence of his counsel because of the time-honored principle that clients are
bound by the mistakes and negligence of their counsel. The notices sent to the counsel of record
is binding upon the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse
judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment
that is valid and regular on its face. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel
within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client.
In highly meritorious cases, however, the Court may depart from the application of this rule such
as when the negligence of the counsel is so gross, reckless, and inexcusable that the client is
deprived of due process of law when adherence to the general rule would result in the outright
deprivation of the clients’ property; or when the interests of justice so require.
In the obtaining case, the negligence of the petitioner’s counsel was evidently so gross as to call
for the exercise of the Court’s equity jurisdiction. Clearly, the negligence of Atty. Baniaga was
unconscionable and inexcusable. It was highly suspicious, if not outright deliberate. Obviously, he
fell short of the high standard of assiduousness that a counsel must perform to safeguard the rights
of his clients. At the inception, CEZA was already deprived of its right to present evidence during
the trial of the case when Atty. Baniaga filed a joint manifestation submitting the case for decision
based on the pleadings without informing CEZA. In violation of his sworn duty to protect his
client’s interest, Atty. Baniaga agreed to submit the case for decision without fully substantiating
their defense. Worse, after he received a copy of the decision, he did not even bother to inform his
client and the OGCC of the adverse judgment. He did not even take steps to protect the interests
of his client by filing an appeal. Instead, he allowed the judgment to lapse into finality, which is
tantamount to reckless and gross negligence that deprived CEZA not only of the chance to seek
reconsideration thereof but also the opportunity to elevate its case to the CA.
 PEDRO LADINES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and EDWIN DE RAMON
G.R. NO. 167333
JANUARY 11, 2016

FACTS: Petitioner Pedro Ladines, together with Herman Licup, was charged with the crime of
Homicide. The RTC convicted petitioner of the crime but acquitted Licup for insufficiency of
evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court
via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 insisting that the CA committed reversible
error in affirming his conviction despite the admission of Licup immediately after the incident that
he had stabbed the victim; and that the res gestae statement of Licup constituted newly-discovered
evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. The State, however, argued
that the petitioner’s insistence raised factual questions which were improper for consideration in
an appeal by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that the CA did not err in affirming
the conviction; and that the evidence to be adduced by the petitioner was not in the nature of newly-
discovered evidence.

ISSUE:

(1) WON factual questions may be considered in an appeal by petitioner for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
(2) WON the concept of newly discovered evidence may be appropriately considered on
appeal to the Supreme Court

RULING:

(1) NO. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that the petition for review
on certiorari shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A
question, to be one of law, must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. There is a question of law in a given
case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts;
there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts. In appeal by certiorari, therefore, only questions of law may be raised,
because the Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts, does not normally undertake
the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial.

The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings thereon are
received with respect and are binding on the Court subject to certain exceptions, including:
(a) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(e) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (j) when in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (i) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the
 supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) when
the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. In the case at hand, none of the
foregoing exceptions applies in order to warrant the review of the unanimous factual
findings of the RTC and the CA.

(2) NO. The absence of a specific rule on the introduction of newly-discovered evidence at
this late stage of the proceedings is not without reason. The Court would be compelled,
despite its not being a trier of facts, to receive and consider the evidence for purposes of its
appellate adjudication. Of necessity, the Court would remand the case to the lower courts
for that purpose. But the propriety of remanding for the purpose of enabling the lower court
to receive the newly-discovered evidence would inflict some degree of inefficiency on the
administration of justice, because doing so would effectively undo or reopen the decision
that is already on appeal.

Thus, the Court has issued guidelines in this regard. The first guideline is to restrict the
concept of newly- discovered evidence to only such evidence that can satisfy the following
requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not
have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the
judgment if admitted.

The proposed evidence of the petitioner in this case was not newly-discovered because the
first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable diligence,
could have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the trial
by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae
declaration of Licup and the relevant documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to
substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.
THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC et.al. v. ERNESTO YU and MANUEL
YUHICO
G.R. NO. 191033
JANUARY 11, 2016
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Respondents Yu and Yuhico were members of petitioner Orchard Golf and Country
Club. Inc. Their membership was suspended by the latter, prompting them to file a Petition for
Injunction to assail the validity of their suspension. On December 4, 2008, the Imus RTC ruled in
favor of respondents. Upon receiving a copy of the Imus RTC Decision on December 22, 2008,
petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on January 5, 2009. Respondents then filed an Opposition to
Notice of Appeal with Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, arguing that the December 4,
2008 Decision already became final and executory since no petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules was filed before the CA. Realizing the mistake, petitioners filed on January 13, 2009 an
Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition. Before the Imus RTC, they also filed a
Motion to Withdraw the Notice of Appeal. On January 15, 2009, the CA resolved to give
petitioners a 15-day period within which to file the petition, but subject to the timeliness of the
filing of petitioners’ Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File ‘Petition for Review’ under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court dated January 13, 2009." Afterwards, on January 21, 2009, petitioners
filed a Petition for Review. On September 16, 2009, the CA set aside its January 15, 2009
Resolution which granted petitioners an additional 15-day period within which to file their Petition
for Review, from which arose this Petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in reversing its previous Resolution which granted petitioners an
additional 15-day period within which to file their Petition for Review.

RULING: YES. Under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC (Re: Mode of Appeal in Cases Formerly Cognizable
by the Securities and Exchange Commission), while the petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules should be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the RTC,
the CA may actually grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition
and a further extension of time not exceeding fifteen (15) days for the most compelling reasons.
This implies that the reglementary period is neither an impregnable nor an unyielding rule.

In the case before the high court, the petitioners committed an excusable delay of only seven (7)
days. When they received a copy of the Imus RTC Decision on December 22, 2008, they filed
before the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition on January 13, 2009.
Meantime, they exhibited their desire to appeal the case by filing a Notice of Appeal before the
Imus RTC. Upon realizing their procedural blunder, petitioners exerted honest and earnest effort
to file the proper pleading despite the expiration of the reglementary period. In their urgent motion,
they candidly admitted that a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a notice of appeal under
Rule 41 ought to have been filed. The material dates were also indicated. Hence, the CA was fully
aware that the 15-day reglementary period already elapsed when it granted the time to file the
petition.

There is also no material prejudice to respondents had the CA allowed the filing of a petition for
review. When the Imus RTC declared as permanent the writ of preliminary injunction, the
injunction became immediately executory. Respondents’ suspension as Club members was
effectively lifted; in effect, it restored their rights and privileges unless curtailed by a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction.
 HEIRS OF JOSE MA. GEPUELA v. BERNITA MENEZ-ANDRES, et.al.
G.R. NO. 173770
JANUARY 13, 2016
JARDELEZA, J.

FACTS: Gepuela filed an action to consolidate his ownership over the 36/72 pro indiviso share
he acquired by way of redemption from the estate of Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz (Basilia). The
RTC granted Gepuela’s petition, declared him the owner of Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share in
the parcel of land covered by TCT No. 95524 and ordered the issuance of a new certificate of title
to reflect this change in ownership. Aggrieved, oppositors Isagani, Perfecto, Jr., Pedrito, Vito and
Alberto appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 25605. The
CA affirmed the trial court’s findings. The CA’s Decision in CA G.R. CV No. 25605 was not
appealed and became final and executory on February 26, 1992. TCT No. 5033-R was issued that
same year, reflecting Gepuela’s ownership of the 36/72 pro indiviso share previously owned by
Basilia.

On October 10, 1995, Basilia’s grandchildren Hernita and Nelia filed a Complaint for Redemption
and Consignation with Damages and a subsequent Amended Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Redemption, Cancellation of Notation in Title, and Consignation with Damages against
Gepuela. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 65327. In his Answer, Gepuela alleged that his
redemption had already been adjudicated by the trial court in LRC Case No. R-3855 and affirmed
by the CA in CA G.R. CV No. 25605. No further appeal having been made, Gepuela asserts that
the CA’s Decision became final and executory on February 26, 1992.

The trial court upheld Gepuela’s redemption of Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share. It, however,
ruled that because Gepuela failed to formally notify Hernita, Nelia and Rosemarie of the
redemption, the same was null and void insofar as it affected the latter’s six percent (6%) share in
the property.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s Decision, with certain modifications. At the outset, the CA noted
that the validity of Gepuela’s redemption has already been settled in LRC Case No. R-3855 and
affirmed by the CA in CA G.R. CV No. 25605. Since the Decision in said case had already become
final and executory per entry of judgment dated February 26, 1992, the CA declared that Hernita,
et al. are barred from assailing it again under the principle of res judicata.

Despite this, the CA still proceeded to resolve the case on the merits. Rejecting Hernita, et al.’s
claim that Gepuela had no personality to redeem Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share, the appellate
court held that Gepuela was not a stranger to, but rather a co-owner of, the entire communal
property. Since redemption inures to the benefit of the other co-owners, the CA affirmed the trial
court’s decision insofar as it nullified the redemption in proportion to Hernita, et al.’s respective
shares. The CA, however, modified the RTC ruling with respect to the computation of Hernita, et
al.’s shares in Basilia’s estate.

ISSUE:
 (1) WON the CA erred when, upon modification of the terms of the case it declared that the
abovementioned decision was already final and executory and thus cannot be appealed
(2) WON Hernita and the others are indispensable parties in the same case

RULING:

(1) NO. The concept of res judicata that is bar by prior judgment applies in this case. The
following requisites must concur in order that a prior judgment may bar a subsequent
action, viz: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or
order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or
stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered
by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must
be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause
of action.

While there appears to be a lack of identity between the concerned parties and the causes
of action involved in the two actions, it must be recalled that absolute identity is not
required for res judicata to apply; substantial identity of parties and causes of actions is
sufficient. In this case, Hernita, et al., though not a party to LRC Case No. R-3855, share
an identity of interest with Isagani, et al., in that they (1) are heirs of Basilia, the owner of
the disputed 36/72 portion of the land covered by TCT No. 95524, and (2) both sought to
challenge the redemption made by Gepuela of the said portion of property. Based on
jurisprudence, both Hernita, et al. and Isagani, et al. can be considered to share "an identity
of interest from which flowed an identity of relief sought," that is, to be eventually declared
owners of the portion being contested. As to the subject matter, it is not in contention that
in both cases, the 36/72 pro indiviso share of Basilia in the land is what is being disputed.

The allegations in Civil Case No. 65327 show that Hernita, et al. are seeking exactly the
same relief sought by the oppositors in LRC Case No. R-3855, that is, the denial of the
consolidation of Gepuela’s ownership over Basilia’s 36/72 pro indiviso share. In fact, the
issues presented against Gepuela’s redemption over the disputed portion had already been
thoroughly ventilated in LRC Case No. R-3855. This is bolstered by the fact that in Civil
Case No. 65327 was filed specifically seeking to declare the nullity of Gepuela’s
redemption of the one-half share previously owned by Basilia. This issue, however, has
already been conclusively settled in LRC Case No. R-3855, where the trial court upheld
Gepuela’s redemption of the share and declared him absolute owner of the same.

(2) NO. Hernita, et al. contend that the doctrine of res judicata "does not at all attach, because
the judgment in LRC Case No. [R-3855] is not valid for lack of due process and in the
absence of indispensable parties." As indispensable parties who were not made part of the
proceedings, Hernita, et al. claim that they cannot be bound by the decision in LRC Case
No. R-3855 or the appeal in CA-G.R. No. 25605. The Supreme Court rejected this
contention. An indispensable party is defined as a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action. Hernita, et al. are voluntary heirs to ten percent of
the free portion of Basilia’s estate. Given their limited participation in the estate, this Court
is at a loss as to how Hernita, et al. can be considered indispensable parties for purposes of
LRC Case No. R-3855, an action to consolidate Gepuela’s title over the property covered
by TCT No. 95524. The claim all the more fails to persuade especially when one considers
that the estate itself, through its Administratrix, and all the other registered co- owners of
aliquot portions of the property appear to have been properly notified of and, in fact,
actively participated in, the proceedings in LRC Case No. R-3855.
 DST MOVERS CORPORATION v. PEOPLE’S GENERAL INSURANCE
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 198627
JANUARY 13, 2016
LEONEN, J.

FACTS: People's General Insurance Corporation (PGIC) filed a Complaint for Sum of Money
before the MeTC, alleging that a Honda Civic sedan was hit on the rear by an Isuzu Elf truck
owned by DST Movers Corporation. In support of its recollection of the events, PGIC relied on a
Traffic Accident Investigation Report (Report) prepared by PO2 Cecilio Grospe Tomas (PO2
Tomas) of the Muntinlupa City Traffic Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police. This
was attached as Annex "E" of PGIC’s Complaint and also as Annex "E" of its Position Paper. The
MeTC rendered a Decision favoring PGIC’s version of events and finding DST Movers liable. On
appeal, the ruling of the MeTC was affirmed in toto by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. Hence,
DST Movers filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court insisting that its
liability was not established by a preponderance of evidence. Specifically, it faults the lower courts
for ruling in favor of PGIC despite how its version of events was supported by nothing more the
Traffic Accident Investigation Report. It asserts that reliance on this Report was misplaced as it
was supposedly "improperly identified [and] uncorroborated."

ISSUES: WON the SC, in a Rule 45 Petition, can review the factual findings of the lower courts.

RULING: YES. A Rule 45 petition pertains to questions of law and not to factual issues. As a
general rule, it becomes improper for the Supreme Court to consider factual issues: the findings of
fact of the trial court, as affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive on the Supreme
Court. The reason behind the rule is that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its
duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence adduced before the lower
courts. A determination of whether a matter has been established by a preponderance of evidence
is, by definition, a question of fact. It entails an appreciation of the relative weight of the competing
parties’ evidence. The determination is a "query [that] necessarily invites calibration of the whole
evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of
the situation."

However, there are exceptions that leave room for the Supreme Court to make a factual
determination for itself and, ultimately, to overturn the factual findings with which it is confronted.
In this case, the findings of the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court
of Appeals in this case are all in accord. They consistently ruled that the proximate cause of the
damage sustained by the sedan was the negligent driving of a vehicle owned by petitioner.
However, this conclusion is founded on the misplaced probative value accorded to a traffic
accident investigation report. In the first place, this Report should not have been admitted as
evidence for violating the Hearsay Rule. Bereft of evidentiary basis, the conclusion of the lower
courts cannot stand as it has been reduced to conjecture. Thus, we reverse this conclusion.
 LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO v. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE,
JR.,et.al.
G.R. NO. 211140
JANUARY 12, 2016
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) filed a Petition for Mandamus seeking
the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory Decisions and Resolution of the
Supreme Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to Velasco and entering
the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives. In her Comment,
respondent Regina Ongsiako Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and
not mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and
the installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his
oath of office and enters his name in the Roll of Members. She argues that, being a collateral attack
on a title to public office, the petition must be dismissed.

ISSUE: WON the special civil action is one for mandamus.

RULING: YES. The instant special civil action is really one for mandamus and not a quo
warranto case. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to
the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim
is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed
by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise,
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.

In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this
Court in G.R. No. 207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No.
13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory
resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of Reyes
and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque - it cannot be claimed that the present petition is one for
the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for
herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the
respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.

As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Y ap have no discretion
whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register the latter's name in the
Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is in
existence final and executory resolutions of the Supreme Court affirming the final and executory
resolutions of the COMELEC cancelling Reyes's Certificate of Candidacy. There is likewise a
final and executory resolution of the COMELEC declaring null and void the proclamation of
Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for
the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. As such, the administration of oath and the
registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing
the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public
respondents.
 P/S INSP. SAMSON B. BELMONTE et.al. v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 197665
JANUARY 13, 2016
PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Petitioners were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct and Abuse of
Authority before the Visayas Office of the Ombudsman which found them guilty of the same and
imposed the penalty of dismissal from service. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
arguing that the Ombudsman’s decision is not supported by evidence. Before the Ombudsman
could resolve the said motion, however, petitioners elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by
filing a Petition for Prohibition, praying that the Court issue a Writ of Prohibition and Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction commanding the Ombudsman to desist
from implementing its Decision ordering their dismissal from service pending resolution of their
Motion for Reconsideration with said office or until remedies under the Rules and law have been
fully exhausted.

Sometime after the filing of the Petition, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an Order modifying
its Decision by finding petitioners guilty not of Grave Misconduct, but of Conduct Prejudicial to
the Best Interest of the Service and further modifying the penalty from dismissal to suspension
from office for a period of six (6) months and (1) day without pay.

ISSUE:

(1) WON Petition for Prohibition was proper/appropriate

(2) WON petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

RULING:

(1) NO. The petition for prohibition filed by petitioners is inappropriate. For a party to be
entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be
directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial or
ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A cursory reading of the
records of the case readily reveals the absence of the second and third requisites.

First, the Court does not find that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the subject Decision. In arriving at the assailed Decision, the Ombudsman carefully
weighed the rights and interests of the parties vis-à-vis the evidence they presented to
substantiate the same. That the Ombudsman’s ruling was unfavorable to petitioners’
interests does not necessarily mean that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion,
especially so when such ruling was aptly corroborated by evidence submitted by the
parties.

Second, petitioners filed the instant action when they clearly had some other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy
 and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the
judgment or rule, order or resolution of the lower court or agency. Here, the remedy of a
motion for reconsideration was still available to petitioners, as expressly granted by Section
8 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order (AO) No. 17. In fact, as borne by the records, petitioners actually
availed of the same when they filed their Motion for Reconsideration with public
respondent on July 18, 2011.

(2) YES. The Petition is likewise dismissible for its violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Petitioners, without awaiting the Ombudsman’s action on their Motion for
Reconsideration, immediately filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court, instead
of the appellate court, as required by said doctrine. Strict observance of the policy of
judicial hierarchy demands that where the issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within
the competence of the CA or the RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ
must be presented to either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it
unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and with
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari,
prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. The judicial
policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the precious time and attention of the
Court.

In this case, petitioners directly elevated the instant case before the Supreme Court failing
to advance any compelling reason for the Supreme Court to allow the same. In fact, they
even raised issues concerning the Ombudsman’s factual findings, contrary to the rule that
parties who appeal directly to the Supreme Court must only raise questions of law. It is
clear, therefore, that the Supreme Court has ample reason to dismiss petitioners’ recourse
 ORIX METRO LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION v. CARDLINE INC.,
et.al.
G.R. NO. 201417
JANUARY 13, 2016
BRION, J.

FACTS: Orix filed a complaint for replevin, sum of money, and damages with an application for
a writ of seizure against respondents. The RTC rendered judgment in Orix’s favor. The CA and
subsequently the Supreme Court denied the respondents’ appeal and affirmed the RTC judgment.
The Supreme Court’s denial of the appeal in G.R. No. 189877 became final and executory.
Respondent Ng Beng Sheng filed a petition for annulment of judgment. He argued that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over his person since the summons was not properly served on him. The CA
denied the petition on the grounds of forum shopping and res judicata. The CA explained that this
issue had already been addressed by the RTC and by the CA and the Supreme Court on appeal. In
the main case, Orix filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution which the RTC granted
in its December 1, 2010 order. Thereafter, respondents filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the issuance of the December 1, 2010
order. The CA granted the petition, annulled the RTC’s order dated December 1, 2010, and
prohibited the sheriff from executing the judgment.

ISSUE:

(1) WON the Petition for Prohibition is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the
circumstances.
(2) WON respondents committed forum shopping.

RULING:

(1) NO. The RTC’s May 6, 2008 judgment has attained finality and can no longer be altered.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of the
decision. Thus, the RTC issued the December 1, 2010 order of execution. An order of
execution is not appealable; otherwise, a case would never end. As a rule, parties are not
allowed to object to the execution of a final judgment. One exception is when the terms of
the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for its interpretation. If the
exception applies, the respondents may seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ
of execution. Although an order of execution is not appealable, an aggrieved party may
challenge the order of execution via an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

The special civil action of prohibition is an available remedy against a tribunal exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers if it acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law. In the present case, the respondents effectively argued that the terms of the RTC’s
May 6, 2008 judgment are not clear enough such that the parties’ agreement must be
examined to arrive at the proper interpretation. The respondents, however, did not give the
RTC an opportunity to clarify its judgment. The respondents filed a special civil action for
 prohibition before the CA without first filing a motion to stay or quash the writ of execution
before the RTC. Hence, the petition for prohibition obviously lacked the requirement that
no "other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy" is available. Thus, the petition should have
been dismissed. However, the CA gave due course to the petition. In granting the petition,
the CA ruled that the judgment had been satisfied; thus, there was no more judgment to
execute. To stress, the CA erred in granting the petition despite the availability of a "plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy."

(2) NO. Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules prohibits forum shopping. The rule against forum
shopping seeks to address the great evil of two competent tribunals rendering two separate
and contradictory decisions. Forum shopping exists when a party initiates two or more
actions, other than appeal or certiorari, grounded on the same cause to obtain a more
favorable decision from any tribunal. The elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of
parties, or at least such parties representing the same interest; (ii) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the latter founded on the same facts; (iii) any judgment rendered in
one action will amount to res judicata in the other action. In the present case, the CA
correctly denied Ng Beng Sheng’s petition for annulment of judgment and correctly
reasoned out that the issue on jurisdiction had been resolved with finality in the review on
certiorari. Thus, the issue could no longer be re-litigated. After the denial of the petition
for annulment of judgment, Ng Beng Shen joined the other respondents in filing a petition
for prohibition.

The recourse to the petition for prohibition did not amount to forum shopping. The two
cases filed collectively by the respondents are similar only in that they involve the same
parties. The cases, however, involve different causes of actions. The petition for review on
certiorari was filed to review the merits of the RTC's judgment. On the other hand, the
petition for prohibition respects the finality of the RTC's judgment on the merits but
interprets the dispositive portion in a way that would render the execution unnecessary.
Thus, the elements of forum shopping are not present in the two cases. With respect to Ng
Beng Sheng's petition for annulment of judgment, the CA has already ruled that the filing
of the petition constituted forum shopping, specifically due to the jurisdictional issue
raised. The petition for prohibition, however, involves a different cause of action. Thus,
there is no forum shopping.
 LUCITA TIOROSIO-ESPINOSA v. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE VIRGINIA
HOFILEÑA-EUROPA
G.R. NO. 1855746
JANUARY 20, 2016
JARDELEZA, J.

FACTS: Respondent Jovero filed an action for damages against Spouses Espinosa. In the
complaint, Jovero alleged that Spouses Espinosa maliciously filed several cases against him for
the sole purpose of vexing, harassing, and humiliating him. With regard to this, Jovero prayed that
Spouses Espinosa be ordered to pay compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and costs of suit. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Jovero.
Consequently, Jovero moved for execution pending appeal, citing his advanced age and failing
health. Meanwhile, Spouses Espinosa moved for reconsideration of the RTC decision. The RTC
granted Jovero’s motion for execution pending appeal and denied Spouses Espinosa’s motion for
reconsideration. The RTC subsequently issued a writ of execution pending appeal which covered
the entire amount stated in the decision. Aggrieved by the denial of their motion for
reconsideration, Spouses Espinosa filed their notice of appeal of the main RTC decision. They also
filed a separate motion to stay execution pending appeal and to approve/fix the supersedeas bond.
They contended that execution pending appeal involving awards of moral and exemplary damages
is improper because it is contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court. The RTC denied the
motion to stay execution pending appeal in an order dated September 14, 2007. Spouses Espinosa
filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the September 14, 2007
order. The CA made an outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari for failure to state the date
when the assailed order was received. Spouses Espinosa filed their motion for reconsideration
alleging that their previous counsel received the assailed order on October 4, 2007, attaching as
proof a certified photocopy of postal registry return card. Thus, they filed the petition for certiorari
on time. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration. This time, it cited Spouses Espinosa’s
failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC’s September 14, 2007 order to sustain its
earlier dismissal of the petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

(1) WON the CA erred in dismissing outright the petitioner for certiorari on tenuous
procedural grounds
(2) WON the CA erred in dismissing the Petition for Failure of Spouses Espinosa to first file
a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order.
(3) WON a Petition for Certiorari is the proper remedy to question the sheriff’s actions.

RULING:

(1) YES. Under Section 3 of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court, the CA has the prerogative to
dismiss the case outright for failure to comply with the formal requirements of an action
filed under Rule 65. The formal requirements include, among others, a statement by the
petitioner indicating the material dates when the order or resolution subject of the petition
was received. The CA identified Spouses Espinosa’s failure to comply with this
requirement as the primary ground for dismissing the petition outright.
 An examination of the petition for certiorari filed with the CA shows that the CA is
technically correct with respect to its finding that Spouses Espinosa failed to indicate the
exact date of receipt of the assailed RTC order. However, the CA should have considered
Spouses Espinosa’s explanation regarding this omission, which was apparent on the face
of the petition. Spouses Espinosa likewise executed a "Joint-Affidavit of Material Dates,"
which was attached to the petition for certiorari filed with the CA, attesting to the fact that
the September 14, 2007 order was not among the documents turned over to them by their
former counsel, and that the registry return card had not been returned to the RTC.

It is therefore apparent that Spouses Espinosa attempted to comply with the material date
requirement. Unfortunately, they themselves could not ascertain when the subject order
was received by their former counsel and thereby make an accurate statement as to such
fact. Moreover, the best evidence to prove receipt of the RTC order, i.e., the registry return
card, was not yet available when they elevated the case to the CA. But, as a sign of good
faith, Spouses Espinosa undertook to submit the return card as soon as it was available—
which they subsequently did on January 30, 2008. Given the foregoing circumstances, it
may be deduced that the basic reason why no precise date of receipt was given by Spouses
Espinosa is because they did not want to misrepresent the date in their petition. In fine,
Spouses Espinosa’s failure to indicate the date of receipt appears to be excusable; the CA’s
outright dismissal of their petition is not commensurate with the degree of their non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure. In any case, the return card showed that the
order was received on October 4, 2007, which means that when Spouses Espinosa filed the
petition for certiorari on November 19, 2007, they did so well within the sixty (60) day
reglementary period. Although it is true that procedural rules should be treated with utmost
respect and due regard, since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
administration of justice, this is not an inflexible tenet. After all, rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application
especially on technical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must be avoided.

(2) NO. A petition for certiorari before a higher court will generally not prosper unless the
inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct the
errors imputed to it. This is because a motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law alluded to in Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion for reconsideration is required in order to grant the
lower court an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. Contrary to the CA’s
findings, however, Spouses Espinosa already complied with this requirement. Their motion
to stay execution is, in fact, a motion for reconsideration of the RTC order dated April 12,
2007 which granted Jovero’s motion for execution pending appeal. Although not captioned
as a "motion for reconsideration," Spouses Espinosa’s motion to stay execution directly
challenged the RTC’s order of execution pending appeal insofar as it allowed the inclusion
of the awards for moral and exemplary damages. Thus, when the RTC denied Spouses
Espinosa’s motion to stay execution, it was already the second time the trial court had
 passed upon the issue of execution pending appeal. Both RTC orders dealt with the same
issue, i.e., the propriety of execution pending appeal. In the first instance, the RTC allowed
the execution pending appeal; in the latter, it denied Spouses Espinosa's motion to stay
execution and, thus, sustained its earlier ruling. On both occasions, the parties had been
accorded ample opportunity to squarely argue their positions and the RTC more than
enough opportunity to study the matter and to deliberate upon the issues raised by the
parties. Under these circumstances, the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the order
denying the stay of execution pending appeal by Spouses Espinosa could not be considered
a plain and adequate remedy but a mere superfluity.

(3) NO. The rest of petitioner's arguments are devoted to assailing the sheriff's levy of her
properties. However, a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to question the
sheriff's actions. The special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not available as a
remedy for the correction of acts performed by a sheriff during the execution process,
which acts are neither judicial nor quasi-judicial but arc purely ministerial functions. The
more appropriate remedy would have been a petition for prohibition filed under Section 2
of Rule 65. Moreover, the matters being raised by the petitioner are factual in nature and,
hence, not proper for the Supreme Court to resolve at the first instance.
NILO S. RODRIGUEZ et.al., v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., and NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 178501
JANUARY 11, 2016
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS: In 1997, the Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALP AP) filed with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike, on the grounds of unfair
labor practice and union-busting by PAL (Strike Case). By virtue of the authority vested upon him
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines (Labor Code), the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over the Strike Case, and
issued an Order prohibiting all actual and impending strikes and lockouts. The DOLE Secretary
issued another Order reiterating the prohibition against strikes and lockouts. Despite the
abovementioned Orders of the DOLE Secretary, ALPAP filed a second Notice of Strike and staged
a strike. The DOLE Secretary immediately called PAL and ALP AP for conciliation conferences
to amicably settle the dispute between them.

After his efforts failed, the DOLE Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order. The members of ALP
AP reported for work but PAL did not accept them on the ground that the 24-hour period for the
strikers to return set by the DOLE Secretary in his Return-to-Work Order had already lapsed,
resulting in the forfeiture of their employment. Consequently, ALPAP filed with the NLRC a
Complaint for illegal lockout against PAL (Illegal Lockout Case). The Acting Executive Labor
Arbiter ordered the consolidation of the Illegal Lockout Case with the Strike Case pending before
the DOLE Secretary.

The DOLE Secretary issued a Resolution in the consolidated Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases
declaring the strike illegal and dismissing the Illegal Lockout case. ALP AP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but it was denied by the DOLE Secretary. ALP AP assailed the Resolutions of
the DOLE Secretary in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed before
the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed said Petition. ALP AP elevated the case to the
Supreme Court which dismissed the Petition in a minute Resolution dated April 10, 2002 for
failure of ALPAP to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court. Said
Resolution dismissing the 1st ALPAP case became final and executory on August 29, 2002.

Meanwhile, 32 ALP AP members, consisting of Rodriguez, et al., filed with the NLRC on June 7,
1999 a Complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL (Illegal Dismissal Case). The Labor Arbiter
found that Rodriguez et al were illegally dismissed by PAL. PAL appealed before the NLRC which
reversed Labor Arbiter Robles' Decision. Aggrieved, Rodriguez, et al. filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals which reversed the NLRC Decision and reinstated the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter which held PAL liable for the illegal dismissal of Rodriguez, et al. Hence,
Rodriguez, et al. assailed before the Supreme Court the Decision of the Court of Appeals by way
of Petition for Review on Certiorari. In the meantime, during the pendency of the instant Petition,
the Court decided on June 6, 2011 Airline Pilots Association ·of the Philippines v. Philippine
Airlines, Inc, (2nd ALPAP case). The 2nd ALP AP case arose from events that took place
following the finality on August 29, 2002 of the Resolution dated April 10, 2002 which dismissed
the 1st ALP AP case. The 2nd ALP AP case was dismissed by the Supreme Court in due deference
to the final and immutable judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the 1st ALPAP case. This
Decision of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case became final and executory on September 9, 2011.

ISSUE: WON the case at hand is barred by the final and executory judgments in the preceding
two cases.

RULING: YES. The 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases which became final and executory on August 29,
2002 and September 9, 2011, respectively, constitute res judicata on the issue of who participated
in the illegal strike in June 1998 and whose services were validly terminated.

The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment
and (b) conclusiveness of judgment. The second concept - conclusiveness of judgment - states that
a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as
far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot be again
litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in one action
can be conclusive as to a particular matter in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive
in the second if that same point or question was in issue and adjudicated in the first suit.

Identity of cause of action is not required but merely identity of issue. The elements for res judicata
in the second concept, i.e., conclusiveness of judgment, are extant in these cases.

There is identity of parties in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases, on one hand, and the Petition at bar.
While the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases concerned ALP AP and the present Petition involved several
individual members of ALPAP, the union acted in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases in representation
of its members. In fact, in the 2nd ALPAP case, the Court explicitly recognized that the complaint
for illegal lockout was filed by ALP AP on behalf of all its members who were returning to work.
Also in the said case, ALPAP raised, albeit belatedly, exactly the same arguments as Rodriguez,
et al. herein. Granting that there is no absolute identity of parties, what is required, however, for
the application of the principle of res judicata is not absolute, but only substantial identity of
parties.

ALP AP and Rodriguez, et al. share an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief
sought, namely, the reinstatement of the terminated ALP AP members to their former positions.
Such identity of interest is sufficient to make them privy-in-law, one to the other, and meets the
requisite of substantial identity of parties.

There is likewise an identity of issues between the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases and these cases.
Rodriguez, et al., insist that they did not participate in the June 1998 strike, being on official leave
or scheduled off-duty. Nonetheless, on the matter of determining the identities of the ALPAP
members who lost their employment status because of their participation in the illegal strike in
June 1998, the Court is now conclusively bound by its factual and legal findings in the 1st and 2nd
ALPAP cases.
 EDGARDO M. AGUILAR v. ELVIRA BENLOT and SAMUEL CUICO
G.R. NO. 232806
JANUARY 21, 2019
J. REYES, JR., J:

FACTS: Edgardo M. Aguilar (petitioner) was elected and had served as Punong Barangay of
Barangay Bunga, Toledo City, Cebu, for three consecutive terms prior to the barangay elections
where he was elected Barangay Kagawad and ranked third. During the same elections, petitioner's
sister, Emma Aguilar-Arias (Arias), was elected Punong Barangay, while Leonardo Oralde
(Oralde) and Emiliana Mancao (Mancao) were elected Barangay Kagawads and ranked first and
second, respectively. On December 2, 2010, Arias, Oralde, and Mancao resigned from their
respective positions, citing personal reasons and inability to concurrently fulfill official and
familial obligations. Their resignations were accepted and approved by the Mayor of Toledo City
on the same day. Being third in rank, petitioner succeeded as Punong Barangay. Five days after,
or on December 7, 2010, petitioner was re-elected as President of the Association of Barangay
Captains of Toledo City, by which he once more earned a seat in the City Council. Subsequently,
Oralde and Mancao were appointed back as Barangay Kagawads by the Mayor of Toledo City on
January 1, 2011. Arias, on the other hand, was hired as an employee of the city government after
her resignation.

Convinced that Arias, Oralde, and Mancao resigned from their respective positions to pave the
way for petitioner's succession as Punong Barangay, Elvira J. Benlot and Samuel L. Cuico (herein
respondents) filed a Complaint on January 31, 2012 before the Ombudsman against the former for
violation of Republic Act No. 6713 or The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees and Dereliction of Duty. According to respondents, the concerted
resignations were part of a ruse to enable petitioner to serve a fourth consecutive term in
circumvention of the three-term limit. For this reason, petitioner was subsequently included as one
of the respondents in the complaint. The Ombudsman first dismissed the complaint but then
reconsidered, where Petitioner and Arias were thus found liable for Grave Misconduct.

On appeal to the CA, petitioner failed to explain why the petition was not personally filed and
served, merely invoking honest mistake. Counsel's office messenger allegedly ran out of time, so
the petitions were mailed, even though the affidavit accompanying the petition averred personal
filing and service. In the exercise of its discretion on procedural defects, the CA did not find the
reasons advanced by the petitioner compelling, particularly the belated explanation why the
petitions were mailed. The CA declared that personal filing and service would have been more
practicable than mailing copies of the petition, considering that the Ombudsman, the CA, and
counsels of the parties all have offices in close proximity with each other within Cebu City.

ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in dismissing the petition due to procedural defects with regard
to personal filing and service.

RULING: NO. The Court found that while the CA had good reason to find petitioner's belated
explanation unsatisfactory, the present case merits the relaxation of the rules. The Court has often
emphasized that the liberal interpretation of the rules applies only to justifiable causes and
meritorious circumstances. As mandated by Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, personal
filing and personal service of pleadings remain the preferred mode. Only when personal service or
filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a
written explanation as. to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the
subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Court cannot rule otherwise, lest we allow
circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rules in order to obviate delay in the
administration of justice.

Here, the CA had judicial notice of the proximity of the counsels' offices to the CA, to the
Ombudsman, and with each other. It could not, thus, be faulted for not finding merit in petitioner's
belated explanation. In the exercise of the CA's discretion in such matters, it should have viewed
petitioner's procedural blunder in conjunction with the prima facie merit of the case, disclosing as
it does that a relaxation of the rules is warranted.