Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as the secretary of the COURT OF APPEALS,
secretary DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND COMMISSIONER MARCELINO C.
LIBANAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the February 4, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 00011
which dismissed the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo under A.M. No. 07-
9-12-SC, as amended. It also assails the CA’s Resolution dated March 25, 2008,
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid February 4, 2008
Decision.
The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November
30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50)
others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of
the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of
Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest
proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner
and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure
Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in
the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name
of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of
national security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others
for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel
of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the
DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the
crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause
must be made personally by a judge.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion
against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated
that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors failed to
show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated with
the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government; that petitioner and other
accused-civilians were arrested because they ignored the call of the police despite the
deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit
themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and
expressing one’s sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them
conspirators absent concrete evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the
intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the
law penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.
On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ
Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 07-3126.
On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioner’s letter stating that the DOJ
could not act on petitioner’s request until Atty. Chavez’s right to represent petitioner is
settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as
counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the
dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on
December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is
included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of
petitioner’s counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight
to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the
Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the
NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers
because of the continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the
Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner
further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of
the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is illegal.
On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following affirmative defenses: 1) that the
Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure Orders under the DOJ
Circulars No. 17, Series of 19982 and No. 18 Series of 20073 pursuant to his mandate
under the Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the
government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec.
Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case against herein
petitioner upon the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature
in view of public respondent’s pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3,
2008 filed by the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC
dismissing Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No.
45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not
be attacked collaterally in an amparo proceeding.
During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of
Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco
Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every time petitioner
would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and
interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the power of the
DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and that petitioner did not file a motion
to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be tantamount to
recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.
For respondents’ part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the
Secretary of the DOJ’s power to issue HDO springs from its mandate under the
Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as the principal law
agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ
Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the
DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of Dismissal of the trial court.
On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the
Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent DOJ’s Motion for
Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also observed that the said
Motion should be dismissed outright for being filed out of time. 4
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated
petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has
no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no
legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.
On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition
and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration5 thereon was also denied in the assailed
Resolution6 dated March 25, 2008.
Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:
I.
THE DOJ SECRETARY’S ARROGATION OF POWER AND USURPATION OF
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS SUPPOSEDLY BEEN "REGULARLY EXERCISED
IN THE PAST" OR HAS "NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).
II.
THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, HENCE, PETITIONER CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE
RESIDUAL POWER OF THE RTC MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL
SUCH CLAIMED POWER.
III.
THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE CONTINUING
ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO TRAVEL THROUGH THE
MAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO LIST AND DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE
SUCH A RESTRAINT.
IV.
DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR THE DOJ
SECRETARY’S CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO FOR IT IS NOT A STATUTE. THE
CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT TO BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES
NOT HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE ATTACKED IN A DIRECT
PROCEEDING.7
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole
gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that "[liberty]
includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful
ways." Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person
to travel.
In their Comment,8 both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and Commissioner Libanan
argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the Secretary of Justice in accordance
with Department of Justice Circular No. 17, Series of 1998,9 and Circular No. 18, Series
of 2007,10 which were issued pursuant to said Secretary’s mandate under the
Administrative Code of 1987, as head of the principal law agency of the government,
to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration
regulatory services; and; 2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretary’s
authority to issue hold departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not
within the ambit of a writ of amparo.
The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been
violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO, which would
entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
The petition must fail.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any
person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual
or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,11 made a categorical
pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two
instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," or to threats thereof,
thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form,
is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings
committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation
of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law."12
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,13 the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule
on the writ of amparo as follows:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response
to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under
the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a
writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that
we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the
writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat,
act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting
affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."14
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence
of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life,
liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed. (Emphasis
supplied)
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the
protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered
by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on
his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not the right to travel
is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1
of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right
to security.
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,15 the Court explained the
concept of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be
alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to
security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which
each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be
unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance
that the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his
person and property. The ideal of security in life and property… pervades the whole
history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence." In a broad sense, the right
to security of person "emanates in a person’s legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his
life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and
the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation
of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according
to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."16
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon.
Laguio, Jr.,17 in this manner:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include
"the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he
has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for
the common welfare." x x x
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.18 thoroughly expounded on the
import of the right to security, thus:
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the
exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people." (emphasis
supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational
principle, but essentially an individual international human right. It is the "right to
security of person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from fear." Article 3 of
the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
xxx
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of
mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same
stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently.
The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the
prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security"
is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with
violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation
of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a
general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.
Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of
physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the
bodily integrity or security of a person.
xxx
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the
government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees
of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and
the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in
this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for
human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government
is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights
to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the
bar of justice. x x x (emphasis supplied) 19
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.20 As we have
stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,21 "xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the
usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice.
In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for
humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion." 22
Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency
of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to
establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it
amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there
exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I – XIII, Inc. et al.,23 this Court ruled
that:
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended
for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right
to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order
to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its
precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of
Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:
Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. – When a criminal action has been
commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ
shall be available by motion in the criminal case.1avvphi1
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available
under the writ of amparo.
Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-
Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however,
did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJ’s HDO, as his co-accused did in
the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ
that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting
of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of
the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.24 We quote with approval the CA’s ruling on this
matter:
The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its
pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul25 that once a complaint or information is filed in
court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the
sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondent’s MR of the dismissal
of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No.
07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo
retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even
this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available
by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).26
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to
separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v.
Del Rosario,27 thus:
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the
possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point
in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any
clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security the personal concern
that the writ is intended to protect is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the
issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on
certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a
separately filed criminal case.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his
apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.28 Petitioner’s
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat
to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of
an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon
the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and
Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18,
Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and
Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated
February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
