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G.R. No. 193787. April 7, 2014.*

SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE and BEATRIZ DELA CRUZ
ROQUE, with deceased Jose C. Roque represented by his
substitute heir JOVETTE ROQUE-LIBREA, petitioners,
vs. MA. PAMELA P. AGUADO, FRUCTUOSO C. SABUG,
JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE
PHILIPPINES (NCCP), represented by its Secretary
General SHARON ROSE JOY RUIZ-DUREMDES, LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (LBP), represented by
Branch Manager EVELYN M. MONTERO, ATTY. MARIO
S.P. DIAZ, in his Official Capacity as Register of Deeds for
Rizal, Morong Branch, and CECILIO U. PULAN, in his
Official Capacity as Sheriff, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Binangonan, Rizal, respondents.

Civil Law; Property; Reconveyance; The essence of an action

for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name to
its rightful owner or to one with a better right.—The essence of an
action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property
which was wrongfully or erroneously registered in another
person’s name to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.
Thus, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he
has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the
registered owner and that the property has not yet passed
to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Same; Contracts; Contracts to Sell; In a contract to sell,
ownership is retained by the vendor and is not to pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price.—Examining its
provisions, the Court finds that the stipulation above-highlighted
shows that the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is actually in the
nature of a contract to sell and not one of sale contrary to Sps.
Roque’s belief. In this relation, it has been consistently ruled that
where the seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale
upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of the
purchase price, the con-

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* SECOND DIVISION.

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781

tract is only a contract to sell even if their agreement is

denominated as a Deed of Conditional Sale, as in this case. This
treatment stems from the legal characterization of a contract to
sell, that is, a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller,
while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject
property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds
himself to sell the subject property exclusively to the
prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the condition agreed
upon, such as, the full payment of the purchase price.
Elsewise stated, in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the
vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the
purchase price.
Same; Same; Double Sales; Circumstances which Must
Concur in Order to Determine the Applicability of Article 1544.—
On the matter of double sales, suffice it to state that Sps. Roque’s
reliance on Article 1544 of the Civil Code has been misplaced
since the contract they base their claim of ownership on is, as
earlier stated, a contract to sell, and not one of sale. In Cheng v.
Genato, 300 SCRA 722 (1998), the Court stated the circumstances
which must concur in order to determine the applicability of
Article 1544, none of which are obtaining in this case, viz.: (a) The
two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to exactly
the same subject matter, and must be valid sales transactions; (b)
The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of
the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of
the subject matter must each have bought from the same seller.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Litigants cannot
raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene
the basic rules of fair play and justice.—Regarding Sps. Roque’s
claims of acquisitive prescription and reimbursement for the
value of the improvements they have introduced on the subject
property, it is keenly observed that none of the arguments
therefor were raised before the trial court or the CA. Accordingly,
the Court applies the well-settled rule that litigants cannot raise
an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the
basic rules of fair play and justice. In any event, such claims
appear to involve questions of fact which are generally prohibited
under a Rule 45 petition.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
782

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The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

  Virgilio U. Librea, Jr. for petitioners.
  Floyd P. Lalwet for Fructuoso Sabug, Jr. and NCCP.
  Legal Services Group for Land Bank of the Philippines.

 
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated May 12, 2010 and the Resolution3 dated
September 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 92113 which affirmed the Decision4 dated July
8, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal,
Branch 69 (RTC) that dismissed Civil Case Nos. 03-022
and 05-003 for reconveyance, annulment of sale, deed of
real estate mortgage, foreclosure and certificate of sale, and
damages.
The Facts
The property subject of this case is a parcel of land with
an area of 20,862 square meters (sq. m.), located in Sitio
Tagpos, Barangay Tayuman, Binangonan, Rizal, known as
Lot 18089.5On July 21, 1977, petitioners-spouses Jose C.
Roque and Beatriz dela Cruz Roque (Sps. Roque) and the
original owners of the then unregistered Lot 18089 —
namely, Velia R. Rivero (Rivero), Magdalena Aguilar,
Angela Gonzales, Herminia R. Bernardo, Antonio Rivero,
Araceli R. Victa, Leonor R. Topacio, and Augusto Rivero
(Rivero, et al.) — executed a Deed of Conditional Sale of
Real Property6 (1977 Deed of Conditional Sale) over a
1,231-sq. m. portion of Lot 18089 (subject

_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 9-28.
2 Id., at pp. 34-53. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro,
with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and Ruben C. Ayson,
concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 55-56.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 22-50. Penned by Presiding Judge Narmo P. Noblejas.
5 Id., at p. 23.
6  Rollo, pp. 58-61.

 
783

portion) for a consideration of P30,775.00. The parties

agreed that Sps. Roque shall make an initial payment of
P15,387.50 upon signing, while the remaining balance of
the purchase price shall be payable upon the registration of

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Lot 18089, as well as the segregation and the concomitant

issuance of a separate title over the subject portion in their
names. After the deed’s execution, Sps. Roque took
possession and introduced improvements on the subject
portion which they utilized as a balut factory.7
On August 12, 1991, Fructuoso Sabug, Jr. (Sabug, Jr.),
former Treasurer of the National Council of Churches in
the Philippines (NCCP), applied for a free patent over the
entire Lot 18089 and was eventually issued Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. M-59558 in his name on
October 21, 1991. On June 24, 1993, Sabug, Jr. and Rivero,
in her personal capacity and in representation of Rivero, et
al., executed a Joint Affidavit9 (1993 Joint Affidavit),
acknowledging that the subject portion belongs to Sps.
Roque and expressed their willingness to segregate the
same from the entire area of Lot 18089.
On December 8, 1999, however, Sabug, Jr., through a
Deed of Absolute Sale10 (1999 Deed of Absolute Sale), sold
Lot 18089 to one Ma. Pamela P. Aguado (Aguado) for
P2,500,000.00, who, in turn, caused the cancellation of
OCT No. M-5955 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. M-96692 dated December 17, 199911 in her
name.
Thereafter, Aguado obtained an P8,000,000.00 loan from
the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) secured by a
mortgage over Lot 18089.12 When she failed to pay her
loan

_______________
7  CA Rollo, p. 25.
8  Records (Civil Case No. 05-003), pp. 18-19. Including dorsal portion.
9  Rollo, p. 63.
10 Records (Civil Case No. 05-003), pp. 32-33.
11  Records (Civil Case No. 03-022), pp. 28-29. Including the dorsal
portion.
12 See Deed of Real Estate Mortgage; id., at pp. 32-34. Including the
dorsal portion.

784

obligation, Land Bank commenced extrajudicial foreclosure

proceedings and eventually tendered the highest bid in the
auction sale. Upon Aguado’s failure to redeem the subject
property, Land Bank consolidated its ownership, and TCT
No. M-11589513 was issued in its name on July 21, 2003.14
On June 16, 2003, Sps. Roque filed a complaint15 for
reconveyance, annulment of sale, deed of real estate
mortgage, foreclosure, and certificate of sale, and damages
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before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-022, against

Aguado, Sabug, Jr., NCCP, Land Bank, the Register of
Deeds of Morong, Rizal, and Sheriff Cecilio U. Pulan,
seeking to be declared as the true owners of the subject
portion which had been erroneously included in the sale
between Aguado and Sabug, Jr., and, subsequently, the
mortgage to Land Bank, both covering Lot 18089 in its
entirety.
In defense, NCCP and Sabug, Jr. denied any knowledge
of the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale through which the
subject portion had been purportedly conveyed to Sps.
Roque.16
For her part, Aguado raised the defense of an innocent
purchaser for value as she allegedly derived her title
(through the 1999 Deed of Absolute Sale) from Sabug, Jr.,
the registered owner in OCT No. M-5955, covering Lot
18089, which certificate of title at the time of sale was free
from any lien and/or encumbrances. She also claimed that
Sps. Roque’s cause of action had already prescribed because
their adverse claim was made only on April 21, 2003, or
four (4) years from the date OCT No. M-5955 was issued in
Sabug, Jr.’s name on December 17, 1999.17
On the other hand, Land Bank averred that it had no
knowledge of Sps. Roque’s claim relative to the subject po-

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13 Id., at p. 441. Including the dorsal portion.
14 Rollo, p. 37.
15 Records (Civil Case No. 03-022), pp. 1-11.
16 Rollo, p. 38.
17  Id., at pp. 38-39. See also dorsal portion of OCT No. M-5955.
(Records [Civil Case No. 05-003], p. 19).

785

rtion, considering that at the time the loan was taken out,
Lot 18089 in its entirety was registered in Aguado’s name
and no lien and/or encumbrance was annotated on her
certificate of title.18
Meanwhile, on January 18, 2005, NCCP filed a separate
complaint19 also for declaration of nullity of documents and
certificates of title and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
05-003. It claimed to be the real owner of Lot 18089 which
it supposedly acquired from Sabug, Jr. through an oral
contract of sale20 in the early part of 1998, followed by
the execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale on December 2,
1998 (1998 Deed of Absolute Sale).21 NCCP also alleged
that in October of the same year, it entered into a Joint
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Venture Agreement (JVA) with Pilipinas Norin

Construction Development Corporation (PNCDC), a
company owned by Aguado’s parents, for the development
of its real properties, including Lot 18089, into a
subdivision project, and as such, turned over its copy of
OCT No. M-5955 to PNCDC.22 Upon knowledge of the
purported sale of Lot 18089 to Aguado, Sabug, Jr. denied
the transaction and alleged forgery. Claiming that the
Aguados23 and PNCDC conspired to defraud NCCP, it
prayed that PNCDC’s corporate veil be pierced and that the
Aguados be ordered to pay the amount of P38,092,002.00
representing the unrealized profit from the JVA.24
Moreover, NCCP averred that Land Bank failed to exercise
the diligence required to ascertain the true owners of Lot
18089. Hence, it further prayed that: (a) all acts of
ownership and dominion over Lot 18089 that the bank
might have done or caused to be done be declared null and
void; (b) it be declared the true and real

_______________
18 Id., at pp. 39-40.
19 Records (Civil Case No. 05-003), pp. 1-15.
20 Id., at p. 3.
21 Id., at pp. 20-21.
22 Id., at pp. 22-26.
23 Namely Pamela Aguado, Emily Aguado, and Gregorio Aguado; Rollo,
p. 41.
24 Id.

786

owners of Lot 18089; and (c) the Register of Deeds of

Morong, Rizal be ordered to cancel any and all certificates
of title covering the lot, and a new one be issued in its
name.25
In its answer, Land Bank reiterated its stance that Lot
18089 was used as collateral for the P8,000,000.00 loan
obtained by the Countryside Rural Bank, Aguado, and one
Bella Palasaga. There being no lien and/or encumbrance
annotated on its certificate of title, i.e., TCT No. M-115895,
it cannot be held liable for NCCP’s claims. Thus, it prayed
for the dismissal of NCCP’s complaint.26
On September 7, 2005, Civil Case Nos. 02-022 and 05-
003 were ordered consolidated.27
The RTC Ruling
After due proceedings, the RTC rendered a Decision28
dated July 8, 2008, dismissing the complaints of Sps. Roque
and NCCP.
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With respect to Sps. Roque’s complaint, the RTC found

that the latter failed to establish their ownership over the
subject portion, considering the following: (a) the supposed
owners-vendors, i.e., Rivero, et al., who executed the 1977
Deed of Conditional Sale, had no proof of their title over
Lot 18089; (b) the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale was not
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds;29 (c) the
1977 Deed of Conditional Sale is neither a deed of
conveyance nor a transfer document, as it only gives the
holder the right to compel the supposed vendors to execute
a deed of absolute sale upon full payment of the
consideration; (d) neither Sps. Roque nor the alleged
owners-vendors, i.e., Rivero, et al., have paid real property
taxes in relation to Lot 18089; and (e) Sps. Roque’s

_______________
25 Id., at pp. 40-41.
26 Id., at p. 42.
27 Id.
28 CA Rollo, pp. 22-50.
29 Id., at p. 47.

 
787

occupation of the subject portion did not ripen into

ownership that can be considered superior to the ownership
of Land Bank.30 Moreover, the RTC ruled that Sps. Roque’s
action for reconveyance had already prescribed, having
been filed ten (10) years after the issuance of OCT No. M-
5955.31
On the other hand, regarding NCCP’s complaint, the
RTC observed that while it anchored its claim of ownership
over Lot 18089 on the 1998 Deed of Absolute Sale, the said
deed was not annotated on OCT No. M-5955. Neither was
any certificate of title issued in its name nor did it take
possession of Lot 18089 or paid the real property taxes
therefor. Hence, NCCP’s claim cannot prevail against Land
Bank’s title, which was adjudged by the RTC as an
innocent purchaser for value. Also, the RTC disregarded
NCCP’s allegation that the signature of Sabug, Jr. on the
1999 Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Aguado was forged
because his signatures on both instruments bear
semblances of similarity and appear genuine. Besides, the
examiner from the National Bureau of Investigation, who
purportedly found that Sabug, Jr.’s signature thereon was

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spurious leading to the dismissal of a criminal case against

him, was not presented as a witness in the civil action.32
Finally, the RTC denied the parties’ respective claims
for damages.33
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
foregoing RTC findings in a Decision34 dated May 12, 2010.
While Land Bank was not regarded as a
mortgagee/purchaser in good faith with respect to the
subject portion considering Sps.

_______________
30 Id., at p. 48.
31 Id.
32 Id., at pp. 48-49.
33 Id., at p. 50.
34 Id., at pp. 34-53.

788

Roque’s possession thereof,35 the CA did not order its

reconveyance or segregation in the latter’s favor because of
Sps. Roque’s failure to pay the remaining balance of the
purchase price. Hence, it only directed Land Bank to
respect Sps. Roque’s possession with the option to
appropriate the improvements introduced thereon upon
payment of compensation.36
As regards NCCP, the CA found that it failed to
establish its right over Lot 18089 for the following reasons:
(a) the sale to it of the lot by Sabug, Jr. was never
registered; and (b) there is no showing that it was in
possession of Lot 18089 or any portion thereof from 1998.
Thus, as far as NCCP is concerned, Land Bank is a
mortgagee/purchaser in good faith.37
Aggrieved, both Sps. Roque38 and NCCP39 moved for
reconsideration but were denied by the CA in a
Resolution40 dated September 15, 2010, prompting them to
seek further recourse before the Court.
 
The Issue Before the Court
The central issue in this case is whether or not the CA
erred in not ordering the reconveyance of the subject
portion in Sps. Roque’s favor.
Sps. Roque maintain that the CA erred in not declaring
them as the lawful owners of the subject portion despite
having possessed the same since the execution of the 1977

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Deed of Conditional Sale, sufficient for acquisitive

prescription to set in their favor.41 To bolster their claim,
they also point to the 1993 Joint Affidavit whereby Sabug,
Jr. and Rivero ac-

_______________
35 Id., at pp. 46-48.
36] Rollo, pp. 48-50.
37 Id., at pp. 50-52.
38 CA Rollo, pp. 301-305. Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2010.
39 Id., at pp. 292-300. Motion for Reconsideration dated June 1, 2010.
39 Rollo, pp. 55-56.
39 2.Id., at p. 24.

789

knowledged their ownership thereof.42 Being the first

purchasers and in actual possession of the disputed
portion, they assert that they have a better right over the
1,231-sq. m. portion of Lot 18089 and, hence, cannot be
ousted therefrom by Land Bank, which was adjudged as a
mortgagee/purchaser in bad faith, pursuant to Article 1544
of the Civil Code.43
In opposition, Land Bank espouses that the instant
petition should be dismissed for raising questions of fact, in
violation of the proscription under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which allows only pure questions of law to be
raised.44 Moreover, it denied that ownership over the
subject portion had been acquired by Sps. Roque who
admittedly failed to pay the remaining balance of the
purchase price.45 Besides, Land Bank points out that Sps.
Roque’s action for reconveyance had already prescribed.46
Instead of traversing the arguments of Sps. Roque,
NCCP, in its Comment47 dated December 19, 2011,
advanced its own case, arguing that the CA erred in
holding that it failed to establish its claimed ownership
over Lot 18089 in its entirety. Incidentally, NCCP’s appeal
from the CA Decision dated May 12, 2010 was already
denied by the Court,48 and hence, will no longer be dealt
with in this case.
 
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the
transfer of the property which was wrongfully or
erroneously
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35 Id., at pp. 22-23.
35 Id., at pp. 24-26.
35 Id., at pp. 87-92.
35 Id., at pp. 92-93.
35 Id., at pp. 93-96.
35Id., at pp. 107-140.
35
 Id., at p. 105. See also Court’s Resolution dated November 24, 2010 in G.R. No.
193875 entitled “National Council of Churches in the Philippines v. Land Bank of
the Philippines.”

790

registered in another person’s name to its rightful owner or

to one with a better right.49 Thus, it is incumbent upon the
aggrieved party to show that he has a legal claim on the
property superior to that of the registered owner
and that the property has not yet passed to the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value.50
Sps. Roque claim that the subject portion covered by the
1977 Deed of Conditional Sale between them and Rivero, et
al. was wrongfully included in the certificates of title
covering Lot 18089, and, hence, must be segregated
therefrom and their ownership thereof be confirmed. The
salient portions of the said deed state:
 

_______________

DEED OF CONDITIONAL SALE OF REAL PROPERTY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
x x x x
That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE PESOS
(P30,775.00), Philippine Currency, payable in the manner
hereinbelow specified, the VENDORS do hereby sell, transfer and
convey unto the VENDEE, or their heirs, executors,
administrators, or assignors, that unsegregated portion of the
above lot, x x x.
That the aforesaid amount shall be paid in two installments,
the first installment which is in the amount of __________
(P15,387.50) and the balance in the amount of __________
(P15,387.50), shall be paid as soon as the described portion of the
property shall have been registered under the Land Registration
Act and a Certificate of Title issued accordingly;

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That as soon as the total amount of the property
has been paid and the Certificate of Title has been
issued, an absolute deed of sale shall be executed
accordingly;

_______________
49 National Housing Authority v. Pascual, 564 Phil. 94, 107; 539 SCRA
102, 116 (2007); Gasataya v. Mabasa, 545 Phil. 14, 18; 516 SCRA 105, 110
(2007).
50 Pacete v. Asotigue, G.R. No. 188575, December 10, 2012, 687 SCRA
570, 580; Heirs of Valeriano Concha, Sr. v. Sps. Lumocso, 564 Phil. 580,
593; 540 SCRA 1, 13-14 (2007).

 
791

x x x x
51
Examining its provisions, the Court finds that the
stipulation above-highlighted shows that the 1977 Deed of
Conditional Sale is actually in the nature of a contract to
sell and not one of sale contrary to Sps. Roque’s belief.52 In
this relation, it has been consistently ruled that where the
seller promises to execute a deed of absolute sale
upon the completion by the buyer of the payment of
the purchase price, the contract is only a contract to sell
even if their agreement is denominated as a Deed of
Conditional Sale,53 as in this case. This treatment stems
from the legal characterization of a contract to sell, that is,
a bilateral contract whereby the prospective seller, while
expressly reserving the ownership of the subject
property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer,
binds himself to sell the subject property exclusively
to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of the
condition agreed upon, such as, the full payment of
the purchase price.54 Elsewise stated, in a contract to
sell, ownership is retained by the vendor and is not to pass
to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.55
Explaining the subject matter further, the Court, in Ursal
v. CA,56 held that:

[I]n contracts to sell the obligation of the seller to sell becomes

demandable only upon the happening of the suspensive condition,
that is, the full payment of the purchase price by the buyer. It is
only

_______________

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51 Rollo, pp. 58-60. Emphasis supplied.

52 See Tan v. Benolirao, G.R. No. 153820, October 16, 2009, 604 SCRA 36, 48-
49; Ver Reyes v. Salvador, Sr., G.R. Nos. 139047 and 139365, September 11, 2008,
564 SCRA 456, 476-481.
53 Id., at p. 49.
54 Ver Reyes v. Salvador, Sr., supra note 52 at p. 477; Ursal v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 142411, October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 52, 65; Coronel v. Court of Appeals,
331 Phil. 294, 310; 263 SCRA 15, 27 (1996).
55  Sps. Serrano and Herrera v. Caguiat, 545 Phil. 660, 668; 517 SCRA 57, 65
(2007).
56 Ursal v. Court of Appeals, supra note 54; id., at p. 66.

792

upon the existence of the contract of sale that the seller becomes
obligated to transfer the ownership of the thing sold to the buyer.
Prior to the existence of the contract of sale, the seller is not
obligated to transfer the ownership to the buyer, even if there is a
contract to sell between them.

Here, it is undisputed that Sps. Roque have not paid the

final installment of the purchase price.57 As such, the
condition which would have triggered the parties’
obligation to enter into and thereby perfect a contract of
sale in order to effectively transfer the ownership of the
subject portion from the sellers (i.e., Rivero, et al.) to the
buyers (Sps. Roque) cannot be deemed to have been
fulfilled. Consequently, the latter cannot validly claim
ownership over the subject portion even if they had made
an initial payment and even took possession of the same.58
The Court further notes that Sps. Roque did not even
take any active steps to protect their claim over the
disputed portion. This remains evident from the following
circumstances appearing on record: (a) the 1977 Deed of
Conditional Sale was never registered; (b) they did not seek
the actual/physical segregation of the disputed portion
despite their knowledge of the fact that, as early as 1993,
the entire Lot 18089 was registered in Sabug, Jr.’s name
under OCT No. M-5955; and (c) while they signified their
willingness to pay the balance of the purchase price,59 Sps.
Roque neither compelled Rivero et al., and/or Sabug, Jr. to
accept the same nor did they consign any amount to the
court, the proper application of which would have
effectively fulfilled their obligation to pay the purchase
price.60 Instead, Sps. Roque waited 26 years, reckoned from
the execution of the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale, to

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institute an action for reconveyance (in 2003), and only

after Lot

_______________
57 Rollo, pp. 48-49.
58 See Ursal v. Court of Appeals, supra note 54 at p. 67.
59 Records (Civil Case 03-022), p. 6.
60 See Padilla v. Sps. Paredes, 385 Phil. 128, 139-140; 328 SCRA 434,
443 (2000).

 
793

18089 was sold to Land Bank in the foreclosure sale and

title thereto was consolidated in its name. Thus, in view of
the foregoing, Sabug, Jr. — as the registered owner of Lot
18089 borne by the grant of his free patent application —
could validly convey said property in its entirety to Aguado
who, in turn, mortgaged the same to Land Bank. Besides,
as aptly observed by the RTC, Sps. Roque failed to
establish that the parties who sold the property to them,
i.e., Rivero, et al., were indeed its true and lawful owners.61
In fine, Sps. Roque failed to establish any superior right
over the subject portion as against the registered owner of
Lot 18089, i.e., Land Bank, thereby warranting the
dismissal of their reconveyance action, without prejudice to
their right to seek damages against the vendors, i.e.,
Rivero, et al.62 As applied in the case of Coronel v. CA:63

It is essential to distinguish between a contract to sell and a

conditional contract of sale specially in cases where the subject
property is sold by the owner not to the party the seller contracted
with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a contract
to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person
buying such property despite the fulfilment of the suspensive
condition such as the full payment of the purchase price, for
instance, cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the
prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the
property. There is no double sale in such case. Title to the
property will transfer to the buyer after registration
because there is no defect in the owner-seller’s title per se,
but the latter, of course, may be sued for damages by the
intending buyer. (Emphasis supplied)

On the matter of double sales, suffice it to state that

Sps. Roque’s reliance64 on Article 154465 of the Civil Code
has been

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61 CA Rollo, pp. 47-48.
62 See Ver Reyes v. Salvador, Sr., supra note 52 at p. 483.
63 Supra note 54 at p. 311; p. 28.
64 Rollo, pp. 24-26.
65  Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have

794

misplaced since the contract they base their claim of

ownership on is, as earlier stated, a contract to sell, and not
one of sale. In Cheng v. Genato,66 the Court stated the
circumstances which must concur in order to determine the
applicability of Article 1544, none of which are obtaining in
this case, viz.:

(a) The two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to
exactly the same subject matter, and must be valid sales
transactions;
(b) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership
of the subject matter must each represent conflicting interests;
and
(c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership
of the subject matter must each have bought from the same seller.

 
Finally, regarding Sps. Roque’s claims of acquisitive
prescription and reimbursement for the value of the
improvements they have introduced on the subject
property,67 it is keenly observed that none of the
arguments therefor were raised before the trial court or the
CA.68 Accordingly, the Court applies the well-settled rule
that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on
appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play
and justice. In any event, such

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first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the
person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the
person who in good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence
thereof; to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
66 360 Phil. 891, 909; 300 SCRA 722, 739 (1998).

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67 Rollo, pp. 24, 26, and 27.

68 “Settled is the rule that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first
time on appeal as this would contravene the basic rules of fair play and
justice.” (S.C. Megaworld Construction v. Parada, G.R. No. 183804,
September 11, 2013, 705 SCRA 584.)

795

claims appear to involve questions of fact which are

generally prohibited under a Rule 45 petition.69
With the conclusions herein reached, the Court need not
belabor on the other points raised by the parties, and
ultimately finds it proper to proceed with the denial of the
petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated May 12, 2010 and the Resolution dated September
15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 92113
are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.―In double sales, the first buyer always has

priority rights over subsequent buyers of the same
property; The good faith of the first buyer remains all
throughout despite his subsequent acquisition of
knowledge of the subsequent sale. (Kings Properties
Corporation vs. Galido, 606 SCRA 137 [2009])
——o0o——

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69  “[A]n appeal by petition for review on certiorari

cannot determine factual issues. In the exercise of its
power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does
not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence
presented by the contending parties during the trial.” (Sps.
Andrada v. Pilhino Sales Corporation, G.R. No. 156448,
February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 1, 8-9.)

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