2. Tabuzo v. Gomos AC No.
12005 July 23, 2018
FACTS:
A verified Complaint was filed by Atty. Achernar B. Tabuzo (complainant)
against Atty. Jose Alfonso M. Gomos (respondent) who was then a
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The controversy stemmed from an administrative complaint filed by Lucille G.
Sillo (Sillo) against complainant before the IBP. The case was assigned to
respondent for investigation and report.
In that administrative case, the respondent issued a Report and
Recommendation recommending that complainant be reprimanded for the
impropriety of talking to Sillo, without her counsel, prior to the calling of
their case for mediation conference, and for the abusive, offensive or
improper language used in the pleadings she filed in the said case.
In this case, the complainant alleged that respondent violated the Constitution,
the Rules of Procedure of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (Commission),
Rule 139-B of the Rules Court and Republic Act (R.A.) No. 67136 when he failed
to act on her pleadings with dispatch and for issuing his report and
recommendation on August 15, 2014 or 174 days from the submission of the last
pleading. Second, Complainant averred that respondent was very cruel and
heartless to an inexperienced lawyer when he mutilated statements made in her
pleadings in CBD Case No. 12-3457; and that he maliciously cropped and pasted
portions of complainant's statement in her position paper to give the wrong
impression before the IBP-Board of Governors (Board) that the introductory
heading was an act of name calling against respondent, thereby violating Rules
1.018 and 1.029 of Canon 1 and Rules 3.01,10 3.02,11 and 3.0412 of Canon 3 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. Third, Complainant asserted that respondent
committed nonfeasance for deliberately refusing to institute disciplinary action
against a lawyer for serious violation of duties owed to the Court and the legal
profession despite several notices. Lastly, complainant posited that respondent
was grossly ignorant of the rules on privileged communication, on evidence, on
the crime of perjury, and on forum shopping when he failed to dismiss the
present administrative case outright because it had no merit and when he
ignored the perjury and forum shopping committed by Sillo.
Respondent denied the allegations and contended that they were not only false
and an unfortunate misappreciation of the laws, facts and circumstances but also
an act of harassment.
The Commission recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.
The complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent, as
an investigating commissioner, has an accountability to the legal profession
separate and distinct from that of the IBP Board and such accountability is not a
mere administrative matter inside the IBP-Commission. Complainant posited that
respondent could be held administratively liable because he was a quasi-judicial
officer performing functions delegated by the Court, hence, a public officer.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent may be held administratively liable in the same manner
as judges and other government officials.
2. Whether respondent may be held administratively liable for rendering an
alleged adverse judgment in his capacity as an investigating commissioner of
the IBP.
RULING:
The IBP is a sui generis public institution deliberately organized, by both
the legislative and judicial branches of government and recognized by the
present and past Constitutions, for the advancement of the legal
profession. The IBP as an organization has as its members all lawyers
coming from both the public and private sectors who are authorized to
practice law in the Philippines. However, Section 434 of the IBP's By-Laws
allows only private practitioners to occupy any position in its organization.
This means that only individuals engaged in the private practice are
authorized to be officers or employees and to perform acts for and in
behalf of the IBP. Hence, the IBP Commissioners, being officers of the
IBP, are private practitioners performing public functions delegated to
them by this Court in the exercise of its constitutional power to regulate
the practice of [Link] IBP-CBD's delegated function of entertaining
complaints against lawyers is public in nature; but the responsible officer
performing such function is a private individual—not a public officer.
Consequently, it also follows that IBP Commissioners are not "public
officers". They are not "public officials" as they are not elective or
appointive officials of the "government". IBP Commissioners cannot be
held administratively liable for malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance in the framework of administrative law because they cannot
strictly be considered as being "employed" with the government or of any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
IBP Commissioners and other IBP officers may be held administratively
liable for violation of the rules promulgated by this Court relative to the
integrated bar and to the practice of law. Even if they are not "public
officers" in the context of their employment relationship with the
government, they are still "officers of the court" and "servants of the law"
who are expected to observe and maintain the rule of law and to make
themselves exemplars worthy of emulation by others.45 Most importantly,
no less than Sec. 5(5) of the Constitution placed them under the Court's
administrative supervision. Therefore, IBP Commissioners may be held
administratively liable only in relation to their functions as IBP officers—
not as government officials.
3. In Re Suspension from the Practice of Law in the Territory of Guam of
Atty. Leon G. Maquera BM No. 793 July 30, 2004 (En Banc)
FACTS:
The District Court of Guam informed this Court of the suspension of Atty. Leon
G. Maquera (Maquera) from the practice of law in Guam for two (2) years
pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior Court of Guam on May 7,
1996 in Special Proceedings Case No. SP0075-94, a disciplinary case filed by the
Guam Bar Ethics Committee against Maquera.
The Court referred the matter of Maqueras suspension in Guam to the Bar
Confidant for comment in its Resolution dated November 19, 1996. Under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, the disbarment or suspension
of a member of the Philippine Bar in a foreign jurisdiction, where he has also
been admitted as an attorney, is also a ground for his disbarment or suspension
in this realm, provided the foreign courts action is by reason of an act or
omission constituting deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct, grossly
immoral conduct, or a violation of the lawyers oath.
Bar Confidant Atty. Erlinda C. Verzosa recommended that the Court obtain copies
of the record of Maqueras case since the documents transmitted by the Guam
District Court do not contain the factual and legal bases for Maqueras suspension
and are thus insufficient to enable her to determine whether Maqueras acts or
omissions which resulted in his suspension in Guam are likewise violative of his
oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
The IBP submitted to the Court its Report and Recommendation and its
Resolution No. XVI-2003-110, indefinitely suspending Maquera from the practice
of law within the Philippines until and unless he updates and pays his IBP
membership dues in full.
The IBP found that Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on
February 28, 1958. On October 18, 1974, he was admitted to the practice
of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from the practice of
law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his clients property as
payment for his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained
an unreasonably high fee for handling his clients case.
On the basis of the Decision of the Superior Court of Guam, the IBP concluded
that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct, there is no
evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in the
Philippines. However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his
failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure
is, in turn, a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court.
The power of the Court to disbar or suspend a lawyer for acts or omissions
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is found in Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do [Link] practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also
been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The
judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.
It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Courts judgment ordering Maqueras
suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his
suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere
grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, at that only if the basis
of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment of the Superior Court of
Guam only constitutes prima facie evidence of Maqueras unethical acts as a
lawyer. More fundamentally, due process demands that he be given the
opportunity to defend himself and to present testimonial and documentary
evidence on the matter in an investigation to be conducted in accordance with
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule mandates that a respondent
lawyer must in all cases be notified of the charges against him. It is only after
reasonable notice and failure on the part of the respondent lawyer to appear
during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may be conducted ex
parte.
The Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the
practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to
the present.38 Under Section 10, Rule 139-A of the Revised Rules of Court, non-
payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be
ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys.
4. Velez v. De Vera AC No. 6697 July 25, 2006 (En Banc)
FACTS:
Three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains
to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Vera's moral fitness to remain as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Vera's letter-request to schedule his
oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his
removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these
cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
Complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of
respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera. Complainant averred that the respondent, in
appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have
performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier,
Hearing Department – San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative
Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced
to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to
evade the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that
the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country's most
noble profession.
Complainant contended that the respondent violated the so-called "rotation rule"
provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan
del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements
outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter Membership. He
surmised that the respondent's transfer was intended only for the purpose of
becoming the next IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the
respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Respondent, in his comment, stated that the issues raised in Complaint were the
very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant
against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively
discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court. Respondent prayed that the
instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res
judicata.
Complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case
at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent
was one for his disqualification. During the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board
the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the
IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President for having
committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.
Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter. In the said letter, he strongly and
categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He
alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter complaint filed by IBP Governor
Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in
complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process.
The IBP Board explained to the Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera
was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant
member. Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal
basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he
violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on
the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP
was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with
the minimum standards of due process of law.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Attorney Leonard S. Devera commited malpractice which
amounted to moral turpitude in the State Bar of California and in the Philippines, in the
course of his practice of law.
2. Whether or not the oath of office as lawyer is attached to the person of Attorney
Leonard S. Devera wherever he may go and not necessarily bound by the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines.
3. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove the moral turpitude, as basis
for disbarment of respondent in an administrative proceeding.
4. Whether or not res judicata applies in this case.
RULING:
The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California,
standing alone, is not proof of malpractice. There’s no final judgment for
suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a
recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to
practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of
California. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into
a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign
courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this
jurisdiction. In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign
judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State
Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior
by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon
which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful
in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine
law.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because
he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paranaque
and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his
IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the
highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in
changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a
lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with
the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice.
The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case
was resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-
laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as
Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions
the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed
that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. The Courts statement,
therefore, that Atty. De Vera cannot be disqualified on the ground that he was
not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow
for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be
disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the
State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law for three years.
There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be
morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because
the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment
of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's
standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as
the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically
the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate
from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or
conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the
complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative
case. The complainant’s contention that the principle of res judicata would not
apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for
disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension
and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that while
the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or
disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the
respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming
office as IBP National President. Although the parties in the present
administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in
these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring
the application of res judicata. In order that the principle of res judicata may be
made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment
sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and
(4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity
of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the absence of any one of
these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor. Finally, the
two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant
in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. De Vera’s
suspension or disbarment.
