T. Bielić, D. Ivanišević, A.

Gundić: Participation-Based Model of Ship Crew Management

TONI BIELIĆ, Ph.D. Safety and Security in Traffic

E-mail: [email protected] Review
DALIBOR IVANIŠEVIĆ, M.Eng. Submitted: Mar. 27, 2014
E-mail: [email protected] Approved: Sep. 23, 2014
ANA GUNDIĆ, M.Eng.
E-mail: [email protected]
University of Zadar, Maritime Department
Mihovila Pavlinovića bb, 23000 Zadar, Croatia

PARTICIPATION-BASED MODEL
OF SHIP CREW MANAGEMENT

ABSTRACT based on the teamwork and synergy of all the crew-

members. The master’s role has become more and
This paper analyses the participation-based model on more indirect whereas some of their traditional duties
board ship as possibly optimal leadership model existing in have been redirected to the shipping companies on
the shipping industry with accent on decision-making pro- shore. Such a course of events in the organizational
cess. In the paper the authors have tried to define master’s
network has changed their traditional role from mas-
behaviour model and management style identifying draw-
backs and disadvantages of vertical, pyramidal organization ters to ship managers. They have become coordinators
with master on top. The paper describes the efficiency of de- and specialists in managing the ship crew. Authoritar-
cision making within team organization and optimization of ian hierarchy has lost its vertical component and has
a ship organisation by introducing teamwork on board ship. become a horizontal one based on consultations and
Three examples of ship accidents are studied and evaluated coordination within teamwork.
through “Leader-participation” model. The model of partici- The officers and crew members have to change the
pation-based management as a model of the teamwork has existing traditional relations onboard the ship in order
been applied in studying the cause-and-effect of accidents
to optimize the organization of the work through team-
with the critical review of the communication and managing
the human resources on a ship. The results have showed
work. Through increased initiative they have to express
that the cause of all three accidents is the autocratic be- the possible disagreement with the master’s decision.
haviour of the leaders and the lack of communication within Precisely the change of communicational relations
teams. and the acceptance of the master as a team leader
who coordinates and maximizes crew resources are
KEY WORDS the conditions of effective application of the “leader-
participation” model.
ship organization; crew members; “leader-participation” Crew members are expected to be well educated
model; teamwork; decision making; accident; master; and trained as well as more specialised when the
technology of a ship they are serving on is concerned.
1. INTRODUCTION Teamwork has been introduced in order to satisfy the
increasing demands for more efficient and safer per-
The pyramidal structure with the master on top can formance. The new requirements of efficient crew man-
be clearly noticed when analysing the ship organiza- agement are therefore the subject matter of this paper.
tion throughout history. The master’s power through-
out history is still present in the title of the “master” 2. TEAM ORGANIZATION
which is still used as the official name for this position
on board the ship. Team organization enables a level of decentraliza-
However, contemporary trends in the development tion of non-flexible organizations as such. Even though
of technological systems of ships require new organi- thorough elimination of the hierarchy on board ship is
zational working frames of the crew. Traditional work- not possible, it is essential to include elements of the
ing hierarchy and management have been converted team organization in the existing hierarchical structure
into new working and communicational relations on board the ship.

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 T. Bielić, D. Ivanišević, A. Gundić: Participation-Based Model of Ship Crew Management

MASTER

CHIEF
ENGINEER
CHIEF
OFFICER

2ND
ENGINEER
2ND BOSUN
OFFICER

ABLE 3RD
CHIEF COOK ELECTRICIAN
BODY ENGINEER
MOTORMAN
3RD
OFFICER
ABLE
BODY
2ND COOK MESSMAN 4TH
MOTORMAN
ENGINEER
ORDINARY
SEAMAN

MOTORMAN

Figure 1 – Ship's crew organization

The team brings dynamics and team organization consideration a demanding communication whose
eliminates rigidity of the classical organizations [1]. realization is the basis of teamwork, the style of man-
The elements of the team organization should agement is crucial for the efficient use of communi-
eliminate communicational barriers, whereas mem- cation postulates. Although the formal leadership of a
bers of the team should be more competent and more master is defined by his role itself, the only way to get
prepared for changes and actions under standard and and keep the authority as a team leader is through his
emergency circumstances. knowledge, experience and capability in managing the
In order to achieve the maximum of expectations, vessel.
a team needs a period of time to adjust itself. A highly
efficient team needs three to five years to adjust itself
[2]. However, when taking into consideration a specific 3. SHIP ORGANIZATIONS BY INTRODUCING
working environment, a ship team needs less time to TEAMWORK
adjust.
Team organization on board the ship can be no- Organization of ship’s crew based on teamwork
ticed in the division of working tasks when deck or ensures the efficiency of the crew, thus significantly
engine-room crew solve tasks as a team, which has reducing the possibility of the conditions for the devel-
clear goals and precise duties. opment of emergency situations. In order for this orga-
The ship’s master manages the officers as a team nizational model to function it is necessary to develop
(within a team organization) and faces consequences teamwork in everyday practice. It is a process that re-
for their work. At the same time he enables the optimal quires the change of certain acquired habits of seafar-
control of a situation and of all the conditions during ers and the introduction of young officers in the ship
the navigation and ship exploitation. Thus, teamwork organization so as to fit the principles of teamwork.
and the role of the master as a formal and true lead- In a system like this, positive motivation of team
er of a team are mutually conditioned. Even though members, in this case, officers and crew on board
master’s formal leadership is clear by the law, his real the ship, is an important factor. The level of motiva-
component as a leader is far more important for the tion of team members can be a key factor to success
team. In order to achieve more efficient realization and and effectiveness of the team. Teamwork assumes
decision-making within a team it is necessary to ap- that individual skills in every team have to be recog-
ply a certain style of management. When taking into nized as well as weaknesses and areas of excellence

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 T. Bielić, D. Ivanišević, A. Gundić: Participation-Based Model of Ship Crew Management

MLC
STCW
ISM

Management
Ergonomic
measures
requirements for
Teamwork in terms of
effective
cultural
action
differences

Decision
making
and acting in
emergencies

Figure 2 - Optimal organizational model of ship's crew management

Source: [3]

of every member of the team. Thus, the organization subordinates and uses their suggestions before mak-
and task planning can take advantage of their full ing a decision.
potential. “Leader-participation” model provides more alter-
In order to obtain optimum possibilities in manag- natives in the direction of selecting an effective man-
ing the vessel, the following conditions must be met: agement style of the master or a team leader. In fact,
(Figure 2) the advantage of this model is reflected in the possibil-
–– Standards of Maritime Labour Convention, 2006 ity of defining certain behaviours of a ship’s master or
(MLC), the International Convention on Standards a team leader in relation to the variety of circumstanc-
of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for es. Furthermore, the model suggests a way to analyze
Seafarers (STCW) and the International Safety the problem by using eight contingency questions, on
Management Code (ISM) which define professional the basis of which the master can predict the most
qualifications, authority, standard operational pro- desirable behaviour when making a decision. In this
cedures, communication, owner’s liability based sense, the model defines five possible behaviours in
on safety of the ship and duties on board the ship; relation to various circumstances [4]:
–– Procedures and management measures in terms AI – You solve the problem on your own or you
of cultural differences; make a decision by using all the information
–– Decision-making and acting in emergencies which available at some point.
imply organizational, communication and psycho- AII – You receive all the necessary information
logical measures and procedures for acting in from your subordinate employees and then
emergencies; you decide for yourself how to solve the prob-
–– Ergonomic requirements for effective actions lem. You may or may not tell your subordi-
which define relationship between machines and nates about the problem when asking for the
team members who use them. [3] information. The role played by your subordi-
All the relevant factors that form the functional nates in decision-making is clear: to provide
organization of teamwork are contained within these all the necessary information, rather than to
four components that enable effective prediction and initiate or evaluate the alternative solutions.
prevention of possible emergency situations, and in CI – You share your problem with the appropriate
the case of their occurrence, the optimal operation of subordinate employees separately by asking
the ship and return to the normal situation. for their ideas and suggestions without bring-
ing them together as a group. Then you make
4. PARTICIPATIVE LEADERSHIP MODEL a decision that may or may not reflect the in-
fluence of your subordinate employees.
Participative leadership behaviour assumes the CII – You share your problem with your subordinate
application of style in which the leader consults his employees as a group, searching for their

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 T. Bielić, D. Ivanišević, A. Gundić: Participation-Based Model of Ship Crew Management

ideas and suggestions within the group. Then Three situations in which the lack of coordination
you make a decision that may or may not re- and cooperation between team members led to mari-
flect their influence. time accidents will be studied further below by using
GII – You share your problem with your subordinate the algorithmic “leader-participation” model.
employees as a group. Then you initiate and
Example 1: “Kariba, Tricolor and Clary”
evaluate alternatives together trying to reach
a consensus about a decision. We will try to get one of five behaviour models in
The leader can choose one of five models of behav- decision-making of a leader, in this case the master,
iour when making a decision by answering, positively through the algorithmic “leader-participation” model
or negatively, the following questions [4]: based on well argumented court conclusion in the
A – If a decision is accepted, is it important to case of the collision of ships “Tricolor” and “Kariba”.
know which course of action is applied? Before that, it is necessary to give a brief overview
B – Do I have enough information to make a high- of the maritime accident in which the ship Tricolor
quality decision? sank after being struck by the ship “Kariba”.
“On the morning of 14th December 2002 vessels
C – Do the subordinate employees have enough
Kariba, Tricolor and Clary along with several uniden-
background information to make a high-qual-
tified ships were navigating in a Traffic Separation
ity decision?
Scheme (TSS) in the English Channel north of Dunker-
D – Do I know exactly which information I need, que, France. The vessels were operating in restricted
where and how to collect it? visibility due to fog. By approximately 2:05 hrs Kariba
E – Is accepting a decision by subordinate em- and Tricolor were sailing in almost parallel courses in
ployees crucial for effective task realization? the westbound lane of the “West Hinder” branch of
F – If I have to make a decision on my own, will it TSS. Both vessels had just made a turn at the “Fair
be accepted by my subordinate employees? South” buoy and were navigating from way-point to
G – Can the subordinate employees be entrusted way-point in their planned courses.”
with giving the basis for the solution of the “At this same time, the Clary was also proceeding
organizational issues? on a steady course in the northbound lane of the inter-
secting branch of the TSS. Tricolor was in the process
H – Is the conflict between the subordinate em-
of overtaking Kariba approximately half a mile off Kari-
ployees, regarding the most desirable solu-
ba’s starboard quarter. When Kariba and Clary were
tion, possible?
just about three miles apart on intersecting courses,
The model below is suitable for use both in ev- Kariba made an abrupt turn to starboard and hit the
eryday and in ordinary circumstances as well as in port side of Tricolor, causing her to capsize and sink
urgency situations and a variety of emergency situa- along with her cargo”. [5]
tions, provided that the team has reached maturity in
There were no casualties.
cooperation and communication. The model gives the
District Judge Harold Baer, Jr. of the court in New
possibility of transition from one management style to
York concluded in January 2006 that the cause of the
another, e.g. from autocratic to participative, depend-
collision was the sole and exclusive fault of the “Kari-
ing on the circumstances.
ba”, where “Tricolor” and “Clary” share no portion of
liability for the collision. [5]
A B C D E F G H The model diagram of the situation based on the
NO AI
YES
NO GII given questions:
NO YES AI A - If a decision is accepted, is it important to know
which course of action is applied?
YES
Identify YES NO
AI
NO NO
the problem
NO YES YES YES
YES GII
It is important to know which course of action is ap-
NO YES
YES
NO NO GII
plied in order to make the second officer and a mem-
NO
NO YES CII
NO AII
NO
YES
NO CI
YES AII ber of the navigational watch choose the course and
NO NO CII
NO AII give the command.
YES
YES
YES CII B - Do I have enough information to make a high-
NO
NO CII
quality decision? YES
NO
YES
YES
GII According to the investigation, all the navigational
CII
NO GII instruments on the bridge were functional and work-
ing whereas visibility was reduced. Therefore, it can
Figure 3 – Leader-participation model be concluded that regarding the distance between
Source: [4] the ships and the working condition of the navigation

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 T. Bielić, D. Ivanišević, A. Gundić: Participation-Based Model of Ship Crew Management

equipment, Kariba’s master had enough information ineffective interaction and cooperation of overly com-
to make a good decision. placent bridge team.
D - Do I know exactly which information I need, Situation diagram based on the given questions:
where and how to collect it? NO A - If a decision is accepted, is it important to know
The investigation showed that despite the fact that which course of action is applied?
“Kariba’s” master had sent the duty officer to visually YES
check the positions of both ships (first the “Clary”, It is important to know which course of action is ap-
then the “Tricolor”), the master and the officer of the plied since all members on the bridge act according to
watch did not read the instruction booklet of the new orders that are the result of a decision made.
3 cm radar that was installed on the “Kariba” that very B - Do I have enough information to make a high-
day. Therefore, the answer to the question is: NO. quality decision? YES
F - If I have to make a decision on my own, will it be Investigation showed that all the navigational in-
accepted by my subordinate employees? struments on the bridge were functional, communica-
YES tion with VTIS unhindered, and visibility excellent.
Given the formal hierarchical organization on board D - Do I know exactly which information I need,
and the fact that at the time of the accident the mas- where and how to collect it? NO
ter was in charge of the bridge, the subordinate crew The investigation showed that the master was not
members (in this case second officer and AB Seaman) navigating according to the rule relevant for this ac-
would have accepted the decision he made. cident as follows: “All vessels navigating in the route-
H - Is the conflict between the subordinate employ- ing system of the Straits of navigation, shall proceed
ees, regarding the most desirable solution, possible? with caution, and shall be in maximum state of ma-
NO noeuvring readiness”[7]. It is assumed that the master
In this very case the second officer and AB on duty was not familiar with this rule. Furthermore, he did not
were on the bridge and due to the hierarchical struc- perform the trial manoeuvre on ARPA radar that could
ture did not oppose the master’s decision. have offered an optimal solution how to avoid three
From the diagram we get the AI model of behaviour: ships, and he was managing the bridge team in ac-
You solve the problem on your own or you make a cordance to the “ICS Bridge Procedures Guide” which
decision by using all the information available at some states: “A bridge team which has a plan that is under-
point. stood and is well briefed, with all members support-
ing each other, will have good situational awareness.
A B C D E F G H
Its members will then be able to anticipate dangerous
Identify YES YES
NO YES NO
AI situations arising and recognise the development of a
the problem chain of errors, thus enabling them to take action to
break the sequence.” [8]
Figure 4 - Leader Participation Model based
F - If I have to make a decision on my own, will it be
on the described example of “Tricolor”
accepted by my subordinate employees?
YES
Example 2: “Maersk Kendal”
The investigation showed that the master and the
According to the “Report on the investigation of the first officer had sailed together on three occasions on
grounding of the MV “Maersk Kendal” on Monggok board this ship, and had established mutual respect
Sebarok reef in the Singapore Strait on 16th Septem- for each other. The first officer was fully confident in the
ber 2009”: m / v “Maersk Kendal” ran aground on a master’s decisions and navigational abilities. Further-
reef in Monggok Sebarok Singapore passage on 16th more, the master used to work alone so his possible
September 2009. The vessel had altered her course errors were undetected and unchallenged. He made it
to starboard to give way to three vessels exiting the clear in his standing orders that the OOW should ques-
Jong Channel. This caused her to head towards the tion his decisions whenever in doubt. However, this or-
reef with the intention of altering course to port and re- der should not have prevented him to discuss his inten-
suming her original planned track after passing astern tions with the navigational watch officer before making
of the third vessel. Despite warnings from Singapore a decision. In this case, the first officer assumed that it
Vessel Traffic Information System (VTIS), the vessel did was not necessary to question the master’s intentions
not reduce speed or alter course in time to prevent her and decisions because of the previous experience with
from grounding. Substantial damage was sustained to the same master. Furthermore, he did not take into
the fore part of the vessel. However, there were no re- consideration the possible danger. The master did not
sulting injuries and no pollution.” consult him in terms of navigational support and the
The MAIB investigation [6] identified a failure of master appeared to be in control of the situation. The
bridge teamwork, which included a lack of comprehen- first officer was culturally reluctant to critically chal-
sive passage planning, poor position monitoring and lenge the master’s intentions and decisions. Also, the

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 T. Bielić, D. Ivanišević, A. Gundić: Participation-Based Model of Ship Crew Management

master was annoyed by the first officer’s VTIS radio erly examined. Furthermore, the aft mooring team
communication. In addition to this, the first officer had showed poor seamanship and did not function as an
not attended the “bridge team management training” effective team. The configuration of the berth on the
course. All the above-mentioned facts show that team aft mooring deck was not designed in a way to secure
members on the bridge accepted decisions made by the obvious and the efficient method of securing and
the master. hauling the steel tow wire. So it can be concluded that
H - Is the conflict between the subordinate employ- the crew applied the unsafe method for hauling the
ees, regarding the most desirable solution, possible? tow wire on board, which ultimately resulted in the ac-
NO cident.
As in the first example, the officer of watch (in this Situation diagram of the situation on the poop of
case, the first officer) and AB Seaman were on duty the ship, “Wah Shan” based on the given questions:
on the bridge of “Maersk Kendal”. Knowing the fact A - If a decision is accepted, is it important to know
that the first officer and AB in charge of watch come which course of action is applied?
from the Asian countries whose societies are tradition- NO
ally authoritarian and where it is not expected to dis- The investigation showed that the second officer
cuss the problem with subordinates, the possibility to did not pre-brief team members on the poop deck
critically examine the team leaders’ decisions, and to prior to the operation of hauling the tow wire from the
oppose them, is minimal. By taking into consideration accompanying tug. He did not define the common goal
the principle of hierarchical structure on board, the of the task nor did he give clear instructions to each
conflict among subordinate employees (members of member of the team. So the team did not foresee the
the navigational watch) about the most desirable solu- potential risks or how to eliminate or reduce them.
tion is not probable; therefore, the master’s decision Therefore, a common plan did not exist at all. All the
will be respected. above-mentioned facts prevented the crew members
From the diagram we get the AI model behaviour: to supervise and support each other, i.e. to act as a
You solve the problem on your own or you make a team. Therefore, it is fair to say that the decision-mak-
decision by using all the information available at some ing process did not start at all, so no decision could
point. have been made or accepted.
D - Do I know exactly which information I need,
A B C D E F G H where and how to collect it? NO
YES NO The second officer clearly demonstrated the lack of
NO
Identify YES YES AI ability to lead the team, which should have assumed
the problem
giving clear instructions to the individuals, coordinat-
Figure 5 – Leader-Participation Model based ing work of individuals towards a common goal and
on the described example of “Maersk Kendal” involving them in the process of planning the task. In-
sufficient knowledge of the mooring details resulted in
the second officer’s lack of authority as a team leader.
Example 3: “Wah Shan”
Because of that he could not have efficiently and in
As in previous two examples, we will try to get one time prevented and stopped the unsafe acts and thus
of five behaviour models in decision-making of the interrupt the chain of errors that led to the accident.
leader, in this case of the second officer who was in From the diagram we get the AI model of this be-
charge of the team on the poop deck of “Wah Shan”, haviour:
by using the algorithmic “leader–participation” model You solve the problem on your own or you make a
and based on the information available from the of- decision by using all the information available at some
ficial report on the incident on board. point.
Here is an abstract of the accident, in which one The second officer showed poor team manag-
of the crew members lost his life, taken from the re- ing skills and he did not establish himself as a team
port made by the MAIB (Marine Accident Investigation leader. He did not understand or predict the possible
Branch). risks related to the task, and despite all clear indica-
In the morning of 2nd October 2012, the carpenter tions that the task was not progressing well, he did
on board the bulk carrier, “Wah Shan,” suffered a se- nothing to prevent the chain of errors. He had all the
vere blow to his neck by a nylon rope used to haul the necessary certificates of competence for a position of
steel tow wire from the accompanying tug. The blow the second officer and in the period preceding the ac-
was fatal and the emergency team that boarded the cident his workload was in accordance with the rules
vessel 50 minutes later could only confirm the death and regulations. Besides, he did not suffer from fa-
of the unfortunate crew member. [9] tigue that could have affected his working abilities and
The investigation revealed that the potential risks decision-making. Moreover, he demonstrated obvious
in securing the steel tow wire on board were not prop- ignorance and poor management of the team.

442 Promet – Traffic&Transportation, Vol. 26, 2014, No. 5, 437-443

 T. Bielić, D. Ivanišević, A. Gundić: Participation-Based Model of Ship Crew Management

After analyzing the results of the above three ex- SAŽETAK

amples included in the “leader-participation” model,
it is obvious that the root cause of all three accidents MODEL PARTICIPATIVNOG UPRAVLJANJA BRODOM
was the lack of teamwork and autocratic behaviour of
the team leaders while making decisions. If the teams Ovaj rad analizira model participativnog upravljanja
had tried to critically challenge the decisions made by na brodu kao moguće optimalnog modela upravljanja
koji egzistira danas u brodarstvu, s naglaskom na proces
the team leader and point out their obvious shortcom-
donošenja odluka. U radu autori pokušavaju utvrditi model
ings, or if they had suggested a different option, the ponašanja zapovjednika i stil upravljanja identificirajući
accidents would probably not have happened. nedostatke i mane vertikalne, piramidalne organizacije sa
zapovjednikom na vrhu.
A B C D E F G H Rad opisuje učinkovitost donošenja odluka unutar timske
NO
AI organizacije i optimizacije brodske organizacije uvođenjem
NO
Identify timskog rada na brodu. Tri primjera brodskih nezgoda
the problem
proučena su i evaluirana kroz model “vođa-participacija”.
Figure 6 – Leader-Participation Model based Model participativnog upravljanja kao model timskog rada
on the described example of “Wah Shan” primijenjen je pri proučavanju nezgoda na bazi uzrok-efekt
s kritičkim osvrtom na komunikaciju i upravljanje ljudskim
resursima na brodu. Rezultati su pokazali da su autokratsko
5. CONCLUSION ponašanje vođa timova i nedostatak komunikacije unutar
tima uzrok sve tri nesreće.
Actual trends in the development and manage-
ment of ship’s technological systems demand new KLJUČNE RIJEČI
communicational as well as working relations. From
this aspect, the role of the ship’s master is going to brodska organizacija; posada; “vođa-participacija” model;
be transformed into the function of the team leader timski rad; donošenje odluke; nesreća; zapovjednik;
or crew manager. In order to achieve synergy among
crew members, in accordance with the demands of REFERENCES
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