MUTUC v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GR NO. L-32717 NOV 26, 1970 SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.

GR NO. L-32717 NOV 26, 1970 SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken.— an appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the
judgment or order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion for new trial is
FACTS: On Oct. 29, 1970, petitioner Amelito Mutuc, then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, alleged that filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.
respondent, Commission on Elections, sent him a telegram five days earlier informing him that his certificate of candidacy was given
The assumption that the fifteen-day period should be counted from February 25, 1963, when a copy of the decision was allegedly
due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. Mutuc claimed
served on appellant's counsel by registered mail, is not well-taken. The word "promulgation" in section 6 should be construed as
that the prohibition violates his constitutional of freedom of speech.
referring to "judgment" while the word "notice" should be construed as referring to "order". That construction is sanctioned by the
COMELEC answered that it does not deny the factual allegations in the petition but it justified its prohibition that it is premised on rule of reddendo singula singulis: "referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object", or "let each
the provision of the Constitutional Convention Act (CCA). COMELEC contends that the jingle proposed to be used by the petitioner is be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively". Therefore, when the order denying appellant's motion
a recorded voice of a singer and thus a tangible propaganda material under the CCA subject to confiscation. for reconsideration was served by registered mail on July 13th on appellant's counsel, he had only 1 day within which to file his
notice of appeal and not 11 days. Appellant Tamani's notice of appeal, filed on September 10, 1963, was 58 days late.
The Court issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition (prayed for by the petitioner) on the ground of the lack of
statutory authority to impose such a ban on the part of AMADORA V CA G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

COMELEC in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis, and that it is an infringement on the right of free speech of the petitioner. Facts of the Case:
ISSUE: Whether or not recorded or taped jingle is classified as an electoral propaganda gadgets similar to the enumerated items 1. Three days before his graduation, Alfredo Amadora, a 17-year old prospective graduate, was in the auditorium of his high
banned by the Constitutional Convention Act. school, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, when his classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo.
2. Damon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.
HELD: 3. Petitioners herein filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 (Note 1-PLEASE READ THIS FIRST) against the high
No. It is not classified as an electoral propaganda similar to the banned enumerated items. school principal, dean of boys and physics teacher together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective
parents (charge against students was later dropped)
1. Following the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words following any enumerated being applicable only to 4. CFI held remaining defendants liable for damages representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, et.al.
things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to. What was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of 5. CA reversed the decision of CFI
the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favourable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. 6. Petitioners contend that Alfredo was in the school to show his required physics project hence under the custody of
respondents. Respondents argue that semester has already ended, hence no longer in their custody.
Also, the enumerated items were more tangible than a campaign jingle such as flashlights, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches 7. In addition to the facts, Sergio Damaso, dean of boys, confiscated a gun from Jose Gumban but later returned it without
and cigarettes. Respondent is also in violation of a cardinal principle of construction that a statute be interpreted in a way that is in making a report to the principal or taking further action. Gumban was one of the companions of Damon when he fired the
harmony with the Constitution. The objective is to reach an interpretation that is free from constitutional defects. gun.
8. Petitioners states that this is important because petitioners contend that this was the same gun that Damon shot and
2. In its prohibition, COMELEC, in effect, imposed censorship on the petitioner. Following respondent’s prohibition on taped jingles Alfredo would not have been killed if it not had been returned by Damaso.
would negate indirectly what the Constitution expressly guarantees/assures i.e. Free speech/free press. Taped jingles during 9. Respondents replies that there is no proof that it was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.
campaigns is tantamount to freedom of dissemination of information which makes more meaningful the equally vital right of 10. Both parties invoked Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
suffrage.

3. The power of decision of COMELEC is limited to purely ‘administrative questions’. Thus, COMELEC cannot exercise any authority in Primary Issue:Whether or not the interpretation of Article 2180 covers even establishments which are not school of arts and trades
conflict with or outside of the law, and there is no higher law than the Constitution.
Ruling: Yes.
Constitutional Convention Act – makes unlawful for candidates “to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, (Author’s note: Since the case cited three cases which I think are important, those cases are summarized below even before the
or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, ruling. You can skip but just putting this as reference.)
bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether domestic or foreign origin.”
Exconde v Capuno – A 15-year old student of Balintawak Elem School, in a Rizal Day parade on the instructions of the school
supervisor, boarded a jeep and drove it recklessly that it turtle flipped, resulting to the death of two of its passengers. Dante was
PEOPLE V TAMANI G.R. Nos: L-22160 & L-22161; JAN 21, 1974
found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the civil case, his father was held solidarily liable for damages (under
Facts:
Art 2180).
On February 14, 1963, the lower court found Tamani guilty of consummated and attempted murder. On February 25, 1963, Tamani’s
School was exculpated on the grounds that it was not a school of arts and trades. Here, Justice Reyes dissented stating the
counsel received a copy of the decision and consequently filed for a motion for reconsideration on March 1, 1963. It was denied. On
school authorities should be held liable under this rule, specifically to: (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and
July 13, 1963, the lower court sent a denial order to the counsel through his wife via registered mail. On September 10, 1963, the said
trades in particular. Justic Reyes opined that “of establishments of arts and trades” under Art 2180 should only apply to “heads” only
counsel appealed the lower court’s decision. Then, the appellees argued that the appeal should be dismissed contending that the
and not “teachers”.
appeal should have been made up to July 24, 1963 which is the 15 day period of appeal from the date of notice and not from the
date of promulgation. Thus, the appellees claimed that the appeal was filed 47 days late. Mercado v CA – Exconde was reiterated in this case. A student of Lourdes School cut a classmate with a razorblade during recess. The
parents sued the culprit’s parents for damages. Court declared that the school was not liable since it was not an establishment of arts
Issue: Whether the 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation or from the date of notice of the decision.
and trades.
Held:
Palisoc v Brillantes – A 16-year old student was killed by a classmate with fistblows in the lab of Manila Technical Institute. Although
Appeal was dismissed. The 15-day period should commence from the date of promulgation.
wrongdoer was already of age and was not boarding in the school, the head and the teacher in charge was held liable with him.
“Custody” in Article 2180 means custody exercised over pupils as long as they are attendance in school, including recess time. The
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:
law does not require for the pupil or student who commits the tortious act to be living and boarding in the school for them to have ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
liability. Court erred in Exconde and Mercado. These previous cases must be deemed to have been set aside by present decision.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within
Justice Makalintal dissented that law should only be applied to pupils not yet of age as teachers are acting only in loco parentis. the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
1. Article 2180 should apply to all schools. Where school is academic, tort committed by student will attach to teacher in (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
charge. Where school is of arts and trades, then it is the head that is liable. (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
2. STATCON Doctrine: reddendo singula singulis
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
a. In the provision of Article 2180, the word “teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and the
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
phrase “heads of establishments of arts and trades” to the word “apprentices”
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
b. The words “arts and trades” does not qualify “teachers” but only “heads of establishments”
c. English of doctrine means “referring to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object” (6) must not be unreasonable.
3. Where the parent places the child under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter should be the one answerable
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is
for the torts committed while under his custody.
a. Court does not find reason for relaxing vigilance in academic schools and increasing vigilance in non-academic subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the
school. Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
Custody Issue
Section 131 under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics, sauna,
4. The student is in custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The
its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. same Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation,
5. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement
exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right or privilege, the where one seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Code considers these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities.
6. Even if student is just relaxing in the campus enjoying the ambiance and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the
custody and subject to the discipline of school authorities. It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to
7. Custody does not connote immediate physical presence but refers more to the influence and discipline instilled in the their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless
student. Therefore, the teacher in charge will be liable for tort, regardless of age. But teacher or school can exonerate this or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise, where words under consideration appear in
liability by proof that it had exercised diligence of a good father. different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies.120
Court’s Conclusions
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by
8. Alfredo was in the custody of the school at the time he was fatally shot. MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the
9. The rector, principal and physics teacher are not liable as none of them was the teacher-in-charge as defined. They were establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard,
only exercising a general authority over the student body. Mere fact that Alfredo went to school to submit a physics
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an
report does not make the physics teacher the teacher-in-charge.
ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must
10. There is no showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Damon. The private respondents have proved
that they had exercised due diligence through the enforcement of the school regulations and maintaining that discipline. not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law
11. Although dean of boys who should PROBABLY be liable for no reporting to higher authorities, his negligence only deserves
sanctions from the school and does not necessarily link him to the shooting as it was not proved that the confiscated gun
was the same gun that shot Alfredo.
MALINIAS V COMELEC G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002
12. School cannot be liable because under the Art 2180, only teachers and heads of establishments of the school of arts and FACTS:
trades is made responsible. On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor and congress representative positions,
None of the respondents are liable. Petition is DENIED. respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag and others for their
violation of the following laws:
MANILA V LAGUIO G.R. No. 118127; April 12, 2005
1. Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646; and
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF 2. Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881.
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE
Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial
AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of
It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was
Bontoc, Mountain Province.
notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is
The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were deprived from participating in the canvassing of election
invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course of their way to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building
they do not market such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only in Bontoc, Mountain Province.
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. Among the private respondents, only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they
ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules
The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized pursuant to COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and order around the vicinity of the canvassing site.
that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City. Also, they said that the presence of the policemen within the said area is to prevent some groups who were reportedly had the
intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such a response was not unwarranted as this has already happened
in the past, wherein, in fact, the petitioners were among them.
COMELEC’s Ruling:
After investigating the allegations, COMELEC ruled to dismiss the petition against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to FACTS: E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. is a limited partnership with principal office address in Davao City and with branch offices in
establish probable cause. Malinias filed an MR but it was also denied for failure of adducing additional evidence thereon. Paranaque and Cagayan de Oro. Petitioner and Imperial Development Corporation executed a Deed of Sale with Development
Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed to SC a petition for review on certiorari on this case. Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land in Cagayan de Oro owned by the latter into a housing
subdivision for the construction of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any dispute arising
therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati
ISSUE: Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause?
Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for breach of contract and damages with RTC Makati on the ground that other
HELD: than a few unfinished low cost houses, there were no substantial developments therein. Summons, together with the complaint, were
No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and found the conduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord with its served upon Villarosa, through its Branch Manager Engr. Wendell Sabulbero at the stated address at Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de
jurisdiction and duties under the law. In this case, COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as there is nothing Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
capricious or despotic in the manner of their resolution of the said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue the extraordinary writ of thru its Branch Manager Engr. WENDELL SALBULBERO on May 5, 1998 at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City,
certiorari. and evidenced by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons.
On the said violations, the only evidence that was successfully presented by the petitioner is the mass-affidavits of his supporters,
which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by the court thus, the same are not enough to prove his claims. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion to Dismiss alleging that "summons intended for defendant" was served upon Engr.
Also, the allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts Wendell Sabulbero, an employee at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the
defined as punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27 of R.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881, respectively. ground of improper service of summons and for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Petitioner contends that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its employee in its branch office at
Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons named in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure upon whom
Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one of the rights of a political party or candidate during elections whereas, the violation of Sec. 232, service of summons may be made. A motion to declare Villarosa in default was filed for failing to file an answer.
which enumerates the persons who are not allowed inside the canvassing site, can only be subjected to an administrative disciplinary
action and cannot be punished by imprisonment as provided for under Sec. 264 of the same law. Imperial Development Corporation filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Villarosa, alleging that the records show that
Moreover, it is clear in the defense of the respondents that they did not violate Sec. 261 (i), a criminal offense, which prohibits any defendant, through its branch manager actually received the summons and the complaint as stated in the Sheriffs Return. Trial court
officer or employee of political offices or police force from intervening in any election campaign or from engaging in any partisan denied the motion to declare in default and the motion to dismiss.
activity except to vote or maintain public order. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration contending strict compliance with the Rules. Imperial filed an opposition to the MR. Villarosa
In the said defense, the respondents said that setting up the checkpoints was done to enforce the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant filed a Reply contending that the changes in the new rules are substantial and not just general semantics. The MR was denied.
to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and not to prejudice any candidate from participating in the canvassing. As such, the actions of the
respondents are deemed lawful and not in excess of their authority. Hence, the present petition alleging that respondent court gravely abused its discretion tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
in denying petitioners motions to dismiss and for reconsideration, despite the fact that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
Ruling related to Statutory Construction – Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, there is no the person of petitioner because the summons intended for it was improperly served.
ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because
this is a non-criminal act. ISSUE: W/N a branch manager can receive summons on behalf of the company which results to acquired jurisdiction by the court.
"It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of
all others. The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. RULING: NO, the Court agrees with the contention of Villarosa. The Court agrees with the petitioner’s contention that the enumeration
of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted, limited and exclusive" following the ruleon statutory construction expressio
unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule is the principle that what
summons, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language.
is expressed puts an end to that which is implied. Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly
limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.
Earlier cases have uphold service of summons upon a construction project manager; a corporations assistant manager; ordinary clerk
of a corporation; private secretary of corporate executives; retained counsel; officials who had charge or control of the operations of
Sec 232 BP 881: Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room. - It shall be unlawful for any officer or member of the Armed Forces of the the corporation, like the assistant general manager; or the corporations Chief Finance and Administrative Officer. In these cases, these
Philippines, including the Philippine Constabulary, or the Integrated National Police or any peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons persons were considered as agent within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service of summons upon
belonging to an extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units, an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized.
barangay tanod, or of any member of the security or police organizations of government ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices,
instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries or of any member of a privately owned or operated The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited
security, investigative, protective or intelligence agency performing identical or similar functions to enter the room where the canvassing of and more clearly specified in Section11, Rule 14. The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate
the election returns are held by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty meters from such room: Provided, however, That the secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase “agent, or any of its directors" is conspicuously
board of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems necessary, may make a call in writing for the detail of policemen or any peace officers for
deleted in the new rule.
their protection or for the protection of the election documents and paraphernalia in the possession of the board, or for the maintenance of
The particular revision under Section 11 of Rule 14 was explained by retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz Regalado, thus:
peace and order, in which case said policemen or peace officers, who shall be in proper uniform, shall stay outside the room within a radius of
x x x the then Sec. 13 of this Rule allowed service upon a defendant corporation to be made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any
thirty meters near enough to be easily called by the board of canvassers at any time.
of its directors. The aforesaid terms were obviously ambiguous and susceptible of broad and sometimes illogical interpretations, especially the word agent
of the corporation. The Filoil case, involving the litigation lawyer of the corporation who precisely appeared to challenge the validity of service of summons
Section 261 RA 6646. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense: but whose very appearance for that purpose was seized upon to validate the defective service, is an illustration of the need for this revised section with
(i) Intervention of public officers and employees. - Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any limited scope and specific terminology. Thus the absurd result in the Filoil case necessitated the amendment permitting service only on the in-house
counsel of the corporation who is in effect an employee of the corporation, as distinguished from an independent practitioner.
officer, employee, or member or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-
defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the court over a corporation. The officer upon whom
election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.
service is made must be one who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient.
The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which
summons should be served on a domestic corporation.

VILLAROSA PARTNER & CO. V HON. BENITO G.R. No. 136426, August 6, 1999
PRIMERO V CA G.R. No. L-48468-69 November 22, 1989 ISSUE: Whether the words “and/or” in Section 19 of PD 1752 refers to the existence of either a superior provident plan or a superior
housing plan, and not the existence of both plans.

Facts:
Petitioner contends that respondent, in the exercise of its rule making power has “overstepped the bounds and exceeded its limit,”.
Orlando Primero was convicted of 2 crimes, Acts of Lasciviousness and Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. According to him, the
The law provides as a condition for exemption from coverage, the existence of either a superior provident (retirement) plan, and/or
complaints were motivated by revenge and that he and the complainant were sweethearts to be wed and that he lived in the
a superior housing plan, and not the existence of both plans.
complainant’s house along with her family.
According to the complaint, Primero used a bayonet to intimidate the complainant and assault her sexually.
On the other hand, respondents claim that the use of the words “and/or” in Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, which words are
“diametrically opposed in meaning”, can only be used interchangeably and not together, and the option of making it either both or
CFI found Primero guilty of the two crimes. Hence, Primero filed a petition to the SC
any one belongs to the Board of Trustees of HDMF, which has the power and authority to issue rules and regulations for the
effective implementation of the Pag-IBIG Fund Law, and the guidelines for the grant of waiver or suspension of coverage.
Issue: Whether or not a bayonet is considered a deadly weapon pursuant to Sec 3 of PD 9
The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words “and/or”.
PD 9 SEC 3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as "fanknife," "spear," "dagger," "bolo,"
"balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being sued
in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words “and/or” should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., “either and or”; e.g.
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct. butter and/or eggs means butter and eggs or butter or eggs.i[6]
“The term “and/or” means that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or;” or that one word or the
other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from
Held: YES
the whole statute. The term is used to avoid a construction which by the use of the disjunctive “or” alone will exclude the
A bayonet is a "bladed, pointed or blunt weapon" decreed unlawful under P.D. No. 9. It can not be disputed that, ordinarily, the
combination of several of the alternatives or by the use of the conjunctive “and” will exclude the efficacy of any one of the
enumeration of specified matters in a statute is construed as an exclusion of matters not enumerated unless a different intention
alternatives standing alone.”ii[7]
appears. However, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is only an auxiliary rule of statutory construction. It is not of
It is accordingly ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term “and/or” is that the word “and” and the word
universal application—neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not
“or” are to be used interchangeably.iii[8]
otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature (Statutory Construction,
Martin, sixth edition, 1984, pp. 71-72). Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular
persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other ... things not so enumerated should not have been included, It is seems to us clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, intended that an employer with a
and manifest injustice will follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be invoked provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had
(Ibid, p. 79). Applying the same in the instant case, it cannot be convincingly argued that a bayonet is not a bladed, pointed or blunt intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it
weapon, possession of which outside of one's residence is decreed by P.D. No. 9 to be illegal. True enough, if the carrying outside would have used the words “and” instead of “and/or”. Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19 requires for annual certification of
one's residence of such weapons as fan knife, "balisong" or club, which are less deadly than the bayonet, are prohibited under the waiver or suspension, that the features of the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law obviously
law, there is no logical reason why the bayonet should be exempted from the prohibition. contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the
concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of both plans would radically impose a more stringent
condition for waiver which was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word “or” in the implementing
CHINA BANKING V HOME DEV’T MUTUAL FUND G.R. No. 131787. May 19, 1999 rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.

FACTS: It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a deligated power to create new or additional legal provisions
Before the amendment of PD 1752 by RA 7742, petitioner China Banking Corporation and CBC Properties and Computer Center that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the Administrative
applied and was granted a periodic certificate of waiver by the Home Development Mutual Fund for having an existing agency.iv[9] “Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.”v[10] As aptly observed in People
retirement/provident plan and/or employees housing plan. The waiver exempts the employer from participation in the HDMF created vs. Macerenvi:
under the law. Upon amendment of PD 1752, the Board of Trusties of the HDMF issued a circular revising the guidelines and
procedure for filing of waiver or suspension from coverage under said law. The amended guidelines, a company must have a
While it may be conceded that the requirement of the concurrence of both plans to qualify for exemption would strengthen the
provident/retirement and housing plan superior to that provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund to be entitled to exemption/waiver from
Home Development Mutual Fund and make it more effective both as a savings generation and a house building program, the basic
fund coverage. When CBC and CBC-PCCI applied for renewal of waiver of coverage from the fund for the year 1996, their application
law should prevail as the embodiment of the legislative purpose, and the rules and regulations issued to implement said law cannot
was denied for non-compliance with the amended guidelines, which provides that to qualify for waiver, a company a must have a
go beyond its terms and provisions.
retirement plan and housing plan which are both superior to Pag IBIG fund.

We accordingly find merit in petitioner’s contention that Section 1, Rule VII of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742,
Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking to annul and declare
and HDMF Circular No. 124-B and the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund
void the Amendment and the Guidelines for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
Coverage under P.D. 1752, as amended by R.A. 7742, should be declared invalid insofar as they require that an employer must have
amounting to lack of jurisdiction alleging that in requiring the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee
both a superior retirement/provident plan and a superior employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver and
housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage from the HDMF, the HDMF Board exceeded
suspension of coverage from the HDMF.
its rule-making power.
WHEREFORE, the petition is given due course and the assailed Orders of the court a quo dated October 10, 1997 and December 19, 1997 are
hereby set aside. Section 1 of Rule VII of the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742, and HDMF Circular No. 124-B
Respondent Board filed a Motion to Dismiss and the court a quo, in its first challenged order dated October 10, 1997 granted the prescribing the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Applications for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752, as
same. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari on the grounds (1) that the denial or grant of an application for amended by R.A. No. 7742, insofar as they require that an employer should have both a provident/retirement plan superior to the
waiver/coverage is within the power and authority of the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with retirement/provident benefits offered by the Fund and a housing plan superior to the Pag-IBIG housing loan program in order to qualify for
grave abuse of discretion in denying the applications; XXXXX waiver or suspension of fund coverage, are hereby declared null and void.
PIMENTEL V COMELEC G.R. No. 126394 April 24, 1998 LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS ASSOCIATION V CA G.R. No. 117188 August 7, 1997

During the 1955 elections, COMELEC found a discrepancy between between the Provincial Certificate of Canvas for Ilocos Norte and
Facts: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association was organized on February 8, 1983 as the association of homeowners and
its supporting Statement of Votes per precinct or municipality for the province, such that the votes for candidates Juan Ponce Enrile,
residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was registered with the Home Financing Corporation, the predecessor of herein respondent
Franklin M. Drilon, Ramon V. Mitra, as appearing in the Provincial Certificate of Canvass 1 were more than the votes tallied as Home Insurance and Guarantee Corporation (HIGC), as the sole homeowners' organization in the said subdivision. For unknown
appearing in the Statement of Votes. COMELEC then initiated an investigation. reasons, LGVHAI did not file its corporate by-laws.
Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel Jr., Senatorial candidate filed his own complaint to COMELEC,against Atty. Dominador Mico, 4 Atty.
In July, 1989, when Soliven, the developer and president of LGVHAI inquired about the status of the corporation at the head of the
Dionisio Caoili and Dr. Ofelia T. Pastor, Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Member-Secretary, respectively, of the Provincial Board of legal department of the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC).
Canvassers of Ilocos Norte, Marvelyn Ramiro, Election Assistant for the COMELEC for San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and member of the
support staff of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, and Flor Mercado, Elementary School Principal of the Department of Education, LGVHAI was informed by HIGC that they had been automatically dissolved. LGVHAI lodged a complaint with the HIGC. They
Culture and Sports, Ilocos Norte and also a member of the support staff of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. alleging they conspired questioned the revocation of LGVHAI’s certificate of registration without due notice and hearing and concomitantly prayed for the
alongside the other candidates. cancellation of the certificates of registration of the North and South Associations by reason of the earlier issuance of a certificate of
Petitioner charged respondents with violation of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law registration in favor of LGVHAI. After due notice and hearing, private respondents obtained a favorable ruling from HIGC recognizing
of 1987, which provides: them as the duly registered and existing homeowner’s association for Loyola Grand Villas homeowners and declaring the Certificates
. . . the following shall be guilty of an election offense: (b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of canvassers who of Registration of Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (North) Association, Inc. and Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South)
tampers, increases or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after Association, Inc. as hereby revoked or cancelled.
proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes.
The South Association appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC but was dismissed for lack of merit. Rebuffed, the South
Specifically, petitioner alleged in his affidavit-complaint that: A comparison between the Provincial Certificate of Canvass and the Association in turn appealed to the Court of Appeals, but it simply reiterated HIGC’s ruling.
Supporting Statement of Votes per Municipality for the Province of Ilocos Norte show an increase in the vote totals for senatorial
Issue: May the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation, as mandated by Section
candidate Enrile from 65,343 as indicated in the Statement of Votes by Municipality to 95,343 in words and figures in the Provincial
46 of the Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution?
Certificate of Canvass; senatorial candidate Drilon, from 48,726 to 78,726, and senatorial candidate Mitra, from 42,959 to 62,959.

COMELEC charged the respondents with violation of Sec 27 of RA 6646. Respondents filed an MR, COMELEC dismissed the complaint
Held: No.
for lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, hence, Pimentel filed a petition to the SC.
The records of the deliberations of the Batasang Pambansa No. 68 suggest that automatic corporate dissolution for failure to file the
The COMELEC in its Comment maintained that no probable cause exists there being no evidence showing that "petitioner prior to his by-laws on time was never the intention of the legislature. Moreover, the law itself provides the answer to the issue propounded by
petitioner. Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli
filing of the complaint against the board members . . . called the attention of the latter to what he claimed were incorrect or
interpretatix est ipsum statutum), reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meaning for the word
tampered votes" and that "respondents were given the chance to verify and be heard on the claim but refused to rectify when
"must" in the first sentence of Section 46 of the Corporation Code.
asked," arguing that "[t]he clear meaning of [Section 27(b), R.A. No. 6646] is that the erring board member must first be given the
chance to credit the correct votes or deduct the tampered votes and the refusal to do so gives rise to his criminal responsibility." Section 46. Adoption of by-laws. – Every corporation formed under this Code must, within one (1) month after receipt of
official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a code of by-laws
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC was correct in reversing its earlier decision due to probable cause. for its government not inconsistent with this Code.
Held: No
There can also be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because the incorporators failed to abide by the required filing of by-
A rule in statutory construction is that the word "or" is disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from
laws embodied in Section 46 of the Corporation Code. There is no outright "demise" of corporate existence. Proper notice and
other things enumerated unless the context requires a different interpretation. In criminal and penal statues, like Section 27(b) of hearing are cardinal components of due process in any democratic institution, agency or society. In other words, the incorporators
R.A. 6646, the word "and" cannot be read "or," and conversely, as the rule of strict construction apply, except when the spirit and must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and remedy the same.
reason of the law require it.
If the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and object reveals that the legislature intended
From a reading of Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646 in its entire context, we cannot but conclude that giving a non-disjunctive meaning to to use the words “shall” and “must” to be directory, they should be given that meaning.
the word "or" is not warranted.
Thus, under the provision, two acts, not one, are penalized: first, the tampering, increasing or decreasing of votes received by a DIRECTOR OF LANDS V CA G. R. No. 102858, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 276
candidate in any election; and second, the refusal, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes. The second part of the provision cannot be conjoined with the first part and regarded as a mere element of one FACTS:
crime, as is the interpretation of the COMELEC. Such cannot be the intent of the framers of the law, and it is with grave abuse of 1. On 8 December 1986, private respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 sq.m. of
discretion that the COMELEC gave Section 27(b) of R.A. No. 6646 of interpretation it did. land under PD 1529 however during the pendency of the petition, Teodoro died hence his heirs were substituted as applicants,
represented by their aunt, who was appointed as their guardian ad litem.
As such, finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and
was by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing 2. The Land registration court dismissed its petition for want of jurisdiction stating that the applicants failed to comply with the
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529 requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of initial hearing in a newspaper of general
requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand circulation in the Philippines and was only published in the Official Gazette and thus the court has not legally acquired jurisdiction
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. This means that, even if we assume for the sake of argument, that Section 27(b) of R.A. 6646 over the instant petition for want of compliance with the mandatory provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in
penalizes only one act, still, the COMELEC's dismissal of the case against the respondents is totally erroneous amounting to grave a newspaper of general circulation.
abuse of discretion.
3. The case was appealed by the private respondents in the CA, which set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the 6. On September 8, 1993, or more than ten days from their receipt of the summons, petitioner submitted an urgent motion
registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The motion for reconsideration was denied, thus this petition. praying for the admission of their answer, which was attached thereto.
7. Two days later, petitioners filed another motion pleading for the admission of an amended answer.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is MANDATORY or 8. On September 23, 1993, the MTCC denied the motions and considered the case submitted for resolution.
DIRECTORY in relation to Section 23(1) of PD 1529.
Section 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an order
Issue: WON Section 6, of the Rule on Summary Procedure, Mandatory or Directory Statutes, such that an answer filed Mandatory
setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the
order. The public shall be given notice of the initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and
beyond the time stated be accepted
(3) posting.
1.) By publication.— Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land RULING: RULING: Section 6, of the Rule on Summary Procedure is a MANDATORY statute, thus, answer/s must be filed within the
Registration shall cause notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in reglementary period.
the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and
"to all whom it may concern". Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause It is clear that the use of the word "shall" in the Rule on Summary Procedure underscores the mandatory character of the challenged
why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. provisions. Giving the provisions a directory application would subvert the nature of the Rule on Summary Procedure and defeat its
objective of expediting the adjudication of suits. To admit a late answer, as petitioners suggest, is to put premium on dilatory
maneuvers -- the very mischief that the Rule seeks to redress. In this light, petitioners invocation of the general principle in Rule 1,
HELD: The Supreme Court held that provision of the law is MANDATORY. The law used the term “SHALL” and denotes an IMPERATIVE
Section 2 of the Rules of Court is misplaced.
and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute, its importance ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision,
and the Court holds that the present case must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. Land registration is a proceeding in
rem and as such is validated essentially in publication this being so the process must be strictly complied with, in that the one who is Speedy resolution of unlawful detainer cases is a matter of public policy, and this rule should equally apply with full force in forcible
instituting the action must be able to prove his title against the whole world. Hence, before the claimed property is taken from entry cases where the possession of the premises at the start is already illegal. Petition DENIED.
concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice and opportunity to oppose, the
reason of which is DUE PROCESS.
SHAUF V CA G.R. No. 90314. November 27, 1990
In the present case, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the law. The Court has declared that FACTS:
where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application and Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf filed a complaint for damages against private respondents Don Detwiler and Anthony Persi before the
there is no alternative. Thus. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Lower Court dismissing the petition for registration of Land Regional Trial Court, Branch LVI at Angeles City for the alleged discriminatory acts of herein private respondents in maliciously
Title to the respondents. denying her application for the GS 1710-9 position in Clark Air Base. Private respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that as officers of the United States Armed Forces performing official functions in accordance with the powers vested in
them under the Philippine-American Military Bases Agreement, they are immune from suit.
GACHON V HON. DEVERA J G.R. No. 116695 June 20, 1997 RTC ordered respondents to pay Shauf for damages. CA denied.
Private respondents also postulate that petitioner Loida Q. Shauf failed to avail herself of her remedy under the United States federal
Petition for Review - a is a formal request for an appellate tribunal to review and make changes to the judgment of a lower court or legislation on equality of opportunity for civilian employees, which is allegedly exclusive of any other remedy under American law, let
administrative body alone remedies before a foreign court and under a foreign law such as the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether or not the term “may” is to be construed as mandatory.

Mandatory Statutes – a statute that requires a course of action as opposed to merely permitting it. It is a statute which leaves
nothing to the discretion of the court in respect of compliance with its terms. If not followed renders the proceeding to which it
relates illegal and void. Typically found by the use of words such as "must", "will" and "shall". Held: NO
In a letter of the Department of the Air Force in Washington, D.C., dated September 1, 1978 and addressed to petitioner Loida Q.
Shauf, 40 the appeal rights of the latter from the Air Force decision were enumerated as follows:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Section 6, of the Rule on Summary Procedure: Effect of failure to answer. — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within
the period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the — You may appeal to the Civil Service Commission within 15 calendar days of receipt of the decision. Your appeal should be addressed to the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein: Provided, however, that the court may in its discretion reduce Civil Service Commission, Appeals Review Board, 1990 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20415. The appeal and any representations in support
the amount of damages and attorney's fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable. This is without prejudice to the thereof must be submitted in duplicate.
applicability of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, if there are two or more defendants. — In lieu of an appeal to the Commission you may file a civil action in an appropriate U.S. District Court within 30 days of receipt of the
decision.
FACTS: — If you elect to appeal to the Commission’s Appeals Review Board, you may file a civil action in a U.S. District Court within 30 days of receipt
of the Commission’s final decision.
— A civil action may also be filed anytime after 180 days of the date of initial appeal to the Commission, if a final decision has not been
rendered.
1. A complaint for forcible entry was filed by Private Respondent Susana Guevara against Patricio Guevara and Petitioners Victoria As earlier noted, in a Supplement to Partial Stipulation of Facts filed by the parties on October 6, 1978, it was manifested to the trial
Gachon and Alex GuevarA before the Municipal Trial Court for Cities (MTCC) of Iloilo City. court that an appeal was lodged by counsel for petitioners on September 30, 1978 before the Civil Service Commission, Appeals
2. Summons was served on and received by petitioners on August 25, 1993, directing them to file an answer within the Review Board from the decision of the Secretary of the Air Force in the discrimination case filed by petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, No SF
reglementary period of ten (10) days 071380181. Said appeal has not been decided up to now.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
3. Patricio Guevara was abroad at that time; hence, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over him. Furthermore, it is basic that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally. The term "may," as used in adjective rules, is only
4. On September 4, 1993, petitioners filed with the MTCC an urgent motion for extension of time to file an answer. permissive and not mandatory, and we see no reason why the so-called rules on the above procedural options communicated to said
5. On September 7, 1993, the MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on petitioner should depart from this fundamental principle. Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf is not limited to these remedies, but is entitled as
Summary Procedure. MTCC denied the motion on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the Rule on Summary a matter of plain and simple justice to choose that remedy, not otherwise proscribed, which will best advance and protect her
Procedure. interests. There is, thus, nothing to enjoin her from seeking redress in Philippine courts which should not be ousted of jurisdiction on
the dubious and inconclusive representations of private respondents on that score.
ABASA V ABALOS GR 168617 February 19, 2007 PEREZ vs. CA G.R. No. 118870. March 29, 1996

1. The case emanated from two complaints filed against petitioner Adasa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan
FACTS:
City for Estafa. A resolution was issued by the City Prosecutor finding a probable cause against petitioner and ordered the
On the issue of custody over the minor Ray Perez II, respondent CA ruled in favor of the boy's father Ray C. Perez, reversing the trial
filing of two separate informations for Estafa against the petitioner.
court's decision to grant custody to Nerissa Z. Perez, the child's mother. Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine
2. The RTC ordered the Office of the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation.
practicing in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They were married in Cebu on December 6,
3. After the reinvestigation, the City Prosecutor reaffirmed its initial finding of probable cause against the petitioner.
1986. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July
4. During the arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty
20, 1992. Petitioner who began working in the United States in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a modest house in
5. The petitioner, dissatisfied with the finding of the City Prosecutor, filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ. The DOJ
Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York. She became a resident alien in
reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor of Iligan City and directed the withdrawal of the Information against
February 1992.
petitioner.
6. The Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said resolution of the DOJ.
- argued that under Sec. 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, if the accused has been arraigned already, the Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had
DOJ secretary should not and cannot take cognizance of the petition, but instead deny it outright. only a tourist visa and was not employed. On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
7. DOJ denied the Motion for Reconsideration Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets.
- Argues that under Sec. 12, in relation to Sec. 7 of the DOJ Circular No. 70, the DOJ secretary can However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they
entertain appeal even if the accused was already arraigned. This is because of the use of “may” in had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working.
the said provision. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there. When Nerissa came home a few days, before Ray II's
8. In the Court of Appeals, the DOJ Resolution was reversed. first birthday, the couple was no longer on good terms. Petitioner did not want to live near her in-laws and rely solely on her husband's
9. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the CA arguing that the overall language of Sec. 7 and Sec. 12 of DOJ meager income of P5,000. She longed to be with her only child but he was being kept away from her by her husband. Thus, she did not
Circular No. 70 is permissive and directory thus the DOJ Secretary can still entertain appeal even if the accused was want to leave RJ (Ray Junior) with her husband and in-laws. She wished for her son to grow up with his mother. On the other hand,
already arraigned. Ray wanted to stay here, where he could raise his son even as he practiced his profession. He maintained that it would not be difficult
10. The CA dismissed the said Motion. This time it gave an interpretation of Sec. 7 in relation to Sec. 12. to live here since they have their own home and a car.
a. Sec. 7: “If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be
given due course if the accused had already been arraigned.”  use of “shall not” connotes a positive On July 26, 1993, Nerissa Z. Perez filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent Ray C. Perez to surrender the custody of their
prohibition son, Ray Z. Perez II, to her. On August 27, 1993, the court a quo issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his
ISSUE: Whether or not the DOJ secretary can still entertain an appeal even if the accused is already arraigned. mother, Nerissa Perez, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the Court of Appeals,
on September 27, 1994, reversed the trial court's order and awarded custody of the boy to his father. CA ruled that there were enough
HELD:
reasons to deny Nerissa Perez custody over Ray II even if the child is under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy's
father would be for the child's best interest and welfare.
1. Rule in Statutory Construction: When a statute or rule is clear and unambiguous, interpretation need not be resorted
to.
 Since Sec. 7 of the subject circular clearly and categorically directs the DOJ to dismiss the outright an appeal or a ISSUE: W/N the custody of the one-year old child Ray should be awarded to the mother pursuant to Article 213 of the Family Code
petition for review filed after arraignment, no resort to interpretation is necessary which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother

 Also there is no irreconcilable conflict between Sec. 7 and Sec. 12 of DOJ Circular No. 70.
HELD: Yes, custody over the minor Ray Z. Perez II is awarded to his mother, herein petitioner Nerissa Z. Perez. When the parents of
Sec. 7 the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. It is not difficult to imagine how heart-rending it is for a
mother whose attempts at having a baby were frustrated several times over a period of six years to finally bear one, only for the
 pertains to the action on the petition that the DOJ must take infant to be snatched from her before he has even reached his first birthday.

 specifically applies to a situation on what the DOJ must do when confronted with an appeal or a petition The Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision. Rule 99, section 6 (Adoption and Custody of Minors) provides:
for review that is clearly without merit, manifestly intended to delay, or filed after an accused has already
"SEC. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated. Appeal. — When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart
been arraigned.
from each other, and the questions as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First
Sec. 12 Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the
care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
 enumerates the options the DOJ has with regard to the disposition of a petition of a petition for review be over ten years of age, unless the parent chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
or of an appeal. incapacity, or poverty. . . . No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefor."
applies generally to the disposition of an appeal. Under said section, the DOJ may take any of four
actions (affirm, reverse, modify, dismiss) when disposing an appeal. "The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man
can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
2. Petitioner’s reliance on principle of contemporaneous construction is unpersuasive. ‘compelling reasons’ for the good of the child; those cases must indeed be rare, if the mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she
Rule: Courts may disregard contemporaneous construction in instances where the law or rule construed possesses no has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and the divorce decree (relative divorce) will ordinarily be sufficient
ambiguity, where the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong reason to the construction exists and where the punishment for her. Moreover, moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand her
court has previously given the statute a different interpretation. situation."
If a contemporaneous construction is found to be erroneous, the same must be declared null and void. Such principle
should be as it is applied in the case at bar.
DIZON V CA and Overland Express Lines, Inc. G.R. No. 122544 January 28, 1999 It is respondent's submission that the aforesaid Resolution failed to comply with Section 4(3), Art. VIII of' the Constitution, which states:

FACTS: Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took
 Overland Express Lines, Inc. entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with petitioners involving a 1,755.80 square meter part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such
parcel of land situated at corner MacArthur Highway and South “H” Street, Diliman, Quezon City. The term of the lease was for 1 Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law
year commencing from May 16, 1974 up to May 15, 1975. During this period, Overland Express Lines was granted an option to laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
purchase for the amount of P3,000.00 per square meter. Thereafter, the lease shall be on a per month basis with a monthly rental
of P3,000.00. Respondent argues that since the Resolution denying its Motion to Suspend the Rules of Procedure and to admit Motion for
 For failure of Overland Express Lines to pay the increased rental of P8,000.00 per month effective June 1976, petitioners filed an Reconsideration was not concurred in by the required three votes, as only two of Members of the Court voted to deny the motion and
action for ejectment against it. The lower court rendered judgment ordering Overland Express Lines to vacate the leased premises one voted to grant the same, the assailed Resolution is void. Hence, it sought clarification on the legal status and effect thereof.
and to pay the sum of P624,000.00 representing rentals in arrears and/or as damages in the form of reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises during the period of illegal detainer from June 1976 to November 1982 at the monthly rental
of P8,000.00, less payments made, plus 12% interest per annum from November 18, 1976, the date of filing of the complaint, until The Motion for Clarification lacks merit.
fully paid, the sum of P8,000.00 a month starting December 1982, until Overland Express Lines fully vacates the premises, and to
pay P20,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees. We need not belabor ourselves further as the constitutional issue raised by respondent had already been laid to rest in the case
of Fortich v. Corona,[3]cralaw wherein we held:
ISSUE: WON Overland Express Lines actually paid the alleged P300,000.00 to Fidela Dizon, as representative (agent) of petitioners in
consideration of the option
A careful reading of the above constitutional provision, however, reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between
HELD: No. cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided" while matters, which include motions, are
 CA opined that the payment by Overland Express Lines of P300,000.00 as partial payment for the leased property, which petitioners "resolved". Otherwise put, the word "decided" must refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters", applying the
accepted (through Alice A. Dizon) and for which an official receipt was issued, was the operative act that gave rise to a perfected rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the
contract of sale, and that for failure of petitioners to deny receipt thereof, Overland Express Lines can therefore assume that Alice other provisions of the Constitution where these words appear.
A. Dizon, acting as agent of petitioners, was authorized by them to receive the money in their behalf. CA went further by stating
that in fact, what was entered into was a “conditional contract of sale” wherein ownership over the leased property shall not pass With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the
to the Overland Express Lines until it has fully paid the purchase price. Since Overland Express Lines did not consign to the court the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not
balance of the purchase price and continued to occupy the subject premises, it had the obligation to pay the amount of P1,700.00 obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of
in monthly rentals until full payment of the purchase price. "case" and not "matter". The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the disposition of cases by a
 In an attempt to resurrect the lapsed option, Overland Express Lines gave P300,000.00 to petitioners (thru Alice A. Dizon) on the division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc.
erroneous presumption that the said amount tendered would constitute a perfected contract of sale pursuant to the contract of On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure
lease with option to buy. There was no valid consent by the petitioners (as co-owners of the leased premises) on the supposed sale of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which
entered into by Alice A. Dizon, as petitioners’ alleged agent, and Overland Express Lines. The basis for agency is representation and must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if
a person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent. As provided in Article the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be
1868 of the New Civil Code, there was no showing that petitioners consented to the act of Alice A. Dizon nor authorized her to act deemed affirmed.
on their behalf with regard to her transaction with private respondent. The most prudent thing private respondent should have
done was to ascertain the extent of the authority of Alice A. Dizon. Being negligent in this regard, private respondent cannot seek
Conformably, the failure of the Members of the Division of the Court to muster the necessary vote to resolve the Motion to Suspend
relief on the basis of a supposed agency.
the Rules of Procedure and to admit respondent's Motion for Reconsideration means the same is denied and the decision sought to
 Every person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his peril the authority of the agent. If he does not
he reconsidered stands.
make such inquiry, he is chargeable with knowledge of the agent’s authority, and his ignorance of that authority will not be any
excuse. Persons dealing with an assumed agency, whether the assumed agency be a general or special one, are bound at their peril,
if they would hold the principal, to ascertain not only the fact of the agency but also the nature and extent of the authority, and in The decision of this case is already final and executory and respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, Second Motion for
case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it. Reconsideration and Motion to Suspend the Rules of Procedure were all denied with finality by this Court. Once a decision is final and
executory, it can no longer be attacked by any party or be modified directly or indirectly, even by the Court.[4]cralaw
Private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Second Motion for Reconsideration, and Motion to Suspend
Procedural Rules in the Higher Interest of Substantial Justice, all of which have been denied by this Court. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Urgent Motion for clarification with prayer for stay/recall of entry of judgment is DENIED for
lack of merit.

Quoted hereunder for your information is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 23 2003.
G.R. No. 122544(Regina Dizon vs. Court of Appeals.); G.R. No. 124741(Regina Dizon vs. Court of Appeals.)

Before the Court is respondent's "Urgent Motion for Clarification with prayer for stay/recall of entry of judgment"[1] seeking to clarify
the legal status and effect of' the Court's Resolution dated January 28, 2003 which denied with finality respondent's motion to suspend
the procedural rules, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the Motion to Suspend Procedural Rules in the Higher Interest of Substantial Justice filed by private respondent
is DENIED WITH FINALITY. No further pleadings will be entertained in these cases. SO ORDERED.[2]cralaw
i[6] 3 Words and Phrases at p. 640. iv[9] Davis-Administrative Law, pp. 194-197, cited in Victoria Milling Co., Inc. vs.
Social Security Commission (114 Phil. 555).
ii[7] Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 148.
v[10] Radio Communication of the Philippines vs. Santiago, 58 SCRA 493.
iii[8] 73 Am Jur 2nd Sec. 242.
vi[11] 79 SCRA 450 at p. 458.