Topic PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE
Case No. G.R. No. 112260 June 30, 1997
Case Name JOVITA YAP ANCOG, and GREGORIO YAP, JR., vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO DIEZ, and CARIDAD YAP,
Ponente MENDOZA, J.:
RELEVANT FACTS
The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property of the spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario
Diez. Gregorio Yap died, leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario Diez, and children, petitioners Jovita Yap
Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap as his heirs.
In 1954 and again 1958: Rosario Diez obtained loans from the Bank of Calape, secured by a mortgage on the
disputed land, which was annotated on its Original Certificate of Title No. 622.
When Rosario Diez applied again for a loan to the bank, offering the land in question as security, the bank's
lawyer, Atty. Narciso de la Serna, suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement covering the disputed land
as a means of facilitating the approval of her application.
o The suggestion was accepted and on April 4, 1961, Atty. de la Serna prepared an extrajudicial
settlement, which the heirs, with the exception of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., then only 15 years old,
signed.
o The document was notarized by Atty. de la Serna on April 12, 1961.
o As a result, OCT No. 622 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3447 (T-2411) was issued on
April 13, 1961.
On April 14, 1961, upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on the land, the loan was approved by the bank.
Rosario Diez exercised rights of ownership over the land. In 1985, she brought an ejectment suit against petitioner
Jovita Yap Ancog's husband and son to evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure
to pay rent.
Shortly thereafter, petitioner Jovita Ancog learned that private respondent Rosario Diez had offered the land for
sale. Petitioner Ancog immediately informed her younger brother, petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., who was living in
Davao, of their mother's plan to sell the land.
CASE FIILED: they filed this action for partition in the RTC of Bohol where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3094. As private
respondent Caridad Yap was unwilling to join in the action against their mother, Caridad was impleaded as a defendant.
1. alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and therefore void.
2. claimed that in signing the instrument they did not really intend to convey their interests in the property to their
mother, but only to enable her to obtain a loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridad's school
fees and for household repairs.
RTC: rendered judgment dismissing petitioners' action.
1. It dismissed petitioners' claim that the extrajudicial settlement was simulated and held it was voluntarily signed
by the parties. Petitioners failed to overcome the presumptive validity of the extrajudicial settlement as a public
instrument.
2. The court instead found that petitioner Ancog had waived her right to the land, as shown by the fact that on
February 28, 1975, 4 petitioner's husband, Ildefonso Ancog, leased the property from private respondent Diez.
3. The court also found that the action for partition had already prescribed. The registration of the land under
private respondent Rosario Diez's name amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership. Therefore, petitioners
had ten (10) years from April 13, 1961 within which to bring an action to recover their share in the property.
While it is true that petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor at the time the extrajudicial settlement was
executed, his claim, according to the court, was barred by laches.
CA: upheld the validity of the extrajudicial settlement and sustained the trial court's dismissal of the case.
1. The appellate court emphasized that the extrajudicial settlement could not have been simulated in order to obtain
a loan, as the new loan was merely "in addition to" a previous one which private respondent Diez had been able to
obtain even without an extrajudicial settlement.
2. Neither did petitioners adduce evidence to prove that an extrajudicial settlement was indeed required in order to
obtain the additional loan.
3. The appellate court held that considering petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's educational attainment (Master of Arts and
Bachelor of Laws), it was improbable that she would sign the settlement if she did not mean it to be such.
Held: We hold that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly acted in upholding the extrajudicial
settlement but erred in ruling that petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was barred by laches from recovering his share in the
property in question.
ISSUE AND RATIO DECIDENDI
Issue Ratio
(1) Whether the
lower courts
correctly ruled that To begin with, it is settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
the contested conclusive upon the parties and are not reviewable by this Court when they are an
extrajudicial affirmation of the findings of the trial court. In this case, the trial court and the Court
settlement is not a of Appeals found no evidence to show that the extrajudicial settlement was required to
simulated one? enable private respondent Rosario Diez to obtain a loan from the Bank of Calape.
YES. Petitioners merely claimed that the extrajudicial settlement was demanded by the bank.
To the contrary, that the heirs (Jovita Yap Ancog and Caridad Yap) meant the
extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective is shown by the fact that Rosario Diez
performed acts of dominion over the entire Land, beginning with its registration, without
any objection from them. Instead, petitioner Jovita Ancog agreed to lease the land from
her mother, private respondent Rosario Diez, and accepted from her a special power of
attorney to use the land in question as collateral for a loan she was applying from the
DBP. Indeed it was private respondent Diez who paid the loan of the Ancogs in order to
secure the release of the property from mortgage.
Petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog contends that she could not have waived her share in the
land because she is landless. For that matter, private respondent Caridad Yap is also
landless, but she signed the agreement. 7 She testified that she did so out of filial
devotion to her mother.
Thus, what the record of this case reveals is the intention of Jovita Ancog and Caridad
Yap to cede their interest in the land to their mother Rosario Diez. It is immaterial that
they had been initially motivated by a desire to acquire a loan. Under Art. 1082 of the
Civil Code, every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is
deemed to be a partition even though it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any
other transaction.
(2) Whether We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim of petitioner Gregorio
petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was barred by laches. In accordance with Rule 74, §1 N of the Rules of Court, as he did
Yap Jr., one of the not take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. It is uncontroverted that, at
co-owners of the the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor. For this
litigated property, reason, he was not included or even informed of the partition.
had lost his rights
to the property Instead, the registration of the land in Rosario Diez's name created an implied trust in his favor by
through analogy to Art. 1451 of the Civil Code.
prescription or
laches? NO
In the case of O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, Art. 1451 was held as creating a resulting trust,
which is founded on the presumed intention of the parties.
As a general rule, it arises where such may be reasonably presumed to be the intention
of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing at the time of
the transaction out of which it is sought to be established.
In this case, the records disclose that the intention of the parties to the extrajudicial settlement
was to establish a trust in favor of petitioner Yap, Jr. to the extent of his share.
Rosario Diez testified that she did not claim the entire property, while Atty. de la Serna
added that the partition only involved the shares of the three participants.
A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years from the
time the trust is repudiated.
Although the registration of the land in private respondent Diez's name operated as a
constructive notice of her claim of ownership, it cannot be taken as an act of
repudiation adverse to petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim, whose share in the property
was precisely not included by the parties in the partition.
Indeed, it has not been shown whether he had been informed of her exclusive claim
over the entire property before 1985 when he was notified by petitioner Jovita Yap
Ancog of their mother's plan to sell the property.
This Court has ruled that for prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be
repudiated by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved by clear and
conclusive evidence.
Furthermore, the rule that the prescriptive period should be counted from the date of issuance of
the Torrens certificate of title applies only to the remedy of reconveyance under the Property
Registration Decree.
Since the action brought by petitioner Yap to claim his share was brought shortly after he was
informed by Jovita Ancog of their mother's effort to sell the property, Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim
cannot be considered barred either by prescription or by laches.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that this case is REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court for the determination of the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.
