Reyes v Alejandro

Facts:

Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the absence of her husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that
her husband had been absent from their conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been
heard from and his whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any
property in his name nor any debts.

The evidence presented by petitioner in support of her petition established that she and Roberto L. Reyes
were married on March 20, 1960; that sometime in April 1962 her husband left the conjugal home due to
some misunderstanding over personal matters; that since then petitioner has not received any news about
the whereabouts of her husband; that they have not acquired any properties during their marriage and that
they have no outstanding obligation in favor of anyone; that her only purpose in filing the petition is to
establish the absence of her husband, invoking the provisions of Rule 107 of the New Rules of Court and
Article 384 of the Civil Code.

After hearing the Court, a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since Roberto L. Reyes left no
properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an absentee.

Issue: Whether or not there is a need for the declaration of absence of Roberto Reyes

Held: No. The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is because of his properties which
have to be administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse
of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court
that the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil
Code). The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of the
conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings,
Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).

Judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the order of the lower Court dismissing the petition to declare
Roberto L. Reyes an absentee. With costs against petitioner-appellant.
Eastern Shipping v Lucero

Facts: The material facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows: On October 31, 1979, Capt. Julio J.
Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., Company for short, as master/captain
to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon plying the HongkongManila route, with the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive
of ship board allowances and other benefits. Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1)
round trip only, i.e., the contract would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of
Manila, unless renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be paid
to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila.

On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila where it was expected to
arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent three (3) messages to the Company's Manila office.

On February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio messages from Capt. Lucero on board the
M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which, received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for immediate assistance
in view of the existing "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees
port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After this message, nothing more has been
heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time.

RESPONDENT informed of the grave situation, immediately reported the matter to the Philippine Coast
Guard for search and rescue operation and the same was coordinated with the U.S. Air Force based at Clark
Air Base. Respondent also released radio messages to all vessels passing the Hongkong/Manila route
requesting them to be very cautious and vigilant for possible survivors and to scan the area whether there
are signs of debris from the ill-fated vessel "EASTERN MINICON" which has foundered In the meantime,
two (2) vessels of the respondent were also dispatched to the area last reported by the Master for search
and rescue operation, but the collective efforts of all parties concerned yielded negative results

Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon through its surveyors, confirmed
the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the corresponding death benefits to the heirs of the
crew members, except respondent Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same.

On May 19, 1981, the Board rendered the aforecited judgment in favor of Mrs. Josephine Lucero and against
petitioner Company. The Board held that the presumption of death could not be applied because the four-
year period provided for by Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet expired; and that the payment of
death benefits to the heirs of the other crew 'members was based upon a voluntary agreement entered into
by and between the heirs and the Company, and did not bind respondent Mrs. Lucero who was not a party
thereto.

Issue: WON The Board held that the presumption of death could not be applied because the four-year
period provided for by Article 391(l) of the Civil Code had not yet expired

Held: It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio messages from
Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon the last of which, received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a
call for immediate assistance in view of the existing "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch"; the
vessel "was listing 50 to 60 degrees port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After
this message, nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time.
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V
Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty
that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this premise, the rule on
presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of
evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which
a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of
evidence controls."

Of similar import is the following pronouncement from American Jurisprudence: 5

Loss of Vessel.— Where a vessel sets out on a voyage and neither the vessel nor those who went in her are
afterward heard of, the presumption arises, after the utmost limit of time for her to have completed the
voyage and for news of her arrival at any commercial port of the world to have been received, that the
vessel has been lost and that all on board have perished. The presumption of death in such cases does not
rest on the fact alone that the person in question has been absent and unheard from for a specific length
of time, but also on the fact that the vessel has not been heard front The question, moreover, is not whether
it is impossible that the person may be alive, but whether the circumstances do not present so strong a
probability of his death that a court should act thereon. The presumption of death from absence of tidings
of the vessel on which the absentee sailed is strengthened by proof of a storm to which the vessel probably
was exposed. The presumption is even stronger where it appears affirmatively that the vessel was lost at
sea, that nothing has been heard of a particular person who sailed thereon, and that a sufficient time has
elapsed to permit the receipt of news of any possible survivors of the disaster.

If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction must be beyond reasonable doubt,
the rule of presumption was not applied and the fact of death was deemed established, with more reason
is this Court justified in entering a finding of death. Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be
substituted for, the facts established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt.
Lucero died shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.

In view of the conclusion arrived at above, We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issued raised in
this case, they being mere adjuncts to the principa issue already disposed of.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC subject of this petition is hereby set aside, and the complaint of
respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed. However, Mrs. Lucero is entitled to death benefits. No costs.
 Manuel v People

Facts:

 On July 28, 1975, Eduardo Manuel married Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati.
 Rubylus Gaa was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned Manuel only visited his wife after
three months and never saw her again
 Manuel met Tina Gandalera in Dagupan City on January 1996.
 Tina was then 21 years old, a computer secretarial student while Manuel was 39.
 Manuel visited Tina in Baguio City. Eventually, despite Tina’s resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his
way with her and proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring Tina that he was single
 Manuel even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina’s parents, and was assured by them that their
son was still single
 Tina agreed to marry Manuel, April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC
of Baguio City
 For three years, the couple was happy until Manuel only went to their house twice or thrice a year and when
Tina asks for money, Manuel would slap her.
 January 2001, Eduardo left and did not return and stopped giving financial support to Tina On August 2001,
Tina made inquiries from the NSO in Manila and learned that Eduardo was previously married
 Eduardo testified that he met Tina in 1995 in a bar where she worked as GRO. He said that he informed
Tina that he was already married but nevertheless, she agreed to marry him
 Manuel stated that he declared he was single in his marriage with Tina because he believed in good faith
that his first marriage was invalid, that he did not know that he had to go to the court to seek nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina
 He further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide
unless he did so.

Issue: WON the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s wife cannot be legally
presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no Judicial Declaration of presumptive death

Held: The Petition is denied for lack of merit. The Petitioner presumed to have acted with malice or evil
intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the
accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal
intent. However, ignorance of the law excuses is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the
law.

Ignorantia Legis Neminem Excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse
may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgement declaring the presumptive death of
the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce
evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgement is
proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of
the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.
Eugenio v Velez

Facts: Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she
was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas
Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ
was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August
1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit. Petitioner claims
that as her common law husband, he has legal custody of her body.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

Held:

The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters.
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

“Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left
any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.

Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife,
and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally
married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority
exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a
subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.

Valino v Adriano

FACTS:

Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office, married
respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons, three (3)
daughters, and one (1) adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.

The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario, however, turned sour and they were eventually separated-in-
fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they decided to live together as
husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario and their
children (respondents).

In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the United States spending
Christmas with her children. As none of the family members was around, Valino took it upon herself to
shoulder the funeral and burial expenses for Atty. Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of her
husband, she immediately called Valino and requested that she delay the interment for a few days but her
request was not heeded. The remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the mausoleum of the family
of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to attend the interment.

Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he was buried
and that his burial at the Manila Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes, respondents commenced suit
against Valino praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees and that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross
Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.

In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than twenty
(20) years before he courted her. Valino claimed that throughout the time they were together, he had
introduced her to his friends and associates as his wife. Although they were living together, Valino admitted
that he never forgot his obligation to support the respondents. She contended that, unlike Rosario, she took
good care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical expenses when he got seriously ill. She also claimed
that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the United States.
According to Valino, it was Atty. Adrianos last wish that his remains be interred in the Valino family
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.

Valino further claimed that she had suffered damages as result of the suit brought by respondents. Thus,
she prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC decision and directed Valino to have the remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense of
respondents. It likewise directed respondents, at their expense, to transfer, transport and inter the remains
of the decedent in the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches, Quezon City.

ISSUE:
Who between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.

RULING:

Under the law, the right and duty to make funeral arrangements is the surviving legal wife.
Article 30 provides:

“The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the
order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers
and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right. ”

Art. 199. Also provides that whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall
devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)

Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:

In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

(a) If the deceased was a married man or woman, the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the surviving
spouse if he or she possesses sufficient means to pay the necessary expenses.

The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the United States when he died has no
controlling significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her
right and duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and
duty to make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to
that end. While there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was
still alive, the Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy
and forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the
respondents wasted no time in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a few days
so they could attend the service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon as they came to know about
Atty. Adriano’s death in the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20, 1992 in the Philippines), the
respondents immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to express their request, but
to no avail.