Alon, Jon Polo A.

Arugay, Angela Justine C.

Santiago, Ramon Jose Delfin

VII. Quasi-Judicial powers

A. Definition and Nature

Adjudicatory Powers
 Power of administrative authorities to make determinations of facts in the
performance of their official duties and to apply the law as they construe it to the
facts so found.
 By this power, administrative authorities are enabled to interpret and apply not
only implementing rules and regulations promulgated by them but also the laws
entrusted to their administration.

Nature of quasi- judicial powers

 It partakes the nature of judicial power, but exercised by a person other than a
judge.
 Limited jurisdiction of quasi-judicial agencies
o An administrative body could wield only such powers as are specifically
granted to it by its enabling statute.
Conditions for the Proper Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Power
1. Jurisdiction must be properly acquired by the administrative body
2. Due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings

SCOPE OF QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

PRESCRIBE RULES OF PROCEDURE

 power to prescribe rules of procedure which are effective until disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 5, par. 5)
SUBPOENA POWER
 power to issue subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum may only
be exercised if allowed by law and only in connection with the matter the
administrative body is authorized to investigate.
CONTEMPT POWER
 power to cite in contempt may only be exercised if expressly granted by law and
only in relation to quasi-judicial functions and not ministerial functions
DETERMINATIVE POWER
 power of administrative agencies to better enable them to exercise their quasi-
judicial authority
 ENABLING POWERS – powers that permit the doing of an act which the law
undertakes to regulate and which would be unlawful without government
approval. (e.g. issuance of a driver’s license by the LTO)
 DIRECTING POWERS – powers that order the doing or performance of
particular acts to ensure compliance with the law. They are often exercised for
corrective purposes. (e.g. order of reinstatement by the NLRC)
 DISPENSING POWER – allows the administrative officer to relax the general
operation of a law to an individual or corporation. (e.g. exemptions granted by the
BIR)
 EXAMINING POWER – power to require the production of books, papers, the
attendance of witnesses, compelling their testimony, etc. Also called
investigatory power.
 SUMMARY POWERS – power to apply compulsion or force against persons or
property to effectuate a legal purpose without judicial warrants to authorize such
actions. (e.g. summary abatement of nuisance per se)
EQUITABLE POWERS – permits the administrative tribunal to consider and make a
proper application of the rules of equity. (Cariño v. CHR, G.R. No. 96681, December
2, 1991)
Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights (CHR) G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CHR may take cognizance of a case originally under the jurisdiction
of the DECS and eventually that of the trial courts; NO.
HELD:
The Court declared that the CHR to have no such power [quasi-judicial powers], and it
was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in
this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that
may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication,
and cannot be likened to judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official.

Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva G.R. No. 161115 November 30, 2006

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rulings of the DOLE and NLRC has the force and effect of law; YES.

HELD:
It is obvious that the visitorial and enforcement power granted to the DOLE Secretary is
in the nature of a quasi-judicial power. Quasi-judicial power has been described by this
Court in the following manner —
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to
decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law.

The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it . In carrying out their
quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate
facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw
conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a
judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary that in the
proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of
the proceedings. (Emphasis supplied.)

The DOLE Secretary, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, exercise
quasi-judicial power, at least, to the extent necessary to determine violations of labor
standards provisions of the Code and other labor legislation. He can issue compliance
orders and writs of execution for the enforcement of his orders.

The Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 September 1993, and of DOLE
Undersecretary Trajano, dated 15 September 1994, consistently found that CAMPCO
was engaging in labor-only contracting. Such finding constitutes res judicata in the case
filed by the respondents with the NLRC.

It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative

agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts
of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction
as to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments or resolutions of a court
or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations,
so as to write finish to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in the
Philippine justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.

B. Distinguished from Quasi-legislative functions

Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77372, April 29, 1988

Petitioners: Lupo L. Lupangco, Raymond S. Mungkal, Norman A. Mesina, Alexander

R. Reguyal, Jocelyn P. Catapang, Enrico V. Regalado, Jerome O. Arcega, Ernesto C.
Blas, Jr., Elpidio M. Almazan, Karl Caesar R. Rimando,

Respondents: Court Of Appeals And Professional Regulation Commission

Issue: (1) whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the PRC? – yes -
(2) Whether the resolution by the PRC is quasi-judicial in nature? – no –
(3) whether the resolution by the PRC is unconstitutional? – yes-

Held:

First issue: The SC held that the cited provision of the CA were erroneous because in
those case, the CFI could not interfere with the orders of the SEC because it was
provided by law. There is no law providing for an aggrieved party who wants to
question a ruling or order of the PRC unlike in the case of SEC. What is clear from
Presidential Decree No. 223 (creating the PRC) is that the Professional Regulation
Commission is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and
coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence is the view that even acts of the Office of
the President may be reviewed by the Court of First Instance because of the principle of
Judicial Review.
a. “The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the
Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief
Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it”

Second Issue: Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9,
paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction over the
case. The said law provides:

"SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,

resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948."

In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CA as provided for in Sec 9,
Paragraph 3 of BP129, there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from
proceedings wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial
functions.

quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public

administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence
of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.
- This does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by an
administrative body
Third Issue: Administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the
issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonably and fairly adapted to secure the ends of the law which they are authorized to
do.
Resolution No. 105 infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty. PRC has no authority

C. Administrative Due Process

Ang Tibay v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940

Petitioner: Ang Tibay, represented by Toribio teodoro manager and

proprietor, and National workers' brotherhood ,

Respondent: The Court Of Industrial Relations And National Labor Union, Inc.

The essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an

administrative character. There must be :
1. Right to a hearing
2. Party must be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights asserted
3. Decision must be based on substantial evidence (uch relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.)
4. decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
5. he administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
6. The administrative body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered

Issue: Whether the NLU should be given a new trial

Held:
The records show that the newly discovered evidence or documents obtained by NLU,
which they attached to their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them
at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but
already existing).

Disciplinary Board, LTO, et al. vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 224395, July 3, 2017

Petitioner: Disciplinary Board, Land Transportation Office; Atty. Teofilo E. Guadiz,

Chairman; Atty. Noreen Bernadette San Luis-Lutey; And Putiwas Malambut, Members;
Atty. Mercy Jane B. Paras-Leynes, Special Prosecutor; And Atty. Roberto P. Cabrera Iii,
Assistant Secretary Of The Land Transportation Office,

Respondents: Mercedita E. Gutierrez

Issue: Whether due process was lacking

Held: The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of
Notice and real opportunity to be heard. In Administrative proceedings, procedural
due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
- To be heard does not mean verbal arguments, can be done through pleadings.
- Due process does not mean imaging a situation like a trial-type. Due process is
satisfied when:
 o A person is notified of the charge against him
o Given an opportunity to explain or defend himself
The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

Section 16 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Services

(RRACCS) - …Where the complaint is initiated by the disciplining authority, the
disciplining authority or his authorized representative shall issue a show-cause
memorandum directing the persons complained of to explain why no administrative
case should be filed against him/her/them

This section shows that Gutierrez was directed to explain why no disciplinary action
should be taken against her.

Cudia v. PMA Superintendent G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PMA, the Honor Committee, and the Cadet Review and Appeals
Board committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing cadet 􀎢rst class Aldrin Jeff P.
Cudia from the academy in utter disregard of his right to due process. [NO]

Held:
There was no violation of his right to due process considering that the procedure
undertaken by the Honor Committee and PMA CRAB was consistent with existing
policy. Thus, the previous finding and recommendation of the Honor Committee 􀎢nding
the subject Cadet guilty of "Lying" and recommending his separation from the Academy
is sustained.
It was held in a US case: Due process only requires for the dismissal of a Cadet from
the Merchant Marine Academy that he be given a fair hearing at which he is apprised of
the charges against him and permitted a defense. x x x For the guidance of the parties x
x x the rudiments of a fair hearing in broad outline are plain. The Cadet must be
apprised of the specific charges against him. He must be given an adequate opportunity
to present his defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and
other evidence.
The PMA has regulatory authority to administratively terminate cadets despite the
absence of statutory authority.
Violation of the Honor Code warrants the administrative dismissal of a guilty cadet.
Cadet Cudia violated the first tenet of the Honor Code by providing untruthful
statements in the explanation for his tardiness.
The higher authorities of the PMA did not blindly adopt the findings of the Honor
Committee.
The procedural safeguards in a student disciplinary case were properly accorded to
Cadet Cudia.
Alon, Jon Polo A.
Arugay, Angela Justine C.
Santiago, Ramon Jose Delfin

III. Requirements for public Office

Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154 / Tapispisan v. CA, 459 SCRA 695

Appointment - The selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its
confirmation, the appointment results in security of tenure for the person chosen unless
he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. Essentially
discretionary power performed by the officer empowered by law to do so. However it is
different when the Constitution or the law subjects the appointment to the approval of
another officer or body.

Designation - Connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an

incumbent official. It is also temporary in nature.

Example: where under the Constitution three justices of the SC are designated by the
Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or House of Representatives.

Pimentel v. Ermita, 472 SCRA 587

Whether the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to department

secretaries while Congress is in session?

Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is

a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter
ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent
appointee of her choice could assume office.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in

session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting
appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. Thus, by the
very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an
acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session.

Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon

acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a recess of
Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any time there is a
vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling
important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance of ad

interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of Congress, way
before the lapse of one year.

Lueigo v. CSC, 143 SCRA 327

Is the CSC authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that

another person is better qualified than the appointee and order his replacement?

No, The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was
therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to
reverse him and call it temporary.
Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have
inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to
positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not
possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.”

The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment
extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing
the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is
qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.

CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another
person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in
the city mayor.

Umoso v. CSC, 234 SCRA 617

Whether the Secretary can delegate the power to appoint?

Yes, while preferential consideration is accorded the "next-in-rank" employee in the

event of a vacancy for a higher position, such consideration does not serve to ensure
appointment in his favor. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor
imposes a ministerial duty on the part of the appointing authority to promote such
person to the next higher position

Secondly, the appointing power is vested in the Department Head/Secretary. Such

power, however, may be delegated to the regional director subject, however, to the
approval, revision, modification and reversal of the Department Secretary.

The rule in the civil service is that appointment, which is essentially within the
discretionary power of whosoever it is vested, is subject only to the condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. In the case at bar, the
Qualifications Standards of the DPWH prescribes the following minimum requirements
for the contested position (Supervising Civil Engineer I)

It is evident that both aspirants sufficiently meet the qualification requirements for
permanent appointment to the contested position. However, since between Caronan
and Umoso the former was chosen by the Department Secretary of the DPWH, the Civil
Service Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance
with the Civil Service Law. The Commission, under P.D. No. 807, may only approve or
disapprove the appointment after determining whether or not the appointee possesses
the appropriate Civil Service eligibility and the required qualifications. The Commission
has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. Correctly then did the CSC, in dismissing the appeal of
petitioner Umoso, hold:

DISQUALIFICATIONS

Monsanto vs Factoran, 170 SCRA 190

Issues: Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment?
Held:
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official
act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is
intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that
in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the
offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the
offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner,
though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for
a new appointment.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional.
Held:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null
and void. In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive
Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary
position to not more than two positions in the government and government corporations,
EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself:
Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
Caasi v. CA, 191 SCRA 317
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not a green card is a proof that the holder is a permanent resident
of US.
(2) Whether respondent Miguel has waived his status as a permanent resident of
the USA prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Held:
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Miguel’s immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an
abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. His intention to live there
permanently is evidenced by his possession of a GREEN CARD, which is a conclusive
proof that he is a permanent resident of the US despite his occasional visits to the
Philippines. There is no clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status
nor he surrendered his green card to the appropriate US authorities before he ran for
Mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18, 1988. The court concluded that he
was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto is null and void.
Scope of Qualifications
Qualifications are continuing in nature and must exist at the commencement of the term
and during the occupancy of the office, if, during the continuance of his incumbency he
ceases to be qualified, he forfeits his office. (Aguila v. Genato, 103 SCRA 380)
The question of eligibility of persons seeking public office must exist to qualify him for
the position is a matter of legislative intent
Who may prescribe qualifications?
1. CONSTITUTION
When the qualifications are prescribed by the Constitution, they are generally exclusive,
except where the Constitution itself provides otherwise
2. CONGRESS
In the absence of constitutional inhibition, Congress has the same right to provide
disqualifications that it has to provide qualifications for office. (De Leon)
Restrictions On The Power Of Congress To Prescribe Qualifications
1. Congress cannot exceed its constitutional powers
2. Congress cannot impose conditions of eligibility inconsistent with constitutional
provisions
3. The qualifications must be germane to the position (“Reasonable Relation” Rule)
4. Where the Constitution establishes specific eligibility requirements for a particular
constitutional office, the constitutional criteria are exclusive, and Congress
cannot add to them except if the Constitution expressly or impliedly gives the
power to set qualifications
5. Congress cannot prescribe qualifications so detailed as to practically amount to
making a legislative appointment: it is unconstitutional and therefore void for
being a usurpation of executive power
Time Of Possession Of Qualifications
1. If law specifies: At the time specified by the Constitution or law
2. If law does not specify, there are two views:
a. Qualification during commencement of term or induction into office: the
word “eligible” as used in constitutions and statutes, has reference to the
capacity not of being elected or appointed to office, but of holding office,
and that, therefore, if qualified at the time of commencement of the term or
induction into office, disqualification of the candidate or appointee at the
time of election or appointment is immaterial
b. Qualification or eligibility during election or appointment: conditions of
eligibility must exist at the time of the election must exist at the time of the
election or appointment, and that their existence only at the time of the
commencement of the term of office or induction of the candidate or
appointee into office is not sufficient to qualify him to office
Qualifications Prescribed By The Constitution
For President and Vice President (Sec. 2-3, Art. VII)
(1) Natural-born citizen
(2) Registered voter
(3) Able to read and write
(4) 40 years old on day of election
(5) Resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding election day
For Senator (Sec. 3, Art. VI)
(1) Natural-born citizen
(2) 35 years old on election day
(3) Able to read and write
(4) Registered voter
(5) Resident of the Philippines for at least 2 years immediately preceding election day

For Members of the House of Representatives (Sec. 6, Art. VI)

(1) Natural-born citizen
(2) 25 years old on election day
(3) Able to read and write
(4) Registered voter in district in which he shall be elected
(5) Resident therefor for not less than one year immediately preceding election day
*Residency and registration in the district are not required for partylist representatives

For Members of the Supreme Court and Lower Collegiate Courts [Sec. 7(1), Art. VIII]
(1) Natural-born citizen
(2) At least 40 years old
(3) 15 years or more as a judge or engaged in law practice
(4) Of proven Competence, Integrity, Probity, and Independence

For Members of the Constitutional Commissions

Duration Of Qualification
The Constitution or the statute usually fixes the time when the qualifications must be
possessed by the appointee or elective candidate for office, either expressly or
impliedly.
The reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the date of
issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of
resolution of the protest against it. (Civil Service Commission v. De la Cruz, 437 SCRA
403)

Cuyegkeng v. Cruz, 108 Phil. 903

Issue: Whether or not the appointment of Dr. Pedro Cruz is Valid? -yes-

Held:
The authority of the chief executive of those states to appoint the officers involved in
said cases springs mostly from statutes, unlike the President of the Philippines, whose
appointing power emanates from our Constitution.

The aforementioned list, submitted by the executive Council of the Philippine Medical
Association, is merely recommendatory in nature and, as such, not binding upon the
President

They are identically referred to in the communication transmitting said list to the
President of the Philippines, which communication is, in turn, described in said
pleadings as a letter of "recommendation". By their very acts therefore, the intervenors
have clearly expressed the belief, which was shared by the President, that the function
of the former under said section 13 is purely recommendatory. Needless to say, a
"recommendation", as such, implies merely an advice, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is
made.

CSC v. de la Cruz, 437 SCRA 403

Issue: Whether or not respondent has sufficiently complied with the required
experience standards? – yes-

Held:
“The contested position requires four years of work experience in position/s involving
management per Qualification Standards Manual and/or four years of experience in
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air
safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all
airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools per ATO
Qualification Standards.”

At the time of his permanent appointment on November 28, 1994 as Chief Aviation
Safety Regulation Officer, respondent had a little over one year of managerial
experience from his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division during
the latter part of 1993. However, the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at
the time of his appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second
clause.

The requirement is 4 yrs of work in managerial position AND/OR supervisory position.

“or” – either the 1st clause or 2nd clause may be applied. Dela Cruz had excellent
credentials and a “proven excellent performance.”

The reckoning point in determining the qualifications of an appointee is the date of

issuance of the appointment and not the date of its approval by the CSC or the date of
resolution of the protest against it.
Yee v. Director of Public Schools, 7 SCRA 832

Issue: W/N Antonia is still qualified teacher under the Revised Administrative Code
Held:

Antonia’s removal was due to the loss of her Filipino citizenship.

There is, however, no doubt that her removal as a public-school teacher because of
loss of Filipino citizenship is legal.

Not being included in Sect. 671 of the Revised Administrative Code which enumerates
the officers and employees constituting the unclassified service, teaching in a public
school is in the classified service – a public function which may be performed by Filipino
citizens only.

An applicant for admission to examination for entrance into the civil service must be a
citizen of the Philippines (Sec. 675 of the Revised Administrative Code). And after he
had qualified himself to be eligible for appointment to a civil service position and had
been appointed to such position, he must continue to be such citizen

A voluntary change of citizenship or a change thereof by operation of law disqualifies

him to continue holding the civil service position to which he had qualified and had been
appointed.

Upon Antonia’s marriage to Ng Foo alias Pio Chet Yee, a Chinese citizen, she ceased
to be a citizen of the Philippines, and for that reason she is no longer qualified to
continue holding the civil service position to which she had qualified and had been
appointed.