G.R. No.

L-18841 January 27, 1969 arrangements with the present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, upon to the satisfaction of all concerned;
vs. (c) To prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head, equitable rates
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for time calls and other
defendant-appellant. services that may be rendered by said system;
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General (d) To establish and maintain coastal stations to serve ships at sea or aircrafts
Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for plaintiff-appellant. and, when public interest so requires, to engage in the international
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for defendant-appellant. telecommunication service in agreement with other countries desiring to
establish such service with the Republic of the Philippines; and
REYES, J.B.L., J.: (e) To abide by all existing rules and regulations prescribed by the
Direct appeals, upon a joint record on appeal, by both the plaintiff and the International Telecommunication Convention relative to the accounting,
defendant from the dismissal, after hearing, by the Court of First Instance of disposition and exchange of messages handled in the international service,
Manila, in its Civil Case No. 35805, of their respective complaint and and those that may hereafter be promulgated by said convention and adhered
counterclaims, but making permanent a preliminary mandatory injunction to by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. 1
theretofore issued against the defendant on the interconnection of telephone
facilities owned and operated by said parties. The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising short), is a public service corporation holding a legislative franchise, Act
governmental powers through its branches and instrumentalities, one of 3426, as amended by Commonwealth Act 407, to install, operate and
which is the Bureau of Telecommunications. That office was created on 1 maintain a telephone system throughout the Philippines and to carry on the
July 1947, under Executive Order No. 94, with the following powers and business of electrical transmission of messages within the Philippines and
duties, in addition to certain powers and duties formerly vested in the Director between the Philippines and the telephone systems of other countries. 2 The
of Posts: 1awphil.ñêt RCA Communications, Inc., (which is not a party to the present case but has
contractual relations with the parties) is an American corporation authorized
SEC. 79. The Bureau of Telecommunications shall exercise the to transact business in the Philippines and is the grantee, by assignment, of a
following powers and duties: legislative franchise to operate a domestic station for the reception and
(a) To operate and maintain existing wire-telegraph and radio-telegraph transmission of long distance wireless messages (Act 2178) and to operate
offices, stations, and facilities, and those to be established to restore the pre- broadcasting and radio-telephone and radio-telegraphic communications
war telecommunication service under the Bureau of Posts, as well as such services (Act 3180). 3
additional offices or stations as may hereafter be established to provide
telecommunication service in places requiring such service; Sometime in 1933, the defendant, PLDT, and the RCA Communications,
(b) To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire- Inc., entered into an agreement whereby telephone messages, coming from
telephone or radio telephone communication service throughout the the United States and received by RCA's domestic station, could
Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces automatically be transferred to the lines of PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls
as may be found feasible and under such terms and conditions or collected by the PLDT for transmission from the Philippines to the United
States. The contracting parties agreed to divide the tolls, as follows: 25% to
PLDT and 75% to RCA. The sharing was amended in 1941 to 30% for PLDT government offices but even to serve private persons or the general public, in
and 70% for RCA, and again amended in 1947 to a 50-50 basis. The competition with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice that if said
arrangement was later extended to radio-telephone messages to and from violations were not stopped by midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would
European and Asiatic countries. Their contract contained a stipulation that sever the telephone connections. 13 When the PLDT received no reply, it
either party could terminate it on a 24-month notice to the other.4 On 2 disconnected the trunk lines being rented by the Bureau at midnight on 12
February 1956, PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate their contract on 2 April 1958. 14 The result was the isolation of the Philippines, on telephone
February 1958. 5 services, from the rest of the world, except the United States. 15

Soon after its creation in 1947, the Bureau of Telecommunications set up its At that time, the Bureau was maintaining 5,000 telephones and had 5,000
own Government Telephone System by utilizing its own appropriation and pending applications for telephone connection. 16 The PLDT was also
equipment and by renting trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government maintaining 60,000 telephones and had also 20,000 pending applications. 17
offices to call private parties. 6 Its application for the use of these trunk lines Through the years, neither of them has been able to fill up the demand for
was in the usual form of applications for telephone service, containing a telephone service.
statement, above the signature of the applicant, that the latter will abide by
the rules and regulations of the PLDT which are on file with the Public The Bureau of Telecommunications had proposed to the PLDT on 8 January
Service Commission. 7 One of the many rules prohibits the public use of the 1958 that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government
service furnished the telephone subscriber for his private use. 8 The Bureau paying (on a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting
has extended its services to the general public since 1948, 9 using the same facilities from the Government Telephone System to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT
trunk lines owned by, and rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its (the replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone
Bureau's) own schedule of rates. 10 Through these trunk lines, a Government service to Europe and Asian countries provided that the Bureau would submit
Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service Commission and in
in the same way that the latter could make a call to the former. consideration of 37 1/2% of the gross revenues. 19 In its memorandum in lieu
of oral argument in this Court dated 9 February 1964, on page 8, the defendant
On 5 March 1958, the plaintiff, through the Director of Telecommunications, reduced its offer to 33 1/3 % (1/3) as its share in the overseas telephone
entered into an agreement with RCA Communications, Inc., for a joint service. The proposals were not accepted by either party.
overseas telephone service whereby the Bureau would convey radio-
telephone overseas calls received by RCA's station to and from local On 12 April 1958, plaintiff Republic commenced suit against the defendant,
residents. 11 Actually, they inaugurated this joint operation on 2 February Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, in the Court of First Instance
1958, under a "provisional" agreement. 12 of Manila (Civil Case No. 35805), praying in its complaint for judgment
commanding the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the
On 7 April 1958, the defendant Philippine Long Distance Telephone Bureau, for the use of the facilities of defendant's telephone system
Company, complained to the Bureau of Telecommunications that said bureau throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might
was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange consider reasonable, and for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
(PBX) is inter-connected with the PLDT's facilities, referring to the rented defendant company to restrain the severance of the existing telephone
trunk lines, for the Bureau had used the trunk lines not only for the use of connections and/or restore those severed.
 the Bureau was to be public throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau was
Acting on the application of the plaintiff, and on the ground that the severance neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse of the poles of the PLDT; and, in
of telephone connections by the defendant company would isolate the view of serious public prejudice that would result from the disconnection of
Philippines from other countries, the court a quo, on 14 April 1958, issued an the trunk lines, declared the preliminary injunction permanent, although it
order for the defendant: dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaims.
(1) to forthwith reconnect and restore the seventy-eight (78) trunk lines that
it has disconnected between the facilities of the Government Telephone Both parties appealed.
System, including its overseas telephone services, and the facilities of
defendant; (2) to refrain from carrying into effect its threat to sever the Taking up first the appeal of the Republic, the latter complains of the action
existing telephone communication between the Bureau of of the trial court in dismissing the part of its complaint seeking to compel the
Telecommunications and defendant, and not to make connection over its defendant to enter into an interconnecting contract with it, because the parties
telephone system of telephone calls coming to the Philippines from foreign could not agree on the terms and conditions of the interconnection, and of its
countries through the said Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio facilities refusal to fix the terms and conditions therefor.
of RCA Communications, Inc.; and (3) to accept and connect through its
telephone system all such telephone calls coming to the Philippines from We agree with the court below that parties can not be coerced to enter into a
foreign countries — until further order of this Court. contract where no agreement is had between them as to the principal terms
and conditions of the contract. Freedom to stipulate such terms and conditions
On 28 April 1958, the defendant company filed its answer, with is of the essence of our contractual system, and by express provision of the
counterclaims. statute, a contract may be annulled if tainted by violence, intimidation, or
undue influence (Articles 1306, 1336, 1337, Civil Code of the Philippines).
It denied any obligation on its part to execute a contrary of services with the But the court a quo has apparently overlooked that while the Republic may
Bureau of Telecommunications; contested the jurisdiction of the Court of not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract with it, the Republic may, in the
First Instance to compel it to enter into interconnecting agreements, and exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the telephone
averred that it was justified to disconnect the trunk lines heretofore leased to company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and
the Bureau of Telecommunications under the existing agreement because its that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject
facilities were being used in fraud of its rights. PLDT further claimed that the to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.
Bureau was engaging in commercial telephone operations in excess of Nominally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
authority, in competition with, and to the prejudice of, the PLDT, using appropriation of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no
defendant's own telephone poles, without proper accounting of revenues. cogent reason appears why the said power may not be availed of to impose
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without loss of title
PLDT to enter into an agreement with the Bureau because the parties were and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
not in agreement; that under Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau of expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way. The use of the
Telecommunications, said Bureau was not limited to servicing government PLDT's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both
offices alone, nor was there any in the contract of lease of the trunk lines, telephone systems is not much different. In either case private property is
since the PLDT knew, or ought to have known, at the time that their use by subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. If, under section 6, Article
XIII, of the Constitution, the State may, in the interest of national welfare, This view we have taken of the true nature of the Republic's petition
transfer utilities to public ownership upon payment of just compensation, necessarily results in overruling the plea of defendant-appellant PLDT that
there is no reason why the State may not require a public utility to render the court of first instance had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and that
services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor. the proper forum for the action was the Public Service Commission. That
Ultimately, the beneficiary of the interconnecting service would be the users body, under the law, has no authority to pass upon actions for the taking of
of both telephone systems, so that the condemnation would be for public use. private property under the sovereign right of eminent domain. Furthermore,
while the defendant telephone company is a public utility corporation whose
The Bureau of Telecommunications, under section 78 (b) of Executive Order franchise, equipment and other properties are under the jurisdiction,
No. 94, may operate and maintain wire telephone or radio telephone supervision and control of the Public Service Commission (Sec. 13, Public
communications throughout the Philippines by utilizing existing facilities in Service Act), yet the plaintiff's telecommunications network is a public
cities, towns, and provinces under such terms and conditions or arrangement service owned by the Republic and operated by an instrumentality of the
with present owners or operators as may be agreed upon to the satisfaction of National Government, hence exempt, under Section 14 of the Public Service
all concerned; but there is nothing in this section that would exclude resort to Act, from such jurisdiction, supervision and control. The Bureau of
condemnation proceedings where unreasonable or unjust terms and Telecommunications was created in pursuance of a state policy reorganizing
conditions are exacted, to the extent of crippling or seriously hampering the the government offices —
operations of said Bureau. to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and
independent Government of the Republic of the Philippines, and for the
A perusal of the complaint shows that the Republic's cause of action is purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in its operation
predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the Bureau's facilities from (Section 1, Republic Act No. 51) —
the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be carried out and the determination of state policy is not vested in the Commission
by the PLDT, thereby preventing the Bureau of Telecommunications from (Utilities Com. vs. Bartonville Bus Line, 290 Ill. 574; 124 N.E. 373).
properly discharging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public. Save Defendant PLDT, as appellant, contends that the court below was in error in
for the prayer to compel the PLDT to enter into a contract (and the prayer is not holding that the Bureau of Telecommunications was not empowered to
no essential part of the pleading), the averments make out a case for engage in commercial telephone business, and in ruling that said defendant
compulsory rendering of inter-connecting services by the telephone company was not justified in disconnecting the telephone trunk lines it had previously
upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine to be just. And leased to the Bureau. We find that the court a quo ruled correctly in rejecting
since the lower court found that both parties "are practically at one that both assertions.
defendant (PLDT) is entitled to reasonable compensation from plaintiff for Executive Order No. 94, Series of 1947, reorganizing the Bureau of
the reasonable use of the former's telephone facilities" (Decision, Record on Telecommunications, expressly empowered the latter in its Section 79,
Appeal, page 224), the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as subsection (b), to "negotiate for, operate and maintain wire telephone or radio
one of condemnation of such services independently of contract and telephone communication service throughout the Philippines", and, in
proceeded to determine the just and reasonable compensation for the same, subsection (c), "to prescribe, subject to approval by the Department Head,
instead of dismissing the petition. equitable rates of charges for messages handled by the system and/or for time
calls and other services that may be rendered by the system". Nothing in these
provisions limits the Bureau to non-commercial activities or prevents it from
serving the general public. It may be that in its original prospectuses the The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its
Bureau officials had stated that the service would be limited to government knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of the trunk lines to
offices: but such limitations could not block future expansion of the system, commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the
as authorized by the terms of the Executive Order, nor could the officials of defendant to such extended use. Since this relationship has been maintained
the Bureau bind the Government not to engage in services that are authorized for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and
by law. It is a well-known rule that erroneous application and enforcement of their interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the
the law by public officers do not block subsequent correct application of the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now at liberty to
statute (PLDT vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 676), and that the unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
Government is never estopped by mistake or error on the part of its agents
(Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; Benguet ..., but there is high authority for the position that, when such physical
Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724). connection has been voluntarily made, under a fair and workable arrangement
and guaranteed by contract and the continuous line has come to be patronized
The theses that the Bureau's commercial services constituted unfair and established as a great public convenience, such connection shall not in
competition, and that the Bureau was guilty of fraud and abuse under its breach of the agreement be severed by one of the parties. In that case, the
contract, are, likewise, untenable. public is held to have such an interest in the arrangement that its rights must
receive due consideration. This position finds approval in State ex rel. vs.
First, the competition is merely hypothetical, the demand for telephone Cadwaller, 172 Ind. 619, 636, 87 N.E. 650, and is stated in the elaborate and
service being very much more than the supposed competitors can supply. As learned opinion of Chief Justice Myers as follows: "Such physical connection
previously noted, the PLDT had 20,000 pending applications at the time, and cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is voluntarily made by
the Bureau had another 5,000. The telephone company's inability to meet the contract, as is here alleged to be the case, so that the public acquires an
demands for service are notorious even now. Second, the charter of the interest in its continuance, the act of the parties in making such connection is
defendant expressly provides: equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the primary right of
independence, and it imposes upon the property such a public status that it
SEC. 14. The rights herein granted shall not be exclusive, and the may not be disregarded" — citing Mahan v. Mich. Tel. Co., 132 Mich. 242,
rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or person other than 93 N.W. 629, and the reasons upon which it is in part made to rest are referred
the grantee franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of message to in the same opinion, as follows: "Where private property is by the consent
or signals shall not be impaired or affected by the granting of this franchise: of the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for the benefit of the
— (Act 3436) public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must
hold it subject to the right of the public in the exercise of that public interest
And third, as the trial court correctly stated, "when the Bureau of or privilege conferred for their benefit." Allnut v. Inglis (1810) 12 East, 527.
Telecommunications subscribed to the trunk lines, defendant knew or should The doctrine of this early case is the acknowledged law. (Clinton-Dunn Tel.
have known that their use by the subscriber was more or less public and all Co. v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 74 S.E. 636, 638).
embracing in nature, that is, throughout the Philippines, if not abroad"
(Decision, Record on Appeal, page 216). It is clear that the main reason for the objection of the PLDT lies in the fact
that said appellant did not expect that the Bureau's telephone system would
expand with such rapidity as it has done; but this expansion is no ground for In the ultimate analysis, the true objection of the PLDT to continue the link
the discontinuance of the service agreed upon. between its network and that of the Government is that the latter competes
"parasitically" (sic) with its own telephone services. Considering, however,
The last issue urged by the PLDT as appellant is its right to compensation for that the PLDT franchise is non-exclusive; that it is well-known that defendant
the use of its poles for bearing telephone wires of the Bureau of PLDT is unable to adequately cope with the current demands for telephone
Telecommunications. Admitting that section 19 of the PLDT charter reserves service, as shown by the number of pending applications therefor; and that
to the Government — the PLDT's right to just compensation for the services rendered to the
Government telephone system and its users is herein recognized and
the privilege without compensation of using the poles of the grantee to preserved, the objections of defendant-appellant are without merit. To uphold
attach one ten-pin cross-arm, and to install, maintain and operate wires of its the PLDT's contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the
telegraph system thereon; Provided, however, That the Bureau of Posts shall right of the PLDT to derive profit from the future expansion of its services
have the right to place additional cross-arms and wires on the poles of the under its non-exclusive franchise.
grantee by paying a compensation, the rate of which is to be agreed upon by
the Director of Posts and the grantee; — WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance, now under appeal,
is affirmed, except in so far as it dismisses the petition of the Republic of the
the defendant counterclaimed for P8,772.00 for the use of its poles by the Philippines to compel the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company to
plaintiff, contending that what was allowed free use, under the aforequoted continue servicing the Government telephone system upon such terms, and
provision, was one ten-pin cross-arm attachment and only for plaintiff's for a compensation, that the trial court may determine to be just, including
telegraph system, not for its telephone system; that said section could not the period elapsed from the filing of the original complaint or petition. And
refer to the plaintiff's telephone system, because it did not have such for this purpose, the records are ordered returned to the court of origin for
telephone system when defendant acquired its franchise. The implication of further hearings and other proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. No
the argument is that plaintiff has to pay for the use of defendant's poles if such costs.
use is for plaintiff's telephone system and has to pay also if it attaches more Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando,
than one (1) ten-pin cross-arm for telegraphic purposes. Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.

As there is no proof that the telephone wires strain the poles of the PLDT
more than the telegraph wires, nor that they cause more damage than the wires
of the telegraph system, or that the Government has attached to the poles more
than one ten-pin cross-arm as permitted by the PLDT charter, we see no point
in this assignment of error. So long as the burden to be borne by the PLDT
poles is not increased, we see no reason why the reservation in favor of the
telegraph wires of the government should not be extended to its telephone
lines, any time that the government decided to engage also in this kind of
communication.
G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958 incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, located
vs. along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek
JUAN F. FAJARDO, ET AL., defendants-appellants. (Exh. D). On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among
Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Higinio V. Catalan for others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the
appellee. public plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their
Prila, Pardalis and Pejo for appellants. request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned down
by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the
REYES, J. B. L., J.: building without a permit, because they needed a place of residence very
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto
convicting defendants-appellants Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia of a they had been living on leased property.
violation of Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, for having constructed without a permit from the municipal On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and convicted by the
mayor a building that destroys the view of the public plaza. justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of the
ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the Court of First Instance,
It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant- which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35
appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines each and the costs, as well as to demolish the building in question because it
Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of
follows: travelers from the National Highway to the said public plaza." From this
SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter
building should, before constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit forwarded the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality
from the Municipal Mayor. of the ordinance in question.
SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each
building permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. We find that the appealed conviction can not stand.
SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above,
this ordinance, shall make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than A first objection to the validity of the ordinance in question is that under it
P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more the mayor has absolute discretion to issue or deny a permit. The ordinance
than 24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor's
the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be action. No purpose to be attained by requiring the permit is expressed; no
removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. conditions for its grant or refusal are enumerated. It is not merely a case of
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its deficient standards; standards are entirely lacking. The ordinance thus confers
approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3) upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance
of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an undefined and
Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful,
and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written request with the
is invalid (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil., 71; refusal of the Mayor of Baao to issue a building permit to the appellant was
Schloss Poster Adv. Co. vs. Rock Hill, 2 SE (2d) 392) predicated on the ground that the proposed building would "destroy the view
of the public plaza" by preventing its being seen from the public highway.
The ordinance in question in no way controls or guides the discretion vested Even thus interpreted, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that
thereby in the respondents. It prescribes no uniform rule upon which the it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own
special permission of the city is to be granted. Thus the city is clothed with property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a
the uncontrolled power to capriciously grant the privilege to some and deny taking of appellants property without just compensation. We do not overlook
it others; to refuse the application of one landowner or lessee and to grant that that the modern tendency is to regard the beautification of neighborhoods as
of another, when for all material purposes, the two applying for precisely the conducive to the comfort and happiness of residents. But while property may
same privileges under the same circumstances. The danger of such an be regulated in the interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State
ordinance is that it makes possible arbitrary discriminations and abuses in its may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty,
execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatever, other 32 Phil. 580), the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently
than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate
which its validity is to be tested. Fundamental rights under our government them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.
do not depend for their existence upon such a slender and uncertain thread. As the case now stands, every structure that may be erected on appellants'
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely land, regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned under the ordinance in
arbitrary, and which may be exercised in the interest of a favored few, are question, because it would interfere with the view of the public plaza from
unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have established a rule by the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be constrained to let their land
which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is best suited,
above sustain this conclusion. being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must
give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.
As was said in City of Richmond vs. Dudley, 129 Ind. 112,28 N. E. 312, 314
13 L. R. A. 587, 28 Am. St. Rep. 180: "It seems from the foregoing authorities An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can
to be well established that municipal ordinances placing restrictions upon not be used for any reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation
lawful conduct or the lawful use of property must, in order to be valid, specify and must be recognized as a taking of the property. The only substantial
the rules and conditions to be observed in such conduct or business; and must difference, in such case, between restriction and actual taking, is that the
admit of the exercise of the privilege of all citizens alike who will comply restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden of payment of taxation,
with such rules and conditions; and must not admit of the exercise, or of an while outright confiscation would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay
opportunity for the exercise, of any arbitrary discrimination by the municipal Constr. Co. vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).
authorities between citizens who will so comply. (Schloss Poster Adv. Co.,
Inc. vs. City of Rock Hill, et al., 2 SE (2d), pp. 394-395). A regulation which substantially deprives an owner of all beneficial use of
his property is confiscation and is a deprivation within the meaning of the
It is contended, on the other hand, that the mayor can refuse a permit solely 14th Amendment. (Sundlum vs. Zoning Bd., 145 Atl. 451; also Eaton vs.
in case that the proposed building "destroys the view of the public plaza or Sweeny, 177 NE 412; Taylor vs. Jacksonville, 133 So. 114).
occupies any public property" (as stated in its section 3); and in fact, the
Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use which can not reasonably the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived
be made of it cannot be said to set aside such property to a use but constitutes and promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c) aforequoted.
the taking of such property without just compensation. Use of property is an
element of ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of zealots that We rule that the regulation in question, Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of
property may properly, by zoning, be utterly destroyed without 1950, of the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority
compensation, such principle finds no support in the genius of our of said municipality to enact, and is therefore null and void. Hence, the
government nor in the principles of justice as we known them. Such a doctrine conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted,
shocks the sense of justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain open with costs de oficio. So ordered.
and unused, then certainly the public, and not the private individuals, should
bear the cost of reasonable compensation for such property under the rules Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
of law governing the condemnation of private property for public use. (Tews Concepcion, Endencia and Felix, JJ.,concur.
vs. Woolhiser (1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827) (Emphasis supplied.)

The validity of the ordinance in question was justified by the court below
under section 2243, par. (c), of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended. This section provides:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character.
— The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following
discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of
buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits
for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by
the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each
building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected
under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school
fund.

Under the provisions of the section above quoted, however, the power of the
municipal council to require the issuance of building permits rests upon its
first establishing fire limits in populous parts of the town and prescribing the
kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them. As there
is absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either
established fire limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or
kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired within them before it passed
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974 A parcel of land (Portion of lot 3, Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd 26254.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, Bounded on the NE by Lot No. 3, on the SE by school lot and national road,
vs. on the SW by Lot 1-B Blk 2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666), on the
CARMEN M. VDA. DE CASTELLVI, ET AL., defendants-appellees. NW by Lot 1-B, Blk-1. Containing an area of 88,772 square meters, more or
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant. less, and registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun under TCT
C.A. Mendoza & A. V. Raquiza and Alberto Cacnio & Associates for No. 8708 of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, ....
defendant-appellees.
In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other things, that the fair market
ZALDIVAR, J.:p value of the above-mentioned lands, according to the Committee on
Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per
Civil Case No. 1623, an expropriation proceeding. hectare, or a total market value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the
provisional value of the lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, (hereinafter referred to as authorizes plaintiff to take immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of
the Republic) filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against that amount with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court
defendant-appellee, Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of appoints three commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
the estate of the late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that the court
over a parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca, issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.
Pampanga, described as follows:
On June 29, 1959 the trial court issued an order fixing the provisional value
A parcel of land, Lot No. 199-B Bureau of Lands Plan Swo 23666. Bounded of the lands at P259,669.10.
on the NE by Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun; on the SE by national road; on
the SW by AFP reservation, and on the NW by AFP reservation. Containing In her "motion to dismiss" filed on July 14, 1959, Castellvi alleged, among
an area of 759,299 square meters, more or less, and registered in the name of other things, that the land under her administration, being a residential land,
Alfonso Castellvi under TCT No. 13631 of the Register of Pampanga ...; had a fair market value of P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market
and against defendant-appellee Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun (hereinafter value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic, through the Armed Forces of the
referred to as Toledo-Gozun over two parcels of land described as follows: Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had been, despite repeated
demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956, thereby
A parcel of land (Portion Lot Blk-1, Bureau of Lands Plan Psd, 26254. preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by
Bounded on the NE by Lot 3, on the SE by Lot 3; on the SW by Lot 1-B, Blk. way of unrealized profits. This defendant prayed that the complaint be
2 (equivalent to Lot 199-B Swo 23666; on the NW by AFP military dismissed, or that the Republic be ordered to pay her P15.00 per square meter,
reservation. Containing an area of 450,273 square meters, more or less and or a total of P11,389,485.00, plus interest thereon at 6% per annum from July
registered in the name of Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun under TCT No. 8708 1, 1956; that the Republic be ordered to pay her P5,000,000.00 as unrealized
of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. ..., and profits, and the costs of the suit.
By order of the trial court, dated August, 1959, Amparo C. Diaz, Dolores G. Bank under the supervision of the Deputy Clerk of Court. In another order of
viuda de Gil, Paloma Castellvi, Carmen Castellvi, Rafael Castellvi, Luis May 16, 1960 the trial Court entered an order of condemnation.
Castellvi, Natividad Castellvi de Raquiza, Jose Castellvi and Consuelo
Castellvi were allowed to intervene as parties defendants. Subsequently, The trial Court appointed three commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, Clerk
Joaquin V. Gozun, Jr., husband of defendant Nieves Toledo Gozun, was also of Court, as commissioner for the court; Atty. Felicisimo G. Pamandanan,
allowed by the court to intervene as a party defendant. counsel of the Philippine National Bank Branch at Floridablanca, for the
plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo F. Lansangan, Filipino legal counsel at Clark
After the Republic had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga Air Base, for the defendants. The Commissioners, after having qualified
the amount of P259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the Republic be placed themselves, proceeded to the performance of their duties.
in possession of the lands. The Republic was actually placed in possession of
the lands on August 10, 1959. On March 15,1961 the Commissioners submitted their report and
recommendation, wherein, after having determined that the lands sought to
In her "motion to dismiss", dated October 22, 1959, Toledo-Gozun alleged, be expropriated were residential lands, they recommended unanimously that
among other things, that her two parcels of land were residential lands, in fact the lowest price that should be paid was P10.00 per square meter, for both the
a portion with an area of 343,303 square meters had already been subdivided lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun; that an additional P5,000.00 be paid to
into different lots for sale to the general public, and the remaining portion had Toledo-Gozun for improvements found on her land; that legal interest on the
already been set aside for expansion sites of the already completed compensation, computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the
subdivisions; that the fair market value of said lands was P15.00 per square amounts already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be
meter, so they had a total market value of P8,085,675.00; and she prayed that awarded.4 The Commissioners' report was objected to by all the parties in the
the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P8,085,675.00, case — by defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, who insisted that the fair
plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959, and market value of their lands should be fixed at P15.00 per square meter; and
attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00. by the Republic, which insisted that the price to be paid for the lands should
be fixed at P0.20 per square meter.
Intervenors Jose Castellvi and Consuelo Castellvi in their answer, filed on
February 11, 1960, and also intervenor Joaquin Gozun, Jr., husband of After the parties-defendants and intervenors had filed their respective
defendant Maria Nieves Toledo-Gozun, in his motion to dismiss, dated May memoranda, and the Republic, after several extensions of time, had adopted
27, 1960, all alleged that the value of the lands sought to be expropriated was as its memorandum its objections to the report of the Commissioners, the trial
at the rate of P15.00 per square meter. court, on May 26, 1961, rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
On November 4, 1959, the trial court authorized the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga to pay defendant Toledo-Gozun the sum of P107,609.00 as WHEREFORE, taking into account all the foregoing circumstances, and that
provisional value of her lands.2 On May 16, 1960 the trial Court authorized the lands are titled, ... the rising trend of land values ..., and the lowered
the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay defendant Castellvi the amount purchasing power of the Philippine peso, the court finds that the unanimous
of P151,859.80 as provisional value of the land under her administration, and recommendation of the commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter
ordered said defendant to deposit the amount with the Philippine National for the three lots of the defendants subject of this action is fair and just.
 also filed, on July 17, 1961, her notice of appeal from the decision of the trial
xxx xxx xxx court.

The plaintiff will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands of The Republic filed various ex-parte motions for extension of time within
defendant Toledo-Gozun since (sic) the amount deposited as provisional which to file its record on appeal. The Republic's record on appeal was finally
value from August 10, 1959 until full payment is made to said defendant or submitted on December 6, 1961.
deposit therefor is made in court.
Defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed not only a joint opposition to
In respect to the defendant Castellvi, interest at 6% per annum will also be the approval of the Republic's record on appeal, but also a joint memorandum
paid by the plaintiff to defendant Castellvi from July 1, 1956 when plaintiff in support of their opposition. The Republic also filed a memorandum in
commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land when the instant action support of its prayer for the approval of its record on appeal. On December
had not yet been commenced to July 10, 1959 when the provisional value 27, 1961 the trial court issued an order declaring both the record on appeal
thereof was actually deposited in court, on the total value of the said filed by the Republic, and the record on appeal filed by defendant Castellvi
(Castellvi) land as herein adjudged. The same rate of interest shall be paid as having been filed out of time, thereby dismissing both appeals.
from July 11, 1959 on the total value of the land herein adjudged minus the
amount deposited as provisional value, or P151,859.80, such interest to run On January 11, 1962 the Republic filed a "motion to strike out the order of
until full payment is made to said defendant or deposit therefor is made in December 27, 1961 and for reconsideration", and subsequently an amended
court. All the intervenors having failed to produce evidence in support of their record on appeal, against which motion the defendants Castellvi and Toledo-
respective interventions, said interventions are ordered dismissed. Gozun filed their opposition. On July 26, 1962 the trial court issued an order,
stating that "in the interest of expediency, the questions raised may be
The costs shall be charged to the plaintiff. properly and finally determined by the Supreme Court," and at the same time
it ordered the Solicitor General to submit a record on appeal containing copies
On June 21, 1961 the Republic filed a motion for a new trial and/or of orders and pleadings specified therein. In an order dated November 19,
reconsideration, upon the grounds of newly-discovered evidence, that the 1962, the trial court approved the Republic's record on appeal as amended.
decision was not supported by the evidence, and that the decision was against
the law, against which motion defendants Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun filed Defendant Castellvi did not insist on her appeal. Defendant Toledo-Gozun
their respective oppositions. On July 8, 1961 when the motion of the Republic did not appeal.
for new trial and/or reconsideration was called for hearing, the Republic filed
a supplemental motion for new trial upon the ground of additional newly- The motion to dismiss the Republic's appeal was reiterated by appellees
discovered evidence. This motion for new trial and/or reconsideration was Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun before this Court, but this Court denied the
denied by the court on July 12, 1961. motion.

On July 17, 1961 the Republic gave notice of its intention to appeal from the In her motion of August 11, 1964, appellee Castellvi sought to increase the
decision of May 26, 1961 and the order of July 12, 1961. Defendant Castellvi provisional value of her land. The Republic, in its comment on Castellvi's
motion, opposed the same. This Court denied Castellvi's motion in a constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of
resolution dated October 2,1964. expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and
The motion of appellees, Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, dated October 6, 1969, stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national
praying that they be authorized to mortgage the lands subject of Security.7
expropriation, was denied by this Court or October 14, 1969.
Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of property
On February 14, 1972, Attys. Alberto Cacnio, and Associates, counsel for the under the power of eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit:
estate of the late Don Alfonso de Castellvi in the expropriation proceedings, (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon the private property for
filed a notice of attorney's lien, stating that as per agreement with the more than a momentary or limited period, and (2) devoting it to a public use
administrator of the estate of Don Alfonso de Castellvi they shall receive by in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
way of attorney's fees, "the sum equivalent to ten per centum of whatever the of the property. This appellee argues that in the instant case the first element
court may finally decide as the expropriated price of the property subject is wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year
matter of the case." to year; that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was
paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract
--------- of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege" to buy the
Before this Court, the Republic contends that the lower court erred: premises "at the value at the time of occupancy." 8
1. In finding the price of P10 per square meter of the lands subject of
the instant proceedings as just compensation; Appellee Toledo-Gozun did not comment on the Republic's argument in
2. In holding that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation support of the second error assigned, because as far as she was concerned the
commenced with the filing of this action; Republic had not taken possession of her lands prior to August 10, 1959. 9
3. In ordering plaintiff-appellant to pay 6% interest on the adjudged
value of the Castellvi property to start from July of 1956; In order to better comprehend the issues raised in the appeal, in so far as the
4. In denying plaintiff-appellant's motion for new trial based on newly Castellvi property is concerned, it should be noted that the Castellvi property
discovered evidence. had been occupied by the Philippine Air Force since 1947 under a contract of
In its brief, the Republic discusses the second error assigned as the first issue lease, typified by the contract marked Exh. 4-Castellvi, the pertinent portions
to be considered. We shall follow the sequence of the Republic's discussion. of which read:
1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding CONTRACT OF LEASE
that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced with the This AGREEMENT OF LEASE MADE AND ENTERED into by and
filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that the "taking" between INTESTATE ESTATE OF ALFONSO DE CASTELLVI,
should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of a special lease represented by CARMEN M. DE CASTELLVI, Judicial Administratrix ...
agreement between the Republic and appellee Castellvi, the former was hereinafter called the LESSOR and THE REPUBLIC OF THE
granted the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to PHILIPPINES represented by MAJ. GEN. CALIXTO DUQUE, Chief of
terminate the lease, and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that Staff of the ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, hereinafter called
the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy; and that the the LESSEE,
permanent improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos WITNESSETH:
1. For and in consideration of the rentals hereinafter reserved and the the LESSEE prior to the termination of this lease. The LESSEE shall
mutual terms, covenants and conditions of the parties, the LESSOR has, and surrender possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of
by these presents does, lease and let unto the LESSEE the following described this lease and if so required by the LESSOR, shall return the premises in
land together with the improvements thereon and appurtenances thereof, viz: substantially the same condition as that existing at the time same were first
Un Terreno, Lote No. 27 del Plano de subdivision Psu 34752, parte de la occupied by the AFP, reasonable and ordinary wear and tear and damages by
hacienda de Campauit, situado en el Barrio de San Jose, Municipio de the elements or by circumstances over which the LESSEE has no control
Floridablanca Pampanga. ... midiendo una extension superficial de cuatro excepted: PROVIDED, that if the LESSOR so requires the return of the
milliones once mil cuatro cientos trienta y cinco (4,001,435) [sic] metros premises in such condition, the LESSOR shall give written notice thereof to
cuadrados, mas o menos. the LESSEE at least twenty (20) days before the termination of the lease and
Out of the above described property, 75.93 hectares thereof are actually provided, further, that should the LESSOR give notice within the time
occupied and covered by this contract. . specified above, the LESSEE shall have the right and privilege to compensate
Above lot is more particularly described in TCT No. 1016, province of the LESSOR at the fair value or the equivalent, in lieu of performance of its
Pampanga ... obligation, if any, to restore the premises. Fair value is to be determined as
of which premises, the LESSOR warrants that he/she/they/is/are the the value at the time of occupancy less fair wear and tear and depreciation
registered owner(s) and with full authority to execute a contract of this nature. during the period of this lease.
2. The term of this lease shall be for the period beginning July 1, 1952 6. The LESSEE may terminate this lease at any time during the term
the date the premises were occupied by the PHILIPPINE AIR FORCE, AFP hereof by giving written notice to the LESSOR at least thirty (30) days in
until June 30, 1953, subject to renewal for another year at the option of the advance ...
LESSEE or unless sooner terminated by the LESSEE as hereinafter provided. 7. The LESSEE should not be responsible, except under special
3. The LESSOR hereby warrants that the LESSEE shall have quiet, legislation for any damages to the premises by reason of combat operations,
peaceful and undisturbed possession of the demised premises throughout the acts of GOD, the elements or other acts and deeds not due to the negligence
full term or period of this lease and the LESSOR undertakes without cost to on the part of the LESSEE.
the LESSEE to eject all trespassers, but should the LESSOR fail to do so, the 8. This LEASE AGREEMENT supersedes and voids any and all
LESSEE at its option may proceed to do so at the expense of the LESSOR. agreements and undertakings, oral or written, previously entered into between
The LESSOR further agrees that should he/she/they sell or encumber all or the parties covering the property herein leased, the same having been merged
any part of the herein described premises during the period of this lease, any herein. This AGREEMENT may not be modified or altered except by
conveyance will be conditioned on the right of the LESSEE hereunder. instrument in writing only duly signed by the parties. 10
4. The LESSEE shall pay to the LESSOR as monthly rentals under this It was stipulated by the parties, that "the foregoing contract of lease (Exh. 4,
lease the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS & 58/100 Castellvi) is 'similar in terms and conditions, including the date', with the
(P455.58) ... annual contracts entered into from year to year between defendant Castellvi
5. The LESSEE may, at any time prior to the termination of this lease, and the Republic of the Philippines (p. 17, t.s.n., Vol. III)". 11 It is undisputed,
use the property for any purpose or purposes and, at its own costs and expense therefore, that the Republic occupied Castellvi's land from July 1, 1947, by
make alteration, install facilities and fixtures and errect additions ... which virtue of the above-mentioned contract, on a year to year basis (from July 1
facilities or fixtures ... so placed in, upon or attached to the said premises shall of each year to June 30 of the succeeding year) under the terms and conditions
be and remain property of the LESSEE and may be removed therefrom by therein stated.
 to 1959 and considering that this action is one of illegal detainer and/or to
Before the expiration of the contract of lease on June 30, 1956 the Republic recover the possession of said land by virtue of non-payment of rents, the
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When the AFP refused to instant case now has become moot and academic and/or by virtue of the
vacate the leased premises after the termination of the contract, on July 11, agreement signed by plaintiff, she has waived her cause of action in the
1956, Castellvi wrote to the Chief of Staff, AFP, informing the latter that the above-entitled case. 12
heirs of the property had decided not to continue leasing the property in
question because they had decided to subdivide the land for sale to the general The Republic urges that the "taking " of Castellvi's property should be
public, demanding that the property be vacated within 30 days from receipt deemed as of the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In
of the letter, and that the premises be returned in substantially the same American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of
condition as before occupancy (Exh. 5 — Castellvi). A follow-up letter was "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of "taking" (in eminent domain) as
sent on January 12, 1957, demanding the delivery and return of the property follows:
within one month from said date (Exh. 6 Castellvi). On January 30, 1957,
Lieutenant General Alfonso Arellano, Chief of Staff, answered the letter of Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as
Castellvi, saying that it was difficult for the army to vacate the premises in entering upon private property for more than a momentary period, and, under
view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost the warrant or color of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise
P500,000.00 that were erected and already established on the property, and informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as
that, there being no other recourse, the acquisition of the property by means substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment
of expropriation proceedings would be recommended to the President thereof. 13
(Exhibit "7" — Castellvi).
Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number of circumstances must be
Defendant Castellvi then brought suit in the Court of First Instance of present in the "taking" of property for purposes of eminent domain.
Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 1458, to eject the Philippine Air Force from the
land. While this ejectment case was pending, the Republic instituted these First, the expropriator must enter a private property. This circumstance is
expropriation proceedings, and, as stated earlier in this opinion, the Republic present in the instant case, when by virtue of the lease agreement the
was placed in possession of the lands on August 10, 1959, On November 21, Republic, through the AFP, took possession of the property of Castellvi.
1959, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, dismissed Civil Case No.
1458, upon petition of the parties, in an order which, in part, reads as follows: Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
1. Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an period. "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of but a moment's
agreement with defendants, whereby she has agreed to receive the rent of the duration" (The Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a
lands, subject matter of the instant case from June 30, 1966 up to 1959 when very short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at
the Philippine Air Force was placed in possession by virtue of an order of the every moment" (Webster's Third International Dictionary, 1963 edition.) The
Court upon depositing the provisional amount as fixed by the Provincial word "momentary" when applied to possession or occupancy of (real)
Appraisal Committee with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; property should be construed to mean "a limited period" — not indefinite or
2. That because of the above-cited agreement wherein the permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a period of one year,
administratrix decided to get the rent corresponding to the rent from 1956 up renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the lease, is
temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through the Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
AFP, constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be conceded that the circumstance
fact that the entry into the land was transitory, or intended to last a year, of the property being devoted to public use is present because the property
although renewable from year to year by consent of 'The owner of the land. was used by the air force of the AFP.
By express provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee,
undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition as at the Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as
time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
intention of the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred In the instant case, the entry of the Republic into the property and its
from the construction of permanent improvements. But this "intention" utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her of
cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. Intent is all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and
to be deduced from the language employed by the parties, and the terms 'of was continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the
the contract, when unambiguous, as in the instant case, are conclusive in the renewal of the lease contract from year to year, and by the provision in the
absence of averment and proof of mistake or fraud — the question being not lease contract whereby the Republic undertook to return the property to
what the intention was, but what is expressed in the language used. (City of Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of
Manila v. Rizal Park Co., Inc., 53 Phil. 515, 525); Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic was bound
Myrick, 71 Phil. 344, 348). Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the to pay, and had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals until the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be time when it filed the complaint for eminent domain on June 26, 1959.
principally considered (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the lessee
(Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy permanently Castellvi's property, It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of Catellvi's property for purposes of
why was the contract of lease entered into on year to year basis? Why was eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
the lease agreement renewed from year to year? Why did not the Republic Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find merit
expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic in the contention of Castellvi that two essential elements in the "taking" of
itself, it expropriated the other parcels of land that it occupied at the same property under the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that the entrance
time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose of converting them into a jet air and occupation by the condemnor must be for a permanent, or indefinite
base? 14 It might really have been the intention of the Republic to expropriate period, and (2) that in devoting the property to public use the owner was
the lands in question at some future time, but certainly mere notice - much ousted from the property and deprived of its beneficial use, were not present
less an implied notice — of such intention on the part of the Republic to when the Republic entered and occupied the Castellvi property in 1947.
expropriate the lands in the future did not, and could not, bind the landowner,
nor bind the land itself. The expropriation must be actually commenced in Untenable also is the Republic's contention that although the contract
court (Republic vs. Baylosis, et al., 96 Phil. 461, 484). between the parties was one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in reality
a more or less permanent right to occupy the premises under the guise of lease
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal with the 'right and privilege' to buy the property should the lessor wish to
authority. This circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in terminate the lease," and "the right to buy the property is merged as an integral
the instant case, because the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee. part of the lease relationship ... so much so that the fair market value has been
agreed upon, not, as of the time of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy"
15
We cannot accept the Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year the lease, in lieu of the lessee's performance of the undertaking to put the land
basis can give rise to a permanent right to occupy, since by express legal in said condition. The "fair value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the
provision a lease made for a determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's lease agreement, does not refer to the value of the property if bought by the
land in the instant case, ceases upon the day fixed, without need of a demand lessee, but refers to the cost of restoring the property in the same condition as
(Article 1669, Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right of eminent of the time when the lessee took possession of the property. Such fair value
domain may be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase was never intended by the
(Rule 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be accepted that the Republic parties to the lease contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of contracts that
would enter into a contract of lease where its real intention was to buy, or "However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood
why the Republic should enter into a simulated contract of lease ("under the to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those
guise of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Republic) when all the time upon which the parties intended to agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code).
the Republic had the right of eminent domain, and could expropriate
Castellvi's land if it wanted to without resorting to any guise whatsoever. We hold, therefore, that the "taking" of the Castellvi property should not be
Neither can we see how a right to buy could be merged in a contract of lease reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same
in the absence of any agreement between the parties to that effect. To sustain pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for
the contention of the Republic is to sanction a practice whereby in order to the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value of
secure a low price for a land which the government intends to expropriate (or the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when it
would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate with the owner of the held that the "taking" of the property under expropriation commenced with
land to lease the land (for say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the same the filing of the complaint in this case.
when the lease is about to terminate, then claim that the "taking" of the
property for the purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of the date when Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, 16 the "just compensation"
the Government started to occupy the property under the lease, and then assert is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court
that the value of the property being expropriated be reckoned as of the start has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
of the lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the property, for many good coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
reasons, had in the meantime increased during the period of the lease. This place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
would be sanctioning what obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
have the effect of depriving the owner of the property of its true and fair complaint. (Republic vs. Philippine National Bank, L-14158, April 12, 1961,
market value at the time when the expropriation proceedings were actually 1 SCRA 957, 961-962). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic
instituted in court. The Republic's claim that it had the "right and privilege" was placed in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court,
to buy the property at the value that it had at the time when it first occupied on August 10, 1959. The "taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes
the property as lessee nowhere appears in the lease contract. What was of determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned
agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the lease agreement was that, should as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed.
the lessor require the lessee to return the premises in the same condition as at
the time the same was first occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the Regarding the two parcels of land of Toledo-Gozun, also sought to be
"right and privilege" (or option) of paying the lessor what it would fairly cost expropriated, which had never been under lease to the Republic, the Republic
to put the premises in the same condition as it was at the commencement of was placed in possession of said lands, also by authority of the court, on
August 10, 1959, The taking of those lands, therefore, must also be reckoned applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted, that is to
as of June 26, 1959, the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent domain. say, What is it worth from its availability for valuable uses?

2. Regarding the first assigned error — discussed as the second issue So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in
— the Republic maintains that, even assuming that the value of the determining the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is
expropriated lands is to be determined as of June 26, 1959, the price of P10.00 practically impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all
per square meter fixed by the lower court "is not only exhorbitant but also cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded
unconscionable, and almost fantastic". On the other hand, both Castellvi and rule, but, as a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner
Toledo-Gozun maintain that their lands are residential lands with a fair is to be estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable,
market value of not less than P15.00 per square meter. having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as
may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. (Miss. and Rum River
The lower court found, and declared, that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo- Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403).
Gozun are residential lands. The finding of the lower court is in consonance
with the unanimous opinion of the three commissioners who, in their report In expropriation proceedings, therefore, the owner of the land has the right to
to the court, declared that the lands are residential lands. its value for the use for which it would bring the most in the market. 17 The
owner may thus show every advantage that his property possesses, present
The Republic assails the finding that the lands are residential, contending that and prospective, in order that the price it could be sold for in the market may
the plans of the appellees to convert the lands into subdivision for residential be satisfactorily determined. 18 The owner may also show that the property is
purposes were only on paper, there being no overt acts on the part of the suitable for division into village or town lots. 19
appellees which indicated that the subdivision project had been commenced,
so that any compensation to be awarded on the basis of the plans would be The trial court, therefore, correctly considered, among other circumstances,
speculative. The Republic's contention is not well taken. We find evidence the proposed subdivision plans of the lands sought to be expropriated in
showing that the lands in question had ceased to be devoted to the production finding that those lands are residential lots. This finding of the lower court is
of agricultural crops, that they had become adaptable for residential purposes, supported not only by the unanimous opinion of the commissioners, as
and that the appellees had actually taken steps to convert their lands into embodied in their report, but also by the Provincial Appraisal Committee of
residential subdivisions even before the Republic filed the complaint for the province of Pampanga composed of the Provincial Treasurer, the
eminent domain. In the case of City of Manila vs. Corrales (32 Phil. 82, 98) Provincial Auditor and the District Engineer. In the minutes of the meeting
this Court laid down basic guidelines in determining the value of the property of the Provincial Appraisal Committee, held on May 14, 1959 (Exh. 13-
expropriated for public purposes. This Court said: Castellvi) We read in its Resolution No. 10 the following:

In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same 3. Since 1957 the land has been classified as residential in view of its
consideration are to be regarded as in a sale of property between private proximity to the air base and due to the fact that it was not being devoted to
parties. The inquiry, in such cases, must be what is the property worth in the agriculture. In fact, there is a plan to convert it into a subdivision for
market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to which it is at the time residential purposes. The taxes due on the property have been paid based on
its classification as residential land;
 Indeed, the owners of these lands have the right to their value for the use for
The evidence shows that Castellvi broached the idea of subdividing her land which they would bring the most in the market at the time the same were
into residential lots as early as July 11, 1956 in her letter to the Chief of Staff taken from them. The most important issue to be resolved in the present case
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. (Exh. 5-Castellvi) As a matter of fact, relates to the question of what is the just compensation that should be paid to
the layout of the subdivision plan was tentatively approved by the National the appellees.
Planning Commission on September 7, 1956. (Exh. 8-Castellvi). The land of
Castellvi had not been devoted to agriculture since 1947 when it was leased The Republic asserts that the fair market value of the lands of the appellees
to the Philippine Army. In 1957 said land was classified as residential, and is P.20 per square meter. The Republic cites the case of Republic vs. Narciso,
taxes based on its classification as residential had been paid since then (Exh. et al., L-6594, which this Court decided on May 18, 1956. The Narciso case
13-Castellvi). The location of the Castellvi land justifies its suitability for a involved lands that belonged to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun, and to one
residential subdivision. As found by the trial court, "It is at the left side of the Donata Montemayor, which were expropriated by the Republic in 1949 and
entrance of the Basa Air Base and bounded on two sides by roads (Exh. 13- which are now the site of the Basa Air Base. In the Narciso case this Court
Castellvi), paragraphs 1 and 2, Exh. 12-Castellvi), the poblacion, (of fixed the fair market value at P.20 per square meter. The lands that are sought
Floridablanca) the municipal building, and the Pampanga Sugar Mills are to be expropriated in the present case being contiguous to the lands involved
closed by. The barrio schoolhouse and chapel are also near (T.S.N. November in the Narciso case, it is the stand of the Republic that the price that should
23,1960, p. 68)." 20 be fixed for the lands now in question should also be at P.20 per square meter.

The lands of Toledo-Gozun (Lot 1-B and Lot 3) are practically of the same We can not sustain the stand of the Republic. We find that the price of P.20
condition as the land of Castellvi. The lands of Toledo-Gozun adjoin the land per square meter, as fixed by this Court in the Narciso case, was based on the
of Castellvi. They are also contiguous to the Basa Air Base, and are along the allegation of the defendants (owners) in their answer to the complaint for
road. These lands are near the barrio schoolhouse, the barrio chapel, the eminent domain in that case that the price of their lands was P2,000.00 per
Pampanga Sugar Mills, and the poblacion of Floridablanca (Exhs. 1, 3 and 4- hectare and that was the price that they asked the court to pay them. This
Toledo-Gozun). As a matter of fact, regarding lot 1-B it had already been Court said, then, that the owners of the land could not be given more than
surveyed and subdivided, and its conversion into a residential subdivision what they had asked, notwithstanding the recommendation of the majority of
was tentatively approved by the National Planning Commission on July 8, the Commission on Appraisal — which was adopted by the trial court — that
1959 (Exhs. 5 and 6 Toledo-Gozun). As early as June, 1958, no less than 32 the fair market value of the lands was P3,000.00 per hectare. We also find
man connected with the Philippine Air Force among them commissioned that the price of P.20 per square meter in the Narciso case was considered the
officers, non-commission officers, and enlisted men had requested Mr. and fair market value of the lands as of the year 1949 when the expropriation
Mrs. Joaquin D. Gozun to open a subdivision on their lands in question (Exhs. proceedings were instituted, and at that time the lands were classified as sugar
8, 8-A to 8-ZZ-Toledo-Gozun). 21 lands, and assessed for taxation purposes at around P400.00 per hectare, or
P.04 per square meter. 22 While the lands involved in the present case, like
We agree with the findings, and the conclusions, of the lower court that the the lands involved in the Narciso case, might have a fair market value of P.20
lands that are the subject of expropriation in the present case, as of August per square meter in 1949, it can not be denied that ten years later, in 1959,
10, 1959 when the same were taken possession of by the Republic, were when the present proceedings were instituted, the value of those lands had
residential lands and were adaptable for use as residential subdivisions. increased considerably. The evidence shows that since 1949 those lands were
no longer cultivated as sugar lands, and in 1959 those lands were already purposes as residential lands. The certification of the assessor refers to the
classified, and assessed for taxation purposes, as residential lands. In 1959 year 1950 as far as the lands of Toledo-Gozun are concerned, and to the year
the land of Castellvi was assessed at P1.00 per square meter. 23 1956 as far as the land of Castellvi is concerned. Moreover, this Court has
held that the valuation fixed for the purposes of the assessment of the land for
The Republic also points out that the Provincial Appraisal Committee of taxation purposes can not bind the landowner where the latter did not
Pampanga, in its resolution No. 5 of February 15, 1957 (Exhibit D), intervene in fixing it. 25
recommended the sum of P.20 per square meter as the fair valuation of the
Castellvi property. We find that this resolution was made by the Republic the On the other hand, the Commissioners, appointed by the court to appraise the
basis in asking the court to fix the provisional value of the lands sought to be lands that were being expropriated, recommended to the court that the price
expropriated at P259,669.10, which was approved by the court. 24 It must be of P10.00 per square meter would be the fair market value of the lands. The
considered, however, that the amount fixed as the provisional value of the commissioners made their recommendation on the basis of their observation
lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily represent the true and after several ocular inspections of the lands, of their own personal knowledge
correct value of the land. The value is only "provisional" or "tentative", to of land values in the province of Pampanga, of the testimonies of the owners
serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property being of the land, and other witnesses, and of documentary evidence presented by
expropriated by the condemnor. The records show that this resolution No. 5 the appellees. Both Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun testified that the fair market
was repealed by the same Provincial Committee on Appraisal in its resolution value of their respective land was at P15.00 per square meter. The
No. 10 of May 14, 1959 (Exhibit 13-Castellvi). In that resolution No. 10, the documentary evidence considered by the commissioners consisted of deeds
appraisal committee stated that "The Committee has observed that the value of sale of residential lands in the town of San Fernando and in Angeles City,
of the land in this locality has increased since 1957 ...", and recommended in the province of Pampanga, which were sold at prices ranging from P8.00
the price of P1.50 per square meter. It follows, therefore, that, contrary to the to P20.00 per square meter (Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23-
stand of the Republic, that resolution No. 5 of the Provincial Appraisal Castellvi). The commissioners also considered the decision in Civil Case No.
Committee can not be made the basis for fixing the fair market value of the 1531 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, entitled Republic vs. Sabina
lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun. Tablante, which was expropriation case filed on January 13, 1959, involving
a parcel of land adjacent to the Clark Air Base in Angeles City, where the
The Republic further relied on the certification of the Acting Assistant court fixed the price at P18.00 per square meter (Exhibit 14-Castellvi). In
Provincial Assessor of Pampanga, dated February 8, 1961 (Exhibit K), to the their report, the commissioners, among other things, said:
effect that in 1950 the lands of Toledo-Gozun were classified partly as sugar ... This expropriation case is specially pointed out, because the circumstances
land and partly as urban land, and that the sugar land was assessed at P.40 per and factors involved therein are similar in many respects to the defendants'
square meter, while part of the urban land was assessed at P.40 per square lands in this case. The land in Civil Case No. 1531 of this Court and the lands
meter and part at P.20 per square meter; and that in 1956 the Castellvi land in the present case (Civil Case No. 1623) are both near the air bases, the Clark
was classified as sugar land and was assessed at P450.00 per hectare, or P.045 Air Base and the Basa Air Base respectively. There is a national road fronting
per square meter. We can not also consider this certification of the Acting them and are situated in a first-class municipality. As added advantage it may
Assistant Provincial Assessor as a basis for fixing the fair market value of the be said that the Basa Air Base land is very near the sugar mill at Del Carmen,
lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun because, as the evidence shows, the Floridablanca, Pampanga, owned by the Pampanga Sugar Mills. Also just
lands in question, in 1957, were already classified and assessed for taxation stone's throw away from the same lands is a beautiful vacation spot at Palacol,
a sitio of the town of Floridablanca, which counts with a natural swimming
pool for vacationists on weekends. These advantages are not found in the case A court of first instance or, on appeal, the Supreme Court, may change or
of the Clark Air Base. The defendants' lands are nearer to the poblacion of modify the report of the commissioners by increasing or reducing the amount
Floridablanca then Clark Air Base is nearer (sic) to the poblacion of Angeles, of the award if the facts of the case so justify. While great weight is attached
Pampanga. to the report of the commissioners, yet a court may substitute therefor its
estimate of the value of the property as gathered from the record in certain
The deeds of absolute sale, according to the undersigned commissioners, as cases, as, where the commissioners have applied illegal principles to the
well as the land in Civil Case No. 1531 are competent evidence, because they evidence submitted to them, or where they have disregarded a clear
were executed during the year 1959 and before August 10 of the same year. preponderance of evidence, or where the amount allowed is either palpably
More specifically so the land at Clark Air Base which coincidentally is the inadequate or excessive. 28
subject matter in the complaint in said Civil Case No. 1531, it having been
filed on January 13, 1959 and the taking of the land involved therein was The report of the commissioners of appraisal in condemnation proceedings
ordered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on January 15, 1959, are not binding, but merely advisory in character, as far as the court is
several months before the lands in this case were taken by the plaintiffs .... concerned. 29 In our analysis of the report of the commissioners, We find
points that merit serious consideration in the determination of the just
From the above and considering further that the lowest as well as the highest compensation that should be paid to Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun for their
price per square meter obtainable in the market of Pampanga relative to lands. It should be noted that the commissioners had made ocular inspections
subdivision lots within its jurisdiction in the year 1959 is very well known by of the lands and had considered the nature and similarities of said lands in
the Commissioners, the Commission finds that the lowest price that can be relation to the lands in other places in the province of Pampanga, like San
awarded to the lands in question is P10.00 per square meter. 26 Fernando and Angeles City. We cannot disregard the observations of the
commissioners regarding the circumstances that make the lands in question
The lower court did not altogether accept the findings of the Commissioners suited for residential purposes — their location near the Basa Air Base, just
based on the documentary evidence, but it considered the documentary like the lands in Angeles City that are near the Clark Air Base, and the
evidence as basis for comparison in determining land values. The lower court facilities that obtain because of their nearness to the big sugar central of the
arrived at the conclusion that "the unanimous recommendation of the Pampanga Sugar mills, and to the flourishing first class town of
commissioners of ten (P10.00) pesos per square meter for the three lots of the Floridablanca. It is true that the lands in question are not in the territory of
defendants subject of this action is fair and just". 27 In arriving at its San Fernando and Angeles City, but, considering the facilities of modern
conclusion, the lower court took into consideration, among other communications, the town of Floridablanca may be considered practically
circumstances, that the lands are titled, that there is a rising trend of land adjacent to San Fernando and Angeles City. It is not out of place, therefore,
values, and the lowered purchasing power of the Philippine peso. to compare the land values in Floridablanca to the land values in San
Fernando and Angeles City, and form an idea of the value of the lands in
Floridablanca with reference to the land values in those two other
communities.
In the case of Manila Railroad Co. vs. Caligsihan, 40 Phil. 326, 328, this The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is awarded
Court said: the just compensation for his property. We have carefully studied the record,
and the evidence, in this case, and after considering the circumstances Republic in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. 31 However, while that
attending the lands in question We have arrived at the conclusion that the ejectment case was pending, the Republic filed the complaint for eminent
price of P10.00 per square meter, as recommended by the commissioners and domain in the present case and was placed in possession of the land on August
adopted by the lower court, is quite high. It is Our considered view that the 10, 1959, and because of the institution of the expropriation proceedings the
price of P5.00 per square meter would be a fair valuation of the lands in ejectment case was later dismissed.
question and would constitute a just compensation to the owners thereof. In In the order dismissing the ejectment case, the Court of First Instance of
arriving at this conclusion We have particularly taken into consideration the Pampanga said:
resolution of the Provincial Committee on Appraisal of the province of
Pampanga informing, among others, that in the year 1959 the land of Plaintiff has agreed, as a matter of fact has already signed an agreement with
Castellvi could be sold for from P3.00 to P4.00 per square meter, while the defendants, whereby she had agreed to receive the rent of the lands, subject
land of Toledo-Gozun could be sold for from P2.50 to P3.00 per square meter. matter of the instant case from June 30, 1956 up to 1959 when the Philippine
The Court has weighed all the circumstances relating to this expropriations Air Force was placed in possession by virtue of an order of the Court upon
proceedings, and in fixing the price of the lands that are being expropriated depositing the provisional amount as fixed by the Provincial Appraisal
the Court arrived at a happy medium between the price as recommended by Committee with the Provincial Treasurer of
the commissioners and approved by the court, and the price advocated by the Pampanga; ...
Republic. This Court has also taken judicial notice of the fact that the value If Castellvi had agreed to receive the rentals from June 30, 1956 to August
of the Philippine peso has considerably gone down since the year 1959. 30 10, 1959, she should be considered as having allowed her land to be leased
Considering that the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun are adjoining each to the Republic until August 10, 1959, and she could not at the same time be
other, and are of the same nature, the Court has deemed it proper to fix the entitled to the payment of interest during the same period on the amount
same price for all these lands. awarded her as the just compensation of her land. The Republic, therefore,
should pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the value of her
3. The third issue raised by the Republic relates to the payment of land, minus the provisional value that was deposited, only from July 10, 1959
interest. The Republic maintains that the lower court erred when it ordered when it deposited in court the provisional value of the land.
the Republic to pay Castellvi interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the total
amount adjudged as the value of the land of Castellvi, from July 1, 1956 to 4. The fourth error assigned by the Republic relates to the denial by the
July 10, 1959. We find merit in this assignment of error. lower court of its motion for a new trial based on nearly discovered evidence.
We do not find merit in this assignment of error.
In ordering the Republic to pay 6% interest on the total value of the land of
Castellvi from July 1, 1956 to July 10, 1959, the lower court held that the After the lower court had decided this case on May 26, 1961, the Republic
Republic had illegally possessed the land of Castellvi from July 1, 1956, after filed a motion for a new trial, supplemented by another motion, both based
its lease of the land had expired on June 30, 1956, until August 10, 1959 when upon the ground of newly discovered evidence. The alleged newly discovered
the Republic was placed in possession of the land pursuant to the writ of evidence in the motion filed on June 21, 1961 was a deed of absolute sale-
possession issued by the court. What really happened was that the Republic executed on January 25, 1961, showing that a certain Serafin Francisco had
continued to occupy the land of Castellvi after the expiration of its lease on sold to Pablo L. Narciso a parcel of sugar land having an area of 100,000
June 30, 1956, so much so that Castellvi filed an ejectment case against the square meters with a sugar quota of 100 piculs, covered by P.A. No. 1701,
situated in Barrio Fortuna, Floridablanca, for P14,000, or P.14 per square prove the fair market value of the land sought to be expropriated, the lands
meter. must, among other things, be shown to be similar.

In the supplemental motion, the alleged newly discovered evidence were: (1) But even assuming, gratia argumenti, that the lands mentioned in those deeds
a deed of sale of some 35,000 square meters of land situated at Floridablanca of sale were residential, the evidence would still not warrant the grant of a
for P7,500.00 (or about P.21 per square meter) executed in July, 1959, by the new trial, for said evidence could have been discovered and produced at the
spouses Evelyn D. Laird and Cornelio G. Laird in favor of spouses trial, and they cannot be considered newly discovered evidence as
Bienvenido S. Aguas and Josefina Q. Aguas; and (2) a deed of absolute sale contemplated in Section 1(b) of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. Regarding this
of a parcel of land having an area of 4,120,101 square meters, including the point, the trial court said:
sugar quota covered by Plantation Audit No. 161 1345, situated at The Court will now show that there was no reasonable diligence employed.
Floridablanca, Pampanga, for P860.00 per hectare (a little less than P.09 per
square meter) executed on October 22, 1957 by Jesus Toledo y Mendoza in The land described in the deed of sale executed by Serafin Francisco, copy of
favor of the Land Tenure Administration. which is attached to the original motion, is covered by a Certificate of Title
issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pampanga. There is no
We find that the lower court acted correctly when it denied the motions for a question in the mind of the court but this document passed through the Office
new trial. of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of transferring the title or annotating
the sale on the certificate of title. It is true that Fiscal Lagman went to the
To warrant the granting of a new trial based on the ground of newly Office of the Register of Deeds to check conveyances which may be
discovered evidence, it must appear that the evidence was discovered after presented in the evidence in this case as it is now sought to be done by virtue
the trial; that even with the exercise of due diligence, the evidence could not of the motions at bar, Fiscal Lagman, one of the lawyers of the plaintiff, did
have been discovered and produced at the trial; and that the evidence is of not exercise reasonable diligence as required by the rules. The assertion that
such a nature as to alter the result of the case if admitted. 32 The lower court he only went to the office of the Register of Deeds 'now and then' to check
correctly ruled that these requisites were not complied with. the records in that office only shows the half-hazard [sic] manner by which
the plaintiff looked for evidence to be presented during the hearing before the
The lower court, in a well-reasoned order, found that the sales made by Commissioners, if it is at all true that Fiscal Lagman did what he is supposed
Serafin Francisco to Pablo Narciso and that made by Jesus Toledo to the Land to have done according to Solicitor Padua. It would have been the easiest
Tenure Administration were immaterial and irrelevant, because those sales matter for plaintiff to move for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covered sugarlands with sugar quotas, while the lands sought to be directing the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to come to testify and to bring
expropriated in the instant case are residential lands. The lower court also with him all documents found in his office pertaining to sales of land in
concluded that the land sold by the spouses Laird to the spouses Aguas was Floridablanca adjacent to or near the lands in question executed or recorded
a sugar land. from 1958 to the present. Even this elementary precaution was not done by
plaintiff's numerous attorneys.
We agree with the trial court. In eminent domain proceedings, in order that
evidence as to the sale price of other lands may be admitted in evidence to The same can be said of the deeds of sale attached to the supplementary
motion. They refer to lands covered by certificate of title issued by the
Register of Deeds of Pampanga. For the same reason they could have been because tinder the circumstances, the correct qualification that can be given
easily discovered if reasonable diligence has been exerted by the numerous is 'forgotten evidence'. Forgotten however, is not newly-discovered
lawyers of the plaintiff in this case. It is noteworthy that all these deeds of evidence. 33
sale could be found in several government offices, namely, in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Pampanga, the Office of the Provincial Assessor of The granting or denial of a motion for new trial is, as a general rule,
Pampanga, the Office of the Clerk of Court as a part of notarial reports of discretionary with the trial court, whose judgment should not be disturbed
notaries public that acknowledged these documents, or in the archives of the unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. 34 We do not see any
National Library. In respect to Annex 'B' of the supplementary motion copy abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it denied the motions
of the document could also be found in the Office of the Land Tenure for a new trial.
Administration, another government entity. Any lawyer with a modicum of
ability handling this expropriation case would have right away though [sic] WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified, as follows:
of digging up documents diligently showing conveyances of lands near or (a) the lands of appellees Carmen Vda. de Castellvi and Maria Nieves
around the parcels of land sought to be expropriated in this case in the offices Toledo-Gozun, as described in the complaint, are declared expropriated for
that would have naturally come to his mind such as the offices mentioned public use;
above, and had counsel for the movant really exercised the reasonable (b) the fair market value of the lands of the appellees is fixed at P5.00
diligence required by the Rule' undoubtedly they would have been able to per square meter;
find these documents and/or caused the issuance of subpoena duces tecum. ... (c) the Republic must pay appellee Castellvi the sum of P3,796,495.00
as just compensation for her one parcel of land that has an area of 759,299
It is also recalled that during the hearing before the Court of the Report and square meters, minus the sum of P151,859.80 that she withdrew out of the
Recommendation of the Commissioners and objection thereto, Solicitor amount that was deposited in court as the provisional value of the land, with
Padua made the observation: interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 10, 1959 until the day full
payment is made or deposited in court;
I understand, Your Honor, that there was a sale that took place in this place (d) the Republic must pay appellee Toledo-Gozun the sum of
of land recently where the land was sold for P0.20 which is contiguous to this P2,695,225.00 as the just compensation for her two parcels of land that have
land. a total area of 539,045 square meters, minus the sum of P107,809.00 that she
withdrew out of the amount that was deposited in court as the provisional
The Court gave him permission to submit said document subject to the value of her lands, with interest at the rate of 6%, per annum from July 10,
approval of the Court. ... This was before the decision was rendered, and later 1959 until the day full payment is made or deposited in court; (e) the
promulgated on May 26, 1961 or more than one month after Solicitor Padua attorney's lien of Atty. Alberto Cacnio is enforced; and
made the above observation. He could have, therefore, checked up the alleged (f) the costs should be paid by appellant Republic of the Philippines, as
sale and moved for a reopening to adduce further evidence. He did not do so. provided in Section 12, Rule 67, and in Section 13, Rule 141, of the Rules of
He forgot to present the evidence at a more propitious time. Now, he seeks to Court.
introduce said evidence under the guise of newly-discovered evidence.
Unfortunately the Court cannot classify it as newly-discovered evidence, IT IS SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and
Aquino, JJ., concur.
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., took no part.
 [G.R. No. L-26400. February 29, 1972.]
3. ID.; ID.; BASIS FOR DUE COMPENSATION. — To determine the due
VICTORIA AMIGABLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NICOLAS CUENCA, compensation for the land appropriated by the Government, the basis should
as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.
PHILIPPINES, Defendants-Appellees.

Quirico del Mar, Domingo Antigua, Antonio Paulin and N. DECISION

Capangpangan for plaintiff and Appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo Torres and Solicitor Dominador MAKALINTAL, J.:
L. Quiroz for defendants and appellees.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in
SYLLABUS its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No.
1. POLITICAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN; PROJECT USED BY 639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of
GOVERNMENT FOR ROAD PURPOSES; RIGHTS OR REGISTERED Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-
OWNER TO DUE COMPENSATION ANYTIME. — Considering that no 3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February 1,
annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in the
of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior expropriation or
of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot, with an area of
lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo
the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the Avenues.
attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession of said
portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this time It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they
because it has been and is now being used for road purposes, the only relief were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful avenues
available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in 1924, and
should have done years ago. the formal construction in 1925." *

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO DAMAGES. — The owner of the land is On March 27, 1958 Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the
entitled to damages in the form of legal interest on the price of the land from Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been
the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor
In addition, the government should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958.
which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing.
A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable’s counsel by the government had not given its consent to be sued. Accordingly, the complaint
Office of the President on January 7, 1959. was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to Us, there being
On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which no question of fact involved.
was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against
the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and government under the facts of the case.
possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages in In the case of Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a
the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral damages claim for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of
in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney’s fees in the sum of P5,000.00 and the the Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique
costs of the suit. M. Fernando, held that where the government takes away property from a
private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of
Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain
the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine of
affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there
having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the said:jgc:[Link]
right of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the
plaintiff, if any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against ". . . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be compensated for property
the Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs had taken for public use were to be respected, as it should, then a suit of this
no valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its character should not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental
consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice
appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango on a citizen. Had the government followed the procedure indicated by the
Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. governing law at the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only
upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment, or after tender to
During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants the party entitled to such payment of the amount fixed, may it have the right
notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive the to enter in and upon the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the
plaintiff’s evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its decision public use defined in the judgment.’ If there were an observance of procedural
holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause of action for the regularity, petitioners would not be in the sad plaint they are now. It is
recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in question on unthinkable then that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what
the ground that the government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is just as
neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff’s important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of
claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the same being a officialdom if the rule of law were to be maintained. It is not too much to say
money claim against the government; and that the claim for moral damages that when the government takes any property for public use, which is
had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be judicially
ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a court.
There is no thought then that the doctrine of immunity from suit could still
be appropriately invoked."cralaw virtua1aw library

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back

of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance
of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner
of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover
possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession
is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since restoration of possession
of said portion by the government is neither convenient nor feasible at this
time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief
available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and
should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for the land,
the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. 2

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form
of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the
time that payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the government
should pay for attorney’s fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the
trial court after hearing.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including
attorney’s fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,

Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995 allocation shall be equal and impartial among all candidates for the same
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 office. All candidates concerned shall be furnished a copy of the allocation of
members, represented by its President, Amado P. Macasaet and its "Comelec Space" for their information, guidance and compliance.
Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner, (b) Any candidate desiring to avail himself of "Comelec Space" from
vs. newspapers or publications based in the Metropolitan Manila Area shall
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. submit an application therefor, in writing, to the Committee on Mass Media
of the Commission. Any candidate desiring to avail himself of "Comelec
RESOLUTION Space" in newspapers or publications based in the provinces shall submit his
application therefor, in writing, to the Provincial Election Supervisor
FELICIANO, J.: concerned. Applications for availment of "Comelec Space" maybe filed at
The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the any time from the date of effectivity of this Resolution.
constitutional validity of Resolution No. 2772 issued by respondent (c) The Committee on Mass Media and the Provincial Election
Commission on Elections ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec Supervisors shall allocate available "Comelec Space" among the candidates
directive dated 22 March 1995, through a Petition for Certiorari and concerned by lottery of which said candidates shall be notified in advance, in
Prohibition. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of writing, to be present personally or by representative to witness the lottery at
newspaper and magazine publishers. the date, time and place specified in the notice. Any party objecting to the
result of the lottery may appeal to the Commission.
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads (d) The candidates concerned shall be notified by the Committee on
in part: Mass Media or the Provincial Election Supervisor, as the case maybe,
xxx xxx xxx sufficiently in advance and in writing of the date of issue and the newspaper
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space or publication allocated to him, and the time within which he must submit the
of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general written material for publication in the "Comelec Space".
circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March
6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senator and from March 21, 1995 until xxx xxx xxx
May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. —
obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city. No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the
Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. — "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication
the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or
which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said
candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances
and their platforms and programs of government. clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by
"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the
vital election information. accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public
Sec. 4. Allocation of Comelec Space. — (a) "Comelec Space" shall also be interest. (Emphasis supplied)
available to all candidates during the periods stated in Section 2 hereof. Its
Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent identical letters, dated 22 March freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.1
1995, to various publishers of newspapers like the Business World, the
Philippine Star, the Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all members On 20 April 1995, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
of PPI. These letters read as follows: Comelec from enforcing and implementing Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772,
This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the Commission as well as the Comelec directives addressed to various print media enterprises
on Elections, you are directed to provide free print space of not less than one all dated 22 March 1995. The Court also required the respondent to file a
half (1/2) page for use as "Comelec Space" or similar to the print support Comment on the Petition.
which you have extended during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections
which was 2 full pages for each political party fielding senatorial candidates, The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent
from March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, to make known their qualifications, their Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No. 2772 does not impose upon
stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as
it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-
We shall be informing the political parties and candidates to submit directly compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the
to you their pictures, biographical data, stand on key public issues and questioned Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in
platforms of government either as raw data or in the form of positives or connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for and
camera-ready materials. mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or
requirements for the candidate's utilization of the "Comelec space" procured.
Please be reminded that the political parties/candidates may be At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the
accommodated in your publication any day upon receipt of their materials questioned Resolution and its implementing letter directives are viewed as
until May 6, 1995 which is the last day for campaigning. mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police
We trust you to extend your full support and cooperation in this regard. power of the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of
(Emphasis supplied) Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or
regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard
a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec Resolution and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.2
No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its At the oral hearing of this case held on 28 April 1995, respondent Comelec
agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just through its Chairman, Hon. Bernardo Pardo, in response to inquiries from the
compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter Chief Justice and other Members of the Court, stated that Resolution No.
directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free "Comelec Space" and 2772, particularly Section 2 thereof and the 22 March 1995 letters dispatched
at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute to various members of petitioner PPI, were not intended to compel those
impositions of involuntary servitude, contrary to the provisions of Section 18 members to supply Comelec with free print space. Chairman Pardo
(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of represented to the Court that Resolution and the related letter-directives were
merely designed to solicit from the publishers the same free print space which
many publishers had voluntarily given to Comelec during the election period consider it not inappropriate to pass upon the first constitutional issue raised
relating to the 11 May 1992 elections. Indeed, the Chairman stated that the in this case. Our hope is to put this issue to rest and prevent its resurrection.
Comelec would, that very afternoon, meet and adopt an appropriate amending
or clarifying resolution, a certified true copy of which would forthwith be Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is not a model of clarity in expression.
filed with the Court. Section 1 of Resolution No. 2772-A did not try to redraft Section 2;
accordingly, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 persists in its original form.
On 5 May 1995, the Court received from the Office of the Solicitor General Thus, we must point out that, as presently worded, and in particular as
a manifestation which attached a copy of Comelec Resolution No. 2772-A interpreted and applied by the Comelec itself in its 22 March 1995 letter-
dated 4 May 1995. The operative portion of this Resolution follows: directives to newspaper publishers, Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is
clearly susceptible of the reading that petitioner PPI has given it. That
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Resolution No. 2772 does not, in express terms, threaten publishers who
the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts No. 6646 and 7166 and other would disregard it or its implementing letters with some criminal or other
election laws, the Commission on Elections RESOLVED to clarify Sections sanction, does not by itself demonstrate that the Comelec's original intention
2 and 8 of Res. No. 2772 as follows: was simply to solicit or request voluntary donations of print space from
1. Section 2 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as publishers. A written communication officially directing a print media
requiring publishers of the different mass media print publications to provide company to supply free print space, dispatched by a government (here a
print space under pain of prosecution, whether administrative, civil or constitutional) agency and signed by a member of the Commission
criminal, there being no sanction or penalty for violation of said Section presumably legally authorized to do so, is bound to produce a coercive effect
provided for either in said Resolution or in Section 90 of Batas Pambansa upon the company so addressed. That the agency may not be legally
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, on the grant of authorized to impose, or cause the imposition of, criminal or other sanctions
"Comelec space." for disregard of such directions, only aggravates the constitutional difficulties
2. Section 8 of Res. No. 2772 shall not be construed to mean as in hearing in the present situation. The enactment or addition of such
constituting prior restraint on the part of publishers with respect to the sanctions by the legislative authority itself would be open to serious
printing or publication of materials in the news, opinion, features or other constitutional objection.
sections of their respective publications or other accounts or comments, it
being clear from the last sentence of said Section 8 that the Commission shall, To compel print media companies to donate "Comelec-space" of the
"unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicate otherwise . . . respect the dimensions specified in Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 (not less than one-
determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or half page), amounts to "taking" of private personal property for public use or
publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the intended frequency of such
and of public interest." compulsory "donation:" only once during the period from 6 March 1995 (or
21 March 1995) until 12 May 1995? or everyday or once a week? or as often
This Resolution shall take effect upon approval. (Emphasis in the original) as Comelec may direct during the same period? The extent of the taking or
deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimistemporary
While, at this point, the Court could perhaps simply dismiss the Petition for limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value
Certiorari and Prohibition as having become moot and academic, we of the compulsory "donation," measured by the advertising rates ordinarily
charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may "donate" free print space for Comelec purposes, or as an exhortation, or
be very substantial indeed. perhaps an appeal, to publishers to donate free print space, as Section 1 of
Resolution No. 2772-A attempts to suggest. There is nothing at all to prevent
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised newspaper and magazine publishers from voluntarily giving free print space
under the rubric of expropriation of private personal property for public use. to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use of Resolution No. 2772 does not, however, provide a constitutional basis for
need to be examined here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the compelling publishers, against their will, in the kind of factual context here
legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking present, to provide free print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 does not
has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to
Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of We would note that the ruling here laid down by the Court is entirely in line
Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. 3 Similarly, it has with the theory of democratic representative government. The economic costs
not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted of informing the general public about the qualifications and programs of those
the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative seeking elective office are most appropriately distributed as widely as
authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement possible throughout our society by the utilization of public funds, especially
and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not funds raised by taxation, rather than cast solely on one small sector of society,
casually to be assumed. i.e., print media enterprises. The benefits which flow from a heightened level
of information on and the awareness of the electoral process are commonly
That the taking is designed to subserve "public use" is not contested by thought to be community-wide; the burdens should be allocated on the same
petitioner PPI. We note only that, under Section 3 of Resolution No. 2772, basis.
the free "Comelec space" sought by the respondent Commission would be
used not only for informing the public about the identities, qualifications and As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of
programs of government of candidates for elective office but also for Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate"
"dissemination of vital election information" (including, presumably, "Comelec space, " may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
circulars, regulations, notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It seems to of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require
the Court a matter of judicial notice that government offices and agencies prolonged consideration on our part. Firstly, there was no effort (and
(including the Supreme Court) simply purchase print space, in the ordinary apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police
course of events, when their rules and regulations, circulars, notices and so power — essentially a power of legislation — has been constitutionally
forth need officially to be brought to the attention of the general public. delegated to respondent Commission.4 Secondly, while private property may
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the
Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" (Article III, state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the
Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. 5
"Comelec space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission, whether Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is read as petitioner Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that
PPI reads it, as an assertion of authority to require newspaper publishers to purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other
imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the Secondly, and more importantly, Section 11 (b) is limited in its scope of
individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located application. Analysis of Section 11 (b) shows that it purports to apply only to
in differing parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or the purchase and sale, including purchase and sale disguised as a donation,
magazine publishers. No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and of print space and air time for campaign or other political purposes. Section
palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by newspapers or
Comelec and that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to
reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to the candidates, their qualifications, political parties and programs of
Comelec. Section 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does not reach commentaries and
of the State. expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcaster or editors or
We turn to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, which needs to be quoted in commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications,
full again: and programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and
Sec. 8. Undue Reference to Candidates/Political Parties in Newspapers. — beliefs are not in fact advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid
No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read as reaching any report or
news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication commentary or other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for by
accounts or comments which manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or candidates for political office. We read Section 11 (b) as designed to cover
political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said only paid political advertisements of particular candidates.
candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances
clearly indicate otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by The above limitation in scope of application of Section 11 (b) — that it does
the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the not restrict either the reporting of or the expression of belief or opinion or
accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public comment upon the qualifications and programs and activities of any and all
interest. candidates for office — constitutes the critical distinction which must be
made between the instant case and that of Sanidad v. Commission on
It is not easy to understand why Section 8 was included at all in Resolution Elections. . . . 7 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
No. 2772. In any case, Section 8 should be viewed in the context of our
decision in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections. 6 There the Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the
Court sustained the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 6646, Comelec to establish a guideline for implementation of the above-quoted
known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which prohibits the sale or distinction and doctrine in National Press Club an effort not blessed with
donation of print space and airtime for campaign or other political purposes, evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A while possibly helpful,
except to the Comelec. In doing so, the Court carefully distinguished (a) paid does not add substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772.
political advertisements which are reached by the prohibition of Section 11 The distinction between paid political advertisements on the one hand and
(b), from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of belief news reports, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters,
or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given
which fall outside the scope of Section 11 (b) and which are protected by the operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press: basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts.
At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any
specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or
implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members has
sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under
Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise
constitutional issue here sought to be raised — whether or not Section 8 of
Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's
power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to
supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits
for the operation of — media of communication or information — [for the
purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply,
including reasonable, equal rates therefore, for public information campaigns
and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding
free, orderly honest, peaceful and credible elections —
is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy
involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8.

Summarizing our conclusions:

1. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as
interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to
require print media enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As
such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside
and nullified.
2. To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an
actual, justiciable case or controversy.

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition is GRANTED in part and Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 in its
present form and the related letter-directives dated 22 March 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE as null and void, and the Temporary Restraining Order is hereby
MADE PERMANENT. The Petition is DISMISSED in part, to the extent it
relates to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. L-48685 September 30, 1987 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been
LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-BALAOING, deprived of the possession of their property without due process of law. This
petitioners, was however, denied.
vs.
HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing
AUTHORITY, respondents. the constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended. Petitioners argue
that:
CORTES, J.: 1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a with grave abuse of discretion by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978
complaint for expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty without notice and without hearing and in issuing the Order dated June 28,
five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the lots of petitioners 1978 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being
square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be violative of the due process clause, specifically:
expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter a) The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size
adopting the market value fixed by the provincial assessor in accordance with and no matter how small the area to be expropriated;
presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in expropriation b) "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding,
proceedings. as defined in said Decree, is not really for a public purpose;
c) The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows immediate
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the
properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the owner his day in court;
Philippine National Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject d) The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon
twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government
defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized assessors;
housing upon payment of just compensation." e) The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to
determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and every raise of
On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge issued the following Order: expropriation.
Plaintiff having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Heart Center Indeed, the exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain
Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, the amount of limitations imposed by the constitution, to wit:
P158,980.00 representing the total market value of the subject parcels of land, Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
let a writ of possession be issued. (Art. IV, Sec. 9);
SO ORDERED.
Pasig, Metro Manila, January 17, 1978. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
(SGD) BUENAVENTURA S. GUERRERO of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art.
Judge IV, sec. 1).
Nevertheless, a clear case of constitutional infirmity has to be established for d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the
this Court to nullify legislative or executive measures adopted to implement development of commercial and industrial estates and such other facilities to
specific constitutional provisions aimed at promoting the general welfare. enhance the total community growth; and
e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to
Petitioners' objections to the taking of their property subsumed under the provide and maintain housing for the greatest number of people under
headings of public use, just compensation, and due process have to be Presidential Decree No, 757, (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1)
balanced against competing interests of the public recognized and sought to
be served under declared policies of the constitution as implemented by The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of eminent
legislation. domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.
In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as
1. Public use follows:
a) Socialized Housing
Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was
1224, as amended, for the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
"public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of people, bereft of public project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets
character." or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long
as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units for the comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to
middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of
the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
1). This definition was later expanded to include among others: other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and
a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at
middle and lower income groups of the society, including the construction of present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
the supporting infrastructure and other facilities; satisfies the requirement of public use [Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,
b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum G.R. Nos. 60549, 60553-60555 October 26, 1983, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) at
dwellers as well as the provision of related facilities and services; 234-5 quoting E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots PHILIPPINES 523-4, (2nd ed., 1977) Emphasis supplied].
to the dwellers in the area or property involved, rearrangemeant and re-
alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and the The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the
construction and provision of basic community facilities and services, where literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public
there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and power has been added the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage. As
system schools, barangay centers, community centers, clinics, open spaces, discussed in the above cited case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona:
parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities;
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which
circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and
which possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of
to take private property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to crowded makeshift dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in
the Philippines. We have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities developing countries. So basic and urgent are housing problems that the
which impel the exertion of sovereign power are all too often found in areas United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International
of scarce public land or limited government resources. (p. 231) Year of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus the attention of the international
community on those problems". The General Assembly is Seriously
Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low- concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at the national and local
cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the levels and of international organizations, the driving conditions of the
expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the majority of the people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements,
Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to especially in developing countries, continue to deteriorate in both relative and
establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing absolute terms." [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the United Nations 1982,
[Art. 11, sec. 7]. The 1987 Constitution goes even further by providing that: Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]
In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing"
The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the fans within the confines of "public use". It is, particularly important to draw
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224 which opportunities
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and
employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the
all. [Art. II, sec. 9] project.
In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of
The state shall by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation land meets the requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being
with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and expropriated by the NHA for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing
housing which will make available at affordable cost decent housing and Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government employees.
basic services to underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and Quoting respondents:
resettlement areas. It shall also promote adequate employment opportunities
to such citizens. In the implementation of such program the State shall respect 1. The Bagong Nayong Project is a housing and community
the rights of small property owners. (Art. XIII, sec. 9, Emphasis supplied) development undertaking of the National Housing Authority. Phase I covers
about 60 hectares of GSIS property in Antipolo, Rizal; Phase II includes
Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state about 30 hectares for industrial development and the rest are for residential
concern since it directly and significantly affects public health, safety, the housing development.
environment and in sum, the general welfare. The public character of housing
measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be It is intended for low-salaried government employees and aims to provide
occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A housing and community services for about 2,000 families in Phase I and about
beginning has to be made, for it is not possible to provide housing for are who 4,000 families in Phase II.
need it, all at once.
It is situated on rugged terrain 7.5 kms. from Marikina Town proper; 22 Kms. MEDIUM TERM PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1987-1992, pp.
east of Manila; and is within the Lungs Silangan Townsite Reservation 240-254].
(created by Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977).
b) Size of Property
The lands involved in the present petitions are parts of the Petitioners further contend that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, would allow
expanded/additional areas for the Bagong Nayon Project totalling 25.9725 the taking of "any private land" regardless of the size and no matter how small
hectares. They likewise include raw, rolling hills. (Rollo, pp. 266-7) the area of the land to be expropriated. Petitioners claim that "there are vast
areas of lands in Mayamot, Cupang, and San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal hundred
The acute shortage of housing units in the country is of public knowledge. of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. It is surprising
Official data indicate that more than one third of the households nationwide [therefore] why respondent National Housing Authority [would] include
do not own their dwelling places. A significant number live in dwellings of [their] two man lots ..."
unacceptable standards, such as shanties, natural shelters, and structures
intended for commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes. Of these In J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration [G. R. No. L-21064,
unacceptable dwelling units, more than one third is located within the February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413 (1970) at 428] this Court earlier ruled that
National Capital Region (NCR) alone which lies proximate to and is expected expropriation is not confined to landed estates. This Court, quoting the
to be the most benefited by the housing project involved in the case at bar dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic vs. Baylosis, [96 Phil.
[See, National Census and Statistics Office, 1980 Census of Population and 461 (1955)], held that:
Housing].
The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII,
According to the National Economic and Development Authority at the time section 4 of our Constitution cannot be determined on a purely quantitative
of the expropriation in question, about "50 per cent of urban families, cannot or area basis. Not only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead
afford adequate shelter even at reduced rates and will need government of landed estates, but I see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest
support to provide them with social housing, subsidized either partially or for social justice and peace, should exclusively devote attention to conflicts
totally" [NEDA, FOUR YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN For 1974-1977, p. of large proportions, involving a considerable number of individuals, and
357]. Up to the present, housing some remains to be out of the reach of a eschew small controversies and wait until they grow into a major problem
sizable proportion of the population" [NEDA, MEDIUM-TERM before taking remedial action.
PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1987-1992, p. 240].
The said case of J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. departed from the ruling in Guido vs.
The mushrooming of squatter colonies in the Metropolitan Manila area as Rural Progress Administration [84 Phil. 847 (1949)] which held that the test
well as in other cities and centers of population throughout the country, and, to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the
the efforts of the government to initiate housing and other projects are matters land and not the number of people who stood to be benefited. Since then
of public knowledge [See NEDA, FOUR YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN "there has evolved a clear pattern of adherence to the "number of people to
For 1974-1977, pp. 357-361; NEDA, FIVE-YEAR PHILIPPINE be benefited test" " [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga,
DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1978-1982, pp. 215-228 NEDA, FIVE YEAR G.R. No. 32049, June 25,1984, 130 SCRA 30 (1984) at 39]. Thus, in Pulido
PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1983-1987, pp. 109-117; NEDA, vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 57625, May 3, 1983, 122 SCRA 63 (1983) at
73], this Court stated that, "[i]t is unfortunate that the petitioner would be
deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his family should not 2. Just Compensation
stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the greater may only of the Petitioners maintain that Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, would allow
inhabitants of the country." the taking of private property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations
arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. In addition, they assert that the
The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine what
the particular property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes would be "just compensation".
and how much thereof may be expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud,
bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which petitioners herein failed to The foregoing contentions have already been ruled upon by this Court in the
demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the case of Ignacio vs. Guerrero (G.R. No. L-49088, May 29, 1987) which,
NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. The property owner may incidentally, arose from the same expropriation complaint that led to this
not interpose objections merely because in their judgment some other instant petition. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential
property would have been more suitable, or just as suitable, for the purpose. Decree Nos. 1224, 1259 and 1313 are the same provisions found in
The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is tempered Presidential Decree Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533 which were declared
by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. The Constitutional unconstitutional in Export Processing Zone All thirty vs. Dulay (G.R. No.
provisions on the subject are clear: 5960 April 29, 1987) for being encroachments on prerogatives.

The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. This Court abandoned the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Reyes
(Art. II, sec. 10) [G.R. No. 49439, June 29,1983, 123 SCRA 245 (1983)] which upheld Pres.
Decree No. 464, as amended by - Presidential Decree Nos. 794, 1224 and
The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that 1259.
protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, In said case of Export Processing Zone Authority, this Court pointed out that:
economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition
of property and its increments. (Art, XIII, sec. 1) Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking.
It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. ALL the facts as to
Indeed, the foregoing provisions, which are restatements of the provisions in the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, emphasize: capabilities, should be considered.
...the stewardship concept, under which private property is supposed to be
held by the individual only as a trustee for the people in general, who are its xxx xxx xxx
real owners. As a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties
property not for his own exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are
entire community or nation [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. supra usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire
at 42-3 citing I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, 70 (1983 ed.)]. total with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never
taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession, the ruling in the Ignacio
possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land case is reiterated, thus:
described as directional has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are [I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in
described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There
estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can must be a Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance;
serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation. (2) A provisional determination of just compensation for the properties
sought to be expropriated must be made by the trial court on the basis of
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by judicial (not legislative or executive) discretion; and (3) The deposit
assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be complied with. (p. 14)
overwhelming mass of landowners accept unquestioningly what is found in
the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them. This Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224,
They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The Idea of as amended by Pres. Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for
expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by purposes of expropriation. However, as previously held by this Court, the
an agency authorized to do so. (pp. 12-3) provisions of such decrees on just compensation are unconstitutional; and in
the instant case the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the corollary
3. Due Process provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without notice and
Petitioners assert that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates procedural due hearing are violative of due process.
process as it allows immediate taking of possession, control and disposition
of property without giving the owner his day in court. Respondent Judge WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court dated January 17, 1978 and
ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without June 28, 1978 issuing the writ of possession on the basis of the market value
hearing. appearing therein are annulled for having been issued in excess of
jurisdiction. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin for further
The constitutionality of this procedure has also been ruled upon in the Export proceedings to determine the compensation the petitioners are entitled to be
Processing Zone Authority case, viz: paid. No costs.

It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove

that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive
to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor
bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the
property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and
after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination
have been judiciously evaluated. (p. 13)
 [G.R. No. 106440. January 29, 1996] historical interest is a public use for which the power of eminent domain may
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, ASUNCION MANOSCA and LEONICA be authorized x x x.
MANOSCA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, In view thereof, it is believed that the National Historical Institute as an
Branch 168, HON. GRADUACION A. REYES CLARAVAL, Presiding agency of the Government charged with the maintenance and care of national
Judge, RTC-Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 71, and REPUBLIC OF THE shrines, monuments and landmarks and the development of historical sites
PHILIPPINES, respondents. that may be declared as national shrines, monuments and/or landmarks, may
initiate the institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of
DECISION acquiring the lot in question in accordance with the procedure provided for in
VITUG, J.: Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The proceedings should be instituted
In this appeal, via a petition for review on certiorari, from the decision[1] of by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic.
the Court of Appeals, dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 24969
(entitled Alejandro Manosca, et al. v. Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al.), this Accordingly, on 29 May 1989, the Republic, through the Office of the
Court is asked to resolve whether or not the public use requirement of Solicitor-General, instituted a complaint for expropriation[3] before the
Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of Regional Trial Court of Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI alleging, inter alia,
a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical that:
Institute (NHI) as a national historical landmark.
The facts of the case are not in dispute. Pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, the National Historical
Institute issued Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, which was approved on
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, January, 1986 by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports,
Taguig, Metro Manila, with an area of about four hundred ninety-two (492) declaring the above described parcel of land which is the birthsite of Felix Y.
square meters. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the Manalo, founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, as a National Historical Landmark.
birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed The plaintiff perforce needs the land as such national historical landmark
Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 [2] of Presidential which is a public purpose.
Decree No. 260, declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. The
resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved by the Minister of Education, At the same time, respondent Republic filed an urgent motion for the issuance
Culture and Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of Justice was asked of an order to permit it to take immediate possession of the property. The
on the legality of the measure. In his Opinion No. 133, Series of 1987, the motion was opposed by petitioners. After a hearing, the trial court issued, on
Secretary of Justice replied in the affirmative; he explained: 03 August 1989,[4] an order fixing the provisional market (P54,120.00) and
According to your guidelines, national landmarks are places or objects that assessed (P16,236.00) values of the property and authorizing the Republic to
are associated with an event, achievement, characteristic, or modification that take over the property once the required sum would have been deposited with
makes a turning point or stage in Philippine [Link], the birthsite of the the Municipal Treasurer of Taguig, Metro Manila.
founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly,
had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the
a national landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the
act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for to meet a public exigency. It is said to be an essential part of governance even
the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from sovereignty.[10] The only
the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 direct constitutional qualification is that private property shall not be taken
Constitution.[5]Petitioners sought, in the meanwhile, a suspension in the for public use without just compensation.[11] This proscription is intended to
implementation of the 03rd August 1989 order of the trial court. provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the
individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
On 15 February 1990, following the filing by respondent Republic of its reply
to petitioners motion seeking the dismissal of the case, the trial court issued Petitioners assert that the expropriation has failed to meet the guidelines set
its denial of said motion to dismiss.[6] Five (5) days later, or on 20 February by this Court in the case of Guido v. Rural Progress Administration,[12] to wit:
1990,[7] another order was issued by the trial court, declaring moot and (a) the size of the land expropriated; (b) the large number of people benefited;
academic the motion for reconsideration and/or suspension of the order of 03 and, (c) the extent of social and economic reform.[13] Petitioners suggest that
August 1989 with the rejection of petitioners motion to dismiss. Petitioners we confine the concept of expropriation only to the following public uses, [14]
motion for the reconsideration of the 20th February 1990 order was likewise i.e., the -
denied by the trial court in its 16th April 1991 order.[8]
x x x taking of property for military posts, roads, streets, sidewalks, bridges,
Petitioners then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court ferries, levees, wharves, piers, public buildings including schoolhouses,
of Appeals. In its now disputed 15th January 1992 decision, the appellate parks, playgrounds, plazas, market places, artesian wells, water supply and
court dismissed the petition on the ground that the remedy of appeal in the sewerage systems, cemeteries, crematories, and railroads.
ordinary course of law was an adequate remedy and that the petition itself, in This view of petitioners is much too limitative and restrictive.
any case, had failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or lack of
jurisdictional competence on the part of the trial court. A motion for the The court, in Guido, merely passed upon the issue of the extent of the
reconsideration of the decision was denied in the 23rd July 1992 resolution Presidents power under Commonwealth Act No. 539 to, specifically, acquire
of the appellate court. private lands for subdivision into smaller home lots or farms for resale to
bona fide tenants or occupants. It was in this particular context of the statute
We begin, in this present recourse of petitioners, with a few known postulates. that the Court had made the pronouncement. The guidelines in Guido were
not meant to be preclusive in nature and, most certainly, the power of eminent
Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less domain should not now be understood as being confined only to the
frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent expropriation of vast tracts of land and landed estates.[15]
power of sovereignty. It need not be clothed with any constitutional gear to
exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more The term public use, not having been otherwise defined by the constitution,
to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public
is generally so described as the highest and most exact idea of property exigency.[16] Black summarizes the characterization given by various courts
remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose to the term; thus:
through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State.[9] It is a right Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional and statutory basis for taking
to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or property by eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, public use is one
which confers same benefit or advantage to the public; it is not confined to as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that
actual use by public. It is measured in terms of right of public to use proposed the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
facilities for which condemnation is sought and, as long as public has right of clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case, the
use, whether exercised by one or many members of public, a public advantage Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into
or public benefit accrues sufficient to constitute a public use. Montana Power account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those
Co. vs. Bokma, Mont. 457 P. 2d 769, 772, 773. who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nations Capital should
be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that
Public use, in constitutional provisions restricting the exercise of the right to stands in the way.
take private property in virtue of eminent domain, means a use concerning
the whole community as distinguished from particular individuals. But each Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
and every member of society need not be equally interested in such use, or be through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of eminent
personally and directly affected by it; if the object is to satisfy a great public domain is merely the means to the end. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co.
want or exigency, that is sufficient. Rindge Co. vs. Los Angeles County, 262 153 US 525, 529, 530, 38 L. ed. 808, 810, 14 S Ct 891; United States v.
U.S. 700, 43 [Link]. 689, 692, 67 [Link]. 1186. The term may be said to mean Gettysburg Electric R. Co. 160 US 668, 679, 40 L. ed. 576, 580, 16 S Ct 427.
public usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general
benefit. It may be limited to the inhabitants of a small or restricted locality, It has been explained as early as Sea v. Manila Railroad Co.,[19] that:
but must be in common, and not for a particular individual. The use must be
a needful one for the public, which cannot be surrendered without obvious x x x A historical research discloses the meaning of the term public use to be
general loss and inconvenience. A public use for which land may be taken one of constant growth. As society advances, its demands upon the individual
defies absolute definition for it changes with varying conditions of society, increase and each demand is a new use to which the resources of the
new appliances in the sciences, changing conceptions of scope and functions individual may be devoted. x x x for whatever is beneficially employed for
of government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an the community is a public use.
increase in population and new modes of communication and transportation.
Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn., 521, 245 A.2d 579,586. [17] Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states:
The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever
purposes is beyond question; it is not at all to be said, however, that public project is undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets
use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that public or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not so any more. As
use is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has long been long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain
discarded. This Court in Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,[18] quoting from comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to
Berman v. Parker (348 U.S. 25; 99 L. ed. 27), held: remove any doubt, determines what is public use. One is the expropriation of
We do not sit to determine whether a particular housing project is or is not lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The
desirable. The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. See other is the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 US 421, 424, 96 L. Ed. 469, 472, 72 private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at present
S Ct 405. The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the Petitioners, finally, would fault respondent appellate court in sustaining the
requirement of public use.[20] trial courts order which considered inapplicable the case of Noble v. City of
Manila.[26] Both courts held [Link] Republic was not a party to the
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land alleged contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni Cristo and petitioners
Tenure Administration,[21] has viewed the Constitution a dynamic instrument which (the contracting parties) alone, not the Republic, could properly be
and one that is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically so as to enable it bound.
to meet adequately whatever problems the future has in store. Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has aptly observed that what, in fact, All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law
has ultimately emerged is a concept of public use which is just as broad as and jurisprudence.
public welfare.[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No costs.
Petitioners ask: But (w)hat is the so-called unusual interest that the
expropriation of (Felix Manalos) birthplace become so vital as to be a public
use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent domain when only
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some
religious perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should
be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that
might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting up the
marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his
founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical reality that
greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by
most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to
be merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would
actually benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily
diminish the essence and character of public use.[23]

Petitioners contend that they have been denied due process in the fixing of
the provisional value of their property. Petitioners need merely to be
reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard; [24]
contrary to petitioners argument, the records of this case are replete with
pleadings[25] that could have dealt, directly or indirectly, with the provisional
value of the property.
G.R. No. L-59603 April 29, 1987 empowers the petitioner to acquire by condemnation proceedings any
EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, property for the establishment of export processing zones, in relation to
vs. Proclamation No. 1811, for the purpose of establishing the Mactan Export
HON. CEFERINO E. DULAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, Processing Zone.
Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, and SAN
ANTONIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. On October 21, 1980, the respondent judge issued a writ of possession
Elena M. Cuevas for respondents. authorizing the petitioner to take immediate possession of the premises. On
December 23, 1980, the private respondent filed its answer.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
At the pre-trial conference on February 13, 1981, the respondent judge issued
The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential Decrees an order stating that the parties have agreed that the only issue to be resolved
Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and superseded Sections 5 to is the just compensation for the properties and that the pre-trial is thereby
8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, such that in determining the just terminated and the hearing on the merits is set on April 2, 1981.
compensation of property in an expropriation case, the only basis should be
its market value as declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of condemnation
whichever is lower. declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to take the properties sought
to be condemned, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation as of the filing of the complaint. The respondent judge also issued a second
No. 1811, reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in order, subject of this petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to
the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the properties
1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export sought to be expropriated.
processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
On June 19, 1981, the three commissioners submitted their consolidated
Not all the reserved area, however, was public land. The proclamation report recommending the amount of P15.00 per square meter as the fair and
included, among others, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of reasonable value of just compensation for the properties.
22,328 square meters owned and registered in the name of the private
respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land On July 29, 1981, the petitioner Med a Motion for Reconsideration of the
from the respondent in accordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, order of February 19, 1981 and Objection to Commissioner's Report on the
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the
an agreement regarding the sale of the property. Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through
commissioners; and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch amount set by P.D. No. 1533.
XVI, Lapu-Lapu City, a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent, to expropriate
the aforesaid parcels of land pursuant to P.D. No. 66, as amended, which
On November 14, 1981, the trial court denied the petitioner's motion for Prior to the promulgation of P.D. Nos. 76, 464, 794 and 1533, this Court has
reconsideration and gave the latter ten (10) days within which to file its interpreted the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution and established
objection to the Commissioner's Report. the meaning, under the fundamental law, of just compensation and who has
the power to determine it. Thus, in the following cases, wherein the filing of
On February 9, 1982, the petitioner filed this present petition for certiorari the expropriation proceedings were all commenced prior to the promulgation
and mandamus with preliminary restraining order, enjoining the trial court of the aforementioned decrees, we laid down the doctrine onjust
from enforcing the order dated February 17, 1981 and from further compensation:
proceeding with the hearing of the expropriation case.
Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA 503, 516),
The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule xxx xxx xxx
67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed amended by "And in the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of commissioners to determine the 31 SCRA 413, the Court, speaking thru now Chief Justice Fernando,
just compensation is concerned. Stated in another way, is the exclusive and reiterated the 'well-settled (rule) that just compensation means the equivalent
mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond that is
and constitutional? more and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the
The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of his indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the expropriating entity."
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and in setting the commissioner's report for Garcia v. Court ofappeals (102 SCRA 597, 608),
hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which is the applicable law herein, the xxx xxx xxx
basis of just compensation shall be the fair and current market value declared "Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property
by the owner of the property sought to be expropriated or such market value and all the uses to which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be
as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no more considered and not merely the condition it is in the time and the use to which
need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the Revised Rules it is then applied by the owner. All the facts as to the condition of the property
of Court and for said commissioners to consider other highly variable factors and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may be shown and
in order to determine just compensation. The petitioner further maintains that considered in estimating its value."
P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the assessors and the property owners
themselves the power or duty to fix the market value of the properties and Republic v. Santos (141 SCRA 30, 35-36),
that said property owners are given the full opportunity to be heard before the "According to section 8 of Rule 67, the court is not bound by the
Local Board of Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment commissioners' report. It may make such order or render such judgment as
Appeals. Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right
to determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings, with of condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property
appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is valid and expropriated. This Court may substitute its own estimate of the value as
constitutional. gathered from the record (Manila Railroad Company v. Velasquez, 32 Phil.
286)."
 Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the
However, the promulgation of the aforementioned decrees practically set recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire
aside the above and many other precedents hammered out in the course of the property."
evidence-laden, well argued, fully heard, studiously deliberated, and
judiciously considered court proceedings. The decrees categorically and We are constrained to declare the provisions of the Decrees on just
peremptorily limited the definition of just compensation thus: compensation unconstitutional and void and accordingly dismiss the instant
petition for lack of merit.
P.D. No. 76:
xxx xxx xxx The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
"For purposes of just compensation in cases of private property acquired by constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to
the government for public use, the basis shall be the current and fair market render this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved
value declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as to it for final determination.
determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower."
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would
P.D. No. 464: still have the power to determine the just compensation for the property,
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating
proceedings. — In determining just compensation which private property is the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor.
acquired by the government for public use, the basis shall be the market value As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to
property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, whichever is satisfy the due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly
lower." fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial proceeding was not had before
the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
P.D. No. 794: proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the
"Section 92. Basis for payment of just compensation in expropriation court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the
proceedings. — In determining just compensation when private property is assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court
acquired by the government for public use, the same shall not exceed the cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or
market value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar as the
interest in the property, or such market value as determined by the assessor, determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
whichever is lower."
In the case of National Housing Authority v. Reyes (123 SCRA 245), this
P.D. No. 1533: Court upheld P.D. No. 464, as further amended by P.D. Nos. 794, 1224 and
"Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property acquired 1259. In this case, the petitioner National Housing Authority contended that
through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not the owner's declaration at P1,400.00 which happened to be lower than the
exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having assessor's assessment, is the just compensation for the respondent's property
legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the under section 92 of P.D. No. 464. On the other hand, the private respondent
stressed that while there may be basis for the allegation that the respondent
judge did not follow the decree, the matter is still subject to his final This time, we answer in the affirmative.
disposition, he having been vested with the original and competent authority
to exercise his judicial discretion in the light of the constitutional clauses on In overruling the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and objection to the
due process and equal protection. commissioner's report, the trial court said:

To these opposing arguments, this Court ruled that under the conceded facts, "Another consideration why the Court is empowered to appoint
there should be a recognition that the law as it stands must be applied; that commissioners to assess the just compensation of these properties under
the decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocally calls for obedience; eminent domain proceedings, is the well-entrenched ruling that 'the owner of
and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks in no uncertain language, property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating authority the
the Court has no choice except to yield to its command. We further stated that fair and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was
"the courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and actually taken by the province, plus consequential damages — including
reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of attorney's fees — from which the consequential benefits, if any should be
justice or the constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due to the owner
owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property." from and after the date of actual taking.' (Capitol Subdivision, Inc. v.
Province of Negros Occidental, 7 SCRA 60). In fine, the decree only
While the Court yielded to executive prerogative exercised in the form of establishes a uniform basis for determining just compensation which the
absolute law-making power, its members, nonetheless, remained Court may consider as one of the factors in arriving at 'just compensation,' as
uncomfortable with the implications of the decision and the abuse and envisage in the Constitution. In the words of Justice Barredo, "Respondent
unfairness which might follow in its wake. For one thing, the President court's invocation of General Order No. 3 of September 21, 1972 is nothing
himself did not seem assured or confident with his own enactment. It was not short of an unwarranted abdication of judicial authority, which no judge duly
enough to lay down the law on determination of just compensation in P.D. imbued with the implications of the paramount principle of independence of
76. It had to be repeated and reiterated in P.D. 464, P.D. 794, and P.D. 1533. the judiciary should ever think of doing." (Lina v. Purisima, 82 SCRA 344,
The provision is also found in P.D. 1224, P.D. 1259 and P.D. 1313. Inspite 351; Cf. Prov. of Pangasinan v. CFI Judge of Pangasinan, Br. VIII, 80 SCRA
of its effectivity as general law and the wide publicity given to it, the 117) Indeed, where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the
questioned provision or an even stricter version had to be embodied in cases determination of just compensation on the value declared by the owner or
of specific expropriations by decree as in P.D. 1669 expropriating the administrator or as determined by the Assessor, whichever is lower, it may
Tambunting Estate and P.D. 1670 expropriating the Sunog Apog area in result in the deprivation of the landowner's right of due process to enable it
Tondo, Manila. to prove its claim to just compensation, as mandated by the Constitution. (Uy
v. Genato, 57 SCRA 123). The tax declaration under the Real Property Tax
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question Code is, undoubtedly, for purposes of taxation."
of whether the courts under P.D. 1533, which contains the same provision on
just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and We are convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the
authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the
the decree and to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such purpose. factors in determining just compensation but it may not substitute the court's
own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at described in terms of only two or three classes of building materials and
such amount. A return to the earlier well-established doctrine, to our mind, is estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values can
more in keeping with the principle that the judiciary should live up to its serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.
mission "by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights." (See
Salonga v. Cruz Paño, 134 SCRA 438, 462; citing Mercado v. Court of First To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by
Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93.) The doctrine we enunciated in National assessors since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The
Housing Authority v. Reyes, supra, therefore, must necessarily be abandoned overwhelming mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in
if we are to uphold this Court's role as the guardian of the fundamental rights the tax declarations prepared by local assessors or municipal clerks for them.
guaranteed by the due process and equal protection clauses and as the final They do not even look at, much less analyze, the statements. The Idea of
arbiter over transgressions committed against constitutional rights. expropriation simply never occurs until a demand is made or a case filed by
an agency authorized to do so.
The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. that the valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive
It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to to basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a
the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court
capabilities, should be considered. promulgated only after expert commissioners have actually viewed the
property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented, and
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination
for just compensation were made by the Lapu-Lapu municipal, later city have been judiciously evaluated.
assessor long before martial law, when land was not only much cheaper but
when assessed values of properties were stated in figures constituting only a As was held in the case of Gideon v. Wainwright (93 ALR 2d,733,742):
fraction of their true market value. The private respondent was not even the "In the light of these and many other prior decisions of this Court, it is not
owner of the properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development surprising that the Betts Court, when faced with the contention that 'one
purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are charged with crime, who is unable to obtain counsel must be furnished
out of date and at prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would counsel by the State,' conceded that '[E]xpressions in the opinions of this
be arbitrary and confiscatory. court lend color to the argument. . .' 316 U.S., at 462, 463, 86 L ed. 1602, 62
S Ct. 1252. The fact is that in deciding as it did-that "appointment of counsel
Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial" — the Court in Betts v.
singled out for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are Brady made an ubrupt brake with its own well-considered precedents. In
usually uniform for very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire returning to these old precedents, sounder we believe than the new, we but
town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual differences are never restore constitutional principles established to achieve a fair system of justice.
taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its . ."
possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops. Very often land
described as "cogonal" has been cultivated for generations. Buildings are
We return to older and more sound precedents. This Court has the duty to
formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts,
doctrines, or rules. (See Salonga v. Cruz Pano, supra).

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a

judicial function. The executive department or the legislature may make the
initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its
own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the
courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed
compensation.

We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's
discretion to appoint commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, is unconstitutional and void. To hold otherwise would be to undermine
the very purpose why this Court exists in the first place.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby

DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on February 16, 1982
is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993 WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be acquired either
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. by purchase or expropriation to implement the above program component;
VILLAFUERTE and HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) present
of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines Sur, petitioners, Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the same pilot
vs. development center;
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN WHEREFORE . . . .
JOAQUIN and EFREN SAN JOAQUIN, respondents. Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its
The Provincial Attorney for petitioners. Governor, Hon. Luis [Link], filed two separate cases for expropriation
Reynaldo L. Herrera for Ernesto San Joaquin. against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special
Civil Action Nos. P-17-89 and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili,
QUIASON, J.: Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon. Benjamin V. Panga.
In this appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-
G.R. SP No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of
V. Panga, et al.," this Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of writ of possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the
agricultural lands by local government units is subject, to the prior approval motion.
of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian
reform program. The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of
inadequacy of the price offered for their property. In an order dated December
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of 6, 1989, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the
Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property upon the deposit
Provincial Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally
provincial capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non- fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents may
traditional agricultural crops and a housing project for provincial government suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court
employees. issued a writ of possession in an order dated January 18, 1990.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the
The "WHEREAS" clause of the Resolution states: Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion
WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five-year to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the
Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital components of which order dated February 1990.
includes the establishment of model and pilot farm for non-food and non-
traditional agricultural crops, soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that
15 small scale technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be
paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and other declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed;
progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to provide the necessary and (c) that the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to
scientific and technology know-how to farmers and fishermen in Camarines dismiss and (ii) allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of
Sur and to establish a housing project for provincial government employees; the property subject of the expropriation and the order dated February 26,
1990, denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution;
aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals
enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction. ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines
Sur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from
has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and
and 7 of Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
are for a public purpose.
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may
Solicitor General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code be exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually
(B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need for the approval by the Office of the be used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before
President of the exercise by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of the taking thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use".
eminent domain. However, the Solicitor General expressed the view that the Under the new concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience
Province of Camarines Sur must first secure the approval of the Department or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity
of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use of the whole community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project
as a housing project. (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 [Link] 461 [1987]).
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is
and the order denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would
ordered the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of
Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Camarines Sur. Once operational, the center would make available to the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property community invaluable information and technology on agriculture, fishery
of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land. and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen
and craftsmen would be enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
Hence this petition. public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in Sumulong v.
Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects
the dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general welfare."
inadequacy of the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the
nullification of Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the
Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Sur. Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section
65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a S Ct. 684). While such delegated power may be a limited authority, it is
non-agricultural land. complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the
delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the law conferring the
The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor power or in other legislations.
General, held that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the
provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9
must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the of B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:
plan to expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins. A local government unit may, through its head and acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the
issue of whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government,
covered by the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. units must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the
There was a finding that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can
an area of 8,970 square meters or less than one hectare was affected by the institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no
land reform program and covered by emancipation patents issued by the provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly
Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While the Court said that there was "no need subjects the expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to
under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of
superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of competing law that the Court of Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the
public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that petitioners had Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the
failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square meters formed Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads:
part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the decision is Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years from its
that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the power to award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for,
distribute lands under the land reform program. agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will
have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner,
Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local government units exercise such with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may
power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129) authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition:
Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent
domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to
(City of Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 [Link]. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of
also true that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain "the lapse of five (5) years from its award."
certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local
governments (Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) Philippines, as sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated
of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the sovereign powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general
authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability term.
of a parcel of agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted
by the expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the
Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove valuation declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded.
conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial This Court has declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing
uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification the just compensation in expropriation cases to be the value given to the
submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries. condemned property either by the owners or the assessor, whichever was
lower ([Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]).
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions As held in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the
cannot be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 of the
N.Y. 2d. 249, 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241). Rules of Court, which allow private respondents to submit evidence on what
they consider shall be the just compensation for their property.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units
can no longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the
roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order
of the use of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
of these projects would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, respondents' property; (b) orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation
it would then be the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether proceedings; and (c) requires the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the
the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use. approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify
private respondents' property from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall
determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside
public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to the order of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the
such legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular private respondents.
undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use (United States
Ex Rel Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66
S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. [G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998]
1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585). MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE, petitioner, vs. V.M. REALTY
CORPORATION, respondent.
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad DECISION
their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially PANGANIBAN, J.:
mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister A local government unit (LGU), like the Municipality of Paranaque, cannot
of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of
its lawmaking body. The Local Government Code expressly and clearly WHEREFORE, defendants motion for reconsideration is hereby granted. The
requires an ordinance or a local law for the purpose. A resolution that merely order dated February 4, 1994 is vacated and set aside.
expresses the sentiment or opinion of the Municipal Council will not suffice.
On the other hand, the principle of res judicata does not bar subsequent This case is hereby dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
proceedings for the expropriation of the same property when all the legal SO ORDERED.[5]
requirements for its valid exercise are complied with.
Factual Antecedents
Statement of the Case
These principles are applied by this Court in resolving this petition for review Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993,[6] the
on certiorari of the July 22, 1996 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA Municipality of Paraaque filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for
GR CV No. 48048, which affirmed in toto[3] the Regional Trial Courts August expropriation[7] against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over
9, 1994 Resolution.[4] The trial court dismissed the expropriation suit as two parcels of land (Lots 2-A-2 and 2-B-1 of Subdivision Plan Psd-17917),
follows: with a combined area of about 10,000 square meters, located at Wakas, San
The right of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain is not Dionisio, Paraaque, Metro Manila, and covered by Torrens Certificate of
disputed. However, such right may be exercised only pursuant to an Title No. 48700. Allegedly, the complaint was filed for the purpose of
Ordinance (Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160). In the instant case, there is no such alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes
ordinance passed by the Municipal Council of Paraaque enabling the for the homeless through a socialized housing project. [8] Parenthetically, it
Municipality, thru its Chief Executive, to exercise the power of eminent was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang
domain. The complaint, therefore, states no cause of action. Bayan Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991,[9] previously made an offer to enter
into a negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter
Assuming that plaintiff has a cause of action, the same is barred by a prior did not accept.[10]
judgment. On September 29, 1987, the plaintiff filed a complaint for
expropriation involving the same parcels of land which was docketed as Civil Finding the Complaint sufficient in form and substance, the Regional Trial
Case No. 17939 of this Court (page 26, record). Said case was dismissed with Court of Makati, Branch 134, issued an Order dated January 10, 1994, [11]
prejudice on May 18, 1988 (page 39, record). The order of dismissal was not giving it due course. Acting on petitioners motion, said court issued an Order
appealed, hence, the same became final. The plaintiff can not be allowed to dated February 4, 1994,[12] authorizing petitioner to take possession of the
pursue the present action without violating the principle of [r]es [j]udicata. subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent
While defendant in Civil Case No. 17939 was Limpan Investment to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
Corporation, the doctrine of res judicata still applies because the judgment in
said case (C.C. No. 17939) is conclusive between the parties and their On February 21, 1994, private respondent filed its Answer containing
successors-in-interest (Vda. de Buncio vs. Estate of the late Anita de Leon). affirmative defenses and a counterclaim,[13] alleging in the main that (a) the
The herein defendant is the successor-in-interest of Limpan Investment complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a
Corporation as shown by the Deed of Assignment Exchange executed on June resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local
13, 1990. Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior
judgment or res judicata. On private respondents motion, its Answer was
treated as a motion to dismiss.[14] On March 24, 1994,[15] petitioner filed its The Court’s Ruling
opposition, stressing that the trial courts Order dated February 4, 1994 was in The petition is not meritorious.
accord with Section 19 of RA 7160, and that the principle of res judicata was
not applicable. First Issue:
Resolution Different from an Ordinance
Thereafter, the trial court issued its August 9, 1994 Resolution[16] nullifying Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for
its February 4, 1994 Order and dismissing the case. Petitioners motions for the purpose of initiating an expropriation case substantially complies with the
reconsideration and transfer of venue were denied by the trial court in a requirements of the law[22]because the terms ordinance and resolution are
Resolution dated December 2, 1994.[17] Petitioner then appealed to synonymous for the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local
Respondent Court, raising the following issues: government unit through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation
1. Whether or not the Resolution of the Paraaque Municipal Council No. 93- proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain. [23]
95, Series of 1993 is a substantial compliance of the statutory requirement of Petitioner seeks to bolster this contention by citing Article 36, Rule VI of the
Section 19, R.A. 7180 [sic] in the exercise of the power of eminent domain Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which
by the plaintiff-appellant. provides: If the LGU fails to acquire a private property for public use,
2. Whether or not the complaint in this case states no cause of action. purpose, or welfare through purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property
3. Whether or not the strict adherence to the literal observance to the rule of through a resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to
procedure resulted in technicality standing in the way of substantial justice. initiate expropriation proceedings.[24] (Italics supplied.)
4. Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to the present
case.[18] The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to
As previously mentioned, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial LGUs, other public entities and public utilities.[25] An LGU may therefore
courts Decision. Respondent Court, in its assailed Resolution promulgated on exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized by
January 8, 1997,[19] denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for lack of Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed through the
merit. law conferring the power or in other legislations. [26] In this case, Section 19
of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain, also
Hence, this appeal.[20] lays down the parameters for its [Link] provides as follows:
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief
The Issues executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent
Before this Court, petitioner posits two issues, viz.: domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
1. A resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
and effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of
valid cause of action. eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has
2. The principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
applicable when public interest is primarily involved.[21] Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings
and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. [32] An
(15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third
amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided
proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.[33]
property. (Emphasis supplied)
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous
exercise the power of eminent domain: Local Government Code. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the the previous Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically
local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an [Link],
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private [l]egislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.
property. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only
welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article lead to an injustice.[34] In the instant case, there is no reason to depart from
III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. this rule, since the law requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd,
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the or unjust.
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted. [27]
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of a fundamental or private right of the people. [35] Accordingly, the manifest
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus, there change in the legislative language -- from resolution under BP 337 to
was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized ordinance under RA 7160 -- demands a strict construction. No species of
through an ordinance. Petitioner cites Camarines Sur vs. Court of Appeals[28] property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by the
to show that a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
domain by an LGU.[29] This case, however, is not in point because the inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater
applicable law at that time was BP 337,[30] the previous Local Government public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his consent,
Code, which had provided that a mere resolution would enable an LGU to the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful
exercise eminent domain. In contrast, RA 7160, [31] the present Local interpretation.[36]
Government Code which was already in force when the Complaint for
expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for this purpose. Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which
requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms resolution and This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself,
ordinance are synonymous. A municipal ordinance is different from a surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it.[37] It is
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended
by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides, what the hypothetically admitted by the motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to
discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer
implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in of the complaint?[42]
exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the
act pursuant to an ordinance. Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The
absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause
In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2, of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error
Article X of the Constitution, which provides that territorial and political in affirming the trial courts Decision which dismissed the expropriation suit.
subdivisions shall enjoy local [Link] merely upholds the law as worded
in RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its powers and Second Issue:
rights are sourced therefrom. It has therefore no power to amend or act Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata
beyond the authority given and the limitations imposed on it by law. Strictly As correctly found by the Court of Appeals[43] and the trial court,[44] all the
speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not requisites for the application of res judicata are present in this case. There is
eminent but inferior domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by a previous final judgment on the merits in a prior expropriation case involving
the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. [38] identical interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been
Indeed, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it. [39]
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which
Complaint Does Not State a Cause of Action finds application in generally all cases and proceedings,[45] cannot bar the
In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its right of the State or its agent to expropriate private property. The very nature
Sanguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11, 1994 which reiterated of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the right
its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts of its mayor to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even by a prior judgment or
regarding the subject expropriation.[40] res judicata. The scope of eminent domain is plenary and, like police power,
can reach every form of property which the State might need for public use.[46]
This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely alleged All separate interests of individuals in property are held of the government
the existence of such an ordinance, but it did not present any certified true under this tacit agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant
copy thereof. In the second place,petitioner did not raise this point before this to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of
Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private respondent, and only in passing.[41] property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the people
In any event, this allegation does not cure the inherent defect of petitioners in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession
Complaint for expropriation filed on September 23, 1993. It is hornbook of the property whenever the public interest requires it.[47] Thus, the State or
doctrine that: its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising said right by
x x x in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal requirement.
state a cause of action, the question submitted before the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself. While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to
Whether those allegations are true or not is beside the point, for their truth is exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a
previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation suit
on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit raising the
same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from thereafter
complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and subsequently
exercising its power of eminent domain over the same property.[48] By the
same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power of
eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it from reinstituting
similar proceedings, once the said legal requirement and, for that matter, all
others are properly complied with. Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning,
the same is also true of the principle of law of the case. In Republic vs De
Knecht,[49] the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to exercise
eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment
over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the
parties. The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its
right to expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are
complied with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the
power of eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED without prejudice to

petitioners proper exercise of its power of eminent domain over subject
property. Costs against petitioner.
 [G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005] The Denzons interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but it was
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL ROMEO ZULUETA, dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry of judgment was made on April 5,
COMMODORE EDGARDO GALEOS, ANTONIO CABALUNA, 1948.
DOROTEO MANTOS & FLORENCIO BELOTINDOS, petitioners, vs.
VICENTE G. LIM, respondent. In 1950, Jose Galeos, one of the heirs of the Denzons, filed with the National
RESOLUTION Airports Corporation a claim for rentals for the two lots, but it denied
knowledge of the matter. Another heir, Nestor Belocura, brought the claim to
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: the Office of then President Carlos Garcia who wrote the Civil Aeronautics
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.[1] When the state wields its Administration and the Secretary of National Defense to expedite action on
power of eminent domain, there arises a correlative obligation on its part to said claim. On September 6, 1961, Lt. Manuel Cabal rejected the claim but
pay the owner of the expropriated property a just compensation. If it fails, expressed willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots within a
there is a clear case of injustice that must be redressed. In the present case, reasonable time.
fifty-seven (57) years have lapsed from the time the Decision in the subject
expropriation proceedings became final, but still the Republic of the For failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, on September 20, 1961, the
Philippines, herein petitioner, has not compensated the owner of the property. Denzons successors-in-interest, Francisca Galeos-Valdehueza and
To tolerate such prolonged inaction on its part is to encourage distrust and Josefina Galeos-Panerio,[2] filed with the same CFI an action for recovery
resentment among our people the very vices that corrode the ties of civility of possession with damages against the Republic and officers of the Armed
and tempt men to act in ways they would otherwise shun. Forces of the Philippines in possession of the property. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-7208.
A revisit of the pertinent facts in the instant case is imperative.
On September 5, 1938, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) instituted In the interim or on November 9, 1961, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935 covering
a special civil action for expropriation with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Lots 932 and 939 were issued in the names of Francisca Valdehueza and
of Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. 781, involving Lots 932 and 939 of the Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated thereon was the phrase subject to
Banilad Friar Land Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of establishing the priority of the National Airports Corporation to acquire said parcels of
a military reservation for the Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in the land, Lots 932 and 939 upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.
name of Gervasia Denzon under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters, while Lot 939 was in the name On July 31, 1962, the CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of Valdehueza
of Eulalia Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560 consisting of 13,164 and Panerio, holding that they are the owners and have retained their right as
square meters. such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the Republics failure to pay the
amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation proceedings. However,
After depositing P9,500.00 with the Philippine National Bank, pursuant to in view of the annotation on their land titles, they were ordered to execute a
the Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the Republic took possession deed of sale in favor of the Republic. In view of the differences in money
of the lots. Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI rendered its Decision value from 1940 up to the present, the court adjusted the market value at
ordering the Republic to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as just P16,248.40, to be paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5, 1948, date
compensation. of entry in the expropriation proceedings, until full payment.
 The points in dispute are whether such payment can still be made and, if
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, Valdehueza and Panerio so, in what amount. Said lots have been the subject of expropriation
appealed from the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in controversy, proceedings. By final and executory judgment in said proceedings, they
directly to this Court. The case was docketed as No. L-21032.[3] On May 19, were condemned for public use, as part of an airport, and ordered sold
1966, this Court rendered its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held that to the Government. In fact, the abovementioned title certificates secured
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, by plaintiffs over said lots contained annotations of the right of the
there having been no payment of just compensation by the Republic. National Airports Corporation (now CAA) to pay for and acquire them.
Apparently, this Court found nothing in the records to show that the Republic It follows that both by virtue of the judgment, long final, in the
paid the owners or their successors-in-interest according to the CFI decision. expropriation suit, as well as the annotations upon their title certificates,
While it deposited the amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was allegedly plaintiffs are not entitled to recover possession of their expropriated lots
disbursed, however, the payees could not be ascertained. which are still devoted to the public use for which they were expropriated
but only to demand the fair market value of the same.
Notwithstanding the above finding, this Court still ruled that Valdehueza and
Panerio are not entitled to recover possession of the lots but may only demand Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to Vicente
the payment of their fair market value, ratiocinating as follows: Lim, herein respondent,[4] as security for their loans. For their failure to pay
Appellants would contend that: (1) possession of Lots 932 and 939 should be Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No.
restored to them as owners of the same; (2) the Republic should be ordered 23934 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 63894 was issued in his
to pay rentals for the use of said lots, plus attorneys fees; and (3) the court a name.
quo in the present suit had no power to fix the value of the lots and order the On August 20, 1992, respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of title
execution of the deed of sale after payment. with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Cebu City, against General
Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of the land, there not Commodore Edgardo Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V of the
having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the Government. The records Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo Mantos and Florencio
do not show that the Government paid the owners or their successors-in- Belotindos, herein petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the complaint to
interest according to the 1940 CFI decision although, as stated, P9,500.00 implead the Republic.
was deposited by it, and said deposit had been disbursed. With the records
lost, however, it cannot be known who received the money (Exh. 14 says: It On May 4, 2001, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent, thus:
is further certified that the corresponding Vouchers and pertinent Journal and WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Vicente
Cash Book were destroyed during the last World War, and therefore the Lim and against all defendants, public and private, declaring plaintiff
names of the payees concerned cannot be ascertained.) And the Government Vicente Lim the absolute and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the
now admits that there is no available record showing that payment for rights of an absolute owner including the right to possession. The
the value of the lots in question has been made (Stipulation of Facts, par. monetary claims in the complaint and in the counter claims contained in the
9, Rec. on Appeal, p. 28). answer of defendants are ordered Dismissed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA- defendant-appellant Republic constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty
G.R. CV No. 72915. In its Decision[5] dated September 18, 2003, the on the title of plaintiff-appellee Vicente Lim that can be removed by an
Appellate Court sustained the RTC Decision, thus: action to quiet title.

Obviously, defendant-appellant Republic evaded its duty of paying what WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in
was due to the landowners. The expropriation proceedings had already the appealed May 4, 2001 Decision of Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Cebu
become final in the late 1940s and yet, up to now, or more than fifty (50) City, in Civil Case No. CEB-12701, the said decision is UPHELD AND
years after, the Republic had not yet paid the compensation fixed by the AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
court while continuously reaping benefits from the expropriated Undaunted, petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed with
property to the prejudice of the landowner. x x x. This is contrary to the this Court a petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Republic has
rules of fair play because the concept of just compensation embraces not remained the owner of Lot 932 as held by this Court in Valdehueza vs.
only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of Republic.[6]
the land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered In our Resolution dated March 1, 2004, we denied the petition outright on the
just for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being ground that the Court of Appeals did not commit a reversible error.
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade Petitioners filed an urgent motion for reconsideration but we denied the same
or more, in this case more than 50 years, before actually receiving the with finality in our Resolution of May 17, 2004.
amount necessary to cope with the loss. To allow the taking of the
landowners properties, and in the meantime leave them empty-handed On May 18, 2004, respondent filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an
by withholding payment of compensation while the government entry of judgment. We only noted the motion in our Resolution of July 12,
speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse, for 2004.
government to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return
it to the landowners, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent On July 7, 2004, petitioners filed an urgent plea/motion for clarification,
domain that must never be sanctioned. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. which is actually a second motion for reconsideration. Thus, in our
Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 404). Resolution of September 6, 2004, we simply noted without action the motion
considering that the instant petition was already denied with finality in our
xxxxxx Resolution of May 17, 2004.
An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud On October 29, 2004, petitioners filed a very urgent motion for leave to file
or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property. It is essential for the a motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated September 6, 2004 (with
plaintiff or complainant to have a legal or equitable title or interest in the real prayer to refer the case to the En Banc). They maintain that the Republics
property, which is the subject matter of the action. Also the deed, claim, right of ownership has been settled in Valdehueza.
encumbrance or proceeding that is being alleged as cloud on plaintiffs title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie The basic issue for our resolution is whether the Republic has retained
appearance of validity or legal efficacy (Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to pay respondents predecessors-in-
SCRA 97). In view of the foregoing discussion, clearly, the claim of
interest the just compensation therefor pursuant to the judgment of the CFI viewed as fair. This is more so when such delay is accompanied by
rendered as early as May 14, 1940. bureaucratic hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza is the fact that respondents
predecessors-in-interest were given a run around by the Republics officials
Initially, we must rule on the procedural obstacle. and agents. In 1950, despite the benefits it derived from the use of the two
lots, the National Airports Corporation denied knowledge of the claim of
While we commend the Republic for the zeal with which it pursues the respondents predecessors-in-interest. Even President Garcia, who sent a letter
present case, we reiterate that its urgent motion for clarification filed on July to the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the Secretary of National
7, 2004 is actually a second motion for reconsideration. This motion is Defense to expedite the payment, failed in granting relief to them. And, on
prohibited under Section 2, Rule 52, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as September 6, 1961, while the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces expressed
amended, which provides: willingness to pay the appraised value of the lots, nothing happened.
Sec. 2. Second motion for reconsideration. No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be The Court of Appeals is correct in saying that Republic’s delay is contrary to
entertained. the rules of fair play, as just compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land, but
Consequently, as mentioned earlier, we simply noted without action the also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking.
motion since petitioners petition was already denied with finality. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered [Link]
jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated property
Considering the Republics urgent and serious insistence that it is still the precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the
owner of Lot 932 and in the interest of justice, we take another hard look at compensation is not paid in a reasonable time, the party may be treated as a
the controversial issue in order to determine the veracity of petitioners stance. trespasser ab initio.[8]
One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person
shall be deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in Corollarily, in Provincial Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. De Villaroya,[9]
expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there must be similar to the present case, this Court expressed its disgust over the
just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. [7] governments vexatious delay in the payment of just compensation, thus:
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of our Constitution mandates: Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. The petitioners have been waiting for more than thirty years to be paid
for their land which was taken for use as a public high school. As a matter
The Republic disregarded the foregoing provision when it failed and refused of fair procedure, it is the duty of the Government, whenever it takes property
to pay respondents predecessors-in-interest the just compensation for Lots from private persons against their will, to supply all required documentation
932 and 939. The length of time and the manner with which it evaded and facilitate payment of just compensation. The imposition of
payment demonstrate its arbitrary high-handedness and confiscatory attitude. unreasonable requirements and vexatious delays before effecting
The final judgment in the expropriation proceedings (Civil Case No. 781) was payment is not only galling and arbitrary but a rich source of discontent
entered on April 5, 1948. More than half of a century has passed, yet, to this with government. There should be some kind of swift and effective
day, the landowner, now respondent, has remained empty-handed. recourse against unfeeling and uncaring acts of middle or lower level
Undoubtedly, over 50 years of delayed payment cannot, in any way, be bureaucrats.
 democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small Landowners in the
We feel the same way in the instant case. Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[13] thus:

More than anything else, however, it is the obstinacy of the Republic that Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does
prompted us to dismiss its petition outright. As early as May 19, 1966, in not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is
Valdehueza, this Court mandated the Republic to pay respondents entered and paid, but the condemnors title relates back to the date on which
predecessors-in-interest the sum of P16,248.40 as reasonable market value of the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioners report
the two lots in question. Unfortunately, it did not comply and allowed several under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.
decades to pass without obeying this Courts mandate. Such prolonged
obstinacy bespeaks of lack of respect to private rights and to the rule of law, x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is
which we cannot countenance. It is tantamount to confiscation of private complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the
property. While it is true that all private properties are subject to the need of owner until payment is actually made. (Emphasis supplied.)
government, and the government may take them whenever the necessity or
the exigency of the occasion demands, however, the Constitution guarantees In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, the US Supreme Court cited several cases
that when this governmental right of expropriation is exercised, it shall be holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just
attended by compensation.[10] From the taking of private property by the compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be
government under the power of eminent domain, there arises an implied uniform to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, it was held
promise to compensate the owner for his loss.[11] that actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a
condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision of Section 9, Article III of the State albeit not to the appropriation of it to public use. In Rexford v.
Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This limiting function Knight, the Court of Appeals of New York said that the construction upon the
is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the arbitrary statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the
exercise of governmental powers to the detriment of the individuals rights. compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land
Given this function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that both on
against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in favor of the principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use
property owner.[12] the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated
under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass
Ironically, in opposing respondents claim, the Republic is invoking this from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been
Courts Decision in Valdehueza, a Decision it utterly defied. How could the made to him.
Republic acquire ownership over Lot 932 when it has not paid its owner the Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and
just compensation, required by law, for more than 50 years? The recognized Paredes, that:
rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the
expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion
Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of
expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute
reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots. This is our
from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid...(Emphasis ruling in the recent cases of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals,
supplied.) et al.,[17] and Reyes vs. National Housing Authority.[18] However, the facts of
the present case do not justify its application. It bears stressing that the
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer Republic was ordered to pay just compensation twice, the first was in the
of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the expropriation proceedings and the second, in Valdehueza. Fifty-seven (57)
Republics acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of years have passed since then. We cannot but construe the Republics failure
just compensation within a reasonable time.[14] to pay just compensation as a deliberate refusal on its part. Under such
circumstance, recovery of possession is in order. In several jurisdictions, the
Significantly, in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia[15] this Court ruled that the courts held that recovery of possession may be had when property has been
expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit: wrongfully taken or is wrongfully retained by one claiming to act under the
x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the power of eminent domain[19] or where a rightful entry is made and the
plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its party condemning refuses to pay the compensation which has been
exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, assessed or agreed upon;[20] or fails or refuses to have the compensation
if not of dismissal of the action, of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff assessed and paid.[21]
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just The Republic also contends that where there have been constructions being
compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x used by the military, as in this case, public interest demands that the present
x x. suit should not be sustained.
It must be emphasized that an individual cannot be deprived of his property
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the for the public convenience.[22] In Association of Small Landowners in the
determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,[23] we ruled:
to be taken. This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners. x x x. One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. It is not
to have been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation,[16] we enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
ruled that, the process is not completed until payment of just compensation. employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency
Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors- will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that not even
in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject
incomplete. only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an
individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a
The Republic now argues that under Valdehueza, respondent is not entitled right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of
to recover possession of Lot 932 but only to demand payment of its fair one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.
market value. Of course, we are aware of the doctrine that non-payment of The right covers the persons life, his liberty and his property under
just compensation (in an expropriation proceedings) does not entitle the Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With regard to his property,
the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the short, it failed to perfect its title over Lot 932 by its failure to pay just
familiar rule that private property shall not be taken for public use compensation. The issue of bad faith would have assumed relevance if the
without just compensation. Republic actually acquired title over Lot 932. In such a case, even if
respondents title was registered first, it would be the Republics title or right
The Republics assertion that the defense of the State will be in grave danger of ownership that shall be upheld. But now, assuming that respondent was
if we shall order the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent is an overstatement. in bad faith, can such fact vest upon the Republic a better title over Lot
First, Lot 932 had ceased to operate as an airport. What remains in the site is 932? We believe not. This is because in the first place, the Republic has no
just the National Historical Institutes marking stating that Lot 932 is the title to speak of.
former location of Lahug Airport. And second, there are only thirteen (13)
structures located on Lot 932, eight (8) of which are residence apartments At any rate, assuming that respondent had indeed knowledge of the
of military personnel. Only two (2) buildings are actually used as training annotation, still nothing would have prevented him from entering into a
centers. Thus, practically speaking, the reversion of Lot 932 to respondent mortgage contract involving Lot 932 while the expropriation proceeding was
will only affect a handful of military personnel. It will not result to irreparable pending. Any person who deals with a property subject of an expropriation
damage or damage beyond pecuniary estimation, as what the Republic does so at his own risk, taking into account the ultimate possibility of losing
vehemently claims. the property in favor of the government. Here, the annotation merely served
as a caveat that the Republic had a preferential right to acquire Lot 932 upon
We thus rule that the special circumstances prevailing in this case entitle its payment of a reasonable market value. It did not proscribe Valdehueza
respondent to recover possession of the expropriated lot from the Republic. and Panerio from exercising their rights of ownership including their right to
Unless this form of swift and effective relief is granted to him, the grave mortgage or even to dispose of their property. In Republic vs. Salem
injustice committed against his predecessors-in-interest, though no fault or Investment Corporation,[24] we recognized the owners absolute right over his
negligence on their part, will be perpetuated. Let this case, therefore, serve as property pending completion of the expropriation proceeding, thus:
a wake-up call to the Republic that in the exercise of its power of eminent
domain, necessarily in derogation of private rights, it must comply with the It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said
Constitutional limitations. This Court, as the guardian of the people's right, to have been completed. Moreover, it is only upon payment of just
will not stand still in the face of the Republics oppressive and confiscatory compensation that title over the property passes to the government.
taking of private property, as in this case. Therefore, until the action for expropriation has been completed and
terminated, ownership over the property being expropriated remains with the
At this point, it may be argued that respondent Vicente Lim acted in bad faith registered owner. Consequently, the latter can exercise all rights
in entering into a contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio despite pertaining to an owner, including the right to dispose of his property
the clear annotation in TCT No. 23934 that Lot 932 is subject to the priority subject to the power of the State ultimately to acquire it through
of the National Airports Corporation [to acquire said parcels of land] x expropriation.
x x upon previous payment of a reasonable market value.
It bears emphasis that when Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
The issue of whether or not respondent acted in bad faith is immaterial respondent in 1964, they were still the owners thereof and their title had not
considering that the Republic did not complete the expropriation process. In yet passed to the petitioner Republic. In fact, it never did. Such title or
ownership was rendered conclusive when we categorically ruled in defined just compensation as not only the correct determination of the amount
Valdehueza that: It is true that plaintiffs are still the registered owners of to be paid to the property owner but also the payment of the property within
the land, there not having been a transfer of said lots in favor of the a reasonable time. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be
Government. considered just.

For respondents part, it is reasonable to conclude that he entered into the WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
contract of mortgage with Valdehueza and Panerio fully aware of the extent CV No. 72915 is AFFIRMED in toto.
of his right as a mortgagee. A mortgage is merely an accessory contract
intended to secure the performance of the principal obligation. One of its The Republics motion for reconsideration of our Resolution dated March 1,
characteristics is that it is inseparable from the property. It adheres to the 2004 is DENIED with FINALITY. No further pleadings will be allowed.
property regardless of who its owner may subsequently be. [25] Respondent
must have known that even if Lot 932 is ultimately expropriated by the
Republic, still, his right as a mortgagee is protected. In this regard, Article
2127 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2127. The mortgage extends to the natural accessions, to the

improvements, growing fruits, and the rents or income not yet received when
the obligation becomes due, and to the amount of the indemnity granted
or owing to the proprietor from the insurers of the property mortgaged, or in
virtue of expropriation for public use, with the declarations, amplifications,
and limitations established by law, whether the estate remains in the
possession of the mortgagor or it passes in the hands of a third person.

In summation, while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just

compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of
the expropriated lots,[26]however, in cases where the government failed to pay
just compensation within five (5)[27] years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their property. This is in consonance
with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor
the judgment.[28] To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage
the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with
justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it
takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the
payment of just compensation. In Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,[29] we