IUMI Position Paper

Firefighting systems on board container vessels

______________________________________________________________________

1. Current situation
Major fires on container vessels count among the worst hazards of the global
shipping industry. Names such as the "Hanjin Pennsylvania" (4,000 TEU; fire on
November 11, 2002, two fatalities, constructive total loss), the "Hyundai Fortune"
(5,551 TEU; fire on March 21, 2006) and the "MSC Flaminia" (6,732 TEU; fire on
July 14, 2012; three fatalities, two seriously injured, constructive total loss) are just a
few of the best-known examples from the past.

Every ineffective attempt to put out such a major fire increases the damage to the
cargo, the vessel and the environment. Moreover, the crew is in great danger when
a fire breaks out on board. Crew members face considerable risks when fighting
such fires with the equipment currently required by law. Some, as was most recently
the case with the “MSC Flaminia”, are unable to extinguish or contain the fire and
ultimately pay with their lives.

In remote locations and on the open sea, it can often be hours or even days after a
fire has broken out before external assistance arrives. As a rule, only seagoing tugs
carry the necessary equipment for effective firefighting. Until they arrive, the crew
has to rely on its own resources and the fire can spread extensively. As a result, as
with the “MSC Flaminia”, it can take weeks to bring the fire under control.

To increase the effectiveness of firefighting, Chapter II-2/10 of the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was amended in 2014 by MSC 92,
applying to new ships constructed on or after 1 January 2016. Although these
changes represent a first step in the right direction, and are expressly welcomed by
IUMI, they do not go far enough. A concern remains with the firefighting
arrangements on existing ships. Even with the new regulation, there is a risk that
fires on board cannot efficiently be fought without putting members of the crew in
immediate danger.

With the growing size of container vessels, the challenge of insufficient firefighting
arrangements is becoming even greater.

2. Prevention matters
Containers often contain a wide range of hazardous and toxic substances and
insufficient declaration of a container’s content has, in IUMI’s view, a significant
impact. Although no reliable figures exist, it is IUMI’s believe that a considerable
amount of container content is declared wrongly which may lead to insufficient
handling of the container as well as an incorrect firefighting strategy. This may
increase the danger of combustion of the goods in the container.
IUMI Position Paper on fire-fighting on container vessels – September 2017

3. Inadequate existing firefighting regulations

The legal requirements prescribed by SOLAS were originally developed for the
situation on general cargo vessels. On this type of vessel, the cargo is stored openly
in the holds and when fire breaks out, the air space within the hold immediately fills
with smoke making a fire easy to detect. Once a fire is detected, the hold in question
can be sealed off and CO2 can be used directly on the fire.

However, this mode of firefighting is not suitable for container vessels:

• The fire detection systems specified in SOLAS do not enable effective

detection of incipient fires in a container. To discover a fire, air from the hold,
more or less directly below the deck, is usually extracted and passed in front of
a photoelectric cell on the bridge. If the air contains smoke particles, the
contact between the photoelectric cell and the opposite light source is
interrupted and an alarm is triggered. For this to happen, however, the hold
must already be full of smoke up to the level of the hatch cover. On a container
vessel, the fire will already have spread by this point.
• The effectiveness of spraying CO2 into the hatch is also doubtful for two
reasons: First, with a closed container the CO2 cannot act directly on the
burning cargo as it will not penetrate through the container wall. Secondly, if
the oxygen content of the container or the cargo is high, the CO2 will be
completely ineffective.
• If the fire develops further, it is inevitable that it will spread to the deck. In
contrast to a general cargo vessel, fire spreading to the deck load on a
container vessel will have even more catastrophic consequences. With the
exception of the superstructure, there are no natural fire compartments on
deck. Due to a lack of suitable equipment, it is practically impossible to cool the
deck by using water.
• In addition, the detection of a fire on deck is left to chance. SOLAS does not
stipulate that fire detectors must be fitted on deck. A fire is only discovered if a
perceptible amount of smoke is produced, the fire results in sounds that drown
out the ordinary noises of the ship, or if flame is discernible..

4. Best Practice
Attached to this IUMI Position Paper is a proposal from the German Insurance
Association GDV which outlines an improved concept for firefighting facilities
onboard container vessels. As an example of the work undertaken on this issue by
classification societies, the ABS “Guide for Fire Fighting Systems for On-Deck
cargo Areas of Container Carriers”1 may be consulted.

1
See https://ww2.eagle.org/en/rules-and-resources/rules-and-
guides.html?utm_term=www.eagle.org&utm_campaign=TEST-ABS%20Expands%20Industry-
leading%20Guidance%20for%20Fire%20Protection%20on%20Containerships&utm_content=email&utm_source=
Act-On+Software&utm_medium=email&cm_mmc=Act-On%20Software-_-email-_-TEST-
ABS%20Expands%20Industry-leading%20Guidance%20for%20Fire%20Protection%20on%20Containerships-_-
www.eagle.org#/content/dam/eagle/rules-and-guides/current/conventional_ocean_service/199_fire-
IUMI Position Paper on fire-fighting on container vessels – September 2017

5. Recommendation
IUMI acknowledges and embraces all efforts undertaken by the leadership of the
IMO to mitigate the risks for crew, vessel and cargo caused by a fire on a container
vessel. However, bearing in mind the increasing size and complexity of modern
container vessels and the inadequacies described above, IUMI believes that further
steps are required to improve safety.

Accordingly, IUMI recommends that the responsible authorities, class and relevant
industry stakeholders engage in discussions on how to further improve the fire
detection, protection and firefighting capabilities on board container vessels.

Implementation of new and improved measures to fight fires on container vessels

will not only protect the vessel and the cargo, but also the lives and wellbeing of the
crew.

Hamburg, 18 September 2017

About IUMI:

The International Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI) represents 43 national and marine
market insurance and reinsurance associations. Operating at the forefront of marine
risk, it gives a unified voice to the global marine insurance market through effective
representation and lobbying activities. As a forum for the exchange of ideas and best
practice, IUMI works to raise standards across the industry and provides opportunities
for education and the collection and publication of industry statistics. IUMI is
headquartered in Hamburg and traces its roots back to 1874.

More information can be found at www.iumi.com

 Firefighting systems on container vessels

A contribution to the discussion by German Insurance Association (GDV)

Proposal on technical improvements

Firefighting operations on container vessels are limited to allowing the containers to burn out in a
controlled manner in such a way that the fire cannot spread further. This approach is still correct and
reasonable but, in view of the rapid pace of development towards ever larger ships, new technical
solutions are also required. It is impracticable to monitor each container separately and provide it with its
own fire-detection and firefighting means. And even if it were technically possible, economic
considerations are unlikely to make such a solution viable. This also applies to complete container stacks
and bays.

To enable the controlled burning of a limited number of containers without losing sight of what is
economically feasible; separating a ship into fire compartments offers an effective and efficient solution.
It would be expedient to utilize the existing division of the ship below deck (hatches) for establishing fire
compartments. A fire compartment can range over one or more hatches. Vertically, the fire compartments
are demarcated by the hatch covers and the deck. Below deck, the fire compartments are demarcated
by the bulkheads and the hull. By additionally cooling the ship's structure, the effectiveness of the fire
compartment below deck is ensured. With fires below deck, the aim is to maintain the stability of the
vessel's hull including the deck and the hatch covers, and to prevent the fire spreading to the deck and
to the adjacent neighbouring holds.

On deck, the lashing structures to secure the container using rods and turnbuckles in the higher levels
(5-7) can be used and extended for vertically separating the fire compartments. By providing additional
sprinklers on the lashing structures, the fire is prevented from spreading to other fire compartments;
monitors enable the fire to be attacked in a targeted way.

Fire compartments below deck:

To enable fires in the individual fire compartments below deck to be attacked effectively, in addition to
the CO2 firefighting system, a water-based firefighting system must be installed. This system should be
suitable for cooling the vessel's structure including the hold walls, the bulkheads, the tank deck, the hatch
covers, the deck and the cargo. Only this additional cooling will prevent the negative thermal influence of
the fire on the structure of the vessel and thus avoid the fire spreading to other fire compartments.

The water supply should have ample capacity in order to be able to supply at least three fire
compartments simultaneously. This enables firefighting even in the event of a fire spreading from one fire
compartment to adjacent neighbouring ones. To provide a degree of redundancy, the water-based
firefighting system must be able to operate entirely independently of the CO2 firefighting system.

If it is not possible to ensure that the vessel has sufficient damage stability for every load situation, either
the bilge pump system must be powerful enough and also have to be designed so there is clear,
unrestricted flow of water out of the hold to safely cope with the water being used to fight the fire, or a
water-saving firefighting system, e.g. fine water mist (hi-fog), must be used. In the latter case, the hatch
cover could be flushed through with water as a "tank" in order to dissipate the heat. The "wastewater"
would run off above deck. Nevertheless, firefighting with water is preferable. Past experience has shown
that hatch fires can only be extinguished if the respective section is flooded with water.
Fire compartments on deck:
The boundary structures of the fire compartments on deck must be positioned vertically in such a way
that they align with the water-cooled bulkheads below deck. Otherwise if a fire broke out below deck and
spread to the deck, there would be a risk of it affecting two fire compartments on deck.

The boundary structures are to be constructed in such a way that they can accommodate a water-based
firefighting system. This must ensure that deck cargo up to the maximum height and width can be cooled
with water curtains, including the fore and aft sides of the fire compartment. At stack heights that permit
only empty containers, it is sufficient if the fire compartment is protected by sprayed water, e.g. water
shields. In addition, it must be possible to fit to the boundary structures with at least one monitor from
which any position of the fire compartment (fore and aft) can be reached at wind speeds up to force 9.
So that the monitors do not get in the way during loading and firefighting operations, and are also
protected from damage by container crane movements, they should be telescopic. It must also be
possible to control the monitors remotely so that they can be operated irrespective of fumes in the
atmosphere on deck. Likewise, suitable cameras are required which give the crew a 180° view in the
spray direction of the monitor.

The water supply for a fire compartment must be designed in such a way that their firefighting systems,
including the monitors on the boundary structures, are able to cool the structural elements of the fire
compartment boundary sufficiently on both sides so that their stability is never in danger and the flames
and heat radiation from a fire are prevented from spreading to or penetrating other fire compartments.

Fire detection systems

To detect fires as early as possible, infrared cameras, thermal sensors or similar systems that detect any
substantive warming of a container could be used. On deck it would be expedient to use infrared cameras
which are mounted on the fire compartment boundary structures and are mechanically protected. There
are no structural elements suitable for thermal sensors or similar systems on deck. However, the vessel's
structure below deck offers good possibilities for deploying thermal sensors or similar systems.

The systems used must not trigger false alarms in the event of temperature fluctuations such as may
occur in refrigerated containers for example.

Superstructures
All the ship's superstructures must be protected fore and aft against the effects of flames and heat by
effective water curtains. The superstructures form a fire compartment boundary and provide a refuge for
the crew. They also house the technical equipment for operating both the ship and the firefighting
systems. In order to be able to attack or cool fires from a safe distance with large quantities of water,
monitors must be installed on the fore and aft sides of the superstructures as on all the other fire
compartment boundary structures.

Lifesaving equipment such as lifeboats and life rafts must also be protected by their own water curtains
that can be activated on demand.

Conclusion

Implementation of all described measures would not only protect the lives and health of the crew
members, the environment but also the vessels, their cargo and the environment. In the event of a fire,
separation into fire compartments plus additional firefighting systems would enable the crew to more
effectively attack and suppress fires and thus prevent them from spreading putting the hull, cargo and
crew at risk.
By attacking and suppressing fires more quickly and more effectively, it is possible to reduce the amount
of water used for extinguishing them and consequently minimize harm to the environment.

An adequately dimensioned firefighting system with partitioning into fire compartments