Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-1446 March 4, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FILEMON DELGADO, defendant-appellant.

Vicente Delgado for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Lucas Lacson for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Before the people court the appellants Filemon Delgado was charged with treason under five counts was found
guilty under four counts of "the crime of treason complexed with the crime of murder", and sentenced to death
penalty by electrocution with all the accessories of the law. He is appealing from that decision.

Because of the nature of the offense especially the extreme penalty imposed we have carefully and painstakingly
examined the evidence in this case from said examination we are convinced of the guilty of the appellant. The
pertinent facts of this case may be briefly sated as follows: During the month of July, 1944 in town of Talisay
province of Cebu a Japanese Navy truck and a train coach operated by the Japanese troops were ambushed by the
resistance and guerrilla forces. As a measure of reprisal on July 29 1944, a mass arrest or concentration of the male
inhabitants of Dolho, Talisay, Mambaling and Basak was effected. Many Japanese soldier accompanied by Filipino
spies and undercover men among them the appellant Filemon Delgado rounded up a great number of men some
through arrests other by invitation and order to go to the Basak schoolhouse for a supposed meeting. In the morning
of that morning of that day Tereso Sanchez a guerrilla soldier and Antonio dela Cerna were arrested in Mambaling
and were lodged at the Mambaling chapel They were later transferred to the Basak schoolhouse where they found
hundred of men among them Jose de la Cerna and Fidencio Delgado and it was there where they saw the appellant
armed with a revolver and other Filipino undercover men working with and helping the Japanese soldiers tying up
the hands of those arrested investigation and torturing them in order to obtain information about the guerrillas and
about firearms they were suspected of possessing. Tereso Sanchez Antonio de la Cerna and Fidencio Delgado saw
Jose de la Cerna being suspended in the air and punched and beaten with an iron bar by appellant Filemon
Delgado during his investigation. After extreme torture Jose de la Cerna finally admitted he had a firearm in his
house after which the appellant accompanied by other undercover men accompanied him to his house and took
said firearm. Thereafter Jose de la Cerna was taken to the Japanese Military Police headquarters and after a
month's confinement he was released. Antonio de la Cerna was also maltreated together with other prisoners by the
defendant. Fidencio Delgado was himself tied up but before his time came to be investigated and possibly
maltreated by the appellant he happened to mention that his surname was Delgado and upon its verification with his
residence certificate said appellant released him from confinement saying that had he known it Fidencio should
have been released earlier.

The following morning or rather on July 30, 1944 a number of the person confined in or around the Basak
schoolhouse were taken toward the mountain of Toong. Among them were Tereso Sanchez and Antonio de la
Cerna. Upon arrival thee the Japanese and Filipino undercover men among them appellant proceeded with their
decision to summarily those prisoner who insisted that they did not have any firearm to surrender. After seeing that
several of his companion had already been shot to death Antonio de la Cerna told his captors that he really had a
revolver in his house and he was separated from the group and his life was spared presumably to give him a
change to get the said firearm and surrender it to the Japanese. Tereso Sanchez was less fortunate. He had no
firearm to surrender. Neither did he make any pretense that he had one which he would surrender were it only to
stall for time suspend his execution and live even only on borrowed time. So the appellant simply told him to turn
around which he did and Filemon Delgado immediately fired at him hitting him on the back of the head on the
occipital region the bullet coming out thru left eyes. As he fell to the ground the appellant pushed him down into a
1
ravine. because he still moving down below some undercover men fired parking shots at wounding him in the back.
Miraculously however Sanchez did not die. After the Japanese and Filipino undercover men had left his friends and
guerrillas finding Sanchez to be still alive helped him up and carried him to a hut where he upon regaining
consciousness found himself. There he stayed for about a month his wounds being treated with coconut oil and he
lived to tell this gruesome tale. His testimony of being shot at by appellant was duly confirmed by the testimony of
Antonio de la Cerna.

About August 24, 1944 while plowing his rice filed in Banilad Mandaue, Cebu, Leonardo Ouano was arrested and
taken to his house where he found the defendant Filemon Delgado together with about nine undercover men and
two Japanese soldiers surrounding his house. His house was ransacked by them. He was questioned about his
brother Sulpicio Ouano, a guerrilla soldier. Later in the afternoon Eduardo Ouano and Patricio Suico under custody
were taken to said house. Patricio was suspected of being a lieutenant in the volunteer guards. In the evening the
three arrested men were taken to the Japanese Military Police headquarters at the city of Cebu. There Leonardo
and Patricio were hanged and suspended in the air and beaten with a wooden stick by appellant and other
undercover men in their effort to make them admit connection with the guerrilla forces and to reveal the
whereabouts of Sulpicio Ouano, brother of Leonardo. Eduardo Ouano was not maltreated but his hands were tied
behind his back. Late that night the three men (Leonardo, Eduardo and Patricio) were taken back to the house of
Leonardo in Banilad Mandaue, where they were closely guarded with their hands tied behind their backs. The
following morning Leonardo and Patricio were hanged and suspended in the air and severely punished and
maltreated by the appellant and his fellow undercover men. All this and what follows was testified to not only by
Leonardo but also by Eduardo who that morning was made to pound rise for the food of the Japanese and Filipino
undercover men and by Arcadio Ceniza who had also been taken to the house of Leonardo and ordered to
slaughter and dress a pig for the mess of the appellant and his companions. While performing their appointed tasks
Arcadio and Eduardo saw all that was happening and was being done to Leonardo and Patricio. After continued
beating Patricio pleaded with the appellant telling him that he could not bear the torture any longer. Filemon Delgado
told him that he should be made to suffer longer and more but evidently seeing that Patricio was collapsing he
ordered him lowered to the floor and then he directed three undercover men to take Patricio to the neighboring
house of Nicanor Ouano in order to look for hidden firearms. On the way and at a distance of about 300 yards
Patricio collapsed and fell to the ground and no amount of threat on the part of the undercover men could make him
get up. By order of the appellant Patricio was dragged back to the house of Leonardo where he was placed on a
native sled. Taking hold of a wooden pestle the appellants began to beat up and belabor Patricio who was lying
motionless on the sled and noticing no reaction to the beating and suspecting that Patricio might be unconscious or
dead the appellant ordered a fire to be built under the sled just below the head and buttocks of Patricio. His face
was burned and his clothing set on fire and still Patricio did not move. He was dead. By order of the appellants the
sled with the body of Patricio on it was dragged to a spot about 300 yards from the house where the body was taken
from the sled and dumped under a buri palm. Pulling out his bayonet the appellant slashed the throat of Patricio with
it and then thrust the bayonet into the right and left breast of Patricio. The following day under the buri palm
Patricio's widow named Rosario Remedio found her husband's body with the face burned and the neck slashed and
with the help of friends and relatives gave it a decent burial.

The theory of the defense is that the appellant could not have been possibly present in the arrest investigation could
not have been possibly present in the arrest investigation torture and shooting committed by Japanese soldiers and
Filipino undercover men on the inhabitants of the province of Cebu particularly on July 29 and August 24-25, 1944,
for the reason that at the time he was under detention in the Constabulary barracks after he had been arrested by
the Japanese forces and was made to work in the Japanese air field in Cebu and later delivered to the Constabulary
for custody. It was also claimed that Filemon Delgado mentioned and referred to by prosecution witnesses as one of
the spies or undercover men who participated in the arrest investigation and torture made and committed on those
days of July and August, 1944, was a person different from the appellant though bearing the same name. This
defense was rejection by the People 's court not only because it was sought to be established by witnesses whose
veracity and responsibility were not believed in by it, - witnesses like Mariano T. Jaucian, Antonio Racaza, and
Eduardo Prieto, all treason indictees who at the time they testified had already been convicted and sentenced
weakness of the evidence for the defense. We are reproducing a pertinent paragraph of the decision of the trial
court:

The facts substantiated by the evidence for the prosecution constituting the overt acts alleged in the
amended information under counts 4 and 5 remain unimpeachable notwithstanding the denial of the

2
 defendant. The alibi defense is entirely flimsy as the assertion made by the witnesses for the defense that
the person named Filemon Delgado who participated in the mass arrest and looted the inhabitants of
Mambaling and Basak was different from the herein defendant. That he has been thoroughly identified on
the record to be the very one who committed the overt acts testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution
is obvious. There is no scintilla no credence on the part of this Court not only because of their being
notorious characters. but also because the evidence for the defense itself merits no serious consideration.
(Page 13, decision of trial court.)

On the point of sufficiency of the evidence to convict, we may add that the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution positively pointed to and identified the appellant not only by name but also by having actually seen him
and maltreated by him. As a matter of fact before the trial some of the government witnesses had been taken to the
stockade where detention prisoners had been kept and Filemon Delgado was positively and unhesitatingly identified
by them. Moreover, there is no reason for the belief that said prosecution witnesses had falsely accused thee
appellant of this grave crime through ulterior motives. On the contrary at least one of the witnesses, Fidencio
Delgado who was a recipient of a favor from the appellant resulting in his release from confinement and perhaps the
saving of his life had more reason to testify in favor rather than against the defendant.

The appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to the Japanese forces of occupation and giving
them aid and comfort by acting as their spy, undercover man, investigator, and even killer when necessary to cow
and compel the inhabitants to surrender their firearms and disclose information about the guerrillas has been fully
established. His manner of investigation and maltreatment of some of his victim like Tereso Sanchez and Patricio
Suico was so cruel brutal and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a Filipino can commit and practice such
atrocity on his own countrymen. But, evidently, war, confusion and opportunism can and do produce characters and
monsters unknown during peace and normal time.

The people Court found the appellant guilty of treason complexed with murder. The Solicitor General however
maintains that offense committed is simple treason citing the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of People
vs. Prieto (80 Phil., 138) but accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under article 14 paragraph 21, of the
Revised Penal Code and not compensated by any mitigating circumstance and he recommends the imposition of
the penalty of death. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the basis of the ruling of this Court in the case of
People vs. Prieto supra the appellant may be convicted only of treason and that the killing and infliction of Physical
injuries committed by him may not be separated from the crime of treason but should be regarded as acts
performed in the commission of treason, altho, as stated in said case the brutality with which the killing or physical
injuries were carried out may be taken as an aggravating circumstance." We refer in the present case to the manner
Tereso Sanchez was shot and Patricio Suico was tortured and finally killed. But while a good number of the justices
participating in these proceeding believe that the appellant is deserving of the death penalty imposed by the trial
court because of lack of the required number of votes, said penalty is hereby reduced to life imprisonment. In
addition the appellant will pay a fine of P20,000. With these modification the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed with costs. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26 August 31, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANUEL BAÑEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

x---------------------------------------------------------x

3
G.R. No. L-27 August 31, 1946

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORENZO SAMANO ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Filomeno Cadayona for appellant Samano.

Gregorio N. Garcia for appellants Tauyan and Medina.
Domingo F. de Guzman for appellants Feliciano and Feliciano.
Francisco and Jacinto for appellant Carballo.
Augusto Revilla for appellant Alcantara.
Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant Cubillas.

First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Assistant Solicitor General Kapunan, jr. for appellee.

MORAN, C. J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila after a joint trial of criminal cases Nos.
70021 and 70022.

In criminal case No. 70021, Manuel Bañez, Estanislao Tauyan, Marciano Medina, Maximo Feliciano, Pablo Senson,
Lorenzo Samano, Alfredo Rivera, Maximo Pabalan, Francisco Feliciano and Arcadia Castro were found guilty of the
murder of Ernesto Lorenzana, and sentenced to (a) reclusion perpetua, with the exception of the minor Francisco
Feliciano who was ordered committed to the Philippine Training School for Boys until he reaches the age of
majority;(b) to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P2,000; and (c) to pay the costs. The defendants
appealed except Manuel Bañez and Maximo Pabalan, and except Pablo Senson, Alfredo Rivera and Arcadio Castro
who remain unapprehended.

The evidence of the prosecution in this case shows that on February 22, 1945, at about the hour of 6 o'clock in the
evening, Ernesto Lorenzana was in a dice game at Solis Street, Tondo, Manila, when three men took him away in a
carretela and brought him to a place in Blumentritt Street known as the headquarters of Company "G," 51st Infantry,
Ramsey Guerilla Unit. Subsequently, he was transferred to the house of a certain Totoy del Rosario, wherein he
was investigated on alleged charges of espionage for the Japanese, and around the premises of which he was
beaten to death.

On February 23, 1945, upon complaint filed by Rosendo Lorenzana, father of the deceased Ernesto, the Criminal
Investigation Division of the United States Army, initiated an inquiry into the case. On February 27, 1945, in an
exhumation conducted by said Criminal Investigation Division near the house of Totoy del Rosario, the putrifying
corpse of Ernesto Lorenzana, among several others, was unearthed, and identified by Rosendo Lorenzana as that
of his son. Whereupon, appellants were apprehended and submitted to individual investigations, in the course of
which they made and signed the sworn statements appearing in the record of this case.

In criminal case No. 70022, the evidence shows that on or about February 22,1945, Virgilio and Emilio Beltran,
brothers, were apprehended and investigated at the headquarters of Company "G," 51st Infantry, Ramsey Guerilla
Unit, on charges of espionage and pro-Japanese activities. After the investigation, the brothers were executed. Also,
the house of Virgilio Beltran was raided and his furniture carted away.

On February 23, 1945, Francisca Capulong, wife of Virgilio Beltran, complained to the Criminal Investigation
Division of the killing of her husband and his brother Emilio. Upon investigation, and in the same exhumation
conducted in the first case, among several corpses unearthed, two were identified as those of the Beltran brothers.
The Criminal Investigation Division then arrested the herein defendants and questioned them, obtaining the sworn
declarations now appearing in the record of this case. They were then formally accused, tried and found guilty of the
murders of Virgilio and Emilio, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P2,000 and to pay costs. From the judgment only the following appealed: Lorenzo Samano, Epifanio

4
Carballo, Avelino Alcantara and Ricardo Cubillas. Narciso Alvarez did not appeal. Juanito Magalis, Timoteo Cruz
and Benjamin Cochon are still at large.

The evidence of the defense tends to prove, among others that the victims, Ernesto Lorenzana in the first case, and
Virgilio Beltran in the second case were all Japanese spies.

After going over all the record, we find no evidence in both cases showing the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt. Defendant Manuel Bañez admitted in his extrajudicial confession having struck Lorenzana thrice
on the head with a hammer, and defendant Timoteo Cruz in his extrajudicial confession admitted having stabbed
Virgilio Beltran with a dagger. As above stated, Timoteo Cruz is still at large and Manuel Bañez did not appeal. As to
the appellants, in their individual extrajudicial declarations, none of them has admitted having participated in the
killing of either Lorenzana or the Beltran brothers. Some of them admitted having been present at the time of the
killing, and others, that they were away. But it is a well-known rule that, without proof of conspiracy, mere passive
presence at the scene of another's crime does not constitute complicity. (People vs. Silvestre and Atienza, 56 Phil.,
353.)

The admissions of Samano and Alcantara to the effect that they had acted as guards near the place of the crime do
not prove complicity, because they did so in obedience to superior orders and without knowledge that the Beltran
brothers, who were then under investigation, would later be killed.

In the extrajudicial declarations made by some of the appellants, there are facts stated which incriminate their co-
appellants. But again, well-known is the rule that the statement made by a defendant is admissible against him, but
not against his co-defendants, unless there is conspiracy proved by evidence other than the statement itself, and
that such statement is made in connection with the conspiracy and during its existence. (Rule 123, section 12.)
These requirements are not present in the instant cases.

For all the foregoing and upon the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the judgments appealed from in these
two cases are reversed and the appellants acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19238 July 26, 1966

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee,

vs.
MARINCHO CASTILLO, ET AL., defendants.
CARLOS CASTILLO, defendant and appellant.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant and appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff and appellee.

DIZON, J.:

In an information filed with the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro Carlos Castillo and his son, Marincho,
were charged with the crime of murder. After trial upon their plea of not guilty, the court found them guilty as
charged and sentenced them accordingly. Only Carlos Castillo appealed.

The prosecution evidence shows the following facts:

5
Sometime in the month of October 1959, Marincho Castillo was slapped in the face by the now deceased Juan
Vargas as a result of an altercation which arose between them because a cow belonging to the former had gone
astray and destroyed some plants of the latter. Unable to retaliate at that time, Marincho merely uttered these
words: "You, Manong Juan, will have your own day."

About 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of December 28, 1959, in barrio Malibago, municipality of Pola, Oriental
Mindoro, while appellant, holding a gun in his right hand, talking face to face with Juan Vargas, Marincho came from
behind and hacked the latter on the head. As Marincho was about to strike the victim a second time, appellant said:
"You kill him."

In the evening of the same day, Marincho accompanied by appellant, surrendered himself to the authorities. 1äwphï1.ñët

A post-mortem examination conducted by the municipal health officer of Pola revealed that the victim died
instantaneously as a result of severe hemorrhage due to multiple wounds.

With the testimony of Jose Ilagan the prosecution attempted to prove conspiracy between appellant and his son.
According to said witness, on the afternoon in question he saw both walking very fast towards the poblacion,
appellant with a revolver in his hand, and his son carrying a bolo, both presumably gunning for Juan Vargas.

Very little credibility can be given to this testimony, firstly, because the incident between Vargas and Marincho had
taken place in the month of October 1959, while the fatal incident took place on December 28 of the same year;
secondly, because the fatal incident took place hardly twenty meters away from appellant's house a circumstance
which would seem to indicate that, instead of appellant and his son going out in search of Vargas, it was the latter
who had gone or who had passed by the street near appellant's house on the fatal day.

The last question to be resolved is whether appellant can be found guilty of murder by inducement simply because
after his son had already fatally boloed Vargas and was about to strike the latter a second time, appellant shouted:
"You kill him." The present case is very similar, if not on all fours, with People vs. Caimbre, et al., G.R. No. L-12087
decided on December 29, 1960 where practically the same words were uttered by one of the defendants but only
after the actual assailant had already boloed his victim several times. It was there held that in determining whether
the utterances of an accused are sufficient to make him guilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear that the
inducement was of such nature and was made in such a way as to become the determining cause of the crime and
that such inducement was uttered with the intention of producing the result. In this case appellant was, of course,
armed with a revolver while talking with the deceased Vargas, but the firearm was not pointed at the latter. Then he
is alleged to have uttered the words "You kill him" only after his son had already fatally boloed Vargas on the head.
It appears, therefore, that the alleged inducement to commit the crime was no longer necessary to induce the
assailant to commit the crime. Upon the principle thus laid down in the Caimbre case — which was merely a
reiteration of the same ruling previously laid down in People vs. Alvarez, et al., G.R. No. L-10650, July 26, 1960;
People vs. Canare, et al., G.R. No. 10677, September 30, 1959; People vs. Omini, 61 Phil. 609; and United States
vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203, We are constrained to hold that appellant's guilt has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment is reversed and appellant is acquitted, with one-half of the costs de oficio.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42476 July 24, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS LADION, and AGAPITO CORTESANO, defendants-appellants.
6
Jose Ma. Capili and Habana and Quimpo for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

Defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao finding them guilty of frustrated homicide,
with the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken of their superior strength, and sentencing each of them
to suffer an indeterminate sentence from six years of prision correccional to twelve years of prision mayor, to
indemnify Angel Pulido jointly and severally in the sum of P540, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the corresponding costs.

The only assignment of error made by the attorneys for the defendants is that the lower court erred in convicting the
appellants, and in not acquitting them with the costs de oficio.

The first question to be considered is the participation of the several defendants in the commission of the crime.

It appears from the evidence that the defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano were working
on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who was the overseer
or manager, with a compensation of ten per cent of the gross receipts. The four defendants lived together in a house
on the plantation.

Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for permission to open a new road through the plantation. According to the
offended party he refused to grant this request because there was already an unfinished road. Kiichi Omine on the
other hand contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission requested and he began work on December 24,
1933. When Angel Pulido and his son, Hilario, accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by the name of Barabadan,
were returning home from the cockpit that evening they noticed that a considerable number of hemp plants had
been destroyed for the purpose of opening a new road. Angered by the destruction of the hemp plants, Angel Pulido
and his party went to the house of the defendants, who had just finished their supper. There is a sharp conflict in the
evidence as to what followed. The witnesses for the prosecution contend that while the offended party was talking
with Omine, Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, but was prevented by Hilario Pulido; that Eduardo Autor
attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did not wound him except on the left thumb; that Luis Ladion and Agapito
Cortesano then held Angel Pulido by the arms, and when Eduardo Autor approached, Omine shouted to him
"pegale y matale", and Autor struck Angel Pulido in the breast with his bolo.

Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano on the other hand maintain that the offended party and his son
were the aggressors; that the first to arrive was Hilario Pulido, who after applying to Kiichi Omine an offensive
epithet and asking him why he had grubbed up the hemp plants, struck him in the breast with brass knuckles; that
when Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, Angel Pulido and his son attacked him their fists, Hilario Pulido him on
the right cheek with brass knuckles; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano ran away before Angel Pulido was
wounded by Eduardo Autor; that Kiichi Omine never uttered the words attributed to him or urged Autor to strike
Angel Pulido.

The only eyewitness for the prosecution were the offended party and his son, and a Bagobo, named Saito, who was
their relative and lived with them. Barabadan was not presented as a witness. The witnesses for the defense were
the four appellants.

The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow struck, and it was struck by Eduardo Autor. The anger
of Angel Pulido and his son was, however, directed chiefly against Kiichi Omine, who was responsible for the
destruction of the hemp plants. There was obviously no conspiracy among the defendants, but the offended party
and his son and his relative, Saito, narrated the facts of the incident in such away that all the four defendants would
appear to be equally responsible for the injury sustained by the offended party. The evidence does not convince us
that Ladion and Cortesano took any part in the fight; on the contrary it inclines us to believe that they ran away and
were not present when Angel Pulido was wounded. This impression is strengthened by the fact that they were not
included in the original complaint subscribed and sworn not by the offended party on December 29th. They were not
included as defendants until the amended complaint was filed on February 19, 1934. But if they were present and
held the offended party by the arms, as alleged by him, the evidence does not show that they held him for the
7
purpose of enabling Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo. If they did in fact intervene, it may have been for the
purpose of preventing the offended party and his son from continuing their attack on Omine. There was no need for
Ladion and Cortesano to hold Angel Pulido in order to enable Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo, or for Kiichi
Omine to induce him to do so by shouting "pegale y matale". According to the witness for the prosecution, Hilario
Pulido and Eduardo Autor had already struck each other in the face with their fists, and Eduardo Autor had received
a blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario Pulido with his bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally intervene in the
fight between his son and Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo, would strike him
without the need of any inducement from Omine. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, even if it were
satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the words in question, we are of the opinion that they would not be
sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it does not appear that the words uttered by Kiichi Omine
caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the first place, as we have indicated, Eduardo Autor had already
other reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have uttered the words of inducement. In the
second place, the words in question were not in this particular case sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor to strike the
offended party with his bolo. Although Eduardo Autor was working under the direction of Omine, apparently
according to the testimony of Angel Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear that Omine had any
particular influence over Eduardo Autor. The cases cited by the Solicitor-General of a father giving orders to his son
are obviously different from the case at bar.

In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was held that in order that a person may be
convicted of a crime by inducement it is necessary that the inducement be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the
crime. In that case various decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain illustrating the principles involved and their
application to particular cases were cited with approval. One of the decisions cited was that of April 24, 1871, where
it was held that one who, during a riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab
him!", it not appearing the he did anything more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not
guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme Court of Spain said: "Considering that, although the
phrases pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be considered
the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as
inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without it the
act would not have been performed." Another decision cited was that of December 22, 1883, where it was held that
a father who simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another. "Hit him! Hit him!", was not
responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was given.

Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, which has been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code
without change as No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can
be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have great dominance and great
influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical
or moral coercion or as violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th Edition.)

We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of Eduardo Autor are not responsible for the injury inflicted by
him on Angel Pulido.

The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and location of the wound of the offended party, found that it
was the intention of the defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the offended party, and accordingly found said defendant
guilty of frustrated homicide, but in our opinion the evidence does not justify this finding. It is true that the wound was
serious and in a vital part of the body, but judging from the nature of the wound, which was about eleven inches in
length, extending from the breast to the lower ribs on the right side, we think it is probable that it was caused by the
point of the bolo on a downward stroke. It was not a stab wound, and was probably given during a commotion and
without being aimed at any particular part of the body. As we have already stated, Eduardo Autor struck the
offended party only once. This fact tends to show that it was not his intention to take the offended party's life. If he
had so intended, he could easily have accomplished his purpose, so far as the record shows. It might be contended
that Eduardo Autor did not strike the offended party a second time, because he thought that he had already killed
him. This was apparently the theory of the prosecution, because the offended party and his witnesses testified that
the offended party dropped down unconscious when he was wounded, but the evidence does not seem to us to
sustain that contention. In the first place a cutting wound like that in question would not ordinarily render the injured
man immediately unconscious.

8
In the second place it appears from the affidavit of Saito, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, that Angel Pulido
did not fall down unconscious; but swayed and asked for help, while the blood was flowing from his breast and
stomach; that Saito approached the wounded man to support him and take him home.

It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be guided by the result unless the intent to kill is
manifest.

When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to perform an act which was not realized, the facts
from which it is claimed that intention sprang must be such as to exclude all contrary supposition. When this
intention is not necessarily disclosed by the acts performed by the defendant, greater importance should not
be given to such acts than that which they in themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability be
extended beyond that which is actually involved in the material results of his act. Intention may only be
deduced from the external acts performed by the agent, and when these acts have naturally given a definite
result, the courts cannot, without clear and conclusive proof, hold that some other result was intended. (U.S.
vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)

There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo Autor that Angel Pulido was accidentally wounded in a struggle for
the possession of the offended party's bolo. That claim is disproved by the affidavit of Autor, Exhibit E, executed on
December 26, 1933, where he stated that he snatched out his bolo and struck Angel Pulido in the stomach because
Pulido was very aggressive.

We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves, since the offended party was
incapacitated for the performance of his usual work for a period of more than ninety days, and not of frustrated
homicide.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed as to Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito
Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio. As to the appellant Eduardo
Autor, the decision of the lower court is modified, and he is convicted of lesiones graves and sentenced to suffer one
year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P540,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to
pay the corresponding costs. In accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be
served by him is fixed at one year of prision correccional.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6969 August 31, 1955

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOMAS UBIÑA, JOSE UBIÑA, ROMERO PAGULAYAN, LORETO MERCADO, MARCELO DE GUZMAN,
PASCUAL ESCOTE and PABLO BINAYUG, defendants-appellants.

Perkins, Ponce Enrile & Associates for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Querube C. Makalintal and Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres for
appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Defendants appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, finding them guilty of the murder of
Aureliano Carag, Esteban Tambiao and Dionisia Tambiao, and sentencing each and every one of them for each of

9
the three deaths to reclusion perpetua, to give an indemnity of P6,000 to the heirs of each of the deceased, and to
pay the costs.

Early in the evening of September 14, 1952, Aureliano Carag, Mayor of Solana, Cagayan arrived on horseback at
the house of the spouses Esteban Tambiao and Teodora Quilang in the barrio of Bañgag, Solana, Cagayan. Upon
arriving he tied his horse beside the house, went up, and delivered a dead rooster which he had brought along, to
Teodora Quilang to be cooked. The Tambiao spouses had a daughter, by the name of Dionisia Tambiao, with whom
Carag had illicit relations. After greeting Dionisia with embraces and kisses, Carag, who had planned to go back,
was prevailed upon to pass the evening in the house, so he went down to a store to buy salmon for their supper.
Teodora Quilang prepared the food for supper, while the three, Carag, Dionisia and Esteban, went down the house
to refresh themselves.

Teodora, while cooking supper, was also dressing the dead rooster on the batalan. North of the Tambiao house is
the house of Flora Quilang, Teodora's sister and wife of Vicente Ubiña. Flora herself was on the batalan selecting
corn. Carag, Dionisia and Esteban had conversation with Flora. Not long after this conversation, Teodora Quilang
called the three to go up for supper. Carag thought of removing the saddle off his horse, so he directed his steps
towards the place where he had tied his horse. It was then that the first gunshot was heard. Carag was hit at the
buttock and immediately called upon Teodora for help. Teodora immediately went down, accompanied by Dionisia
and Esteban. Flora also heard the call, so she also started to go down. It was then that further shots were heard.
Carag asked Teodora to proceed to the house of Pedro Madella to secure help. Madella was to go to his (Carag's)
sister for help, but Madella refused to go for fear.

At that time, Proceso Ledesma, a policeman of Carag, who had heard the shots and the call of Carag for help, went
down, stealthily approaching the besieged house of the Tambiaos. He fired two shots in the air as a signal. Upon
hearing these, Carag knew that it was Proceso, his policeman, who fired the two shots. So he called upon Proceso
to help him, telling him to fire at his attackers and that Tomas Ubiña and his companions were on the road. It was
then that a voice was heard in answer, "You call for all your policemen, although they are many, we are not afraid."
Proceso fired at the attackers while hiding himself beside a granary, and as his shots were returned, he scampered
away to safety. After 15 minutes had elapsed, the firing stopped and the attackers went away.

The following morning, the police were called, and upon examining the premises around the house, they found the
dead bodies of Aureliano Carag, Dionisia Tambiao and Esteban Tambiao, all on the ground, the first east of and
under the house, and the other two towards the northeast. They also found the 45-caliber pistol of the deceased
Carag beside his dead body and his horse also dead nearby and under the house. Upon examining the surrounding
ground, the police found 30-caliber carbine shells in various places, namely, near a well towards the southwest,
near the gate of the fence northwest of the house, on a small way or path north of the house, and also near the
intersection of the said path and the road east of the house. Near the place in front of the house of Teodora Quilang,
they also found 30-caliber pellets or bullets scattered around. There were also empty 45-caliber revolver shells
southwest, in a place where many of the carbine shells were found.

The President of the Sanitary Division examined the dead bodies and found the following: On the body of Aureliano
Carag, gunshot wounds on the right and left buttocks, and on the heels; on the body of Dionisia Tambiao, one
gunshot wound penetrating thru and thru the deltoid muscle, another gunshot wound at the back of the region of the
fifth rib, which lacerated the ventricles of the heart and hurt the lobe of the lung, and a third also at the back and
penetrating the abdominal cavity, all of which caused instantaneous death; and on the body of Esteban Tambiao,
two gunshot wounds at the back near the sixth and seventh ribs, and one on the right ankle, all of which caused
instantaneous death due to shock and hemorrhage.

As the case involves the credibility of witnesses, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution will now be
considered.

Ruben Francisco.—He lived in the house of Tomas Ubiña at the time of the incident. In the afternoon of September
14, 1952, at about 3:00 o'clock, Tomas Ubiña, Jose Ubiña, Marcelo de Guzman, Loreto Mercado, Jose de Guzman
and he (the witness) were in the house of Tomas Ubiña in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Before 5:00 o'clock that
afternoon, they planned to kill Aureliano Carag who, according to Tomas Ubiña, was then in the barrio of Bañgag.
After perfecting the plan, Tomas Urbiña took three carbines, a 38-caliber revolver and a 45-caliber pistol from a
10
wardrobe. Tomas Ubiña put the 38-caliber in his pocket and had the other firearms placed inside a sack. Between
5:00 and 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, they boarded a freight truck belonging to Tomas Ubiña. The driver was
Antonio Ugaddan. The truck proceeded to the barrio of Bayo, Municipality of Iguig, and there they got off the truck
and crossed the Cagayan River by means of banca, reaching the barrio of Andarayan on the other side of the river.
Then they walked about 1 1/2 kilometers to where the house of Tomas Ubiña was located, and here they found
Pascual Escote, Romero Pagulayan and Pablo Binayug. It was about 7:00 o'clock p.m. when they reached
Andarayan. Tomas Ubiña told the others that they were going to Barrio Bañgag to kill Mayor Carag. So they started
for that place by foot, Loreto Mercado carrying the sack in which the firearms were placed, and Romero Pagulayan
riding a horse. On their way they passed the barrio of Cattaran where Jose Ubiña bought cigarettes from a store.
Then they proceeded to Barrio Bañgag, which they reached at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening.

When they reached a place about 200 meters from the Barrio of Bañgag, they stopped and Tomas Ubiña called for
the sack containing the firearms. He took the firearms out and gave Jose Ubiña the 45-caliber pistol, one carbine to
Jose de Guzman, one carbine to Marcelo de Guzman and another carbine to Loreto Mercado. Thus armed they
proceeded to a house in the barrio, and upon orders of Tomas Ubiña they placed themselves around the house in
the following manner: Tomas Ubiña and Jose de Guzman, northwest of the house near the gate; Marcelo de
Guzman on the road east of the house; Loreto Mercado, north of the house on a small path; Jose Ubiña, near a well
southwest of the house; Romero Pagulayan, west of the house; and Pascual Escote and Pablo Binayug, southeast
of the house. After the accused had taken their respective positions as above indicated, he went back to the place
where the horse of Romero Pagulayan had been left. From this place he heard shooting, which lasted for 15
minutes. Afterwards, his companions returned. He heard them conversing that he was already dead, referring to
Carag. The firearms were collected and again placed in the sack, and Loreto Mercado again asked by Tomas Ubiña
to carry it. Pascual Escote and Romero Pagulayan rode on horseback to Cattaran, while the rest proceeded to
Barrio Andarayan. When they reached that place, Pablo Binayug went home. They then left Andarayan, crossed the
Cagayan River by means of a banca, and reached Barrio Bayo again on the other side of the river. While they were
riding in the banca, the sack containing the firearms was thrown into the river by Loreto Mercado upon orders of
Tomas Ubiña. In Bayo they rode on a truck and proceeded to Tuguegarao, alighting at Barsain bridge and thereafter
proceeding back to the house of Tomas Ubiña. Once in the house, Tomas Ubiña gave Jose de Guzman, Mercado
de Guzman and Loreto Mercado, P500 each, and to him P100.

Antonio (Getulio) Ugaddan.—He is a driver of Tomas Ubiña on September 14, 1952. He drove the cargo truck of
Tomas Ubiña in the afternoon of September 14, 1952, and the persons who rode therein were Tomas Ubiña, Jose
Ubiña, Ruben Francisco, Jose de Guzman, Loreto Mercado and Marcelo de Guzman.

Flora Quilang.—Her husband is Vicente Ubiña, a cousin of the accused Tomas Ubiña. She has a son by the name
of Cecilio Ubiña, another witness for the prosecution. Tomas Ubiña had been buying the tobacco that they used to
produce two years before the incident in 1952. Their house is north of that of Teodora Quilang. The gate of the
fence enclosing the yard of Teodora Quilang is close to the batalan of her house, and she saw Carag when he
arrived on horseback with a dead rooster in his hands, and again when he went out of the gate of Teodora Quilang
to buy salmon. At that time, she was on the batalan selecting corn, being lighted by a lamp placed on top of one of
the posts of the batalan. There was another lamp placed on the window of the house. At that time her husband was
sick, and she did not know where her son Cecilio Ubiña, was. As she was selecting corn, she suddenly heard a
burst of shots and then she heard the voice of Carag asking for help. She tried to go down to help him, so she took
the lamp and proceeded to go down the ladder of the batalan, but as she stepped on the ladder two shots were fired
at her and she fell down, the light of the lamp being put out. She was able to identify the one who had fired the shots
at her, both by the light of the lamp in the window of the house of Teodora Quilang and by the flash produced by the
shots. It was Tomas Ubiña who was holding a short gun at that time. She could not recognize the other. As she
heard the shots, she crawled back to the house and brought her husband and children within the house. Once
inside the house with the members of her family, she recognized the voice of Tomas Ubiña saying that even if
Carag would call all his policemen, they (the attackers) were not afraid.

Cecilio Ubiña.—This witness is 11 years old. He was in an annex of the house when he heard the first shot. After
the first shot, he heard Carag calling for help and, thereafter, his mother went down (to give succor to Carag). His
mother was not able to help Carag because Tomas Ubiña fired at her twice and his mother fell down and the light of
the lantern was put out. When Tomas Ubiña fired at his (the witness) mother, he was around four meters away from
her. He also saw another individual one meter away from Tomas Ubiña, who was firing a long firearm. When he saw

11
these things, he was in the door of the annex of the house. After that he opened the window and peeped through it
and saw Tomas Ubiña giving bullets to his companion. Afterwards, he heard Carag say, "Esong, Esong, fire at them
rapidly. Tomas Ubiña and others are on the road." A voice answered, "Although you call all your policemen, I am not
afraid of anybody," and he recognized this to be the voice of Tomas Ubiña, his uncle.

Teodora Quilang.—At the time she heard the first gunshot, she was dressing the dead rooster. There were two
lamps in the house, one at the window of the kitchen and the other at the batalan. Immediately after the first shot,
she heard Carag calling for help, whereupon, she, together with Esteban and Dionisia, went down. When they
arrived at the place of Carag, they found him lying down flat, face upwards. Carag asked her to get help from his
(Carag's) sister, through Pedro Maddela, so she went to the house of Pedro Maddela. But Maddela refused to go,
so she went back to the house. Upon arriving at their house, she put out the light of the lamp in the kitchen and laid
down with face down near a water container, as there were many shots. It was then that she heard Carag shouting,
"Esong, Esong, succor me. Tomas Ubiña and others are here. Fire at them rapidly." After hearing these, she heard
a voice reply, "Even though you call all your policemen, we are not afraid", and she recognized the voice as that of
Tomas Ubiña, because the latter had been a candidate and she had heard him speak at his political meetings. She
knew the voice also because he had been buying tobacco from them.

Proceso Ledesma.—This witness lives west of the house of Teodora Quilang. On the night in question, he was in
the house of his wife's uncle Agacaoili. He saw Carag arrive in the evening in barrio Bañgag, at the intersection of
the road. When he heard the first shot coming from the yard of Teodora Quilang, he got up, went down immediately,
and went to the house of Vicente Liñgan. Both of them went of investigate the cause of the gunshots. Liñgan lighted
a cigar and was fired at from the gate of the fence of Teodora Quilang near the well, so they left the place. Liñgan
went back to his house while he went closer to the house of Teodora Quilang and fired two shots in the air to notify
the police. After firing these shots, he heard Carag say, "Aray, Esong, fire at them rapidly, Tomas Ubiña and others
are on the road." He also heard a voice believed by him to be that of Tomas Ubiña which answered, "You call for all
your policeman, although they are many, we are not afraid." From the place where he had placed himself he saw
and recognized Tomas Ubiña by the help of the light from the house of Teodora Quilang. The firing at Carag,
continued. He also fired at the assailants of Carag, but when his shots were returned, he hid behind a log and then
ran towards a bamboo groove where he hid himself until dawn.

Geronimo Batang.—This witness had a store in Cattaran, Solana, Cagayan. In the afternoon of September 14,
1952, a person by the name of Ben Mañgulab left a dead rooster with him to be delivered to Mayor Carag. Carag
came later, riding on horseback, and as he passed by, witness gave the rooster to him. Just after Carag left,
appellant Romero Pagulayan passed by his store riding on a horse, going on the same way that Carag had taken.
He saw him again towards the evening, when he and Jose Ubiña passed by his store to buy cigarettes. When Jose
Ubiña was in his store, the witness asked him who were his companions and Jose Ubiña answered it was Tomas
Ubiña and others. The witness then looked out of the store and saw Tomas Ubiña, Pablo Binayug, Romero
Pagulayan and others.

Vicente Bautista.—On September 9, he saw Mayor Carag meet Tomas Ubiña in front of a bakery and there Carag
insulted Ubiña, saying that the latter's properties were obtained by cheating and stealing. Ubiña did not say anything
but he looked sullen and his face was heavy.

All the above witnesses were subjected to very long, detailed and close cross-examination, but with the exception of
the minor discrepancy in the testimony of Flora Quilang as to where she fell down, whether on the batalan or on the
ground, nothing was elicited with respect to their interest, bias, prejudice, or their lack of knowledge of the facts to
which they testified which would in the least affect their credibility. They testified to facts which they saw and heard
positively and concretely, such as to give no room for doubt that they actually saw with their eyes and heard with
their ears the events testified to by them.

The testimony of Ruben Francisco for the prosecution is claimed to be unworthy of credit because later on he
testified for the defense, declaring that all he had stated against the defendants is not true, that he had been paid
P700 to make his affidavit incriminating the defendants and was furthermore intimidated into making the same. The
person who supposedly gave the witness a bribe of P700 denied this charge, explaining that he had only one
hectare of land and had therefore no means to pay the amount mentioned. Just before the trial this witness was
living with Tomas Ubiña in the latter' house and it is improbable that he could have been intimidated into making the
12
incriminating affidavit without Ubiña having come to know of it. These are circumstances which refute witness' claim
that this testimony for the prosecution is false.

The theory of the defense that Francisco's previous testimony is false, as he subsequently declared it to be so, is a
illogical as it is dangerous. Merely because a witness says that what he had declared is false and that what he now
says is true, is not sufficient ground for concluding that the previous testimony is false. No such reasoning has ever
crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is that a witness may be impeached by a previous contradictory
statement (Rule 123, section 91); not that a previous statement is presumed to be false merely because a witness
now says that the same is not true. The jurisprudence of this Court has always been otherwise, i.e. that
contradictory testimony given subsequently does not necessarily discredit the previous testimony if the
contradictions are satisfactorily explained. (U. S. vs. Magtibay, 17 Phil., 417; U. S. vs. Briones, 28 Phil., 362; U. S.
vs. Dasiip, 26 Phil., 503; U. S. vs. Lazaro, 34 Phil., 871).We have also held that if a previous confession of an
accused were to be rejected simply because the latter subsequently makes another confession, all that an accused
would do to acquit himself would be to make another confession out of harmony with the previous one (U. S. vs.
Acasio, 37 Phil., 70). Similarly, it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before
courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on change their mind for one reason or
another, for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses. If Francisco says that when he testified for the prosecution he was paid P700, what can
prevent the court from presuming that subsequently he testified for the defense because the defendants also paid
him to testify for them? The rule should be that a testimony solemnly given in court should not be lightly set aside
and that before this can be done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one be carefully compared, the
circumstances under which each given carefully scrutinized, the reasons or motives for the change carefully
scrutinized—in other words, all the expedients devised by man to determine which of the contradictory testimonies
represents the truth.

We have carefully read the testimonies of Francisco, both for the prosecution and later for the defense, and we
agree with the trial court that the first testimony reflects the truth. His testimony for the prosecution recites a story,
complete in its important details, logical and probable and positive in character, corroborated in all its essential parts
by other evidence for the prosecution. His later testimony, for the defense is an incoherent story, unbelievable
because of its inherent improbability. In his testimony for the defendants he states that after four o'clock in the
afternoon of September 14, he and his wife went to Calle Commercio, in Tuguegarao and they rambled around on
said street until 6 or 7 in the evening; that they separated at around 7 o'clock, she going home to the house of
Tomas Ubiña, and he going to take wine near the market; that at around 7:30 he and Peter Pinson went around in a
calesa near Cine Center, and that as a fellow boxed the driver, he and not the driver was hit; that after this they went
to Cine Dizon, but then went back to Cine Center, because Peter Pinson wanted to know who boxed him (witness);
that one Gosengfiao fixed the trouble, and that thereafter, he went home. Witness did not tell for what purpose he
and his wife had rambled around for more than two hours; nor what they saw or have tried to see. Neither does he
explain why he and Pinson should be riding in a calesa for fully one hour; neither does he state what he and Peter
were going to Cine Dizon for. But it appears that they never entered that cinematograph or any other cinematograph
after all. The supposed movements of the witness during the evening are devoid of any aim, purpose, or intention.
Mens' acts are performed for a purpose, for an intention, for a desire; yet the supposed movements of the witness
were without aim, purpose or end. This is contrary to human nature. It is unbelievable, improbable, and evidently
false. The Peter Pinson with whom witness was from around seven to about ten in the evening (the time when the
trip to Bañgag was made) was not introduced to corroborate the supposed presence of the witness in Tuguegarao
during the disputed hours of the evening. On the other hand, the witness who testified to the supposed incident or
trouble before Cine Center, was introduced, but the incident testified to look place around ten o'clock in the evening,
when the party that committed the crime had arrived in Tuguegarao from the barrio where the murder had taken
place two hours before. Between the testimony for the prosecution and that for the defense there cannot be room for
choice; that for the prosecution only bears the earmarks of truth.

It is also claimed that the testimony of Flora Quilang is unbelievable for the following reasons: That in spite of her
nearness to the gunmen, she was not hit by the bullets, nor was the wall of her house; and that neither did she hear
the supposed answer of appellant Tomas Ubiña to Carag's instructions to Proceso Ledesma because Ledesma's
appearance in the scene took place after 20 minutes from the time the first shots were fired and witness was no
longer in the batalan at that time. In answer to the first objection, it must be remembered that Tomas Ubiña is a
cousin of Flora Quilang's husband, so the shots fired at her evidently were not intended to hit her, but just to frighten

13
her away. As to the improbability of having heard Tomas Ubiña's answer to Carag's call for help, we note that Flora
Quilang heard said remarks when she had already been able to gather her family inside her house, and not at the
time she was still in the batalan (t. s. n., p. 16). As the shooting took place during the night, the voices must have
been clear and easy to understand. It is further claimed that she could not have identified Tomas Ubiña by the flash
of the latter's pistol. But it must be remembered that one of the assailants was one meter away from Tomas Ubiña
and the former was continuously firing shots at the house of Teodora Quilang. It must have been by the flash of
these shots that witness was able to recognize Tomas Ubiña.

The testimony of Cecilio Ubiña is also attacked on the supposed ground that when he was asked if Tomas Ubiña
had been purchasing tobacco from his family in the years 1935 and 1936, he answered in the affirmative, when at
that time he was only about 4 years old. We note, however, that the question propounded to this witness included
two particulars, namely, the date of the buying of tobacco and the buying of the tobacco. As the question directed to
him involved two points, it is probable that the witness was paying attention only to the more important point, i.e., the
buying of the tobacco and not the date. It is also alleged in objection (to his testimony) that whereas he did not
identify Tomas Ubiña as one of the assailants before he was confined in the Constabulary barracks, he did identify
him while he was already inside the barracks. The explanation lies in the fact that his father Vicente Ubiña is the
cousin of Tomas Ubiña, and must have enjoined his son and his wife to keep silent about the identity of the
assailants. As a matter of fact, Vicente Ubiña testified for Tomas Ubiña, which shows his interest in shielding his
cousin. It must have been out of respect for him that Cecilio Ubiña did not, before his confinement in the
Constabulary barracks, disclose the identity of Tomas Ubiña as one of the assailants.

Proceso Ledesma's testimony is also objected to for the reason that he did not disclose the identity of Tomas Ubiña
until after three days. The explanation he gave was that the Chief of Police was not able to speak to him, and that
he did not like to make the disclosure for fear of being shot as he was the only policeman in the barrio. This
explanation, in our opinion, is satisfactory.

The defenses presented by the appellants are alibis. Tomas Ubiña claims that he was in Tuguegarao on September
14, going to the tienda of Domingo Lim at 6 o'clock in the afternoon to sell "mani", later talking with Celo Donato and
Emilio Panaga, and then going to the tienda of Quicay Tan in Barsain to pay his debt; he dined at his house at 8
o'clock, together with his wife and others and saw the wife of Jose Ubiña embark in a Luzon Bus Line for Manila at
10 o'clock in the evening. He also claims that on September 14, he did not know where Jose de Guzman, was, not
Romero Pagulayan, Pascual Escote and Pablo Binayug, and that Marcelo de Guzman was in Carig; that neither had
he known that Carag was in barrio Bañgag on that day; that Carag had committed irregularities in the elections,
using force and intimidation in the course thereof and that as a result he had filed an election protest against him.

Jose Ubiña testified that in the afternoon of September 14, he was occupied in the loading of sacks of rice and fruits,
a basket of chickens and two suckling pigs for Manila; that as he could not load these aboard the Rural Transit bus,
he made arrangements to load them in the Luzon Bus Line bus, getting a rig for the purpose of loading them there,
and that his wife and children boarded it at 10 o'clock in the evening.

Romero Pagulayan says that he left his house at 3 o'clock in the afternoon to pasture his horse and returned for
supper at 6 o'clock, and then went to bed at 8 o'clock as he was tired; and that he never left the house at night.

Loreto Mercado states that from 3 o'clock in the afternoon to 7:30 o'clock in the evening on September 14, he was in
the house of Cauilan in barrio Carig; and that he supped at 7 o'clock in the evening and went to bed at 8 o'clock,
with his wife and children.

Marcelo de Guzman testified that he was also in barrio Carig on September 14, 1952, in the house of Vicente
Cauilan; that he was there at the house of the barrio lieutenant because it was Sunday; and that he supped at 7:00
o'clock in the evening and went to bed at 8:00 o'clock.

Pascual Escote says that between 6:00 and 7:00 o'clock in the evening of September 14, he went to play dice with
his wife; that his wife stayed with him until 6:00 o'clock and then left him there; and that he went home at about 3:00
o'clock of the following morning. He admits having signed a confession, Exhibit L, on September 20, 1952, but
declares that he was forced to sign it.

14
The trial court refused to believe these defenses of alibis for the reason that no third persons, but the relatives of the
defendants themselves, corroborated them. The evidence of the alibis are inherently weak and improbable. They
are based on the testimonies of witnesses alone, without corroboration from official documents or records which can
not be subject to falsification of fabrication. No less than seven witnesses identified Tomas Ubiña, namely, the driver
of his truck one of his companions, the owner of the store on their way where his companions purchased cigarettes,
his nephew Cecilio Ubiña, his relative in-law Flora Quilang, policeman Proceso Ledesma, and the deceased Mayor
Carag himself. All of these witnesses except the policeman had the store owner were close personally or related to
Tomas Ubiña and they had no reason or cause to testify against him. Certainly his mere denials and the doubtful
evidence of his alibi are unavailing against the unimpeached testimonies of these witnesses against him.

Circumstances not denied by the defendants also indicate that all the other defendants must have participated in the
commission of the crime, as pointed out by the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution. Jose Ubiña is his
nephew and lived in his house about the time of the commission of the crime. Appellant Tomas Ubiña lost in the
election for Mayor to the deceased Aureliano Carag. Tomas Ubiña filed a protest against him and utilized his two co-
defendant, Marcelo de Guzman and Loreto Mercado, as witnesses in his favor. These two individuals together with
Ruben Francisco were living at his house evidently at Ubiña's own expense. He gave them work by which to earn a
living. The other defendants, namely, Romero Pagulayan, Pascual Escote and Pablo Binayug, did not live in
Tuguegarao, but were tenants of or connected with Tomas Ubiña in his business and in politics, and when the party
headed by Tomas Ubiña arrived at his other house in barrio Andarayan together with his co-defendants, these three
were already there waiting for him. These are circumstances which justify the conclusion that they helped and joined
Tomas Ubiña in his evil design.

It is also important to remember that Geronimo Batang had testified that Romero Pagulayan had followed Carag,
and the latter rode on horseback from Batang's store to Bañgag. This, evidently, was a precaution taken by Tomas
Ubiña and Pagulayan to assure themselves that they would find the victim at the place where they intended to get
him.

After a consideration of all the evidence submitted by the prosecution and the defense, we find the following facts to
have been proved beyond reasonable doubt: That because of political enmity and a personal affront committed by
the deceased against appellant Tomas Ubiña on September 9, 1953, the latter decided to take revenge, so at 3:00
o'clock in the afternoon of September 14, 1952, he called upon his political adherents and protegees, namely,
Marcelo De Guzman, Jose de Guzman and Loreto Mercado, and his nephew, Jose Ubiña, to a conference, in which
they resolved to put an end to the life of the deceased; that at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon, after Tomas Ubiña
had placed 3 carbines and 1 pistol in a bag and armed himself with another revolver, they embarked on a truck,
together with said firearms; after crossing the Cagayan River they passed by Andarayan, Solana, where the 3 other
appellants were already waiting for them; that these 3 were advised of their purpose and were asked to go with
them, which they did; that all of them proceeded to Barrio Bañgag, and once there and after the firearms were
distributed among the original conspirators, they went to the house of Esteban Tambiao and there attacked and fired
at and killed Aureliano Carag, Dionisia Tambiao and Esteban Tambiao.

The first question to determine is the criminal responsibility of each of the appellants. It must be noted that
appellants Romero Pagulayan, Pascual Escote and Pablo Binayug were not among those who had conspired to kill
the deceased Carag, and that they only joined Tomas Ubiña and his companions on their way to Bañgag to commit
the offense. Then there is no evidence submitted by the prosecution to show that they were armed, or that they had
any personal enmity or grudge against the intended victim, or that they had induced or encouraged the original
conspirators. Their participation in the act of assassination appears to be limited to being present and staying
around the premises, while their companions fired at the victims and carried out their original purpose.

The problem as above indicated has received the attention of the Supreme Court of Spain in cases involving similar
circumstances. In its decision of December 7, 1885, it held that a person who assists one who commits the crime of
arson and who knows the latter's purpose, but whose participation in the arson is not disclosed, may not be
considered as a principal because his acts were neither direct, nor absolutely necessary for the commission of the
offense, nor did it induce the said commission (2 Viada, pp. 369-370). In another decision dated December 6, 1902,
it said that where the accused accompanied the killer on a road where the victim was going to pass and with open
knife encourage him (the killer) with his presence, the former is not guilty of the crime as principal because his
participation is neither direct as defined in Article 13 of the Penal Code, nor does it constitute the inducement
15
necessary to bring about the execution of the crime as defined in paragraph 2 of the same Article, or that of
cooperation as defined in paragraph 3 thereof as his act is not indispensable in the commission of the crime(Ibid,
pp. 383-384). In still another decision dated June 20, 1892, it held that the mere fact that a person is present when a
crime is committed, when such presence does not have the purpose of encouraging the criminal and when there is
no previous agreement between them as to the commission of the crime, will make the former responsible only as
accomplice in the crime committed (Ibid, pp. 455-456). In another one, dated January 27, 1887, it was held that the
presence of the accused, who was armed with a stick, when his companion assaulted the victim with his own stick,
makes him responsible only as accomplice for the reason that he only participated in the manner defined in Article
15 of the Penal Code, because he is not a principal by cooperation in the commission of the offense by acts,
previous or simultaneous (Ibid, pp. 428-429).

In the case at bar, other than being present and, perhaps, giving moral support no act of theirs may be said to
constitute a direct participation in the acts of execution, and their presence and company was not necessary and
essential to the perpetration of the murders. The act of Romero Pagulayan in following the deceased Carag as the
latter went to Bañgag, and thus assuring the conspirators after the latter had decided to commit the act. Under the
circumstances, they do not fall under any of the three concepts defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, and
may only be considered guilty as accomplices. The same conclusion is strengthened by the principle that when
doubt exists as to whether persons acted as principals or accomplices, the doubt must be resolved in their favor and
they should be held guilty only as accomplices (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil., 38; People vs. Bantagan, 54 Phil.,
834).

The next question to be resolved is the determination of the crime committed and the circumstances that may be
considered as having attended said commission. There is no question that evident premeditation was present. It has
been held that if a crime was planned at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and carried out at 7:00 o'clock in the evening,
or planned at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon and executed at 7:30 o'clock in the evening, the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation is present because sufficient time has intervened between the conception of
the idea and the resolution to carry it out and the fulfillment thereof (People vs. Lazada, 70 Phil., 525; People vs.
Mostoles, et al., 85 Phil., 883). This is what exactly took place in the case at bar.

It is true that in the case of People vs. Guillen, 47 Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3433, we held that when the person killed is
different from the one intended to be killed the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation may not be
considered as present. However, in the case of People vs. Timbol, et als., G. R. No. 47471-47473, promulgated
August 4, 1944, we held that evident premeditation may be considered as present if it is shown that the conspirators
were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also any one who may help him put a violent resistance. In
the case at bar, it may not have been the original intention of the conspirators to murder Dionisia and Esteban
Tambiao, but the fact that the conspirators number more than five and were armed with three carbines and two
revolvers, indicates that they were to carry out their intention to murder the deceased mayor notwithstanding any
objection or opposition that the latter or his companions may interpose or offer or may be able to put up. This
determination to kill all who stood on their way is evident from the answer of appellant Tomas Ubiña to the deceased
mayor's call for help, when Tomas Ubiña said that even if the deceased would call all his policemen he is not afraid
of them. We hold, therefore, that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is present not only with
respect to the killing of the deceased Mayor Carag, but also with respect to Dionisia Tambiao and Esteban Tambiao.

The court a quo correctly found that the aggravating circumstance of alevosia attended the commission of the crime,
with nighttime as having been included therein. The scene of the crime was in a remote barrio where Carag must
have felt secure. This, together with the suddenness of the attack and the darkness of the night, certainly insured
the success of the attack and shielded the conspirators from risk or danger. There was, furthermore, the additional
circumstance of abuse of superior strength because there were no less than eight of the attackers, all acting in
concert around the besieged house, three of whom were armed with carbines, which are certainly superior in
deadliness and accuracy to the only pistol with which the victim was armed (U. S. vs. Tandoc, et al., 49 Phil., 594;
People vs. Abril, 51 Phil., 670; People vs. Antonio, 73 Phil., 421).

We, therefore, find that three murders have been committed, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
abuse of superior strength. In the commission of these crimes, we hold that Tomas Ubiña, Jose Ubiña, Loreto
Mercado, and Marcelo de Guzman participated as principals, whereas Romero Pagulayan, Pascual Escote and
Pablo Binayug took part as accomplices. Under the provisions of the law, which we have been sworn to uphold and
16
to apply without fear or favor, the supreme penalty should be imposed upon all the principals, the crime committed
being triple murder attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength. A
sufficient majority of the Court, however, can not agree to the imposition of the supreme penalty upon Jose Ubiña,
Marcelo de Guzman and Loreto Mercado in view of the personal influence that Tomas Ubiña had over them, by
reason of their relations or the favors that he had extended to them. They appear to have depended in their
livelihood upon Tomas Ubiña, and this dependence must have influenced them into helping their protector. Their
acts were, therefore, not entirely the voluntary results of inner depravity.

But as to Tomas Ubiña, who conceived the plan and utilized his influence to carry out the offense, the
circumstances show marked determination, cruelty and depravity. Assuming for a moment that he had reasons for
resenting the treatment that he received at the hands of the deceased Mayor Carag, there certainly was no
justification for him to enlist the help of so many people, armed with so may arms, to carry out his revenge, or to
wreck vengeance on innocent victims like Dionisia Tambiao and her father Esteban Tambiao. He did not personally
avenge the supposed wrong he had received at his victim's hand, as ordinary men would do; he sought the aid of
armed cohorts and took advantage of an unexpected and sudden attack in a remote barrio, and the superiority of his
men and arms. And he did not wreak vengeance on his personal enemy alone, but gave vent to his anger
unnecessarily murdering two other innocent and defenseless victims. For him justice can not be tempered with
mercy; the law must be applied in its full force and to its full extent.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified and we hereby sentence Tomas Ubiña to suffer the
penalty of death by electrocution as provided by law, defendants-appellants Jose Ubiña, Marcelo de Guzman and
Loreto Mercado to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each of the deaths of Aureliano Carag, Dionisia
Tambiao and Esteban Tambiao, and defendants-appellants Romero Pagulayan, Pascual Escote and Pablo Binayug
to a period of from 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 14 years 8 months and one day of reclusion temporal for
each and every one of the above murders. All the accused-appellants are further sentenced to indemnity jointly and
severally the heirs of each of the deceased in the amount of P4,000, and to pay the costs.

It appearing that Jose de Guzman has not been included as an accused, proceedings against him should
immediately be instituted unless such action has already been taken.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-41674 March 30, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REMEDIOS DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Silvino Lopez de Jesus for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, finding the defendant guilty of
homicide and sentencing her to suffer not more than fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal
and not less than eight years and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francisco Rivera
in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.

Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:

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 I. El Juzgado a quo, erro al dar absoluto credito a las pruebas de la acusacion, las que son insuficientes
para apoyar una declaracion de conviccion.

II. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que los celos fueron el motivo que impulso a la acusada al agredir al
occiso Francisco Rivera.

III. El Juzgado a quo al declarar increible el testimonio de la acusada en esta causa.

IV. Y el Juzgado a quo erro al no absolver a la acusada.

It appears from the evidence that on the evening of February 18, 1934, Francisco Ramos and his wife, Brigida
Vistada; his sister, Baltazara Ramos; and a woman named Consuelo or Natividad Santoyo called at the house of
the defendant and asked her to go with them to a wake in honor of one Sion, who had died in the house of Maria
Inguit. About nine o'clock the defendant and her friends started home. They were followed about five minutes later,
according to Enrique Bautista, by the deceased Francisco Rivera, who had been playing cards in the house where
the wake was held. He was accompanied by Enrique Bautista. Rivera and Bautista overtook defendant's party.
When they reached a narrow part of the path, Rivera went ahead of Bautista. At that time the members of the
defendant's party were walking in single file. Baltazara Ramos was in the lead and the defendant was the hindmost.
She was about two brazas from the person immediately ahead of her. Francisco Ramos, the only one of defendant's
companions that was called to testify, heard someone cry out "Aruy, Dios mio". He went back and found that
Francisco Rivera had been stabbed under the right breast. The wounded man was taken to the hospital, where he
died the next afternoon.

Francisco Ramos testified that it took him about two minutes to go back to the place where Francisco Rivera was.
He found and that Enrique Bautista was with the wounded man, and the defendant had started back towards the
house of mourning. He overtook her. She had a knife in her hand. When they reached the house of Maria Inguit,
Remedios de la Cruz stuck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced
her.

The case for the prosecution rests upon the testimony of Enrique Bautista. According to him the defendant waited
on the right side of the path near some guava trees and stabbed Francisco Rivera with a knife in her right hand
when he arrived in front of her; that the injured man cried "Aruy, Dios mio", while the defendant turned around and
returned to the house of Maria Inguit, saying "Icao ay malaon na" (hacia tiempo ya). He further testified that the
defendant stabbed the deceased before either of them had said anything; that the distance between him and the
deceased was about one foot; that he did not see any of the companions of the defendant after they reached the
path and had to walk one behind the other.

The defendant on the other hand testified that after they had passed a fork in the trail and reached a narrow part a
man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts and kissed her, and seized her in
her private parts; that she tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her down; that when she felt weak
and could do nothing more against the strength of the man, she got a knife from her pocket, opened it, and stabbed
him in defense of her honor. She further testified that the man who attacked her did not say anything; that she asked
him who he was but he did not answer; that when she was assaulted she cried for help, saying "Madre mia; Dios
mio"; that when she was seized, she was about two brazas behind her nearest companion; that when she was face
to face with her assailant during the struggle she could scarcely recognize his face in the darkness and could not be
sure that it was Francisco Rivera.

Her testimony as to what occurred is as follows:

P. ¿Y que paso siendo usted la ultima de entre sus compañeros? — R. Despues de pasar nosotros en una
bifurcacion de los caminos cuando llegabamos en una parte estrecha el occiso subitamente me abrazo por
detras cogiendome los pechos y basandome.

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 P. ¿Y entonces que hizo usted cuando usted sintio ese abrazo y beso? — R. todavia me agarro en mi parte
genital y en eso yo trataba de desasirme de el; el me siguio abrazando cogiendome de los pechos y
basandome, y yo a mi vez seguia tratando de desasirme de el insistentemente.

P. ¿Y que sucedio? — R. Cuando yo trataba de desasirma de el, el me siguio abrazando y yo a mi vez

seguia tratandome de desassirme de el y el llego a agarrarme en la parte genital y trato de lanzarme.

P. ¿Y que hizo usted cuando le trataba de lanzarle a usted el occiso? — R. Yo procuraba desasirme de el y
cuando me quede debilitada y ya no podia hacer nada contra la fuerza de el yo saque de mo bolsillo un
cortaplumas.

P. ¿Y que hizo usted del cortaplumas? — R. Lo abri porque cuando ya no podia hacer nada y estaba y a
debil yo hice lo que debia hacer en defensa de mi pudor, le apuñale.

She further testified that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the fanknife in question was in a pocket of the
overcoat she was wearing that day; that she went off with her friends without having an opportunity of changing her
clothes.

We cannot believe the testimony of Enrique Bautista, because Francisco Ramos, one of the witnesses for the
prosecution, testified that it was a dark night, and Bautista himself said that he could scarcely see anyone in the
darkness ("Apenas se podia ver a alguien en esa obscuridad."); that he did not see any of the companions of the
defendant.

It appears from the evidence that the deceased had been making love to the defendant, and also to another girl
named Felicisima Sincaban; but the finding of the trial judge that Francisco Rivera and the defendant were engaged,
that she was madly in love with him and was extremely jealous of Felicisima Sincaban is not sustained by the
evidence of record.

The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained possession of the knife, and undoubtedly
could have inflicted other wounds on him if she had desired. In other words she desisted as soon as he released
her.

The evidence shows that an officer of the Constabulary went to see the injured man about eleven o'clock that night
in the hospital, but it does not appear that Rivera told him anything about the circumstances under which he had
been stabbed.

The appellant is an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and scarcely eighteen years old. We do not believe
her story is a fabrication. In this connection it is to be noted that almost immediately after the incident in question
took place, the appellant said she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he embraced her. It is not improbable that she
was reluctant to relate in the presence of all the people in the house of Maria Inguit the details of what had occurred.

We are convinced from a study of the record that the deceased did in fact grab hold of the defendant on the night in
question, and whether he intended to rape her or not, taking into consideration that it was a dark night and that the
deceased grabbed her from behind without warning and without making himself known and refused to say who he
was, and in the struggle that followed touched her private parts, and the fact that she was unable to free herself by
means of her strength alone, we are of the opinion that she was justified in making use of the pocket-knife in
repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, since she had no other means of defending herself.

In the case of the United States vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488), this court held that a person is not criminally
responsible when, by reason of a mistake of facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as
he supposed them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the time, provided
that the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

The appellant claims to have cried for help, but so far as the record shows her cries were not heard by any of her
companions. Whether she did in fact cry for help, as claimed by her, or failed to do so because of the suddenness
19
with which the deceased grabbed her and the fright which it naturally caused, taking into consideration the
circumstances of the case, we still think she is exempt from criminal liability. In the case of the United States vs.
Santa Ana and Ramos (22 Phil., 249), this court held that a woman in defense of her honor is justified in inflicting
wounds or her assailant with a bolo which she happens to be carrying, even though her cry for assistance might
have been heard by people near by.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the appellant is acquitted, with the costs de
oficio.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 1345. December 29, 1903. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. JOSE MONTANO, Defendant-Appellant.

Carlos Ledesma, for Appellant.

Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ROBBERY EN CUADRILLA; ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT. — One who disposes of stolen property after he
is informed of its character by demand for its return to the owner is guilty as an accessory, even if he did not know that the
property was stolen at the time it came into his possession.

DECISION

McDONOUGH, J. :

The defendant, Jose Montano, was charged with being accessory to the crime of robbery in a gang, committed in the month
of January, 1902, in the barrio of Napnapin, in the town of Tigbauan, by more than three armed men, who, in the nighttime,
with force and arms committed a robbery and carried away as the proceeds thereof eight carabaos.

There is evidence in the case to show that soon after the robbery four of these carabaos were found in the possession of the
defendant at Alimodian; that the defendant was informed that these carabaos had been stolen; and that the credentials of
ownership were exhibited to him by the rightful owners; that the defendant stated that if he had known that the carabaos
had been stolen he would not have bought them, and that he asked to be paid one-half of the price of the carabaos as a
condition of delivering them to the owners.

The owners testified that they then stated to the defendant that they had not the money with which to make this payment,
but that they would go to their homes and return with the money. This they did the next day, but then the defendant stated
that he had returned the carabaos to the men from whom he had bought them; and so the owners were not able to recover
possession of their property by reason of the disposal of the same by the defendant after he had been informed that the
carabaos had been taken from the owners through robbery.

The defendant denied that he had these carabaos in his possession; denied that he had promised to return them on payment
of half the price which he had paid for the same, and denied that he had any conversation with the owners about the same.
He also produced witnesses whose testimony tended to prove an alibi, but this branch of the proof was weak, and the
contradictory statements of the defendant had the effect of weakening his testimony also.

The court below, evidently believing the evidence produced by the prosecution, found the defendant guilty and sentence him
to serve a term of four months of arresto mayor, together with the corresponding accessories and indemnification and to the
payment of the costs.

20
In order to convict the defendant of the crime of being accessory to the crime of robbery committed as shown by the
evidence in this case, it was not necessary to show that he had participated therein. It was sufficient to show that he had
knowledge of it, and the proof shows that he acquired such knowledge when he was told by the owners that these carabaos
had been taken away from the owners by robbery. After having obtained this knowledge he disposed of the property or
concealed the same so that the owners were deprived of their property — the body and effects of the crime. (See art. 15,
Penal Code.)

We are of opinion, however, that in sentencing the defendant an error was committed by the court below. As the punishment
provided for the crime of robo en cuadrilla is that designated in No. 5 of article 503 of the Penal Code in its maximum grade,
the penalty corresponding to an accessory after the fact is not that of arresto mayor in its maximum grade — the punishment
fixed for an accomplice — but a correctional fine. (Arts. 26, 67, and 68 of the Penal Code.)

The judgment below is therefore reversed and judgment ordered as follows: That the said Jose Montano be sentenced to pay
a fine of 2,500 pesetas, and, if he fail to pay said fine, that he be imprisoned until the same shall be paid, but such
imprisonment not to exceed one month. (Art. 92, Penal Code.)

21