A v. RUSSIA
A v. RUSSIA
CASE OF A v. RUSSIA
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 November 2019
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
A v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 1
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 37735/09) against the
Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms A (“the applicant”), on
14 April 2009. The President of the Section acceded to the applicant’s
request to grant her anonymity (Rule 47 § 4 of the Rules of Court).
2. The applicant was represented initially by her mother, and
subsequently by Ms O.A. Sadovskaya, a lawyer practising in Nizhniy
Novgorod. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented
by Mr M. Galperin, Representative of the Russian Federation to the
European Court of Human Rights.
3. The applicant alleged, in particular, that by carrying out her father’s
violent arrest in her presence, the authorities had breached her rights under
the Convention.
4. On 11 September 2017 notice of the application was given to the
Government.
THE FACTS
18. The applicant described her state of health after the incident of
31 May 2008 as follows. She started screaming at night, wetting herself and
suffering panic attacks when left alone. She stopped communicating with
other children, became reserved, lost her vivaciousness, had difficulties
speaking and developed a tremor affecting her face and limbs. She lost her
interest in music, despite having previously been a successful violin student.
19. On 3 June 2008 the applicant was examined by a neurologist and
diagnosed with a neurological disorder and neurosis-like enuresis. On
6 June 2008 she was examined by a psychologist, to whom she complained
that her stress had caused screaming at night, fears and unsociability. She
was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder, high levels of anxiety
and fixation on the stressful situation. The diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder was confirmed on 25 June 2008 by children’s psychiatrists and
psychologists at Specialised Clinical Psychiatric Hospital no. 1 in
Krasnodar and the Krasnodar regional children’s hospital. On the same day
a neurologist from the regional children’s hospital also diagnosed her with
neurogenic hyper-reflective urinary bladder. A cardiologist from the same
hospital confirmed her previously known diagnosis of mitral valve prolapse.
She received out-patient treatment and was supervised at the Apsheronsk
central district hospital. She was again seen by doctors for her
post-traumatic stress disorder in July and August 2008.
20. It follows from a record of the applicant’s statements to a lawyer of
12 October 2017 that her state of health improved after her father’s release.
Her enuresis almost ceased but her nightmares continued for about two
more years. She confirmed that she was currently not suffering any health
problems.
21. According to a preliminary conclusion of psychologist D.S. from
“Independent Expert Examination Bureau Versia” based in Moscow and St
Petersburg, who interviewed the applicant on 15 February 2018 and
examined her medical records, there could have been a cause-and-effect
relationship between the events of 31 May 2008 and the medical condition
she developed immediately thereafter, which lasted for more than two years.
In order to substantiate such a conclusion, complex psychological and
psychiatric examinations needed to be carried out on the applicant with the
involvement of her parents. A psychiatrist would be competent to carry out
a clinical assessment of the consequences of the impact which the events of
31 May 2008 had had on her health. D.S. provided details of the cost and
duration of the proposed examination.
22. An “experimental psychological examination” was carried out on the
applicant by psychologist D.T. from the non-commercial organisation
“Sotsialnaya Sfera” based in Nizhniy Novgorod. According to D.T.’s report
of 7 March 2018, the results of the examination could be interpreted as
6 A v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
handcuffed him. While apprehending him they had torn his shirt. B had not
resisted arrest. The blows he had received had not left bruises on his body.
35. On 22 August 2008 investigator M.V. interviewed P.M., another
attesting witness of the test purchase of drugs carried out in relation to B.
According to P.M.’s explanations, which were essentially similar to those of
[Link]. (see paragraph 31 above), the arresting officers were in civilian
clothing. B behaved calmly, his shirt was unbuttoned but not damaged, and
there were no injuries on him. B talked to [A] firmly. The FSKN officers
asked him why he was ordering her to go home, stating that they could take
her along with him when going to his house to carry out a search. B
disagreed.
36. According to an operational officer of the FSKN unit in Tuapse,
E.N., who acted as a buyer in the drugs test-purchase operation (interviewed
by investigator M.V. on 24 August 2008), on 30 May 2008 B gave him
drugs and they agreed that he would pay B the following day. The transfer
was watched by the attesting witnesses from a car. At about 8.30 a.m. on
31 May 2008 near school no. 1, after a telephone conversation between
them, E.N. handed over a bag with money to B. B’s daughter was sitting in
a car nearby. After the transfer of the money, E.N. and B were arrested by
approximately eight persons in civilian clothing who had jumped out of two
cars. They introduced themselves and produced their documents. They were
from the FSKN and the Federal Security Service. No physical force,
strong-arm tactics or holds were used against B during his arrest. B behaved
calmly and did not resist arrest. No physical or psychological violence or
threats were used against B’s daughter. Nobody blocked the doors of the car
in which she was sitting.
37. According to Apsheronsk police officers K.A. (interviewed on
22 August 2008) and M.I. (interviewed on 1 September 2008), on 31 May
2008 they were passing by school no. 1 in a car and saw their colleague, B.
They stopped, got out of the car and walked towards him. Their way was
blocked by several persons in civilian clothing who explained that they
could not go any further since there was an operation underway. B was
about ten metres away. His shirt was open and apparently slightly torn. The
buttons on the shirt were missing. They did not see any bodily injuries on B.
The situation was calm, and they left.
38. According to FSKN officer S.S. (interviewed on 24 August 2008),
on 31 May 2008 he arrived at the place of the arrest after B’s apprehension
and went to B’s house together with his colleagues. He saw the applicant
approaching her house and then going away.
39. According to S.P., an operational officer of the Belorechensk unit of
the Krasnodar regional department of the Federal Security Service
(interviewed by investigator R.Z. from the investigative committee on
29 August 2008), who had been present during B’s arrest, physical force
was used against B because he had been trying to flee the scene of the
A v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 9
crime. The force used was necessary and not excessive, that is it did not
involve B being beaten up. B’s daughter was sitting in B’s car. B was
invited to inform his wife that she should come and take the girl away.
However, B insisted that the girl should run home. The girl listened to her
father and ran home. No one held her or chased her.
40. On 29 August 2008 investigator M.V. also interviewed A.Z., a
senior operational officer of the internal security unit of the FSKN’s
Krasnodar regional branch, who had carried out (from 30 July 2008 to
7 August 2008) an internal investigation following the complaint lodged by
the applicant’s mother with the FSKN. A.Z. related his findings as
follows. According to explanations received from FSKN officers S.K.,
V.D., A.O. and V.E., as well as individuals P.M., I. and G., B was not
beaten up during his arrest, and A was not held forcibly in a car. B himself
ordered her to get out of the car and she ran away. No one chased her or
used measures of psychological influence against her. R.G., an electrician
working for Energoservis, was checking traffic lights at the intersection near
the place of the arrest. He confirmed having seen FSKN officer S.K.
apprehending B and delivering several blows to his body. However, given
that the director of Energoservis had not “officially” confirmed whether
R.G. had been working that day, and that R.G. had been registered since
25 February 2007 as a drug user and had been repeatedly arrested by the
FSKN for administrative offences involving drugs consumption, he could
have given false statements aimed at discrediting the FSKN officers.
According to a “specialist” consulted in relation to A’s medical documents,
A was highly sensitive, emotionally unstable, selective in her contacts, and
had a high level of anxiety. Taking into account her pre-existing
neurological pathology, even a minor stressful situation, especially
involving her father, would have sufficed to cause her psychological trauma.
Her father might not necessarily have been beaten up in her presence. The
fact that she had been in a car for a long time was irrelevant for the stress
she had suffered. Therefore, the internal investigation did not establish the
FSKN officers’ guilt in relation to the temporary damage to A’s health
which had occurred during B’s arrest.
41. On 1 September 2008, relying on the above material and using the
same reasoning as in his previous decision, investigator M.V. refused to
institute criminal proceedings against FSKN officers S.K., V.D., A.O., V.E.,
E.N. and S.S. He added that in the absence of intent to harm A’s health, the
FSKN officers’ lawful and justified actions in arresting B lacked the
elements of a crime.
THE LAW
45. The applicant complained that the unjustified use of physical force
against her father during his arrest in her presence and her treatment by
FSKN officers had breached her rights under Article 3 of the Convention.
She further complained under Article 13 of the Convention that there had
been no thorough and independent investigation into that incident.
Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention read as follows:
Article 3
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”
Article 13
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
1. The Government
46. The Government contested the applicant’s allegations, relying on the
results of the pre-investigation inquiry (see paragraph 17 above). They
submitted that the applicant’s presence during B’s arrest at the scene of the
crime, immediately after his receiving money for sold drugs, had not been
anticipated. The arresting officers had been unable to predict the time and
place of the offence committed by B. If B had not been arrested, the
evidence of the criminal offence would have been lost.
47. The Government stated that the authorities had conducted a
comprehensive and thorough investigation into the applicant’s alleged
ill-treatment in compliance with Article 3. However, not a single piece of
12 A v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
information, apart from what had been provided by the applicant’s family
members, had demonstrated that force had been used against the applicant’s
father or that she herself had been subjected to the treatment alleged. The
applicant had availed herself of effective domestic remedies. The relevant
decisions had not been in her favour because her allegations had been
unsubstantiated.
2. The applicant
48. The applicant argued that as an involuntary witness to her father’s
cruel arrest and beatings, she had not received any support or protection
from a State representative. After her father’s arrest she had been left alone
in his car, had run home alone and by chance had been found by one of her
relatives in the street in a condition of profound shock. The incident had had
serious consequences for her health and development. Ten years after the
events complained of she was still suffering from its consequences. Given
that she had been nine years old at the time and therefore more susceptible
than an adult to the negative consequences of cruel treatment, and taking
into account the long-lasting adverse effects it had had on her, the level of
her suffering had been so high that her treatment by the police officers
should be classified as torture.
49. The applicant further argued that the authorities should have
anticipated her possible presence at the scene of the arrest, since the arrest
had been carried out near the school where her father had taken her. They
could have, for instance, communicated with the school administration to
prevent her from coming out of the school at the time of the arrest, or to
ensure the presence of a member of the school staff to provide her with
psychological support during the arrest. Afterwards they could have taken
her back to the school in order to shorten her presence at the place of the
arrest or to avoid her going home unaccompanied. The authorities had had
the necessary time but had not taken any measures to prevent or minimise
the harm to her health.
50. The authorities had refused to initiate criminal proceedings into the
applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by the police and, instead of a proper
investigation, had carried out a superficial pre-investigation inquiry. Their
decision had been based on the FSKN officers’ statements and had failed to
take into consideration evidence supporting the applicant’s allegations and
the contradictions between the statements of the FSKN officers and the
witnesses.
B. Admissibility
51. The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes
A v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 13
that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be
declared admissible.
C. Merits
1. General principles
52. The Court reiterates that Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one
of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in
absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
irrespective of the circumstances and the victim’s behaviour (see Kudła
v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 90, ECHR 2000-XI).
53. Where an individual makes a credible assertion that he or she has
suffered treatment infringing Article 3 at the hands of the police or other
similar agents of the State, that provision, read in conjunction with the
State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the]
Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective
official investigation. That investigation should be capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those responsible (see Labita v. Italy [GC],
no. 26772/95, § 131, ECHR 2000‑IV). Otherwise, the general legal
prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment
would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice and it
would be possible in some cases for agents of the State to abuse the rights of
those within their control with virtual impunity (see Assenov and Others
v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998, § 102, Reports of Judgments and Decisions
1998‑VIII).
54. Allegations of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention
must be supported by appropriate evidence. To establish the facts, the Court
applies the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Ireland v. the
United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, § 161 in fine, Series A no. 25).
However, such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently
strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted
presumptions of fact (see Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 100,
ECHR 2000-VII).
55. In respect of children, who are particularly vulnerable, the measures
applied by the State to protect them against acts of violence falling within
the scope of Articles 3 and 8 should be effective and include reasonable
steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities had, or ought to have
had, knowledge and effective deterrence against such serious breaches of
personal integrity. Such measures must be aimed at ensuring respect for
human dignity and protecting the best interests of the child (see Söderman
v. Sweden [GC], no. 5786/08, § 81, ECHR 2013).
14 A v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
56. The Court has previously found in the case of Gutsanovi that the
possible presence of children, whose young age makes them
psychologically vulnerable, at the scene of an arrest is a factor to be taken
into consideration in planning and carrying out this kind of operation (see
Gutsanovi v. Bulgaria, no. 34529/10, § 132, ECHR 2013 (extracts)). In that
case the Court found that the fact that the police operation had taken place
in the early hours of the morning and had involved special agents wearing
masks had served to heighten the feelings of fear and anxiety experienced
by the children who had witnessed their father’s arrest, to the extent that the
treatment to which they had been subjected exceeded the threshold of
severity required for Article 3 to apply, amounting to degrading treatment
(ibid., § 134).
used against B – notably being knocked to the ground and kicked several
times – could have left no visible traces on his body. The Court notes in this
regard that – according to B and witness R.G. (see paragraphs 10 and 13
above) – the FSKN officers who arrested B, including the one who
allegedly used force against him, were dressed in tracksuits (see also the
statements by attesting witnesses [Link]. and P.M., FSKN officer E.N. and
Apsheronsk police officers K.A. and M.I., who mentioned that the arresting
officers had been in civilian clothing, paragraphs 31 and 35-37 above). This
suggests that they may have been wearing trainers, which might not have
caused the same blunt-trauma bruising and abrasions as army-type boots
(see, for example, Ksenz and Others v. Russia, nos. 45044/06 and 5 others,
§§ 39, 43, 45 and 96, 12 December 2017).
59. According to the identical written “explanations” made by FSKN
officers S.K., V.D. and A.O., who apprehended B, and senior officer V.E.,
who was present during the arrest, no physical force was used against B
during his arrest (see paragraph 24 above). According to FSKN officer E.N.,
who acted as a buyer in the undercover operation against B and was also
present during B’s arrest, no physical force, “strong-arm tactics” or “holds”
were used against B (see paragraph 36 above). Apart from the fact that the
above-mentioned officers had a direct interest in denying the accusations
made against them by the applicant, their statements sit ill with those made
by S.P. and R.G.
60. S.P., the Federal Security Service officer present during B’s arrest,
acknowledged that physical force had been used against B. He contended
that it had been necessary because B had tried to escape, and had not been
excessive, that is it had not escalated into a beating (see paragraph 39
above). It should be noted that S.P.’s statement that B had tried to escape
finds no support in the statements of the FSKN officers (see paragraphs 24
and 36 above), the attesting witnesses (see paragraphs 31 and 35 above) or
witness R.G. (see paragraph 13 above). Nor was it claimed that B had
resisted his arrest by using force.
61. According to R.G., an electrician who had been carrying out
maintenance work on the traffic lights near school no. 1 on the morning of
31 May 2008 and witnessed B’s arrest, FSKN officer S.K. delivered several
blows to B during his arrest (see paragraph 40 above); he knocked B to the
ground and kicked him (see paragraph 13 above). FSKN officer A.Z., who
carried out the FSKN internal investigation, dismissed R.G.’s statements as
unreliable. He alleged that R.G. was a drug user who had been arrested in
the past for administrative offences of drugs consumption. Moreover, there
had been no confirmation from his employer that R.G. had indeed been
working in the area on 31 May 2008 (see paragraph 40 above). The Court
does not find A.Z.’s assessment convincing, since he belonged to the same
unit as the FSKN officers who were allegedly at fault, which raises an issue
as to the independence of such an investigation. Apart from the fact that
16 A v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
64. It transpires that E.N., who acted as a buyer in the FSKN operation
against B, learned from a telephone call on the morning of 31 May 2008
that B was at the school (see E.N.’s statements and B’s statements about
informing E.N. that he was at the school with his child, paragraphs 36
and 10, respectively). When B came out of the school together with the
applicant, E.N. was waiting for him. Immediately after the meeting between
B and E.N., B was arrested by the FSKN officers, who acknowledged in
their explanations to the investigative committee that when they
apprehended B, he was near his car in which his daughter, A, was sitting
(see paragraph 24 above). Federal Security Service officer S.P.’s statements
also show that the law-enforcement officers participating in B’s arrest were
aware that B’s daughter, A, was present at the place of arrest (see
paragraph 39 above).
65. While the Court cannot examine the applicant’s allegation that she
had been left to go home unaccompanied, which was not raised in the
domestic proceedings (see paragraph 23 above), and cannot establish
beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the material before it her
allegations about being addressed rudely and held in the car, the above
assessment leads the Court to conclude that her allegations concerning her
being exposed to her father’s arrest, and the violent nature of the arrest,
were credible.
(b) Compliance with Article 3
66. The Court notes next that the Government’s version of the facts was
based on the pre-investigation inquiry, the first stage in the procedure for
examining criminal complaints. The Court has held, however, that the mere
carrying out of a pre-investigation inquiry, not followed by a preliminary
investigation, is insufficient for the authorities to comply with the
requirements of an effective investigation into credible allegations of
ill-treatment by the police under Article 3 of the Convention (see Lyapin
v. Russia, no. 46956/09, § 136, 24 July 2014, and, more recently, Samesov
v. Russia, no. 57269/14, § 51, 20 November 2018). The Court has no reason
to reach a different conclusion in the present case. The authorities responded
to the applicant’s credible allegations of treatment proscribed by Article 3
by carrying out a pre-investigation inquiry and refused to institute criminal
proceedings and carry out a fully-fledged investigation. This was endorsed
by the domestic courts, thereby departing from their procedural obligation
under Article 3. The pre-investigation inquiry did not provide the
Government with a proper basis to discharge their burden of proof and
produce evidence capable of casting doubt on the applicant’s credible
allegations concerning her exposure to the violent arrest of her father, which
the Court therefore finds established (see Olisov and Others v. Russia,
nos. 10825/09 and 2 others, § 85, 2 May 2017, and Samesov, cited above,
§ 53).
18 A v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT
67. The interests of the applicant, who was nine years old at the time,
were not taken into consideration at any stage in the planning and carrying
out of the authorities’ operation against her father. The law-enforcement
officers paid no heed to her presence, of which they were well aware,
proceeding with the operation and exposing her to a scene of violence
against her father in the absence of any resistance on his part. This very
severely affected the applicant and, in the Court’s view, amounted to a
failure on the part of the authorities to prevent her ill-treatment (see
paragraph 55 above).
68. There has therefore been a violation of the State’s positive
substantive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention.
69. There has also been a violation of Article 3 under its procedural limb
in that no effective investigation was carried out in that respect.
70. In view of its finding of a violation of Article 3 under its procedural
limb the Court does not find it necessary to examine separately under
Article 13 of the Convention the applicant’s complaint concerning the lack
of an effective investigation into the incident of 31 May 2008.
71. The applicant complained that the use of unjustified force against her
father in her presence had also disregarded her feelings towards her beloved
father in breach of her rights under Article 8 of the Convention, which reads
as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
72. The Government contested that argument.
73. The Court notes that this complaint is linked to the one examined
above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
74. Having regard to the finding relating to the applicant’s complaint
under Article 3 (see paragraphs 67-68 above) which was based on the same
facts as her complaint under Article 8, the Court considers that this
complaint is absorbed by the preceding complaint and it is not therefore
necessary to examine whether, in this case, there has also been a violation of
Article 8.
A v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 19
A. Damage
79. The applicant also claimed EUR 4,500 for the costs and expenses
incurred before the Court.
80. The Government stated that Article 41 should be applied in
accordance with the Court’s case-law.
81. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown
that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as
to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its
possession, notably a legal services agreement concluded by the applicant
after lodging her application with the Court, and the above criteria, the
Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 3,500 for costs and
expenses for the proceedings before the Court.
C. Default interest
82. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate
should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,
to which should be added three percentage points.
4. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint concerning the lack
of an effective investigation separately under Article 13 of the
Convention;
6. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted
into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date
of settlement:
(i) EUR 25,000 (twenty-five thousand euros), plus any tax that may
be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 3,500 (three thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and
expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a
rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period, plus three percentage points;