INSTIGATION
In People v. Bartolome,1 the court defined instigation as the
means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him. In instigation, officers of
the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused
into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not
commit and has no intention of committing. Where law enforcers act
as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted. It has been
said that instigation is a “trap for the unwary innocent”. Instigation
absolves the accused of any guilt, given the spontaneous moral
revulsion from using the powers of government to beguile innocent
but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise resist.
The same case, citing People v. Doria2 enumerated the instances
when the Court recognized instigation as a valid defense:
In United States v. Phelps3, we acquitted the accused
from the offense of smoking opium after finding that
the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually
induced him to commit the crime in order to
persecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that
Phelps’ apprehension came after he overheard
Phelps in a saloon say that he like smoking opium
on some occasions. Smith’s testimony was
disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact
that it was Smith who went to the accused three
times to convince him to look for an opium den
where both of them could smoke this drug. The
conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as “most
reprehensible.”
In People v. Abella4, we acquitted the accused of the
crime of selling explosives after examining the
testimony of the apprehending police officer who
1 G.R. No 191726, 06 February 2013.
2 G.R. No. 125299 22 January 1999.
3 16 Phil. 440 (1910).
4 46 Phil. 857 (1923).
pretended to be a merchant. The police officer
offered “a tempting price, xxx a very high one”
causing the accused to sell the explosives. We found
there was inducement, “direct, persistent and
effective” by the police officer and that outside of his
testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to
convict the accused.
In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng5, we convicted
the accused after finding that there was no
inducement on the part of the law enforcement
officer. We stated that the Customs secret
serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction
of opium from Hong Kong to Cebu after the accused
had already planned its importation and ordered
said drug. We ruled that the apprehending officer
did not induce the accused to import opium but
merely entrapped him by pretending to have an
understanding with the Collector of Customs of
Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited
drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers.
In the case of People v. Legaspi,6 citing again the case of People
v. Doria, the Court explained that where the criminal intent originates
in the mind of the instigating person and the accused is lured into
the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him,
there is instigation and no conviction may be had. Where, however,
the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the
criminal offense is completed, even after a person acted as a decoy
for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity
for the commission of the offense, or the accused was aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to
prosecute him, there is no instigation and the accused must be
convicted. The law in fact tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal.
5 56 Phil. 44 (1931).
6 G.R. No. 173485, 23 November 2011
In a buy-bust operation, the distinction between instigation and
entrapment has proven to be very material in anti-narcotics
operations. In People v. Agustin,7 citing the case of People v. Gatong-
o,8 the court explained that entrapment is the employment of such
ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a
lawbreaker. Oftentimes it is the only effective way of apprehending a
criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. A criminal is
caught committing the act by ways and means devised by peace
officers. It must be distinguished from inducement or instigation
wherein the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator
and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged
in order to prosecute him. The instigator practically induces the
would-be accused into the Commission of the offense and himself
becomes a co-principal. In entrapment ways and means are resorted
to for the purpose of capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto. In
entrapment, the crime had already been committed while in
instigation, it was not and could not have been committed were it not
for the instigation by the peace officer.
7 G.R. No. 98362, 13 November 1992.
8 168 SCRA 716 (1988).
