THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

LEGISLATIVE POWER

• The power to propose, enact, amend, and repeal laws.

• Vested in the Congress, except to the extent reserved to the people

by the provision on initiative and referendum.

N.B.

The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a

system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law, or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body
after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at
least ten per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered
voters thereof. (Sec. 32, Art. VI)

In compliance with the constitutional mandate, Congress passed RA

6735, known as an Act providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum.

i) Initiative is the power of the people to

propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislation through an election
called for the purpose.

Three systems of initiative:

1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a

petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution.

2. Initiative on statutes.

3. Indirect initiative which refers to the exercise of

initiative by the people through a proposition sent
to Congress or local legislative body for action.
 (Sec. 2, R.A. 6735).

• Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which is

specifically vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to
referendum until 90 days after their effectivity [Sec. 10, R.A. 6735].

Local Initiative

• Not less than 2,000 registered voters in case of autonomous regions,

1,000 in case of provinces and cities, 100 in case of municipalities, and 50
in case of barangays.

• May file a petition with the Regional Assembly or local legislative

body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance, or resolution. (Sec. 13, R.A. 6735).

Limitations on Local Initiative:

(a) The power of local initiative shall not be

exercised more than once a year:

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subject or

matters which are within the legal powers of the
local legislative bodies to enact.

(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the

local legislative body proposes amendments to the
Constitution or proposes and enacts legislation
through an election called for the purpose.

CONGRESS
 THE SENATE

• Composition [Sec. 2, Art VI]: 24 Senators elected at large by the

qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

• Qualifications of Senator (Sec. 3, Art. VI):

1. natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. on the day of the election, at least 35 years of age;
3. able to read and write;
4. registered voter; and
5. resident of the Philippines for not less than 2 years immediately
preceding the day of the election.

N.B.

The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office shall

enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test.” Is not tenable as it enlarges the
qualifications set forth in the Constitution. COMELEC cannot, in
the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a
citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution. (Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous Drugs Board, 570 SCRA 410, 2008)

Term of Office

• Sec. 4, Art. VI: 6 years, commencing at noon on the 30 th day of June

next following their election.

Limitations:
• No Senator shall serve for more than 2 consecutive terms.

• Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be

considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he has been elected.

N.B.

• The Constitution provides that a majority of each house shall

constitute a quorum to do business. The total number of senators in the
senate is 24, therefore its majority should not be less than 13. (Avelino v.
Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17, 1949)

• The term “majority,” when referring to a certain number out

of a total or aggregate, simply means the number greater than
half or more than half of any total. In effect, while the
Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all
the members thereof, it does not provide that the members
who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law
or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall
automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of

electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter
says under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that “each House shall choose
such other officers as it may deem necessary.” The method of
choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative
of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the said
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Court. (Santiago v.
Guingona, 298 SCRA 756, 1998)
 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

• Composition [Sec. 5(1) and (2), Art. VI]: Not more than 250
members unless otherwise provided by law, consisting of:

• District representatives, elected from legislative districts

apportioned among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila
area.

• Party-list representatives, who shall constitute twenty per centum of

the total number of representatives, elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

• Sectoral representatives. For 3 consecutive terms after the

ratification of the Constitution, ½ of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.

N.B.

• Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a

list of nominees by the respective sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral
representation (Sec. 7, Art. XVIII, 1987).

• These appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the

Commission on Appointments. (Quintos-Deles v. Committee on
Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA
259).

• Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. It
follows then that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of
the proclamation. The party questioning his qualification should now
present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a
Member of the House of Representatives with respect to the latter's
election, returns and qualifications. The use of the word "sole" in Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 2509 of the OEC
underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over
election contests relating to its members.

The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this

case, was alleged to have been tainted with irregularity does not divest the
HRET of its jurisdiction. (Limkaichong v. Commission on Elections, 583
SCRA 1, 2009)

Apportionment of legislative districts

• The question of the validity of an apportionment law is a justiciable

question (Macias v. Comelec, 3 SCRA 1).

• Apportionment shall be made in accordance with the number of

respective inhabitants (among provinces, cities and Metro Manila area), on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.

• Each city with not less than 250,000 inhabitants shall be entitled to
at least one representative; and each province, irrespective of number of
inhabitants, is entitled to at least one representative.

• Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,

contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. This is intended to prevent
gerrymandering.

• Congress shall make re-apportionment of legislative districts within 3

years following the return of every census.

• The Constitution does not preclude Congress from increasing its

membership by passing a law other than a general apportionment law.
Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special
law.

• To hold that reapportionment can be made only through a general

law would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province
created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. That intolerable situation would deprive the
people in the new city or province a particle of their sovereignty.

• Sovereignty cannot admit of subtraction; it is indivisible. It must be

forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
• While concededly the conversion of Biliran into a regular province
brought about an imbalance in the distribution of voters and inhabitants in
the 5 districts of Leyte, the issue involves reapportionment of legislative
districts, and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. The Supreme Court
cannot itself make the reapportionment as petitioner would want.

• Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly

the power to create legislative districts. Nothing in Sec. 20, Article X of the
Constitution, authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to
create or reapportion legislative districts.

• The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of

Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is vested exclusively
in Congress. The statutory grant to ARMM Regional Assembly of the power
to create provinces and cities, is void being contrary to Sec. 5, Art. VI, and
Sec. 20, Art. X, as well as Sec. 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution.

N.B.

• There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a

250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district. The use by the subject provision of a comma to
separate the phrase “each city with a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each
province” point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a city, but not for a
province. (Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, 617 SCRA
137, 2010)

• With respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a

requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the
creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces,
the 3 indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided
for. (Navarro v. Ermita, 613 SCRA 131, 2010)

Qualifications for members of the House (Sec. 6, Art. VI):

 1. natural-born Filipino citizen;
2. on the day of the election, at least, 25 years of age;
3. able to read and write; and
4. except for party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected and a resident
thereof for not less than one year immediately preceding
the day of the election.

The Party-List System - R.A. 7941 (The Party-List System Act).

• A mechanism of proportional representation in the election of

representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections.

Registration, Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System.

• Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization

or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the Comelec
not later than 90 days before the election a petition verified by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list
system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
coalition of such parties or organizations.

• Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, 618 SCRA 32

(2010) - “The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors
is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is specifically
enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

• Any party, organization or coalition already registered with the

Comelec need not register anew, but shall file with the Comelec not later
than 90 days before the election a manifestation of its desire to participate
in the party-list system.

Grounds for Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration - Sectoral

Party, Organization or Coalition:
 1) it is a religious sect or denomination, organization or
association organized for religious purposes
2) it advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal
3) it is a foreign party or organization
4) it is receiving support from any foreign government; foreign
political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members, or indirectly
through third parties, for partisan election purposes
5) it violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations
relating to elections
6) it declares untruthful statements in its petition; it has
ceased to exist for at least one year
7) it failed to participate in the last 2 preceding elections or
fails to obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the 2 preceding elections for the constituency
in which it has registered.

• The disqualification of the nominees must simply be regarded as

failure to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in any way,
blemish the qualifications of the party-list group itself with defect. The
party-list group must be treated as separate and distinct from its nominees
such that qualifications of the latter must not be considered part and
parcel of the qualifications of the former.

Nomination of party-list representatives

• Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to

the Comelec not later than 45 days before the election a list of
names, not less than 5, from which party-list representatives
shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of
votes.

• A person may be nominated in one list only. Only persons

who have given their consent in writing may be named in the
list.
 • The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office
or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election.

• No change shall be allowed after the list shall have been

submitted to the Comelec except in cases where the nominee
dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute
nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral
representatives in the House of Representatives who are
nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.

N.B.

• A person may be nominated in one (1) list (party-list) only.

Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of
any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an
elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall
be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in
which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be
placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in
the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-
list system shall not be considered resigned. (Lokin Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, 621 SCRA 385, 2010)

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees:

1. natural-born citizen of of the Philippines
2. a registered voter
3. a resident of the Philippines for at least one year immediately preceding
the day of the election
4. able to read and write
5. a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election,
6. at least 25 years of age on the day of the election. For the youth sector,
he must be at least 25 years of age but not more than 30 years of age on
the day of the election.

• Any youth representative who attains the age of 30 during his

term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration
of his term.

N.B.

• As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the

youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it
must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day
is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this
mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System
Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list
representative seats. (Amores v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, 622 SCRA 593, 2010)

Manner of Voting

• Every voter shall be entitled to 2 votes: the first is a vote for

the candidate for member of the House of representatives in
his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the party,
organization or coalition he wants represented in the House
of Representatives.

• A vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not

entitled to be voted for shall not be counted.

• In Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Comelec, G.R. No.

177271, May 4, 2007, the Supreme Court held that the
Commission on Elections has a Constitutional duty to disclose
and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups, citing Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution on the right
of the people to information on matters of public concern as
 complemented by the policy of full disclosure and
transparency in Government.

• Barangay Association for National Advancement and

Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections, 586 SCRA
210 (2009); 592 SCRA 294 (2009)

Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the

entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be
more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.

The 2% threshold in the distribution of the additional seats

frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.

Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political

parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to
participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by
vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans
disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.

• Atong Paglaum, Inc., v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos

203766 et al. (April 2, 2013)

In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May

2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:

Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:

(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
• National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and
do not need to represent any "marginalized and under
represented" sector.

• Political parties can participate in party-list elections, provided

they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections.

• A political party, whether major or not, fielding candidates in

legislative district elections, can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately
register under the party-list system.

• The sectoral wing is by itself, an independent sectoral party,

and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

• Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized

and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies."

• It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the

special interest and concerns of their sector.

• The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented"

include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers.

• The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"

include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

• A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations

that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector
they represent.

• Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or

organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
must belong to the sector they represent.
 • The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political
constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors,
or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

• National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall

not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

N.B.

• Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-
list elections. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that
members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list
system. For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list
system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations
or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is
"either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean,however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for
that matter – may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system,
as laid down in the Constitution and RA7941. (Ang Bagong Bayani–OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 359 SCRA 698, 2001)

Number of partylist representatives

• The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total

number of the members of the House of Representatives
including those under the party-list.
 • For purposes of the May, 1998, elections, the first 5 major
political parties, on the basis of party representation in the
House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of
the Philippines, shall not be entitled to representation in the
party-list system.

• In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the

following procedure shall be observed:
- the parties, organizations and coalitions shall be ranked from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections
- the parties, organizations and coalitions receiving at least 2%
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled
to one-seat each; provided, that those garnering more than
2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes
- provided, finally, that each party, organization or coalition
shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

N.B.

• Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up

of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found
in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of
Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members
of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling;
party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives.

In computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued

operation of the 2% threshold for the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of
RA 7941 is unconstitutional. The Court finds that the 2%
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the
maximum number of available party-list seats when the
available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation
of the 2% threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives. The Court struck down the 2%
 threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The 2% threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of “the-broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.” [Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on
Elections, 586 SCRA 210 (2009); 592 SCRA 294 (2009)]

Choosing Party-List Representatives

• Party-list representatives are proclaimed by the Comelec

based on the list of names submitted by the respective
parties, organizations, or coalitions to the Comelec according
to their ranking in the list.

Effect of change of affiliation

• Any elected party-list representative who changes his political

party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall
forfeit his seat. If he changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation within 6 months before an election, he shall not be
eligible for nomination as Party-Iist representative under his
new party or organization.
Vacancy

• In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list

representatives, the vacancy shall be automaticaly filled by the
next representative from the list of nominees in the order
submitted to the Comelec by the same party, organization, or
coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is
exhausted, the party, organization, or coalition concerned
shall submit additional nominees.

Term of office; rights

• Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three

 (3) years, and shall be entitled to the same salaries and
emoluments as regular members of the House of
Representatives.

Privileges of Members of Congress (Sec. 11, Art. VI).

• Freedom from arrest "A Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session."

• Art. 145, Revised Penal Code, provides: "The penalty of prision

mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall use force, intimidation,
threats, or fraud to prevent any member of the National Assembly from
attending the meetings of the Assembly or of any of its committees or
subcommittees or divisions thereof, from expressing his opinions or casting
his vote; and the penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall, while the Assembly is in regular or
special session, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under this Code by a penalty
higher than prision mayor. "

N.B.

• The Supreme Court denied the motion of Congressman Jalosjos that

he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee hearings despite his
having been convicted by the trial court of a non-bailable offense.

• The denial was premised on the following:

[1] Membership in Congress does not exempt an accused from statutes

and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons;

[2] One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after

final conviction, is public self-defense, i.e., it is the injury to the public, not
the injury to the complainant, which state action in criminal law seeks to
redress;
[3] it would amount to the creation of a privilege class, without justification
or reason, if, notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they
would be considered immune from arrest during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same; and

[4] Accused-appellant is provided with an office at the House of

Representatives with a full compliment of staff, as well as an office at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, where he attends to his
constituents; he has, therefore, been discharging his mandate as member
of the House of Representatives, and being a detainee, he should not even
be allowed by the prison authorities to perform these acts.

• Same ruling in Trillanes IV v. Judge Pimentel, G.R. No. 179817, June

27, 2008, thus:
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression
that the call of duty conferred by the voice of the people is
louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent
discord may be harmonized by the overarching tenet that
the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which
the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule
of law. The performance of legitimate and even essential
duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the
"mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-
appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in
the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only
one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not
to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the
duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x
Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a
different classification from those others who are validly
restrained by law.

• Privilege of speech and of debate - No Member shall be questioned

nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.
 N.B.

• A member of Congress may be held to account for such speech or

debate by the House to which he belongs. (Osmena v. Pendatun, 109 Phil.
863; Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876).

• Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity to enable and

encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy
the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be protected from
resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense, the Court said, citing previous decided cases.

Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would

degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are
immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative
duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The
privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader,
or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s
speculation as to the motives. (Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago, 597 SCRA 1,
2009)

Disqualifications (Sec. 13, Art. VI).

• Incompatible office.

"No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any

other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries during his term without forfeiting his
seat.".

N.B.

• Forfeiture of the seat in Congress shall be automatic upon the

member's assumption of such other office deemed
incompatible with his seat in Congress. (Adaza v. Pacana, 135
SCRA 431). However, no forfeiture shall take place if the
member of Congress holds the other government office in an
 ex officio capacity, e.g., membership in the Board of Regents
of the University of the Philippines of the Chairman,
Committee on Education in the Senate.

• Forbidden office
"Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been created, or the emoluments therefor
increased, during the term for which he was elected."
N.B.

The ban against appointment to the office created, or the

emoluments thereof increased shall, however, last only for the duration of
the term for which the member of Congress was elected.

Other inhibitions (Sec. 14, Art. VI):

• No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may

personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the
Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial or other administrative bodies.

• Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any

contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any governmentowned or controlled corporation, or its
subsidiary, during his term of office.

• He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the

Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office.

N.B.

• What is prohibited is "personally" appearing as counsel.

• Upon assumption of office, Senators and Congressmen must make a
full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the
House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the
filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors (Sec. 12, Art VI).
• The Senate is a "continuing" institution as it is not dissolved as an
entity with each national election or change in the composition of its
members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business, the Senate
of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate before
it. All pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even
legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is
merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such
unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such rule is readily apparent considering
that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a
different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be
bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which they had no
part. (Romero II v. Estrada, 583 SCRA 396, 2009)

• Joint session:
Voting separately:

1. Choosing the President (Sec. 4, Art. VIII).

2. Determine President's disability (Sec. 11, Art. VII).
3. Confirming nomination of the Vice President (Sec. 9, Art. VII)
4. Declaring the existence of a state of war (Sec. 23, Art. VI)
5. Proposing constitutional amendments (Sec. 1, Art. XVII).

Voting jointly:

• To revoke or extend proclamation suspending the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus or placing the Philippines under martial law (Sec. 18,
Art. VII).
Quorum [Sec. 16(2), Art. VI]:
• A majority of each House, but a smaller number may adjourn from
day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may determine.

• The basis in determining the existence of a quorum in the Senate

shall be the total number of Senators who are in the country and within
the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate.

• Arroyo v. De Venecia declared that the question of quorum cannot

be raised repeatedly, especially when a quorum is obviously present, for
the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

Discipline of members [Sec. 16(3), Art. VI]:

• House may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with
the concurrence of 2/3 of all its members, suspend (for not more than 60
days) or expel a member.

• What acts constitute disorderly behaviour is within the full

discretionary authority of the House concerned, and the Court will not
review such determination, the same being a political question.

• The order of suspension provided in RA 3019 is distinct from the

power of Congress to discipline its own ranks. Neither does the order of
suspension encroach upon the power of Congress. The doctrine of
separation of powers, by itself, is not deemed to have effectively excluded
the members of Congress from RA 3019 or its sanctions.

Electoral Tribunals (Sec. 17, Art. VI)

• The HRET has no jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay Party-

list, as it is vested by law, specifically, the Party-list System Act, upon the
COMELEC.

• Section 6 of said Act states that “the COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition xxx.

Composition:
• 3 Surpeme Court justices designated by the Chief Justice.

• 6 members of the house concerned chosen on the basis of

proportional representation from the political parties registered under the
party-list represented therein.
N.B.
• The Senior Justice shall be the Chairman.

• The HRET was created a non-partisan court.

• It must be independent of Congress and devoid of partisan influence

and consideration.

• "Disloyalty to the party" and "breach of party discipline" are not

valid grounds for the expulsion of a member.

• HRET members enjoy security of tenure; their membership may not

be terminated, except for just cause. Just cause, includes "the expiration
of congressional term, death, resignation from the political party, formal
affilaiton with another politcal party, or removal for other valid causes.

• The Supreme Court held that it cannot order the disqualifcation of

the Senators-Members of the Electoral Tribunal simply because they were
themselves respondents in the electoral protest, considering the specific
mandate of the Contitution and inasmuch as all the elected Senators were
actually named as respondents.

• The Supreme Court said that even assuming that party-list

represertatives comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate
common nominees to the HRET and Commission on Appointments, their
primary recourse clearly rests with the House of Representatives and not
with the Court.

• Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the

Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the HRET
and Commission on Appointments can the party-list representatives seek
recourse from the Supreme Court through judicial review.

• Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, prior

recourse to the House is necessary before petitioners may bring the case to
court.

Power

• The Electoral Tribunals of the Houses of Congress shall be the sole

judge of all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
their respective members.

• The power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does
not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of
naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule
otherwise would operate as a collateral attack on the citizenship of the
father which is not permissible. (Renald F. Vilando v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al., G.R. Nos. 192147, August 23,
2011)

• In Sampayan v. Daza, 213 SCRA 807, involving a petition filed

directly with the Supreme Court to disqualify Congressman Raul Daza for
being allegedly a green card holder and a permanent resident of the
United States, the Court held that it is without jurisdiction as it is the HRET
which is the sole judge of all contest relating to election returns and
qualifications of its members.

• The HRET may assume jurisdiction only after the winning candidate
(who is a party to the election controversy) shall, have been duly
proclaimed, has taken his oath of office and has assumed the functions of
the office, because it is only then that he is said to be a member of the
House (Aquino v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400).

• The Electoral Tribunals are independent of the Houses of Congress

and their decisions may be reviewed by the Supreme Court only upon
showing of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari filed under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Pena v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, G.R. No. 123037, March 21, 1997).

• So long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Note
members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the s in
Politi
HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by cal
this Court, the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal x x x excludes the Law
exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise Revie
restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same. [Dueñas v. House of w
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 593 SCRA 316 (2009)]

Justic
Commission on Appointments (Sec. 18, Art. VI). e
Amy
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Composition:
Lazar
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• The Senate President, as ex officio Chairman.

Javie
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• 12 Senators and 12 Members of the House of Representatives,

elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from
25
the political parties registered under the party-list system represented
therein.

• The Chairman shall not vote except in case of a tie.

• Guingona v. Gonzales held that a political party must have at least

two elected senators for every seat in the Commission on Appoinments.
Thus, where there are two or more political parties represented in the
Senate, a political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate
cannot constitutionally claim a seat in the Commission on Appointments. It
is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission; what the
Constitution requires is that there must be at least a majority of the entire
membership.

Powers

• The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within

30 session days of Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority vote of its members. The Commission shall meet only
while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all
its members. (Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549; Deles v. Committee on
Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA
259; Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 169).

• The Commission on Appointments is independent of the two Houses

of Congress; its employees are not, technically, employees of Congress. It
has the power to promulgate its own rules of proceedings.

N.B.

• Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly

confers on the Senate and on the House the authority
to elect among their members those who would fill the
12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members
in the Commission on Appointments.

Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the

Constitution, party-list representatives must first show
to the House that they possess the required numerical
strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the CA.
Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of
the Constitution on proportional representation of
political parties in the HRET and the CA can the party-
list representatives seek recourse to this Court under its
power of judicial review. Thus, even assuming that
party-list representatives comprise a sufficient number
and have agreed to designate common nominees to the
HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests
with the House of Representatives and not with the
Court. (Pimentel Jr. v. House Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 393 SCRA 227, 2002)
 • The House of Representatives is authorized to change
its representation in the Commission on Appointments
to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in
the political alignments of its membership. It is
understood that such changes must be permanent and
do not include the temporary alliances or factional
divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or
formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance
from one political party to another. (Daza v. Singson,
180 SCRA 496, 1989)

Powers of Congress

General [plenary] legislative power (Sec. 1, Art. VI)

• Legislative power is the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal

laws.

Limitations:

Substantive Limitations:

Express:

• Bill of rights (Art. III)

• On appropriations (Secs. 25 and 29 (1) & (2), Art. VI)

• On taxation (Secs. 28 and 29 (3), Art. VI Sec. 4 (3), Art. XIV)

• On constitutional appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Sec.

30, Art. VI)
• No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be passed (Sec. 31,
Art. VI)

Implied:

• Non-delegation of powers

• Prohibition against the passage of irrepealable laws.

Procedural Limitations:

1. Only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof (Sec. 26, Art.
VI)

N.B.

• The title is not required to be an index of the contents of the

bill. It is sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general
subject, and all the provisions of the statute are germane to
that subject.

• The creation of an additional legislative district need not be

expressly stated in the title of the bill.

• A law having a single, general subject indicated in its title may

contain any number of provisions, no matter how adverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject.

R.A. 8249 which "defines" the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan but allegedly "expands" said jurisdiction, does
not violate the one-title-one-subject requirement.

The requirement that every bill must have one subject

expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the
 general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.

Sec. 14 of R.A. 9006, which repealed Sec. 67, but left intact
Sec. 68, of the Omnibus Election Code, is not a rider, because
a rider is a provision not germane to the subject matter of the
bill, and the title and objectives of R.A. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Sec. 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

2. Three readings on separate days:

• Printed copies of bill in its final form distributed to Members

three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency;

• Upon last reading, no amendment allowed, and vote thereon

taken immediately and yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

• The presidential certification dispenses with the requirement

not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on Note
s in
separate days. Politi
cal
Law
Legislative Process. Revie
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Requirements as to bills:
Justic
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1. Only one subject to be expressed in the title thereof. Amy
C.
Lazar

• o-
Appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the Javie
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate r
exclusively in the House of Representatives (Sec. 24, Art. VI).

• It is not the law, but the bill, which is required to originate

29
exclusively in the House of Representatives, because the bill may undergo
such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of
the whole. As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced.

• To insist that a revenue statute, not just the bill, must be

substantially the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's
power not only "to concur with amendments" but also to "propose
amendments." It would violate the coequality of legislative power of the
Senate.

• The filing of a substitute bill in the Senate in anticipation of its

receipt of the bill from the House does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of
Representatives as long as the Senate does not act thereon until it receives
the House bill.

Legislative veto

• A congressional veto is a means whereby the legislature can block or

modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a form of
legislative control in the implementation of particular executive action.
Note
s in
• The form may either be negative, i.e., subjecting the executive Politi
cal
action to disapproval by Congress, or affirmative, i.e., requiring approval of Law
the executive action by Congress. Revie
w

N.B.

• It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive Justic

e
limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against Amy
C.
the passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive Lazar
succeeding legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte o-
blanche in crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Javie
(City of Davao v. Regional Trial Court Br. XII Davao City, 467 r
SCRA 280, 2005)

Power of Appropriation 30
• While it is the President who proposes the budget, still, the final say
on the matter of appropriation is lodged in Congress.

• The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the

project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. It can be as
detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.

Need for appropriation. Sec. 29(1), Art. VI:

"No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an

appropriation made by law.

Classification:

• General appropriation law: passed annually, intended to provide for

the financial operations of the entire government during one fiscal period.

• Special appropriation law: designed for a specific purpose.

• The automatic appropriation for debt service under the 1990

General Appropriation Act is valid . The legislative intent in the law is that
the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable
the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and
other normal banking charges on the loans, credit, indebtedness x x x
when they become due without the need to enact a separate law
appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. x x x

• Although the decrees do not state the specific amounts to be paid x

x x the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the decrees.

Constitutional limitations on special appropriation measures:

• Must specify the public purpose for which the sum is intended.

• Must be supported by funds actually available as certified to by the

National Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal
included therein [Sec. 25(4), Art. VI].
Constitutional rules on general appropriations law Sec. 25, Art. VI:

• Congress may not increase the appropriations recommended by the

President for the operation of the Government as specified in the budget.

• The form, content and manner of preparation of the budget shall be

prescribed by law.

• No provision or enactment shall be embraced unless it relates

specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates. This is intended to prevent riders or irrelevant provisions included
in the bill to ensure its approval. (Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 520).

• Procedure for approving appropriations for Congress shall strictly

follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments
and agencies. This is intended to prevent sub rosa appropriation by
Congress.

• Prohibition against transfer of appropriations. Sec. 25(5):

No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations; however, the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item
in the general appropriation law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

N.B.

• A Special Provision in the 1994 GAA which allows a member of

Congress to realign his allocation for operation expenses to any other
expense category is subject to the approval of the Senate President or the
Speaker, hence, it is not unconstitutional.
• The Supreme Court upheld the Presidential veto of a provision (in
the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, 1994 GAA) which
authorized the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund,
on the ground that under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI, such right must and can be
exercised only by the President of the Philippines.

• It is not the law — but the revenue bill — which is required by the
Constitution to "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may
undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole. What is important to note is that, as a result of the
Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue
statute — and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law — must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur
with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would be to
violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress
and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. [Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 (1994)]

Prohibition against appropriations for sectarian benefit Sec. 29(2),

Art. VI:

• The expropriation of the birthplace of Felix Manalo, founder of

Iglesia ni Cristo, was deemed not violative of the provision.

• The attempt to give some religious perspective to the case deserves

little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective
of, not casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the
power.

• The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members

of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true, but such
peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and secondary in
nature.

Automatic reappropriation Sec. 25 (7), Art. VI:

"If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed re-
enacted and shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress."

Impoundment

• The refusal by the President for whatever reason to spend funds

made available by Congess. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget
authority of any type. This power of the President is derived from Sec. 38
of the Administrative Code of 1987 on suspension.

Appropriation reserves

• Sec. 37 of the Administrative Code authorizes the Budget Secretary

to establish reserves against appropriations to provide for contingencies
and emergencies which may arise during the year. This is merely
expenditure deferral, not suspension, since the agencies concerned can
still draw on the reserves if the fiscal outlook improves.

N.B.

• The power to transfer savings under Sec. 25(5), Art. VI

of the 1987 Constitution pertains exclusively to the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions and no other.

The individual members of Congress may only

determine the necessity of the realignment of savings
in the allotments for their operating expenses because
they are in the best position to know whether there are
savings available in some items and whether there are
deficiencies in other items of their operating expenses
that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives who shall approve the realignment.

• Too, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines may not be given authority to transfer funds
under this article because the realignment of savings to
 augment items in the general appropriations law for
the executive branch must and can be exercised only by
the President pursuant to a specific law.

• There are two essential requisites in order that a

transfer of appropriation with the corresponding funds
may legally be effected. First, there must be savings in
the programmed appropriation of the transferring
agency. Second, there must be an existing item, project
or activity with an appropriation in the receiving agency
to which the savings will be transferred. (Sanchez v.
Commission on Audit, 552 SCRA 471, 2008)

• The President shall have the power to veto any

particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.

• Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the

President and if exercised would result in the veto of
the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is
referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto
power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
or tariff bill.

• As specified, the President may not veto less than all of

an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the
power given the executive to disapprove any item or
items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales v.
Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 133, 1992)

• On the President's veto power, Justice Carpio in his

Separate Opinion in the DAP case said: "The General
Appropriations Act (GAA) is a law and the President is
sworn to uphold and faithfully implement the law. If
Congress in the GAA directs the expenditure of public
funds for a specific purpose, the President has no
power to cancel, prevent or permanently stop such
 expenditure once the GAA becomes a law. What the
President can do is to veto that specific item in the
GAA. But once the President approves the GAA or
allows it to lapse into law, the President can no longer
veto or cancel any item in the GAA or impound the
disbursement of funds authorized to be spent in the
GAA.”

Power of Taxation.

Limitations:

• Rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. Congress shall

evolve a progressive system of taxation.

• Charitable institutions, etc., and all lands, building and

improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation [Sec.
28(3), Art. VI].

• All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational

institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes
shall be exempt from taxes and duties [Sec. 4(3), Art. XIV].

• Law granting tax exemption shall be passed only with the

concurrence of the majority of all the members of Congress [Sec. 29(4),
Art. VI].

Power of Legislative Investigation Sec. 21, Art VI:

• "The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective

committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected".

• Sec. 4 (b) of Executive Order No.1, issued by President Aquino on

February 28, 1986, which provides that "no member or staff of the
Commission (PCGG) shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceedings concerning matters
within its official cognizance" is repugnant to Sec. 21, Art. VII, of the
Constitution, and is deemed repealed.

• The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation

encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws,
as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.

• It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and

officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or
abolish.

• Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the

broad power of Congress in the absence of any constitutional basis.

• Sec. 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1, being in the nature of an immunity, is

inconsistent with Art. XI, Sec. 1, of the Constitution which states that
"public office is a public trust," as it goes against the grain of public
accountability and places PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
the courts, Congress and other administrative bodies (Miguel v. Gordon,
G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006).

Limitations of Legislative Investigation:

1. In aid of legislation.

Romero II v. Estrada, 583 SCRA 396 (2009)

• The Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of

Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution or
administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a
legislative purpose.

• The Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from

requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an
inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be
respected by respondent Senate Committees.

• The Supreme Court declared that the speech of Senator Enrile

contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called
upon the Senate to look into possible violation of Sec. 5, RA 3019. There
appears to be no intended legislation involved. Further, the issue to be
investigated is one over which jurisdiction has been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan; the issue had thus been preempted by that Court.

• The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a

court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any
intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint.

N.B.

• The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that

certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest
in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.

• Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the

executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefor and why it must be respected. (Senate of the
Philippines v. Ermita, 495 SCRA 170, 2006)

2. In accordance with duly published rules of procedure.

• In Neri v. Senate Committees, the Supreme Court declared that the

conduct of the investigations by the Senate Committees did not comply
with the Constitution, for failure to publish the rules of procedure on
legislative inquiries.

• The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of

proceedings has been recognized and affirmed by the Court. The only
limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the
observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. (Pimentel
v. Senate Committee on the Whole, 644 SCRA 741, 2011)

3. Rights of persons appearing in, or affected by such, inquiry shall

be respected.

• Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, held that

the legislative inquiry does not violate the petitioners' right to privacy.

• The right of the people to access information on matters of public

concern generally prevails over the right to the privacy of ordinary financial
transactions.

• Employing the rational basis relationship test laid down in Morfe v.

Mutuc, the Court said that there is no infringement of the individual's
right to privacy as the requirement to disclose information is for a valid
purpose; in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in
foreign securities.

• The inquiry does not violate the petitioners' right against self-
incrimination, because the officers of Standard Chartered Bank are not
being indicted as accused in a criminal proceeding; they are merely
summoned as resource persons, or as witnesses. Likewise, they will not be
subjected to any penalty by reason of their testimony.

• The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in

the legislative process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries
concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or
possibly needed statutes.

• It includes surveys of defects in our social, economic or political

system for the purpose of enabling the Congress to remedy them. It
comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to
expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.

• But, broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no

general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without
justification in terms of the functions of the Congress.

• Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency. Investigations

conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to
"punish" those investigated are indefensible.

• Mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry

in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the existence of, and
the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding
disclosures from an unwilling witness.

• We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional

investigation is justified by a public need that overbalances any private
rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by
the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not
unjustifiably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his
liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly.

• Fundamental fairness demands that no witness be compelled to

make such a determination with so little guidance. Unless the subject
matter has been made to appear with undisputable clarity, it is the duty of
the investigative body, upon objection of the witness on grounds of
pertinency, to state for the record the subject under inquiry at that time
and the manner in which the propounded questions are pertinent thereto.
To be meaningful, the explanation must describe what the topic under
inquiry is and the connective reasoning whereby the precise questions
asked relate to it. (Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 1 L Ed 2d 1273,
77 S Ct 1173, 1957)

Power to punish contempt.

• Punishment of contumacious witness may include imprisonment, for

the duration of the session.

• The Senate, being a continuing body, may order imprisonment for an

indefinite period, but principles of due process and equal protection will
have to be considered. Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil 29; Arnault v.
Balagtas, 97 Phil 358.

• Miguel v. Gordon underscored the indispensability and usefulness of

the power of contempt in a legislative inquiry.

• Sec. 21, Art. VI, grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate
and the House of Representatives, but also to their respective committees.

N.B.

• The power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is

an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to effect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information — which is not
infrequently true — recourse must be had to others
who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is
essential to obtain what is needed.

• The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to

Congress the power to punish its Members for
disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication
exclude the power to punish for contempt any other
person. But no person can be punished for contumacy
as a witness before either House, unless his testimony
is required in a matter into which that House has
jurisdiction to inquire. (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil.
29, 1950)

• The power of both houses of Congress to conduct

inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute or
unlimited. The investigation must be "in aid of
 legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of
Rights must be respected, including the right to due
process and the right not to be compelled to testify
against one's self. (Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee, 203 SCRA 767, 1991)

• The Congress power of inquiry is broad enough to cover

officials of the executive branch. The power of inquiry is
co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters
which may be a proper subject of legislation and those
which may be a proper subject of investigation are one.

It follows that the operation of government, being a

legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation.

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the

operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not
extend to executive officials who are the most familiar
with and informed on executive operations.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there

are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive
privilege." (Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 488
SCRA 1, 2006)

• The 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of

investigation, not just of Congress, but also of “any of
its committee.” It constitutes a direct conferral of
investigatory power upon the committees and it means
that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in
order to effectively perform its investigative function
are also available to the committees. (Sabio v. Gordon,
504 SCRA 704, 1916)

De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 615 SCRA 666 (2010)

• Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines
the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme
Court, among others. Section 4 (1) and Section 9 of this Article
are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment
of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that
the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made
by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three
nominees by the JBC; Section 4 (1) of the Article mandates the
President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy.

• Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained

in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They
could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or
Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.

• While all other appointive officials in the civil service are

allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law
or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words,
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

• Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987

Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple
 offices or employment in the government during their tenure,
the exception to this prohibition must be read with equal
severity.

• The language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it

must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. The phrase "unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited
in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being
appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances
provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and, the
Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

• Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice

concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor General,
therefore, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section 13,
Article VII, whose text and spirit were too clear to be
differently read. Hence, Agra could not validly hold any other
office or employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor
General, because the Constitution has not otherwise so
provided.

• The language of Section 13 of the Constitution makes no

reference to the nature of the appointment or designation, as
such, the prohibition against dual or multiple offices being
held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or
temporary. (Dennis Funa v. Acting Secretary of Justice
Alberto C. Agra, et. al., G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013)

Question hour

• The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules
of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on
any matter pertaining to their departments.

• Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate

or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before
their scheduled appearance.

• Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may

cover matters related thereto.

• When the security of the State or the public interest so requires, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session. (Sec. 22, Art. VI).

N.B.

• When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department

heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, the department heads must give a report of their performance
as a matter of duty.

• Art. VI, Sec. 22, in keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers,
states that Congress may only request the appearance of department
heads, who may appear with the consent of the President.

• When the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in

aid of legislation" under Sec. 21, the appearance is mandatory.

• When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
executive privilege.

• They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
heads.

• Only one executive official may be exempted from this power – the
President – on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach
of Congress except through the power of impeachment.

• Members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of
inquiry.
• The requirement for Cabinet Members to secure Presidential
consent under Sec. 1 of E.O. 464, which is limited only to appearances in
the question hour, is valid on its face. It cannot, however, be applied to
appearances of deparment heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.

• Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the

department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege
is subsequently made either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary, acting for the President. (Senate v. Ermita.)

• Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of

executive officials under Section 22.

• Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the
claim (of executive privilege) with such particularity as to compel
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This
is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department. (Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
549 SCRA 77 (2008); 564 SCRA 152 (2008)

War powers.

By a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting

separately, declare the existence of a state of war [Sec 23(1), Art. VII].

Power to act as Board of Canvassers in election of President. Sec 4,

Art. VII

N.B.

• In the exercise of this power, Congress may validly delegate the

initial determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass to a Joint Congressional Committee, composed of
members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate.
• The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse
and cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of
Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules
under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be
subject to the approval of the joint session of Congress, the two Houses
voting separately (Ruy Elias Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No.
163556, June 8, 2004).

• Even after Congress has adjourned its regular session, it may

continue to perform this constitutional duty of canvassing the presidential
and vice-presidential election results without need of any call for a special
session by the President.

• The joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by

express directive of Sec. 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the
votes for and to proclaim the newly-elected President and Vice President
has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its
constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has
completed its functions is it rendered functus officio (Pimentel v. Joint
Committee of Congress, G.R. No. 163783, June 22, 2004).

Power to call a special election for President and Vice President

(Sec 10, Art. VII).

Power to judge President's physical fitness to discharge the

functions of the Presidency (Sec. 11, Art. VII).

Power to revoke or extend suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus or declaration of martial law (Sec. 18. Art. VII).

Power to concur in Presidential amnesties. Concurrence of majority

of all the members of Congress (Sec. 19, Art. VII).
 Power to concur in treaties or international agreements.
Concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate (Sec. 21, Art.
VII).

N.B.

• Congress, while possessing vast legislative powers, may

not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations.

• While Article VII, Section 21 provides for Senate

concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the
treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of
negotiations attendant to its conclusion.

• It is not even Congress as a whole that has been given

the authority to concur as a means of checking the
treaty-making power of the President, but only the
Senate. (Akbayan Citizen Action Party (Akbayan) v.
Aquino, 558 SCRA 468, 2008)

Power to confirm certain appointments/nominations made by

the President.

• Nomination made by the President in the event of a vacancy in the

Office of Vice President, from among the members of Congress, confirmed
by a majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of Congress, voting
separately (Sec. 9, Art VII).

• Nominations made by the President under Sec. 16, Art VII,

confirmed by Commission on Appointments.

Power of impeachment (Sec. 2, Art. XI).

Power relative to natural resources (Sec. 2, Art. XII).

Power to propose amendments to the Constitution (Secs. 1 and 2,

Art. XVII).

CASES

III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Who may exercise legislative powers Congress Delegation To local
governments To the People through initiative and referendum To the
President under martial law rule or in a revolutionary government.

Sanidad v. Comelec (1976)

President Marcos, in exercise of his emergency powers, proposed

amendments to the Constitution and proposals to set up the machinery
and procedures required for the ratification of his proposals by the people.
Pablo and Pablito Sanidad challenged the validity of the amendments, as
the power to amend is legislative. The SC upheld the amendments,
because the governmental powers in a crisis government are more or less
concentrated in the President. The presidential exercise of legislative
powers in time of martial law is a valid act. This is not to say that the
President has converted his office into a constituent assembly normally
constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly
not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in
operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the
President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Supreme Court possesses no
capacity to propose constitutional amendments.

Although the President has nothing to do with the proposition or adoption

of amendments to the constitution, it is permissible to grant more powers
to the President in times of emergency in the interest of restoring
normalcy.
Congress The Senate Composition, Qualifications, and Term of Office

Dimaporo v. Mitra (1991)

Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for
the post of ARMM Governor. He lost the latter election, and despite
making known his desire to continue as Representative, was not able to
return to that office. The Supreme Court did not allow him to take office as
Representative again. It differentiated a term, i.e. the period an official may
serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the period that an official
actually serves. The Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By
filing the certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his tenure. Thus,
there is no violation of the Constitution when he was prevented from re-
assuming his post. A term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not
be extended or shortened by law, but the period during which an officer
actually serves (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or
beyond the power of the officer.
7

The House of Representatives

Aquino v. COMELEC (1995) Agapito Aquino filed a certificate of candidacy

for the position of Representative of the 2nd district of Makati. However, it
was shown that he had been a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac, for the
previous 52 years. Ruling that Aquino was not a resident of Makati for the
1 year period required in the Constitution, The Supreme Court held that
the residence requirement in Constitution connotes domicile. Domicile is
the place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
intends to return and remain. A person may have several residences but
just one domicile. An intention to return is established by determining (1)
whether there was abandonment of domicile of origin, and (2) whether
there was establishment of permanent residence in the district

District Representatives and questions on Apportionment and

Reapportionment

Bagabuyo v. COMELEC APPORTIONMENT-REAPPORTIONMENT case

RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of
Cagayan de Oro was assailed on constitutional grounds, on the ground that
it is not re-apportionment legislation but that it involves the division and
conversion of an LGU. The Supreme Court held that RA 9371 is simply a
reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority
granted to Congress under Article VI, section 5(4). Reapportionment is the
realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.

LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENT
CREATION, DIVISION, MERGER, ABOLITION, ALTERATION OF BOUNDARY OF
LGUs Constitutional Provision Article VI, Sec. 5 Article X, Sec. 10 Meaning
Determination of the number of representatives which a state, country or
other subdivision may send to a legislative body Concerned with
commencement, termination, and modification of an LGU’s corporate
existence and territorial coverage Requirement  Legislation providing for
apportionment  “Each city with a  criteria established in Local
Government Code
8

population of at least 250, 000 shall have one representative.”

 Approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political

units affected
Result LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT  No legal personality  Purpose:
representation
LOCAL GOV’T UNIT  Political subdivision  Can discharge gov’t functions 
Has political and economic effects on inhabitants  Has own IRA; can
generate own revenue

The Party List System

BANAT v. COMELEC (2009)

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency

(BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation of party-list
representatives released by the COMELEC, as well as the formula being
used. BANAT’s claims were that the 2% threshold is invalid, and that the
20% allotment to party-list representatives is a mandatory requirement,
not merely a ceiling.

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions

the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the
issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in
the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
The Supreme Court, granting the positions, laid down the following
guidelines: The Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters:
1. The 20% allocation---the combined number of all party-list congressmen
shall not exceed 20% of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party-list. 2. The 2%
threshold---only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in the
House of Representatives. 3. The three-seat limit--- each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats. 4.
Proportional representation---the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total number of
votes.”

How to Allot Slots to Party List Representatives:

1. Find total number of Party List Representatives
9

Following the Constitution, the total number of seats allocated to party list
is in reference to the seats for representatives of legislative districts. The
combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the
total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected
under the party-list. This ceiling is provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(2).

2nd level of analysis: Allocation of Seats for Party List Representatives

The allocation of party list seats was left to the wisdom of Legislature.
Congress enacted RA 7941 (Party List System Act).
Sec. 11, RA 7941:
1. Parties should be ranked from highest to lowest based on the number of
votes garnered. 2. Parties receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast shall
be entitled to one seat.

3rd level of analysis: Allocation of Additional Seats

The Court departs from the Veterans procedure in allocating additional
seats. 2% threshold in 2nd round of allocation is declared unconstitutional.
The 2% threshold set by Veterans in the 2nd round of allocation of seats
prevents filling of the seats allocated for party list. The number of
additional seats to be allocated is
[Maximum number of seats for party list] -[guaranteed seats].
In allocating additional seats, even the parties who did not garner 2% could
be entitled to additional seats.
Procedure in second round of seat allocation: 1. Correct formula in
determining the number of additional seats: [Number of votes
received/total number of votes] x Remaining available seats 2. Seat is
assigned to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. 3. 3-seat cap is applied to determine to determine
the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Participation of major political parties in Party list elections

Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. But, by a vote of 8-7, Court decides to
continue with the ruling in Veterans, disallowing major political parties
from participating in the party list election.
NOTE: But in Atong Paglaum the Court laid down new guidelines on the
participation of major political parties as follows:

10

ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC (2013)

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (a)
national parties or organizations, (b) regional parties or organizations, and
(c) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party that field candidates in
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.”
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
6. National, regional and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

Legislative Privileges, Inhibitions and Disqualifications

Salaries

Philconsa v. Mathay (1966) Philconsa challenged the appropriation of

salaries of the members of Congress set out in the GAA for 1965-1966,
which had been increased the year before (1964). The controversy came
because the Senators who took part in the approval of the law would be in
office until 1969. The SC agreed with Philconsa. The “term” mentioned in
the provision refers to the term of the Congress as a whole. Members of
Congress who approved the increase will not have the salary increase.

Freedom from Arrest – Article VI, Sec. 11 While Congress is in session (Art.
VI, Sec. 15)

Martinez v. Morfe (1972)

An information was filed against Martinez for falsification of public

documents, and 2 informations Bautista for violations of the Revised
Election Code. As members of the Constitutional Convention, they invoked
the protection of the Constitution against search and arrest against
members of Congress.
11

However, the SC held that Martinez and Bautista were not covered by the
privilege. Parliamentary immunity granted to the members of the
legislature and the Constitutional Convention was never meant to shield
them from criminal liability, only to protect them from possible
harassment. Any privileges extended to the legislature should not harm the
State. Immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason,
felony and breach of peace. Here, petitioners are charged with felonies;
hence, the immunity does not apply to them.

Speech and Debate

Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)

Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman

of its Committee on National Defense. He caused the publication of an
open letter addressed to the Philippines, alleging that there were plans to
hold a coup d’état. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang for
damages due to the Cabangbang’s libellous statements. In response,
Cabangbang invoked the parliamentary immunity from suit.

The SC held that he was not entitled to the privileges. The expression
"speeches or debates herein" in Art. VI § 15 (1935 Constitution) only refers
to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches (sponsorship, interpellation, privilege uttered
in Committees or to Congress in plenary session), statements and votes
cast while Congress is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress. It
also includes other acts performed by the same either in or out of
Congressional premises while in the official discharge of their duty when
they performed the acts. It does not include acts not connected with the
discharge of their office.
12
Disqualifications and Other Prohibitions a. From holding any other office or
employment in Government during term without forfeiting seat
b. From appointment to any office which may have been created or its
emoluments increased during his term
c. From personally appearing as counsel
d. From financial interest in any contract with, or in any franchise granted
by the government during his term
e. From intervening in any matter before any office of the Government for
his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of
his office
Duties f. Duty to Disclose
g. Full disclosure of financial and business interests
h. Notify the House of potential conflict of interest from proposed
legislation of which they are authors

Flores v. Drilon (1993)

The Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 that allowed the
Mayor of Olongapo City to be appointed as Chairman of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority was challenged on the ground that it violated the
constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective
officials to other government posts.
The SC agreed and declared the provisions unconstitutional. Art. IX-B § 7 of
the Constitution expresses the policy against concentrating several public
positions in one person, so that a public official may serve full-time with
dedication and efficiency. While the provision allows appointive officials to
hold multiple offices within limits, par. 1 for elective officials is more
stringent in not allowing exceptions unless the Constitution itself says so.
While the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains
throughout his tenure/incumbency, the official may resign first from his
elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualifications. The
respondent does not automatically forfeit his elective office when he is
appointed to another position.
Quorum and Voting Majorities

Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)

Senator Tañada invoked his right to speak on the Senate floor to formulate
charges against then Senate President Avelino. However, Avelino and his
camp employed dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from
delivering his piece. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due
to the disorder.
13
Avelino banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was
immediately followed by his followers.

The remaining members voted to continue the session in order not to

paralyze the functions of the Senate. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s
Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This
was unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of
the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter.
Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him
as the rightful Senate President.

On the issue of quorum, the SC held that as there were 23 senators

considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor),
twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House”
shall constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members.
Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a
difference between a majority of “all the members of the House” and a
majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less
one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose
of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum,
they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members;
if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt about Quorum then,
and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as
there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained
Discipline of Members

Osmeña Jr. v. Pendatun, et al. (1960)

Congressman Osmeña Jr made a privilege speech entitled, “A Message to

Garcia,” in which he accused Garcia of corruption. A Special Committee
was formed through House Resolution 59, to investigate and discipline
Osmeña. Osmeña asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground
of infringement upon his parliamentary immunity through a petition for
declaratory relief.

The SC denied his petition. The rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body.

Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997)

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Arroyo et al., all
members of the HOR, claimed that there was a violation of the rules of the
House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their
violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. They claimed
that the passage of the bill was railroaded.

14

The SC ruled that it did not have the power to inquire into allegations that
Congress failed to comply with its own rules while enacting a law when no
constitutional provision or rights of private individuals were violated.
Within the limits of constitutional restraints, fundamental rights and a
reasonable relation between the means of proceeding and the intended
results, all matters of methods for internal procedures are open to the
determination of the House and cannot be subject to judicial inquiry. There
was no grave abuse of discretion, only a matter of internal procedure.

Garcillano v. House Committees (2008)

A legislative inquiry was carried out regarding the “Hello Garci” tapes in
relation to election fraud. The propriety of the legislative inquiry was
challenged based on the non-publication of the Senate rules of procedure
in accordance with Art. VI § 21.

The SC struck down the proceedings for lack of publication of the rules. It
would be an injustice if a citizen is burdened with violating a law or rule he
did not get notice of. It consists of “publication either in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines” (Civil Code Art.
2) and the law shall only take effect 15 days after said publication.
Publication via the Internet alone is considered invalid since the provisions
state that the rules must be published in the OG or in a newspaper.
According to RA 8792, an electronic document serves as the functional
equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it does
not make the Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations.

The rules must also be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the
term of 12 Senators as it is a continuing body independent of the Senate
before it, and its own rules state that they expire after every Senate.

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001)

Defensor-Santiago was preventively suspended by the SB for 90 days in
accordance with RA 3019. She assailed the SB’s authority to do so, claiming
contravention of Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) which provides for suspension only for
60 days max.

The SC held that the SB had the authority to suspend Santiago. Suspension
in Art VI, Sec. 16(3) is different from preventive suspension under RA 3019,
Sec. 13. Preventive suspension is not a penalty and thus is not a
suspension under the purview of the Constitution.

De Venecia v. Sandiganbayan (2002)

De Venecia, as House Speaker, was cited in contempt of court for not
implementing the preventive suspension by Sandiganbayan against one of
the House Members. While the Supreme Court held the case moot and
academic, since the term of the member expired while the case was
pending, further differences between Art. VI, Sec. 16(3) and RA 3019, Sec.
13 were discussed, to wit: o Art. VI, Sec. 16(3):
15

 House-imposed sanction  Penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce

discipline, maintain order in proceedings or vindicate honor and integrity o
RA 3019, Sec. 13:  Prevent accused from influencing witnesses  Prevent
tampering with documentary evidence  Prevent committing further
crimes while in office Sessions Regular Sessions Special Session Restrictions
Adjournment for more than 3 days As to venue Emergency Sessions
Vacancy in Pres/ VPres office Ability of President to discharge powers and
duties of office Presidential proclamation of martial law or suspension of
habeas corpus
Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments
Powers of Congress

White Light v. City of Manila (2009)

The City of Manila issued an ordinance disallowing the operation of motels
as well as offering quick-time rates. White Light as well as various other
motels challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance.
The Supreme Court struck down the ordinance for being unconstitutional.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response
as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of
necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people.
Agustin v. Edu (1979)
LOI 229 was issued by Pres. Marcos, recommending the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices. Upon
constitutional challenge, the SC held there was no unlawful delegation of
police power.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of police power, there must be a

standard which implies at the very least that the legislature itself
determines matters of principle and lays down the fundamental policy. The
standard lays down the legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out
boundaries, and specifies
16

the public agency to apply it. With this standard, the executive or
administrative agency designated to carry out the legislative policy may
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. General Plenary Powers
Legislative Power Substantive Limitations Express Substantive Limitations
Bill of Rights Appropriations Taxation (infra) Public Money in a Special fund
Increase of appellate jurisdiction of the SC without its advice and
concurrence Granting title of royalty or nobility Implied Substantive
Limitations Delegation of legislative powers Criterion of valid delegation

Abakada Guro v. Exec. Sec. (2005)

The grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT under
certain circumstances was challenged for being undue delegation of
legislative power, as VAT was not mentioned in Art VI, Sec 28. The SC held
that there was no undue delegation.

Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making
a law, only the power to ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law.
The criteria for valid delegation are that:  Law is complete in itself, setting
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate
 Law fixes a standard, the limits of which are determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions
Undue delegation of legislative power

Pelaez v. Auditor General (1965)

By virtue of several PDs, 33 municipalities were created. Pelaez challenged

the constitutionality of their creation. The SC agreed with him, ruling that
while the power to fix common boundaries of adjoining municipalities to
avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction may be administrative in nature, the
authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
nature.

The questioned statutes did not meet the requirements for a valid
delegation of power to fix details in enforcing a law. They neither
enunciated a policy to be implemented by the President nor gave a
17

sufficiently precise standard to avoid the violation. The phrase “as the
public welfare may require” is so overbroad that it rests in the President a
virtually unfettered discretion that is tantamount to a delegation of
legislative power. For the President to create municipalities will be for him
to exercise the power of control over local government units denied to him
by the Constitution. Proper delegation by express authority of the
constitution Delegation to the president to fix tariffs, rates, etc.

Garcia v. Executive Secretary (1992) EO 475 (reducing the rate of additional

duty on all imported articles from 9% to 5% according to their value,
except for crude oil and other oil products which continue to have a 9%
additional duty) and E.O. 478 (which laid a special duty on imported crude
oil and oil products) were constitutionally challenged.

The SC upheld the validity of the EOs. Under Art. VI § 24 of the

Constitution, the enactment of appropriation revenue and tariff bills is
within the province of the legislative and not the executive branch. Art. VI
§ 28(2) allows Congress to authorize the President to fix within specific
limits, among others, tariff rates and other duties. There is explicit
constitutional permission to allow the E.O.s to be issued. The Tariff and
Customs Code also laid down sufficiently determinate benefits for the valid
delegation of legislative power. Delegation to the President in times of war
or national emergency Delegation to Local government Delegation of
power to carry out defined policy to prescribe standards

Rafael v. Embroidery Board (1967)

RA 3137 (creating an embroidery and apparel control and inspection board

and providing for a special assessment to be levied upon all entities
engaged in an amount to be fixed by the Board) was constitutionally
challenged for being an undue delegation of legislative power.

The SC upheld the law. Article XVI § 4 (2) sets a reasonable basis under
which the special assessment may be imposed. The true distinction
between delegation of power to legislate and conferring of authority as to
the execution of the law is that the former involves a discretion as to what
the law shall be, while in the latter, the authority as to its execution has to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

Osmeña v. Orbos (1993)

PD 1956, which empowered the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve
the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on petroleum
products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund
(OPSF). The OPSF was established to reimburse ailing oil companies in the
event of sudden price increases. The decree was challenged on the ground
of undue delegation of legislative powers to the ERB.

18

The SC upheld the PD. The provision conferring authority upon the ERB to
impose additional amounts on petrol products provides a sufficient
standard by which the authority must be exercised. The standard to which
the delegate of legislative authority has to conform may be implied from
the policy and purpose of the act, not only spelled out specifically. The
challenged law sets forth a determinable standard that governs the
exercise of power granted to the ERB. Promulgation of Internal Rules and
Regulations Prohibition Against Passage of Irrepealable Laws Procedural
Limitations (see part on Legislative process for more detail) Oversight 1.
Congressional Scrutiny
2. Congressional Investigation –
3. Legislative Supervision –
Question Hour (Art. VI, Sec. 22) Legislative Investigations

Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)

A legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of

the Buenavista and Tambobong estates was undertaken. During the Senate
investigation, one witness, Arnault, refused to reveal the identity of the
representative of the vendor to whom he delivered money, at the same
time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate
adopted a resolution holding Arnault in contempt and ordered him
imprisoned in the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned.
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus.

The SC did not issue the writ. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to
be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question
pertinent to that inquiry, subject to his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

The question subject of the refusal for which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. It is not
necessary for the legislative to show that every question addressed to a
witness is material to any proposed legislation, but it is required that each
question be pertinent to the matter under inquiry. If the subject of
investigation before the Committee is within legitimate legislative inquiry
and the proposed testimony of the witness relates to the subject,
obedience to the process may be enforced by the Committee by
imprisonment. The power to hold a non-member of Congress in contempt
is a power necessary to enable Congress to perform its function without
obstruction. Therefore, the Court finds no sound reason to limit such
power which has already been recognized as an appropriate auxiliary
power of Congress.

19

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (1991)

A Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Investigation was commenced regarding

Kokoy Romualdez’ participation in various corporations put up by the
Marcoses. The investigation was started based on a privileged speech
delivered by Sen. Enrile. Bengzon, called as a witness, challenged the
propriety of the investigation. The SC ruled that the investigation did not
have a valid legislative purpose. Investigations must be in aid of legislation
in accordance with duly published rules of procedure and must respect the
rights of the persons appearing in or affected by the inquiries. Senator
Enrile’s privilege speech that prompted the committee investigation
contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation, only a call to look
into a possible violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
call seems to fall under the jurisdiction of the courts rather than the
legislature, such as the case filed with the Sandiganbayan. For the
Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy
already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of the court.

Senate v. Executive Secretary (2006)

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail

Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced, prompting the Senate to
conduct public hearings to investigate the said anomalies. The investigating
Senate committee issued invitations to certain department heads and
military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately. EO 464
prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive departments
who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege. EO 464 was challenged for contravening the power of
inquiry vested in Congress.

The SC held that it did. Executive privilege is based on the constitutional

doctrine of separation of powers and is one of the exemptions to the
power of legislative inquiry. It exempts the executive from disclosing
information to the public, Congress and the courts. To determine the
validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only
if the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges,
but also if that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.
Presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of
disclosure.

(Question hour vs. legislative inquiry)

On the validity of § 1 of E.O. 464 (which applies specifically to heads of

executive departments): the required prior consent is grounded on Art. VI
§ 22 or what is known as question hour. ConCom records show that it was
considered distinct from inquiries in aid of legislation. In question hour,
attendance is meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation, attendance is
compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory question period, it becomes a
greater imperative to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in
the performance of its legislative function. When Congress exercises its
power of inquiry, department heads can only exempt themselves by a valid
claim of inquiry. The only officials exempt are the President on whom the
executive power is vested and members of the Supreme Court on whom
the judicial power
20

is vested as a collegial body as co-equal branches of government. For § 1,

the requirement for Presidential consent is limited only to appearances of
department heads in the question hour but not in inquiries in aid of
legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or
Executive Secretary.

Although some executive officials hold information covered by “executive

privilege”, there can be no implied claim of executive privilege thereby
exempting some officials from attending inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress has a right to know the reasons behind the claim of executive
privilege before an official would be exempt from the investigation.

Act as Board of Canvassers for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections

Call special election for President and Vice-President Revoke or extend
suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus and declaration of martial
law Approve presidential amnesties Confirm certain appointments Cf.
Commission on Appointments (Art. VI, Sec. 18) Concur in treaties (Senate)
Bayan v. Zamora (2000)

The VFA was challenged on the ground of Art. XVIII § 25 on military bases
in the Philippines.

The presence of U.S. Armed Forces in the Philippines pursuant to the VFA is
allowed under Art. XVIII § 25 for 2 reasons:

1. The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been
recognized as a treaty by the U.S. since it was attested and duly certified by
a U.S. government representative. That it was not submitted for advice and
consent of the U.S. Senate does not detract from its status as a binding
international agreement/treaty recognized by the U.S. since it is a matter
of internal U.S. law, where the U.S. submits to its Senate policymaking
agreements for advice or consent, while those that further implement
these policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress within
60 days of ratification.

2. Joint R.P.-U.S. military exercises fall under the provisions of the earlier
R.P.-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 that was signed and duly ratified
with both countries’ senates concurring; the VFA is simply an
implementing agreement to the main Military Defense Treaty, so it was not
necessary to submit it to the U.S. Senate, but only to its Congress. This is
why the U.S. certified it as a binding international agreement (treaty) that
substantially complies with Art. XVIII § 25.

21

Declaration of war and declaration of emergency powers Be judge of

president’s physical fitness (16) Power of impeachment
(17) Amendment or revision of the Constitution (supra)

6. The legislative process

Requirement as to bills As to title Embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.

Lidasan v. Comelec (1967)

R.A. 4790 (An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur) was challenged for falling short of the constitutional
requirement that bills shall embrace 1 subject that must be expressed in
the title.

The SC ruled that the Act was unconstitutional. The Constitution has 2
limitations for bills: 1) Congress can not conglomerate under 1 statute
heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be couched in
language sufficient to notify legislators and the public of the import of the
single title. Complying with the second directive is imperative since the
Constitution does not require Congress to read a bill’s entire text during
deliberations. For H.B. 1247/R.A. 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House.

The test of the sufficiency of a title a bill is whether or not it is misleading.

If the language is so uncertain that an average person reading it is not
informed of its purpose, or if it is misleading by referring to one subject
when another is embraced in the act or by omitting any indication of its
real subject/scope, it is misleading. It is not required that the title use
language of such precision that it fully catalogues all its contents and
minute details, but that it serves its constitutional purpose of informing all
interested persons of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation.

Power of taxation and requirement as to tax laws

Lutz v. Araneta (1955)

Commonwealth Act 567 Section provided for an increase of the existing tax
on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, while section 3 levied
on owners or persons in control of lands devoted to cultivating sugar cane
and ceded to others for a consideration a tax equivalent to the difference
between the value of the consideration collected and the amount
representing 12% of the assessed value of the land. The Act was
challenged on constitutional grounds.

22

The SC upheld the Act. Commonwealth Act 567 was not purely an exercise
of taxing power but was an exercise of the police power, since tax was
levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for rehabilitating and
stabilizing the threatened sugar industry. It is rational that the tax be taken
from those who will benefit when it is spent. It is inherent in the power to
tax that a state is free to choose who to tax.

Tan v. Del Rosario (1994)

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of RA 7496 (Simplified Net
Income Taxation Scheme) amending certain provisions of the NIRC and RR
No. 2-936 promulgated by respondent pursuant to RA 7496.

The SC upheld the RA. The contention that RA 7496 goes against the
constitutional requirement that taxation be uniform and equitable ignores
that such a system of income taxation where single proprietorship and
professionals be taxed differently from corporations and partnership had
long been the prevailing rule. Uniformity of taxation merely required that
all subjects of objects of taxation similarly situated were to be treated alike
both in privileges and liabilities and did not discount classification as long
as: ● the standards are substantial making real differences;
● the categorization is germane to achieve legislative purpose;
● the law applies, ceteris paribus, to both present and future conditions;
and
● the classification applies equally to the same class.

Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (infra, under Judiciary)

First Lepanto Ceramics v. CA (1994)

The Omnibus Investments Code gave the SC appellate jurisdiction over BOI
decisions. The SC issued a circular giving the CA that jurisdiction, on the
ground that its appellate jurisdiction could not be increased without its
concurrence.

After the 1987 Constitution took effect, Congress was now barred from
increasing Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction without its concurrence.
This was done in order to give the Court a measure of control over the
cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction. The indiscriminate enactment
of legislation enlarging the Court’s appellate jurisdiction could
unnecessarily burden the Court and undermine its essential function of
expounding the law in profound national aspect.

D. Legislative veto